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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE **15th** MEETING

Chairman: Mr. **RANA** (Nepal)  
later: Mr. **MARTYNOV** (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic)  
later: Mr. **RANA** (Nepal)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.30 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 45 TO 66 AND 155 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL **DISARMAMENT** AGENDA ITEMS

Mr. BRAUTIGAM (Germany): Let me first congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on your election to this important office. I am convinced that your long diplomatic experience as the representative of your country in important international posts, not least since 1985 at the United Nations here in New York, will stand you in good stead in the discharge of your responsibilities. I am confident that under your guidance we shall be able to cope with the challenges facing us. I also extend congratulations to the **other** officers of the Committee.

The representative of Italy has already delivered a **statement** on behalf of the Twelve, which we fully endorse. I should like to add the following remarks in the **name** of my Government.

As a result of the spread of freedom and democracy in Europe, the situation in Germany has changed in an unexpectedly quick and very favourable manner. **For** the first time in the history **of** the United Nations, **Germany** is attending the General Assembly as a united country.

We owe deep **gratitude** to our friends and allies, in particular to President Bush, President Mitterrand and Prime Minister **Margaret** Thatcher for their contribution to German unity. We equally acknowledge that President Gorbachev created the pre-conditions vital for the unification **of** Europe and the unity of **my country\*** We regard the award **of** the Nobel Peace **Prize** to him as a well-deserved recognition of his policy of reform, from which we also benefit.

I should also like to **express my** appreciation to the speakers who preceded me **for** their kind and positive **remarks** on **German** unity.



(Mr. Brautigam, Germany)

The united Germany will make its contribution towards stability in the whole of Europe. The renunciation of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons, reaffirmed only recently by Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and the legally binding commitment to limit our armed forces to a total of 370,000, including 345,000 land and air forces, lend increased credibility to our role in multilateral disarmament negotiations. Disarmament and arms control as well as the creation of co-operative security remain the keys to the pan-European house.

The end of East-West confrontation and the new relationship between the members of the two changing alliances pave the way for new co-operative security structures in this one Europe, where the post-war era has now ended. Thus, Europe is showing the way that might be followed, mutatis mutandis, by other regions of the world.

I noted with particular interest the carefully thought-out guidelines for the creation of co-operative security presented by the Canadian Secretary of State in his statement at a plenary meeting of this year's session of the General Assembly.

Since the forty-fourth session of the General Assembly we have made further substantial progress in disarmament and arms control. At the Vienna negotiations we anticipate the completion of the first phase in good time for the Paris Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) summit. We consider the uninterrupted continuation of the arms-control negotiations in Vienna - for the first time having the same participants and the same mandate - to be highly important, particularly from a German point of view, because they offer a forum for finding answers to the questions on arms control arising from the political changes in Europe.



( M r . )

We welcome the significant headway made at the **strategic** arms reduction (START) negotiations. These negotiations, which are also in Germany's and Europe's interest, are strongly supported by my Government.

A convention providing for an effectively verifiable ban on chemical weapons remains a main objective of our disarmament policy. Given the propitious developments in other arms-control forums, we trust that the success considered long overdue by the international public will be achieved at the Geneva **negotiations** next year. The solution of the remaining problems at the political level should, after suitable preparation, be tackled as soon as possible.

It is gratifying to note that within a brief period we have made unexpectedly great **progress** in arms control and disarmament. Europe has proved that disarmament is possible. Germany will continue to do everything in its power to bring about a more peaceful and stable world. Active participation in disarmament and arms control is a central element of our foreign and security policy.

I should like to enlarge on the main disarmament efforts and achievements as seen by my Government. The conclusion next month of the first major disarmament agreement in Europe, CFE I, will be the point of departure *for* a fundamental reorientation of military security in Europe. The objective of the CFE negotiations is to establish a secure and stable balance of conventional forces at lower levels and to eliminate the capability for launching surprise attacks and initiating large-scale offensive actions. The CFE I agreement will be a first substantive **step** towards attaining this goal.



(Mr. Brautigam, Germany)

The parallel negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures offer a special opportunity for setting up co-operative security structures. New confidence can be generated by enhancing transparency, improving predictability in the military sphere and promoting military contacts. My Government therefore seeks an agreement by November 1990 on a set of substantive new confidence- and security-building measures,

Today we have the opportunity in Europe to achieve security not through military rivalry but through co-operation and openness. This also necessitates the further development of political institutions and mechanisms. The CSCE provides a forward-looking framework for this purpose. The CSCE summit in Paris next month will for the first time give the CSCE process an institutional character and open up a new chapter in Europe's history.



(Mr. Brautigam, Germany)

This will include regular summit consultations and meetings of the Foreign Ministers of all 35 participating countries as well as the establishment of a conflict prevention centre.

The Western Alliance is engaged in the process of adapting to the new conditions in Europe. The London Declaration, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council, states:

"the Alliance's strategy, structure and armaments must be adapted in line with the new situation and geared to the overriding goal of co-operative stability; the members of the Atlantic Alliance no longer regard the Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe as adversaries but as fellow architects of the new Europe and extend to them the hand of co-operation".

The events of recent weeks have again brought home to us that the use of poison gas, one of the most dreadful and pernicious weapons, is by no means merely an abstract danger. As impressively reaffirmed by the 149 countries participating in the Paris Conference in January 1989, there is world-wide consensus that only a complete ban on chemical weapons can fundamentally improve the situation.

The progress that was made possible by the United States-Soviet co-operation in the field of chemical-weapon disarmament is a convincing example of what can be achieved when there is a serious will to negotiate. However, the last session of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament failed to produce the hoped-for breakthrough towards the long-overdue global ban on chemical weapons. Nevertheless, we are convinced that no truly insurmountable problems remain on the road to a convention banning chemical weapons. Given sufficient readiness to compromise and a serious will to achieve success on everyone's part, it should be possible to open the Convention for signature by the end of 1991. Together with its Western partners,



(Mr. Brautigam, Germany)

the Federal Republic of Germany has stated its intention to be one of the first signatories of a convention banning chemical weapons world-wide.

The Federal Republic of Germany advocates an early agreement on an effectively verifiable nuclear-test ban at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. It last reaffirmed this position at the Fourth Review Conference of Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. It considers a step-by-step approach to this goal to be expedient and desirable.

My Government welcomes the re-establishment this year of the Ad Hoc Committee on a test ban at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. We hope that this Committee will be able next year to continue its thorough and comprehensive treatment of all questions connected with a nuclear-test ban.

My Government finds it regrettable that the Fourth Review Conference of Parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty ended without the adoption of a final document. It is encouraged, however, by the degree of concordance on central non-proliferation issues expressed at the Conference. Awareness of the vast destructive potential of the atom bomb makes nuclear-arms control one of the central objectives of our arms-control policy. This objective is shared by all States Members of the United Nations.

As for the forthcoming United States-Soviet negotiations on the reduction of short-range nuclear systems, Germany again has a strong interest in a solution which takes account of the changed military and political conditions as well as the elimination of the East-West conflict and which helps to strengthen security and stability in Europe. Land-based nuclear missile systems are increasingly losing their military and political justification as Europe merges into a single security area. This is all the more true of nuclear artillery, We shall advocate the most comprehensive possible, mutual and verifiable reduction of these systems. The



(Mr. Brautigam, Germany)

expected completion next month **of** the negotiations on conventional armed **forces** in Europe will pave the way for negotiations on short-range nuclear **systems**.

We fully support the strategic **arms** reduction **(START)** negotiations on a dramatic reduction in the strategic **nuclear arsenals** of the United States and the Soviet Union. They serve the interests not only of the participants or **of** European countries but of the entire international community. We hope that the unprecedented series of high-level and top-level United States-Soviet meetings will lead to the conclusion of a treaty before the end of this year.

Transparency and openness are the key to the verification **of** arms-control agreements and to confidence-building. **These** are also the goals pursued by the West with its **Open** Skies proposal, which was the subject of negotiations at Ottawa and **Budapest** earlier **this** year. The Open Skies initiative opens up a new dimension **of** confidence-building. The conclusion of an Open Skies agreement could make another important contribution to openness and confidence and would further stimulate the arms-control **process**.

My Government attaches great importance to the United Nations as the only **forum** where all members **of** the international community can share in the disarmament debate. In this way the United Nations constructively complements the ongoing bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations. We hope that the results of disarmament negotiations in one region serve as an incentive **for** other regions of the world,

Confidence-building can help eliminate tensions. Over the past years this **Committee** has reached a consensus on confidence-building on which **we must** build. **We** are encouraged by the unanimous interest expressed by parliamentarians from all parts of the world at Bonn in May **of** this year in the experience **gained** by Europe in the field **of** confidence-building.



(Mr. Brautigam, Germany)

Enhanced peace and stability in one region must not result in further discord and instability in other regions through the increasing export of military equipment from one part of the world, where the market for it has disappeared, to other parts. Recent events make greater transparency in arms transfers imperative. We regard the standardised United Nations system for reporting on military expenditure as an essential contribution to fostering transparency and we hope that all countries that have not yet done so will participate as soon as possible.

This year we shall submit draft resolutions on confidence-building measures and on science and technology for disarmament. This Committee's work can give fresh impetus to the debate now under way on arms conversion. Through the joint efforts of all Member States, we succeeded last year in initiating the reform of the United Nations Disarmament Commission's activities,



(Mr. Brautigam, Germany)

We are greatly interested **in** this reform being successfully completed and hope that all member countries will support it in a spirit of compromise.

In the medium and the long term, nobody will lose from progress in disarmament, **On** the contrary, co-operative security releases **forces** and resources for the world-wide fight against poverty and underdevelopment and for the **conservation** of our **common** natural resources.

You may rest assured, Mr. Chairman, that we shall support you in **your** work.

Mr. ORDONEZ (Philippines): On behalf of the Philippine delegation, let me **extend** my warmest congratulations to you, Sir, on this the forty-fifth United Nations Day, and **express** our support for you in your capacity as Chairman of the First **Committee**. **The** Philippines is cognizant of Nepal's leading role in **disarmament**, which has been appropriately **recognized** by the location in **Kathmandu** of the United Nations Centre for Peace **and** Disarmament in Asia and the Pacific I have **no** doubt that, **with** your personal diplomatic skills and wide-ranging experience, you **will** lead the Committee to a successful conclusion.

Let **me** also take **the** opportunity to thank Wader-Secretary-General **Yasushi** Akashi and the highly **efficient** staff **of** the Department for Disarmament Affairs. We found Mr. **Akashi's** report dated 15 October on the activities of his department especially **enlightening**.

**"We** have closed the book on World War II and started a new **age"**. These were **the** words uttered by Soviet **Foreign** Minister **Eduard** Schevardnadse on the occasion of the signing in Moscow last month of the Treaty on the final settlement with **respect** to Germany - a historic occasion graced by the presence **of** Soviet President **Mikhail Gorbachev** and the representatives **of** the **four** allied **Powers** and the two **Germany** . **On** 3 October all **other** nations had the **opportunity** to welcome a united Germany at the United **Nations** General Assembly. **On** 15 October President Gorbachev's



**(Mr. Ordoñez, Philippines)**

achievements in furthering the cause of peace and security were recognised by his being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, on which we extend to him our heartiest congratulations.

Undoubtedly, 1990 is a major turning point. As was stated by President Corazon Aquino on the eve of the last negotiation of the Philippine-United States Bases Agreement, "The old cannot continue; the new must now be born." The challenge of realising the goals of this era, which has been declared the Decade of International Law and simultaneously the Third United Nations Disarmament Decade, looms larger than ever before. But, even as troops are withdrawn, arms reduced and tensions lessened in one part of the world, a conflict striking at the heart of the principles of the Charter has erupted in another area.

October 1990 will therefore be remembered as a Janus-like month which faced starkly both forward and backward.

Traditionally, this has also been the month when we begin our work in the First Committee, not simply for numerical reasons but because of its primary function: the discussion of the over-arching issues of international peace and security and of disarmament.

The Philippines is among the many nations which have welcomed the vastly improved relations between the two major Powers and their respective alliances, as setting the stage for greater co-operation and stability in the field of international peace and security. The Philippines is also among those countries which during the cold war sought to find an alternative path, best exemplified by the Non-Aligned Movement, that would truly represent the interests of the developing world.

With the 45-year-long cold war abruptly drawn to a close, we find our world in a state of flux, with the familiar signposts, directions and guidelines obscured or taken away.



(Mr. Ordoñez, Philippines)

However, the new situation before us simply confirm8 the validity of our common stand previously. The challenge now is to achieve these goals in the light of the vastly changed circumstances in which we find ourselves today. Our duty is to see to it that, in a recent period of bilateral **success**, multilateral efforts, already confirmed as viable in such bodies as the Security Council and the process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, to name but two, do not go unheeded **and**, indeed, are furthered. **This** is especially important in the field of disarmament and international peace and security.

**As** we look back on the **year** since our last deliberation8 in 1989, we note that we have indeed made considerable progress in the multilateral process.

Foremost among the achievements is the renewed commitment to the collective security system and the rule of international law as embodied in the Charter. **As** we enter this **new** post-cold-war era, we are called upon as members **of** the international community to ensure that this commitment does not waver and that we do not have recourse to unilateral actions and measure8 contrary to the spirit of the Charter.

In disarmament, the new spirit **of** co-operation in the multilateral field was well reflected at the last session of the Disarmament Commission, held in May this year. Whereas in past years we **were** blocked and stymied on several issues, this year, under the **forceful** leadership of Ambassador Nana Sutresna of Indonesia, we were able to conclude important item8 and adopt measures that will streamline the proceedings of **the** Commission. All told, the Disarmament Commission emerged as a stronger and more efficient body than it had **ever** been before. What **has** ritually been described **as** "political will" - which had been found wanting in **many** bodies of the United Nations - **emerged** at the **1990 session of** the Disarmament Commission,

This political will was also evident **in** the **majority of** countries present at the preparatory session of **the** 1991 partial test-ban amendment **Conference**, held in



(Mr. Ordoñez, Philippines)

New York in May and June this year. Though some **stumbling-blocks** were put in its way, the achievement and **successful conclusion** of the preparatory session reflected the will of the majority of the parties to the partial **test-ban** Treaty concerning the urgent need for and the importance of a **comprehensive** test-ban treaty. It is expected that the 1991 **amendment** Conference, as well as any further **sessions** on the same line, will continue to reinforce and reflect that political will.

The Philippine<sup>8</sup> was an **active** participant in the Fourth Review Conference of the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty, held in Geneva in August and September this year. Several delegations regretted the lack of a final document at the conclusion of the meeting in the early dawn of 15 September. We note at this **session** of the **First** Committee that some delegations regard the Fourth Review Conference as a **success despite** the lack of a final document, while others are not of this opinion,

For those who may consider it of overriding importance, as much as 95 per cent of what would have been a final text is estimated to have been negotiated by the closing hour of the Conference, reflecting both the diligence of the representatives and the desire to achieve a consensus. What finally prevented a **consensus** was not a mere detail or a sticking point arbitrarily **chosen** by any one delegation. The urgent need for a comprehensive test-ban treaty is an issue on which the majority of non-nuclear-weapon States are agreed and something that will be consistently pursued in this and other bodies. We hope that the nuclear-weapon State<sup>8</sup> will finally realise the significance of **this** step for issues of non-proliferation of all kind<sup>8</sup> of weapons and for international peace and security, and act accordingly.



(Mr. Ordoñez, Philippines)

To be sure, in light of an international situation newly endangered by a regional conflict, those States as well as others will have to take the long view in adopting such a measure. In any case, the resolution of such conflicts should surely not depend either on current nuclear weapons or on new weapons of mass destruction.

The Fourth Review Conference of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) was also valuable in providing the opportunity to examine in close detail ideas and proposals to promote, encourage or serve the goal of non-proliferation. Among those which we found noteworthy as a step towards non-proliferation was the support expressed by the delegations for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace in various regions of the world. We take seriously the commitment expressed in section 8 of our Constitution, which states that the Philippines

"consistent with the national interest, adopts and pursues a policy of freedom from nuclear weapons in its territory,"

This was entirely consistent with the intention expressed by the member countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in Kuala Lumpur in 1971 and again in 1977. They stated that they were

"determined to exert initially necessary efforts to secure recognition of and respect for South East Asia as a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality, free from any form or manner of interference by outside Powers.\*"

In 1987, the Manila Declaration of the ASEAN Heads of States affirmed that

"ASEAN shall intensify all efforts towards achieving the early recognition of a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia in consultation with States outside ASEAN."

It further stated that



(Mr. Ordoñez, Philippines)

"ASEAN shall intensify its efforts towards the early establishment of a South-East Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone, to include the continuation of the consideration of all aspects relating to the establishment of the zone and of an appropriate instrument to establish the zone."

We note that the South-East Asian zone of peace, freedom and neutrality, as well as the nuclear-weapon-free zone, would be contiguous to the zone which is covered by the Treaty of Rarotonga and which in turn is proximate to both the zone covered by the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the area covered by the Antarctic Treaty.

In the past year we have seen iron curtains pierced and lifted, barbed wires and cruelly divisive walls taken down, countries as diverse as Germany and Yemen reunified. In North-East Asia, the question of the reunification of the Korean peninsula has again arisen. In our own region of South-East Asia, an end to the Cambodian problem and peace on the Indo-Chinese peninsula loom as strong possibilities in the immediate future. As stated by the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, Mr. Ali Alatas:

"The path ahead may still be rocky but I am confident that we have now come to the final stretch on the road to a just and enduring peace in Cambodia and an end to the immense suffering of its people." (A/45/PV.5, p. 64)

Even in this period of continued stress, we no longer consider it a pipe dream to propose that the zone of peace, freedom and neutrality in South-East Asia (ZOPFAN) and the nuclear-weapon-free zone will finally be realized.

For its part, the Philippines is determined both to live up to the demands of its Constitution and fully to support the aims of ASEAN as regards a nuclear-weapon-free zone and a zone of peace, freedom and neutrality, and hopes to get the Support Of the community of nations in this endeavour.



(Mr. Ordoñez, Philippines)

The experience gained at the Fourth NPT Review Conference should serve to hearten rather than discourage us. **As** a way *of* preparing for the fifth NPT **review** conference, we should consider more frequent informal consultations, initially on a yearly basis, among all Parties, as well as with non-parties to the Treaty, to discuss ways and **means** to strengthen the Treaty with a view to its renewal after 1995.

Turning to **the** work **of** the First Committee, we wish to touch on the question of **rationalization** as a means **of** strengthening its effective functioning. We recognize the intrinsic value of **many** of the initiatives which have been debated in this forum over the course **of** the years. In fact, we have supported the vast majority of **the** First Committee resolutions and co-sponsored those initiatives **which** were consistent with our national policies. However, we also recognize the possibility of diluting our effectiveness as a Committee through the sheer proliferation of resolutions as well as through duplication and overlap of initiatives. The First Committee has been known to be among those producing the largest number **of** resolutions in the General Assembly - an indication of the importance of its topic but also of the number of unsettled issues of disarmament and international peace and security resulting from the cold war. At a time of realignment and of a **major** sea change in international relations, we have an opportunity to restate our priorities and to make our original **message** clearly heard and understood through fewer but **more** effective resolutions.

**Like other** delegations, the Philippines has its own list of disarmament topics **which** it **considers** important and on which it will intervene in the course of our proceedings. It hopes that maximum flexibility and restraint will be shown by all delegations in the course of the proceedings **and** that, as has been the trend, **greater** consensus and **agreement** will be achieved on a wider range **of** resolutions than in **previous** years. **In** this connection, it **signals** its support to the



( M r , )

Chairman for his efforts both at rationalisation and at achieving greater consensus in this Committee.

With regard to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, we wish to indicate our appreciation and support for its efforts to achieve a treaty which would completely ban the deployment, production, stockpiling and development of chemical weapons. We believe that this task has become all the more urgent and that the achievement of a treaty - the first potential one in the *Conference's* history - would serve to boost both the cause of multilateral disarmament and the efficacy of the Conference on Disarmament itself. We also await movement in the Conference on Disarmament through the provision in 1991 of negotiating mandates to ad hoc committees on such vital issues as a nuclear-test ban and a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

Through you, Mr. Chairman, we should like to express our sincere thanks for the efforts of the *officers* of the Conference on Disarmament to inform us of the progress in its work, as was recently done formally by the Chairman of the Conference and will be done tomorrow by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons. We hope that such briefings will also be provided us in the future by other sub-committees of the Conference on Disarmament.

At the beginning, we noted that the month of October 1990 would be remembered as a special month of deliberations since it faced, Janus-like, towards the past and the future. In the Philippines also October is special because we celebrate during this month the ancient feast called La Naval de Manila. This commemorates the defence and salvation of the city from destruction by foreign forces in the seventeenth century - a fate it was not able to escape 300 years later.



**(Mr. Ordóñez, Philippines)**

The old historic walled city of Intramuros in Manila where La Naval was traditionally held suffered most during the Second World War. In fact, Manila's destruction was only surpassed by that of Warsaw in the Second World War. Where the heart of the city once lay is a gaping hole, and though some belated attempts have been made to reconstruct it, it will never be the same as it was prior to 1945. It is a permanent reminder to Filipinos of the terrible price of the arms race, of war and the suffering it inflicts on peoples and cultures. As a symbol, Intramuros de Manila - especially in the month of October - inspires us all to work all the harder to achieve the goals of our Committee.



**Mr. HOULLEZ** (Belgium) (interpretation from **French**): First of all, Sir, I should **like** to express to **you the warm** congratulations of **my** delegation on your election as Chairman of the First Committee. **I** am sure that you will perform your responsibilities with great judgement and diplomacy, and that **our** work will proceed harmoniously under your enlightened leadership.

My delegation will be happy to co-operate fully with you in your efforts to improve the functioning of this Committee.

The **statement** made by the Italian President **of** the European Community, which Belgium **fully** supports, **makes** it **unnecessary** for **me** to speak at length about the **various points** that were taken up. I will thus confine myself to a **few** points **which we** think are priority **matters**.

Sufficient stress has been laid on the end of the cold war and the emergence of a growing community of interests between countries that were formerly adversaries. Therefore, it is unnecessary for **me** to dwell on this formidable upheaval. The recent unification **of** Germany, which is evidence **of** greater stability **in** Europe, is undeniably a dasaling indication of this new climate.

The **near** future will no doubt confirm this general trend in various ways: the **immirent** ratification by the two nuclear Powers of the Protocols to the 1974 and 1976 Treaties on thresholds and peaceful nuclear **explosions**; the forthcoming conclusion of a START agreement; the imminent agreement in Vienna on the balanced reduction of conventional forces in Europe, the convening **in Paris** of the **summit** of **the** Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe; and the ambitious arms control programme established by the Heads of State and Government in **the** Declaration of London, aimed at bringing **about** a lasting peace in **Europe.\***

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\* Mr. **Martynov** (Byelorussian Soviet **Socialist** Republic), **Vice-Chairman**, took the Chair.



(Mr. Houlliez, Belaium)

**However**, we cannot demand that the major Powers and Europe alone disarm **immediately** and in all fields, while in other regions of the world disarmament is barely, if at all, being considered. This situation can only reinforce our apprehensions regarding the growing number of countries in different parts of the world which are acquiring arsenals of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles. My delegation **is** convinced that the global improvement in international relations can and **should** lead to renewed and strengthened efforts in arms control and disarmament. That is why we must **work** tirelessly where feasible and, in particular, at the Conference on Disarmament, so as to give substance to our ambitions for disarmament.

My delegation believes that an initiative should be taken to ensure that the **question** of regional disarmament will be dealt with by the Disarmament Commission, **This** idea is shared by numerous delegations from different parts of the world, some of which have mentioned the possibility of a resolution.

My delegation and the countries of the European **Community** agree with this approach. However, we wonder whether the study that might eventually be carried out by the Disarmament Commission should not concentrate first and foremost on the role that confidence-building **measures** could play as a point of departure or a catalyst in this area.

**I** should like to draw your attention to the fact that this would be an initiative reflected in a text which differs from the type of document that my delegation usually **submits** every **two** or three years in an effort to rationalise our work. This new text should take **into** account two considerations.

First, there should be a growing, widespread awareness **of** the need to set up disarmament machinery at the regional level, based on a climate of confidence **created** by mutual **respect**, justice, solidarity and co-operation, **The** European experience **is** the most striking example of this. **But** other initiatives **have** been



**(Mr. Houlliez, Belgium)**

taken, in particular, in Latin America, which should also ensure the conditions necessary for effective and lasting regional disarmament. Lastly, current events give us further proof that tensions in certain parts of the world must be resolved in a local, regional context with ~~the~~ assistance of the United Nations.

The second consideration is, quite naturally, related to what I have just said. This new draft directly concerns the work being carried out by this great **Organization**. The Disarmament Commission should, most certainly, deal with this question within its deliberative framework.

In this regard, my delegation welcomes the excellent climate in which the Disarmament Commission carried out its work at its 1990 session, which ensured a transition towards a more feasible procedure in its management and its spirit. This subsidiary body of the United Nations will be able to do **more** effectively what **is** expected of it once the provisions governing it have been properly refined.

If we had to sum up the **1990** session of the Disarmament Conference, we could no doubt use the expression "year of transition".

**In** support of this, I need only mention a striking development that **characterized** this year's work: the restoration of the **Ad Hoc** Committee under agenda item 1 of its agenda, concerning a nuclear-test ban. There was not enough time, in just a few **weeks**, to take **up** matters of substance, but I think we can safely assume that work will be **resumed** next year in a constructive spirit in order to achieve the objective, which Belgium - as well as many **other** States - has always pursued, namely, the total, final and **verifiable** cessation of testing. This could be achieved at the **end** of a step-by-step **process**, in which certain milestones can already be **seen**, both at the bilateral level, involving the United States and the Soviet Union, and at the multilateral level, The **Disarmament Conference** has yet to agree on the notion of scope and on all the aspects of verification of a future treaty. **In** this regard, the work of ~~the~~ **Ad Hoc** Group of Scientific Experts on



(Mr. Houlliez, Belgium)

seismic matters and their relationship to verification must be duly appreciated.

**Furthermore**, Ambassador Palenykh and Ambassador Robinson, the negotiators for the Protocols of the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty and the threshold test-ban Treaty, have revealed the complexity of an effective verification **system** in the area of nuclear testing. These and **other matters** must be dealt with as part of a **programme** of work, on **which** all participants must reach agreement on the basis of a **mandate, which** must essentially be realistic.

The question of nuclear testing was also discussed at considerable length at the **Fourth** Review Conference on the non-proliferation Treaty, recently **held** in **Geneva**. Some participants merely focused on the absence of a final declaration. **While** we do regret this failure, we would like to be a bit **more** specific in our **assessment** of the declaration.



(Mr. Houlliez, Belgium)

Without wishing to play down the importance of the **issue** of a **cessation** of **nuclear tests** by the nuclear **Powers**, we do not believe that it **is** of paramount **importance** in the area of non-proliferation. Belgium particularly regrets the rejection by some **delegations** of a compromise which **is** otherwise acceptable to almost, all **parties** to the Treaty. This attitude made it impossible to reach agreement on a broad formula relating to many issue which, in our view, are more directly related to the issue of the proliferation of nuclear **weapons**, and are therefore very much more relevant.

The participant8 realised that the Treaty **was** not as watertight **as** it ought to be. **Measures** to strengthen controls were proposed which, if they were universally applied, would make a **decisive** contribution to strengthening the non-proliferation régime.

As regards negative security **assurances**, the report of the Conference on Disarmament stresses here again the hopes we might have for the future:

"... many positive political changes were underway which were expected to have a bearing on the search for **possible** solutions". (A/45/27, para. 121, part IV, para. 19, (p. 329))

The Belgian delegation remains convinced that the Conference on **Disarmament** is the appropriate place for negotiations on such assurances. We would like to **reaffirm**, however, that even **in** the absence of a common formula, the unilateral **assurances** given by the nuclear **Powers** and reaffirmed in Geneva at the most recent Review Conference of the **Parties** to the non-proliferation Treaty remain completely valid. My delegation remains willing, however, to consider any realistic proposal which would aim to strengthen or **rationalize** the existing régime.



(Mr. Houlliez, Belgium)

**In** particular, we believe that suitable measures might be needed to assure the protection of non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty, given the attitude - which to us seems an ambiguous one - on the part of some States, whether parties to the Treaty or not, with **major** nuclear facilities not under safeguards.

On yet more points, the Conference on Disarmament has shown its willingness to forge ahead and open up serious prospects for reaching a consensus text at the next session. **I** am thinking in particular of the splendid job carried out by the contact group responsible **for** developing a draft convention banning radiological weapons. The text we now have has a logical structure, with a well-reasoned preamble and a **new** section entitled "Verification and compliance" (A/45/27, para. 124, annex. attachment. part V (p. 336)). Work will resume in 1991 on a good, solid document, and the few areas of disagreement which remain ought to be able to be eliminated at the next session.

This encouraging outcome makes it painfully obvious that there has been a complete stalemate in the **work** of the parallel contact group responsible for considering a prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities. My delegation would be interested in any initiative aimed at getting these negotiations going again, and therefore supports the proposals made at the recent Review Conference of the Parties to the non-proliferation Treaty.

My delegation would now like to turn to the area of chemical weapons, which falls under the purview of the Conference on Disarmament - an area which we consider one of particular **importance**.

**Although** we do welcome the progress made in these last few years in the Geneva negotiations, we are not alone **in** deploring the fact that despite the dynamism and open-mindedness of the Chairman, Ambassador **Hyltenius**, the **Ad Hoc** Committee did not live up to our expectations **at** its last session. The **lack of a** breakthrough was attributable, among other things, to the fact the fundamental political aspects



(Mr. Houlliez, Belgium)

are emerging at this stage in the negotiations, which have sometimes focused too much on technical details. In addition, **the** threat now being made **by** one State to use these weapons, and their persistent proliferation, have emphasized the deterioration in the general climate of the talks **in** Geneva, even though the international community has unequivocally condemned chemical weapons because they are so horrendous. I would point out that my country, as you will be aware, had **painful** experience of these weapons at the beginning of this century.

The only way to spare mankind any more suffering from chemical weapons is to ban them completely, finally and universally and to do so as soon as possible, by producing an effective legal instrument which would eliminate chemical weapons as a military option for ever. To achieve this, **there** are three crucial stages we must go through: we must conclude the treaty and open it to signature, and then **there** must be a transitional period during which the objective of the treaty must be achieved in its vertical dimension, that **is**, by the destruction of chemical weapons and production facilities, and in the horizontal dimension, that is, by the universal renunciation of these weapons.

To overcome the reticence of those who hang back from involving themselves in the concluding stage, we should seek to reconcile the notions of a system providing maximum **assurances** that it will be observed, in other words, a system which would inspire confidence, and one which would cost a reasonable amount and would make it possible **for** all countries, large and small, to participate in it. The mesh of the verification net must be fine enough to discourage any tendency to slip through it, **by exposing offender8** to a real risk of being caught out in their activities in breach of the treaty.

The members of the Atlantic Alliance, at the ministerial meeting at Turnberry in June last year, stated that **the** solemn commitment of **the** United States and the



(Mr. Houlliez, Belgium)

USSR to **discontinue** all production and to begin to destroy their chemical weapon **facilities and** stockpiles **even** before the entry into force of the Convention should 'give a major impetus to the work being *done* to **conclude** the treaty as soon as **possible**.

My country fully **endorsed** that statement, and welcomes the fact that some of the provisions of the Soviet-American agreement have already been incorporated into this rolling **text** of the future convention, and also welcomes the fact that the United States began destroying **its** stockpiles last July.

There have been some who have pointed out the difficulties of viewing some provisions of the Soviet-American agreement as a contribution to our multilateral negotiations. It is quite natural that a bilateral agreement should sometimes be **based on** certain particular **considerations**; however, it ought to be said that we would still be no further forward than we were a few years ago if the United States and the Soviet Union had not **abandoned** their unique status as the principal possessors of chemical weapons. This is why Belgium believes, as do other countries, that the Soviet-American bilateral agreement deserves study, as a **positive** contribution towards concluding a truly universal convention. My delegation welcomes the Soviet-American commitment to make use of the provisions of the universal draft treaty in **so far as is possible**.



**(Mr. Houlliez, Belgium)**

Negotiations are at a **crossroads**. Undoubtedly, the main question **is how** to avoid a situation in which the two super-Powers would not possess **chemical** weapons while other countries would keep **them** or try to acquire **them** while staying outside the convention. **In** the common declaration at Turnberry last June, Belgium, along with its partners in the Alliance, agreed to be one **of the** first signatories to the convention and to promote its entry into **force** at the earliest possible date. We welcome a similar **commitment** by the States of Eastern **Europe** and **many other States**, **in** the hope that this example will soon be followed by others, possibly in the **form** of a General Assembly resolution.

Furthermore, it should also be recalled that declarations by States regarding whether or not they **possess** chemical weapons and on their formal **commitment** to abandon such weapons by adhering to the convention serve to enhance confidence and transparency in the negotiations. My delegation invites all countries possessing chemical weapons to come forward and pledge to destroy them.

The idea **that** a ministerial conference is needed to provide **fresh** impetus to the **negotiations** has made **some** progress. We support that initiative. **However**, we believe, too, that a ministerial conference in itself is not a panacea and that thorough and careful preparation is indispensable.

The prospects of such a high-level meeting should encourage the negotiators *of* the **Ad Hoc Committee** to do their **utmost** to create the conditions necessary **for** success - that is to say, a spirit of compromise **and** political will should prevail in the **work of** the Committee so that crucial **matters may be** resolved such **as** those concerning verification, universality, **and** assistance **and** co-operation, as well as questions relating to institutions, in particular the Executive Council,

**My** country continues to give high priority to the **conclusion** of a treaty on chemical **disarmament and** we ardently hope that negotiators will **bequeath** to the international community **a** safer world free from the **scourge of chemical weapons**.



(Mr. Houlliez, Belgium)

This year the Conference on Disarmament has begun organisational reforms that should lead to **improvement** as to its functioning and effectiveness. We are convinced that that **process** should continue. Furthermore, **we** think it is important to **resolve** without delay the problem of the increased membership so as to resolve the deadlock in the Conference in that regard. **We** must overcome the contradiction, on **the** one hand, *of* calling for as broad as possible adherence to conventions that are to **be** concluded by the Conference, while on the other, refusing to implement decisions that have already been agreed concerning the admission of new members. This problem will again arise at the start of the 1991 session. We hope that realism and open-mindedness will prevail in dealing with that question, while taking account of the other provisions of the rules of procedure.

Mr. HAYES (Ireland): Let me begin by congratulating Mr. **Rana** on his unanimous election as Chairman **of** the Committee. His experience, wisdom and capacity are **sure guarantees** that our work will **be** guided firmly towards satisfactory results. **I** also congratulate the other **members** of the Bureau and wish **them all** well in their **tasks** while **assuring** them of my delegation's full **co-operation**.

**My** delegation, of course, associates itself with and fully endorses the **statement** already **made** in this debate by the Ambassador **of** Italy on behalf of the 12 States **members** of the European Community.

**The** Minister for Foreign **Affairs** *of* Ireland stated in his address to the **General Assembly** a **few weeks** ago that

"**With** the end *of* the East-West confrontation, we have begun at last to emerge into a truly post-war world **where the institutions of international order** established after **the** Second World War could function as intended".

(A/45/PV.9, p. 131)



(Mr. Hayes, Ireland)

While recent **events** in the Gulf **presented** a serious **test** for the institutions of international order, these institution<sup>8</sup> have **responded** in a **decisive** manner. Ireland fully supports the Security Council resolutions already adopted in relation to the crisis in the Gulf. This **crisis** has demonstrated the importance of the United Nations and underlines the fact that it **is** the forum in which the collective will of the international community can be clearly expressed.

The United Nations, in accordance with the Charter, has a central role in the sphere of disarmament. Correspondingly, it **has** a key role to play in the achievement of a co-operative approach to international security. Such an approach must be based on the building of confidence among nations and - by eliminating the means of waging war - removing the fear of attack. In this context Ireland believes that the elimination of nuclear weapons is of primary importance.

It is essential that recent achievements in bilateral and regional **arms control negotiations** be reflected also in progress on the central **issues** on the multilateral disarmament agenda. In the bilateral area we have **seen** the conclusion of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (**INF**); we have **seen** good **progress** on **START**; recent agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union on the verification protocols of the threshold test-ban and the peaceful nuclear explosion Treaties have also **occurred**; and we have seen agreement on reduction of their chemical-weapon **stocks**. In **Europe**, there is the promising prospect of negotiations on short-range nuclear missiles and unprecedented progress **in** conventional arms control. Despite all this, much remains to **be** achieved in the disarmament field. To demonstrate **this** I shall give a few examples of undesirable features still continuing in thin field:

The world is **still** spending more than \$2.5 billion on armaments every day. While the quantitative nuclear-arms race appear<sup>8</sup> to have slowed, approximately



(Mr. Hayes, Ireland)

47,000 nuclear warheads still exist and continue to threaten the very survival of life on **this**planet;

Nuclear tests and the qualitative development **of** nuclear weapons are **continuing**;

No multilateral negotiations **towards** the achievement of a comprehensive **test-ban** treaty have taken place in the last five years;

Just as we approach the serious possibility of significant reductions in **numbers** of nuclear weapons held by the super-Powers, we face the fearsome prospect of increases in the number of nuclear-weapons States.

**Progress** in the negotiations on a chemical-weapons convention in the **Conference** on Disarmament remains very slow.



(Mr. Hayes, Ireland)

The present climate in international relations affords us a unique opportunity to make real progress in disarmament and to move away from the mistaken belief that security must necessarily be based on military strength. It is essential that we take advantage of this opportunity. The best way to do so is by the attainment of a few key objectives which we consider to be of vital importance.

The first and most important objective is to halt the nuclear-arms race. An issue of major concern in this connection is the qualitative arms race, that is, the development of new and more destructive nuclear weapons. To atop the development of such weapons we need an immediate end to nuclear testing. We believe that this requires a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The total prohibition of nuclear testing should be seen as the first step towards disarmament, not as the final stage, to be undertaken only after the other elements of disarmament have been agreed. A universal production cut-off in weapons-grade fissionable material is also required.

We note that there have been some positive developments in the area of nuclear testing. The agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on ratification of the threshold test-ban Treaty and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty is welcome. We are also encouraged by the recent re-establishment of the Ad-Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban at the Conference on Disarmament. However, to be effective, this Committee must be speedily empowered to undertake real negotiations. All nuclear-weapon States should participate in these negotiations with a view to the early and successful conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

The cessation of all nuclear-weapon testing, as a matter of top priority, is a constant and annually repeated demand of the world community. Yet, over 30 years of deliberations and negotiations have produced partial agreements only. These



(Mt. Haves, Ireland)

have not hindered improvements in nuclear weapons. Thus, the political reality is that failure to agree on a comprehensive test-ban treaty **means** that one of the major hopes and aspirations of non-nuclear-weapon States has not been **met**. In this regard, Ireland understands the motives behind the convening of the forthcoming negotiations **on** the amendment of the partial test-ban Treaty. We hope that the amendment Conference, in which we will participate in a constructive manner, will pave the way to a commitment by all States - including, most importantly, the nuclear-weapon States - to a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

A second and equally important objective is the maintenance and strengthening of an effective nuclear non-proliferation **régime**. In our view, a universal and effective nuclear non-proliferation **régime** is in the best interests of international peace and stability and **of** all countries, both nuclear and non-nuclear. The non-proliferation Treaty, which has proved to be the keystone in efforts to contain nuclear proliferation, remains one of the **most** important arms-control agreements reached to date. It is also the **most** widely supported arms-control measure in history.

Ireland is a strong and consistent supporter of the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. My delegation regrets, therefore, that the recent Fourth Review Conference did not agree on a concluding document. We are convinced, however, that the comprehensive review of **the** Treaty undertaken during the Conference will serve to strengthen both the Treaty itself and the commitment of States parties to its **implementation**. We noted especially the degree **of** consensus reached during the Review Conference on issues of particular importance for the peaceful uses **of** nuclear energy, including full-scope safeguards and international co-operat~~iaa~~ on nuclear safety. We hope to build on the basis of the **consensus** reached at the Conference on a wide number of issues in order to ensure the continued viability



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of the Treaty and a successful **meeting** of States parties in 1995. We look forward to 1995 as an opportunity to reinforce the non-proliferation Treaty and to renew our commitment to it for an indefinite period. It will be clear from what I have said already that Ireland attaches the highest priority to the early achievement of a comprehensive **test-ban treaty**. We attach **major** importance also to the indefinite, **unconditional** extension by consensus of the non-proliferation Treaty, as an essential measure in its own right.

The Ambassador of Italy, speaking on behalf of the European Community and its member States, has already referred to the Declaration on Nuclear Non-Proliferation issued by **the** Heads of State or Government of **the** European Community in Dublin on 26 June 1990, during the Irish presidency of **the** Community. The Declaration is an illustration that as 12 **sovereign** States, including **both** nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, we all share the same irreducible **commitment** to **the** objective of non-proliferation. We hope it will encourage others, whether parties to the non-proliferation **Treaty** or not, to work towards strengthening the non-proliferation **régime**.

A third objective is deep cuts in strategic and short-range nuclear weapons as a **prelude to the** complete elimination **of** all nuclear weapons. **The** continuing satisfactory implementation of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range **Missiles** - the **INF** Treaty - which for the first time ever eliminates a whole class **of** nuclear weapons, is **most** welcome. We welcome, **too**, the prospect **of** early conclusion of an agreement in the strategic arms limitation talks (START). A further positive development is the commitment **of** the United States **of** America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to initiate early **consultations** about additional reductions **of** strategic weapons. Talks on the reduction of short-range nuclear forces in Europe and on the elimination **of** all **nuclear** artillery shells from that region **are** also likely at an early date. However, **these**



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measures must **not** be seen as an end in themselves; they **must** be part of an irreversible **movement** towards general nuclear disarmament. This should include an end to the development **of** new weapons and of their delivery **systems**. It is obvious that all categories of nuclear weapons, sea-based, land-based or airborne, must be included in this process. In **our** view, the only acceptable level of nuclear weapons is **zero**.

We heard with interest the recent **comments** by the Swedish delegation on the **issue** of nuclear weapons at sea. **This** is a question of genuine concern to us. **As** the Irish Minister for Foreign Affairs pointed out in his recent statement to the General Assembly, we have repeatedly drawn attention to the dangers posed by **nuclear-submarine** traffic in the Irish Sea and similar areas of busy shipping and fishing activities. We are very seriously concerned by the possibility, even the likelihood, that sooner or later an accident will occur, with what could be **calamitous consequences**. In addition to the weapons carried by nuclear submarines, the nuclear-power units **of** these and other vessels are also cause for serious concern. **In** practice, these vessels are in **some cases underwater and in all cases** highly **mobile** nuclear-power stations, with nuclear-weapons capability. Like land-based nuclear installations, they are not **immune** to accidents, and indeed they are subject to the additional danger of collisions.



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With **this** in mind, we were pleased to support the recent Nordic proposal in the IAEA for the updating of **safety** guidelines for nuclear-powered vessels. The **dangers** posed to the environment, **in** the largest **sense**, by these vessels must be a legitimate object of concern in this United Nations forum also.

Fourthly, all other weapons of **mass** destruction should be eliminated. My **Government** believes that **there** should be no further delay in reaching agreement at the **Conference on Disarmament** on the total elimination of all chemical weapons and the destruction of stockpiles - **in other words**, in reaching agreement **on** a global ban on **chemical** weapons. We trust that the recent United **States-Soviet** Union agreement to make **significant** reductions in their chemical weapons **stocks** and to cease production of these weapons will facilitate progress in the negotiations on a comprehensive ban. The convention for a comprehensive ban, once agreed, **must** become truly a convention enjoying the universal participation of States. In this regard, once the negotiations on the convention have been **satisfactorily** concluded, Ireland intends, subject to the requisite governmental and parliamentary decisions, to be numbered among the original signatories to the convention and to encourage its early entry into force.

Ireland does not possess chemical **weapons**, nor **is** it a producer of **chemicals** generally regarded as central to acquiring a chemical **weapons** capacity. We fully support concerted international efforts to establish and strengthen strict controls on chemicals **which** can be used **in** the production of chemical weapons. However, such controls are no substitute for a chemical **weapons** convention.

Fifthly, international peace and security cannot be achieved **unless** all aspects of the problem of **conventional** disarmament, including the increasing sophistication of conventional weapons, **are addressed by the international**



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community. Conventional disarmament is an integral and important part of the disarmament process. **The** concept of general and complete disarmament was never intended to apply solely to nuclear weapons. While progress in nuclear disarmament cannot be held hostage to reductions in conventional armaments, prospects for nuclear disarmament would be immeasurably enhanced if the threats posed by conventional armaments were removed. **Moreover**, the conventional **arms race serves** to sharpen tensions: it undermines security; and it extends to every corner **of** the globe. It consumes vast resources which are needed - and indeed often desperately needed - for economic and social development.

In the context of disarmament, a **most** important element of the new relationships being established between the countries of Europe is the opportunity to establish a new **system** of security based on co-operation rather than on confrontation. The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) provides the appropriate framework for this process. The Paris summit next month will put in place the structures to make this **new** co-operative **system** of security a reality. The current negotiations on security in Vienna, taking place within the CSCB framework, are contributing, in their separate ways, to increasing mutual trust and to bringing about a more peaceful and stable Europe. Very important agreements affecting the levels of conventional armaments have recently been reached in the negotiations on conventional armed forces in Europe. However, progress in the negotiations on **confidence-** and security-building measures **must** also be maintained **so** that positive and **concrete** results from both sets of negotiations are placed before the Paris summit; These **agreements** will represent a significant step towards **more** structured co-operation between CSCE participants on security **matters**. We look forward **to** the **commencement** of discussions among the Thirty-four aimed at establishing, by 1992, a disarmament and



(Mr. Hayes, Ireland)

confidence-building measures process open to all CSCE **members** that wish to participate.\*

The impetus for progress on the multilateral disarmament agenda **must** obviously also be reflected in the improved efficacy of the United Nations disarmament institutions. In this Committee in recent years we have seen a welcome increase in willingness to try to develop consensus on **the many** important topics on our agenda. This trend will, we hope, continue. The last session **of** the United Nations **Disarmament** Commission also reached a remarkable level of agreement on the outstanding items on its agenda. We hope that consensus will also be attained at this session of the General **Assembly** on the items to be included in the 1991 working agenda of **the** Commission. We shall continue to participate constructively in the ongoing consultations on this issue. However, the Conference on Disarmament must also fulfil its role as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating forum in the United Nations **system**. We earnestly hope that the States **members** of the Conference, which have been entrusted with negotiating responsibilities by the international community, will be able to fulfil their mandate by reaching consensus **on** the important issues on their agenda.

To conclude, all that I have said in this statement **may** be crystallised in an appeal to the international community to adopt and pursue fully an approach to disarmament based on the following elements: the development of a co-operative approach to security; a new emphasis on making progress in the multilateral disarmament process; and a determination to achieve first, a comprehensive test ban and an end to production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons; secondly, the strengthening **of** the Non-Proliferation Treaty; thirdly, deep cuts in strategic and

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\* The Chairman returned to the Chair,



(Mr. Hayes, Ireland)

shorter-range nuclear weapons as a prelude to **the** complete elimination of all nuclear weapons: fourthly, a complete ban on chemical weapons; and, fifthly, reduction in the level of conventional weapons. We believe that real progress can be made in these areas even in the short term if we avail ourselves of the opportunities offered by the improved climate in international relations.

Mr. MUNTEANU (Romania): **At** the outset, on behalf of the **Romanian** delegation I extend to you, Sir, my warmest congratulations on your election as Chairman of the First Committee. I am confident that your outstanding diplomatic skills **and** experience will guide us through a very productive session. I should also like to extend our best wishes of **success** to the other officers of the **Committee. My** delegation pledges its fullest co-operation to all **of** you in the accomplishment of the high responsibilities with which you have been entrusted.



**(Mr. Munteanu, Romania)**

The Committee is holding its meetings at a unique moment in European history. We are witnessing a fundamental change in our area of the world, putting an end to the cold war and to the East-West confrontation. The ideological division of Europe has ceased to exist, or has at least diminished to a great extent. The unification of Germany is indicative of the paramount process that will eventually lead to the fulfilment of the old dream of a united Europe.

The impending first treaty on substantial reductions of conventional armaments and a new set of confidence- and security-building measures are also practical steps towards that goal. Regardless of past experience, all European nations share the same fundamental human, political and economic values and have a common understanding of the need for a sound pattern of security and co-operation on the whole continent.

The Paris Summit meeting that is to take place in a few weeks' time might well be viewed as a milestone on the road towards a new identity for Europe, opening up unprecedented prospects for security and co-operation.

Romania has undergone a process of fundamental change. My country's irreversible option is for a free society and pluralism, and respect for and full protection of the human rights and fundamental freedoms appertaining to all human beings. On that basis our foreign policy is firmly aimed at promoting broad and active co-operation with all nations. We strive to secure peace, achieve disarmament and strengthen regional and international security. In this context I should like to emphasize that Romania is firmly committed to the goal of arms control and disarmament, including nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons.



(Mr. Munteanu. Romania)

The **Romanian** Government is in favour of a comprehensive approach to arms limitation and disarmament issues and the adoption of concrete measures in all fields without linking results in one area to progress in another. **At** the same time, we believe that in the process of such negotiations all parties should show realism, flexibility, a spirit of compromise and pragmatism. We are confident that such an approach would open up new vistas for agreements in the negotiations on chemical weapons, a nuclear-test ban and other arms-control and disarmament problems.

Nuclear disarmament is **one** of the highest priorities **for** the international community. This objective can be achieved only through sustained efforts and progressive measures of nuclear **arms** limitation and disarmament. Therefore we welcome **the** agreements which have been reached, in particular the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles - INF Treaty - and its satisfactory implementation. We believe that at present all efforts should be concentrated on speeding up the conclusion of a treaty on the reduction of offensive strategic weapons.

We very much appreciate the American-Soviet initiative in starting negotiations on the reduction of short-range nuclear forces in Europe. Shortly, a treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe will be signed, and there will be new negotiations on further reductions in their strategic weapons.

**The** challenge is real, since nuclear arsenals will continue to exist and their qualitative improvement will go on in spite of the agreements already implemented or already in progress.



(Mr. Munteanu, Romania)

Romania takes a firm **stance** in favour of a total ban on nuclear tests and favours **decisive steps** with this fundamental aim. The **validity** of this goal is also firmly based on moral and environmental considerations. At the **same** time, the positive impact of the prohibition of nuclear tests on progress towards the cessation of the nuclear-arms race, nuclear disarmament and the strengthening of the non-proliferation **régime** is not doubted by any nuclear or non-nuclear State.

We share the legitimate concern that, despite all the **efforts made** during more than a quarter of a century, the world **has** not yet come closer to that objective. My country, like **most** other **States**, considers that this situation calls for new and intensified efforts towards the complete prohibition of nuclear tests. We are of the view that the new international situation, the unprecedentedly positive developments in relations among the non-nuclear-weapon States in Europe and in other parts of the world, and the new approaches in arms control and disarmament offer better prospects for reaching that goal.

Committed though it **is** to the goal of a complete test-ban treaty, my country accepts the principle of reaching that objective gradually, in stages. In keeping with this flexible approach, Romania welcomes the agreement on the verification protocols to the threshold test-ban Treaty and the Treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions, which **has** opened the way for the entry into force of these agreements.

The Romanian Government will welcome any new agreement on further limitations on underground nuclear tests and any new step in this direction. We have noted with interest the readiness expressed in our debates regarding new negotiations on possible further limitations on nuclear testing, as well as the measures of



(Mr. Munteanu, Romania)

self-restraint to be used in carrying out such tests. In our opinion, at **the** present time it is essential to find the most promising **course** of action and to initiate a genuine process of negotiations leading to the cessation of all nuclear tests.

The New York **amendment** Conference, which will take place in January 1991, might be able to give a political impetus to efforts to discontinue all nuclear tests. Aware as we are **of** the existing substantive differences of view on this subject, we believe that it is of vital importance and in the interest of attaining the goal of a nuclear-test ban to ensure that at the amendment Conference there will be an appropriate climate favourable to constructive talks and the search for solutions that will lead to the prohibition of nuclear tests. **At** the same time, the Conference should casue the efforts made elsewhere, in particular in the **Conference** on Disarmament, to achieve a nuclear-test ban to be not slackened, but intensified. We are in favour of the re-establishment, at the beginning **of** the 1991 session **of** the Conference on Disarmament, of the Ad Hoc Committee on a Nuclear Test Ban and the continuance within this framework of systematic, substantive work on a nuclear-test ban, which, through negotiations, will lead to new **operings** and concrete steps towards an agreement.

Romania wishes to **enhance** its contribution to the substantive work of the Ad Hoc Committee, which will have to pave the way towards an agreement. In the same spirit, my country is participating in the work **of** the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures **to** Detect and Identify Seismic Events and in the experiments that **are** at present taking place in this field.



**(Mr. Munteanu, Romania)**

Romania believes the non-proliferation Treaty to be one **of the pillars** of a stable international **system of peace**, security and development. An efficient non-proliferation **régime** requires **appropriate measures to** prevent access to nuclear materials, equipment and technology for purposes other than peaceful. My country is fulfilling in good faith all the obligations it assumed under the non-proliferation Treaty and the International **Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)** system of safeguards, as well as other recognised international arrangements in the field of nuclear transfers, which are an integral part of the non-proliferation **régime**.



**(Mr. Munteanu, Romania)**

Romania recently adopted a number of important decisions to that end. Let me recall just a couple of **them**. The **Romanian** Government has issued a statement declaring null and void any possible agreements concluded by the former dictatorial **régime** which could have **been** in contradiction with the international obligations assumed by Romania in the field of non-proliferation. At the **same** time, Romania has officially accepted the non-proliferation guidelines for nuclear transfers - contained in **document IFCIRC/254** of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) - agreed upon by the group of countries exporters of nuclear materials, equipment and technology. In reaching this decision the Government of Romania was fully aware of **the** need to participate in the development of nuclear energy while avoiding contributing in any way to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and of the need to remove safeguards and non-proliferation assurances from the field of commercial competition.

The Fourth **NPT** Review Conference demonstrated that quite often non-proliferation issues and related matters give rise to controversy and even confrontation.

We believe that the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the major objective, to which most States have subscribed - could best be achieved through genuine co-operation between equal partners acting towards a common goal. In our opinion, this is **one of the foremost lessons** of the Fourth **NPT** Review Conference, which confirmed **that** the **cornerstone of** the non-proliferation Treaty from the **very** beginning was, and still is, nuclear disarmament.

**There** is a **growing** concern on the **part of** the **international community** over chemical weapons, their possible use and proliferation. **The Romanian** Government considers that the earliest possible conclusion, within **the Conference on** Disarmament, **of** a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the



(Mr. Munteanu, Romania)

development. production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction has become a matter of utmost importance **and** urgency.

Romania is participating **in** the process of negotiations on the draft convention on chemical weapons and, like **other** countries, has taken this year a number of constructive steps to increase confidence and promote the achievement of such a convention.

For instance, Romania stated in a plenary meeting **of** the Conference on Disarmament that it does not produce or have chemical weapons nor does it intend to produce or otherwise acquire such **weapons in** the future. It also stated that it is ready to become an original party to a convention with universal participation on **the** prohibition **and** destruction of chemical weapons.

At the same time, the **Romanian** Government has presented **in** a Conference on Disarmament working paper **complete** data regarding the production, retention or non-retention, **consumption**, import or export **of** substances **of** the civil chemical industry, data **that** could be relevant to **the purpose** of **the future** convention.

Romania wishes to take this opportunity to reaffirm in the First Committee the aforementioned statements **and** to confirm the complete data presented **in** the Conference on Disarmament.

We are fully aware of the core **issues that** have to be solved before there can be a global ban on chemical **weapons**. **Nevertheless**, we **hope** that the progress already made **in drafting the text** of the convention and the **steps** expected to be taken by **various** countries will lead in the near future to **an efficient and** universal legal **instrument** that will be **all-encompassing** and well **balanced**, providing **among other things for effective** international control **on** the prohibition and elimination of **chemical weapons**.

we welcome the bilateral **agreement** between **the United States and the Soviet Union** on chemical weapons and **expect it** to contribute **to the conclusion** of a



(Mr. Munteanu, Romania)

comprehensive convention on the prohibition and elimination of all chemical weapons, as requested by the international community.

Like other countries, Romania is concerned over the risks of proliferation of chemical weapons before the conclusion and entry into force of the future convention, which would undermine or make more difficult the achievement of the objectives of prohibiting and eliminating all chemical weapons.

Romania expressed to the States concerned its readiness to join the Australia Group, which seeks to control the export of certain sensitive chemicals and chemical technology in order to prevent the proliferation of chemical weapons,

At the same time, measures are being taken to ensure at the national level the appropriate regulations and machinery functioning in conditions of privatization and in a market economy, which would guarantee strict control over the non-proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, and also co-operation with other States on these issues.

The Romanian Government considers that the changes in Europe and in the whole world call for an intensified and more productive process of disarmament and for increased efficiency on the part of all bodies involved in arms control and disarmament debates and negotiations so that they can keep pace with events and stimulate the positive course of political developments.

First of all, we think that the United Nations should strengthen its position in guiding and stimulating the activities of bodies debating or negotiating arms control and disarmament matters and should increase the efficacy of its own debates and resolutions.

Like other delegations, we welcome the new trend in the activities of the Disarmament Commission, which has a major role to play in multilateral disarmament.



(Mr. Munteanu, Romania)

My delegation appreciates the work and the positive results of the Disarmament Commission's last session, in particular the set of principles, adopted by consensus, on the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

In this context we take note with interest of the comprehensive study on nuclear weapons and the study on the role of the United Nations in the field of verification, which by their content and conclusions as well as recommendations deserve the particular attention of the First Committee and Member States.

We should also like to congratulate the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) on the useful activities it has carried out during the first 10 years of its existence and express the hope that it will make greater contributions in future.

At the same time, the Romanian delegation believes that the First Committee can and must play an increasingly effective role in the arms control and disarmament process. To this end we look with favour on various ideas and suggestions, such as those regarding the simplification of the agenda, the merger of draft resolutions and the consideration of some items on a two- or three-year basis. It goes without saying that a greater role for the First Committee in the field of arms control and disarmament requires, above all, a realistic and pragmatic approach to issues and an active and constructive search for meaningful consensus on practical solutions. We welcome your initiative, Mr. Chairman, in opening informal consultations on this subject which involve both substance and procedure.



(Mr. Munteanu, Romania)

In the same spirit, Romania fully supports the efforts ~~being~~ made to improve the activities and ~~increase~~ the efficiency of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. In our opinion, the positive developments taking place in Europe and other parts of the world must be reflected in the proceedings and, particularly, in the results of the Geneva Conference.

While we welcome the steps taken at this year's ~~session~~ of the Conference, we believe that much still remains to be done to ~~strengthen~~ as much as possible the character of the Conference on Disarmament as a negotiating body so that it can fully meet the legitimate expectations of the world community in 1991 and subsequent years.

Mr. GHEZAL (Tunisia) (interpretation from Arabic) I am pleased to congratulate you most cordially, Sir, on behalf of the Tunisian delegation on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. Your personal qualities and abundant diplomatic experience, particularly in the Security Council and the Disarmament Commission, are ~~guarantee~~ enough for the successful conduct of our work,

We congratulate, too, the other officers of the Committee.

May I convey, too, to Mr. Yasushi Akashi, Under-Secretary-General for Disarmament Affairs, our thanks for his statement and for his tireless efforts on behalf of the cause of disarmament.

The representative of Algeria will speak on behalf of the member States of the Arab Maghreb Union. For my part, I have a number of observations which I wish to make on behalf of the Republic of Tunisia.

This session of the General Assembly is being held at a high point in history. For about a year now, the world has been witnessing a phase of profound change whose dimensions and consequences seem to broaden from one day to the next.



(Mr. Ghezal, Tunisia)

The time of cold wars, tension and ideological confrontations is past. This is a time of understanding and co-operation between the United States and the Soviet **Union**. The collapse of the Berlin Wall paved the way to the reunification of Germany, which has just taken place. This has been accompanied by a tidal wave of freedom and democracy in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in various parts of the third world. Namibia's accession to independence brought to an end the colonial era in Africa and brought with it the hope that the end of **apartheid** is near in South Africa. At the same time, the United Nations has regained the ability to play its role and carry out the mission entrusted to it under the Charter **recognized** for the maintenance of international peace and security and for the upholding **of** the rule of law and justice in the world.

The Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles signed by the United States and the Soviet Union in 1987, in our opinion, was an event **which** proved to be the harbinger **of** these changes. This fact highlights the true importance of disarmament for the future of mankind and for the **new** world order to which we fervently aspire.

Many other similar steps have been taken, or are about to be taken. Worthy of note is the United States-Soviet declaration on **the** elimination of chemical weapons **and** the prospect of the conclusion in the near future and within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (**CSCE**) of an agreement on conventional forces.

Political will is more necessary now than ever if we are to bolster this trend **and** consolidate **the** present tendency towards **a** world of peace and harmony. The objective **of** the international community in this regard is the achievement **of** general and **complete disarmament** under international control.

we **welcome** the achievements that have **been** made towards the realisation of **that objective**. **However**, complete and comprehensive nuclear, chemical and



(Mr. Ghezal, Tunisia)

conventional disarmament still requires a great deal of continuous unremitting **efforts** to ward *off* the threat of the mass destruction of humanity.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear **Weapons** is of the highest importance in our view. Its **implementation** must, however, be accompanied by political and legal guarantee<sup>8</sup> to non-nuclear-weapon States against the threat or use of **such** weapons. **This certainly** fits neatly into the logic of **peace** and security for all.

One can never overemphasise that the willingness of States to accede to the Treaty and to comply with the constraint<sup>8</sup> it involves will continue to depend on its general and equal implementation without any kind of selectivity, **since** it would hardly be proper to invoke the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons while overlooking the nuclear capability of South Africa, or the nuclear armaments which have been stockpiled by Israel.

While persisting in its aggressive and **expansionist** policies and continuing to occupy by force the territory of the Palestinian people, South Lebanon and the Syrian Golan Heights, **Israel** continue<sup>8</sup> to be the **only** country in the whole Middle East region which has refused - just exactly **as** *South Africa* has done - to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty or to place all **its** nuclear facilities under the safeguard system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (**IAEA**). However, the constant threat which it poses to the security **and** stability of the region, and well beyond, as everyone knows, is no mere figment of the imagination. It is a **reality** which we have seen in action repeatedly. In the absence of any deterrent, and since Israel enjoys the tolerance or collusion of some, it creates a dangerous precedent which can only become contagious and eventually attract other imitators.



(Mr. Gheaal. Tunisia)

Therefore, it is incumbent on the Security Council, which has recently discovered a new vigour, to act and take appropriate action to put an end to this defiant resistance by compelling Israel to act in conformity with Security Council resolution 487 (1981) which, like so many other resolutions relating to Israel, has remained dead letter. Moreover, an end must be put to nuclear co-operation between Israel and South Africa.

We would like to commend **the** central role played by the **Conference** on Disarmament in the multilateral negotiating process. Tunisia is firmly committed to **the** Charter **of** the United Nations and to the attainment **of** the objectives enshrined therein. It has long shown a sustained interest in the work of the **Conference**, and would like to be able to contribute to it **more** fully. For that reason, it has applied to become a **member** of the Conference in order for it to take a more active part in the building **of** a new international order.

The Paris Conference **on** the prohibition of chemical weapons has given a **new** political momentum to the efforts **of** the international community to rid the world of **these** destructive and horrendous weapons. **The** Geneva Protocol needs to be consolidated and developed.

The changes now occurring **in** international affairs and the philosophy of peace and **détente** manifest **in certain** recent developments prompt us all to work together to accelerate the conclusion of the convention prohibiting the design, development, **production**, stockpiling and use **of** chemical weapons world-wide.

A genuine, sincere commitment to the prohibition of chemical weapons **should**, in our view, take the form **of** universal accession to the future **convention**.

Universality will be one of the political and legal guarantees **of** full compliance by all with the obligations under the **convention**.

**The** complete elimination **of** chemical **weapons** and **other weapons of mass** destruction does not **seem likely** to take **place in** the **immediate** future. It may not



(Mr. Ghezal, Tunisia)

be achieved in the short term. Consequently, we firmly believe that the inclusion of guarantees in the body of the convention, dealing with the general security of States in certain regions of the world, will do much to help effectively the **conclusion** of the new convention.

The possession of chemical weapons, like the possession of nuclear weapons and any other weapons of mass destruction cannot but complicate the elaboration of the convention.

The legitimate security concerns of States and peoples and their need to promote their capabilities in **the** areas of scientific and technical research and co-operation should be taken into account by the convention with all due clarity.

The strengthening of the role of the United Nations as an instrument of peace **and**, especially, of the role of the Security Council in the Gulf crisis, encourages us to hope that the Security Council will in future fully discharge its responsibilities, with the same vigour, in every situation and under various circumstances, in addressing all the issues it deals with under the Charter, so that it may work side by side with **the** General Assembly in maintaining international peace and **security**.

There is a clear need for the Security Council's active role to include also the resolution of other conflicts, particularly that of the Middle East, and 'the plight of the Palestinian people which has continued to suffer 'the most horrendous forms of injustice for more than forty-three years as a result of Israel's colonialist and repressive policies which have gone to extreme lengths in flouting international law **and** thwarting every peace initiative with complete impunity thanks to the indifference shown by certain **Powers**. The recent massacre and desecration of the **holy** places by the Israeli occupation forces in Al-Quds are but a **reminder** of this shameful state of affairs,



**(Mr. Ghezal, Tunisia)**

The lack of a comprehensive, just and lasting solution to the conflict cannot but doom the Middle East region to perpetual insecurity and pervasive violence. This contrast8 starkly with the current international orientation towards the settlement by peaceful means of all other regional conflicts.

Tunisia, which reject8 all forms of occupation, can only denounce the fait accompli policy imposed by Israel on the Palestinian people and all the countries of the region especially that such a policy can only lead to more stockpiling of weapons and the perpetuation of a flourishing market **for** the arms trade in that part of the world.

Development, to which the peoples of the world legitimately aspire, particularly in the third world, cannot be achieved under the extreme pressures of armament and the resultant squandering of precious resources.

The World Bank Report on World Development, 1990 indicates that the world total military expenditure in the **1980s** reached **an** all time high in **peacetime**: it amounted to 1,000 billion US dollars. This figure represents 5 per cent **of** total world income.

We are disturbed to note that the developing countries which are in desperate need for the investment of their resources in development are a flourishing market for the arms trade. We all know that **the arms race**, whether it involves nuclear or conventional weapons, and **whether** it occurs **in** the industrialised or in the developing countries, can only pose a deadly threat to stability and development.

The relationship between disarmament and development was the main focus of the Conference **held** on that subject in 1987 **and** also in the Concluding Document of the General Assembly at its tenth special session. **Therefore, there** is an urgent and imperative need for us to implement agreed **measures** in order to attain the objectives jointly drawn **up** by all members **of** the international community.



(Mr. Gheaal, Tunisia)

The most recent reports *of* the United Nations Children's Fund and of the World Bank have highlighted the pressing need to stem the spread of poverty and disease in many parts of the world.

The final Declaration of the World Summit for Children also emphasised the urgent need to ensure a better future for our children.



(Mr. Ghosal, Tunisia)

The adoption of the 1990s as a decade for the reduction and elimination of poverty should call for a resolute commitment on the part of all of us to avoid the errors of the past and avoid having another lost decade such as was the case with the 1980s.

The European and Maghreb countries of the western Mediterranean, are intent upon initiating dialogue among themselves with a view to making the Mediterranean a region of security, stability and co-operation.

In that context, the foreign ministers of those countries have met in Rome on 10 October 1990 with a view to promoting and consolidating relations of co-operation among themselves and co-ordinating efforts to convene a Mediterranean security and co-operation conference, in line with the prevailing climate of détente in international relations. The foreign ministers declared the commitment of their countries to the principles of the comprehensive and indivisible nature of security in the Mediterranean region and highlighted its interdependence with the issues of development. They pointed out that awareness of this interdependence is the only way to promote peace and co-operation in the entire region. They declared that the question of security in the Mediterranean region must be considered in the broader context of international security, that it is closely linked to the security of the entire region, and that in the Mediterranean countries should benefit from the favourable processes in terms of security and co-operation now developing in Europe.

We shall never live in a better world unless military and non-military threats have been supplanted by mutually advantageous co-operation and assured security for all. The objectives of the Charter are still attainable. The will and sincere commitment of all partners is necessary for their attainment.



Mr. LUNA (Peru) (interpretation from Spanish): Mr. Chairman, at the outset allow me to express to you my sincere congratulations on **your** election to guide the work **of** the First Committee. Your well-known diplomatic skills and personal virtues assure us of a positive outcome in dealing with the delicate matters entrusted to us, which are closely related to the promotion of peace. The fact that you are the representative of Nepal, a country with which **we share** common goals and objectives and which also has the honour of hosting the regional centres for peace, disarmament and development, demonstrates the degree of our commitment to the ideals of the Organisation.

I should like also to express my sincere recognition of the magnificent work achieved by Ambassador Taylhardat during the forty-fourth session, which confirms the commitment of Latin America to a safer world. Likewise, I should like to convey, through **you**, my felicitations to the other officers of the Committee and to the members of **the** Secretariat for their efficient collaboration.

The ideological rivalry that brought **about over** a period of 40 years an extraordinary arms race and super-Power confrontation is beginning to **be** supplanted by the initiative and hope of peoples that are beginning to put behind them a sombre stage in history during which they were hostages to a narrow and militaristic concept of security. It is perhaps too bold to suggest that the process at present being inaugurated lays the foundations for a new, qualitatively different stage of history as compared with the one that ended with the revolution of 1989. It is, however, valid and **useful** to recall here that during that previous period alternatives of a different nature, programmatic and regional, were put forward with the aim of ending the precarious **security system** based **upon** nuclear deterrence, that is, the mutual threat **of** mass annihilation. Alternative<sup>8</sup> for a



(Mr. Luna, Peru)

normative order were sought first to halt and then gradually to reverse the arms race in all its aspects, from nuclear to conventional. The ablest expression of that effort by the international community is enshrined, as members are aware, in the Final Document and the Programme of Action of 1978.

However, even long before that, the non-nuclear and non-aligned countries tried by various means to freeze, geographically limit and morally isolate the phenomenon of the nuclear arms race. It is not mere coincidence that such efforts, although often partial and incomplete, stemmed from a more humane notion of security, directed towards the establishment of policies beyond narrow and limited national efforts that "guaranteed" individual security and thereby enhanced general insecurity. Again, it is not by accident that this criterion - which in the final analysis is the conviction that security must be a broad process directed towards a flexible and collective system having social, political and economic aspects - should be the one prevalent today, after 40 years of obscurantism.

Although none of the steps mentioned have attained the importance and dramatic impact achieved by the present process in Europe, I must recall that they are pioneering elements, if not phases of transition, towards regional security schemes perfectly complementary to the elusive goal of global security. Along these lines, we have, inter alia, the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America, the demilitarization of Antarctica, the zone of peace and co-operation in the South Atlantic, the Declaration of Cairo for the Denuclearisation of Africa, the Treaty of Rarotonga and the present transformation of traditionally antagonistic and confrontational concepts into a pan-European system of collective security. None of these efforts or others of a similar nature have reached such a level of liability or compulsion as to render them fully effective. However, they all



(Mr. Luna, Peru)

follow a **course** which rejects weapon-prone **options** and denies a conceptual and strategic **monopoly** to the **sadly renowned** concept of **balance of terror**.

**Ideological** and **geopolitical** conditions, if they continue, are now more **propitious than ever** before for putting the idea of **global security** into practice and not merely analysing it in depth. The peoples themselves have **decided** that their institutions should undertake bold initiatives which link all **aspects** of security, from **personal to global**, without eroding, even marginally, the stability of the nation-State in the international system.

It is **therefore** high time to reconcile the great divisions of the twentieth century, the East-West confrontation and the North-South **gap**, through a sustained effort aimed at achieving a change of mind that will allow **first** the visualisation and **then** the channelling of the **feeling** of belonging and participation not **only** in family relations and tribal and national ties but **also** in the world community, menaced, **as** are **each** and every one of **its** members, by **various** forms of threats to the instinctive **sense** of security and survival.

We are indeed aware of the validity and importance of all the progress attained **as well as** of the **prospects** opening up. We should like, however, to reaffirm our **position** in regard to security **concepts** and their consequences in a world still divided by seemingly **unbridgeable** gape - **especially** in the **social** and **economic spheres** - that nevertheless can be **overcome** if a real **sense** of solidarity **among nations emerges**, as demonstrated by the **events** in recent months.



**(Mr. Luna, Peru)**

My country belongs to a region that **almost** thirty years ago set an unprecedented example by proclaiming itself - on its own initiative and in keeping with its people's wishes - the world's first inhabited **area** free of nuclear weapons.

However, it is still a region afflicted by serious problems impeding the achievement of the essential requirements for a dignified life. **So long as extreme** poverty, infant mortality, malnutrition, illiteracy and other ominous realities of third-world countries still exist, security cannot be lasting. It is difficult to explain to a population that daily endures all these calamities the merits of the **world's** freeing itself from the threat of self-annihilation, when this is not having any effect on the subhuman conditions in which they must struggle to survive.

In this context, I want to stress the innovative concept of **security** contained in **the** Galapagos Declaration - **Andean** Agreement on Peace, Security and Co-operation - signed at the Galapagos, Ecuador, Summit by the Heads of State of Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Colombia and Venezuela in December 1989, which **has been** circulated in the Conference on Disarmament as document **CD/1011**.

Likewise, the renewed vision with which Latin America is facing its security and co-operation requirements will be implemented more efficiently **through** instruments such as the recently enhanced "Mechanism for Political **Concertation**" of the Group of Rio, which at present covers eleven nations: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.

Latin America has **never** been a lyric oasis of peace. It is difficult to overstate its social upheavals, historical contradictions and the permanent **gap** between its idealism and its realities. But **the** imagination of its sons and the intelligence of its peoples to open up hopeful paths are heightened in **periods of** crisis and institutional decline. Today, they guide us on the path of a young democracy focused on the strengthening of its social meaning, abandoning



(Mr. Luna. Peru)

territorial ambitions and anachronistic concepts in favour of pragmatic attempts at collective security and self-defence against such serious and deep-rooted threats as drug trafficking and terrorism. In other words, Latin America has committed itself to take a less familiar path, to create its own destiny and for the first time abandon imitating a region which, in spite of its brilliant heritage and civilisation, has made this century the scene of two immense, pointless and unthinkable wars of destruction and genocide.

When the less developed countries put forward proposals such as disarmament and development, a development fund based on resources free & as a result of the disarmament process, conventional disarmament in all spheres and the control of arms transfers they often met with indifference at best and, in the majority of cases, with stiff opposition. It is therefore ironic to see that some of those proposals which were suggested long ago by the poorest countries are now taken up, reshaped and embraced as their own by regions that spawned the concept of security based on the balance of terror.

Security, then, is not the closed hunting preserve of the developed countries or of those which were preoccupied with the bipolar division of the world. Nor can it be based solely on narrow and anachronistic militaristic concepts. Security is and must be an integral process, in keeping with the characteristics of each region of the world and with the cultural identity of their peoples.

Hence, when Europe began its most welcomed regional disarmament process, it did so because it was convinced that the very existence of its region was at risk by the possibility of an armed conflict of unforeseen consequences.

When Latin America and other regions with similar characteristics took the first steps towards disarmament, they did so with the clear intention of



**(Mr. Luna, Peru)**

restricting the arms race, but the purpose was also to use their scarce resources for the well-being of their peoples.

Here is the basis for the fundamental difference between these two processes, that is, different premises for a similar corollary: security is indivisible, integral and mutual but **with** different interactions in its dynamics. It is essential that in any process towards global security all countries be aware of and honour their respective identity. The different paths towards that end can only be considered as points of reference and not as a rigid outline to be followed.

**This** year two important international conferences on disarmament were held. In addition to **their** individual merits, both are intrinsically linked, **for** both are **pursuing the** same goal to ensure mankind's survival. Peru is solemnly committed to these two processes and reiterates its full confidence in the **goals** and objectives of both.

The international community honoured my country with the presidency of the **Fourth** Review Conference by **the** parties to the Treaty for the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, a responsibility it assumed with the firm resolve to contribute all in its power to strengthen the Treaty, which it considers as both a necessary pillar to halt and reverse the nuclear-arms race and the ideal vehicle for international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Substantial progress was made at the Fourth Review Conference. Full-scope safeguards, security guarantees, the prohibition of **attacks** against nuclear **facilities** and the peaceful use of nuclear energy have received unprecedented support by the **Parties** to the Treaty.

Although a final document was not **agreed upon**, these achievements **must be** recognised as concrete proof of the majority's support for nuclear non-proliferation.



(Mr. Luna. Peru)

Peru will not rest in its efforts to co-operate in order to make the Treaty universal and its duration indefinite. However, to achieve this it is essential to recognise that it still suffers from a partial implementation that is likely to give rise to **concerns** of unfairness, which must be overcome through dialogue and negotiations, on an equal footing, in keeping with the right of parties to an internationally binding legal instrument.

This Committee has heard the statements of the representatives of the nuclear Powers regarding the responsibility of all States in this process. We welcome the fact that the reiterated calls of non-nuclear countries, which have always claimed such responsibility, have at last been heard. We remain committed to participation on an equal footing and in full sovereignty and respect; to that end, multilateral negotiations are irreplaceable.

My country will support the decision of the majority of States parties to the Treaty on its follow-up in the work of this Committee. Our traditional spirit of co-operation and participation is extended to all delegations in order to reach agreement on this matter. Further, we shall reject any unjustified and sterile confrontation, especially among countries that enjoy long-standing friendship founded upon common positions in favour of international peace and security.

Peru has the privilege of being one of the six initiators of the process to convene an amendment Conference of the 1963 Moscow Treaty - a position that is deeply rooted in Peruvian disarmament policy. The delicate and long road already travelled in regard to this matter, which has now led to the holding of the organizational meeting for the substantive Conference, to be held early next year, makes it incumbent upon us to exercise special caution in its consideration at the current session,



(Mr. Luna, Peru)

My **Government** believes - and this cannot be denied - that nuclear-weapon testing is predicated **on** obsolete doctrines **of** deterrence and **of** balance of power that put the security and survival of mankind at risk.

The States that claim they have overcome their hegemonistic aspirations in **the** nuclear field are the **very** ones that would today impose on **the** international community the ways and means to achieve a complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests in keeping with their own interests, at their own pace and pursuant to their own strategies,

Similarly, certain countries that pride themselves on being champions **of** the **environment** and try to impose international norms, without **committing** themselves to the **necessary** technical and financial co-operation, maintain, develop **and** test nuclear **weapons**, thus harming not only their own environment but that **of** areas far from **their** territory without **regard** to the **consequences** for neighbouring countries, This is totally unacceptable, and Peru will continue to condemn nuclear tests, which not only damage **the** environment but also undermine the credibility of **the** States that **defend** such positions.



(Mr. Luna, Peru)

On the other hand, we are also deeply concerned that countries which have in common **the** just cause of the struggle to combat underdevelopment and poverty should have to divert enormous human and material resources to the pursuit of a nuclear security **which** is unreal. Indeed, it is because of this solidarity which **we** feel with **them** that we appeal to them to give up these contrary positions and join the majority of countries, which reject this kind of weapon fever. Peru, along with a group of countries which are aware of their obligations and **commitments** towards their peoples and the international community, has for a good five or ten years now been an **exponent** of the view that **there** is a need for regional approaches in the area of conventional disarmament.

It is ironic that those self-same countries which used to flourish convoluted **arguments** about self-defence during the cold war are the very ones which today want to be in the vanguard of the regional conventional disarmament processes. Peru welcomes them, and can only congratulate itself now that its ideals have at last received proper **recognition**: it is patently obvious that the principles of the 1974 Ayacucho Declaration, which was taken up by the 1978 Final Document, are in force; this should **be** a source of inspiration for other initiatives in this area of conventional disarmament. In proof that the principles are indeed in full and renewed force, the Presidents of Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, Colombia and **Venezuela** restated **them** in the **Act of Macchu Picchu** of June last year.

It is a source of satisfaction to recognise that important steps have been taken in European regional disarmament, specific measures have been adopted in the Central **American peace** process and important advances **have** been made in building **confidence** in Africa and Asia. We hope that these efforts succeed, as this would boost the process of general and complete disarmament as an institutional instrument for greater international security.



(Mr. Luna, Peru)

Regrettably, there are still regions where the danger of a widespread conflict looms larger with every passing day, constituting a serious threat to international peace and security. Peru is **therefore** fully behind the international community's call for Iraq to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of **the** peaceful people of Kuwait, **and** for the same reason reaffirms its commitment to all the resolutions adopted by the Security Council on the **matter**.

Peru also takes **the** view that the situation in the Middle East requires the international community to adopt specific and prompt measures **to** achieve the **longed-for** peace in this war-torn, long-suffering region. For this, it is vital **for** there to be final recognition of the right of the Palestinian people to a **permanent** homeland, and final recognition of the State of Israel. We think that an international conference on the Middle East, with the participation of all parties involved, including the legitimate representatives of the Palestinian people, is the best way to find a just and final solution. Therefore we also think that the **immediate** fulfilment of the Security Council's recent resolutions on the situation in **the** region would be a major step towards this end. History **moves** on, and there is no way to avoid it or postpone it: **our** obligation is to prevent suffering on the long road which must lie **ahead** of any **major** human endeavour.

**There** is an intimate link between conventional disarmament and arms **transfers**. We **therefore** look forward with optimism to the report which is now being prepared by the group of **experts** appointed by the Secretary-General. **Not** long ago **we** heard a famous **Read of State** refer to the enormous amounts of money **swallowed up** by this **destabilizing** and threat-bound **trade**, which **has the** unfortunate distinction of being the **most** profitable,



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In this connection, we should focus on an aspect which is even **more** serious: the illegal traffic in **arms**. Every day, thousands of innocent people are killed or are otherwise **victims** of assaults and attacks perpetrated by sloganeering groups trying to take **over societies** by surprise. **A sort** of ideological smugness enables them to justify any kind of **atrocities** or outrage they **may attempt** against **the most** basic human **rights** and fundamental freedoms. **These** poisonous groupings have even gone so far as to **connive** with the drug cartels, so called, giving **them** access to huge financial resources so that they can go on threatening and terrorising **societies** which **are trying**, through **honesty** and **toil**, to climb up out of the **difficult** social situation which lies so heavy on **them**.

Another dominant **theme in the** work of this Committee is **that** of chemical **weapons**. It **has not been** long **since** the international community saw **with** dismay what the heartbreaking effects of these weapons are. Peru's position in this is very **clear**: total rejection of chemical weapons. We **therefore** think there is no point **in** giving **the** convention **that now being** discussed a merely non-proliferationist look. **Rather**, we **share** the view put forward by other delegations to **the** effect that **there** is an immediate **need** for an international instrument to prohibit **the** production, use and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the complete destruction of those now in existence.

**I will** digress briefly **here** if I may. It is also of vital importance for those countries which are committed, as is Peru, to finally eradicating **the** problem of the illicit consumption and traffic in drugs, that the international **community** should become aware that the **use of** chemicals which are basic to **the** illicit manufacture of narcotics and other controlled substances is in a way a chemical weapon eroding our **societies**, corrupting our youth and *dragging us down* towards a future where the outlook is sombre, **It is therefore imperative** that a **specialized**



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international conference should be held to develop a convention to control and **monitor** the trade in these chemical inputs.

**My** country strongly supports **the** notion that we should deal with chemical weapons in a comprehensive **manner**. We cannot just discuss worries about proliferation **alone**: this would mean leaving to one side aspects which are all of a piece with **the** subject of chemicals and their illegal use. For **all the** above reasons, I find myself obliged to draw this parallel **between two** scourges afflicting mankind. The problem must **be** attacked at its root: we must not try simplistically to palliate its **symptoms**. By controlling, in both cases, the **chemical** inputs and taxing sales, **we** would be cutting off at **the** root any attempts to **use them** illegally and **inhumanely**.

The new international climate has given our Organisation a privileged place. **The ideals** formulated **in** the Charter of **the** United Nations are at last beginning to **become** reality. **We** must therefore be capable **of** meeting the challenge, and **must** give this Organisation effective tools to banish for ever the option of using force in international relations. **In the** area of **disarmament**, this necessarily implies optimising **the** various organs in the United Nations **system**.

Peru **therefore** supports rationalising **the work** of **the** First **Committee**. **We** **should use** all **means to seek consensus** adoption of our **resolutions**. Nevertheless, **in this** effort at **rationalization** we should always bear **in mind** that it is the **political** will of States to co-operate with **each** other that is the real touchstone **for** improved **functioning** by **this Committee**. We must avoid a rationalisation which, **based on** doubtful technical **premisses**, including **financial ones**, would **be** merely administrative: this would be a sophism aimed at voiding the proposals this **Committee** studies of **their political content**. **Consensus** cannot **be** the objective, it is **rather the** reflection of the agreement, co-operation, solidarity and, **above**



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all, of the common, shared responsibility which all peoples must assume in building a better future.

The work of the substantive session of the Disarmament Commission in 1990 was encouraging proof of this. Even if **the results** did not completely satisfy all States, it would be wrong to hold that the success **of** the international negotiations should be measured only in these **terms**. The problem should be considered comprehensively, as only negotiated solutions agreed in common will be capable of addressing the challenges we are facing. It is also the case that the proposals adopted *for* the future functioning of the Disarmament Commission will give it the new life and sense **of** urgency the present international situation demands.

**My** delegation therefore finds it paradoxical that, in **the** Commission's work, the subject which had the highest priority in the disarmament field, namely nuclear disarmament, was yet again made the object **of** insensitive positions adopted by some States. Here we should recall the words of the Secretary-General of this **Organization: "By what right do the nuclear States hold the very existence of all mankind hostage?"**

Adopting by consensus the reports on the subjects of conventional **disarmament**, the declaration of the **1990s** as the Third **Disarmament** Decade, the question of South Africa's nuclear capability, and the role **of** the United Nations in the field of **disarmament** would allow us to look forward with cautious optimism to future sessions in the firm expectation that we will reach agreement on the nuclear item.



(Mr. Luna, Peru)

I should like to comment briefly on the World Disarmament Campaign. The work entrusted to the United Nations *in* this field has already yielded important **results**. The dissemination *of* ideas in favour of disarmament has met with a favourable response from our peoples. The campaign can therefore be considered successful and **deserves** the full support of all States. Within a short period, three regional centres for the promotion of peace have been established. They have engaged in a wide variety *of* activities and contributed decisively to the promotion of the objectives that bring us together in this room.

It is a pleasure for my country, which has the honour of being the seat of one of those centres, to congratulate **the** Department for Disarmament Affairs and, in particular, its Under-Secretary-General, Mr. Yasushi Akashi, and his colleagues, on the important work accomplished through the Campaign. The task is still in its initial stage and we therefore call on all States to continue to contribute to this noble cause. My **country**, faithful to its commitments, will maintain its support for this important enterprise. We believe the adoption last year *of* resolution **44/117 F**, which decided that Directors should be appointed to those centres, to be a positive step in the interest of their commendable functions and objectives,

It is the responsibility of all to build a more just and equitable world. Our commitment to our peoples, who have appointed us **their** representatives, is a delicate one. Mankind demands *of* us its legitimate right to live in peace, free of the **danger** of self-destruction. **The** conditions for paving the **peaceful** path to international co-operation are **coming ever** closer.

History has **overcome** geography, material walls **are** collapsing and ideological barriers have become obsolete. But the **efforts** to overcome the tribal instinct *of* self-protection **are** hindered *by* walls of prejudice and remnants *of* arrogance, which



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impede international creativity. However, today, for the first time, this creative movement is capable of forcing **Governments** to take their lead from the original mandate of the San Francisco Charter, which begins, as we all know, with an imperative that transcends the *Members* of our **Organization** and grants the privilege of articulating a realistic future to **"We the peoples Of the United Nations"**.

**The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.**