



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 10th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. Roche (Canada)
laterr Mr. Batiouk (Vice-Chairman) (Ukrainian SSR)
laterr Mr. Roche (Chairman) (Canada)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 51 TO 69, 139, 141 AND 145 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS

Mr. AL-KETAL (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic) : It gives me great pleasure to congratulate you, Sir, on your election as Chairman of the First Committee. I wish you and the other officers of the Committee success in your onerous task. My delegation intends to co-operate fully with you in order to ensure that the deliberations of the Committee will be fruitful.

The sincere desire of the peoples of the world and their constant quest for peace and security to prevail stem from the conviction that this is the only way to utilize the often scarce resources available for their development, happiness and well-being, for providing a decent life and for increasing their ability to contribute positively to the building of a more humane civilization.

The peoples of the world recognize that amongst the prerequisites for achieving just and durable peace are the conduct of international relations on the basis of the United Nations Charter, the principles of international law, and equality and mutual respect, and the renunciation of obsolete privileges and ambitions and of the threat or use of force.

(Mr. Al-Ketani, Iraq)

They would **thus** be renouncing the use of **force** and **abandoning** the yearning *for*, and the policies of, hegemony, expansion, aggression and interference in the affairs of others. Without this understanding, real **peace** cannot **prevail**, neither can there be anything but the strengthening of the bent to increase one's defences and military potentialities, in order for every State to defend its **security** and exercise its legitimate **right to self-defence**. Such an **outlook can** hardly **encourage progress towards disarmament**; it **rather** leads to the exacerbation of the **arms race** on both the regional and the international level.

The peoples **of** the world look forward with **a great deal of** optimism to a continuation of the **atmosphere of détente** that **has** started between the Soviet **Union** and the United States of **America** and to **a** further improvement in the prospects for settling **certain** long-standing regional **conflicts** within the tenets of the Charter and under the rules of international law. Iraq has welcomed **this** encouraging **development**, which **resulted** in the signing of the Treaty on the **Elimination** of Intermediate-Range and **Shorter-Range** Missiles - the INF Treaty - and the negotiations which aim at reducing the present levels of strategic weapons.

Iraq has also **welcomed** the positive initiatives of the **Soviet Union** in the field **of** disarmament, **confidence** building and the maintenance of international peace and **security**. In contrast, there has been the **major** disappointment caused by the failure of the third special session of the **General** Assembly devoted to disarmament to reach an agreed final document. **None of** the expected results of that session has **materialized** although the **session** took place in **an** atmosphere of **détente** and **regardless** of the determined efforts by many countries, **especially those** of the non-aligned movement, exerted with a view to making a **success** of the session, throughout meetings of the General **Assembly** and even **before that**, in the Havana meeting that preceded the **special** session.

(Mr. Al-Ketal, Iraq) ,

Disarmament **is** a responsibility and a duty **incumbent** upon all States. **The** threat of nuclear weapons is a threat to all peoples and an **impending catastrophe** for all humanity if they **were to be** used in any **circumstances**. We must **hope** therefore that the **atmosphere of detente** will **promote** concrete **achievements in** the field of **disarmament** with regard to strategic weapons and the strengthening of the United Nations' role **as** well as the role of multilateral **negotiations** in the field of disarmament.

Within the context of **this** view of the United Nations' role, the delegation of Iraq finds it imperative to establish close **contact between the workings of the** international bodies **concerned** with disarmament and the maintenance of international peace, among which are this Committee and the Conference of **Disarmament**. The channels of **communication** between these **bodies** should be kept open, in order that the international community as a whole may have an opportunity of **contributing** to the negotiations on disarmament. Here I would reiterate the call by Iraq to facilitate the participation of all the countries desirous of **taking** part in the activities of the Conference on **Disarmament**. This call results from our belief that all the peoples of the world have a **vital** interest in the conduct of disarmament **negotiations** and, therefore, have the right to participate on an equal footing in the said negotiations.

The Final **Document** of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament stressed that of all **the measures** aiming at the **achievement** of the highest goal of all States, namely general and complete disarmament under effective international control, in the interest of the survival of **mankind and the** elimination of the **scourge of war**, especially a nuclear war, the highest priority

(Mr. Al-Ketani, Iraq)

should be given to effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of a nuclear war.

In this connection, we wish to stress the following important points.

First, the priorities of disarmament, as set out in the Final Document of the first special session, should not be amended, in any circumstances and regardless of the purposes behind such amendment. Therefore, all measures, whether they be bilateral, regional or international, including the holding of international conferences or special sessions, should aim at mobilizing efforts to overcome the hurdles which impede the realization of concrete results in the field of nuclear disarmament.

Secondly, the issue of formulating international treaty on the total and absolute prohibition of nuclear tests remains the highest priority. Iraq, therefore, fully endorses the call by Mexico and other States to hold a conference of the States parties to the Partial Test Ban Treaty, with a view to considering and adopting an amendment that would turn that Treaty into an instrument that bans comprehensively all tests - in the atmosphere, in outer space, in the seas and oceans and under ground. We look forward to the holding of such a conference at an early date, and, we hope, not later than early in 1989.

Thirdly, the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of such nuclear weapons should be accorded a high priority. This is of particular importance in areas in regions, especially in the Middle East. There cannot be any remaining doubt that the Israeli entity is in possession of nuclear weapons and of the vehicles necessary for their delivery. The intentional policy of ambiguity on the part of Israel and the vague statements made by officials of that régime that it will not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the region, have become a sort of bare faced game and a naive attempt to hoodwink the international community with regard to the genuine threat posed to

(Mr. Al-Ketsl, Iraq)

peace and security in the region and the world as a whole and a threat to the **non-proliferation** Treaty, to which the other countries of the region have adhered.

The policy of **creating a smoke-screen** to hide Israel's nuclear activities and **protect the Israeli régime** in international forum are **causes for extreme concern and denunciation**, because this practice of turning a blind eye amounts to an **intentional disregard of Israel's introduction of nuclear weapons into the Middle East** and Africa through its collaboration with the racist regime in **South Africa**.

(Mr. Al-Ketsl, Iraq)

The States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty will soon start the preparatory work *for* the fourth **review** conference in 1990. **We** should not overlook the flagrant defiance by Israel of that Treaty as demonstrated by its **posture on** the acquisition of nuclear weapons and the impotence of **international organizations to take** any appropriate measures in that **respect**.

In addition to the measures required for **nuclear disarmament** and the exorcism of the demon *of* nuclear war, **measures** should be adopted with respect to other **weapons** of mass destruction. In this respect, my delegation wishes to reiterate that such measures should **be** general and comprehensive. **They** should deal with every aspect relating to such **weapons** and, in particular their production, **development**, stockpiling and **use**, together with the definition of ways and means of effective verification. Without such a comprehensive approach, the measures will remain ineffectual and will lead to none of the practical and **genuine** results we hope for.

In this respect, **we maintain that the** efforts *of* the Conference on Disarmament should be intensified **with** a view to formulating a similar comprehensive treaty on chemical weapons. The efforts *of* States should focus on upholding **the** role of the United Nations and the Conference **on Disarmament** in order to achieve this comprehensive goal and thus avoid the pursuit of **substitutes** for the existing negotiating machinery.

The intensification **of** efforts in this respect calls for the reconsideration by certain States of their positions in the Conference on Disarmament and the relinquishing of such positions, as they have resulted in impeding or delaying the work **of the** Conference. Instead, they should adopt more positive attitudes in order for **them to give a measure of** credibility to their positions.

(Mr. Al-Ketal, Iraq)

In the **context** of this view of the **situation**, the delegation of Iraq maintains that consideration of questions relating to the production, development, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons will continue to **be** incomplete unless it includes military **attacks on** operating nuclear facilities, inasmuch as the outcome of such attacks will **be** similar to **the use** of radiological **weapons**. Thus, the prohibition should **include** military attacks against nuclear facilities in order to prevent a repetition of what took place in 1981 when the Israeli entity **launched such an** attack with its military aircraft against the Iraqi Tammuz reactor, a reactor devoted to peaceful purposes and **subject** to the safeguards of the International **Atomic** Energy Agency (IAEA).

Outer space belongs to all mankind. It is the common heritage of humanity. Therefore, it should be used solely for peaceful purposes and for the promotion of the well-being and happiness of all peoples, regardless of the level of their scientific and economic development. This would require those States which have the economic and scientific capability to **use** outer space strictly to adhere to the legal restrictions on the use of outer space for military purposes. We **are extremely** concerned regarding the attempts to extend the arms race to **outer space** and the ongoing preparations to deploy new types of weapons in outer **space**, along with its use for spying and other purposes that **contravene the notion** of outer space as the common heritage of mankind. Our concern has become all the **greater** after the launching by the Israeli entity **of** its first satellite, which functions in an orbit that will enable it **to spy on Arab** and African countries. In that **way**, Israel contributes in a practical manner to attempts to **militarize outer** space over and **above** its introduction of nuclear weapons into the Middle **East**.

(Mr. Al-Ketani, Iraq)

It is most deplorable and regrettable indeed that some speakers who have preceded me have repeated **false** allegations **concerning** the **use** of chemical weapons. Those **statements** are completely false. Those speakers **know very well** that reliable sources **which** are greatly respected in international circles and are very **close** to the **scene** of events have **categorically** refuted **the** claims that **such** weapons have been used. **Those sources** include **Turkish** Government officials, **Turkish** Qatars, officials **of** the Red Cross and foreign journalists who visited the region. All those **sources have** emphasized that the allegation of the **use** of chemical **weapons** is groundless. The persistent repetition of such claims despite the fact that they are groundless can only **be** explained as a wilful insistence **on** harming the image of Iraq and interfering in its internal affairs. **Iraq** denounces **those attempts** and considers them to **be** part of a hostile campaign to prepare for a **new act** of aggression against its industrial **facilities**.

I wish here to **refer to the statement** made by His **Excellency**, Mr. **Tariq Aziz**, **Deputy** Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of **Iraq**, on 17 September 1988. He **said**:

“Despite the **tendentious** campaign by well-known circles in the United States of America and certain western States, the **motives** and purposes of **which** Iraq officials have exposed before, and in order to remove any misunderstanding or **ambiguity** that might **have** resulted from that campaign” - the Foreign Minister emphasized that - **“Iraq** respects and adheres **to** all the **provisions** of international law and conventions accepted **by** the **international community**, among which is the Geneva **Protocol** of 1925, which **bans** the use of chemical weapons and toxic gases, together with other conventions **within** the framework of international humanitarian law, **vis-à-vis** **all those** who adhere to these conventions and respect all instruments and covenants as **an** indivisible whole.”

(Mr. Al-Ketal, Iraq)

The **preconceived positions** of certain **States** can only **cast aspersions** on the **nature** of the proposed **conference** for the **States** parties to the **Geneva Protocol** of **1925**, which is to be held in Paris. This **may result** in negative implication⁸ for the negotiation⁶ between Iraq and Iran **aimed** at the establishment of an equitable and **comprehensive** peace between the two countries.

(Mr. Al-Ketani, Iraq)

I wish to reiterate here something that was stated by the Secretary-General at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. He said:

"Like all other complex international questions, disarmament does not lend itself to simple solutions. Yet its difficulties do not diminish its urgency. The outcome of disarmament debate and negotiations directly concerns the survival of mankind and the economic and social development of the world community."

He went on to say:

"On the basis of the Final Document, we must - and we can - carry on the quest for disarmament by co-ordinating bilateral, regional and world-wide initiatives. For the sake of the survival of peace, of progress, we have no other option." (A/S-15/PV.1, p. 31)

The delegation of Iraq will speak again to express its views on certain agenda items, such as those on turning the Middle East into a nuclear-weapon-free zone and the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, and denuclearizing Africa, as well as other matters, when they come up for debate.

Mr. BAYART (Mongolia) (interpretation from Russian): One of the main themes of the statements of delegations in the general debate in both the General Assembly and the First Committee has been the desire to preserve and increase all the positive elements achieved by the relaxation of the international atmosphere by substantive agreements to consolidate and make irreversible the disarmament process and internationalise disarmament efforts. The First Committee's task is to make a specific contribution to the attainment of this goal by taking practical steps. The implementation of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles - INF Treaty - which has already begun, shows that nuclear disarmament is fully feasible. The Treaty represents the triumph of political

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realism. It is a first historic step towards real nuclear disarmament. The elimination of part of the nuclear means of waging war reduces the dependence of international security on so-called nuclear deterrence. It reduces the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons and is instrumented in the prevention of nuclear war,

Mongolia has expressed its satisfaction that, by agreeing to eliminate its medium-range and shorter-range missiles in the Asian part of its country, the Soviet Union has accommodated the wishes of the States of the Asian and Pacific region. Mongolia hopes that the willingness of the Soviet Union to eliminate two classes of nuclear missiles in Asia will, among other things, promote a solution to the problem of the reduction of the United States military presence in the region.

The full effect of the INF Treaty will be realized only if the nuclear armaments thus eliminated are not offset by a qualitative build-up of other types of weapons. In order to reinforce this first success in nuclear disarmament, it is exceedingly important for the United States and the Soviet Union to conclude an agreement on a 50 per cent reduction of their strategic offensive arms, in strict compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM), in 1972, and including the commitment not to withdraw within an agreed period.

We are delighted that the Moscow summit meeting of General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan gave an impetus to the framing of such an agreement. Our delegation was exceedingly interested to hear the statement of President Reagan in the General Assembly to the effect that work on the preparation of an offensive strategic arms treaty might be completed within a year. We, and many others, of course, would be pleased if this important event could take place even before that. None the less, the statement of the President of the United States and the announcement by the Soviet side of considerable progress in negotiations on this

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question **bolster our hope** for the prompt attainment of the goal of a **true, substantial** reduction in offensive strategic armaments.

My delegation particularly wishes to **emphasize** that additional multilateral **disarmament efforts** are **especially important** today. In paragraph 48 of the Final Document of the **first special session** of the General Assembly devoted to **disarmament, we read:**

"In the task of achieving the goal of nuclear **disarmament**, all the **nuclear-weapon States**, in particular **those** among them **which possess** the **most** important nuclear **arsenals**, bear a **special responsibility.**" (resolution S-10/2, para. 48)

Therefore, **now**, when **questions** of substantial reduction in the nuclear **arsenals** of the **Soviet Union** and the United States are entering **the practical stage**, the Conference on **Disarmament**, at which all nuclear-weapon States are **represented**, must **conduct negotiations** on **questions** of nuclear disarmament. **This is a task entrusted to it** by the General Assembly, in particular, in the Final Document of its first special session on disarmament.

We feel that special Security Council **meetings** to **discuss** objectives and **tasks** with regard to nuclear **disarmament** would provide an important channel for the combined efforts of the **nuclear-weapon States**.

A **complete** nuclear-test ban is a fundamental **issue** in **connection** with the cessation of the nuclear-arms race and nuclear disarmament. In the **absence** of **solution** to that problem, which **is** long overdue, it **will be impossible** to prevent the proliferation, both vertical and **horizontal**, of nuclear **weapons**. We attach particular importance to the Soviet-American **negotiations** on questions related to the problem of nuclear testing, and we hope that they will lead to the ultimate

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goal of a **complete nuclear-test ban** and, as **steps towards** the goal, to the prompt **ratification of** the 1974 Treaty **on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear-Weapon Tests** and the 1976 Treaty **on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes**.

However, bilateral talks must not be allowed to **overshadow** the commencement of **multilateral efforts on questions** related to a **comprehensive nuclear-test ban**, in **this particular case** at the **Conference on Disarmament**. All possible means to **achieve** this end must be used. We wish to **express our support** for the **proposal of** Indonesia, **Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia** for the **convening of a conference of the States parties** to the 1963 Treaty Banning **Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water** to **consider possible amendments** to that Treaty to turn it into a **comprehensive nuclear-test ban**. Mongolia **welcomes the willingness of the Soviet Union to declare**, mutually with the **United States**, a **moratorium on nuclear-weapon testing**, with or without a **time-limit**.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

Notwithstanding the unquestionably positive changes that have occurred in international affairs, the arms race is still going on, and the danger of nuclear war is still there. Therefore, until nuclear disarmament has been achieved it is impossible to prohibit the use or the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. In this regard, I wish to emphasize that the Foreign Minister of my country proposed at the third special session devoted to disarmament that the Security Council might consider the adoption of a legal instrument on banning the first use of nuclear weapons, an instrument acceptable to all nuclear-weapon States. We feel that there is already a sufficiently solid basis for such action.

The States parties to the Warsaw Treaty have declared that they would never be the first to use nuclear weapons. The People's Republic of China has assumed a commitment to the effect that it will never in any circumstances make first use of nuclear weapons. The member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have also stated that none of their weapons would be used except in response to an armed attack. Lastly, we are aware of the joint Soviet-American statement that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought. If, in the light of these statements, an appropriate binding legal instrument were to be elaborated to prohibit the first use of nuclear weapons, that would be tantamount to the prevention of nuclear war.

Great importance as regards reducing the threat of the outbreak of nuclear war is attached to the Soviet-United States agreement on notification of the launching of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles. Adherence to that agreement by the other nuclear-weapon States or the concluding of a similar agreement among all the nuclear-weapon powers would be a substantive supplement to it. We would also emphasize the current importance of an agreement being reached among all the nuclear Powers on the establishment of centres for the reduction of the nuclear danger.

(Mr. Bayar t, Mongolia)

The **establishment** of nuclear-weapon-free **zones** in **various** part8 of the world **is** an **important step** in disarmament. **Such zones** help to **prevent** nuolear war and **strengthen** the non-proliferation **régime**. My delegation **welcomes** the **readiness** of the Soviet **Union**, *together* with the United **States** and the People's **Republic** of China, to **become** a guarantor of the nuolear-free zone in the Korean peninsula proposed by the Democratic **People's Republic** of Korea. In the event of the implementation of this agreement, the **measure, together** with the Rarotonga Treaty, would make an important contribution **to** the strengthening of **security** in the **Asia** and **Pacific** region.

The Treaty **on** the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons has *for two* decades **played an** important role in the **strengthening of** international **security**. **Mongolia, as in** the **past, advocates** an **increase** in the number of **parties to** the **Treaty, and enhancing** it8 **effectiveness**. Therefore we **propose** that the General **Assembly appeal** **to** all **States** that have not **yet** done **so** to **sign** the Non-Proliferation Treaty **so** that **by 1990 -** in other words by the time of the **Fourth Review** Conferenae of Par tie8 **to** the Treaty - it would **become** truly **universal**.

According to certain data, expenditures on military **research** and development at present account for 25 per cent of total **research** and **development** outlays. Thus the **latest accomplishments** of **science** and technology **are** being extensively **used** to develop weapon8 and **upgrade** them in qualitative terms, particularly **weapons of mass** de8**truction**. Therefore the proposal **by** India and other States **for** the **establishment** in the **Office of** the Secretary-General Of a group **for** the **assessment** and forecasting of new technology **is** very timely and **deserves support**.

It is also essential without delay to **prohibit** the **development** of an ti-ba 11 **is tic-missile** **defences**. The establishment of such defence8 by **one side** **Will compel** the **other side** to concentrate all it8 **efforts** on the elaboration of mean8 of **overcoming** them, and **this** would lead to an uncontrollable **arms** race in

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outer space. Many States have made a number of proposals and come forward with a number of initiatives designed to keep outer space peaceful and to keep weapons out of outer space. All these deserve thorough consideration. The prevention of an arms race in outer space is well served by the proposal of the Soviet Union for the establishment of a system of international monitoring of compliance with a ban on weapons of any sort in outer space, the central component of such a proposal being an international space inspectorate. Inspection at space launching facilities - of which there are not so many in the world at the present time - carried out immediately before the launching of objects into outer space would, in our opinion, be a simple and effective means of ascertaining that objects launched into space were not weapons and were not carrying weapons.

Within the range of initiatives designed to strengthen peace and security in the region of Asia and the Pacific, the Soviet Union has recently proposed the establishment at the Krasnoyarsk radar station of a centre for international co-operation in the use of outer space for peaceful purposes. This is a fine supplement to its proposal for the establishment of a world space organization.

The completion of the elaboration of a convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction is one of the most urgent disarmament tasks. The present level of the talks on the elaboration of a convention at the Conference on Disarmament makes it necessary for the participants to mobilize all their political will in order to achieve agreement and demonstrate openness and trust towards their partners.

Mongolia has already declared that it does not have any chemical weapons. Today I am empowered to state that as soon as a convention on the total prohibition of chemical weapons is opened for signature Mongolia will act to sign it among the first signatories. This again confirms our sincere desire to put an end to the

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chemical threat for all time. Mongolia actively **advocates** strengthening the **régime** prohibiting the use of **chemical** weapons and **supports the proposal** for the **convening** of a **conference** of the **States** parties to the 1925 **Geneva Protocol** and other **States** so as to **take measures to** strengthen that **Protocol**. We share the view that such a conference should give a powerful **impetus** to the **acceleration** and **successful completion of talks** in **Geneva** on the **prohibition** of **chemical** weapons.

The **interrelationship** between nuclear disarmament and **the** limitation and **reduction of** conventional weapons is **acknowledged** by the international **community** , Therefore the **process** of nuclear disarmament must be **accompanied** by and strengthened by **measures** in the sphere of conventional **arms** reduction. Mongolia has **been carefully** following **the efforts** being made in Europe to ensure **a stable equilibrium** at ever **lower** levels of armed **forces** and armaments. We feel that the **programme** of negotiations for a **radical reduction** of armed forces and **conventional armaments** in Europe **from** the Atlantic to the Urals **proposed** by the **States parties** to the **Warsaw Treaty** in July **this year** **constitutes** an **excellent basis** for the **attainment** of that objective,

The **use of** the **latest** accomplishments in **science and technology** for the development of means of **waging** war is gradually eliminating **the broad boundary** between nuclear and conventional weapons, This again **testifies to** the need to **establish control** Over the use of new technology. We **continue to believe** in the need to **consider** the possibility of elaborating an international agreement on the **prohibition** of new types of conventional weapons, **particularly those** of great destructive force.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

The negative **impact** of the naval **arms** race on the general **military and strategic** situation internationally and regionally **makes** solution **of that problem a matter** of the **highest** urgency.*

*Mr. **Batiouk** (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist **Republic**), Vice-Chairman, **took** the **Chair**.

(Mr. Bayart, Mongolia)

In **his** statement laet Tuesday the **Deputy** Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet **Union**, Mr. **Petrovsky**, eubmitted data on the naval **forces** of **his** country. That **step**, taken by the Soviet Union in **a spirit** of glasnost, and openness in the **military** sphere, demonetrates **its** trust towards its partners in its desire in actual **practice** to resolve **this** problem of naval armaments. We hope that the other so-called naval **Powers** will **respond** positively to **this** important initiative.

At the third special eeeeion on diearmament, deepite all **expectations**, it **was** not **possible** to arrive at a final document. **However**, we do not consider that **session** as a complete failure. As we see it, it became an important **phase** in the **development** of a conatrutive dialogue on a wide **range** of **questions** of security and disarmament. It made it **possible** to broaden the parameters of interaction between **States** in their joint **quet for practical** means to resolve the cardinal problems of **world** development, **as** a counterweight to military and coercive **methods**. The **session** accumulated **a** whole range of constructive propoeals and valuable ideas and **considerations** with **regard** to the disarmament **question**. We must now make full use of them.

In **conclusion**, I wiah to **emphasize** that the Government of **my** country fully supports and encouragee the comprehensive **activities** of United **Nations** bodies **and** related agencies **working** on disarmament **questions**, and we advocate the unswerving enhancement of the role of the United **Nations in disarmament problems**. The aim of general and complete disarmament **can be** achieved **only** by the combined efforts of all Stateo and **through** the strengthening of the United **Nations**.

Mr. ADJOYI (Togo) (interpretation fr om **French**): Mr. Chairman, heeding **your** appeal under rule **110** of the rules of procedure, I shall refrain from conveying to you the usual words of congratulation, although I remain firmly convinced **that** your **personal** qualities, **as well as those** of the **other officers** of the **Committee**, are deserving of the **praise** of the **Togolese** delegation.

(Mr. Adjayi, Togo)

The **work** of the **First** Committee is taking place in an international **political** climate **in which** - despite the persistence of **many** areas **of concern** - distrust, the quest for military and strategic superiority and belligerence **seem nevertheless to be** gradually yielding to the creative forces of **r eason**.

A sign of our times, disarmament is finding its way owing **to the** growing **awareness** of the absurdity of ideological and **military confrontation** and, hence, of the **virtues** of openness, dialogue and broad **agreement**.

The consolidation and **realization** of encouraging **trends towards arms control** is all the **more urgent**, since there **remain** serious obstacles to the cessation and **reversal** of the **arms race**. We have **known** for a long time **now** that military competition was taking **on** growing dimensions as a result of the hostility **between** two **socio-political** and economic **systems**, each wishing to **displace** the other because of incompatibility, and as **a** result of distrust, and all **manner of** interference and pressure in the developing **world**.

Today we must recognize that **the** gradual improvement in East-West relations **allows us to cherish** the hope for **genuine disarmament**. An analysis of the situation shows that, in the second half of the **1980s**, there has been a **positive** evolution in the two **super-Powers'** perception of the need for nuclear disarmament. **Furthermore**, it is comforting **to** note that this evolution echoes the **high** priority given **to** nuclear disarmament.

In this connection, the signing and ratification **by the** United States of America and the Soviet Union **of the Treaty on** the Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles is significant, as is the resolve **of both countries to** pursue negotiations with a view to a **50-per-cent** reduction of their strategic nuclear **arsenals**. For that goal to be achieved within a reasonable period of time, it is important that efforts **be** undertaken **by** all **to** strengthen the Treaty on the

(Mr. Adjoyi, Togo)

Limitation of **Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems** - the **ABM Treaty** - and to **secure a common commitment** on the **non-militarization** of space.

Furthermore, it is appropriate to hail the joint verification steps taken **recently** at the Nevada and **Semipalatinsk** test **sites** within the framework of the gradual process towards the total **prohibition** of **nuclear-weapon tests**. While that gradual approach seems realistic given the present state of East-west relations, it **has the major drawback of** not preventing the **qualitative** development of **nuclear weapons**. It is **therefore** necessary to ensure that that **approach** does **not become a** pretext for the indefinite postponement of a total **prohibition** of **nuclear tests**.

In this connection, the Soviet proposal to establish a bilateral moratorium on **nuclear tests** deserves careful consideration.

The valuable contribution of the two super-Powers to the peaceful settlement of certain regional conflicts **also** deserves **special** mention. **However**, finding a **way out** of the impasse in other crises should remain central to their concerns.

For the bold initiatives taken by the United States of America and the **Soviet Union** to take their rightful **place** in the history of nuclear-disarmament efforts, **bilateral** negotiations must create a threefold process **aimed at first**, avoiding the **effect** whereby implementation of plans to **modernize** **nuclear weapons** offset the **impact** of eliminating **whole** categories of **such** weapons) secondly, giving **impetus to** multilateral **negotiations**; and, thirdly, beginning the step-by-step and **irreversible** **elimination** of **nuclear weapons**...

The **Secretary-General's** report on the "Study on the climatic and other global effects of **nuclear war**" (A/43/351), **is** **valuable**, **since** it sheds **new** light on the **serious** threat of **nuclear weapons** posed to the survival of **civilization**.

(Mr. Adjayi, Togo)

According to that report,

"The scientific evidence is now **conclusive** that a major nuclear war would entail the high risk of a **global** environmental disruption . . . a . . .

"The **socio-economic consequences** in a world intimately interrelated **economically**, **socially** and **environmentally** would be **grave**. The functions of production, distribution and consumption in existing **socio-economic systems** would be **completely** disrupted. The **severe physical** damage from **blast**, fire and radiation in the targeted countries would preclude the **type** of support that **made recovery** possible following the **Second World War.**" (A/43/351, **paras. 22, 25**)

On the basis of the illuminating **conclusions** of the experts, we must **concede** that the **promotion** of nuclear **disarmament** is an urgent task associated with the **defence of the right to life** and the achievements of human **civilization**.

In my **delegation's** view, the **Fourth Review Conference of the Treaty** on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear **Weapons (NPT)** should be an **opportunity** to strengthen the non-proliferation **regime**. Universal adherence to the **NPT** should be **assiduously promoted**. In this **connection**, pressure on the racist **regime** of South Africa to **adhere** to the Treaty and respect the Declaration on the Denial of Apartheid should be stepped up.

Togo was among the first signatories of the Treaty, and we firmly support Sweden's proposal for a new **United Nations study** on nuclear weapons, in the **context of the Fourth Review Conference of the NPT**.

(Mr. Adjoyi, Togo)

The Conference on **Disarmament's** adoption of a **net** of guiding principles on **confidence-building measures** and verification will unquestionably lead to **greater** awareness of the important **contribution that the application of these concepts can make** to the arms-control **process**. It is **reassuring** that those concepts **are understood** almost universally and form part of the efforts to improve East-West **relations** and increase **respect** for agreements on **disarmament** and on **the** prevention and **control** of **conflicts**.

This is shown by the exchange of **inspection** missions between **countries of the** East and **of the West** under the Stockholm **agreement**.

It is **shown** also by the initiatives **taken by African countries** to promote confidence-building **measures** within the **framework of** the United Nations **Regional** Centre for Peace and Disarmament in **Africa**. In February this year the Centre organised a conference on **confidence, security and** development in the **framework** of the Economic **Community of Central African States**. The **conference** considered the **formulation** of a **programme** of measures to strengthen confidence **and** security **and** to **enhance** the **development** prospects of the **countries** of that region.

Another meeting sponsored by the Centre was held **at Lomé** in **August this year**. Its **purpose was to set up** a training **programme** on **the** settlement of conflicts, the prevention and control of crises and confidence-building measures among **States members** of the **Economic Community of West African States**. We welcome **the** plan to extend that programme to include all interested African **countries, and** express appreciation of the **work** of the Centre, and the efforts of the Under-Secretary-General, Mr. **Akashi**, to **promote** the Centre's **activities**.

(Mr. Adjayi, Togo)

These are only **some** of the **measures** **organised** by the Centre this year. They highlight the **central contribution which** that institution **can make** to efforts by African leaders to safeguard and consolidate balance in the continent. Clearly, the **Centre's** increased effectiveness will **depend largely on** the **political and financial support** of States **Members** of the **United Nations**.

To the extent possible, the Government of **Togo** will **continue to provide assistance** to ensure the proper functioning of **the** Centre.

Allegations, **now** proved correct, of **the use of chemical weapons** in the Iran-Iraq conflict are a cruel reminder of **the excesses and horrors of the First World War that** led to the conclusion of the **Geneva Protocol**. **Because** of its limited **scope** and **the many reservations** to which it gave rise, **that international legal instrument** is today **inadequate** to prevent the proliferation of the **chemical weapons - which some refer to as the poor man's atom bomb**. These hard **facts make the adoption** of appropriate measures to halt the spread of **chemical weapons and prohibit** their production **for all time** extremely urgent.

That is why **my country, which is a party to the Geneva Protocol** and has undertaken **not to carry out any chemical-weapons production activities, firmly supports** the **United States proposal to** convene a **conference of States signatories** to the Geneva Protocol for the **purpose of** strengthening the Protocol. **Besides** providing an opportunity to reaffirm **our commitment to the non-use of chemical weapons, the conference should have** as its **goal the prevention of the spread of these weapons, the promotion of universal adherence to the Protocol, and the strengthening of verification procedures**.

(Mr. Adjoyi, Togo)

It is also for this **reason** that, while awaiting **the entry** into force of the International **Convention** on the **Prohibition** of the **Development, Production** and **Stockpiling** of **Bacteriological (Biological)** and **Toxin** Weapons and **on their** **Destruction**, Togo is in favour of the **application** of a variety of sanctions against **States** known to be guilty of using **chemical** weapons. **The Conference on Disarmament** **is** the **body** that should **step** up negotiations towards the **conclusion** of a **convention** providing for a strict international **verification mechanism**. In short, **chemical weapons** and all means of producing **them** must be eliminated for ever.

Including **on** the agenda of the First Committee the item entitled "Dumping of **nuclear** and industrial wastes" is, in our view, an **important political decision** reflecting the **concern** of **African** leaders with regard to practices that are to be **considered inimical** to our **continent**. Quite clearly this practice was started by **unscrupulous** business groups and **transnational corporations** bent on exploiting, for **base materialistic purposes**, the **economic** and financial **difficulties** confronting our **continent**. Such a contempt for the environment and for the health of the **peoples** of **Africa** is a new threat to the **security** of our **States**.

The vigilance shown and the firm stand taken by the heads of State, **in** Particular at the twenty-fourth **summit conference** of the **Organization of African** Unity and **at** the eleventh **summit conference** of the West **African** Economic Community, **clearly** show that **they are** aware of the dangers posed by the practice of dumping nuclear and **industrial** wastes. In calling for **consideration** of this **question**, **Africa** wishes **to** bring about a greater awareness of the **serious damage** that the dumping of **waste** poses for developing **countries**. **Africa** wishes also to see a **concerted** international strategy worked out **for** an effective struggle against this situation.

(Mr. Mjoyi, Togo)

For **the moment, it** would be well for developed countries to undertake a **strict control of transboundary and transmarine movements of wastes to developing countries.**

In **this** regard the delegation of **Togo welcomes the serious attention that** the European **Economic** Community has **been** giving recently to **the** question **of the** transport and dumping of toxic wastes. The resolution **adopted** by the European Parliament in Brussels in **May** 1988, as well as the **prohibition measures** envisaged by the European **ministers** of the environment, **indicate the Community's** concern with **regard to** practices **that** may seriously threaten **the** security of African and **other** developing **countries.** We should also **welcome** the solidarity expressed by New Zealand towards Africa with regard to attempts to dump nuclear and industrial wastes on our **continent.**

The **rationalization of the work of the First Committee** is a matter of **common concern because of** its implications for the increasing effectiveness of **this** important body, and **because of** the wish to strengthen **the role of** the United Nations as **the central** authority in the field of **disarmament.** The adoption of General Assembly resolution **42/42 N** is a clear expression of that **concern** and provides us with an appropriate framework for future steps towards **rationalization.**

My delegation **also welcomes** the efforts made **by the** Chairman of **our Committee** to **ensure** efficient programming of our meetings. The following three **steps** should, in **our opinion,** guide us in improving the **effectiveness of the Committee:** first, the encouragement of intensive consultations **on** preliminary drafts and draft **resolutions with a view to** achieving consensus) **secondly,** the merging of draft resolutions and the grouping of questions in clusters without infringing **the** right of any delegation to **submit proposals;** thirdly, the avoidance of any **simplification** likely **to** interfere with **the** importance **attached** to a given item or to call into question the agenda allocated to the **First Committee.**

(Mr. Adjoyi, Togo)

The failure of the third **special session** of the General **Assembly** devoted to **disarmament** is already part of **history** as a major **lost** opportunity. That failure arrested the momentum that had been built up since 1978 and **gave rise to doubts as to the** ability of this Organization to promote a multilateral approach to disarmament. The absence of **consensus** at that **session** does not, however, mean **that** that **was** the end of **special sessions** of the **General** Assembly devoted to disarmament. It **is** important that we **should** learn from the experience **and thus mobilize our energies once more** to preserve and consolidate the **areas of agreement** and to go deeper into questions which, **because** of their sensitivity or complexity, call for **greater** realism, openness and flexibility.

For the moment, the Final Document of the **first special** session devoted to **disarmament** remains a valid record of the **progress made and of the principles and priorities adopted** in **respect** of **arms control** and disarmament. In the final **analysis**, there are **still encouraging signs of disarmament on the horizon**, and they provide opportunities gradually to **put** an end to the arms race in all **its forms**. The **hope** that **bilateral initiatives** have given **us could be even greater if the** multilateral approach to disarmament were to be given new momentum **through** the **participation** of other militarily **important States in the efforts** towards arms **control** and **disarmament**. At a time when the United Nations **is** enjoying new **prestige** and **credibility** it is **essential** for **us** to work in **concert** to **rid** our **selves** of the **demons that** turn the minds of **men** away from the **virtues of** Peace.

Mr. ALEINIK (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian) : The spirit of the last meeting of **the working** bodies of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament **was** one of hope, intense creative **effort** and a vigorous **search for** broadly **acceptable** solutions. That spirit can still **be** felt in this **room**.

The constructive and **non-confrontational** tone set by the third special session from the outset, as well as the multitude **of** new proposals **put forward**, evidenced the seriousness of the approach taken by States and their desire to achieve a substantial breakthrough in favour of the prevention of war, the cessation **of** the **arms race** and a decisive shift towards disarmament, primarily nuclear **disarmament**.

On the other hand, the conclusion of the third special session demonstrated that the large and diverse orchestra of the world community needs to **become** more symphonic, to play with greater consonance and **unison**, if it is to become **genuinely** philharmonic. For genuine harmony presupposes, notwithstanding the diversity and competition **among** various instruments and themes, a subordination to one higher and common goal. That highest common goal of the **world community** is **to** guarantee the **interests** of mankind as a whole, to guarantee to all the peoples of the world their **right to** life and **development** in **conditions** of stable **peace** and freedom.

If we look back objectively **over** recent years, **free** from rose-tinted illusions **and** from undue gloom, it is **clear** that after a period **of** confrontation during which substantial progress in disarmament was ruled **out** and, indeed, met with **outright** failure, mankind has **now** entered onto a path of serious achievements in many areas dealing **with the further** limitation and reduction of armaments and disarmament. The **rudder** that has enabled us to **change** course, as it were, and to steer away from disaster has been the new political thinking based on truly universal human **priorities**. By maintaining and developing the present bilateral **impetus**, **supplemented** by the **multilateral** process, a new **quality** in international relations

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can be achieved. The present session of the General Assembly can stimulate and give impetus to such efforts.*

We are witnessing a unique period in international relations. We see a shift occurring before our very eyes from a stage of hope to a stage of action, to the first practical steps in the area of nuclear disarmament. We are also witnessing the realization of a vision embodied in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which stated:

"the accumulation of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons, today constitutes much more a threat than a protection for the future of mankind. The time has therefore come to put an end to this situation, to abandon the use of force in international relations and to seek security in disarmament" (S-10/2, para. 1).

At a time when there is still no guarantee that present processes may not be reversed, they must be strengthened. It is therefore extremely important to maintain the momentum achieved: having taken the first step, we must prepare for the second and ponder the third, without losing sight of our goal.

The entry into force and implementation of the Treaty between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination Of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles - the INF Treaty - pave the way for the actual elimination of other classes of nuclear weapons. The admittedly difficult progress towards that goal includes the welcome Soviet-United States talks on the 50 per cent reduction of strategic offensive weapons in the context of compliance with the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and non-withdrawal from it within a specified period of time. At the summit meetings at Washington and Moscow it was agreed that vigorous and determined efforts should be made at those talks to ensure their progress without pauses or

*The Chairman returned to the Chair.

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letdowns. Those meetings **also reaffirmed the postulate** that **a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought**. **There was a determination to prevent any war between the Soviet Union and the United States, whether nuclear or conventional, and to renounce any intentions to achieve military supremacy**. Those principles represent valuable contributions **to the foundation of comprehensive international security**.

The **Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic** actively **advocates the** constant strengthening of those **principles** within the practical **scale** of values of the **international community**, including the **United Nations**, and believe that they should gain universal **recognition**. The logic and gradual development of the process of nuclear disarmament **that is now under way** demand that **at some stage all the nuclear Powers must be involved in the process**. In keeping with the spirit of **that** process and the aforementioned agreements, **it** is assumed that **no steps will be taken** to extend the arms race to other spheres.

A great deal of work, calling for intellectual daring and flexibility, is **now** being carried out in the **area of strategic concepts**. The **realization** of the **fact** that **the** old military and strategic **maxims** have brought mankind **into** the impasse of **nuclear** confrontation **has** led responsible State officials radically to reconsider relevant values in this sphere. The Minister of Foreign **Affairs** of the Federal Republic of **Germany**, Hans **Dietrich** Genscher, recently **emphasized**, quite correctly, that unlimited armament does not **create** unlimited security. The logic of **that** principle applied to **nuclear** weapons leads to the **conclusion** that the concept of **nuclear** deterrence has outlived **whatever** usefulness it might have had. We cannot **continue to** balance forever on the tightrope of fear over the nuclear **abyss**.

The nuclear Powers play a most **important** role in nuclear **disarmament and are** primarily responsible for it. It would **be** wrong, **however**, to underestimate the significance and **potential** of the multilateral dimension in resolving those problems. Multilateral efforts **have** a **unique** and singular **potential** for dealing

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with some **aspects** of preventing **nuclear war** and **removing the nuclear** threat. In that **connection it** is to be regretted that the **world community** has wasted so **much** time in futile **attempts at** the **Conference on** Disarmament to establish subsidiary bodies **to** deal with issues involved in the **prevention of nuclear war, nuclear** disarmament, the banning **of** nuclear tests **and** ensuring its own efficient **functioning**. The **Byelorussian** SSR will **support** draft resolutions that call for the establishment of such bodies and the **commencement of their work**.

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In addition the world **community** has accumulated valuable **experience** in bilateral and multilateral spheres which will be of great help in **actual** nuclear disarmament. It includes procedures to verify **compliance** with the Treaty between the United **States of America** and the Union of Soviet Socialist **Republics** on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range **Missiles** as Well as the International **Atomic Energy Agency's verification mechanism** and experience which **can** be effectively used in developing **politico-legal** and verification **mechanisms** , both for the initial stage of **nuclear** disarmament **and** in a future nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world.

The potential of the United Nations Institute for **Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)** could be utilized, as was proposed by the Byelor **ussian SSR** at the third special session devoted to disarmament, to study guarantees of the **non-resurgence of** nuclear weapons and the non-development **of** new types of weapons of mass destruction in a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world.

The full **potential** of the United Nations Disarmament Commission has yet to be used. The documents adopted by the **Commission** at this year **'s session**, which **contained** guidelines for confidence-building measures and **verification principles testify** to the **Commission's considerable** productive Potential. The Byelorussian SSR, which had the honour to **chair** the consideration of nuclear disarmament problems **at** the Commission's last session, is convinced that it is possible to break the **long-standing stalemate** in the examination of these issues. Substantial **progress** has been made by the Commission in its work to draft a nuclear-test-ban recommendation due to the efforts made, above all, by the delegations of **Australia** and **Mexico**. The delegation of the Byelorussian SSR hopes that the language worked out by the Disarmament Commission will facilitate the examination of this problem at the current session of the General Assembly. That would be a significant step

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marking the beginning of **practical multilateral** work on this **extremely** important task of working out a **comprehensive** and **complete** nuclear-test ban.

We are convinced that on our way to that goal, which is crucial for nuclear disarmament, not a single opportunity or path should be neglected. In this context work done at the Soviet-United States full-scale stage-by-stage talks on matters relating to the nuclear-test problem is of great significance. A joint verification experiment conducted recently at the test sites of both countries is a major milestone in the sphere of openness. Moreover, it creates actual prerequisites for an early ratification of the Soviet-United States Treaties of 1974 and 1976 on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests and on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, opening a new stage in subsequent talks on the limitation and, eventually, complete cessation of nuclear tests. It also has great conceptual significance both for disarmament and for environmental protection.

The Byelorussian SSR has been consistent in its support for the initiatives to establish nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. It regards them as an unconditionally crucial element in strengthening international security. We call upon the nuclear Powers which have not yet done so to ratify the relevant protocols to the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarutonga. We also call on the States which have a role to play in the establishment of nuclear-free zones in their regions to begin the practical implementation of this idea.

At the third special session many States, including the USSR and other socialist countries as well as India, Zimbabwe, Sweden, Iceland, Togo, Cameroon, Ecuador, Nigeria and Greece, made proposals concerning both the non-use of nuclear weapons and various aspects of their elimination. These proposals in our view should be carefully studied and implemented. They should not be lost in the united

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Nations **archives** but on the contrary should give new **impetus** to **the discussion** of the entire range of nuclear **disarmament problems** at **the current session** of the **General Assembly**.

Multilateral efforts today play a major role in the elimination of chemical **weapons**, an important area in the elimination of weapons of mass **destruction**. The **adoption** of a global **convention** on the **comprehensive** prohibition and destruction of these weapons is becoming increasingly urgent. **To be effective**, such a convention should **cover** all States which have a chemical-weapon-production capability.

Unfortunately, this year the Conference on Disarmament failed to enter the final stage of **its work** on drafting the convention. Very useful work has been done on several **aspects**, including the **Soviet** proposal to conduct an international experiment to *test procedures for verifying* the **non-production** of chemical-warfare **agents** by civilian industries. However, substantial and rapid progress has yet to be made in finding an effective solution **to** the complicated problem of preventing the development and production of **chemical** weapons without disrupting the **normal development** of peaceful chemistry, the problem of verification procedures and bodies, and so on. We hope that discussion of the chemical disarmament problem at **the forty-third session** of the **General Assembly** will induce the **Governments** of all participants **in** the Conference **on Disarmament**, without exception, to give their delegations instructions **that** will enable them without delay **to complete** the drafting of the **convention**.

A **multilateral data exchange** in the **framework** of the **convention proposed** by the **USSR** would contribute to the **practical solution** of **verification problems**.

The **proliferation** of chemical weapons and instances of their use **aggravate** concern for the convention's future. All **this** makes the efforts of the world community to create an atmosphere **of intolerance** of chemical weapons and, more

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important, of their **use**, particularly urgent. The Byelorussian SSR supports the role of the United Nations **Secretary-General** in **investigating** without delay **evidence** of the **use** of chemical weapons.

The **geographical spread** of **chemical** weapons lends further strength to the idea of **establishing zones** free from **chemical** weapons. The Byelorussian SSR has **consistently supported** relevant initiatives by the German **Democratic Republic** and **Czechoslovakia** as well as by **Bulgaria** and **Romania**.

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Several proposals to ban chemical weapons and to prevent their use were made at the third special session devoted to disarmament. All of them should be closely studied.

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction has also grown in significance. It would be most useful if strict compliance with obligations under the Convention itself were supplemented with the participation of all countries in confidence-building measures and with the development of international co-operation within the framework of the Convention.

The Byelorussian SSR takes part in publishing information in accordance with the decisions and recommendations adopted by the ad hoc meeting of scientific and technical experts from States parties to the Convention. The forthcoming third review conference for the Convention prompts the need for scientists and research institutions to undertake more vigorous efforts in drafting appropriate recommendations.

In conclusion, our delegation would like to inform the Committee that, in September, just before the forty-third session of the General Assembly, the Byelorussian SSR had the honour of receiving a group of disarmament Fellows from the United Nations. When we got to know these talented young people better, we saw once again that our support for this useful programme was quite correct. We hope that they will soon join in our common effort to ensure an effective and irreversible disarmament process and to shape genuine comprehensive security.

The meeting rose at 11.50 a.m.