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Chairman:

Mr. **RANA**

(Nepal)

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General debate on all disarmament agenda items

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The meeting was called to order at 10.30 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 45 TO 66 AND 155 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS

Mr. HOLGER (Chile) (interpretation from Spanish): a t u l a t e
you, Sir, on being unanimously elected Chairman of the First Committee. I also
congratulate the other officers of the Committee on their election,

Your experience and diplomatic skill, Mr. Chairman, guarantee that we shall do
fruitful work in this new era in international relations that is now beginning. I
also pay tribute to your predecessor, Ambassador **Adolfo** Taylhardat, for the
excellent work he did in support of disarmament and international security.

History is a long process, and time for reflection is needed before we can
truly assess what has been achieved. However, over the short term it is possible
to point to certain trends which in one way or another affect the future of
international affairs. The reassertion of democracy as a fundamental value of
human society is becoming more and more widespread among States.

(Mr. Holger, Chile)

Chile is an eloquent example of what I have just stated. Perhaps for that reason we should like the **democratization** movement, in which most of the Members of the Organisation are involved today, to be extended to multilateral forums.

However, Chile notes with concern that in regard to certain topics' fundamental to international peace and security, such as a total ban on nuclear testing, the winds of democracy are not blowing as they are in other world political arenas.

The convening of the Conference to amend of the Moscow Treaty of 1963, a direct alternate solution to the problem, could be undermined by the re-establishment of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Conference on Disarmament. Unlike the earlier one, that Committee does not seem to be in an appropriate position to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. If we take into account also the attitude of the major Powers, everything seems to indicate that the item on a nuclear-test ban is supposed to be solved by a small group of States. To judge by their behaviour, those States seem to be unaware that nuclear tests have adverse effects for mankind as a whole.

Nuclear explosions are without any doubt harmful to the environment. That has been recognised in this very forum by countries that have no direct interest in the subject, and by many authoritative international scientific bodies in the field. Chile and many **other** members of the Permanent South Pacific Commission have denounced on innumerable occasions the nuclear tests undertaken in the geographical area within the Commission's purview, and we shall not falter in our efforts to bring about an absolute end to those tests.

How can we interpret the present world situation? On the one hand, the major Powers are initiating a disarmament **process**, but on the other great stress is being laid on perfecting weapons capable of destroying the world several hundred times **over**. Is it **not** ironic that **one** nuclear Power, invoking democratisation, should

(Mr. Holoer, Chile)

announce its intention to continue nuclear testing without considering the justified concerns of the countries in a large area of the world? Finding a solution to the question of nuclear tests is of course not simple, but that is no reason to create parallel bodies or to suggest approaches that will only contradict or disrupt genuine negotiations on the subject.

Our Government believes that the initiation of disarmament negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament is tremendously important. **However**, an analysis of the report it has presented to **the** forty-fifth session of the General **Assembly** suggests that very meagre results have been achieved, owing mainly to the lack of political will shown by some of its members. If we consider that the Conference on Disarmament is the sole multilateral negotiating body in the area of disarmament, **we** cannot fail to **express** concern over its future. Furthermore, recent political events, such as the disappearance of ideological blocs and the reunification of States, raise questions about the membership of the Conference that must be resolved in a truly democratic way. Chile, now participating as an observer, is prepared to become a full member of the Conference and thus to contribute to the inauguration of the new disarmament era that should result from the positive political changes now taking place in the world.

The Government of Chile completely agrees **with** the objective of the total destruction of chemical weapons, and can only express concern over the delays in **the negotiations** taking place in the Conference on Disarmament. **At** the same time, we believe **that** if the relevant legal system is to be universally accepted, there **must** be no discrimination in favour of some countries and against others, nor **must** there be any norms that could hinder **the** simultaneous total destruction of all **chemical-weapons arsenals**. In addition, there must be an **effective** verification system guaranteeing objectivity in the implementation of the **system**,

(Mr. Holger, Chile)

The international **community** must take decisive action on the **subject** of outer space. Our country, which is doing landmark **work** in multilateral forums on that subject, does **not** believe it appropriate for various bodies are dealing with the subject while the ones directly *concerned have* no decision-making **power**. Preventing the militarisation of outer space and ensuring its peaceful use for the **benefit of** mankind are two sides of the same coin. and they must both be accomplished within the shortest possible time.

Political **changes** in the lives of States are inevitably accompanied by structural and conceptual changes. States certainly are moving towards a **new**, multifaceted approach to security. Military concepts are no longer the only ones taken into *account*; other concepts, such as the elimination of the **causes** of peoples' **insecurity** and global approaches to the major world problems, are also being considered. Within that context, it is clear that there is an ever-closer link between the concepts of **disarmament**, development and the environment. We must absolutely allocate the economic resources released by the disarmament process to **the** solution of the rapidly increasing economic and ecological problems **of the world**. We must ensure stable, sustained economic development in an environment favourable to the development of human life.

The delegation of Chile entirely agrees with those countries that have called for the rationalisation of the **First Committee's** work. The international **community** would assess at its true **worth** the **work** being done by the United **Nations** for **international** peace and security if we sent it an unequivocal message **contained** in a few clear **and precise** resolutions.

(Mr. Holger, Chile)

The Government of Chile believes that the studies prepared by the United Nations on nuclear weapons and on the role of the Organisation in the sphere of verification are important elements **of** the negotiations on disarmament, and we congratulate **Maj Britt** Theorin of Sweden and **Mr. Fred Bild** of Canada for their wise guidance of that *work*.

The challenges facing the world have not changed, but the attitude of States towards resolving them has. The Government of Chile believes that the **community** of nations cannot and must not fail to take advantage of the **new** hopes that are emerging. We **face** challenges with true political will and **seek** to show the world that the political changes now under way can become concrete facts.

Mr. BATIOUK (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian) : I should like, in this statement, to speak **on** the **work** of the Disarmament Commission and **of** the Conference on Disarmament. Many members of this Committee have emphasised the significance **of**, and the ever-growing role played by, the United Nations in the disarmament process. In his address to the First Committee a week ago, the **Minister** for Foreign Affairs of the Ukraine said:

"The Organisation has proved its unique significance as the single world centre for harmonising the will, positions and efforts of all States, above all in dealing with global universal issues.** (A/C.1/45/PV.10, DD. 27-28)

The United Nations, as we see it. is the sole universal forum in which all **Member** States **can** make their own contributions to the disarmament process and can, in fact, make an impact **on** the process **of** strengthening international security **through disarmament.** In the disarmament machinery of the United Nations an eminent role is played by the Disarmament Commission. Recently there has been a search for means of **rationalizing** the activities of that body. The session of the **Commission** that took place this year demonstrated clearly the significant opportunities that, potentially, **are** available to it. Its achievements in the matter **of** ways and means to enhance the functioning of the Commission - results that are referred to in document A/45/42 - justify the assumption that that efficiency **is** improving significantly.

In our view, agreed measures - measures such as those designed to **systematize** the agenda of the Commission, limit the time **for** consideration of specific **and** really pressing **issues**, and regulate its work more **satisfactorily** - will make **it** possible to turn the Commission into a genuinely effective **body** of the United **Nations.**

(Mr. Batiouk, Ukrainian SSR)

The activity of the Conference on Disarmament has always been the subject of close attention in the First Committee. Judging by the general tone of the discussion, many delegations are seriously concerned at the slowness of the progress **that** has been achieved at the Conference. It seems to us that this concern is entirely justified. Indeed, the report of the Conference for 1990, like those of the past few **years**, provides definite grounds for such concern.

Of course, we note with satisfaction the progress that has been achieved at the negotiations concerning the drawing up of a convention on the banning and **destruction** of chemical weapons. We are happy that these negotiations are now reaching **their** final stage. Incidentally, this serves to confirm that productive global multilateral negotiations on real disarmament measures are entirely feasible.

We welcome also **the** creation, at the Conference, of a special committee on the banning of nuclear tests, although, up to **now**, it has not been possible to achieve **general agreement on** a negotiating mandate. That, however, is the only achievement that we **can** chalk up to the Conference for this year. **Nevertheless**, it is a **positive development**, but it cannot justify the fact that, to all intents and **purposes**, multilateral negotiations on the items on the extensive agenda of the Conference are virtually not **being** carried out.

For **many** years now, **the** Conference has failed to yield practical results. We **cannot be complacent** in **the** face of the fact **that** its **most** recent specific **agreements** were drawn up more than 10 years ago. *Such* a situation today strikes a clearly dissonant note against the background of the **successes** achieved at **bilateral** Soviet-American and regional European negotiations **on** a great number of important areas of genuine **disarmament**.

In view of the **dangerous** escalation of militarisation **in** some regions of the world, the **objective** of a *global* approach to the **resolution** of issues relating to

(Mr. Batiouk, Ukrainian SSR)

limitation of the arms race and to achieving disarmament, as well as a reduction in the **general** level of military confrontation, have become **more** relevant than **ever**.

We agree with those delegations that have emphasised that full **use** has **not yet been** made of **the** potential of the Conference on Disarmament as a negotiating body. I **refer both to the** opportunities **inherent** in the **Conference** and **to the** possibilities resulting from the rapid **and** radical positive changes in the international situation.

As is clear from **the** report of the Conference, the participants too are concerned at the **lack** of **positive** results, and they have begun to search for ways to **enhance the** efficiency of this forum. We wish them **success** in their efforts. In the view of **the** delegation of the Ukraine, these efforts should take account of **the need** to clarify the purpose of **the** Disarmament Conference and, in the **new** conditions, the role of multilateral **mechanisms** in general, and of the Conference in particular, in the **disarmament** process as a whole.

In our view, the Conference is simply indispensable, as it is the sole **negotiating** body. Genuine disarmament and demilitarisation, in **the** context of international **relations**, can be lasting and effective only if they are global.

The need for a review of the agenda of the Conference arises from time to **time**. Clearly, over a period, anything can be subject to review, clarification **or change in form**. **The** present agenda is very comprehensive, but it is **not covered** fully by the work **of** the Conference. To some extent we agree that, **in** its present form, the agenda is not a practical basis on which to draw **up** appropriate multilateral agreements. Perhaps some of its items are still too general - insufficiently specific - to become subjects **for** negotiation. But the most **important** thing is not the agenda; **rather**, it is the political will **of** the multilateral forum to carry on multilateral negotiations aimed at drawing **up** appropriate specific agreements and real disarmament measures.

(Mr. Batiouk, Ukrainian SSR)

In this regard, we are **conscious** that something is missing. This gap must, first and **foremost**, be filled. The agenda can always be amended so long as there **is** a readiness to carry on negotiations. In its present form **it allows** for work in many important areas.

In **respect** of certain **issues**, such as **nuclear** disarmament and the prevention of war, it would be possible to **single out** specific points that are most promising from the point of view of reaching practical agreements. In this regard, appropriate proposals have already been made.

In our view, membership of the Disarmament Conference and participation in its **negotiations** is a serious question. The Ukrainian **SSR** is following carefully the work of the Conference. As we should like to make our own contribution to that work, we have been following with particular interest the exchange of views on the question of enhancing the effectiveness of the Conference, with particular reference to membership and to the participation of observers in its work. Experience suggests that there is a need for all countries interested in any of these issues - for example, negotiations on a convention on the banning of chemical weapons and on the destruction of stockpiles of such weapons - to participate in the negotiations in one form or another. The extent of the convention's universality will determine its **effectiveness** and its **fate**. That is why we regard it as desirable that in the final stages of work on the convention there be greater participation of States that are not members. This applies also to other negotiations, whether present or future, for global disarmament **requires** a global approach and global participation.

(Mr. Bntiouk, Ukrainian SSR)

On the other hand, we are all aware **of** the fact that serious negotiations are productive in a forum with limited membership. In fact, that was the basis for drawing up the original membership of the Conference on Disarmament, then the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Nevertheless, we believe that a compromise between these two extreme methods of dealing with one and the same problem can be found if we approach the matter flexibly and realistically, guided by the principle **of** focusing on the objective.

One could possibly find the solution by simplifying the question of the participation of observers in the work of the Conference, or in the work **of** its individual bodies, for example, the ad hoc committees and working groups. Perhaps it would be possible for the membership of the ad hoc committees of the Conference not to correspond exactly to that of the Conference: in other words, to give all countries involved an opportunity to conduct negotiations within the framework of the Conference on issues of interest to them, on an equal footing, regardless of whether they are formal members of the Conference or not.

Naturally, there may be other proposals and other solutions to this problem, but one thing is clear, and that is that the crucial changes that are taking place in the world today offer us an opportunity to make a breakthrough in the cause of multilateral disarmament, and it would be inexcusable to let that opportunity slip.

Our delegation is gratified by the fact that, as is clear **from** the report of **the** Conference, very many States are demonstrating a definite and vital interest in its work, and in that we see grounds for optimism for its **work** in the future.

Mr. GARCIA MORITAN (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): I should like to express to **you**, Sir, our delegation's pleasure at your election as Chairman of the First **Committee**. We are familiar with your diplomatic skills, which you have already amply demonstrated, and therefore we have great confidence in your

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guidance of the **work** of the First Committee at this session. You can count on my delegation's full co-operation.

In the course of the last year and a half we have witnessed facts, particularly with the **chawing** of the cold war, that confirm that the world has evolved much more than we perhaps realise or are willing to admit. But whatever the case **may** be, there is no doubt that a formidable challenge is taking shape which the **international** community is going to have to face. **This** challenge concerns each and every State and cannot be ignored.

The new structuring in international relations in the field of security does not necessarily imply using the imagination ex nihilo. Quite the contrary, like any human undertaking, it will in some way be influenced by the past, although **there** is no doubt that it will have its own rationale, with many different configurations of power and security interests.

We are convinced that the best way to avoid repeating the dogmatic experiences or political guidelines that have characterised the framework **of** power in this century is to develop a comprehensive perception of collective security that includes, **among** other factors, the **decision** to approach disarmament issues with determination, the adoption of attitudes of increasing transparency and confidence-building, and the beginning of a multilateral process which gives renewed dynamism to international co-operation.

It is time to **move** ahead in the building of **a more** integrated world, one in which reason and the sovereign equality **of** States prevail. We all, without **exception**, share a responsibility **for** what happens on our planet, and it will be up to us all to find equitable and lasting solutions. It should not be such a difficult task inasmuch as we share common goals and problems that are **more** important **than the ones that divide us**, such **as**: overcoming poverty and economic

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stagnation; ensuring social justice) defending **the dignity of man**; protecting **the environment**; scientific and technological co-operation as an instrument of development; and, in our area, a new criterion on **disarmament**.

There already exist different **forums** and **negotiating bodies**. From a global perspective, all those parallel **processes**, apparently unrelated, have an internal **logic** and coherence that must not be overlooked. This is **seen** clearly in **the multiple links between the various weapons systems** that are being negotiated. If we had to identify a **single link** shared by them all, it could be found in the fact that, independent of their final results, they aim at redefining international security.

The building of a new network of international relations in the area of security **is** essentially a multilateral task that cannot be delegated. **It is** precisely in this field that, in our opinion, the Conference on Disarmament - contrary to *what some* see as its inevitable apathy - is called upon to play a relevant role. We *are* determined to undertake an unbiased and realistic analysis of its agenda, and in so doing concentrate on setting concrete **goals** that supersede the aimless ritual with which some **issues** are dealt.

We cannot conceive that a body of a different nature would be able to deal adequately with the set of common security **issues** emerging in a world where bipolar confrontation has significantly diminished. **It is** precisely this forum, where States from the North and the South are represented, that can contribute to analysing from a different perspective the essentially Eurocentric **vision** of international security.

If we have put forward **these** thoughts it is because we **consider** it important to **emphasize** that it is time to think of the options that the new circumstances

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

impose on us. In this sense, we believe that in order to deal with the problems of the future, we have to take hold of the present with a sense of responsibility and find an appropriate solution for the issues that are still pending.

A treaty on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban is the logical outcome of the evolution of the international situation and, as was acknowledged very recently by one of the military alliances, this makes it possible for us today to envisage a world in which the role of nuclear weapons is losing importance.

As everyone knows, nuclear-weapon tests have a definite purpose, namely, to make it possible for arsenals to be modernized and to incorporate new systems that are more precise and more lethal. How then do we reconcile the reality of two alliances that virtually do not acknowledge each other as opponents with the continuation of these test programmes?

Those of us who are observing this situation attentively might interpret it as the lack of a real will to abandon the arms race once and for all. In this context, if the bilateral talks between the two major nuclear-weapon States concerning their strategic systems are a means of modernising their arsenals, it would make perfect sense to refuse to agree to a complete ban on nuclear-weapon tests.

A multilateral effort to put an end to all tests by all States for all time - which we all very much desire - should, if it is to be a credible instrument, be negotiated with the active involvement of all the Powers that carry out nuclear-weapon tests and should not become an agreement that condones the continuation of these tests through mechanisms that make them possible, albeit at lower levels.

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

The central axis of the negotiations **must** be the structure of the treaty, its scope and the modalities **for** verification and compliance. **It** is important to stress that these **are** interrelated **questions**, directly linked to the final objective. In short, each of these elements presents aspects that must be dealt with as a whole, according to the internal logic that **emerges** from the discussions.

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

I should like to quote what the Argentine and **Brazilian** delegations pointed out in a joint statement in the Conference on **Disarmament** on 16 August, on the item concerning nuclear-weapon tests:

"Precisely because we are aware of the importance of **those** aspects of **security** linked to nuclear activity, we have shaped unique patterns of co-operation and **harmonization** of our joint policies on the main international issues in the nuclear area. They are well **known**, and perhaps the experience we have gained at the bilateral level in Latin **America** may be useful when the moment *arrive*s to establish mechanisms that link the treaty on the complete ban of nuclear-weapon tests with the existing **international** agreements on the subject and with other relevant instruments'@.

Much has been said about the complete and final ending of nuclear-weapon tests as a goal. It will **not** be an easy task, but, if **there** is a real **commitment** on everybody's part, concluding a satisfactory agreement to put an end to the qualitative and quantitative development of nuclear arsenals in a **reasonable** time should not be a Utopian dream. In this context, the **Conference** on the amendment of the partial test-ban Treaty provides us, in our opinion, with another *opportunity* to discuss all the aspects related to the subject and **try** to harmonise positions.

At a time **when** we are reviewing patterns that seemed to be unchangeable **realities**, it is difficult to understand the lack of multilateral progress in the area of nuclear disarmament. It **is** really surprising that inaction has persisted even in the field of negative security **assurances**. Since the time when nuclear States issued their **unilateral** declarations, **between** 1976 and 1982, a very important change has **taken** place in the world. At a time when a hand **is** offered to

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

the one that until yesterday was an **enemy**, and even when each party still keeps its **nuclear** arsenals almost complete, the non-nuclear-weapon States cannot yet see their security **strengthened** by an agreement not conditioned **by** negative security assurances.

It has become customary to recognise the unquestionable importance **that** outer space has for the international **community**. Therefore, I will **not dwell** extensively on the different types of activities* including **those** of a military and strategic nature, that some States are continuing to **carry** out in space. I do believe it is important to emphasise that the international scene at the end **of the century has**, as far as outer space is concerned, different aspects from those that **were** characteristic of the past three decades and at the same time it poses increasingly **serious** questions from the viewpoints **of** global strategy and security.

A very superficial analysis shows that on the subject **of** outer **space** there still prevail criteria of exclusivity and partiality **that** have hindered the **beginning of** specific negotiations. In that regard, it is sufficient to read thoroughly **the** report **of the** Conference on Disarmament. However, **the work of the Ad Hoc Committee** on the Prevention of **an Arms Race** in Outer Space this **year** has brought out some new aspects that, in our opinion, should be followed up,

The concept of confidence-building measures in outer space is gaining **more** and **more** advocates, and **the** different proposals by a number **of** delegations reflect enough **consensus** on dealing with the subject in a **more** substantive and systematic **way**. **This** task will undoubtedly be complex **and** should not be carried out to **the** detriment **of other** equally important subjects which the **Ad Hoc Committee** should continue to consider just as earnestly. For that reason we are **sure** that a group of governmental **experts** might carry out **this** special work thoroughly and contribute

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

to the enrichment of global consideration of the subject of the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

The final stage of the negotiations on a convention on the complete prohibition of chemical weapons calls for a series **of** additional efforts from all of us to continue fostering the balance and coherence **of** the draft convention and to speed up the pace of the negotiating process. For that reason we welcome all initiatives aimed at that objective. We have acted accordingly with the Conferences of Paris and Canberra. We should like to point out with the same emphasis that the experience we have acquired in the past year and a half leads us to stress that we must avoid taking steps that **may** generate expectations that at a later stage will not be **realized**, particularly if the willingness to conclude the instrument is not maintained. With an evolving text that **would** be a treaty today if there had been enough political will, all the States **committed** to the final results of these negotiations **must** endeavour to **take** measures pertaining to the pragmatic aspects of the convention and to the quality of the future mechanisms in order to guarantee their **efficiency** and to ensure universal adherence.

This year the First Committee has received two documents concerning the work **done** by governmental groups of experts appointed by the Secretary-General in the field of verification and that of nuclear weapons. These studies reflect another important aspect of the work **of the** Department for Disarmament Affairs of the United **Nations**, headed with so much **devotion** by Mr. Akashi, to whom we should like to pay a tribute here. We should also like to **take up some aspects** of those documents.

The study (A/45/372) concerning **the** role **of** the United Nations in the field **of** verification contains **some** conclusions worth **mentioning**. For example, **paragraph** 257 states that the Group concluded that the United Nations should pay

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

more attention to **the** multilateral aspects of verification, and this could be done through the establishment of an adequate data base, through a greater activity in the field of information and through its role as a depositary of disarmament instruments.

Along these lines, and with the objective that the United Nations may become the axis of the future process of disarmament, the Group of Experts considered the possibility that the **Organization** might use aircraft for verification purposes and that the United Nations might develop and put into orbit a network of satellites in order to verify agreements on disarmament.

Together with these specific ideas, which **seem** to be more and more necessary, **the chapter** entitled "Conclusions and recommendations*" refers to the possibility of creating an integrated multilateral **system of** international verification, **pointing out:**

"The same basic reasons which have led to a multilateral approach to certain arms limitation and disarmament questions also raise the issue of a multilateral **framework** to ensure the verification of resulting disarmament agreements". (A/45/372. para. 275)

The study recalls that **the** majority of the international community does not have "the means to perform the full **range of** tasks nor do they have access to the necessary expertise*" (ibid.)

Among the **comments** of the Group of Experts on this issue, **we** should point out **that,** in their opinion, the establishment of an international **system of** verification must be seen as a possible result of an evolutionary **process,** which could be reached, inter alia, through the **creation** of

"an 'umbrella' verification **organization** resulting from the co-ordination or merging of two or more future **verification systems**". (ibid., para. 276)

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

Those of us who have participated actively in the multilateral process of negotiation at the Conference on Disarmament are aware of the real need for a multilateral system with regard to verification. It was **for** this reason, among others, that, prior to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the delegations of Argentina, Greece, India, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania encouraged this idea at the highest governmental level. Accordingly, it is now important for the General Assembly to request the Secretary-General to begin implementation of the suggestions contained in the document to which I have just referred.

Document A/45/373 contains other information provided by the group of experts and presents additional information to that provided in the report **(A/35/392)** submitted to the General Assembly 10 years ago. Although the work has been intensive, it is not always easy to complement a document that is one of the most complete and serious of the series of disarmament studies. Unfortunately, in our opinion, **the** study done in 1990 has not maintained the balance achieved in 1980. In the new document there is excessive emphasis on hypothetical proliferation, conveying the false impression that the real threat to peace lies in horizontal rather than in vertical proliferation, whereas arsenals have multiplied significantly in the period between the first and second reports although the **number** of nuclear-weapon States has remained the same.

One of the most significant differences between the developed and the developing countries lies in the huge priority that the former give to technological and scientific factors. Recognising this, some States believe that access to the major scientific and technological sources is a key element in overcoming the tragedy of stagnation that afflicts some societies **today**.

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

We are convinced that the new approaches in international relations will also modify the restrictive criteria relating to access to state-of-the-art technology so as to replace **the** hierarchical patterns and the technological oligopolies which in the last four decades have demonstrated not only their inefficiency but, even worse, their unfairness.

A **dynamic** and **thorough** mechanism **of** co-operation in the scientific and technological **fields**, in particular in areas such as nuclear energy, space, chemistry and biology, on a basis **of** equality, rather than on a discriminatory basis will make possible the implementation **of** an effective, genuine and universal **system** of confidence-building in international relations and, at the same time, make a decisive contribution to economic and social development. The Secretary-General, **in** his report on the **work of** the Organisation, lay special stress on the need to tackle this operation.

Some experiences deserve thorough analysis and could **serve** as a basis in this connection. Some of these are **of** a regional, multilateral nature and others of a bilateral nature. The Permanent **Representative of** Brasil referred to the latter type in his statement some days ago and they are contained in the document circulated by **Argentina** and Brasil under the symbol A/45/586.

Argentina and Brazil, as everyone knows, **are** among the States that **in** the last few decades have vigorously implemented **programmes in** the field of energy designed to enable them to achieve a **degree** of autonomy that will make it possible for them to meet their needs. In a highly technologically advanced world, with serious supply **problems**, of which no one is unaware, to have our own scientific and technological bases would seriously affect our **common** priority objective **of** economic **and** social development.

(Mr. Garcia Moritan, Argentina)

Given the nature and characteristics of the technologies involved, some years ago we began an almost unique process of integration, complementarity and co-ordination which today enables us to affirm that there are not many examples of two programmes of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes that have established such a solid and transparent system of confidence and mutual benefit as that existing between Argentina and Brazil.

We hope that our experience of regional integration and co-operation will serve as a basis for encouraging a comprehensive process at the international level in state-of-the-art technology aimed at putting an end to underdevelopment and, at the same time, contributing to the strengthening of peace and stability. We know from our own experience that the two objectives are perfectly complementary.

Mr. (Algeria) (interpretation from French): I have the honour to speak today on behalf of the delegations of countries members of the Arab Maghreb Union: the Libyan Arab Jamahariya, Tunisia, Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria.

Mr. Chairman, the delegations of the Arab Maghreb Union are happy to associate themselves with delegations that have already expressed satisfaction at seeing you guiding the work of the First Committee. Your personal qualities and great diplomatic experience are clearly an outstanding guarantee of the success of our work. I should like to add to our sincere congratulations the assurance that you have the full support and Co-operation of our delegations.

The positive developments in international relations that have taken place throughout this year have been fully reflected in the markedly tranquil atmosphere during the general debate on questions of disarmament which traditionally marks the opening of the work of our Committee. There can be no doubt that the East-West

(Mr. Boudiaf, Algeria)

ideological confrontation, **for** which our Assembly was at the same time a forum and a witness, has disappeared, to give way to the fruitful exercise of dialogue and negotiation within the international community.

Nor can there be any doubt that the newly acquired trust between the great Powers is extremely important in **the** revitalisation of the peace process for numerous regional conflicts which have recently been **brought** to our **Organization** with their train of **suffering**, injustice and despair.

Lastly, **there** can be no **doubt** that the retreat of the philosophy of power and **the** resurgence of confidence offer the United Nations and, in particular, the First Committee an unexpected field for investigation and recommendation to promote the highly relevant objectives of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, on disarmament.

That said, **I** should like to **express** the hope that in our common search for general and complete disarmament the ideological confrontation of yesterday will not be replaced by an even more frustrating conflict between the egoism of the **richest** and strongest and the legitimate claims of the third world, which for so long now has aspired to peace, justice and economic and social development.

(Mr. Boudiaoui, Algeria)

The new atmosphere prevailing in our work naturally owes a great deal to the continued improvement in Soviet-American relations. The signing and implementation of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles is the most striking example so far. The next important step, we hope, will be the 30-per-cent - and perhaps 50-per-cent - reduction in strategic nuclear arsenals.

This demonstrates that in the field of disarmament, with which we are concerned today, nuclear catastrophe represents the most serious challenge to mankind. To employ negotiation, with all its virtues, in order to reduce and eventually eliminate the danger of a nuclear apocalypse is and must remain our primary task in this forum. So long as that terrifying threat of mankind's extinction continues to exist, any progress towards eliminating other weapons systems, notwithstanding *their* merits, will remain relative.

And it is in the field of nuclear disarmament - notwithstanding the progress made in the bilateral American-Soviet negotiations - that we find ourselves unable, unfortunately, to affirm that the process of the total elimination of the nuclear threat has been truly entered into. At best we are talking about a reduction of arsenals that are already more than large enough to annihilate all life on our planet several times over.

Therefore, *in theory* the risk of a nuclear catastrophe has not been reduced, and if proof of the inadequacy of that exercise is required we need only refer to the continued explicit reluctance of certain nuclear Powers to offer non-nuclear States specific and binding guarantees against the use or threat of use of nuclear arms within the framework of an international legal instrument

Even more serious is the fact that the exercise itself has been outstripped by **the continuing arms race**, which is now directed towards ever-more-sophisticated systems of total destruction and which puts a heavy burden on the **efforts** that have so far been made to deal with the quantitative aspects of nuclear **disarmament**.

(Mr. Bendjama, Algeria)

The danger **of** this headlong pursuit **is** one that our Committee has been obliged to note every year for two decades now by reaffirming that continuing nuclear testing lies at the very heart **of** the arms race. For three decades numerous appeals have been launched, in vain, for a total halt to nuclear tests, which are the direct source of **the** ongoing development of nuclear weapons and their horizontal proliferation.

In less than three months the Conference to amend the Moscow Treaty will be held here with the goal of promulgating a universal ban on all nuclear tests in all environments. Here, we would voice the hope that the nuclear Powers will join in working towards that simple but radical goal and abandon their approach consisting **of** a gradual reduction in the strength of underground tests, which, *in* the last **analysis**, will only lead to regulating a continuing nuclear-arms race.

It is obvious **that** the road to nuclear disarmament will necessarily be **long** and strewn with obstacles so long as there are still elements concerned with **preserving** past positions and the dubious security of nuclear deterrence. That is why our Committee at a **very** early stage decided to rise above that view by proposing to make entire regions of the globe safe by declaring them nuclear-weapon-free **zones**.

The African leaders courageously embarked upon that course at their **very** first meeting at **Addis Ababa** in 1964. *However*, their efforts have been and are still being thwarted by the will to power of a racist **régime**, the **régime** of South Africa, which is continuing to subject the entire continent to the threat of total destruction. Is there any need to emphasise here that it is South Africa's nuclear capability that underlies the entire problem, and that the **abhorrent apartheid régime that** prevails in that country only serves to heighten the threat? Need we note the inconsistency of the argument that has **been** so complacently employed in the general debate, according to which South Africa's nuclear capability has

(Mr. Bendiama, Alcreria)

miraculously vanished now that there have been a few signs - albeit exceedingly feeble - of a possible dismantling of the apartheid system?

With or without the system of apartheid the same potential threat remains, and we will not cease calling for its total elimination and denouncing those who participate in it by delivering materiel or technical assistance for its technological improvement.

Should we be surprised, indeed, that the principal accomplice of the apartheid regime in its manufacture of nuclear weapons is another regime of the very same stripe whose inhumane practices with regard to the Palestinian people, deprived of their lands, are regularly condemned by the international community. A heavy burden of responsibility rests upon those who, through their guilty silence or tacit complicity, have enabled that regime to develop such terrifying destructive capabilities with impunity and outside any international control, intended as they are to fulfil its desire for regional domination by means of nuclear blackmail.

Last year's test firing by the Zionist authorities of a missile capable of carrying nuclear warheads and whose trajectory ended off the coast of Libya proves, if any proof were needed, the reality of that threat.

Early last year, following the Paris Conference, we had hopes for a new political impetus in multilateral negotiations on chemical weapons within the framework of the Ad Hoc Committee established by the Conference on Disarmament for **that** purpose. **The** expected acceleration of the negotiations did not, unfortunately, occur. On the contrary, during the summer session we witnessed a serious and deliberate challenge to the earlier consensus on questions we regard as fundamental. We cannot stand idly by and allow the negotiations to be diverted from their initial goal, namely, the total elimination of chemical **weapons**, and turned instead towards a mere non-proliferation treaty, a legal instrument of whose

(Mr. Bendjama, Algeria)

limitations and drawbacks we are all well aware, based on past experience in **the** nuclear field.

However, we welcomed with great satisfaction the breakthrough achieved last June within the framework of Soviet-American negotiations with regard to the difficult question of **the** priority and timetable for **the** destruction of 98 per cent of chemical-weapon stockpiles and installations. Nevertheless, the conditions laid down for the destruction of **the** balance, namely, adherence to the Convention by all **so-called** capable or essential States, implicitly tends to set up a non-proliferation **régime** of undefined duration. Our fears with regard to **this** change in the defined goals of multilateral negotiations have been reinforced by the continuing reluctance some have evidenced with regard to the very notion of a ban on the use of chemical weapons. Such reluctance clearly reveals their intention not to proceed with the destruction **of** all chemical stockpiles and in fact to maintain their reservations to **the** 1925 Geneva Protocol, even though they do not say so formally.

(Mr. Bendjama, Algeria)

We are fully aware that the road to general and complete disarmament is long and full of obstacles and that we will need to proceed gradually as confidence grows. Reduced ideological antagonism and positive developments in regional conflicts have in many fields restored to our international Organisation the authority it needs to exercise the multiple mandates given it. The field of concerted action and multilateral co-operation is expanding day by day to include new questions facing mankind - from acid rain to drugs, from AIDS to drift-net fishing.

Wow therefore can we fail to feel surprise and regret at the absence of real progress in forums for multilateral negotiations on questions of disarmament, which has from the very outset of our Organisation been one of its principal objectives?

How can we fail to express concern at the semi-paralysis of that unique forum for multilateral negotiation, the Conference on Disarmament, which through procedural devices is prevented from engaging in substantive consideration of nuclear disarmament, which must remain the priority of us all?

I refer to our concern at year after year seeing the Conference devote the majority of its meetings - 65 per cent this year - to the question of chemical weapons. I am also alluding to our legitimate question concerning the future of that valuable framework for negotiation once the Convention banning chemical weapons has been adopted.

Concerning the Disarmament Commission, this year's session will allow us to conclude consideration of numerous agenda items. But let there be no mistake. The important concessions we have made within the framework of drawing up consensus documents should not be interpreted as our going back on the political principles and positions that we, with the Movement of the Non-Aligned Countries, have

(Mr. Bendjama, Algeria)

always championed **in** this forum. That effort at conciliation and compromise should above all be perceived as an expression of political will to achieve a **common** denominator - even **the** smallest possible one - in the analysis of and conclusions on these agenda items,

A few weeks from now, during discussion of the contents of the agenda for the Disarmament Commission's **next** session, we shall demonstrate **the same** spirit of openness and the same **will** to compromise, for of course we share **the** concern expressed here by many delegations regarding making our **work in this** framework for agreement as effective as possible.

That is why we expect the new agenda - which of necessity will be **more** limited - to focus more on the objectives entrusted to the **Commission** at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, among which nuclear disarmament - I **repeat,** nuclear disarmament - must continue to occupy a most important place.

At this crucial stage in the modern history of mankind, multilateralism - with all it implies for the participation of all on an equal footing - is a valuable development and provides a viable **framework for work** in our joint endeavours towards general and complete **disarmament.** We hope that the present **session** will provide proof that it has positive results if the political will exists and if all States assume their full role in resuming dialogue in order to achieve the objective, which for all of **us** is peace, **security** and **social** development.

Mr. PIRIZ-BALLON (Uruguay) (interpretation from **Spanish**): **The** delegation of Uruguay is **very** pleased to congratulate you, **Sir,** on your election as Chairman of the First **Committee and** also to congratulate **the member8** of the **Bureau.** We look forward to giving you our support at a time when matters **considered in the** Committee are having a **special** influence on the **new** international climate.

(Mr. Piriz-Ballon, Uruguay)

The peoples of the world attach great importance to **the** problems of peace and security as a **result of the** ideological **disarmament between** the two **major** blocs which divided **the** world.

We should now try to ensure that this ideological disarmament will **lead** to the end of the arms **race**, which can perhaps **best** be accomplished by strengthening **the** United Nations system. There are certainly clear indications that this is what is happening. Next month's summit meeting in **Paris** will put **the** final stamp on a new form of European security: bloody conflicts are tending to **be resolved;** bilaterally, the **Soviet** Union and the United States can point **to** significant **achievements** in their disarmament negotiations.

But this **new** climate is not really widespread, **nor** has it magically resolved all the ills **that** beset **the** world.

Iraq's invasion of **Kuwait**, the first conflict to arise in **the** post-cold-war period, brings us face to face with stark reality. It also reveals flaws in the system of collective security which had been **overshadowed** by East-West rivalries and theoretical bipolar schemes.

The crisis in **the** Gulf was caused largely by an arms **race** that had run **amok**, and now we are faced with an overriding need to create **disarmament** machinery as a matter of great urgency.

As **the** head of the Uruguayan delegation, Mr. Gros **Espiell**, stated at this session **of the General Assembly**, on 4 October **1990**:

"The international community must avoid **the occurrence of similar dangerous situations** in the future. That will be possible only if we accelerate the disarmament **process**. Uruguay understands that the immediate task is to concentrate on further **advancing** the regulation and limitation of armaments, whether **conventional**, nuclear, chemical, **bacteriological** or radiological, or space **weapons**.

(Mr. Piriz-Ballon, Uruguay)

"The task must be carried out through the launching of new negotiations or acceleration of the current **ones**, the preparation of new conventions on the subject, the ratification of existing treaties by those States that have not yet done so; the creation of more nuclear-weapon-free zones, and the improvement and strengthening of the existing ones, and the full **establishment** of **zones of peace**." (A/45/PV.21, p.8)

The concept of security **should** not be limited to a mere balance of military forces based on a parody of the arms race.

We must realize that **instability**, insecurity and underdevelopment are **injustices** caused by the arms race. Giving priority to military security over other areas of life only further intensifies the vicious circle of underdevelopment, the **arms** race and insecurity.

Future years should bear witness to a massive diversion of financial, technological and human resources from the military to **other** more productive areas.

(Mr. Piriz-Ballon, Uruguay)

The intelligent use of the peace dividends will be one of the **keys** to breaking the vicious **cycle** to which I have just referred. The environmental aspect of security and the interrelationship of disarmament, development and the environment have all been highlighted in the **course** of this debate, particularly eloquently by the **Ambassador of Brazil**. The mere existence of nuclear, chemical, radiological and bacteriological weapons, and the carrying out of nuclear tests are clearly the greatest threats to the environment. For that reason we enthusiastically support the initiative put forward last week by the representative of Sweden, Ambassador **Maj Theorin**.

As the report of the Secretary-General to the forty-fifth **session** of the General Assembly correctly points out:

"We are witnessing a situation in which political developments have fast overtaken the cautious pace of negotiations to limit arms and armaments."

(A/45/L. Dr. 17)

My delegation believes that nuclear non-proliferation is a particularly urgent concern in the multilateral sphere. Uruguay believes that the Non-Proliferation **Treaty** is the best instrument for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. But the Treaty is not only about non-proliferation. Nuclear-free **zones, zones of peace**, and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards agreements are, **inter alia**, efficient means to achieve the **common** goal of combating the various forms of **proliferation**.

The **Fourth Review Conference** of the Non-proliferation Treaty could have gone further, particularly with regard to guarantees for non-nuclear countries. But we should be **comforted** by the significant achievements of the recent Geneva meeting when the most thorough debate held thus far took place **precisely** on the subject of non-proliferation.

(Mr. Piriz-Ballon, Uruguay)

Regrettably, on the question of nuclear-test bans it was not-possible to reconcile positions enough to achieve more positive end concrete results. In our opinion this subject is at the heart of the debate on non-proliferation. We cannot agree that greater technological perfection of atomic arsenals as a result of testing will in any way lead to global peace and security - certainly not in present circumstances. Notwithstanding the sensitivity of the item, my delegation is convinced that we must make progress in this area. It is in this spirit that Uruguay will participate in the Conference that will be held next January to amend the Moscow Treaty.

The mere fact that the possibility now exists that chemical weapons use will be used in a regional conflict highlights once again the urgent need to accelerate work in the Conference on Disarmament aimed at concluding a convention banning the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons and the total destruction of all existing stockpiles; on the basis of non-discrimination, universal application and verification. We trust that the proposed ministerial meeting of the Conference on Disarmament will give a decisive impetus to the final drafting of this document.

On conventional disarmament, my delegation welcomes the unprecedented success recorded at the regional level in Europe within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. Nevertheless, we are concerned that the envisaged reductions in the level of armaments in Europe may lead to the transfer of arms surpluses to other regions. Once again a crisis in the Middle East provides a harsh lesson, that we must seek machinery to limit all dealings in weapons and ensure their transparency. In this sense my delegation supports the appeal of the Secretary-General for

"earnest consideration to be given to establishing an international arms transfer register as a step towards curbing what has been a burgeoning trade." (A/45/L. P. 19)

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We believe also that the report of the Group of Experts approved this year in the Disarmament Commission by consensus provides useful material for further progress in this area.

Finally, allow me to offer a few thoughts on the rationalization of the First Committee's work. Throughout the present general debate we have heard many appeals for realism, pragmatism and a sense of responsibility, which, it is hoped, will lead to positive concrete results. My delegation completely agrees with these appeals which suggest that we should not set for ourselves unrealistic goals that cannot be achieved. But enlightened realism should be creative and based on a real determination to advance with a sense of historical perspective. The outer limit of rationalization is, after all, respect for the opinions of others. The past session of the Disarmament Commission is a good illustration of that trend.

My delegation will support rationalisation efforts that have already been mentioned, such as combining similar draft resolutions, removing from the agenda items that are no longer relevant, and considering other items every two or three years when long-term aims are involved. We shall participate in a constructive spirit in the consideration of any other measures that might be proposed.

It is in that spirit and within these guidelines that Uruguay once again expresses its confidence in the role the United Nations plays in work for international peace and security.

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.