



FIRST COMMITTEE
8th meeting
held on
Friday, 15 October 1987
at 10 a.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 8th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. BAGBENI ADRITO NZENGEYA (Zaire)

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Statements were made by:

Mr. Okun (United States of America)
Mr. Kostov (Bulgaria)
Mr. Petrovsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)
Mr. Al-Kavari (Qatar)
Mr. Morel (France)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 48 to 69 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS

Mr. OKUN (United States of America): The United States delegation congratulates you, Sir, on your assumption of the chairmanship of this Committee during the forty-second session of the General Assembly. We look forward to working closely with you and pledge you our support.

The Committee is meeting at a time of increased expectations. Due to the past year's important events have occurred that have lent a new impetus to efforts to achieve greater international stability and an enduring peace at successively lower levels of armaments, both nuclear and conventional.

It is worth recalling that the meeting between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Reykjavik took place almost exactly one year ago. That meeting has been followed by meetings at the ministerial level between the United States and the Soviet Union as well as by concerted and painstaking work at the delegation level in the nuclear and space talks in Geneva and in other forums.

The most significant event was the much-welcomed agreement in principle to conclude a treaty on ground-launched intermediate-range nuclear missiles which would eliminate the entire class of intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) missiles - that is, missiles with a range of from 500 to 5,500 kilometres, from the arsenals of the two countries. Following the meeting between Secretary of State Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze last month, further intensive efforts have been undertaken in the Geneva talks, looking towards the meeting in Moscow between the Ministers on 22 and 23 October and a summit meeting between the leaders of the two countries later this year.

Okun, United States)

Welcome as this result is, it is important not to lose sight of the fact that an agreement in principle is not the same as an agreement on treaty provisions that translate principle into practice. In this endeavour we anticipate success, but the work is not yet finished.

In the Geneva talks dealing with strategic nuclear arms reduction and defense and space issues, progress has been less remarkable than that recorded in the intermediate nuclear force negotiations. The first priority of the United States remains deep reductions in strategic offensive arms, and the two sides have agreed to intensify efforts to address the problems standing in the way of 50 per cent reductions in strategic offensive arms. Although the Soviet draft treaty of 31 July was a welcome departure from previous highly generalized documents and further progress has subsequently been recorded, fundamental differences on specific and important issues, such as sub-limits, remain. Moreover, the Soviet position continues to link strategic force reductions to restrictions on strategic defence which would go beyond those contained in the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. These would appear to be designed to cripple the strategic defence initiative, an outcome which the United States will not accept.

Another significant accomplishment during the meeting of Secretary Shultz and Minister Shevardnadze was the signing on 15 September of an Agreement to establish nuclear risk reduction centres. In the preamble to the Agreement, the two sides reaffirm that

"a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought"

and reiterate

"their desire to reduce and ultimately eliminate the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, in particular as a result of misinterpretation, miscalculation or accident".

(Mr. Okun, United States)

On the occasion of the signing of the agreement, President Reagan pointed out that the risk reduction centres would help further lessen the chance of conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union. The centres will be connected by satellite and will be equipped to exchange textual and graphic information quickly. Under the Agreement, notifications of ballistic missile launcher will be made, and there is the possibility of additional exchange of material, as a display of goodwill and in order to build confidence.

It is also worth recalling that the accord reached in Stockholm at the Conference on Confidence and Security Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe was concluded only a little more than a year ago. During the intervening period, on 26 August, the United States elected to exercise its right under paragraphs 65 and 66 of that agreement to inspect a military activity of the Soviet Union taking place near Minsk. The inspection was successful in helping to resolve uncertainties about the precise scope and nature of this activity, and the United States welcomed the spirit of co-operation shown by many Soviet officers and military men towards the inspectors. We believe that this inspection demonstrated the significant and essential contribution which inspection can make to the confidence-building process. The implementation of the inspection provisions is an encouraging step for East-West relations.

The Stockholm accord has been followed by the initiation of discussions in Vienna on a mandate for negotiations between the 23 States of the Western and Eastern alliances on conventional armaments. On 27 July the 16 Western countries proposed a mandate for these conventional armaments negotiations, aimed at establishing a stable and secure balance of conventional forces at lower levels.

(Mr. Okun, United States)

These negotiations should eliminate force disparities prejudicial to stability and security, and should seek to eliminate a surprise-attack capability, and a capability to initiate large-scale offensive action. In addition, efforts continue in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe to negotiate additional security- and confidence-building measures.

Concurrently, States participating in the mutual and balanced force reduction negotiations in Vienna convened on 24 September for their forty-third session. The United States continues to hope that the Warsaw Pact representatives in these negotiations will respond positively to the Western proposals, on the table since December 1985, for an effectively verifiable accord that would meet the objective of redressing the force imbalance in Central Europe.

The past year has also witnessed important developments in arms control related to biological and toxin weapons, and to chemical weapons. with regard to the former, last April States parties to the 1972 biological and toxin weapons Convention held a successful meeting of technical experts, as mandated by the Second Conference to review the Convention, held in September 1986. The recommendations adopted by the experts at the April meeting are now being implemented, with the valuable result of supporting and strengthening the norm against biological and toxin weapons. The United States has already provided appropriate information to the United Nations Department of Disarmament Affairs.

At the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, under the leadership of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Ralph Ekeus of Sweden, advances have been recorded in the effort to negotiate a comprehensive ban on chemical weapons. The United States welcomes, for example, the new position taken by the Soviet Union on the crucial question of verification, in particular its acceptance of United States proposals on the challenge inspection question.

(Mr. Okun, United States)

In addition, the United States recognizes the positive value of the recent visit by participants in the chemical weapons negotiations to the chemical weapons facility at Shikhany in the Soviet Union. At the same time, we look forward to discussion with the Soviet Union of the many questions that have arisen from the visit. We also look forward to receiving Soviet visitors at the United States chemical weapons destruction facility at Tooele, Utah, next month. The United States was pleased to sponsor the first of these visits in 1983. Our hope is that such visits will serve to increase the confidence of the negotiating States that the prospective chemical-weapons ban will deal with the realities of the chemical weapons assets to be prohibited.

These visits are not, of course, a substitute for the detailed and painstaking negotiating efforts required to convert apparent agreement at the level of principle into the actual provisions of a convention. In the chemical weapons negotiations it is clear that the negotiators at the Conference on Disarmament still have much work to do. There are many issues to be addressed, including development of challenge inspection procedures and negotiation of provisions for an international body responsible for monitoring compliance, as well as elaboration of provisions for monitoring the chemical industry to ensure the non-production of chemical weapons. And these issues must be dealt with not just by two Powers, but by all the participants in the negotiations. Finally, there is the troublesome possibility that some of those States that may pose a chemical weapons threat may refuse to become parties to the Convention.

The spread of chemical weapons must also be arrested. The international community must continue to work to deal with this menace, including, in cases where the threat of use is real, by restricting access to materials that can be used in the production of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Okun, United States)

The United States condemns any and all illegal use of chemical weapons wherever and whenever it may occur. The United States at the same time supports investigations, initiated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, of allegations of the use of chemical and biological weapons. After several years of experience with the procedures for investigation of use, in response to General Assembly resolution 37/98 D, the United States believes it is now appropriate to develop further technical guidelines and procedures for such investigations. My delegation expects to return to this matter on a later occasion.

Progress also took place during the past year on another issue of considerable interest to many in this chamber, that of nuclear testing. At the time of the September meeting between Secretary Shultz and Minister Shevardnadze, the United States and the Soviet Union announced their agreement to begin full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations on nuclear-testing issues before 1 December 1987. The first order of business in these negotiations is to agree on effective measures of verification that will make it possible to ratify the 1974 threshold test-ban Treaty and the 1976 Treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions. For the purpose of elaborating such measures joint verification experiments are envisioned at each other's test sites. The United States and the Soviet Union also agreed:

"to proceed to negotiating further intermediate limitations on nuclear testing leading to the ultimate objective of the complete cessation of nuclear testing as part of an effective disarmament process. This process, among other things, would pursue, as the first priority, the goal of the reduction of nuclear weapons and, ultimately, their elimination."

At the same time, the United States continues to support the establishment of an appropriately mandated subsidiary body in the Conference on Disarmament to consider, on a multilateral basis, issues related to a nuclear-test-ban treaty,

(Mr. Okun, United States)

such as scope, verification and compliance. The United States also continues to support the excellent work of the Conference's Group of Scientific Experts on the International Exchange of Seismic Data. In this regard, the United States is sponsoring a workshop in Washington from 26 to 30 October on the development of procedures to be utilized at international data centres, to which all participants in the Group of Scientific Experts have been invited.

I have outlined some of the promising developments over the past year that relate directly to issues before us in the Committee. The sense of optimism that these developments have engendered in our work is justified, but it would be a serious error to allow this sense of optimism to cloud a realistic, sober assessment of the global security situation.

To begin with, there continues to be serious concern with ensuring compliance with arms control and disarmament agreements already negotiated. I have mentioned the continuing use of chemical weapons, which is a grave breach of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. The Soviet Union continues with its construction of a radar at Khamovnik, in clear contravention of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.

(Mr. Okun, United States)

The United States regards strict compliance by all States parties to existing arms-limitation and disarmament agreements to be essential. The United States believes that all States in the international community have an interest in, and a duty to support, strict compliance with these obligations, and should work to restore the integrity of agreements in instances where they are not being fully respected. States should make available information both on actions taken by parties to comply with agreements and on indications that parties may not be in compliance. Last year, the United States delegation introduced a draft resolution on this important issue, which was adopted by consensus. My delegation intends to pursue this subject in the course of our work.

Secondly, the problems of international security of which we are seized extend beyond those of deep reductions in nuclear weapons and the elimination of chemical weapons. I have already mentioned the efforts in the European context to deal with conventional weapons. But the problem of conventional weapons transcends the European continent. In fact, it is a cause of concern with respect to practically every region in the world. It is important, therefore, to give serious consideration to the issues posed by conventional weapons, and our delegation welcomes the work in this area that has been initiated in the United Nations Disarmament Commission. This work should continue.

The United States has always regarded openness in military matters as essential for facilitating progress in disarmament. We are pleased to see that others are increasingly recognizing this fact. We have taken careful note of recent indications by General Secretary Gorbachev that some information relating to military forces and expenditures may finally be made available by the Soviet Union. If meaningful information is actually provided it would be a step in the right direction of further openness and the free exchange of information.

(Mr. Okun, United States)

Free exchange, including opportunities for the free exchange of views on disarmament and other security issues, should be much more extensive. All individuals in all countries should have available the necessary information to participate in free and open debate on the merits of the actions of their Governments. When such opportunities are available, Governments may be more judicious in making investments in military forces and more realistic in arms control. When citizens have the opportunity to make their views fully known, and when all Governments take those views seriously into account, then the international community may finally be able to come to grips with the underlying sources of international conflict that prompt nations to arm themselves.

I should like to conclude with a few remarks concerning actions that may be taken in this Committee. At this past spring's meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, a draft agenda was adopted and it was decided to hold the session in 1988. It remains to determine the exact dates for the session and, at the forthcoming meeting of the Preparatory Committee early in 1988, to make the final arrangements. The third special session on disarmament will come at an opportune time as we pursue our goal of a more secure world. The United States looks forward to participating in its work fully and vigorously.

In speaking about the relations between the United States and the Soviet Union before the General Assembly on 21 September this year, President Reagan pointed out that we can expect our bilateral differences to continue. He said this imposes a special responsibility to find realistic ways aimed at resolving political problems peacefully.

I believe that such a challenge is equally important for all of us in this forum. I have outlined a broad range of positive developments that have occurred over the past 12 months, events that have moved us closer to our shared objective

(Mr. Okun, United States)

o f greater international activity. I hope that a year from now we can point to even greater successes. Whatever our differences, we have our work cut out for us, both here and at the forthcoming third special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. The United States is ready to do its part.

Mr. KOSTOV (Bulgaria): The question of achieving a safer and more stable world free of the danger of nuclear war and the burden of the arms race is once again among the highlights of this session. That question has steadily grown in importance, along with the need to find an adequate and unequivocal solution to it. That is only logical: the nuclear age has given us not only very limited options - we can either survive together or die together - but also very little time for decision-making. That is why it is necessary that all our efforts should be aimed at ensuring a peaceful future for mankind and at eliminating the virus of militarism, which has brought the world untold suffering and has set the stage for universal catastrophe.

The present time is made momentous also by the fact that the technical potential for the destruction of mankind is paralleled by the obsolete political thinking of those political leaders who ignore reality and continue to rely on the use of force as the main instrument for accomplishing their goals. Progress in physics and military technology has simply overtaken progress in political thinking. Today, the gap between the new realities and the inability, or unwillingness, to recognize those new realities poses the greatest danger.

The question of peace in the modern world, affecting all countries and peoples and all spheres of life, requires a thorough restructuring of the entire system of international relations and the creation of a new model which would facilitate the transition from distrust to mutual understanding, from confrontation to co-operation, from the arms race to disarmament.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

In our view, that new model for international relations is best embodied in the concept of ● establishing a comprehensive system of international peace and ● security, the corner-stone of which would be the curbing of the arms race, the achievement of disarmament and a world free of nuclear weapons. That is a formidable, yet doable task. It is beyond the reach of any single State or group of States. It can be achieved only through the collective efforts of the entire international community on the basis of a new way of thinking and a new approach to international affairs.

The 15 January 1986 declaration of the Soviet Union is an outstanding example of new political thinking. For the first time ever, an all-embracing, well-thought-out and well-timed programme for the general and complete elimination of nuclear weapons was set forth. General statements and expressions of hope gave way to specific plans and actions. A continuation of this policy was the summit meeting at Reykjavik, where a whole set of related proposals was put forward with a view to eliminating the threat of nuclear war and paving the way for a new nuclear-free age in the history of mankind.

The Reykjavik summit demonstrated the practicality of that idea, which had earlier seemed to be an improbable, if not altogether impossible, dream. There was a real closing of the gap between the positions of the Soviet Union and of the United States on the most complex problems of curbing the arms race and embarking upon disarmament, and although the summit failed to achieve the desired ends, for reasons that are well known, the intellectual breakthrough of Reykjavik continues to affect the ongoing talks and to serve the cause of disarmament.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

The People's Republic of Bulgaria welcomes the agreement recently reached in principle to eliminate the shorter- and medium-range missiles, as well as the agreement to begin wide-ranging bilateral negotiations for the limitation and the ultimate total cessation of nuclear-weapons tests. The agreement to remove the medium-range and shorter-range missiles, as well as their nuclear warheads, would be the first effective step towards the elimination of nuclear weapons and the building of security and mutual confidence. Although it will affect less than 5 per cent of the world's nuclear arsenals, this agreement would have a politically and strategically stabilizing effect of major proportions and would be of immense moral value. It could serve as a useful precedent in working out agreements on the reduction of other types of nuclear arms. It holds out prospects which require serious and responsible consideration. It is now particularly important that no new obstacles should be created to reaching a mutually acceptable agreement. For example, we find it objectionable that the reduction and elimination of one type or weapon should be "offset" by building up another type of weapon.

In Washington another agreement was signed to establish centres in the Soviet Union and the United States to limit the risk of nuclear war. However modest it may be as compared to the entire range of disarmament issues on the negotiating table of the two Powers, this confidence-building measure constitutes a useful step towards the final and reliable elimination of the risk of nuclear conflict.

The efforts to build a world free of nuclear arms should continue in other areas of disarmament as well. Today it is clear that the desire to extend the arms race into outer space is intricately linked to the Gordian knot of problems related to curbing the arms race and, therefore, to the future of international security as a whole. It is on this issue that certain circles continue to cling to the old mode of thinking. They see the future only in terms of the use of force,

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

particularly of overwhelming force which the *enemy* have no chance of matching. And all this is done in the name of security. But to build security at the expense of others means to seek military superiority. This would be the result of the efforts to provide the "nuclear sword" with a "nuclear shield", thus creating the potential for a pre-emptive first strike.

Bulgaria is of the view that, given the nature of modern weaponry, it is impossible to ensure the security of any country by military-technical means, even the most sophisticated ones. In this action-reaction cycle, an escalation of the arms race is thus precipitated, leading inevitably to the risk of mankind's destruction. That is why we maintain that the time has come when the problem of security can be resolved only by political means. The new thinking means, first of all, recognizing the important principle that today there can only be security which is mutual and, in global terms, common security.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria supports the proposal of the Soviet Union for the elaboration of "new key provisions of an agreement" stipulating strict observance of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and on that basis a 50 per cent reduction of the strategic offensive arms of the USSR and the United States of America, preventing the transfer of the arms race into outer space, and beginning negotiations on the gradual cessation of nuclear-weapon testing. These proposals are designed to break the vicious circle of action and reaction and to take a decisive step towards the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.

The removal of nuclear weapons in accordance with the proposals of the socialist countries is not the only task on the way towards establishing a peaceful and secure world. We call for the adoption of an integrated approach that would couple the elimination of nuclear arms with the elimination of the other weapons of

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

mass destruction, considerable reduction of conventional armaments and armed forces to a level required only for defence, as well as collateral confidence- and security-building measures under strict and comprehensive international control.

The practical application of the latest achievements of the revolution in science and technology has led to changes which in turn have forced a reappraisal of the political, military and economic threat posed by conventional arms. As is known, the programme of the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) adopted in 1978 stresses the qualitative improvement of conventional armaments, particularly the steep enhancement of their destructive fire power.

On the other hand, the growing deployment of automated military systems for control, command and communications has aggravated the risk that a conventional conflict could escalate into a nuclear war. That is why the socialist countries have emphasized time and again the conclusion that in these circumstances even military parity has ceased to be a guarantee of international security.

It will be necessary to agree upon specific measures for conventional disarmament based on the principle of reasonable sufficiency in the respective types of arms, coupled with the adoption of a military doctrine of a strictly defensive nature.

The readiness of the socialist countries to embark upon this road was reaffirmed in the document adopted at the Berlin meeting of the Political Consultative Committee of the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty held last May. At that meeting the socialist countries formulated proposals for the implementation of specific measures for nuclear and conventional disarmament. They also outlined the basic provisions of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty, which is geared to the objective of avoiding war, whether nuclear or conventional. The defensive

(Mr. Koatov, Bulgaria)

nature of this doctrine is reflected in the statement of the allied States that in no circumstances will they initiate armed hostilities against any other State or group of States, unless they come under attack; nor will they ever be the first to use nuclear weapons; that they have no territorial claims against any European or non-European State, nor do they view any State or people as their enemy.

At Berlin the socialist countries proposed to the NATO member States that they hold consultations with a view to comparing and bringing into alignment the military doctrine of the two alliances on the basis of purely defensive principles. Such a dialogue in international relations, along with specific disarmament measures, would have a major effect on building confidence and mutual trust. Regrettably, we have not yet received an unequivocal reply to this proposal of ours.

Today Europe has its eyes set on Vienna. The People's Republic of Bulgaria has consistently maintained that the meeting of the States participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe should adopt meaningful and balanced decisions which would move ahead the all-European process with regard to all sections of the Helsinki Final Act. The problems of disarmament should find their due place within the framework of this all-encompassing approach. All European States should be involved on an equal footing in the solution of these problems.

What Europe needs now is a drastic reduction of military confrontation as well as further confidence-building. There is also the question of avoiding a surprise attack. This could be achieved by lowering the concentration of armed forces and armaments in the zone of direct confrontation between the two military alliances, by withdrawing the most dangerous offensive arms from any such zones, and by establishing zones free of nuclear and chemical weapons. The initiative of the

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

German Democratic Republic and Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to create a nuclear-weapon-free corridor in Central Europe, the initiative of my country and the Socialist Republic of Romania to transform the Balkan peninsula into a zone free of nuclear and chemical weapons, as well as the comprehensive plan of the Polish People's Republic on arms reduction and confidence-building in Central Europe, are all designed to serve this objective.

(Mr. Kostov, Bulgaria)

In our view, the time has come to undertake practical action to turn the Balkans into a nuclear-weapon-free zone, as called for by the leaders of the People's Republic of Bulgaria and the Republic of Greece in their joint statement of 15 July 1987 addressed to all Balkan countries and again during the current visit by the Greek President to Sofia.

It is an encouraging fact that the positions of the socialist countries and those of the New Delhi Six are close or similar on urgent issues such as the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons and the avoidance of an arms race in outer space. The realistic proposals advanced by the New Delhi Six are an indication that new political thinking is steadily taking hold.

Now is the time for political commitment to be matched by specific actions. The Bulgarian delegation hopes that the Committee will make a contribution by adopting concrete and positive decisions on all the items on its agenda.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The process of disarmament and its internationalization, as well as the gradual evolution of a comprehensive security system through collective efforts, is creating a need to establish confidence in international relations on a wide scale. Confidence is precisely what is needed as a catalyst for these historical processes.

In the present circumstances, when the groundwork is being laid for the building of a truly nuclear-free world, confidence cannot be restricted to selected measures or spheres. It has assumed a wholly new dimension requiring a transition to a broad policy of confidence-building that will become the core of a comprehensive system of international security.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

To create, strengthen and develop confidence, it is necessary to act in concert, thus paving the way through the accumulating of experience in co-operation, through increased mutual understanding and through the joint solution of practical issues.

"The origins of being derive from deeds." Thus, paraphrasing the Bible, the great Goethe expressed the idea that reality can only be created through concrete deeds. Confidence can become the immutable norm of international life if it is embodied in the practical work of developing comprehensive security, excluding reliance on force.

Real and tangible action in all spheres accelerates the process of confidence-building. Confidence built up through joint action created the conditions for undertaking increasingly far-reaching forms of international interaction and thus constitutes a system-forming process.

Confidence has a special role to play in such a sensitive area as disarmament, where national security interests are directly affected. It is, I believe, here more than anywhere else that confidence must manifest itself in concrete action.

Indeed, what spurs on the arms race is fear and suspicion. At the same time, a very clear trend is emerging, with the arms race becoming self-contained and having its own internal logic and in fact precluding the building up of confidence. The result is a vicious circle, with mistrust generating an arms race and the arms race in turn intensifying suspicion.

The way out of this stalemate, as we see it, can be found only by shoving determination and concentrating our political will to achieve a joint breakthrough and accomplish tangible measures to curtail the arms race. Each step in the direction of arms reductions will contribute to progress in and development of the disarmament process. In other words, the formula "the more arms, the greater the

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

insecurity and suspicion" should be countered by another; "the more disarmament, the greater the confidence."

The most important instruments of confidence are openness and glasnost. There is no need to prove that where there is a shroud of mystery, suspicions frequently arise, myths are created and speculation begins. But openness should not be an end in itself but, rather, an instrument for the building of confidence: the goal is not openness in continuing the arms race. After all, in disarming we are concurrently opening ourselves up by eliminating those areas of activity that are primarily concerned with secrecy. Openness is intended to remove sources of suspicion and create an atmosphere of clarity and predictability conducive to real disarmament.

We agree with those who call on us not to fear openness. It was precisely we who were the first to raise the question of openness in international relations. The first international act of the great socialist October Revolution - whose seventieth anniversary we celebrate this year - was the Decree on Peace. The Soviet State declared that it was renouncing secret diplomacy and secret treaties and proclaimed its commitment to the principles of openness and true democracy in foreign policy.

Even if, to be absolutely frank, in the past there have been some departures from that principle, they were necessitated by the foreign intervention that immediately followed our Revolution and by attempts on the part of some Powers, including those now advocating openness, to undermine the foundations of our country and strangle it by political and economic blockade and direct military intervention. We were forced to shut ourselves in to protect ourselves from hostile encirclement. And today, we ourselves must melt mistrust and circumnavigate the ice floes and icebergs of confrontational attitudes.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

In this connection I should like to refer to the statement by the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Edis, in which he quite rightly stated "and I agree with him" that we must all be open to new ideas and approaches. Such openness is particularly important, indeed, an absolute necessity, today. Without it there can be no broad-based approach to resolving the problems of global security. I understood that the words of the representative of the United Kingdom would be translated into deeds with regard to all new ideas and proposals, including those advanced by the socialist countries for developing a comprehensive system of international security. We hope that constructive and unprejudiced attitudes to each other's words and deeds will characterize all stages of the First Committee's work at this session.

Confidence begins above all with a realistic assessment of one's own actions. It is created not by posing as a self-styled supreme judge with regard to the entire world or by using double standards, one standard for oneself and another for others, but respect for others, coupled with an objective and self-critical view of one's own society and policy. This, it appears to us, is the best possible approach to creating confidence and mutual understanding. In world politics there cannot and must not be either teachers or students. There must be mutual enrichment.

Our new philosophy of security is based on recognition of the fact that in today's complex and contradictory world, which is at a crossroads, new, bold approaches and unorthodox methods are needed to deal with international problems. Confidence-building in world affairs does not merely presuppose unity of word and deed, it requires it, for only a world that has moved from statements to practical measures can have a chance of survival.

Grasping this truth and upholding it has become the law governing Soviet foreign policy. We not only proclaim our commitment to peace, but always back up

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

our declarations of peace with concrete proposals and constructive negotiating positions. On 15 January 1986 General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev put forward a specific programme for achieving security through disarmament. In working for its implementation we are not only actively seeking solutions to the problem of reducing and limiting specific types of armaments, but also taking steps to strengthen confidence and constructive co-operation.

In order to begin moving towards mutual confidence through the thick fog of suspicion and fear, it is sometimes necessary to feel one's way carefully, step by step. Here, the force of example can be extremely helpful, and unilateral steps can be taken towards the solid ground of confidence, making a conscious choice in favour of self-control and restraint.

The Soviet Union does not simply argue in favour of unilateral actions and the accommodation of the legitimate interests and concerns of others. It has undertaken a unilateral obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Our unilateral moratorium on putting anti-satellite weapons in outer space has been in effect since 1983, and it will remain in effect as long as other countries, including the United States, act similarly. The 18-month unilateral moratorium on nuclear explosions observed by us was a striking example of the Soviet Union's goodwill. The unilateral action taken by the other nuclear socialist Power, the People's Republic of China, which has undertaken to forgo the first use of nuclear weapons and reduced its armed forces by 1 million men, is also a very positive step.

The new military thinking of the USSR and the socialist countries allied with it is summarized in a joint document on military doctrine adopted by the member States of the Warsaw Treaty organization. The most significant features of that doctrine are as follows: first, it is oriented towards ensuring military security

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

first and foremost through political means; secondly, it is not conceived within the framework of past wars but is based upon a consideration of the realities of the nuclear and space age; thirdly, it is strictly defensive in character and is based on the assumption that military methods should not be used to solve any outstanding problems) and fourthly, it is based on a non-offensive strategy.

We have not confined ourselves merely to presenting the essence of our military doctrine, but are willing to go further. The Soviet Union, together with its Warsaw Treaty allies, has put forward a far-reaching proposal for consultations with the countries members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in order to compare the military doctrines of the two alliances, analyse their character and engage in joint consideration of the direction in which they should evolve to dispel the mutual suspicion and mistrust that has been built up over the years, arrive at a better understanding of each other's intentions and ensure that military thinking and the doctrines of the military blocs and their adherents are based on defensive principles. The agenda for such consultations would also include existing imbalances and asymmetries in individual types of armaments and armed force?, as well as a search for ways and means of correcting them, based on the notion that whichever group is in the lead should make reductions on the understanding that such reductions will lead to increasingly lower levels.

In our view, a strong impetus in this direction can be provided by agreement on a defensive strategy and the notion of reasonable sufficiency. Such concepts presuppose a structure of armed forces in a country that would be sufficient to repel possible aggression but not to engage in offensive action. A first step would be a supervised withdrawal of nuclear and other offensive weapons from national borders, followed by the establishment along borders of sparsely armed strips and demilitarized zones. Ultimately our goal should be to work Co

(Mr. Petkovsky, USSR)

dismantle military blocs, • eliminate bases in foreign territories and bring home all troops now stationed abroad,

We have therefore proposed, in • rmonce, a major measure of confidence and openness that makes it possible to ascertain: sincerity of our intentions and the truly defensive character of both our doctrine and our practice in military matters, and, in turn, for us to be presented with arguments in support of the sincerity of the • tatomentr by leaders of the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance to the effect that they would use military force only in response to aggression. We hope that our honest proposal will be considered on its merits and that the NATO countries will respond to it constructively. we eagerly await their answer to our proposal.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

We want our honest policy to be clear to everyone, and, naturally, we expect an adequate response. This is precisely what motivated us when we take action to build confidence, for example in the field of compliance with the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, and the banning of chemical weapons.

In order to remove the very source of suspicion and to create a normal, healthy atmosphere for a detailed discussion of questions related to the observance of compliance with the ABM Treaty, the Soviet Union invited a delegation from the House of Representatives of the United States Congress to visit the radar station in the area of the city of Krasnoyarsk, which has been the subject of so much speculation. The American Congressmen examined, without any restrictions, the buildings that house the radar under construction and went over the technical specifications of the equipment at the station.

The American aide received first-hand, factual confirmation of the firm intention of the USSR to continue to abide by its obligations under the 1972 ABM Treaty. In order to allay suspicion and prevent the circulation of myths with regard to space activities that they have generated, the Soviet Union proposes to strive for agreement on confidence-building measures that would provide the assurance that no one was engaged in activities banned by international agreements.

Let us take another example. In order to create an atmosphere of confidence, and in the interest of concluding at an early date a convention banning chemical weapons, the Soviet side invited the negotiators on chemical weapons to visit the Soviet military facility at Shikhany to see for themselves typical examples of our chemical weapons and of the technologies used for their destruction at a mobile unit. The experts will also be able, later on, to visit the special facility for

(Mr. Potrovaky, USSR)

the destruction of chemical weapons which is under construction in our country, in the area of the city of Chapaevsk.

The Soviet Union is also on record as having organized - during its moratorium on nuclear explosions - a trip for foreign representatives to the nuclear test site in the area of Semipalatinsk, to enable them to set up special seismic equipment there to carry out on-site verification of the fact that no explosions were being conducted, and ultimately we agreed to carry out, jointly with the Americans, a calibrating experiment using non-nuclear underground explosions. The progress of the on-site experiment was observed also by a group of American Congressmen. Unfortunately, there has been no reciprocal invitation to observe American nuclear explosions.

All this is our concrete contribution to a reasonable, responsible, rational organisation of international affairs, which is being expanded before our very eyes. Standards - unheard of before - are being established with regard to openness, glasnost, and the extent and depth of mutual inspection and verification of obligations assumed.

An important measure - strengthening mutual trust is the implementation of the recommendation of the Geneva Conference of Scientific and Technical Experts from States parties to the Convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons. We would like to inform the Committee that our country has presented, on time, the information called for by those recommendations.

In our view, confidence-building can also be served by introducing glasnost with respect to military spending. The repeated attempts to reduce military budgets have invariably been rejected on the pretext that there are difficulties with regard to comparisons. Obviously, we have to be fair in comparing defence expenditure, which is no simple matter, since the price structure of armaments and the pricing mechanism of various countries differ fundamentally.

(Mr. Patrovaky, USSR)

The defence budget published by the USSR = 20.2 billion roubles = reflects only the expenditures of the Ministry of Defence on the maintenance of the armed forces personnel, logistics support, military construction, retirement benefits, and some other items. Research and development financing and arms and equipment procurement are covered under other articles of our State budget. Upon completion of a radical pricing reform to be carried out in our country, we think it will be possible to make a realistic comparison of overall military spending. We believe that in the next two or three years we will be able to compare data of interest both to us and to our partners, data that would uniformly reflect expenditures by the two sides. This is a very serious and responsible undertaking but we are ready to carry it out.

To make confidence an effective policy and to ensure that it is firmly embedded in the fabric of international relations, efforts must be made by all sides. One hand is not enough for a handshake.

The United Nations has, undoubtedly, a major role to play in internationalizing, promoting, strengthening and making irreversible the process of confidence. The United Nations, which had its very origin in a spirit of co-operation, can function effectively and meaningfully only when it breathes the oxygen of confidence. Therefore, ● strengthening confidence also means consolidating the United Nations, enhancing its significance and authority, and translating its Charter into real life. It should help to produce a universal language of confidence and openness, understandable to all, that would gradually force out the jargon of threats and confrontational polemics from the political vocabulary of the international community.

A first step in this complex process of compiling a lexicon of confidence and openness could be made by implementing the Secretary-General's proposal to set up,

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within the Organization, a multilateral centre for reducing the threat of war. We believe it would also be advisable to • establish direct lines of communication between the United Nations Headquarters and the capitals of the States that are permanent members of the Security Council as well as the location of the Chairman of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries.

The fact that confidence is entering the mainstream of broad politics creates favourable conditions both for • enhancing confidence-building measures and for extending them to new areas of activity,

These confidence- and security-building measures in Europe, agreed upon in Stockholm, which have been in effect since 1 January 1987, are now being tested in practice and demonstrate that, provided there is political will and mutual constructiveness, it is possible to overcome the most formidable hurdles and to achieve impressive results. In our view, the agreements reached at the first stage of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-building Measures and Disarmament in Europe, moving us towards an integrated system that will encompass confidence-building, security and disarmament measures. At the second stage, disarmament negotiations could be conducted along with the preparation of confidence-building measures on which there was no previous agreement, or which could be advanced in future, and which would include a gradual limitation and reduction of military activities - particularly by the two military alliances - notification of independent air force and naval manoeuvres, coverage by confidence-building measures of the territories of all countries participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) and other confidence- and security-building measures.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

Concurrently, consideration would be given to new kinds of confidence-building measures and to measures of military and strategic stability in Europe directly related to reductions in armed forces, conventional armaments and military expenditures, which would facilitate the conclusion of agreements and lead to the establishment of a military balance at the lowest possible level.

We believe that confidence-building measures can have a major effect and that they can be particularly beneficial to relations among States possessing substantial military potential and belonging to different military blocs. First and foremost, this applies to the nuclear Powers and to the two alliances, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Treaty.

The initiatives proposed at Murmansk by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, are designed to strengthen trust in the north of Europe and spread it to the Arctic. The Soviet Union has stated its readiness to serve as a guarantor of a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe should a decision to establish such a zone be taken. We also support Finland's initiative on the limitation of naval activities in northern European coastal seas. Through joint efforts aimed at developing and expanding confidence-building measures in the military sphere, radically reducing the level of military confrontation and utilizing the resources of northern and Arctic regions for peaceful purposes while protecting their environment, it would be possible to turn the northern regions of the planet into a genuine zone of peace and fruitful co-operation.

The Soviet Union is focusing its attention also on issues relating to enhancing security and building confidence in Asia and the Pacific region. Our proposals in that regard, put forward by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in his Vladivostok statement

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and in an interview with the Indonesian newspaper Merdeka, are well known and remain unchanged.

In the present circumstances we attach considerable importance to harmonizing confidence-building measures in the naval area. These could include prior notification of certain naval activities, invitations to observers to attend naval exercises and manoeuvres, limitation of the number and scope of naval exercises and the areas in which they are held, exchanges of information on naval matters, and other measures.

It is quite clear that the current nature of relations makes it impossible simply to decree confidence or to ensure the instantaneous removal of suspicions that have accumulated over many years. For that reason, as we make progress towards the reduction and elimination of certain classes of weapons and the limitation of military potential to a level of reasonable sufficiency, verification will evolve into the most important factor in the attainment of security.

Our position on verification matters is based on the premise that at all stages of real disarmament everyone must be completely certain that there will be scrupulous compliance with agreements. We favour the most rigorous verification. If the question of double verification is raised, we will respond by advocating triple verification. Without the most stringent and comprehensive verification, the necessary certainty that agreements were being respected would be lacking and consequently there could be no confidence.

The practice of conducting verification should become a school for confidence-building and should help us to see for ourselves the sincerity of one another's intentions and to become immune to distrust. As the process of disarmament is internationalized and as multilateral efforts to attain equal security for all are intensified, the significance of international verification

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and the co-ordinating role of the United Nations in that respect will grow. The United Nations will become a focal point for the involvement of all States in the building of relations of confidence and security.

That is the aim of an idea proposed by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, for establishing, under United Nations auspices, machinery for broad international control over compliance with agreements on reducing international tension and limiting armaments, as well as over military situations in conflict areas. As we see it, that machinery would operate by using various forms and methods of verification to collect information and transmit it promptly to the United Nations. It would provide an objective picture of developments, ensure the timely detection of preparations for hostilities, make a surprise attack more difficult, and make it possible to take measures to prevent the initiation, expansion and exacerbation of a military conflict. That machinery could be the underpinning of a sort of Eiffel Tower of verification and confidence, and a central link for intertwining and complementary measures of disarmament, verification and confidence-building.

The proposals we have put forward are comprehensive and encompass all major components of disarmament, verification and confidence-building.

In complete conformity with that view, we have put forward at the Conference on Disarmament a proposal for a broad network of measures for confidence-building and international monitoring of space activities. This system would include prior notification of each planned launch, the permanent presence of groups of inspectors at all sites used for launching space objects and inspection of every space launch. Moreover, we think it would be necessary to provide for the right to on-site inspection should suspicions arise that there has been a launch from an

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

undeclared site. With a total ban on space strike weapons, the Soviet Union would be ready to extend inspections to storage and industrial facilities, laboratories, test centres and so forth.

Control issues with respect to the prevention of the deployment of arms in outer space call for a broad approach and for use to be made of the creative potential of all forces concerned. To that end, we have proposed the convening of an international symposium in the USSR in 1989, with the participation of Government representatives and prominent scientists and public figures.

Soviet proposals on a series of issues of verification and confidence-building have also been put forward at the negotiations on the elimination and prohibition of chemical weapons. In addition to earlier Soviet initiatives, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Eduard Shevardnadze, stated on 6 August this year at the Conference on Disarmament that it was necessary to consolidate legally the principle of binding challenge inspections without the right of denial.

We hold the view that the Secretary-General has an active role to play in ensuring reliable control over compliance with commitments to ban and eliminate chemical weapons. To build on our expressed readiness to have recourse to his services in investigating cases of the use of bacteriological weapons, we declare our agreement to the services of the Secretary-General being extended also to investigations into cases of the use of chemical weapons.

Work on effective verification of disarmament also presupposes unbiased discussion of various ideas, and there are quite a few of them, including the proposal of France to set up an international satellite monitoring agency. We are open to an exchange of views on that proposal.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

With the practical implementation of disarmament, there will be an enormous increase in the significance of the question of monitoring the non-conduct of activities banned under a given possible agreement at military bases located in the territories of other States.

I should like to highlight particularly the importance of this problem in terms of the strengthening and the establishment of confidence. We must turn our attention and that of the United Nations and international conferences to the situation in military bases. Military bases make up part of the military infrastructure. It is quite obvious that they can perform functions which are rather important in military terms and which cannot be ignored in concluding specific agreements. We believe there must be a new approach to the question of the situation in military bases. To be confident that the obligations assumed are respected, it is essential to have inspection access to such bases. In this important matter, naturally, it will be necessary to obtain the co-operation of the States on whose soil those bases are located. Such a measure could become a first step towards the dismantling of military bases in foreign territories. We call for a serious, thorough-going dialogue on the question of opening up military bases for inspection and verification. The Soviet Union is ready to do this.

World public opinion is the most important source of ideas and proposals, both in matters of verification and in the disarmament sphere as a whole. That is why the USSR has proposed the convening of a conference, to be held in 1988 in the Soviet Union, with the participation of representatives of the general public and non-governmental organizations, and devoted to the problems of monitoring compliance with arms limitation and disarmament agreements. It believes that such a conference can make a valuable contribution to the treasury of ideas for resolving problems in finding the best possible forms of control and verification in the disarmament area.

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Peaceful and mutually beneficial co-operation as an alternative to military-technological competition can also become a school of confidence. The peaceful alternative make it possible to expand openness, to know one another better, to know each other's plans and intentions, to build confidence and to overcome the "enemy" psychology. This is a very serious problem. It is not quite within the province of this Committee, but we must give some thought to this too: how to unlearn the lesson of thinking of each other as enemies and start thinking of each other as partners. To embark on that road means trying to turn the existing negative connection between the arms race, suspicion and mistrust into a constructive interlinkage in which the peaceful accomplishments of each and every one will be of benefit to all, and no one will stand to gain from the other's backwardness.

The USSR is ready to study in a constructive way the proposals for: any specific steps - I stress, any specific steps - that would lead to stronger international confidence, openness and glasnost.

Now is the crucial time to break through the thicket of mistrust and to assert mutual understanding on the basis of a new political philosophy which provides for maximum regard for the legitimate interests and concerns of States. And this is the critical time, now. The time factor is acquiring decisive significance. If we are not to be like Breughel's blind men who are heading inexorably towards a fatal abyss, it is essential now promptly to begin shedding the fetters of mistrust and suspicion and to broaden the horizons of the policy of trust. We hope that this session will make a valuable contribution to the laying of the foundations of confidence, openness and glasnost in international relations.

Mr. AL-KAWARI (Qatar) (interpretation from Arabic) : Mr. Chairman, allow me at the outset to express to you our congratulations on your election to the chairmanship of this important Committee. I hope that you, the two Vice-Chairmen and the Rapporteur will achieve all success in your task.

At every session we convene here to debate the problems of disarmament on the agenda, in the hope that the international community will achieve the required progress in the field of disarmament. Time goes on, however, and we do not achieve any concrete results. Many delegations have expressed their regret at this fact and their hope that the future will show a way out of the stalemate that has dissipated all efforts to that end.

Despite the arduous debate and the continuous negotiations, the arms race, and especially the nuclear arms race, still seriously jeopardizes international peace and security.

We submit that national security together with its maintenance is a basic right of every State. However, it is illogical to imagine that the present proliferation of arms safeguards the security of the world. On the contrary, this threat hangs over world security and leads to widespread tension, the exacerbation of conflicts, and the focusing of attention on armaments at the expense of economic and social development.

Notwithstanding this dark picture, there is a glimmer of hope reflected in the agreement concluded between the two super-Powers, the Soviet Union and the United States of America, on the elimination of shorter- and medium-range missiles. We hope that agreement will be the first step in a long journey towards the far-distant goal of the elimination of strategic nuclear missiles and agreement in other areas such as the banning of chemical weapons. The report of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva indicates significant progress in the latter. We hope

(Mr. Al-Kawari, Qatar)

that we shall grapple with other problems which are the subject of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva and on which, according to its report, progress has not yet been made. Needless to say, solving those problems requires political will on the part of the negotiators.

The expenditure on arms amounts to nearly \$1,000 billion, and a considerable part of it is devoted to arms research and development. It is estimated that expenditure in this area is four times the amount spent in the whole world on research and development in other areas such as medicine, agriculture, industry and others.

(Mr. Al-Kawari, Qatar)

The international community has long grappled with the problem of the arms race **and** the accompanying spiral in military expenditure that is taking place at the expense of economic and social expenditure. The International **Conference** on the Relationship **between** Disarmament and Development was a combined effort on the part of the international community in the context of the United Nations. Its aims were **to focus** on the relationship between disarmament and development and to outline the measures that could be taken to spend for development purposes the **sums** of money saved as the result of disarmament.

The Conference, which **concluded** its **work** a few weeks ago, requested the General **Assembly** keep the issue under periodic review. We look forward to the result of the General Assembly's efforts to implement that proposal of the Conference. **My** delegation participated in the Conference and **supported** the main goals articulated there - first, to study the link between disarmament and development in all its aspects; secondly, **to study** the consequences of the continuation of vast military expenditures on the world economy and on the world social situation, particularly as it affects the developing countries; thirdly, to consider ways **and** means to provide additional **resources for** development through disarmament **measures**, especially in the interest of the developing countries.

In view of the careful preparations for the Conference, my delegation was hopeful that most of the goals of the Conference **would be** realised and that consensus would **be** reached on the principles to be adopted to deal with the issue. If it is commonly agreed that the Conference had served or would serve to alert public opinion to this issue and to the interconnection between disarmament, security and development, leading to peace and other concrete attempts to deal with **that** issue in all its aspects, the implementation of the conclusions has none the less **been** disappointing to many, including my delegation. It hopes that efforts will not stop at this stage.

(Mr. Al-Kawari, Qatar)

We hope that the Conference will lead to future efforts that might help channel the resources released by disarmament into the areas of economic and social development, especially in the developing countries. We hope that those efforts will serve as a main factor in achieving disarmament, easing tension and stabilizing international peace and security on solid and just foundations.

My delegation supports the request of the Conference - contained in the final paragraph of the Final Document of the Conference - that the General Assembly should keep under periodic review the relationship between disarmament and development, including its consideration at the forthcoming third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament to be held next year.

My delegation wishes to express its profound concern at, and condemnation of, Israel's nuclear armaments, which clearly endangers peace and security in the area. They are a flagrant challenge to a world which is making every effort to prevent the spread of such lethal weapons. The nuclear weapons that Israel today possesses have great destructive power. Although the number of States acceding to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is increasing - there were over 135 at the time of the 1985 Review Conference - Israel still persists in its refusal to accede to that Treaty and to open its nuclear installations to international inspection, unlike the States of the area that acceded to the Treaty and accepted international control over some of their nuclear installations.

Since the mid-1970s, the General Assembly has adopted year after year a resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East - a resolution in which the General Assembly calls upon the States of the region to establish such a zone and invites them, pending the establishment of the zone, not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices and to place their nuclear activities under International Atomic Energy Agency

(Mr. Al-Kawari, Qatar)

(IAEA) safeguards. It also calls on the States of the area to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

However, we see that Israel is flouting those resolutions. It has still not acceded to the NPT. Its nuclear installations are not yet subject to the régime of international safeguards. We continue to support the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. We call on the General Assembly to be strict in its request to Israel to comply with the provisions laid down in this respect.

I must point out in this respect another aspect of Israel's nuclear armaments - that is, the collaboration between the racist régime in Tel Aviv and that in South Africa. This collaboration is still a cause of concern to my country and to the countries of the Middle East and Africa, because it poses a grave threat to many regions of the world and has serious implications for international peace and security. The two régimes are similar, not only from the point of view of possessing a nuclear capability, but also that of possessing nuclear weapons. Like Israel, the Government of South Africa refuses to accede to the NPT and rejects IAEA controls over some of its sensitive nuclear installations.

My delegation fully supports the role played by the United Nations in respect of disarmament, especially through public information. My delegation follows closely and with interest the activities of the World Disarmament Campaign, launched during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament of 1982. We hope that such campaigns will culminate in the realisation of the seriousness of the arms race, the continuation of which will increase the use of armaments, thus putting world security in greater jeopardy.

Mr. MOREL (France) (interpretation from French): On 13 October the Ambassador of Denmark, currently President of the Twelve, set forth the common views of the countries members of the European Community on questions of security, as should be the case. Increasingly, the countries members of the Treaty of Rome and the single European Act perceive a convergence of interests in the areas of disarmament and security.

The events of the past year, whether connected to the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), the Gulf crisis, terrorism or the recent Soviet-United States agreement in principle on intermediate-range nuclear forces, cannot but strengthen us in that conviction. More than ever, the security of Western Europe is undoubtedly at the heart of the East-West dialogue, and it must remain active to promote the collective interests and those of each of its members. This prompts me today to explain the views of France on recent developments and ongoing negotiations.

(Mr. Morel, France)

In the nuclear field we must begin with a consideration of the agreement in principle recently reached on Soviet and American intermediate-range nuclear forcees. Although some expressed their enthusiasm at the outset, without awaiting further developments, we for our part recall that the final text of the agreement has not yet been signed, nor even completed, and we would note that matters are not very clear with regard to substance.

To address the essential, I would say that this agreement in principle, though important from a political standpoint, is relatively limited in the area of disarmament and that its implications for security are still uncertain.

The political importance of the agreement in principle reached at Washington and of the future treaty is obvious. After years of no dialogue, the United States and the USSR have returned to effective negotiations leading to concrete agreements. We welcome this improvement in United States-USSR relations with the greatest interest.

The limited nature of a future treaty on intermediate-range forces is a fact. We are not trying to detract from its value but rather to appreciate it for what it is: it relates to a well-defined category of weapons, namely, intermediate- and shorter range nuclear weapons of the United States and the USSR. It does abolish for the first time a category of weapons, but these are systems whose development has been relatively recent. In other words, the treaty will correct a mistake - the unreasonable deployment of SS-20 missiles during the 1970s. Ten years have been required to achieve this, after considerable political activity, needless obstacles to negotiations, periods of tension and even crisis and vast amounts of money. All could have been avoided. Now, however, we must address the essential question, which is not that of intermediate-range missiles.

(Mr. Morel, France)

Turning finally to **security**, which we view as of overriding interest, we must say that **things are not clear**. A great deal will depend upon the way in which the intermediate-range force agreement will enable the United States and the USSR to address the real priority, which is that of **strategic weapons**. The USSR has stated very clearly that that **treaty is a first step towards the denuclearization of the continent**. That argument is well known; it has been around for a long time. But we do not agree with it. We reject any attempt, on the basis of that limited and specific treaty, to make the presence of nuclear weapons on European soil the subject of future negotiation between the United States and the Soviet Union. so long as the USSR has nuclear weapons, countries of Western Europe will have to rely on similar national or Atlantic Alliance weapons to ensure their own security. That fundamental fact of the balance of forces is precisely what has brought about a response to the unilateral deployment of the SS-20s to obtain their elimination. It continues to be the key to our security.

We cannot ignore the fact that, in spite of this agreement and the goals proclaimed by the USSR with regard to the continent, Europe will continue to live under the very real threat posed by the considerable panoply of Soviet strategic systems.

This is why France considers the goal of a 50 per cent reduction in the strategic arsenals of the Soviet Union and United States set at the Reykjavik summit meeting last October to be the true priority. The two major Powers have set that goal themselves, and henceforth it will be the best means of judging the credibility of their intentions in the area of disarmament. We would recall, however, that such an apparently considerable reduction would only partially redress the long-standing redundancy in Soviet and American weapons, since it would merely reduce the arsenals of the two countries to the levels they had reached at

(Mr. Morel, France)

the time of the SALT II agreement in the late 1970s. In other words, this is an old and deeply entrenched problem. So long as the United States and the USSR do not redress their overkill capacity in strategic weapons, their initiatives and actions in the disarmament field, spectacular as they may be, will continue to play a secondary role.

Along these same lines I should like to refer to the recent attacks against deterrence per se. Such repeated challenges to one of the fundamental elements of security in today's world is on many levels strange, contradictory and, ultimately, artificial. Listening to some of them, one would get the impression that deterrence is absurd, a perverse doctrine, a path leading to the abyss and so on. One would be tempted to call it an emanation of the evil empire.

But let us be more objective and note that deterrence is not mere theory but a practice, a fact. Viewed from the standpoint of security, it is neither miraculous nor evil but rather a part of the history of the past 40 years.

At a time when disarmament and arms-control negotiations are taking on a new dynamism, we fail to see the point of entering into an ideological quarrel that would supposedly separate the good from the bad by means of slogans. Let us rather return to simpler considerations. The nuclear weapon was a product of the last World War, of the intense rivalry between the two largest Powers, and of technological development. It then became one of the fundamental elements of the balance of forces in the contemporary world. As for deterrence, far from being an evil doctrine of unknown provenance, it is the result of behaviour and mechanisms that have been established and gradually improved upon for 40 years by all the parties concerned in an attempt to prevent the outbreak of a nuclear or conventional conflict and thus preserve security.

Based on those statements of fact, which are difficult to impugn, in general the debate today is taking three different directions.

(Mr. Morel, France)

From a historical standpoint the critics of deterrence say that the last 40 years have shown no incontrovertible evidence of having played any effective part in the absence of conflict between East and West. In the light of its own history over the past century, my country can only point out the obvious ineffectiveness of deterrence by conventional means.

From a political standpoint it is said that nuclear deterrence, because of its unstable and dangerous nature, must be replaced by another system of guarantees based on mutual security. This would appear to be the key to current Soviet thinking. France, for its part, cannot forget that in the inter-war period it was the country that supported most vehemently, and for the best of reasons, the establishment of collective security based on co-operation among all States and aimed at replacing the former Power rivalries.

(Mr. Morel, France)

Nor can it forget that the ill-fated attempt of the League of Nations, undertaken among partners motivated by very different intentions, led to the worst conflict the world has known. Nothing is more dangerous than to try to establish security by decree.

There remains the moral argument, that deterrence would preserve security on the basis of principles that are unacceptable from an ethical standpoint. No country denies the fact that its foremost duty is to ensure the security of its citizens, and if moral arguments must be made to challenge deterrence, it must be stressed that it is not acceptable to condemn it without recourse, ignoring the terrible price of past illusions. One does not have the right to let the public believe that a world without nuclear weapons, with its hypothetical benefits, is just around the corner.

We, of course, cannot hope to finish this debate here, a debate so important in our time. We stand ready to pursue it further, being as objective as possible, realizing that the best way to reach this end is to proceed from the actual behaviour of States. Today, in fact, we think that what makes nuclear deterrence a lasting reality is the considerable scope of the strategic programmes of the major Powers. With regard to the USSR in particular, which has stated that it wants to renounce deterrence, we note that it has developed strategic systems unparalleled in the world, such as the Typhon submarine or the mobile intercontinental missile, both designed to remain active for 20 to 30 years, if not more. This will take us well beyond the year 2000. That is the first fact that we must take into account in our debate.

In the ultimate analysis, what is absurd is not deterrence, as such, but the useless, costly, destabilizing accumulation of strategic weapons by the two major Powers. All the same, this is the movement which we now see towards a controlled

(Mr. Morel, France)

and concerted reduction of redundant weapons. Because of the enormous power involved, nuclear weapons call for control of quantity and quality. In brief, they call for taking a *minimal* stand, for economizing. Rather than to decree in theory the inadmissibility of deterrence, we must try to introduce more responsibility, restraint and predictability; in other words, to bring more reason into the process.

This is what France has always believed in, deterrence of the strong by the weak, linking possible recourse to the atomic weapon with the very survival of the nation. Having adopted a minimal stand, my country cannot be placed on the same level as the over-abundant forces of the two major Powers. While awaiting due participation in true nuclear disarmament, when the three well-known conditions relating to the non-development of defensive systems, the present conventional and chemical imbalance and disparity of arsenals will be met, we must maintain the credibility of our strategic forces at the necessary levels, which requires that we continue our nuclear testing.

With regard to the last point, I wish to recall the invitation made on 23 September last in the General Assembly by the French Minister for Foreign Affairs. France, after having taken a new step this year and welcomed several Heads of State or Government of the region to the Mururoa testing site, is ready to welcome political and government officials from the five coastal Pacific Andean countries. We recalled on that occasion that other States for a longer time and on a regular basis have been carrying out more tests. As far as we know, none has opened up this possibility. And none has offered comparable environmental safety guarantees, which in our case were duly verified in 1983 by a high-level expert mission from the region whose conclusions were carefully prepared and are still important today.

(Mr. Morel, France)

I wish now to refer to non-nuclear issues, which are no less important to security and disarmament. The First Committee debates, the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly at its forty-first session and the work of the Disarmament Commission last May clearly confirm this.

Having referred to the future intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) agreement and the remaining uncertainties with regard to its security implications in Europe, I will now begin by stressing the extreme importance in this context of the present considerable imbalances in the area of conventional and chemical weapons.

The Committee does not have to be reminded of France's interest in the control of conventional arms, since it was on its initiative that in 1978 a plan was launched for a conference on disarmament in Europe. After the Stockholm Conference, that proposal became a reality and achieved its first success with the document dated 16 September 1986 on confidence- and security-building measures. Recent developments in this regard confirm our desire to continue working hard along these lines and do even more.

In the first place, we wish to stress the first very positive results obtained through the effective implementation of confidence- and security-building measures. So far the results here have been very satisfactory, be they in the area of notification, exchanges of observers or, especially, inspection measures. The latter, which are by far the most sensitive to tackle, have quite recently been put through several tests. Time periods were observed, the necessary means for inspection were provided, and on-site verification was carried out to the satisfaction of the requesting country. These first experiences, which are now possible, normal and agreed to, will henceforth contribute to strengthening confidence in Europe, and confirm that the direction taken in Stockholm was the right one.

(Mr. Morol, France)

Now, we must work on preparations for a conference on conventional stability in Europe, with a view to arriving at a stable, secure and verifiable balance of conventional forces at lower levels.

The Vienna follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE) provides for consideration of the future framework for a twofold exercise covering all of Europe: on the one hand, negotiations on confidence- and security-building measures, which will be a follow-up to and complete the results of the Stockholm Conference between the 35 participants in the CSCE; and on the other, negotiations on conventional stability among the countries members of both alliances, with a view to adopting verifiable measures of control, reduction and redeployment, or any other measures which apply to armed forces and conventional weapons in Europe. It has now been clearly established, and my country has spared no efforts in this regard, that these two sets of negotiations will involve appropriate progress reports to the "35" by the "23" on their work, and that they will take place within the unique multilateral framework of the CSCE.

This brief account of the preparatory work in progress in Vienna is by way of drawing attention to the importance and relevance of this twofold exercise. It has required intense consultation within the alliances. But France is also very much interested in the proposals and contribution of countries members of the Warsaw Pact, as well as in the specific views of the neutral and non-aligned countries.

We have stressed in particular the proposals made to the East on the question of military doctrines, which have been discussed often in this Committee. These doctrines must be taken for what they are, something which can always be changed unilaterally, whereas military capabilities are the result of forces, of positions and of structures which have been long established and also of a State's assessment of its opponent's forces. All these elements are more lasting, more objective and more linked to the situation as it exists than doctrines per se.

(Mr. Morel, France)

Having treasured the importance we attach to conventional disarmament, I wish to add that this question is not of concern to Europe only. For States that so desire, and given specific regional conditions, it provides a way of reducing confrontation and strengthening stability and security in the region in question. There are many areas in the world where, as in Europe, it would be desirable to reduce the threat of surprise attack and large-scale military offensives.

We stated those views last year when we submitted a draft resolution which, after very useful negotiations, led to the adoption of resolution 41/59 E, which enjoyed broad support. With an eye to developments since then, we intend this year to propose a draft resolution responding to the same concern.

As in the case of conventional disarmament, the future treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces makes us stress the need for the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. Considerable progress was made - sometimes more rapidly than anticipated - at Geneva this year in the negotiation of a draft convention; that is part of the good news participants can bring to New York. But we must also stress that major questions have not yet really been resolved. Among them are: the institutional framework of a future convention; the implementation and verification of non-production in civilian industry; informing parties to the convention; and the destruction of stockpiles.

Outside Geneva too, the picture is one of contrasts. We met with interest the Soviet invitation to visit the Shikhany chemical site; yet we must deplore the repeated violation of the 1925 Protocol in the Iran-Iraq war.

France has long attached importance to the question of stockpiles and last June made specific proposals. I wish briefly to recall these here. We agree that security is an imperative that must be respected for all States parties when the convention enters into force, and throughout the initial 10-year period

(Mr. Morel, France)

provided for the total destruction of stockpiles, the complete success of which is indispensable if we are to move to the final régime of a total prohibition. To prevent the treaty from becoming during that period - like the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty - a disarmament treaty of disarmed countries, maintaining the armament of some and the non-armament of others - we have proposed the establishment of a provisional security balance enabling all States which deem it necessary to possess a minimal chemical-weapons capability in the form of a security stock of some 1,000 to 2,000 metric tons under very strict constraints. These stocks would be destroyed during the final two years of the 10-year period. These quantities can be put in context by recalling - using declared quantities in one case and estimates in the other - that the two major Powers now possess stocks of tens of thousands and hundreds of thousands of metric tons respectively. That disparity should show that security stocks can only act as a deterrent and defensive force in the event of a possible chemical attack. Thus, there is no contradiction with the provisions of the 1925 Geneva Protocol.

For technical and security reasons, those stocks would be established with a single production facility that would be under international control from the entry into force of the convention until the end of the 10-year period. This may be surprising to some, but we think it is necessary to meet possible incidents during a long period of storage and, above all, to deter any party that might be tempted to deceive and convince all non-signatory States that there is no clear advantage to remaining outside the convention. The State that is the site of this single facility would obviously have to accept a very strict international monitoring mechanism.

(Mr. Morel, France)

In more general **terms**, it goes without saying that verification plays an essential role here; it is indispensable for ensuring that this temporary **régime** is not diverted to other ends. without going into details, I would recall that we Proposed submitting these security stocks to challenge inspection procedures and giving notice of the location of these stocks upon the entry into force of the convention, in accordance with a special **régime** known as an envelope **régime**.

As I remind the First Committee of the outlines of **our** proposal, I Want also to note **that it** has met with strong reservations which have by no means disappeared. But I want also to say that none of the countries participating in the negotiations has denied that the problems of the security of the parties during the 10-year period, which had been ignored for too long, are decisive for the implementation of the convention. The main objection involveu tne risk of **cnemical** proliferation. We **respond** that this risk exists in any event without security **stocks**, since no State can be compelled **to** adhere to the convention. With the stocks we are proposing, which involve a very strict and intrusive machinery, the regime would be particularly selective. It would attract countries with a real security problem and prepared to pay the price in terms of sovereignty, and would prevent resisters from taking easy advantage of constraints for parties and licence for themselves.

Let me conclude on this point **by** saying that discussion on the central question of security has finally begun. **We have stated** our readiness to study the question in depth. Whatever the final solution we remain convinced that there can **be no stable**, solid and lasting convention if the security of all parties is not continuously guaranteed during the 10-year period. So there can **be** no mistaking our intentions, I shall recall the position publicly stated by OUR Prime **Minister** last May in Moscow:

(Mr. Morel, France)

"When there is verified elimination of chemical weapons, we shall destroy ours; I can undertake a formal pledge that we shall reach the zero point at the same time as the others."

The international community has continued to be interested in the question of the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Yet we feel it could do more in this sphere; on the bilateral level, the Geneva negotiations continue. Everyone knows how important they are, and we hope they will lead to concrete results. In that context, we reaffirm our commitment to the Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty. In our view, if it is to be changed, this can be only through agreement between the parties.

But we must also express concern here over the role of the international community in outer space matters. I recall my country's unchanging position: the international community must play an indispensable supplementary role. This role already exists, but it should be developed in a far more active and methodical way. We must not act in haste; the extreme caution of the two Powers most directly involved is very instructive in this respect. In our view, multilateral work toward a systematic inventory of space activities, of their security consequences and of possible developments should be carried forward more actively.

(Mr. Morel, France)

If the international community wishes to assert its role in this field - and it has excellent reasons for doing so - it must prove its competence. It must define its terms of reference, take technological uncertainty into account and not be ready to act in haste. It is through such work that the time for the major choices would come after gaining future credibility in this field.

Many proposals need to be looked into more thoroughly, including French proposals which have been made for the past 10 years and where present developments confirm that they have been wise, be it on the question of anti-satellite weapons, the high-orbit, strengthening the registration régime for space objects or, in more general terms, the plan for an international satellite monitoring agency. Recent international developments, practical experience in high quality remote sensing by civilians, with the French satellite "SPOT" and various projects under study, show that the necessary means for such an agency to operate already exist in the countries with a space capability other than the two major-Powers.

I should like to add on prevention of the arms race in space that, as far as the Western countries are concerned, my country together with Italy this year will co-operate in the preparation of a consensus text along the lines of last year's text.

Concerning international security, and in particular the Soviet proposal, I shall refer to this later on in the debate.

Finally, I wish today to refer to the recent Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. The plan proposed by the President of France in 1981 led to the first result which we should address. Despite the difficult circumstances and profound differences between all the various theses about this, it was possible to confirm the importance of security in the disarmament-development relationship, to approach the very important question of

(Mr. Morel, France)

the transparency of military budgets and to consider various concrete measures. Undeniable differences surfaced in the work of the Conference, but this did not prevent all participants from arriving at a consensus. In order to mark the stage set by the New York Conference in further thought on this difficult question, which has now received recognition, France will in the near future submit a draft resolution with a view to its adoption by consensus.

As I was able to underscore in the case of nuclear disarmament, it may be stated in more general terms that progress can be made in the treatment of all the major disarmament issues only if they are treated with more reason and responsibility in the particularly difficult areas. In general, one can say that, this year, progress has been made along those lines, and further important, not to say essential, progress is awaited. This points to the importance of our forthcoming meeting, that is, the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which we shall prepare for most actively. At all times we shall need to be lucid. As stated by the French Foreign Minister on 23 September, more disarmament does not necessarily mean more security. The very clear and firm commitment of my country to all the questions to which I have referred is precisely in keeping with its desire to guarantee at all times most clearly that disarmament will lead to better security.

Mr. ALZLDGALY (Oman) (interpretation from Arabic): May I congratulate you once again, sir, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the First Committee. My delegation is confident that, under your guidance and with the help of the other officers, the Committee will achieve success.

I should also like at the outset to state that my country, through its membership in this International Organization and through our participation as a developing country in its work, reaffirms its keen interest in safeguarding

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international peace and security and the implementation of the plans of this world body.

Having listened to the statements of the delegations which have spoken so far, we feel that progress has been made towards better international relations. We are particularly gratified that agreement was the outcome of the recent meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the two super-Powers, the United States and the Soviet Union. This agreement augurs well for the limitation of the nuclear threats and demonstrates the serious intentions of the super-Powers to curb the arms race and halt the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The immediate gain is the elimination, as a first step, of two categories of destructive weapons, namely, shorter-range and intermediate-range nuclear missiles. We, on our part, commend this initiative and hope that the two countries will soon reach an understanding on the other issues of disarmament which are the concern of humanity as a whole, namely, the limitation of nuclear tests and giving an impetus to a process that would lead to an agreement which the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva has been advocating for a long time now with a view to halting the proliferation, production and use of chemical and bacteriological weapons.

This nascent convergence of views and these decidedly peaceful initiatives could never have been possible were it not for the dedicated efforts of the United Nations and its specialized agencies. Since its inception, the United Nations has spared no effort in trying to contain crises, in compliance with the noble objectives of its Charter. The United Nations was created to ensure the well-being and co-operation of all.

Consequently, the Sultanate of Oman attaches special importance to the role of the United Nations and its agencies in safeguarding peace and security and co-operation between peoples. Therefore, we in the Sultanate, look forward to the

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third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which will be held early next year. Our participation in that dialogue should be viewed as the contribution of an Arab/Muslim developing and non-aligned country genuinely interested in the search for peace and security in every part of the world.

We believe that we must all make a positive contribution to the creation of the conditions which would make it possible to accept the new reality of a world wherein the equal sovereign rights of all should be respected, the need for non-interference in the internal affairs fully recognized and the right of every people to choose their own political system without any foreign interference duly safeguarded.

The Sultanate also believes that despite the cautious optimism that has come to pervade the world as a result of the Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development held in New York earlier this year, it is imperative that we pay heed to the military and other risks such as hunger and poverty which continue to threaten us all and wake up to the need for mutual confidence and determined action to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the extension of the arms race into outer space.

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The Sultanate believes that holding this conference, the first of its kind, under the auspices of the United Nations, will strengthen the international community's confidence in the role of this Organization and consolidate the common effort and collective resolve to meet the world's problems.

In its report to the Secretary-General in compliance with resolution 41/48, the Sultanate of Oman made a point of stating that, like all other countries of the world and States Members of this Organization, it shares the views of peace-loving forces and is aware of the increasing importance of creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.

While Oman upholds and supports the idea of declaring the Middle East a zone of peace, free from nuclear weapons, it hopes to draw the attention of the international community to the fact that the increasing nuclear capability of the Israeli entity and its refusal to place its nuclear facilities under the supervision and safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) pose a serious threat indeed to the security of all the States of the region and obstruct the efforts aimed at making the Middle East a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

The Sultanate's awareness of the destabilizing effect of this situation on the region re-emphasizes the need to intensify the efforts of the United Nations and its agencies. We believe that the international community should have the wisdom and far-sightedness to realize the concomitance of creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and safeguarding international peace and security.

The Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of my country has referred, in his statement to the General Assembly at this session, to the fact that the Sultanate of Oman, in seeking the maintenance of balance in the region and distancing it from the maelstrom of big-Power rivalry, has called and continues to call for the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, embodied

(Mr. Alzedgaly, Oman)

in General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI) of 1971. Events in that region show that the implementation of that Declaration will be a major step towards the establishment of international peace and security.

There is no doubt that the Conference on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace is a long-overdue step that should be taken to implement that Declaration.

The Sultanate of Oman regrets that the Conference has been postponed once again and hopes that the resolution unanimously adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean at its last session - calling for that Conference to be convened not later than 1991 - will prove to be conclusive.

In conclusion, because we are a coastal State, we deem it necessary to ensure the freedom of navigation and the flow of international trade under the rule of international law and the Convention on the Law of the Sea. These are vital principles which should not be violated by anyone, for any reason, under any pretext..

My country, which has jealously defended its national independence throughout its history, has embarked on a policy of good-neighbourliness with fraternal neighbouring countries since 1970.

We have made a genuine contribution to the establishment of the Arab Gulf Co-operation Council. We have also made positive contributions through our membership in the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries, as well as in this Organization and its specialized agencies. We have always been cognizant of the importance of peace and security as a means of successful economic and social development.

(. Alzedgaly, Oman)

For all these reasons, we reaffirm the importance of building trust and confidence between all the countries and groupings of the world, so that all may live in an atmosphere of international peace and security, free from nuclear risks.

The meeting rose at 12.45 p.m.