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Chairman: Mr. Roche (Canada)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.15 a.m.

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GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS

Mr. MUDENGE (Zimbabwe) : First, I would like to extend the **congratulations** of my delegation to you, Sir, upon **your election as** Chairman of the **First Committee** at the **forty-third session of the General Assembly**. Our experience of you, and in particular **your** wide knowledge of your subject, **your approachability** and **professionalism**, **as** well as the high regard in which your country **is** held, all **augur** well for the **work of the Committee**. The **rest** Of the Bureau **is similarly distinguished** and we would like to extend our felicitations **to** them. The **Zimbabwe** delegation intends to **co-operate** fully with the Bureau and to **ensure** the **smooth** conduct of **business**.

Our meeting this year is **taking** place **against** the background of a more relaxed international climate.- **Relations among the big Powers** appear to be on **an** even keel. The Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles - INF Treaty - **has** been signed **and** delivered, negotiations are under **way** for a **50** per cent reduction in the **strategic** arsenals of the two **super-Powers** and there **is** **movement** towards the **resolution** of **some of the most intractable focal** Points of tension in the world, a development that has brought deserved if belated prestige and renewed vigour to the **United Nations**.

It is proper that we should **take note** of the **present** positive international atmosphere. But it is **even more** important that we should **not** relent or relax **in** **our** endeavour **s** to achieve permanent peace and **security** in the **world**. **This is** no **time for euphoria**. We **are** still **at the** foothill^s of the **mountain**, the **summit is** still **some** distance away and **in between** there are many treacherous ravines, gorges and glaciers to cross.

(Mr. Mudenge, Zimbabwe)

If the present looks bright it is mainly because our yesterday was not particularly good. In a room that is pitch black, a glow-worm becomes a veritable luminescence, a point of reference, a source of hope. But this should not blind us to the fact that we could still enjoy the greater luminescence of a candle or even an electric light.

(Mr. Mudenge, Zimbabwe)

The present fresh breeze is a product of the culmination of a particular concatenation of circumstances which may well not persist. It therefore needs to be strengthened and nurtured, otherwise it will ebb and die.

This is the premise upon which my delegation is approaching the present session. It is not that we do not appreciate the current détente. We do, But we think it should be made more secure. In the nuclear age we can no longer afford to play a game of roulette with the security of mankind, We need predictability and guarantees, not gambling. This we can achieve by realistically attending to the disarmament agenda before us and putting the security of the world on a sounder footing, not leaving it to be a mere game of chance. In this endeavour we can use the present climate itself, the mutual understanding it has generated and the opportunities it affords us to work out mutually binding obligations that impede the use or threat of force in relations among States, that allow for co-operation in all spheres among States and that engender continued mutual confidence among States. In short, we must not only improve the present state of international relations in the short term, but also make the improvement permanent.

To achieve this we must not only commit ourselves to the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes, but also remove the means of waging war, in particular nuclear war, from the arsenals of States. For, while it can be said that the institution of efficacious modalities for the peaceful resolution of disputes is necessary if war is to be avoided, it is also equally logical to assume that in the absence of the means of waging war States would be more inclined to settle disputes peacefully. The big question, of course, is whether in the absence of such means of peaceful solution States would want to limit their capacity to wage war in the first place.

(Mr. Mudenga, Zimbabwe)

The INF Treaty is clear evidence that they would. In that Treaty we have seen that States have voluntarily given up killing capacity not only as being superfluous but, more important, as a measure for generating a healthier climate, creating greater mutual confidence and acquiring increased security. That Treaty has conclusively demonstrated how States can obtain greater security from disarming rather than arming. With that example as our guide, and the opportunities offered by the improved international atmosphere as our environment, we should now go forward and address the issues before us. As we do so, let us constantly bear in mind that while the present favourable environment is not the result of breakthroughs in the First Committee, breakthroughs in the First Committee can make that positive climate last.

The views of the non-aligned countries on the issues before us are well known. Not only have these issues been a subject at summits of the non-aligned leaders, including the summit at Harare in 1966, but they were the exclusive concern of non-aligned Foreign Ministers meeting at Havana, Cuba in May this year, and were also addressed at Nicosia, Cyprus, last month. That being so, I trust everyone here is aware of the importance the Non-Aligned Movement attaches to the issue of the prevention of nuclear war and nuclear disarmament. We have always stressed the fact that the United Nations has stated that the prevention of nuclear war is the most urgent task facing mankind today. Hence, we profoundly regret that the Conference on Disarmament has failed yet again to establish a working group on that matter. Perhaps, with the new international atmosphere and increased mutual confidence between the two super-Powers, it will now be possible for the Conference on Disarmament to establish this working group so that this very urgent issue can be attended to.

(Mr. Mudenge, Zimbabwe)

similarly, we urge progress on the issues of nuclear disarmament. The INF Treaty, of course, gives us cause for hope. Put as the President of the Republic of Zimbabwe and Chairman of the Non-Aligned Movement affirmed before the General Assembly meeting in Plenary at its forty-third session, that Treaty accounted for too few weapons, and greater efforts are needed if the future of humanity is to be assured. In particular, we should like to urge the two super-Powers to deliver on their promise of 50 per cent reduction in strategic offensive nuclear arsenals.

The question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty has always been regarded as a particularly urgent issue by the non-aligned countries. It is only by taking that route that the international community can insure against both the horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and the greater perfection and usability of those weapons. We do not believe that partial solutions are adequate. Not only is the banning of all nuclear tests, by all States, in all environments, for all time the soundest way of curbing the nuclear-arms race, but the universality of such a prohibition should also make it easier to deal with the question of verification. Indeed, the many reasons why this comprehensive approach is favoured by the non-aligned countries have been stated repeatedly by many non-aligned delegations, including my own, for so long that it would be superfluous to recall them all here. I will limit myself at this stage to restating this fundamental non-aligned goal and to commending the sponsors of the proposed conference to amend the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty in order to turn that agreement into a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Other issues in the disarmament field also cause us grave concern. We need to prevent the spread of the arms race to outer space. We need to have a chemical weapons treaty. We need to curb the spread of conventional weapons.

(Mr. Mudenge, Zimbabwe)

For us in southern Africa there is no **spectre** so ominous as the **apartheid régime's possession** of nuclear weapons. That **régime** has **now** openly admitted that it possesses the capability to **produce nuclear weapons. Whether or not it possesses nuclear weapons is now** an academic **issue**. We all remember the Kalahar i test site in 1977 and the double **flash** in the South Atlantia in 1979. What **is** beyond doubt **is the fact that it has** not only the means and capability, but also the motive to manufacture them.

South Africa is a well-endowed country. It has **abundant coal reserves** and **is** in fact an **exporter** of **coal**. It operates an oil-from-coal plant at its **SASOL** facility, and it can import **cheap** electricity from **Mozambique**. There is, in our view, **no** economic basis for its nuclear plane. Its official spokesmen, and eminent private citizens such as Dr. Christiaan Barnard, have on a number of **occasions** clearly said as much.

As far as we are **concerned**, South Africa will use its nuclear **weapons** against us. And this **is** not only to believe South African clergymen **such as the Reverend Beyer s Naude** and United States academics **such as Professor Ronald Walters**, who say it would) it is merely to look at the **facts on the ground dispassionately**.

South Africa is like no other **country**. Its strategic situation can only deteriorate. As that strategic situation deteriorates, the compulsion to use nuclear **weapons** will be high. Even as we speak, the death of white youths on the border **is** causing concern in the country. Youngsters are dodging being drafted into the **conscript** army. Money is short. **Apartheid** does not allow losses in the **white** army at the hands of black armies. How **then** do Afrikaner military planners **see** a situation like that? Can the lie of **apartheid** be maintained while a white army is bleeding at the hands of a black or mulatto **one**? What then shall the final solution be - a **blaze** of glory **showing the triumph** of white over black for all time, using a tactical nuclear device?

(Mr. Mudenge, Zimbabwe)

It is not a question of South Africa's subscribing to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Most countries subscribe to the Geneva Protocol, and yet chemical weapons are still being used. Indeed, that is why work is going on now in Geneva on a chemical-weapons convention that would provide for the destruction of chemical-weapon stockpiles.

We cannot understand the logic of saying that in order for South Africa's nuclear-weapons programme to be controlled South Africa should continue to enjoy participation in the nuclear field. That is the same as saying that to ensure that South Africa does not further develop its nuclear weapons it should be given more technology and greater skills in nuclear matters. But that is precisely what we are saying when we say that South Africa must not be expelled from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) because it would be more difficult to control outside rather than inside that body. The fact is that we are not controlling South Africa now.

South Africa's collaborators co-operated with that country before and after South Africa built a test site for nuclear weapons in the Kalahari - a test site that constituted clear evidence that South Africa was going nuclear. They co-operated before and after the 1979 double-flash in the South Atlantic - a nuclear explosion that constituted clear evidence that South Africa had gone nuclear. President Carter said the South African Prime Minister had given him guarantees that South Africa would not go nuclear. Mr. Vorster said he had done no such thing. They are co-operating with South Africa now, yet they are not allowed to look into the nuclear-enrichment facilities in South Africa, at Valindaba and elsewhere, to investigate their technology and materials and the transfers of skills.

The General Assembly, at its tenth special session, clearly stated that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by racist régimes presents

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"a challenging and increasingly dangerous obstacle to a world community faced with the urgent need to disarm. It is, therefore, essential for purposes of disarmament: to prevent any further acquisition of arms or arms technology by such régimes, especially through strict adherence by all States to relevant decisions of the Security Council." (resolution S-10/2, para. 12)

At their eighth summit conference in Harare in 1986, the Heads of State or Government of non-aligned countries called upon the Security Council,

"in the discharge of its responsibilities as the primary organ of the United Nations responsible for the maintenance of international peace and security, to take effective and concrete measures to meet the danger posed by the acquisition of nuclear capability by the South African racist régime."

This call was again made by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of non-aligned countries at Havana last May, who specifically quoted paragraph 63 (c) of the Final Document of the first special session of the general Assembly devoted to disarmament with regard to the responsibility of the Security Council for eliminating obstacles to the implementation of the 1964 Declaration on the Denuclearisation of Africa. To date, nothing has been done. Unbelievably, the chief collaborators in this regard are themselves signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, under article 1 of which they have undertaken "not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control such weapons or explosive devices."

Or do these countries think that this prohibition applies only to assistance rendered to non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT? We would have thought the prohibition should apply with even greater force and urgency with regard to

(Mr. Mudenge, Zimbabwe)

assistance to States non-parties to the NPT, such as South Africa, who are hell-bent on acquiring nuclear weapons.

Let there be no mistake the fact that South Africa has been given a nuclear capability informs those countries such as mine of the minefield being created for US as we look to the realization of basic human rights on our subcontinent. That South Africa's membership of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continues to be defended even after the intention of that country to produce and use nuclear weapons has been made manifest shows us that some very great countries represented here do not really care very much about our falling victim to the use of nuclear weapons.

The nuclearization of South Africa poses considerable difficulties for its neighbours. It makes it harder for them to accede to the NPT or to sign a chemical-weapons convention. If one were concluded now, for, in so doing, these countries would only be assuring South Africa that they are defenceless against its nuclear blackmail. This is a very serious issue, and the nuclear Powers have a responsibility to obviate South Africa's nuclear blackmail of its neighbours.

Another disarmament issue of particular importance to my own and other non-aligned countries is the long-delayed implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. It is now 17 years since the General Assembly declared the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, since that time, despite the many meetings held by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, it has not been possible to convene the envisaged Conference at Colombo for the implementation Of the Declaration.

The littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean depend heavily on that Ocean for their commerce. The heavy militarization of the Indian Ocean that is going on jeopardizes not only the smooth flow of that commerce but also the very

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security and physical well-being of those States. It is therefore imperative that the objective of the United Nations in declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace be realized, and that great-Power armed presence in the area be eliminated.

The lack of progress in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean is thus particularly disturbing. It cannot be said that a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean should first materialize on its own, and that our mandate is merely to ratify such manna from heaven. This is particularly so when, in the meantime, the Powers which argue thus are proceeding with the militarization of the area, thereby making the possibility of such a self-delivering eventuality even more remote. Common sense informs us that the longer we wait, the more the area will, in fact, be militarized, and the harder it would be to demilitarize the region. We cannot, therefore, subscribe to the "self-delivery" thesis.

Even then, we are happy to note that solutions have been found to some of the crises and conflicts that littered the Indian Ocean littoral. It is to be hoped that the solutions to the Afghanistan and Gulf conflicts will now enable those States which felt that the presence of conflict in the region militated against the implementation of the Declaration, to see their way clear to allowing the international community to deal with the problem now. The Colombo conference has been postponed repeatedly. It is the sincere hope of my delegation that it will not be postponed again from the present target date of 1990.

The fact that the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament did not produce a final document should not make us oblivious to the important issues that were addressed, the consensual positions that were arrived at on most of those issues, and the many constructive proposals that were put forward by delegations during the session. A recapitulation of the events at that special session will show that the international community arrived at, or came close to,

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consensus on various issues that were addrrrmrd. It is important that these issues and the consensual viewpoint generated should not be forgotten at this forty-third • wman.

In particular , we have in mind here thr work on banning nuclear tests, curbing the prolifera tion of nuclear weapons, conventional disarmament, the proposal for a United Nations-based international vmr ifica tion mechanism, and a structured role for thr Secretary-General in investigating allegation8 of the use of chemical weapons.

We would almo like to refer to the consideration by the General Assembly, during the third special session, of the item on the relationship between disarmament and development. The importance of *that* item was reaffirmed repeatedly during the session.

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Most of the developing countries today are indeed under greater attack from non-military than military threats to security. A major non-military threat to security is, of course, the risk of social upheaval attendant upon underdevelopment and maldevelopment. These are problems exacerbated by the squandering of scarce resources in the arms race. In 1987 the Assembly took the initial vital step of articulating the international concern over this haemorrhage of sorely needed resources to unproductive and deadly pursuits. It was our hope that SSOD III would advance this process further. The fact that the special session did not produce a final document does not mean that this vital issue should be shunted aside. Therefore, the Zimbabwe delegation would like to see the issue reinscribed on the United Nations agenda.

I should like to end by reiterating the view of my country that the world can no longer afford to let the international climate blow hot and cold according to chance. We must not merely embrace the present thaw as a God-given boon to be enjoyed while it lasts. Rather, we must take hold of the opportunities it affords and use them to create a more predictable, hospitable international climate. The best way to do that is to use the current climate of mutual confidence among States to work out equitable binding arrangements that make the present happy state permanent. That is the task before the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: It is a great pleasure for me now to call on a former Chairman of the First Committee, Mr. Henryk Jaroszek, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Poland, who was Chairman of the First Committee in 1976.

Mr. JAROSZEK (Poland) : I very much appreciate your kind words,

Mr. Chairman. Only slightly bending rule 110 of the rules of procedure, I wish to congratulate you on assuming the chairmanship of the First Committee. As a former Chairman of the Committee - as you mentioned, Sir - I well know the heavy responsibilities of your office. I sincerely wish you every success in carrying out your task. The Polish delegation pledges its full support and co-operation in the efficient and successful discharge of your duties.

I also extend our felicitations to the other officers of the Committee.

The Washington Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles - INF Treaty - has initiated a long-awaited process of real nuclear disarmament. The Moscow summit meeting of the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States generated new hope of significant reductions of their respective strategic offensive nuclear arsenals. At this stage it is important that every State and the international community as a whole make an effective contribution to the strengthening of those favourable trends, making their positive effects irreversible and translating them into tangible progress in the field of multilateral disarmament negotiations.

The first such attempt was made only a few months ago at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Regrettably, the special session, despite the strenuous efforts of a majority of delegations, was not able to adopt a final document. That fact cannot and must not be interpreted as total failure. Without any doubt the session played an important role in the clarification of positions of States on a broad spectrum of disarmament questions, including the United Nations negotiating machinery. Negotiations on a draft final document reached a remarkable degree of compromise. A comprehensive exchange of views on the crucial questions of peace, international security and disarmament led

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to the accumulation of valuable ideas, constructive proposals and new approaches to disarmament issues. That vast potential of political and intellectual achievements must not be forgotten in the archives.

It seems only natural to suggest that the results of the special session should constitute a starting point for the work of our Committee in many areas. Since a thorough review of major disarmament issues has already been made, the First Committee should without any delay proceed to the adoption of conclusions and recommendations on issues where a considerably high degree of compromise has been achieved, and it could actively search for acceptable solutions in those areas where the special session was unable to bridge the existing gaps.

Last July the Political Consultative Committee of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty held its annual meeting in the Polish capital, Warsaw. It made a thorough review of the present international situation and came out with a number of new proposals. As Secretary General of that meeting of the highest political body of the alliance, I should like to comment briefly on its results, particularly in the field pertaining to the work of this Committee.

The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty proposed a comprehensive set of measures aimed at further consolidation of positive trends in international relations and eliminating all those phenomena which still negatively influence the situation in Europe and in the world at large. In the communiqué adopted by the meeting they reaffirmed

"their adherence to the ideals of a world free of weapons of mass destruction and violence, based on the principles of mutual and equal security, democratic coexistence and broad co-operation on an equal footing". (A/43/406, p. 5, para.2)

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

While welcoming the entry into force of the INF Treaty, they emphasized that it should be followed by more agreements in the field of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, down to the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

They also stressed the necessity of developing new thinking and a new approach to the questions of war and peace, in the interest of assuring lasting international security.

The participants in the Warsaw meeting clearly indicated that they considered the following to be priority objectives: conclusion of an agreement on a 50 per cent reduction of the Soviet and American strategic offensive arsenals, in strict compliance with the anti-ballistic missile Treaty) a complete and universal ban on nuclear testing; the signing of a convention on the complete elimination of chemical weapons) and a reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe, cutting military spending accordingly.

The States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty pointed out that

"The resources released in the process of disarmament should be diverted to the needs of economic and social development." (ibid., p. 6, para. 6)

I should also like to draw attention to the fact that the participants in the meeting expressed themselves in favour of stepping up efforts by all States to make the process of disarmament negotiations more effective, to streamline their mechanism and to increase the role of the United Nations in this regard.

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Addressing the *most pressing issues of the time*, the Political Consultative Committee adopted a statement signed by the leaders of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty on negotiations on reduction in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe. It also adopted a document related to some aspects of ecological security.

The statement contains a set of concrete and far-reaching proposals concerning conventional disarmament in Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, thus constituting an important and timely contribution to the process of disarmament negotiations in the region with the highest concentration of armed forces and armaments. In it, the States party to the Warsaw Treaty called for proceeding immediately, in 1988, to negotiations with the aim of reaching radical reductions of the military potentials of the two alliances and of achieving a situation in Europe in which the States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and those parties to the Warsaw Treaty would retain forces and means necessary for defence but insufficient for launching a surprise attack and conducting offensive operations. The statement gives a detailed outline of the first stage of such negotiations.

Let me comment briefly on the salient points. First of all, the final objective is to be the reduction of joint manpower of armed forces and of a quantity of Conventional weapons of the two alliances to levels respectively equal to or lower than those currently maintained by each side. It seems advisable that such a reduction should, in the first place, lead to the reciprocal elimination of the existing asymmetries and imbalances in armed forces and conventional weapons of both - and I stress "both" - alliances.

Secondly, the process of reduction would inseparably involve measures aimed at reducing and eliminating the threat of a surprise attack, such as the establishment

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of zones of lowered levels of armaments along the alliances' line of contact. Consequently, military potentials left in such zones would be sufficient for defensive operations but would preclude the possibility of launching a surprise attack.

The States party to the Warsaw Treaty propose that at the beginning of the negotiations - or, if possible, even before they commence - a mutual exchange of relevant data necessary for the conduct of negotiations should take place. Needless to say, the establishment of an appropriate and effective system of verification of the implementation of the arrangements agreed during the negotiations is also envisaged. Such a system would, inter alia, include mandatory on-site inspection.

Furthermore, I should like to recall the strong emphasis put by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty on the issue of further development and expansion of confidence-building measures in Europe as a means of reducing the threat of a surprise attack and promoting greater openness and predictability in the military field. Needless to say, such measures, once elaborated, could be applied much more universally than on the European continent alone.

I am very pleased to say that the statement was received with great interest and generated favourable reactions in different quarters. It has been generally recognized as a coherent and, at the same time, elastic concept of a conventional disarmament in Europe that meets halfway the position taken by the NATO countries on a number of issues, including such vital areas as the need to eliminate asymmetries and imbalances in the armed forces and conventional weapons of the two alliances, the prevention of a surprise attack and the question of verification. Objective analysis of the document indicates that it takes into account the legitimate concerns of all parties and does not contain elements that could give

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unilateral **advantage** to any negotiating party. **It is** based on the fundamental **PC inciple** of the equal **and** undiminished security of every State at a **lower** level of armaments. We sincerely hope that proposals contained in the document will stimulate the future **process** of negotiations on conventional armaments in Europe and create favourable conditions for the **expeditious** achievement of concrete results.

It goes without saying that the question of time is a crucial one, The qualitative development of conventional weapons leading to a **steady** increase in their accuracy and destructive power continues to escalate the complexity and scope of negotiations. The **sooner** we break that vicious circle the greater will be the chance for tangible results in the field of conventional disarmament.

For that particular reason we note with serious concern the emergence of various concepts of so-called compensation or so-called modernization, which can only be regarded as attempts to nullify the results already achieved and as having a highly negative impact on new, positive trends in the international climate,

I should like to stress with satisfaction that the Warsaw Treaty statement concerning negotiations on reduction in armed forces and conventional arms in Europe embodies a number of ideas contained in Poland's own contribution in that connection, namely, the plan to decrease armaments and increase confidence in Central Europe commonly known as the Jaruzelski Plan. At this stage I should like to recall that the provisions of that plan have recently been further amplified and specified in a message of the President of the Council of State of the Polish People's Republic, Wojciech Jaruzelski, addressed to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament (A/S-15/29) and, subsequently, in a statement of the Government of the Polish People's Republic that has become an official document of the present session of the General Assembly (A/43/411).

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While elaborating an expanded version of the plan, the Polish Government carefully considered numerous views on the memorandum of 17 July 1987 expressed by the Governments concerned as well as gathered in the course of bilateral contacts we had with the interested parties. The plan develops the idea of the transformation of the military potentials of the States concerned into strictly defensive ones. Such a transformation would lead to the elimination of the possibility of carrying out offensive operations, first of all surprise attack, thereby ensuring a mutually acceptable stability on a proportionately lower level of military force. At this juncture an attempt has been made to prepare a tentative list of weapons that could be used, first of all, for surprise attack. In addition to tactical nuclear missiles, that category would comprise tactical-strike aircraft, tanks and other armoured combat vehicles, armed helicopters and long-range artillery, including rocket artillery.

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In our opinion, the withdrawal and eventual reduction of agreed weapons could lead to the establishment of the zone of dispersed armaments. The plan contains certain characteristics of such a zone as well as related verification and confidence-building measures.

Considerable attention has been given to the need for an evolution of the nature of military doctrines and for ensuring their defensive character. The measures proposed in this regard range from an analysis of their nature and developing trends to the consideration of this question at meetings of Political representatives and high-ranking military commanders.

In the course of our dialogue with other countries on the Jaruseleki plan, we were pleased to notice that its ideas had been widely recognised as strictly interconnected with many disarmament and security topics that are at present the subjects of various negotiations. These and other positive reactions to the plan have led us to the conclusion that, in addition to the general recognition of its validity for Central Europe, it also contains a number of aspects of a universal nature. It is true that evolution for one region cannot be automatically implanted into other regions. Matters affecting the national security interests of States are fraught with many complicated problems, frequently having their own unique regional character. Allow me, however, to dwell on some aspects of the plan that can be regarded as having a universal character.

First, I would like to stress its open nature. Although it stresses the security requirements of Central Europe, it remains in strict relationship with the situation, security requirements and solutions on a European scale in general, and leaves open the possibility of its territorial expansion.

Secondly, it encompasses a broad spectrum of inter related questions, from the reduction of different types of armaments and armed forces, the elimination of

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asymmetries and imbalances and the transformation of the character of military doctrines into defensive ones, to confidence-building measures and verification.

Thirdly, a strictly numerical comparison of military potentials has been abandoned in the plan in favour of a complex analysis of the offensive capabilities of States, regarded as one of the criteria for equivalent reductions.

Last but not least, the plan covers the region characterised by the highest concentration of armaments and armed forces, which considerably affects the complexity of the problems that have to be solved, but which at the same time can generate a number of new concepts that could stimulate similar processes in other regions.

Allow me to comment briefly on the document adopted at the Warsaw Meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, entitled "The Implications of the Arms Race for the Natural Environment and other Aspects of Ecological Security". I should like to stress that by taking up this issue, the highest authority of the Warsaw Treaty Organization demonstrated that particular importance is attached by the States members to the question of broad international co-operation in solving the global threats and challenges facing mankind today. The negative impact of the arms race and of military activity on the natural environment is becoming widely recognized by the international community. Of particular concern are the ecological effects of nuclear-weapon tests. There is no need to recall at this forum the threats to the environment and in general to biological life on earth posed by the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons or resulting from human error or accident.

The preservation of the natural environment is extremely expensive and in many cases beyond the means of a single State. It therefore calls for global solutions, for uniting the international community around this cause. Genuine disarmament

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could lead to the release of huge financial resources that could be utilized in part for the ~~improvement~~ of the ~~ecological~~ situation on both a regional and a global scale.

The document is not limited to the military aspects of ecological security ~~alone~~. It also reoognizes the negative consequences to the environment of peaceful activity carried out without its ecological factors being taken into account.

Considering these legitimate concerns, the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty came out with a proposal to work out and consistently put into effect a concept of international ecological security on the basis of the broadest possible and most ~~open~~ international a-operation.

The Warsaw Meeting of the ~~Political Consultative~~ Committee of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty has ~~once~~ again demonstrated its dedication to the cause Of disarmament and to the ~~establishment~~ of a ~~peiceful~~ and secure world. The documents adopted at the meeting contain a broad spectrum of concrete proposals that ~~could help~~ to eliminate the elements of ~~confrontation~~ that still exist and to secure the development of positive processes, especially of significant changes in international relations, including their demilitarisation, further ~~democratization~~ and their foundation on a philosophy of peaceful co-existence and ~~co-operation~~.

I sincerely hope that the results of the meeting will ~~generate~~ a positive response not only in Europe but in this international forum as well.

In the ~~opinion~~ of my delegation, positive trends in the international climate have opened up new prospects in the work of this Committee. We are of the view that the First ~~Committee~~ should take full advantage of this favourable situation and make serious efforts with a view not only to strengthening those trends and rendering them irreversible but also to ensuring their further ~~development~~.

(Mr. Jaroszek , Poland)

It is our duty to stimulate the process of disarmament and to make concerted efforts to expand the area of consensus and translate it into concrete disarmament agreements. By doing so we can contribute - not only with words but also, what is of course even more important, with deeds - to the discharge of our responsibility for the peaceful and secure future of mankind.

The Polish delegation is ready to co-operate fully with all delegations in the pursuit of this noble goal.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom) : May I first say, Sir, what a pleasure it is to see you in the Chair. Canada is well known for its dedication to the search for effective arms limitation, and we are particularly fortunate to have in you one of the most experienced delegation leaders in the field of disarmament. I look forward to co-operating with you closely in the weeks ahead.

May I also express my appreciation for the statement by the Ambassador Of Greece, serving in the presidency of the 12 member countries of the European Community. His statement, of course, has the full support of my authorities.

We are approaching the end of 1988. This has particular significance for me personally, as it marks the end too of my first year in my present job. What does 1988 mean for us, and what does it portend for the months ahead?

In many ways 1988 has been a good year. It has been a time when stagnant problems have begun to yield to the flow of fresh ideas. Solutions have been found for issues long enmeshed in seemingly intractable complications. It has been a year of movement forward, if still slow and tentative,

The list is well known: the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles - the INF Treaty - ratified and implementation under way; progress in the negotiations on a strategic arms reduction treaty (START); the joint experiment on verification of nuclear testing carried out; the successful implementation of confidence-building measures under the Stockholm agreement; and the prospect for early negotiations on conventional stability in Europe. Two years ago all these were just hopes. In 1988 these hopes are at last being realized.

The British Government wholeheartedly welcomes these achievements, achievements which constitute a realistic step-by-step approach, which recognize the need for effective verification, and which acknowledge the relationship between disarmament and security, and the importance of safeguarding and, if possible, enhancing security at the lowest possible level of armaments. They are the sort of

(Mire Solesby, United Kingdom)

arms control and disarmament measures which we in the West have long been advocating. With the emergence of new thinking in Moscow, they are now beginning to be realised.

East-West relations are improving. There is more dialogue, greater confidence. Hopeful moves have emerged towards resolving tensions in other regions. In Afghanistan, in the Gulf and in Western Sahara major steps have been taken, and there is progress too in Cambodia, Namibia and Cyprus. In all of these areas the United Nations has played a useful, sometimes vital role. So much for those who were saying the United Nations was on its knees.

But more, so much more, remains to be done. In some sad respects - I am thinking in particular of the repeated use of chemical weapons in the Gulf - this last year has seen retrogression rather than advance.

We in the West are still faced by the massive forces of the Soviet Union. It is worth reminding ourselves that the entire Soviet strategic nuclear force in place in the mid-1980s will have been replaced by new or modernized systems by the mid-1990s. A new Soviet submarine is deployed every six weeks. More accurate SS-21s are increasing the huge advantage the Soviet Union enjoys in shorter-range missiles. Last year alone, the Soviet Union made over 90 space launches for military purposes. From the Atlantic to the Urals, the Warsaw Pact has 51,000 tanks, over half of which are modern. The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has 17,000 in total. NATO is also outnumbered two to one in aircraft. We see still that the Soviet military posture in Europe is dominated by offensive weapons, that the forces of the Soviet Union still go far beyond the needs of a purely defensive strategy.

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

It is not only the arms race between East and West. The arsenals of war have been growing at least as much outside Europe. In the past 25 years, the average percentage of gross national product devoted to military spending in developed countries has actually fallen from 7 per cent to 5.7 per cent, while in developing countries it has risen from 3.1 per cent to 5.4 per cent. In several developing countries military spending is running at well over 20 per cent of gross national product, and in some over 40 per cent. The dark cloud of proliferation of weaponry, including the most sophisticated and destructive types, hangs over all corners of the world. Arm control is for conventional forces as well as for nuclear forces.

Each of our countries represented here has a programme of arms control and disarmament reflecting its own national security requirements. The top priorities for the British Government remain a 50 per cent reduction in the strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union, the global elimination of chemical weapons, and the establishment of stability and security at lower levels of conventional forces, by the elimination of disparities, in the whole of Europe.

That is an ambitious agenda, but we believe a realistic one. The agendas for other regions of the world are bound to differ in some respects, but I would venture to hope that they will be equally ambitious.

For the British programme of arms control and disarmament we rely on the bilateral, the regional and the multilateral forums. Our own national goal will only be realized if each one of these forums is successful. It is true that there are differences among the countries represented here over the exact role multilateral organs are to play at the present stage, as well as over the substance of disarmament. The absence of a concluding document from the third special

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is a disappointing reminder of the gap which divide us. Yet that special session also demonstrated the wide areas of consensus which bind us together. Let us build on what we have in common.

The multilateral forum of the Conference on Disarmament has the leading role in negotiating one of Britain's highest priorities, namely a comprehensive, universal and verifiable ban on chemical weapons. The urgency with which we must strive for this objective has been underlined all too graphically by events in the Gulf: the use of chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq conflict and their alleged use against Kurdish civilians. This has raised the spectre, unfamiliar since the First World War, of chemical weapons as part of the arsenal of countries at war. There can be no country which does not now recognize the choice before each one of us. Either we run the risk of proliferation in which chemical weapons spread from neighbour to neighbour, or we conclude a treaty which will remove these terrible weapons from our world for ever. The negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament offer a path to national security through a total ban. That is the direction which the British Government has chosen, and I hope it is one to which every country will subscribe.

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

We want a convention as soon as practicable, but it must be a good and durable convention, one in which we can have confidence. And progress has been made, but difficult and complex problems remain to be resolved.

The key problem is how to complete a reliable system of verification. This is the heart of the matter. We do not yet have a proper grip on verification of dual-purpose chemical compounds produced for genuine civil uses but with potential for chemical weapons; nor have we adequately covered undeclared facilities. And the chemical-weapon agents so far listed are for the main part those developed during the First and Second World Wars and in the 1950s. We must be sure we are keeping pace with technological advances.

The question of conduct of on-site inspections also remains to be tackled in a good deal greater depth than has been done so far. Inspections have to be as intrusive as necessary in order to fulfil their purpose. On the other hand, we must recognise legitimate concerns about secrecy. How can these criteria be reconciled? Is there anything more we can do that has not yet been done to bring us to the point where we can provide practical answers to the remaining problems? I think there is. It is my belief, and that of my authorities, that the negotiations have reached the point where our concepts need to be put to the test, as realistically as possible, to see how far they work and to attempt to identify improvements. We need to move from theory to experimentation.

My own authorities have for some time been considering the possibilities of practice inspections. We are delighted that at the summer session of the Conference on Disarmament member States agreed to co-operate in organizing a series of practice routine inspections of the civil industry, first on a national and later on an international basis. We see those inspections as being essentially tools for learning, for putting the assumptions of our inspection verification

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provisions to the test, for seeing how far they work and especially how they can be improved. Britain intends to join fully in this useful endeavour.

Britain also sees a real need for Governments to test the implementation of the concept of inspection on challenge. National trials for challenge inspection could help to provide answers to a number of questions raised by this concept. Can a challenge inspection provide evidence of compliance? How intrusive does the inspection need to be? What ways and means can be employed to preserve the confidentiality of legitimate military and commercial activities? We talk a lot around these questions, often without having a clear idea of how the theory will work in practice. The best way of finding out is to put it to the test.

I should like to inform you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the Committee that, for the reasons I have given, Britain intends to hold national practice inspections not only in civil chemical facilities but also on a challenge basis in military installations. We hope that other countries will also hold national challenge inspection tests of military facilities. We would be very ready to exchange experiences with them, and we intend, of course, to report to the Conference on Disarmament on the lessons we draw from our trials.

One of the principal obstacles in the negotiations is secrecy, unwillingness to acknowledge possession of chemical weapons or to go beyond limited disclosure. We must know the facts, the accurate facts, about the weapons we are trying to eliminate.

Maximum openness is what we in Britain have deliberately adopted. We abandoned our offensive-chemical-weapons capability in the late 1950s. The international community witnessed the destruction of our disused pilot nerve-agent plant. We have provided detailed data about our former chemical-weapons stocks and production of chemical agents and about the current production of dual-purpose

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chemical products by our civil industry for legitimate peaceful purposes. In 1986 we invited a delegation of Soviet experts to visit our Chemical Defence Establishment at Porton Down; the visit took place in May this year. We showed our visitors unprecedented openness. They were able to go anywhere they chose. A British team paid a return visit to the Shikhany military chemical facility in the Soviet Union in July. Unfortunately, I have to say that our return visit to Shikhany showed a difference in attitudes towards the degree of secrecy appropriate in this area. More frankness is required. Many questions and concerns remain. Nevertheless, this exchange of visits has, I believe, been an extremely significant experiment.

The best way of putting an end once and for all to the use of chemical weapons lies in the conclusion of a comprehensive, global and verifiable ban. But meanwhile we should not just sit back and wring our hands. We must make every effort under international agreements that already exist to stop this terrible form of cruelty. The British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, proposed at the third special session three steps to uphold the 1925 Geneva Protocol, which bans the use of chemical weapons. His proposals were: first, all States that have not yet acceded to the Geneva Protocol should immediately do so; secondly, procedures should be established without delay for investigating automatically allegations of the use of chemical weapons; and, thirdly, wherever the use of chemical weapons is clearly established, the international community must take effective and speedy action to cut off the supply of key precursors.

These points are included in Security Council resolution 620 (1988), which Britain welcomes. But the recent tragic events in the Gulf highlight the urgent need for further action on these three fronts. We therefore welcome and support the timely initiative of President Reagan and President Mitterrand in calling for a

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conference to reaffirm States' commitment to the authority of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

We should not always listen to the pessimists. This year is the anniversary of ~~one~~ of the major successes of multilateral negotiation: it is the twentieth anniversary of ~~the Treaty on the~~ Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The Treaty has played a vital role in the history of recent decades in helping to contain the spread of nuclear weapons while at the same time ~~encouraging~~ the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It will be just as essential in the decades to ~~come~~.

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

Preparations for the next Review Conference on the Treaty, in 1990, begin at this session of the General Assembly. The Conference will provide a further opportunity to reaffirm the cardinal importance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty for international peace and security. The British Government calls on all States which have not yet acceded to the Treaty to do so and thus signal their support for its important objectives.

Preparation for the 1990 Review Conference will take place against the background of considerable progress by the United States and the Soviet Union in limiting their nuclear arsenals, and, as part of that process, in holding negotiations on nuclear testing. The British Government strongly supports the pragmatic stage-by-stage approach adopted by those two Governments, which is proving its worth by results.

In stark contrast is the proposal made to amend the partial test-ban Treaty in order to turn it into a comprehensive test ban. This seems to us a less than realistic response to a highly complex problem. I must make it clear that the British Government cannot support that proposal.

It might be helpful if I reminded representatives of the long-standing policy of the British Government on the limitation of nuclear-weapon tests. The most recent restatement of it was by the then Minister of State, Mr. Mallor, in the House of Commons in June. He said:

"For the foreseeable future the United Kingdom's security will depend on deterrence based, in part, on the possession of nuclear weapons. That will mean a continuing requirement to conduct underground nuclear tests to ensure that our nuclear weapons remain effective and up to date.

"We hope that the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty and the threshold test-ban Treaty will be ratified soon. Further steps to limit tests will then

(Miss Soleeby, United Kingdom)

have to be considered. But serious technical problems of verification remain. As thresholds are reduced, verification becomes more important but also more difficult.

"A comprehensive test ban remains a long-term goal. Progress will be made only by a step-by-step approach. This must take account of technical advances on verification as well as progress elsewhere in arms control, and the attitude of other States."

In addition to the welcome progress being made on a bilateral basis by Washington and Moscow we can also look forward to the possibility that the Conference on Disarmament will be able to agree to a mandate acceptable to all member Governments for an ad hoc committee on a nuclear test ban. Like other Western countries, we have consistently worked for such a mandate. This committee could complement the useful work already being done by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts.

The key to peace through arms control is realism. All-or-nothing approaches which attempt to brush aside very real problems do not help. The first step in wisdom is to face reality as it is; only then are we able to improve it.

That is a lesson of 1988. The tide has begun to turn towards peace and security at lower levels of armament. New opportunities have been opened up, even if formidable problems remain. The challenge before the First Committee and before all our Governments is to maintain this forward movement into 1989.

Mr. HORN (Hungary) (interpretation from Russian): The profound changes which have taken place in international relations over the past two or three years have produced the first tangible results. A growing number of countries have come to realise - and to act accordingly in their foreign policy practices - that in our world the prosperity and security of nations can be guaranteed only by

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recognising the mutual dependence, or interdependence, of States and conducting their activities accordingly. The role of the United Nations in strengthening international security is increasing as the recognition of such interdependence grows.

The world Organisation provides a unique framework for the establishment of mutual security in promoting disarmament and the peaceful settlement of local conflicts and in devising appropriate systems of verification. Further political and organizational renewal in the United Nations would be greatly enhanced if its forums were able to create the conditions needed to prevent the emergence of international conflicts. Such tasks could include, among other things, predicting political or issues entailing international consequences, calling the attention of the international community to sources of danger, and co-ordinating preventive measures as required.

In the past the work of the United Nations has attracted considerable criticism. However, it is true that the pattern of relations between Member States, and the great Powers in particular, has a direct effect on the activities of the United Nations and considerable influence on its effectiveness. The events of the past year have given convincing proof of the viability of the institutional system of multilateral diplomacy. Intensification of work in multilateral forums has reflected the improvement in the international situation, while contributing to the strengthening of favourable trends. co-operation among the great Powers and growing activity by local forces working for reconciliation have had valuable results in efforts to eliminate regional hotbeds of crisis.

Similarly, successful work in international disarmament forums is likely to be greatly enhanced by constructive relations between the great Powers and progress in bilateral disarmament talks. It is to be hoped that radical cuts in strategic

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of offensive weapons will also follow the conclusion and implementation of the Treaty on the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles - INF Treaty - which has substantially reduced the feeling of direct threat and which may be said to have set a precedent. My Government remains convinced that the political and technical obstacles to the new Treaty can be removed if political resolve is maintained and readiness for compromise increased. Efforts in this direction would make a particularly substantial contribution to the gradual elimination of the threat posed by nuclear weapons.

We believe that the third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which reaffirmed the need for a multilateral approach to disarmament issues, was an outstanding event of multilateral disarmament diplomacy. The most important aspect of its deliberations, in our view, was that they provided an opportunity for comparing the disarmament concepts of Member States and identifying differences in priorities.

The Hungarian People's Republic supports the proposal for the preparation of a study on the role the United Nations might play in the verification of compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements. Moreover, we deem it necessary to examine, inter alia, the possible role of the World Organisation in keeping a register and compiling a catalogue of national military programmes and development trends that are likely to influence the implementation of agreements, together with ensuring the necessary transparency.

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To devise such a system, it would be practicable to draw up, as soon as possible, a list of the required military data and to work out the categories and elements of identification programmes. In so doing, the United Nations could act as a catalyst for increasing military openness, thus strengthening mutual confidence.

During the special session a number of innovative proposals were introduced which should be addressed by disarmament forums without delay. The concepts of increasing the effectiveness of disarmament machinery should also be considered. One such proposal is to devote more time and attention to substantive work in the First Committee. It is also important to extend the Secretary-General's authority to investigate reports of the alleged use of chemical and biological weapons. Noteworthy also is the proposal calling for the multilateral forums to be kept informed of the status of bilateral disarmament talks. It would also be desirable for non-metier States to be more actively involved in the work of the Conference on Disarmament. But all this requires member States to demonstrate the necessary political will.

The road to averting the danger of nuclear war and preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons passes through the cessation and complete prohibition of nuclear tests. We welcome the joint efforts of the Soviet Union and the United States in this area. We believe that it is possible to find a satisfactory solution for this question on a multilateral basis and through the adoption of a step-by-step approach. The series of recent experiments in bilateral verification is a good illustration of the fact that there are still great reserves yet to be tapped in the field of co-operation. It is becoming more and more urgent for the participants in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament to ponder calmly whether it is inevitable that this multilateral forum should be doomed to years of

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inaction and be unable to start substantive work on an agreement. Urgent consideration should be given to what steps could be taken by the Conference on Disarmament in this field.

As a result of joint work over the past years it has been possible to consider thoroughly the problems of preventing an arms race in outer space. In the current situation the main task is to produce practical measures without delay. Progress could be facilitated by the a top-by-step approach in this respect as well. We deem it practicable for the Geneva Conference on Disarmament to consider the possibility of devising a mechanism for international verification in outer space. This is all the more necessary since the range of countries directly involved in space research and the utilization of outer space is widening,

We believe that prohibition of radiological weapons and the closely related efforts to prohibit attacks on nuclear facilities are indispensable for nuclear security. Unfortunately, the talks on these issues have made little progress despite urgent appeals repeated every year, while there is a growing awareness of the pressing need for a solution.

The past year has seen intensification of work on the elaboration of a convention prohibiting chemical weapons. Concrete preparations have been made to conduct trial inspections within a national framework as a first stage. Hungary supports any move likely to bring us closer to a convention on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons. We are considering ways and means of participating in the trial inspections. At the same time, we would welcome the possibility of trial inspection being conducted within the framework of multilateral co-operation from the very outset. However, the failure to bring a convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons to its final stage of elaboration gives us cause for dissatisfaction with the work of the Conference on Disarmament in this area.

(Mr. Horn, Hungary)

There is a growing world-wide recognition that the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments at both global and regional levels are equal in importance to, and organically interrelated with, nuclear disarmament. This process can play a decisive role in ensuring that while guaranteeing the security of States there will be a shift of emphasis from military factors to elements of the political and economic as well as of human rights. Such a change would also have a decisive impact on the creation of an atmosphere of mutual confidence.

Maintaining the momentum of nuclear disarmament likewise requires favourable processes to be set in motion as early as possible in the field of conventional disarmament. It is a welcome fact that organs of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) are increasingly aware that the continuing build-up of armed forces and armaments, while imposing enormous economic burdens, impedes political efforts to ease international tension. Radical diminution of the basis of military confrontation and stabilisation of the balance of forces at a lower level have therefore become an imperative of the day.

A substantive dialogue between WTO and NATO is the key to strengthening European and international security and ending the division of Europe. An active contribution to the intensification of the dialogue between the two alliances can be made by such events as the Budapest round-table conference on questions concerning the reduction of conventional armaments, where experts, high-ranking military officers and diplomats from five countries of NATO and WTO all exchanged views in order to become better acquainted with each other's positions.

As a result of the consultations held by the Group of 23 parallel to the Vienna follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe,

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the mandate for the talks on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe has almost been concluded. My Government is urging an early start to concrete talks following the conclusion of the Vienna meeting. Those talks should produce, in the foreseeable future, a notable improvement in European security. This is of fundamental importance in averting the danger of war and producing a general reduction of military tension as well. The talks should lead to a situation of stable security of which the main feature would be a balance of opposing forces based on an inability on both sides to launch an attack. The Hungarian People's Republic has a profound interest in seeing concrete steps towards a radical reduction of armed forces and armaments taken as early as possible as part of European disarmament.

A reduction of conventional armed forces and armaments cannot be achieved without an effective system of verification. The creation of a comprehensive mechanism for verification by States directly affected by reductions should be the paramount consideration in designing such a system. Efforts aimed at an unnecessary enlargement of such a system would be unproductive and they would delay indefinitely the establishment of an effective system.

(Mr. Hor n, Hungary)

The **system of confidence- and security-building measures** is becoming an independent and increasingly important area of arms limitation. The favourable experience in the implementation of the Stockholm Agreement shows that its provisions are applicable not only in Europe, but, when appropriately adapted, also in other regions of the world. The extension of the process of strengthening confidence and security to other regions would have a favourable influence on the success of European disarmament efforts as well.

The multilateral dialogue among States on all aspects of international relations is growing in intensity under a more favourable set of international conditions. The concept of the socialist countries concerning the creation of comprehensive international peace and security calls for a complex approach to security, under which economic, political, cultural and humanitarian co-operation and ensuring human rights are regarded as being as important as disarmament in the system of international relations and the effort to ensure the survival of mankind.

The Hungarian People's Republic expects a fruitful and frank exchange of views in the world Organisation about the comprehensive concept of international security. In initiating the consideration of that concept the socialist countries were guided by the sincere desire to close the gap existing in many aspects between the purposes and principles of the Charter and the realities of our time. The debate about specific aspects of comprehensive security will be successful if multilateral accords are reached, new form of international political and economic co-operation emerge and meaningful relations between various organs of integration are established.

It is likewise necessary to eliminate the source of tension still characterizing the human rights and humanitarian fields. The role of the United Nations in dealing with the latter question could be strengthened if, among other things, the world Organization also acted as a kind of monitoring institution for

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the implementation of human rights. In the current situation we should all work to see to it that the United Nations and its organs become active participants in multilateral co-operation. By devising mechanisms for the effective co-ordination of interests we would contribute to the attainment of the objectives set forth in the Charter of the world Organisation and to the building of a more secure world.

Hr. FAN Guoxiang (China) (interpretation from Chinese) : The Chinese Delegation is very pleased to see you in the Chair of the First Committee for the current session, sir. You have worked in the disarmament field for years, becoming well-known for your rich experience and outstanding competence. I have great confidence in your skilful guidance, which will help further boost the momentum achieved in the work of the Committee over recent years, better reflect here the ardent aspirations of the international community on a great number of major disarmament issues and lend impetus to the continued progress in multilateral disarmament efforts.

In broad outline, we can describe the situation in the field of disarmament in the past 12 months as follows: gratifying initial progress has been made, but persistent efforts are still required for continued progress.

The past year has witnessed an increasingly clear trend towards relaxation in the international scene. The once tense relations between East and West are showing signs of easing, and regional hot-spots are somewhat cooling down. Dialogue taking the place of confrontation has become an important feature of the current international situation.

It was against that backdrop that the Soviet Union and the United States signed, on 8 December last year, the Treaty on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles - the INF Treaty - and started destroying those missiles last August. They are also continuing their negotiations

(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)

on reducing by 50 per cent their strategic nuclear forces and on the question of outer space.

We welcome negotiations between the two major nuclear Powers, which are conducive to easing international tension, and regard their INF Treaty positively.

It should be, pointed out, however, that the improvement in the international situation is the result of the common efforts of all the countries of the world. There are profound underlying causes of the progress achieved so far in the field of disarmament. Power politics - the act of bullying the weaker and smaller countries with sheer force - has suffered repeated setbacks. Neither the third-world countries nor the developed countries want to go through the holocaust of another world war. Even the super-Powers have admitted that they cannot win a nuclear war. The world is moving from being bipolar to multipolar. All these factors which favour peace and deter war will certainly exert a restraining influence on the arms race between the two super-Powers.

In the mean time, we should be sober-minded about the fact that the achievements in disarmament are only initial and limited. Even after eliminating all their intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, the Soviet Union and the United States still possess the over-kill capacity to destroy the world many times over, and their huge nuclear arsenals remain a menace to world peace. There is not enough evidence to suggest that the two major nuclear Powers' basic policy of vying for military superiority has changed. Not only is their arms race still going on, but there has also emerged the trend of both sides trying hard to improve the quality and functioning of their nuclear weapons, competing in developing high-tech weaponry and extending their arms race into outer space.

It is the hope of the people of the world that in the interest of continued relaxation in the international situation, the two major nuclear powers, which bear a special responsibility for disarmament, will go along with the trend of the times

(Mr. Fan Quoxiang; China)

and continue their efforts to reach agreement at an early date on a drastic reduction of nuclear weapons, starting with a 50 per cent out in their strategic nuclear weapons.

China has always maintained that the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament is the complete prohibition and total destruction of all nuclear weapons. To this end, the major nuclear Powers which possess the largest and most sophisticated nuclear arsenals should be asked to take the lead in stopping the testing, production and deployment of all types of nuclear weapons, and drastically to reduce and destroy the various types of nuclear weapons deployed anywhere inside or outside their respective countries. In other words, the United States and the Soviet Union should not only substantially cut the numbers of their nuclear weapons, but also halt the qualitative escalation in their nuclear arms race by stopping the production of new types of nuclear weapons. After that is accomplished a widely representative international conference on nuclear disarmament, with the participation of all nuclear States, may be held to discuss the steps and measures for the complete destruction of nuclear weapons.

As a country dedicated to its own modernization drive, China is opposed to the arms race and has never taken part in it. China possesses a small number of nuclear weapons solely for the purpose of self-defence.

(Mr. : 'Fan Guoxiang , China)

China will not enter into alliance with any nuclear Powers, nor will it practice nuclear proliferation. China has undertaken not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States and regions, and has stated on many occasions that it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons at any time, under any circumstances. The Chinese Government long ago signed and ratified Protocol 2 Of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and signed on 10 February 1987, and ratified over one month ago, protocols 2 and 3 of the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty .

While striving to achieve the goal of nuclear disarmament, one should not overlook the important significance of and pressing need for conventional disarmament. Mankind has suffered great loss of life and property from conventional wars. There is a growing awareness of the close interrelationship between nuclear and conventional disarmament. At the last session the General Assembly adopted by consensus resolution 42/38 G on the question of conventional disarmament, which for the first time in history gave expression to the common perspective of the international community in this respect.

The past year saw continued consultations among the European countries on the new mandate for negotiations on European conventional disarmament. We welcome this development and hope that it will soon lead to dynamic negotiations. Europe has the world's highest concentration of arms and military forces. It is a region where the two military alliances are in direct confrontation. An outbreak of conventional war in Europe would not only inflict appalling disasters on the people of various European countries but would also threaten to escalate into nuclear war. Therefore, it is highly proper that efforts for conventional disarmament should first be made in Europe by the two military blocs, and particularly by the countries possessing the largest arsenals. At the same time, we also believe that all the countries of the world should step up their efforts and take appropriate

(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)

action, individually and in a regional context, to promote conventional disarmament and strengthen peace and security. All the conventional forces of all countries should be used only for the purpose of self-defence and not for armed aggression and intervention against other countries.

Recently there have been talks exaggerating and inflating the rate of growth in the military expenditures and arms build-up of the developing countries, as though they bear chief responsibility for the arms race. This is obviously unfair, as it is not in keeping with the facts. China has always believed that the third-world countries should devote their limited resources to social and economic development and resolve their disputes with other countries through peaceful means instead of force. But very often they are not in a position to make a free choice, as their security is still threatened by armed aggression from outside. In fact, in terms of both military expenditure and armaments, by any measure the developing countries cannot compare with the two super-Powers or the two military blocs.

The prevention of an arms race in outer space has already become an important question of universal concern. It is also a new priority item in the disarmament field. The development of space weapons will lead to a 'qualitative escalation of the arms race, and poses a new threat to international peace and stability. Therefore, the international community has strongly demanded forceful measures to prevent an arms race in outer space.

There have been some international legal instruments on outer-space arms control. They have some degree of effectiveness in checking the deployment of certain types of weapons in outer space and, their further consolidation is necessary. However, due to historical limitations of the time, these instruments have not been able to ban all outer-space weapons.

We are of the view that the two major space Powers bear an unshirkable special responsibility for the prevention of an arms race in outer space. They

(Mr. Fan Guoxianq, China)

should commit themselves to the cessation of the development, testing and production of outer-space weapons, as well as to their non-deployment and on that basis conduct negotiations aimed at concluding an international agreement on a complete ban on outer-space weapons.

China is in favour of the early conclusion of an international convention on the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of chemical weapons so as to eliminate all existing chemical weapons and ensure that no such weapons will be produced. This convention should include necessary and effective verification measures. In the meantime, it should help enhance international co-operation in civilian chemical industries, instead of compromising the interests of those industries in various countries.

It is our view that the following points need to be highlighted at present:

First, the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva should step up its work so that the drafting of the Convention can be completed as soon as possible. The Chinese delegation will continue its active involvement and make its own contributions.

Secondly, the use of chemical weapons is a serious crime against human conscience and should be stopped resolutely. The Geneva Protocol of 1925 must be strictly complied with. Every country which possesses chemical weapons should pledge not to use them.

Thirdly, all countries that have the capability to produce chemical weapons should stop the testing, production, transfer and deployment of these weapons.

The third special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, held not long ago, was an important session convened in a new international situation. Most countries attended the session with a positive and realistic approach and worked hard to make it a success. However, the session failed to adopt a final document by consensus because of the rigid position held by one or two countries.

(Mr. ban Guoxiang, China)

Nevertheless, we do not regard the session as a defeat. After all, it demonstrated that the entire international community shares an aspiration to maintain peace, oppose the arms race and strive for disarmament. The strong moral strength generated by this common aspiration serves as a powerful restraining force on the arms race. During the session many countries put forward suggestions and proposals that deserve our close attention. They will prove useful in advancing the disarmament process in the future. It is highly relevant to mention here that all sides again reaffirmed the proposition that the two super-Powers possessing the largest arsenals bear a special responsibility for disarmament and should take the lead in drastically reducing their armaments. This is the only feasible way to achieve disarmament.

It is the popular demand of the international community that multilateral disarmament efforts continue to be strengthened. As disarmament has a bearing on world peace and the security of all nations, every country big or small is entitled to have a say in the matter, and should and can play a role on an equal footing. As a matter of fact, nothing we have achieved in the disarmament field can be separated from the common effort of all the countries of the world. It is our view that multilateral disarmament efforts can be made at both the global and the regional levels, although the elements they cover can vary. The conclusion of legally binding international conventions through multilateral negotiations is undoubtedly very important. But multilateralism is not limited to this aspect alone. It should include discussions and deliberations of political significance and moral strength at the United Nations and other multilateral forums. It should also be linked to efforts in which countries air their views, make their suggestions and exert their influence through various channels with respect to bilateral and regional disarmament negotiations. In this way, rational,

(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)

mutually complementary relationship between multilateral, regional and, bilateral efforts, and between legal, political and moral commitments, will take shape, thus giving a strong impetus to the cause of disarmament.

(Mr. Fan Guoxiang, China)

In a positive and realistic spirit, the Chinese delegation will again present to the First Committee three draft resolutions concerning nuclear disarmament, conventional disarmament and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We are also ready to study carefully the suggestions and proposals put forward by other delegations. It is our hope that, with the efforts of all delegations, the First Committee at the current session will make new progress on the road towards the further strengthening of multilateral disarmament efforts.

Mr. ZACHMANN (German Democratic Republic): Mr. Chairman, taking into account your appeal to follow rule 110 of the rules of procedure, I will merely say that we are delighted to see you presiding over our proceedings. In our effective and constructive co-operation during my chairmanship of the First Committee, in 1986, I came to appreciate your valuable experience and your dedication. I am also glad to recall our substantive and constructive consultations this summer in my country in preparation for the forty-third session of the General Assembly. My delegation assures you and the officers of the Committee of its full support in the complex work that lies ahead of us.

We are all aware that important steps have been taken during the past few months to bring mankind closer to achieving the aim of banning the threat or use of force, once and for all from inter-State relations.

A turn for the better is taking place in international relations. The Treaty on the Elimination of the Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles and progress in Soviet-American negotiations have their share in this process, as do emerging political solutions to a number of regional conflicts, and growing international co-operation in many fields. The German Democratic Republic makes its own contribution through an active policy of dialogue and understanding and through concrete initiatives on arm limitation, disarmament and confidence-building. Comprehensive security through international co-operation on

(Mr. Zachmann, German
Democratic Republic)

the basis of the United Nations Charter, and a turning away from confrontation and towards co-operation are what we seek to achieve.

The joint communiqué on the recent visit to the Soviet Union by Erich Honecker, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and Chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic says, in this context:

"In international affairs the USSR and the German Democratic Republic, along with their Warsaw Treaty organisation allies, are true to the idea of a world without nuclear weapons, wars and violence. They are promoting by practical measures the achievement of that goal. ... They are open to all proposals to eliminate the threat of the annihilation of mankind. They are prepared to co-operate fruitfully in this noble cause with all interested countries and socio-political forces on our planet."

The most important milestone so far on this road has been the exchange between the USSR and the United States of America of the instrument of ratification of the Treaty on the elimination of their intermediate- and shorter-range missiles, thus making a start on nuclear disarmament by eliminating an entire class of nuclear missiles. Proof has been furnished that, in spite of continuing serious differences of interests and views, the road towards nuclear disarmament can be embarked upon.

Implementation of the verification provisions of the Treaty, unprecedented as they are - like the destruction of the missiles - should generate a considerable increase in confidence, security and co-operation, and thus help to achieve a breakthrough as regards more far-reaching disarmament measures. The German Democratic Republic, as a country directly affected, not only promoted the conclusion of the Treaty, but immediately took all the legislative steps required

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for implementation of the Treaty on its territory, and supported the early withdrawal of the Soviet shorter-range missiles concerned. In accordance with the legal obligations that it assumed, the German Democratic Republic created all the conditions necessary for the United States inspectors to convince themselves, on the spot, of the correct implementation of the Treaty's provisions.

Jointly with the other Warsaw Treaty States, the German Democratic Republic has further developed a programme of peace and disarmament. This programme deals with both European and international security, and takes account of General Assembly resolutions and of initiatives put forward by non-aligned and Western countries. It is our aim to continue the disarmament process with determination, not to allow any hiatus to occur, and to keep strengthening confidence and security.

We believe the following to be the priority tasks. The first is the conclusion of an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States on halving their offensive strategic weapons, while adhering strictly to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. This should be followed by new measures of nuclear disarmament, involving all nuclear-weapon States and leading up to the elimination of all nuclear weapons. This could be achieved by way of bilateral and multilateral negotiations and agreements.

The second priority task is the conclusion of a complete and general ban on nuclear-weapon tests. Negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States, as well as the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, should contribute to achieving this aim. The proposal put forward by a group of non-aligned States, to transform the Moscow Treaty of 1963 into a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty and hold an international conference on that subject is rightly considered a far-reaching initiative, and we support it.

(Mr. Zachmann, German
Democratic Republic)

The third priority task is the speedy completion of the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We believe that the First Committee could make a specific contribution towards speeding up the conclusion of the convention. My delegation is ready to play an active part in this process, just as it endeavours, at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, to contribute its share to the completion of work on the text of the convention by submitting relevant detailed working papers and promoting the exchange of data. We support all means and methods that will lead to the completion of the convention without delay.

(Mr. Zachmann, German Democratic Republic)

The *fourth* priority task is the prevention of an arms race in outer space, Coupled with **concrete** progress in negotiations on the prohibition of anti-satellite weapons, the **establishment** of an inspectorate to observe all space launches and the **creation** of an outer space organization.

The *fifth* priority task is the **radical** reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in **Europe** with the aim of starting negotiations this year. We consider that in parallel with this the further development of **confidence- and security-building measures** is a major task.

All **those** steps would lead to **a** cut in military spending. The **means** released through **disarmament** measures should be used for **economic** and social development, notably *that* of developing countries. The action programme adopted in 1987 at the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development points the way.

At the third **special session** of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament we noted with satisfaction that positions **are** drawing closer together as regards both the **priority** tasks I have just outlined and the conceptual approach of States to the issue of international security.

The central theme of the debates, which were held in a frank, businesslike and constructive spirit, was the growing **awareness** that the time has come to break the cycle of mistrust, the accumulation of arms and the aggravation of military **confrontation** and to seek comprehensive and equal security *for* all. This encourages us to **pursue** with still greater determination our initiative concerning **a comprehensive** system of international **peace** and security. At the same time we regret that in spite of **generally favourable conditions** no final document could be **adopted** at the **special session**. The *reasons are* well known. However, we look upon the **following elements** as crucial for a realistic evaluation of the session.

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Multilateral discussions on security and disarmament held at the session were marked by a new quality. This was the result of both the diversity and the specific nature of the proposals submitted and of the wide measure of high-level and top-level participation.

The overwhelming majority of representative of States Members reaffirmed the priorities set out in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. At the same time a number of new fields for multilateral disarmament activities began to emerge. These included the impact of new technologies on the arms race, multilateral verification, limitation of the naval arms race and matters of global conventional disarmament, among them restriction of the arms trade, termination of foreign military presence and removal of military bases from foreign territory.

The prevailing endeavour was to develop, for the continued pursuit of the disarmament process at all levels, a common platform that would be in line with the new conditions. As for the tasks at hand, there was a large measure of agreement. There was an emphatic call for enhancement of the role of multilateral forums within the framework of the United Nations and the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

It was obvious from the commitment taken by representatives of non-governmental organizations and from the numerous activities undertaken by public organizations during the session that disarmament is no longer a matter for politicians, diplomats and experts only.

The special session also reflected the continuing complexity of the situation in the sphere of disarmament. The arms race is continuing, notably in qualitative terms. An attempt is being made to prevent further reductions in nuclear weapons in the European North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) area, in particular in tactical nuclear weapons. There are plans to modernize nuclear weapons and to

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create new kinds of weapons systems based on the application of high technologies in the non-nuclear field. Continued adherence to the doctrine of nuclear deterrence impedes progress on the road to disarmament. The endeavour to expand chemical weapons stocks - that is, the commencement of the production of binary weapons - delays efforts to achieve a global prohibition of chemical weapons. The manufacture of more and more new nuclear warheads is a major obstacle to a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

In view of all this, the adoption of measures to put an end to the qualitative arms race is a matter of the greatest urgency. Of great relevance in this context are the initiatives undertaken by the foreign ministers of the non-aligned countries, at their meeting in Nicosia, with a view to preventing the misuse for military purposes of new technological achievements.

Applying the principle that everything must be done to ensure that never again will a war start from German soil, but that peace alone will emanate from it, it is a special concern of the German Democratic Republic to help free the European continent from weapons of mass destruction, reduce armed forces and conventional armaments and enhance confidence and security. In this way we want to contribute our share to the strengthening of international peace and security and point to ways of safeguarding peace in a co-operative political effort.

This was also reflected at the International Meeting for Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones held in the capital of the German Democratic Republic from 20 to 22 June 1988. It was attended by 1,034 personalities from 113 countries, representing Governments, parliaments and non-governmental organisations. The Berlin meeting demonstrated, as did the concurrent third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, that the peoples are increasingly aware of the risks involved in the continuing arms drive. At that meeting, too, many ideas

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on ways of averting the risk of a nuclear holocaust were put forward. In what was a wide-ranging, frank and businesslike dialogue, in which all participated on a footing of equality, experiences came together from all continents, from countries already in nuclear-weapon-free zones and from others pursuing that goal,

My delegation will make the documents of the Berlin meeting available to the General Assembly during the current session.

The joint proposal of the German Democratic Republic and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to establish a nuclear-weapon-free corridor in central Europe, is designed to raise the nuclear threshold by moving the nuclear weapons farther apart, to lessen the danger of nuclear escalation through human or technical error and to help clear the way for a third zero evolution - that is, the one covering tactical nuclear weapons.

Concerning the proposed establishment of a zone free from chemical weapons in central Europe, this move, too, would have far-reaching world-wide implications. It would provide experience on how to achieve a convention on the global prohibition of chemical weapons. Parts of such a convention already agreed at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament could, under this initiative, be subjected to what could be seen as a regional trial run. We reaffirm our readiness to enter into negotiations on this subject without delay.

The course of the general debate at the current session of the General Assembly made it clear that efforts for greater security and stability and for more disarmament are being stepped up practically everywhere in the world. We wholeheartedly support the early implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and the holding in Colombo in 1990 of the conference envisaged for that purpose. We welcome the efforts being made to create a zone of peace and co-operation in the South Atlantic, a project that was reaffirmed at a

(Mr. Zachmann, German Democratic Republic)

meeting of its littoral States in Rio de Janeiro last July. The entire Southern Hemisphere should be made into a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

We give our backing also to the most recent far-reaching initiative under taken by the USSR in order to enhance security in the Asian-Pacific region. It appears that the time has come to give greater attention to the cessation of the arms race at sea. Many constructive proposals on this subject are on the table. Seas of peace in which military activities and armaments would be limited by agreement could form integral parts of peace-zone concepts.

Thus far, some general remarks. As the debate progresses my delegation will speak again on a number of specific items on our agenda.

In conclusion, permit me to give my assurance that also during this forty-third session of the General Assembly the initiatives of the German Democratic Republic will be designed to advance the process of disarmament and to make irreversible the turn for the better initiated in international relations. In pursuit of this objective, we will be working for the adoption by consensus of the largest possible number of decisions.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): The central task of the United Nations is • to maintain international peace and security”.

None of us have much difficulty in defining peace. Certainly when peace is absent we are acutely aware of it and of how precious it is.

But the same cannot be said of the concept of security. Indeed, we have often argued about security - what it is, how it is threatened or what actions must be taken in order to see that it is maintained.

Although arguments about security have a long and confused history, one thing is clear: much past argument about security has been couched in narrow, largely military terms.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Traditionally we have focused on the security of the State, defined largely territorially and measured in terms of the sum of armed force available to the State for its perceived defence needs.

This narrow approach - the approach that has given us the contemporary arms race - needs to be put behind us.

Ironically a major reason for this fact is that the weapon systems that have formed the currency of the arms race have themselves become so devastating that they can no longer provide security. They cannot be used, because if they were no one would survive.

But there is another deeper and more complex reason why a purely military approach to security has no place in our efforts to ensure common security,

The fact is that all people and all States in today's world face a range of non-military threats to security which, while they are large in terms of any order of magnitude, are distinguished not by their size or quantity but by their nature and quality.

Their inner nature is that they render national borders to the insignificance of mere lines on a map, lines that are completely distant from the flesh and blood reality of the problems of survival and security faced by all people, irrespective of which State or tribe, or political, social or religious philosophy they adhere to.

This wider concept of security was recognized in the United Nations 1981 study on disarmament and development, from which I quote:

"Security is a wider concept than that of military security alone.

Economic as well as social aspects of this problem are of great importance.

With this broader approach it becomes clear that the threat to security may be aggravated in many ways. Moreover, the spectrum of factors which may aggravate the threat to security and their relative urgency is not static but

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

subject to continual evolutionary change. This being the case, the central political function at both the national and international levels is to continually assess whether the available human and material resources are being disposed in a rational manner given the known and foreseeable threats and challenges to security." (A/36/356; Annex, para. 43)

Let me exemplify these facts by reference to six main areas of current vital human and global concern. Each of these areas represents daunting challenges to the maintenance of security.

Taken together they are awesome.

First, the problem of underdevelopment and of the declining possibilities for development faced by the overwhelming majority of human beings. No one's security will be immune or safe from the problems of food supply, the still unsolved problem of fertility control and the utterly fundamental problem of jobs and employment - the only means through which families can even begin to aspire to a decent standard of living.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

The second area is the increasing degradation of the global environment. The United Nations took up the issue of the environment almost two decades ago. So the subject is on our agenda, but degradation of the global environment continues and has developed further with the emergence of major problems, such as the warming of the earth and the depletion of the ozone layer. In the face of these facts, past notions of security are inadequate.

Thirdly, human health is facing larger challenges today than ever before, and not least through the hideous and growing incidence of the AIDS virus. Will conventional notions of security provide the answer to AIDS?

Fourthly, there is the enormous problem of the circulation in the world of narcotic drugs. The nice phrase that has been designed to describe this problem is "drug abuse". That phrase may have some meaning on a personal level, but on the level of our concern - the maintenance of international peace and security - surely what is at issue in the international narcotics trade is the grave threat that it poses to security, whether defined in social, political or economic terms. It is wholesale "people abuse". And it is more than merely coincidental that wherever the drug trade flourishes it is shored up by a thriving gun-running industry.

Fifthly, while the United Nations through its Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is committed to the defence of human rights, the world community remains deeply troubled by racism, apartheid, ethnic and religious intolerance, and sexism. For individuals threatened by such dreadful prejudices, or who have no basic human rights, security can be meaningfully defined only in terms of human rights rather than in terms of the conventional notion of the security of the State. And it has to be noted that in too many cases it is the State itself which is the instrument for the violation of human rights.

(Mr. Butler, Aumtr alia)

Sixthly, the international arms trade, both overt and covert, to which so many vitally needed material resources are devoted - and very often by those whose developmental needs are the largest - has grown to a point far beyond legitimate defence requirements. Excessive international trade in arms makes the peaceful settlement of disputes far more difficult than would otherwise be the case.

I have sketched, briefly, some of the non-military threats to security which are faced by all of us. I have done this in the context of our debate on disarmament because the fact that our world is characterized by much threats to security has a direct bearing on what we should and must do in disarmament, through the First Committee, in the United Nations.

Simply, if we do not proceed to disarm under effective international control, our ability to address the wider and potentially terminal problems we face will be seriously threatened. We shall fail because we would have lost our way. We shall fail because our priorities were wrong. And, without disarmament, we shall fail because we shall have less of the resources that are required to attack and deal with the non-military problems which threaten global security. In order to avoid this failure we need a new vision of what constitutes security so that with that vision we can see clearly what truly threatens our security.

Because of the shortness of time available to us in the face of the problems with which we are collectively confronted, a major act of renewed international co-operation will be required. Such a new vision, much a new act of co-operation, is required first and foremost in the area of arms control and disarmament. We know that this area of international co-operation has been immensely difficult in the past. But if we can break through its hard shell we shall have, by that action, demonstrated dramatically that the world's priorities have changed. That will breed a new confidence in international co-operation, the confidence we had

(Mr . Butler , Australia)

when this Organization was formed, the confidence that will be the minimum requirement for collective action on our global problems and to ensure common security.

Much has been done in disarmament, since the last session of the General Assembly, on a bilateral basis between the two most militarily powerful States. My Government has welcomed those achievements and is deeply conscious of the great changes that have been under way in the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. A fascinating and highly relevant example of this is that three weeks ago when the Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union visited Washington for consultations with his United States counterpart, that visit constituted the twenty-eighth bilateral meeting between Mr. Shevardnadze and Mr. Shultz in the period since Mr. Shevardnadze took up his office just three years ago.

We hope and expect there will be further significant progress in disarmament as a consequence of this sea-change in United States-Soviet relations. But the question of the relationship between what is done by those two powerful States and what is done in the wider world community, in particular at the United Nations and its related institutions such as the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, remains unclear and vexed.

In Australia's view that must cease to be the case. We need the progress that is taking place in the super-Power relationship, and indeed we need more of it. But because of the global nature of the problems they face and because of our shared need for security - our need for common security - it cannot and must not be the case that a main consequence of bilateral progress is that multilateral progress is put on ice. Such a consequence would make no sense in logic or reality but, more importantly, would constitute failure to find a new vision and to enter into a renewed act of international co-operation - a renaissance of the United Nations.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

The world community cannot be told by the super-Powers, "Trust us", and thus be relegated to the position of being mere spectators when we are, clearly, all players. The United Nations needs the full and vigorous participation of the super-Powers and of other nuclear-weapon States in the multilateral disarmament process just as surely as those Powers need the participation of all other States in global agreements on: the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the abolition of chemical weapons, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the settlement of regional disputes - to mention just a few goals.

But the picture would be incomplete if we were to refer only to the role of the super-Powers on the one hand and the role of the rest of the world community on the other. There is in fact within that world community a truly significant group of States that share a common outlook on the way in which international relations should be conducted. I am referring to the Non-Aligned Movement. That Movement, formed over 30 years ago as a consequence of the great movement of decolonization and the end of the dangerous period of the cold war, was a development of enormous significance. With a unified voice a truly significant and representative group of States said that it wanted no part of an East-West conflict but wanted instead to run along a third track, a track constructed on values many of which are found in the Charter of the United Nations.

For many years the declarations and policies of the Non-Aligned Movement have been directed towards the fostering of a world in which principles of tolerance, international co-operation and the maintenance of peace were paramount. The role and influence of the Non-Aligned Movement have not diminished, but we believe that if we are to find the new vision of our future that is required and forge a new level and character of international co-operation, the full commitment of the Non-Aligned Movement to the negotiation of disarmament agreements able to be universally accepted will be required.

The recent **meeting** in **Nicosia** of the **Movement of Non-Aligned Countries** indeed showed signs of **positive new developments** in that regard.

My Government hopes, and will do whatever it can to try to ensure, that at this session there is truly significant progress in the **First Committee** on the following items of our agenda.

There must be an end to all nuclear testing at the earliest possible time. For this purpose a treaty banning all nuclear tests by all States in all environments for all time must be negotiated,

It is doubtful that many States believe that an end to nuclear testing can be brought about by proposals to amend an existing treaty. But this General Assembly can and should call on the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva to lay aside political manoeuvres and instead initiate work on a nuclear-test-ban treaty.

It is hard to think of any other practical step, in addition to what is being negotiated bilaterally in the field of nuclear arms control and disarmament, that would have a more significant effect on bringing about an end to the nuclear arms race or to pressures towards the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

As regards chemical weapons, this Assembly should also make clear that those abhorrent weapons should never be used and must be eliminated. The single voice of the Assembly should be expressed in such a way as to leave no doubt that the negotiations on a chemical weapons convention in Geneva must be brought to the earliest possible conclusion, thus ridding the world of chemical weapons for ever.

In the field of outer space, our sight is turned to the future. Outer space is already heavily utilised for a variety of purposes, but, in the Australian view, it would be a potentially terrible failure if we did not forge universal agreement that there must never be an arms race in outer space.

The United Nations must also place on its agenda the question of the impact on peace and security of arms transfers, in both their overt and their covert forms. This is a subject which demands international co-operation.

If we are to take the steps to make the progress I have sought to describe, we shall require a new vision. This is imperative because of the nature of the threats we face, at present both military and non-military threats to our common security.

We shall find that way ahead only if we are prepared to enter into a new act of co-operation and, as is stated in the Charter, if we are determined "to practice tolerance". These words of the Charter remind me of the wisdom of the great twentieth-century scientist and humanist, Jacob Broinowski, who, writing in his remarkable book The Ascent of Man, said:

"All knowledge, all information between human beings can only be exchanged within a play of tolerance. And that is true whether the exchange is in science, or in religion or in politics."

This is our choice. The exercise of tolerance will enable us to address together the truly great and complex problems we face in the name of our common security. The absence or lack of such tolerance could condemn us to a common tragedy.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.