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Chairman: Mr. BACBENI ADEITO NZENGEYA (**Zaire**)

CONTENTS

GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS (continued)

Statements were made by:

Mr. Ott (**German Democratic Republic**)
Mr. Badawi (**Egypt**)
Mr. Petrovsky (**Union of Soviet Socialist Republics**)
Mr. Lautenschlager (**Germany, Federal Republic of**)
Mr. Eggar (**United Kingdom**)
Mr. Horn (**Hungary**)

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AGENDA ITEMS 48 'PO 69 (cont inued)

GENWAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS

Mr. OTT (German Democratic Republic): On behalf of the delegation of the German Democratic Republic, I wish to congratulate you, Sir, on your assumption of the chairmanship of this important Committee. My delegation is convinced that under your able guidance our work will be crowned with success. Let me assure you and the other Committee officers of my delegation's constructive support.

In a few days, 70 years will have passed since the young Soviet State, with its Decree of Peace, addressed a peace offer to Governments and peoples in order to "Free mankind from the horrors of war and its consequences". Today, in 1987, the opportunity to proceed to disarmament and ensure a durable peace is within reach, thanks to significant developments in international relations during the past few weeks and months.

The emerging accord on the total elimination of two categories of nuclear weapons, the medium-range and shorter-range nuclear missiles of the Soviet Union and the United States of America, has enhanced the possibility of progress in other important areas of arms limitation and disarmament. Thus, the opportunities to push open the door to nuclear disarmament are more favourable than ever before. What is needed now is more intensive thought on guarantees for a secure world and on new rules for coexistence among States, rules which will meet the realities of the nuclear and space age.

That need was taken into account by the socialist States when they proposed the creation of a comprehensive system of international peace and security. After broad and open discussion, the outlines of such a system are already beginning to appear. It could operate within the Framework of the United Nations and on the basis of its Charter.

(Mr. Ott, German Democratic Republic)

We take the view that the effectiveness of the system could be ensured through strict observance of the requirements of the Charter, additional unilateral commitments by States and measures of confidence and international co-operation in all areas: military-political, economic, ecological, humanitarian and others.

The implementation of the idea of comprehensive security in the military-political area, as we see it, would not only show recognition of the fact that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought; above all it would mean taking steps towards the stage-by-stage elimination of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction by the year 2000. The German Democratic Republic therefore welcomes the agreement in principle reached between the Soviet Union and the United States on global elimination of their land-based medium-range and shorter-range missiles. The conclusion of such an agreement and its translation into practice without ifs, ands or buts would indeed be an expression of a new political thinking. It would mark the beginning of genuine nuclear disarmament. Together with all other forces of common sense and realism, the German Democratic Republic has contributed, and will continue to contribute, its share to bringing about without delay a double-zero solution concerning intermediate-range missiles. We have repeatedly reaffirmed our readiness to guarantee the required verification procedures on our territory in connection with the implementation of such an accord.

It is therefore of special importance that in the joint communiqué issued during the official visit of the Head of State of the German Democratic Republic, Erich Honecker, to the Federal Republic of Germany, the following was laid down:

"Both sides stressed the particular importance of an agreement on intermediate-range systems and declared that the world-wide elimination of Soviet and United States intermediate-range missiles with a range of over

(Mr. Ott, German Democratic Republic)

500 kilometres would essentially enhance stability and security in Europe and Asia.*

General-Secretary Erich Honecker and Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl shared the view that the conclusion of such an agreement would have positive effects on other fields of arms limitation and disarmament as well as on East-West relations in general, and that the opportunity offered should be seized. In their joint communiqué, both States emphasised their will to contribute to the success of negotiations on arms limitation and disarmament and to continue their dialogue regarding those questions.

The achievement of an agreement on intermediate-range missiles would also expose the untenable character of concepts regarding the so-called limited use of nuclear weapons, the so-called controllable escalation of nuclear conflicts, and, finally, the dangerous doctrine of "nuclear deterrence". At their Berlin summit, the Warsaw Treaty States stressed that the current situation in the world demanded abandonment of the concept of nuclear deterrence. To prevent war and banish it for ever from the life of mankind was stated as the most important task. The participants in the socialist alliance further reaffirmed that their military doctrine was strictly defensive in nature. They expressed their readiness to co-operate with a view to overcoming stereotyped enemy images, enhancing confidence in relations between States with different social systems and their respective military-political alliances, and promoting a better perception of the other side's concerns, objectives and intentions in the military field. The participants in the Berlin summit had exactly those ends in mind when they proposed consultations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty organization to analyse the character of their respective military doctrines and jointly discuss the patterns of their future development.

(Mr. Ott , German Democratic
Republic)

Why, we ask, should it not be possible to have direct negotiations between the two alliances regarding a 'strategy of defence'? The socialist peace programme, which was further defined at the Berlin summit, is truly comprehensive and does not leave out any kind of weapon. It advocates following the Soviet-United States accord on intermediate-range missiles with other agreements. proceeding, so to speak, from one zero solution to another. To that end, the following tasks should have priority;

First, there should be a radical reduction in offensive strategic weapons, with a strengthening of the anti-ballistic missile Treaty. The German Democratic Republic welcomes the agreement recently achieved in Washington between the Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, and the United States Secretary of State, George Shultz, on making active efforts towards the formulation of a treaty on a 50 per cent. reduction in the offensive strategic weapons of the two countries. A key question is, undoubtedly, the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

(Mr. Ott, German Democratic Republic)

Secondly, there should be a complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests as a decisive step towards ending the nuclear-arms race, especially in the qualitative field. The moratorium on all nuclear explosions which the Soviet Union observed for 18 months has given fresh impetus to the world-wide efforts for a comprehensive test ban.

Recent Soviet activities, the proposal for "Basic provisions of 3 treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests" which the socialist States submitted at the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva on 9 June of this year, the proposal made by the six-nation initiative for peace and disarmament, and those of other countries and non-governmental organizations leave no doubt that there are no technical obstacles whatsoever that might block the conclusion of a comprehensive and reliably verifiable test-ban treaty. The comprehensive, step-by-step negotiations which the Soviet Union and the United States of America intend to start soon must find the necessary multilateral complement in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

Thirdly, the earliest possible conclusion of a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons is imperative. We are aware that even more intensive efforts will be required from all sides to resolve the remaining questions. We consider the demonstrations of methods of destroying chemical weapons carried out in the Soviet Union for participants in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament as a very far-reaching confidence-building measure. During the workshop at Shikhany a host of ideas and suggestions were put forward on how to continue at the Geneva negotiations. We express the hope that no attempts will be made in those negotiations to complicate the discussions through unilateral steps and proposals directed against the purpose of the agreement.

(Mr. Ott, German Democratic Republic)

The start of the production of binary chemical weapons would be a serious set-back for efforts designed to eliminate those weapons completely. In contrast, the USSR, which this year declared that it will forgo the production of chemical weapons, has made an important advance concession in the interest of the earliest conclusion of the convention.

Fourthly, it is furthermore of great importance to complement and stimulate global disarmament steps through regional disarmament measures. Important elements of global solutions are the proposals of my country and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to establish a nuclear-weapon-free corridor and a chemical-weapon-free zone in Central Europe, and the Polish initiative known as the Jaruzelski Plan. Similar proposals exist for other European regions and other parts of the world. Only recently, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev submitted at Murmansk new, far-reaching proposals for a nuclear-weapon-free North and for peaceful co-operation in northern Europe and the Arctic. The German Democratic Republic follows with great interest the upswing of regional disarmament efforts as they reflect indeed the growing responsibility of all States, large, medium and small, for tackling the vital problems of mankind.

Fifthly, we consider as another priority measure the intensification of the efforts for conventional disarmament. International peace and security could, in my country's view, be considerably strengthened if the military forces and conventional armaments of States were reduced to levels appropriate for defence, thereby taking into account specific regional characteristics.

One of the fundamental aims of the military doctrine of the Warsaw Treaty organization is the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe to a level where neither side would have the means to stage a surprise attack against the other or offensive operations in general, while maintaining a capacity sufficient for defence.

(Mr. Otto German Democratic Republic)

Measures aimed at lessening military confrontation and averting the danger of surprise attack - such as the mutual withdrawal of the most dangerous categories of offensive weapons from the zone of direct contact between the two military alliances - would enhance military stability in Europe and initiate a process of restructuring the armed forces leading to a non-offensive capability on both sides.

The German Democratic Republic advocates an early start of negotiations, within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), on the reduction of armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe and participates actively in consultations between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Treaty organization regarding the elaboration of a permanent mandate. The proposals submitted by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty in Budapest in June 1986 represent a substantial basis for such negotiations. The reductions of conventional armed forces and armaments should be seen in conjunction with the reduction of tactical nuclear systems.

The asymmetrical structures and imbalances in certain categories of armaments and armed forces, which are rooted in historical, geographical and other factors, should be redressed, with the side which has an advantage over the other making the appropriate cutbacks.

The German Democratic Republic is in favour of further confidence- and security-building measures within the CSCE framework - for example, regarding the activities of naval and air forces and the restriction of the scale of military manoeuvres. My country has scrupulously carried out the corresponding obligations that it assumed under the Stockholm Document of September 1986. Already three times this year observers from 22 CSCE States were able to confirm the non-threatening character of the notified manoeuvres on the territory of the German

(Mr. Ott, German Democratic Republic)

Democratic Republic. Furthermore, at the request of the United Kingdom an inspection on the territory of the German Democratic Republic within the framework of the Stockholm Document took place. There are active contributions to the reduction of distrust in the sensitive field of military security, contributions that will have a favourable impact on ongoing and future disarmament negotiations. At the same time they reflect new thinking in action.

Mr. BADAWI (Egypt) (interpretation from Arabic): On my own behalf, and on behalf of the Egyptian delegation, I am happy to congratulate you, sir, on your election to the chairmanship of this Committee. I assure you of our full confidence in your conduct of our deliberations, a confidence based on your wisdom and diplomatic skill and experience, reflected in your very able work during your long diplomatic career, work that has included chairing the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.

I am also pleased to congratulate the Vice-Chairmen and Rapporteur of our Committee. I assure all the officers of the Committee of our full co-operation, so that the Committee may achieve the desired results or enhancing disarmament efforts and establishing international stability and security.

This is probably the last session of our Committee to be held before the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which we hope will take place next Summer. Therefore, perhaps we may pause now to take stock of our work and place consequent recommendations before the international community. That could be a positive contribution on our part, which might enable the special session to agree on the necessary arrangements to enhance our work and remedy our failures and set us on a new course. In this context, I have the following remarks to make.

First, in recent years a new disturbing trend has emerged, and it is growing stronger year by year: the tendency to separate the various international organizations concerned with international security and disarmament - the First Committee, the Disarmament Commission and the Geneva Conference on Disarmament. It is serious to say that the resolutions adopted by the First Committee do not affect the work of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Badawi, Egypt)

Although we are convinced that each of the three bodies has a **specific** nature, and the **C**onference on **D**isarmament has its distinctive negotiating role, the difference in the nature of the work **done** by some bodies does not warrant their separation. To say otherwise is to question the commitment of some to the unity of the United Nations system and acceptance of that **s**ystem as a framework for **a**ll international relations matters. That point of view also ignores the obvious fact that those bodies were established and assigned specific tasks within the framework of the United Nations system and in accordance with its Charter. Hence, the difference in the tasks assigned to them or their method of adopting resolutions cannot be accepted as a pretext for calling for **s**eparation of those bodies.

Because the **E**gyptian **d**ele~~gation~~ does not agree with that, it reiterates that all these international forums concerned with international security and disarmament are inseparable. The First Committee has a major role in defining the political directions of **M**ember **S**tates and of all those **b**odies. We hope that the forthcoming special session will affirm this concept, so that co-ordination between the various international forums may become more effective.

Secondly, Egypt - and perhaps all other delegations - has noticed the **i**ncrease in the number of resolutions adopted by the Committee every year. That in itself does not worry us, as long as it is the result of a growing concern by the international community about disarmament. We are prompted to raise the question because we feel that the quantitative increase has not been an expression of constructive participation, but, rather, is the result of an attempt to **s**trike a balance with other resolutions or to use them as bargaining counters in the negotiating process. It is not our intention to prejudice the right of every Member State to submit the draft resolutions that it deems fit, but, the **i**ncrease in the number of resolutions that we have seen in the Committee has affected their

(Mr. Bsdawi, Egypt)

credibility and has negative implications for our Committee's work as a whole. We call upon the Committee to seek ways and means to make its work more useful and effective. This in turn will strengthen its direct impact on disarmament and create more respect for its resolutions on the part of the international community.

The solution may lie in holding a number of informal meetings to exchange views on the draft resolutions, particularly those related to agenda items requiring more than one draft resolution. That would avoid any duplication or overlapping.

The forthcoming special session of the General Assembly will be a favourable opportunity to call upon representatives to intensify their efforts to adopt resolutions that restore credibility to the Committee and reinforce the international community's respect for its work.

My third and last point, and perhaps the most important, relates to limiting the role of multilateralism in the disarmament field. We have noticed that some multilateral bodies have thought themselves unable to discharge their responsibilities concerning some matters submitted to them, under the pretext that those matters are being negotiated bilaterally. That has also been reflected in the First Committee's work. The Committee was reluctant to adopt resolutions on some substantive aspects, lest those resolutions influence the conduct of bilateral negotiations, when it should support and welcome that bilateral concept. Therefore, we have become idle spectators, unable to participate positively in matter 1 of the utmost importance to us.

We are concerned to see multilateral relations and diplomacy play this cosmetic role, which does not reflect its reality in guiding the international community and determining the ground rules that should govern international relations at all levels, particularly as regards international security and

(Ms. Badawi, Egypt)

disarmament. The special session should underline the genuine, fundamental role of the First Committee and all the other multilateral negotiating bodies on these matters.

We must decide our choices clearly. It is no longer acceptable to pursue policies that result in aggravating international confrontation, under the pretext of seeking further security, policies that give new stimulus to the arms race and consequently waste world resources and wealth, at a time when thousands are dying of famine or living in inhuman conditions. We must now join hands and simultaneously rally international, regional and national efforts in all spheres.

We now have a golden opportunity to make some progress towards eliminating the risk of nuclear annihilation once and for all. We are gathering after the meeting between the Foreign Ministers of the Super-Powers. There is reason for optimism, since the two have reached an agreement in principle on banning certain classes of nuclear missiles. Egypt welcomes this and all other sincere efforts to achieve disarmament and alleviate international tension. We wish them the best in their efforts, especially those related to nuclear weapons, which are the gravest threat to mankind.

(Mr. Badawi, Egypt)

Such efforts are being made with regard to a region geographically close to us where weapons of all types are stockpiled, a region where all strategic doctrines related to the policy of military blocs are to be found. Egypt, a non-aligned country, does not subscribe to such doctrines. While we welcome these efforts, it is incumbent upon us to renew our appeal for the intensification of efforts in all fields of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. In this regard, I would like to refer to the importance of the declaration made by the super-Powers of their endeavour, in the near future, to eliminate nuclear strategic weapons and to take measures leading to the banning of nuclear tests.

It is the responsibility of the whole world to take an effective part in measures to eliminate nuclear weapons. More than twenty years have passed since the conclusion of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which is the basis for an international system for the prevention of such proliferation. The current international situation and the fact that renewal of its validity will be considered by its supporters in the near future, will perhaps provide an impetus for the parties to the Treaty to prove that their practices are in accordance with its spirit. The NPT was concluded as a first step towards preventing vertical and horizontal proliferation of those weapons, a step towards nuclear disarmament. It is no longer acceptable that, after two decades, the nuclear-weapon States - parties to the Treaty - while agreeing that nuclear disarmament is a sensitive and complex issue, argue that they have honoured their obligations since they have taken part in the negotiations on some types of nuclear weapons.

It is also no longer acceptable to have two kinds of non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Convention. The first kind consider themselves non-nuclear despite

(Mr. Badawi, Egypt)

the proliferation of nuclear weapons on their territories, or because they enjoy the protection or nuclear shield given by a major Power or because they have joined one of the major military blocs. The second kind is subject to all safeguards and inspection to verify that they do not possess nuclear weapons and have accepted inspection procedures, with the result that these procedures prejudice their right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

It is a contradiction that we are unable to establish an international system that provides mandatory safeguards for the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Because we are all non-nuclear-weapon States we are in the same boat, without distinction between those which entered into security arrangements that include nuclear components and those which declined to accept such arrangements.

As for the countries that decided to remain outside the framework of the Treaty, we question the value of maintaining nuclear arsenals for security reasons as long as those arsenals are, as their owners acknowledged, limited in their capacity as compared with the nuclear arsenals of the super-Powers. All those who demand non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament are called upon to translate their positions into practical steps or initiatives, or to accede to international or regional arrangements for the promotion and development of the non-proliferation system.

It is natural that every country should determine its position and policies and that we may differ in interpreting some issues, particularly the regional or national ones. We must however agree that nuclear danger is unlimited. Whether the initiator or the aggressor is the oppressed or the oppressor, nuclear war will entail disastrous results for all. This should prompt us to participate in a positive way in the elaboration of an international system that satisfies us and protects us from this deadly peril.

(Mr. Badawi, Egypt)

Before commenting on non-nuclear issues, we would like to reiterate our support for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different regions of the world as one of the arrangements that could help prevent horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, and for the development of a nuclear non-proliferation régime conducive to nuclear disarmament.

We hope that international efforts to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and to implement the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa may be translated into action. We would like to express our regret that Israel and South Africa still have nuclear installations not subject to international safeguards. We appeal to them to accede to the NPT or to permit international inspection of their nuclear facilities as a practical step towards ensuring that both regions will remain free from nuclear weapons.

Everyone agrees that general and complete disarmament under effective international control is very complicated and may require more time for its realization. Despite our differences regarding the way or the time needed to achieve it, one thing is beyond dispute: the fact that the extension of the arms race to new horizons cannot lead to achievement of that objective. This applies particularly to the extension of the arms race to outer space. This will drag us into needless mazes that jeopardize the efforts and agreements made to ward off this development.

In keeping with its firm belief in the necessity of preserving outer space for the benefit of mankind and of prohibiting its use for military purposes, Egypt, together with a number of other countries, submits each year a draft resolution on the prevention of an arms race in outer space, in which it requests the international community to take further effective measures to prevent such a race since outer space should be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and for the

(Mr. Badawi, Egypt)

benefit of mankind. Militarization of outer space would add to the present dangers of the nuclear arms race.

The First Committee should make the following specific recommendations to give impetus to negotiations on this subject: first, consideration of specific arrangements to alleviate the aggravation of this issue and to prevent extension of the arms race in outer space; secondly, strengthening of the legal system relating to outer space with a view to achieving this goal; thirdly, creation of the necessary international climate through agreement on confidence-building measures to ensure the success of negotiations on the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

In discussions relating to disarmament, the international community gives priority to weapons of mass destruction immediately after nuclear weapons. Among the weapons that have with good reason gained growing attention, are chemical weapons. The Geneva Conference on Disarmament has made substantive progress towards conclusion of an agreement banning the production of these weapons and calling for their destruction.

(Mr. Badawi, Egypt)

The First Committee acknowledges that achievement, as well as the need to conclude such an agreement. We hope that the remaining issues under negotiation will be settled so that another achievement may be made in the field of conventional disarmament. However, we regret that the Conference on Disarmament did not conclude an agreement, particularly since it has become obvious that the impediment to achieving that goal is a lack of political will to eliminate such weapons once and for all and to pledge not to produce other, more sophisticated weapons.

In conclusion, I should like to mention that the deliberations in the Committee are taking place right after the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. That Conference, within limits, was successful. It underlined the close relationship that exists between disarmament and development, particularly as it affects developing countries. It represents a constructive forward step that deserves support. Additional measures must be taken to examine the relationship in a practical and fruitful manner.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian) : The Soviet delegation fully shares the view expressed by many States not only that the emerging bilateral Soviet-United States movement towards disarmament is not only conducive to the undertaking of multilateral efforts to achieve security through disarmament, but that it should be viewed as an organic part of the intensification of such efforts in all areas.

We are convinced that the internationalization of the concern for security building, both in the military and in other areas of international relations, is today a necessity. It is a result of the growing interdependence of States and of the realities of the nuclear and space ages. The world we live in and which we

(Mr. Patrovsky, USSR)

must pass on to succeeding generations is too small and fragile for military competition and too vulnerable, both economically and ecologically, for us to continue to waste our energies and resources on preparations for universal annihilation.

Common sense, the instinct of self-preservation and the ethical norms of civilization demand that all of us transcend the limits of our national experience, accept the reality of the world community and realize that we all, whatever our geographical or ideological divisions, are residents of "man's world", in the phrase of Antoine de Saint-Exupéry, the French humanist writer.

This means organizing life in our common planetary dwelling in such a manner that the security of all may guarantee the security of each and every one, and that such security may be ensured by solid guarantees of mutually beneficial co-operation and by the primacy of international law.

In the article by Mikhail S. Gorbachev, "The Reality and the Guarantees of a Secure World", the States Members of the United Nations and the world community are invited to engage in a wide-ranging and creative exchange of views on ways and means of achieving that world order.

I doubt if anyone seriously challenges the idea that a really solid security edifice, built to last as it were, can be built by using a mixture that does not contain a nuclear ingredient. The concept of genuine security for all is incompatible with the policy of intimidation and with the absurd and immoral situation in which the entire world is held nuclear hostage.

We regard nuclear weapons not as an inevitable element in stability but, rather, as a destabilizing factor that undermines not only the security of the side against which they are aimed but also the security of the side that possesses

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

them. Such weapons are also the main obstacle to any genuine democratization of relations among States and to their real equality and joint responsibility.

An attitude of nuclear arrogance toward international dialogue is unconscionable. Those who insist on boycotting such a dialogue, on whatever pretext, setting themselves up against the world community and ignoring its expressed will, are in the final analysis only doing harm to themselves.

Today, it is imperative to bring the military and political conduct of nuclear-weapon States into conformity with the fundamental conclusion that a nuclear war must not be fought and cannot be won. We favour a determined intensification of the efforts of the whole of the international community with a view to preventing nuclear war, to achieving nuclear disarmament and to entering into a substantive discussion of the entire range of nuclear issues in all multilateral forums.

The Soviet Union keeps the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament regularly informed of the progress at the bilateral Soviet-United States negotiation in Geneva. Although a certain amount of confidentiality is useful in the conduct of such negotiations, the world community must be made aware of the work being done and of the progress being achieved.

We believe that it is precisely because of the strength of collective reason and the expressed will of the whole of the world community that there now exists a real and feasible opportunity to create a nuclear-free and safe world before the end of the century. What is involved is a nuclear-free future for all, and disarmament questions cannot therefore be fully resolved solely within the framework of bilateral United States-USSR talks. The creative participation of the Governments and peoples of all countries is required.

(MC. Pet roveky , USSR)

The building of a nuclear-free world ~~covers~~ the broadest possible gamut of action. It cannot be confined to reductions in existing nuclear arsenals, but must include the strengthening of the régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the establishment of denuclearized zones and, finally, guarantees against the reconstitution of nuclear weapons.

We were impressed by the proposal made by the Foreign Minister of Norway, Mr. Stoltenberg, to raise the level of political participation in meetings of main United Nations bodies and to hold periodic meetings of the security Council at the foreign-minister level. We are thinking along the same lines. A more efficient United Nations involvement in dealing with the problem of the elimination of nuclear weapons could, in our view, be facilitated by using the potential of the Security Council as the body which, under Article 26 of the United Nations Charter, is responsible for drawing up plans for establishing a system for the regulation of armaments. The Soviet Union is in favour of convening, after the necessary preparations, a special meeting or meetings of the Security Council, possibly at the foreign-minister level, to discuss the goals and objectives in the field of nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

Apart from addressing the issues of reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons and creating the necessary conditions for that purpose, the proposed exchange of views could provide an outline of specific measures conducive to ridding the world of nuclear weapons and providing universal guarantees against their reconstitution. This whole range of problems, of course, is extremely complicated and multifaceted. No one can have ready-made prescriptions dealing with them. A great many things will have to be reassessed, thought through and reworked.

In our view, it is essential here not to engage in academic arguments about whether or not a nuclear-free world is possible - that it is possible is quite obvious today; we must focus our efforts on working out specific steps towards nuclear disarmament and on formulating agreed measures to be taken in the event of a breach or an attempted breach of a comprehensive agreement on the non-use and the elimination of nuclear weapons. Even now it is clearly possible to evaluate in advance and prepare collective measures for preventing nuclear piracy.

Also of major significance would be a reliable system of measures to prevent an attack against nuclear facilities and an international convention on that subject, steps to prevent nuclear terrorism, and international legal legal arrangements governing liability for nuclear damage.

A practical issue - one whose resolution is long overdue and for which the international community bears a historical responsibility - is the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. We have consistently sought full-fledged negotiations on this subject, both at the Conference on Disarmament and on a bilateral basis with the United States of America. In a matter of such high priority as banning nuclear tests, it is extremely important that full use be made of all possibilities, bilateral, trilateral and multilateral. The Soviet Union believes that bilateral, trilateral and multilateral negotiation; should

V S .Pet.rovsky, USSR)

complement one another, and that **progress** in one should lead to **success** in the others, bringing us **closer**, in the end, to a **test** ban. We are in **favour** of the immediate initiation of practical work on the substance **of** this problem at the Conference on **Disarmament**, where the **socialist** countries have put forward **the** basic provisions of a treaty on the subject.

The Soviet Union **prefers** a radical **solution**: the **immediate** cessation of all **nuclear** testing. But it is also **ready**, in a **constructive** spirit, to study other proposals as well. To paraphrase the well-known statement of the **French** historian and diplomat Jules **Caenon**, it may well be said that in conducting talks it is not **enough** to be sure you are right; it **is** necessary also to take **into account** the opinions of your **partners**.

The General Assembly has expressed **the** view that it **would** be of **some** use to notify the United Nations of nuclear tests. The USSR, having thoroughly **analyzed** this question, decided to support in **principle** the appeal issued by the General Assembly at its forty-first session to that **effect**. As members will recall, the USSR publishes reports in an established format about its explosions, **and** we are prepared to communicate such notifications to the United Nations, viewing this too as a step towards enhancing the **Organization's** role in matters of military **security**.

It is important that in the future the world community should not slacken its attention to the problem of **banning** **nuclear** tests. We should like to see the Assembly at its forty-second session come out vigorously in favour of an early solution. It is entirely feasible, both technically **and** politically. Every measure to that end would be an important practical step towards a nuclear-free world and towards **ensuring** that new types of nuclear weapons are not developed.

Generally speaking, the **most** important problem the world community must resolve on the way to eliminating the nuclear threat **is** to guarantee that the

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

elimination of certain types of weapons will not be accompanied by a build-up of other weapons or by the development of weapons based on new principles of physics.

Preventing the spread of the arms race to outer space is indispensable. One does not need the unbridled imagination of those who made the film Star Wars to understand the unpredictable consequences, including nuclear consequences, of the spread of the arms race to outer space. Such plans are obviously not in keeping with the purpose of eliminating nuclear weapons, as is proclaimed by their advocates. Awareness is growing that the development of weapons based on fundamentally new principles will not only undermine existing stability - which is already fragile enough - but will also make the overwhelming majority of the world community totally dependent on the will of the space Powers. That situation would not be very different from the era of colonial empires. The world community will therefore have to mobilize its efforts to prevent the emergence of space empires.

Strict compliance with the anti-ballistic missile Treaty régime is an indispensable element in the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We mention this in the United Nations since we are convinced that that bilateral document is an integral part of the system of international law and that it is related to the security interests not only of the USSR and the United States but of the entire international community.

Given the global significance of the problem of preventing an arms race in outer space, the Soviet Union, together with an overwhelming majority of the States Members of the United Nations, is in favour of active talks at the Conference on Disarmament to solve this problem. The establishment of a world space organization for the purpose of supervising the prevention of an arms race in space and co-ordinating the peaceful uses of outer space would contribute to effective, comprehensive decisions by the entire world community to ensure the peaceful

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

exploration of outer space. Such an organization would be an important part of machinery to internationalize the efforts of States to ensure security and co-operation.

The prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons and the destruction of the industrial base for producing them constitutes one of world community's most important disarmament objectives. Thanks to joint efforts by all participants, the talks at the Conference on Disarmament on formulating a convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons have now entered their final stage. The Soviet Union has taken a most active part in these efforts.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

In 1987 we submitted proposals for the disclosure of locations of chemical-weapon storage facilities, on verified total destruction of their stocks, and on mandatory challenge inspections without the right of denial. Only recently we supplemented mutual efforts by taking yet another major step and proposing on a bilateral basis a verifiable exchange of data between the USSR and the United States of America on their chemical arsenals prior to the signing of the convention.

The number of outstanding questions has now been reduced to a minimum and differences on them have largely been narrowed down; all major questions on the convention have in fact been resolved. What we need now is to complete this work immediately and make vigorous efforts to bring the talks to a conclusion as soon as possible. It would be unforgivable not to solve now the problem of the complete prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons. It is important to bear in mind the time factor in the talks, to sustain their momentum, and to prevent them from becoming a routine procedure. All the necessary conditions now exist for signing the convention as early even as 1988. This historic opportunity must not be missed. The importance of concerted efforts to this end by participants in the Conference on Disarmament cannot be overestimated.

We are realists and we are not proposing to eliminate nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction while leaving everything else untouched. The Soviet Union is equally interested in ensuring that a nuclear-free world would not mean a return to the pre-nuclear world, where in the first half of this century alone we experienced two foreign invasions. Any possibility of a third world war must be excluded, both in the process of nuclear-weapon reductions and in a post-nuclear situation.

In paving the way to a nuclear-free and subsequently demilitarized world, it is not too early even now to think about how security can be ensured at every stage

(Mr. Yetcoveky, USSR)

of the disarmament process. The Soviet Union would like to see the adoption Of specific measures to prevent war in general, both nuclear and conventional. It would be of great importance, in our view, for the nuclear Powers and States members of military and political alliances to renounce the first use of nuclear and conventional weapons and the use or threat of force in relations among States and blocs in all conditions and in all circumstances.

These ideas of ours have been echoed at the current session in the statement by the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Spain, Fernandez Ordoñez, to the effect that "security in the world today can and should be achieved on the basis of, among other things, a balance of forces at the lowest possible level."

(A/42/PV.13, p. 102)

It is our view that the movement towards a nuclear-free world can proceed stage by stage in terms of both the composition of the participants and the coverage of arms with security and strategic stability steadily strengthened at every stage and throughout the process. At intermediate stages of this movement, agreement should be reached at least on a reasonable sufficiency of both nuclear and conventional arms and on maintaining strategic stability at the lowest possible level of this sufficiency.

A powerful boost in that direction could be given by negotiated agreements on defensive strategy and military sufficiency, providing for a structure of the armed forces Of States that would be adequate to repel any possible aggression but not sufficient for engaging in offensive action. A first step towards that would be the supervised withdrawal of nuclear and other offensive weapons from national borders with the subsequent establishment of sparsely-armed strips and demilitarized zones along borders or Lines of contact between military alliances.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

It is necessary to reach agreement urgently on radically reduced Levels of non-nuclear arms. This also calls for concentrated international effort and collective wisdom. We cannot put up with attempts to distort the sense of disarmament by those who, while obstructing the elimination of nuclear weapons, are already talking about the need to supplement nuclear deterrence with so-called conventional deterrence - in other words, who want to impose another round of the conventional arms race. I believe that Mr. Andersson, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Sweden, is undoubtedly right when he emphasizes that it would be a serious set-back if the intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) agreement were followed by an arms buildup in other areas.

The problem of reducing armed forces and conventional armaments is of particular importance for the European continent, where two 3-million-strong groups equipped with the most sophisticated conventional weapons are facing each other. Nor should it be forgotten that Europe is glutted with nuclear reactors and chemical facilities whose destruction, even if accidental, would be tantamount to a nuclear strike.

A sweeping programme of reductions in armed forces and armaments from the Atlantic to the Urals was proposed by the socialist countries as far back as July 1986. The ideas contained in that programme were amplified and supplemented at the Berlin meeting of the States members of the Political Consultative Committee of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, held in May 1987. Tangible progress towards reducing the threat of war in Europe is also the goal of the series of proposals made by the Polish People's Republic, known as the "Jaruzelski plan"

Despite the urgency of curbing the conventional arms race in Europe, it should not be forgotten that that programme is global in nature and it is only right and

(Mr. Petcoveky, USSR)

logical, therefore, for it to be the subject of increasing attention in the United Nations.

The international community has already ~~said~~ a loud "No" to ~~the~~ use of the so-called inhumane ~~kinds~~ of conventional ~~weapons~~: a Convention has been concluded to that effect and it ~~is~~ now in force. The ~~task~~ now is to ensure that the number of countries parties to that ~~Conventlon~~ is ~~increased~~ and that all militarily significant States, without exception, ratify it.

The Soviet delegation is authorized to state that the Soviet Union has no objection to ~~Sweden's proposal~~ to consider in this context the ~~yuestion~~ of banning ~~laeer~~ weapons designed to kill personnel, and this ~~includes~~ the question of formalizing ~~such~~ a ban in the form of an additional protocol to the Convention.

We are very much concerned about the naval situation. ~~It is~~ difficult to speak of global security when vast ~~tracts~~ of oceans on ~~this~~ planet are filled with weapons of destruction. International debate on the problem of curtailing the naval ~~arms~~ ~~face~~ ~~is~~ taking place in the United Nations Commission on Disarmament. There ~~has~~ been some movement there and the ~~best~~ should be made of that.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The Soviet Union advocates opening talks on the limitation and reduction of naval activities and naval armaments. We have no objection to the first step towards such talks being the discussion of confidence- and security-building measure⁸ for naval communication.

Great opportunities have been opened up by regional approaches to measures designed to limit the naval arms race. Ensuring calm and peacefulness in the Mediterranean is long overdue, as is meeting the need to bring back warmth and cordiality to the waters of the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union favours implementation of the United Nations decision to convene the international Conference on the Indian Ocean in 1988. We wish to see the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. Early practical implementation of the United Nations Declaration to that effect would be helped by establishing international guarantees of the safety of shipping in the Indian Ocean and the seas, straits and gulfs adjacent to it, by solving the problem of safety of air communications and developing collective measures against terrorism in the sea lanes and air lanes of the Indian Ocean. We should all do our utmost to ensure that the Pacific Ocean lives up to the name given it by Magellan.

The international community is becoming increasingly aware that the arms race not only undermines global security, but also slows down development, exacerbates the economic backwardness of entire regions and diverts colossal resources from meeting social and economic needs. The recently concluded International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development demonstrated the resolve of an overwhelming majority of States to channel scientific and technological progress exclusively towards meeting the needs of development and global prosperity.

A broad international dialogue on this challenging problem of today's world was begun for the first time at the Conference. The work of the Conference

(MC. Petrovsky, USSR)

not only bore out the existence of an integral link between the two processes, but also pointed to possible concrete international action to make disarmament a factor for development. It is here that the need to internationalise the efforts and the desire of the international community for closer interaction make themselves particularly clear. As has rightly been pointed out by the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of the Congo, Mr. Ndinga-Oba, the Final Document of the Conference,

"establishes the basis for a process which must be continued and strengthened with real political will so as to achieve the objectives of disarmament and development as set forth in the Charter." (A/42/PV.7, pp. 79-80)

In our view, a constructive and action-oriented discussion of the question at the current session of the General Assembly could play an important part in enhancing the authority of the United Nations and its role in promoting development through disarmament. Those who have so far chosen to stand aloof from this important matter must show respect for the will of the world community and begin to act in a new, responsible and democratic way. If every specific arms reduction measure is complemented with practical action to reallocate resources thus released to development purposes, this will create solid material guarantees of security for all.

The internationalization of the disarmament process should be carried out not only at the global level but also at a regional level. The Soviet Union is actively engaged in the search for solutions to the problem of ensuring regional security. We have proposed a series of measures to strengthen security in the Asia and Pacific region. In his recent address at Murmansk, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail S. Gorbachev, outlined Soviet initiatives designed to establish a zone of peace in the north of the planet - in the Arctic.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The intensification of multilateral disarmament efforts demands that the work of the entire disarmament machinery be put into top gear and that a constructive search be conducted for ways and means of moving towards a nuclear-free world on the basis of a balance of interests and ensuring equal security for all States.

The forum in which the efforts to move towards a nuclear-free future should be internationalized is the Conference on Disarmament. We should like to see the Conference functioning on a year-round basis, with two or three breaks, so that it would ultimately become a standing universal disarmament negotiating body.

The importance we attach to the effectiveness of the Conference on Disarmament was emphasized this year in the statement made to the Conference by Eduard Shevardnadze. The Soviet Foreign Minister offered a concrete programme, calling for making the talks more productive and effective and intensifying the search for solutions in all areas of the Conference's work.

The Conference should not become used to a situation in which in fact it is not discussing questions of a reduction of nuclear arms, even though they are on its agenda. We believe that these questions should be put at the top of its agenda today.

The internationalization of efforts to establish the fundamental principles of comprehensive security in the military field in effect leads to an even greater entrancement of the authority and role of the United Nations. Where, if not at the United Nations, can we make the greatest possible multilateral efforts to achieve security for all?

A big contribution to expanding the dialogue on ways of achieving security for all in the military field should be made at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We are ready to discuss substantively with all Member States the practical tasks and agenda for the special session. We

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

believe that the session could also solve questions related to enhancing the effectiveness of multilateral disarmament machinery. The Soviet Union proceeds on the basis that the special session should be oriented towards achieving new progress in arms limitation and reduction and making more active use of the United Nations potential in this area.

The Soviet Union advocates the revitalization and maximum use, in matters of disarmament, of such United Nations mechanisms as the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Disarmament Commission. We also attach great importance to the Secretary-General's role.

The General Assembly could request the Secretary-General to submit to it annual reports on the disarmament process, in which he would report on the situation with regard to the implementation of General Assembly resolutions on disarmament, particularly those adopted by consensus, on the basis of information received from Member States. We believe that that would be particularly useful.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

Because the Secretary-General acts as the representative of each Member of the Organization, all countries should give him the maximum support and help him to carry out his important mission.

We are impressed by the ideas of the United Kingdom and some other Western countries about examining the whole question of disarmament resolutions and considering the possibility of reducing their number. We believe that consensus resolutions are particularly important. We should work to have resolutions adopted by consensus, but it is no less important to secure consensus at the stage of their implementation, so that the consensus reflects the readiness of the parties to them to take action in the field of disarmament.

It is essential to put into effect the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and also, for example, to implement the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace and resolutions on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and on accession to the Convention on so-called inhumane weapons.

It also seems high time to take a fresh look at the potential of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, which brings together prominent experts on disarmament from many countries. That body could undoubtedly play a more substantial role.

The Soviet Union supports the work of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR). The Soviet delegation has been instructed to announce today another regular Soviet contribution to the UNIDIR Fund in the amount of 200,000 roubles, or \$20,300.

There is an upsurge of activity in the world situation today, characterized by a virtually unanimous desire on the part of the world community to end the threat of self-annihilation, with movement in all areas towards security through

(M. Petrovsky, USSR)

disarmament. True, the activity is not the same or uniform everywhere, but its pace is quickening, though here and there it is still being held back by certain braking mechanisms. We believe it is essential now to create all the necessary conditions to accelerate simultaneous, parallel and uninterrupted movement in all areas.

As ancient philosophers used to say, the present is the gateway from the past to the future. Now this gate is opening for us on to the path to a nuclear-weapon-free world, which is taking tangible shape. We must pass through this gate without delay and head boldly towards mutual trust and understanding.

We are convinced that the 1990s could become a decade of building a nuclear-weapon-free and non-violent world.

Mr. LAUTENSCHLAGER (Federal Republic of Germany): Before beginning my Statement, I should like to convey to you, Sir, my delegation's congratulations on your unanimous election to chair the Committee. We are convinced that your well-known competence and experience in the subject-matter is before the Committee will lead to the success of our work.

I should also like to take the opportunity of the presence of the head of the Department for Disarmament Affairs, Under-Secretary-General Akaishi, the Secretary-General of the Conference on Disarmament, Mr. Komatina, and the Secretary of the Committee, Mr. Kheradi, to thank them for effectively contributing to the success of the multilateral disarmament process.

Let me initially refer to the statement made yesterday by the Ambassador of Denmark, speaking on behalf of the States members of the European Community. We fully endorse the views expressed in his statement.

A year ago I emphasized to the Committee that the time was ripe for tangible results in the fields of arms control and disarmament. Today it is not

(Mr. Lautenachlager, Federal
Republic of Germany)

12 months significant and gratifying progress has been made in this area. An presumptuous to speak of legitimate hopes of an early harvest. Over the last agreement on the complete elimination of United States and Soviet intermediate-range missiles is within reach. We observe a certain acceleration at the other tables of the Geneva negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union, too. There have been major advances in the negotiations on the world-wide prohibition of chemical weapons. A United States-Soviet understanding has been reached to begin negotiations before 1 December this year on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. As regards conventional arms control, the Vienna mandate talks on reductions in the whole of Europe are proceeding well. The disarmament dialogue, then, is forging ahead on a broad front with clear aims and a desire for results.

The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany unreservedly welcomes this development, which it has emphatically encouraged and supported. We Germans are the only nation in Europe which is partitioned along the divide between East and West; armed forces and weaponry are more densely concentrated on German soil than anywhere else in the world. For that reason, progress in arms control and disarmament is a fundamental German interest.

The Federal Government will therefore continue to press vigorously as possible for further moves in this direction. Its guideline will remain the coherent and comprehensive concept of arms control and disarmament adopted at the last ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, held at Reykjavik in June 1987. This concept must now be translated into practice. Besides an agreement on the complete elimination of United States and Soviet intermediate-range missiles, the concept includes the following; a 50 per cent

(Mr. Lautenschlager, Federal
Republic of Germany)

reduction in the strategic offensive nuclear weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union, to be achieved during the current Geneva negotiations; the global elimination of chemical weapons; the establishment of a stable and secure level of conventional forces, by the elimination of disparities, in the whole of Europe; and, in conjunction with the establishment of a conventional balance and the global elimination of chemical weapons, tangible and verifiable reductions of American and Soviet land-based nuclear missile systems of shorter range, leading to equal ceilings.

Allow me to evaluate these individual areas briefly from a German point of view.

In the field of nuclear systems, the United States and the Soviet Union agree in principle on the elimination of their land-based intermediate-range missiles in the 500-km to 5,500-km range. We expect that the text of the agreement will be brought a good deal closer to completion at next week's Foreign Ministers' meeting in Moscow and that it can be signed at a summit meeting before the end of this year. This agreement will be of historic significance.

(Mr. Lautenachlager,
Federal Republic of Germany)

The following points, in particular, should be highlighted: for the first time in the history of arms control, a category of weapons is not: Just to be limited but completely eliminated) the aim of parity of both sides - at zero in this case -- is to be achieved through the reduction of disparities. This is important as a principle for future disarmament in other spheres as well. The agreement will contain provisions for co-operative verification measures to an extent which seemed inconceivable only a short time ago. This, too, establishes a principle for the future.

The Federal Government regards this as an endorsement of a North Atlantic Alliance policy which it has supported from the outset. The Federal Government called consistently, on the one hand, for necessary defensive efforts when it was a matter of counteracting the nuclear imbalance in the intermediate range and on the other, was equally resolute in urging that the logic of the so-called two-track intermediate-range nuclear forces decision of 1979 be converted into a negotiated co-operative solution acceptable to all concerned. The global double-zero option which is now emerging is a major contribution to greater stability in Europe. Through the statement on the Pershing-1A systems made by Federal Chancellor Helmut Kohl on 26 August this year, the Federal Republic of Germany smoothed the way for an agreement which implements this option.

The acceptance, in principle of an INF agreement set in motion a process which must be made irreversible. This means that further steps in the other areas have to follow. Arms control must cover the entire military balance of power, so that potentially destabilizing disparities and excessive potentials can be eliminated wherever they exist. Greater stability and security in the nuclear sphere, too, are possible and necessary at lower levels.

(Mr. Lautenschlager,
Federal Republic of Germany)

With regard to the strategic nuclear potentials of the super-Powers, we expect that the halving of the existing arsenals agreed upon in principle by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev at the Geneva summit in 1985 will be carried out and will be accompanied by provisions governing the future structure of strategic potentials - provisions that will strengthen strategic stability. We assume that in this context both sides are in a position to reach agreement on the level of predictability required in the field of strategic defensive systems. ^{1 Am.?} A requisite framework for a compromise was outlined in Reykjavik: namely, adherence for a certain time to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

An INF agreement also necessitates an arms-control régime for short-range nuclear systems. In terms of land-based missile systems with a range below 500 kilometres, the Soviet Union possesses an enormous preponderance over the United States. The aim of our arms control policy is to establish equal ceilings at a lower level.

The signs of a forthcoming reduction in the nuclear arsenals make it all the more urgent to correct the conventional disparities which currently weigh upon the West, thereby eliminating the danger they pose to peace and security. We see good prospects of instituting negotiations within the framework of the Conference on Security and co-operation in Europe (CSCE) process, on conventional stability in the whole of Europe, with a view to ensuring a secure, comprehensive and verifiable balance of forces at lower levels. Talks involving the 23 members of the two military alliances on a mandate for such negotiations are encouraging. The Federal Republic of Germany has a special and vital interest in these talks and is playing

(Mr. Lautenschlager,
Federal Republic of Germany)

a correspondingly active role in them. We hope for a result from the mandate talks by the end of this year and for the start of the negotiations proper during the coming year.

The satisfactory outcome of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and Disarmament in Europe has considerably stimulated the disarmament dialogue between West and East. In particular, the implementation of the Stockholm document has been an encouraging experience. The exchanges of annual calendars, the early notification of major military activities and the observation of military manoeuvres have led to greater openness and transparency in the military field and hence to greater predictability. The first inspections carried out under the terms of the Conference Document have made clear to all participants that this instrument of verification can do a great deal to strengthen confidence. If the East were to show similar willingness at the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction negotiations to agree to a verification régime as proposed by the West which provides for on-site inspections without right of refusal, this would be a major contribution to the launching of negotiations on conventional arms control covering the whole of Europe.

Notwithstanding this positive balance in respect of the Conference Document there is still scope for improvement of the confidence- and security-building measures adopted at Stockholm. In addition, it is necessary to agree, during a new negotiation phase, on a further set of confidence- and security-building measures which build upon the Stockholm results. That is why the Federal Republic of Germany together with its Western partners at the CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Vienna, has submitted a proposed mandate to that effect.

At the current CSCE Follow-up Meeting in Vienna, our interest is not confined to progress in the security field. We also seek progress in the implementation of

(Mr. Lautenschlager,
Federal Republic of Germany)

human rights, in scientific, technological and cultural exchanges and in exchanges of information. To this end, we are ready to join our Eastern European neighbours in the comprehensive co-operation envisaged in the Final Act of the Helsinki CSCE. West and East can only gain from co-operation. Confrontation would deprive them of all prospects of progress.

The encouraging development of East-West relations should also be vigorously harnessed to bring about the early completion of the Geneva negotiations on chemical weapons. Next to an INF agreement, we consider the conclusion of a convention on the world-wide prohibition of chemical weapons to be of paramount importance. The aim here is the prohibition, elimination and destruction of an entire category of particularly insidious weapons throughout the world. The draft text of the convention is already well advanced, which means that the goal is attainable within a relatively short period.

During the 1987 session of the negotiations at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, considerable movement occurred. Progress was achieved in the fields of challenge inspections and non-production control, while we also observed encouraging developments with regard to confidence-building. However, more intensive work, geared to success, is needed in Geneva if an early and satisfactory result is to be achieved. We shall continue to make appropriate contributions to this end. The use of chemical weapons and the danger of ever-wider proliferation underline the urgency of the need to eliminate this horrifying category of weapons.

(Mr. Lautenschlager, Federal
Republic of Germany)

Another source of encouragement. is the progress made in an adjacent area, that generated in 1986 by the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. The Federal Republic of Germany welcomed from the outset the provision on exchange of information adopted at that Conference with a view to making the contractual fidelity of the States parties to the Convention more transparent, and we co-operated in its formulation. In our recent first release of information we provided substantial data and we expect the other States parties to do likewise.

Another important subject is the nuclear-test ban. The Federal Government continues to attach the same great importance to the earliest possible adoption of a comprehensive and effectively verifiable nuclear-test ban. we welcome the agreement to begin negotiations to this end at an early date that was reached at the talks in Washington between Secretary of State George Shultz and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and recorded in a joint statement. We understand that the initial step taken at those negotiations will be to agree on effective verification measures that will make it possible to ratify the threshold treaties. We have long advocated a step-by-step approach to the test-ban question because we are convinced that experience proves the futility of an all-or-nothing policy.

The brunt of the responsibility for the reduction of nuclear tests and their complete cessation naturally falls upon the nuclear-weapon States. Despite the fact that it is a non-nuclear-weapon State, the Federal Republic of Germany has never regarded its role as that of merely an interested onlooker. On the contrary, we have participated actively in the Conference on Disarmament in the establishment. Of a test-verification concept based on a world-wide seismic monitoring system.

(Mr. Lautenschlager, Federal
Republic of Germany)

This participation includes the providing of facilities at the seismological institutions in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Confidence-building, arms control and disarmament, as well as tangible steps to strengthen security and safeguard peace, are a world-wide requirement that transcends the framework of East-West relations. This will be the key subject of the disarmament discussion during coming weeks here in the First Committee and in the General Assembly.

The agenda reveals a number of focal points. I cannot deal with all of them within the scope of this general debate. The diverse initiatives on the problems of nuclear weapons rightly play a pre-eminent role. That, however, must not lead to comparative neglect of the problems arising in connection with arsenals of conventional weapons. We therefore urge that the Committee avoid minimizing the many aspects of conventional-arms control in the light of the nuclear debate. Our goal is the prevention of any war, be it nuclear or conventional.

The considerable number of draft resolutions on chemical weapons is renewed evidence that the world's nations are calling for 'the control and elimination of those weapons. I have already said that, in our estimation, the world-wide elimination of chemical weapons is making good headway. In this situation localized approaches and regional solutions are not helpful. What is essential is that the final obstacles to world-wide prohibition should be removed in Geneva.

If I may highlight another point, the Committee will also try to bring about greater transparency and comparability of military expenditure. We are convinced that this is an important contribution to confidence-building. My Government is one of the few that has provided data ever since the standardized reporting system was established within the United Nations. If a significant number of Member States do likewise, the strategic situation will become a little more calculable.

(Mr. Lautenschlager, Federal
Republic of Germany)

We shall also have to analyse and evaluate the result of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development. The Conference has raised important new issues and has helped to clarify existing ideas on the relationship between excessive armament⁶ and underdevelopment. It has also found answers to some questions. We welcome the fact that the Conference was able to adopt its Final Document by consensus.

Finally, we shall be preparing another important conference, namely, the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. That special session will give us an opportunity to define the current disarmament situation and to discuss our future course, provided that we use it as a forum for reaching agreement on future steps. With that aim in mind, my Government is willing to play an active and co-operative role.

I have highlighted only a few points in a long agenda. In principle, we expect the debate in the Committee to underline the world-wide interest in Universally acceptable solutions to disarmament problems, thereby enriching the specialized negotiations in the various forums. To that end we hope for specific and objective discussions; practicable and workable proposals are called for, not Utopian visions. Only co-operative discussions between sovereign and equal States can foster progress.

I should like to make one last, important point. This year's working programme is fresh evidence of the central role played by the United Nations in the discussion of arms-control and disarmament matters. We regard the United Nations as the paramount and universal organ for generating new ideas, approaches and initiatives. It does, however, need to improve its working methods. The First Committee, above all, must be able to fulfil its function more efficiently than is widely perceived to be the case. We seek to help the Committee to deal in

(Mr. Lautenschlager, Federal
Republic of Germany)

substantive and fruitful debates with the key issues of security and disarmament. In our judgement, neither a series of monologues nor the compulsion to reaffirm past resolutions can contribute to that end. For that reason, we call once more for a critical review of the Committee's procedures. We are willing to play an active part and to make specific proposals to that end.

Let me say in conclusion that the new momentous developments between West and East, which entitle us to be very hopeful today, only became possible because an attitude of co-operation replaced one of confrontation. Co-operative thinking is gaining ground throughout the world. This arises from a growing awareness that States can organise their security better together than in competition, not to mention confrontation. It arises from a growing awareness that the central problem of war must be eliminated once and for all and that the use of force to resolve local and regional conflicts can never be justified. On the threshold of a new century mankind has other urgent tasks to perform, tasks that demand a supreme effort - stabilizing the world economic situation, fighting poverty, controlling diseases and epidemics, safeguarding and strengthening human rights, and protecting our environment so as to leave our planet habitable for coming generations. ALL of that can be achieved only through co-operation, not confrontation. Let us walk with firm unwavering steps along the path to a more secure and peaceful world. Let us tread this path together.

Mr. EGGAR (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland) : This is my first visit to this Committee, but there is a long tradition of British Ministers participating here. We come because we believe the questions under consideration are vitally important. Disarmament is not the concern of an exclusive club. It matters to the whole world. It affects all our futures. Everyone has the right and the duty to contribute to the debate. We should all be open to new ideas and new approaches. The United Nations and the First Committee have a vital role to play.

May I say, Sir, that I am delighted that you are presiding over this important work. I am confident that under your chairmanship the session will be positive, practical and forward-looking.

Let me make it clear at the outset that I associate myself completely with the statement made yesterday by the Permanent Representative of Denmark, Mr. Ole Bierring, on behalf of the 12 members of the European Community.

The United Kingdom is completely sincere and frank about its policies and doctrines on security and disarmament. We do not seek to score cheap propaganda points. We do not play to the gallery. We are consistent. And I can speak today with especial confidence: the British people reaffirmed strongly their continuing support for our approach, in our general election in June this year.

We know that our policy of defence and deterrence, which is, of course, shared with our allies, has kept the peace in Europe for over 40 years. This has not just safeguarded Europe; it has brought benefit to the entire international community.

But disarmament is not an end in itself. Disarmament without security is a step backwards. In arms control, our basic goal is to maintain, and where possible enhance, the security that has been established, but, of course, to do so with lower levels of weapons.

(Mr. Eggar, United Kingdom)

Progress can only be made through painstaking and detailed negotiations between the States concerned; between the States that have the weapons and those whose security is put at stake by the reduction or abolition of those weapons. The agreements that emerge must be verifiable; they must be legally binding. Above all, as I have emphasized, they must maintain and enhance security. So, of course, it is essential that verification provisions be effective. Those provisions must guarantee on a continuing basis the necessary degree of confidence that the agreements are actually being respected. If we succeed in all this, we shall also be making important progress towards our goal of improved East-West relations.

We have a saying in the United Kingdom which goes, "The proof of the pudding is in the eating." We believe that the approach and the policies I shall outline do indeed provide good eating. We are at last at a stage where there is the prospect of the sorts of arms-control agreements that are effective, that will endure, and that can make a very significant contribution to improving the international atmosphere.

I refer, of course, to the most encouraging signs emerging from the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. It seems likely - and we must all hope that this will come about - that these negotiations will culminate in a global double-zero intermediate nuclear forces agreement. Indeed, perhaps that will happen later this year. I do not need to remind this Committee that it was the West that put forward the idea of a global zero agreement. That was our goal as long ago as 1981.

Let us pause for a moment and look at what happened. In the 1970s, the Russians refused to negotiate about intermediate nuclear forces; they would not accept the zero option and, indeed, temporarily walked out of the Geneva talks.

(Mr. Eggar, United Kingdom)

The Russians then attempted to bring the British and French nuclear deterrents into the argument. And finally they resorted to Linkage with the strategic defence initiative, further to muddy the waters.

The alliance stood firm. The agreement that is now taking shape is possible only because we and our allies refused to be deflected from our objective. We were obliged to deploy Long-range intermediate nuclear missiles in response to the new and serious threat posed by Soviet SS-20 deployments.

As a politician I well recall the vocal opposition that deployment aroused in some quarters. But we persevered. And now our approach, our resolve, is paying dividends. The United Kingdom welcomes wholeheartedly the prospect of a double-zero intermediate-range nuclear forces agreement.

That of course, would remove an entire category of nuclear missiles - a previously unattained and almost unimaginable achievement. Assuming adequate verification arrangements are worked out, as they must be, the agreement will help increase trust between East and West. We also hope that greater confidence will extend to other areas of arms control and lead to progress there as well.

The next priority in nuclear arms control is 50 per cent cuts in the strategic arsenals of the super-powers. This is an immensely significant goal for all of us. We believe it must be pursued and achieved without unjustified linkage to other areas.

We also naturally share the goal of the United States-Soviet bilateral negotiations of preventing an arms race in outer space. We believe firmly that this will be achieved only through an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union, which, between them, possess the overwhelming current and potential military capability in space.

(Mr. Eggar, United Kingdom)

A lot of nonaenee is, I am afraid, sometimes hoard on the question of the military use of apace. Let me take thin opportunity to restate our fundamental view, which reflects the Camp David Four Points.

First, the Western aim is not superiority, but rather to maintain balance, taking account of Soviet deployments. We are determined to enhance deterrence, not to undermine it.

It follows, as the United States has made clear, that strategic defences other than those permitted by the anti-ballistic missile Treaty would not take place without negotiation. If there is to be a transition to a strategic balance placing more reliance on defence, it would be bent accomplished on the basis of agreement.

We are also determined to reduce conventional armaments and forces. We need to tackle the current imbalance between East and West. It is important to recall that we need nuclear weapons, not juet to guarantee our fun&mental security, but because of the threat posed by the huge Soviet conventional superiority.

(Mr. Eggar, United Kingdom)

This is a question that needs urgent attention and concerns us as Europeans particularly. As Mr. Biecring recalled in his statement, Europe has the largest concentration of conventional forces anywhere in the world.

In order to negotiate seriously on these matters, both sides must share a common data-base. This is vital indeed it is obvious and self-evident. Greater openness and exchange of information on military matters - greater glasnost is a prerequisite of serious negotiations.

We and our allies and partners are as open as we can be about our military resources and our military postures. The United Kingdom publishes every year exhaustive statistics on its military spending, but the Warsaw Pact States have up to now failed to provide similar information. Those statistics that are available suggest that Soviet military spending increased by about 50 per cent in real terms between 1970 and 1985. There is little sign that the pace of this growth has slackened.

The Soviet Union now proposes that we should compare military doctrines. Does this mean discussing the numbers, structures and dispositions of the armed forces themselves? If it does, we welcome it; we are all in favour. Discussions of those kinds are the key to progress; abstract discussions are not. If it does not, if it means something else, then frankly that proposal is a waste of time.

We welcome the inspections and observations that have been taking place on the basis of last year's agreement at the Stockholm Conference on disarmament in Europe. They should show that there is nothing to fear from greater openness.

Against this background, let me stress that we attach major importance to the setting up of new talks between the 23 members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact. They should consider conventional forces

(Mr. Eggar, United Kingdom)

in Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. here, again, our aim is to enhance security and stability at lower levels of forces. We want to eliminate the capability for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action.

The Vienna Talks on Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe are still under way. We will continue to play our part in them. We also look forward to new negotiations in the Conference on disarmament in Europe on further confidence-building measures.

I have spoken so far of bilateral and East-West negotiations. I wanted first to explain our attitude towards them. I recognize the great significance that all countries of the world attach to their progress. But I now want to turn to an area of multilateral negotiations. We are convinced that here, too, pragmatism and realism can bear fruit.

There is one particular area of multilateral work where we can welcome major progress: we and our allies remain firmly committed to an effective, verifiable, global ban on chemical weapons, which safeguards Western security. Indeed, this was identified as an arms-control priority in the talks between my Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, and President Reagan at Camp David in November of last year; it was subsequently endorsed by the whole of the alliance in Reykjavik in June.

The British delegation has played a leading part in the negotiations and has submitted a series of working papers on key issues, such as non-production and challenge inspection. The British chairmanship of negotiations last year was, I think, generally acknowledged to have moved the process forward significantly. We and our allies remain firmly committed to continuing this work.

We must all continue to work constructively together towards resolving the problems that remain. We welcome the recent evolution in the Soviet position on

(Mr. Eggar, United Kingdom)

challenge verification. We also welcome the confidence-building visit that the Soviets arranged earlier this month to one of their many chemical-weapons establishments at Shikhany.

Those are all small steps in the right direction. Although they do not in themselves resolve the difficulties, we are determined to persevere. The urgency of the task before us is underlined by the fact that one country, Iraq, is repeatedly using such weapons in a current conflict. We can see on our television screens the terrible potential of those weapons to wreak suffering and death.

We also welcome the outcome of the Biological Weapons Review Conference Experts meeting earlier this year in Geneva. The United Kingdom delegation played its full part. That Conference worked out a series of realistic confidence-building measures designed to help strengthen the biological weapons Convention. Those are practical and useful measures; they deserve the fullest support. We call on all parties to the Convention to give that support whole-heartedly.

A consistent theme of this statement and of our policy has been the need for realism and pragmatism in disarmament. The same applies in multilateral bodies, such as this Committee, which are not of course in themselves negotiating forums. The role of this Committee and similar bodies, such as the Disarmament Commission, should be, first, to promote the right political atmosphere for progress in disarmament negotiations; secondly, to seek common approaches; and, thirdly, to make specific constructive suggestions which may be of value to those bodies actually charged with negotiating responsibility.

We have recently witnessed a multilateral conference which, in our view, lost its way, which failed to live up to the important role which we believe the United Nations should be playing in this field. I refer to the International Conference

(Mr. Eggar, United Kingdom)

on the Relationship between **Disarmament** and Development, which ended here in New York about a month ago. I cannot say that **the results** of that Conference **justified** the effort. An opportunity **was missed** for a **serious study** of the **real** relationships between disarmament, development and the intimately connected **subject** of security.

We made clear our **views** on the Final Document **at the Conference itself**; other major aid **donors made similar criticisms**. We very much regret that a Conference on such important **issues** was not **more practical** and **constructive**. Such **meetings can** only harm the credibility of the United Nations. They are a drain on **its** finances. **Who can doubt** that the money expended **just for** that Conference and its preparation could have been **better spent** - perhaps on a practical aid project in a developing country?

(Mr. Eggar, United Kingdom)

I do not make this criticism lightly or destructively. I make it because the issues are so important that we should all be prepared to learn from our mistakes. I make it above all because we must be honest with each other if we are to work together effectively.

The third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is due to take place next year. It will be an opportunity to restore the United Nations role and credibility on disarmament issues - an opportunity we must not miss. It is vital that the session give balanced attention to the full range of disarmament issues. It should be realistic and forward-looking. It should look constructively at the possibilities of promoting genuine and concrete progress in arms control. Above all, it should be open-minded, and the views of all countries should be given proper attention.

Finally, I turn to the work of this Committee at its present session.

We should not weary each other with long speeches about our desire for peace. We all want peace and security. What we should discuss here are practical steps to make peace more certain for all our countries and peoples. The last thing we need is declamatory, propagandist resolutions which bear no relationship to the real world.

There is only a limited amount of time at our disposal. There is only a limited amount of money. The First Committee must play its part in renewing respect for the United Nations and for the principles for which the United Nations was founded. I am confident that under your leadership, Mr. Chairman, we shall be able to do so.

As the last session before the scheduled special session, this session has particular significance and responsibility. It is true - and we very much welcome

(Mr. Eggar, United Kingdom)

this - that in recent years, and in particular last year, there have been signs of greater realism and pragmatism in the Committee's work.

New consensuses have emerged on vital principles, such as verification and compliance. There has been a growing recognition of the importance of conventional arms control, and the role of confidence-building measures and of transparency. It must be our united task - the task of all of us here - to further this desirable trend.

Mr. HORN (Hungary) (interpretation from Russian): The 5 statements made during last year's general debate in the First Committee gave a good reflection of the expectation5 of a profound and positive change in the international atmosphere. Among recent events which give hopes of progress, developments in the Soviet-American relationship stand out. The concrete and comprehensive approach to the key issues of security policy has proved productive.

Although one cannot speak of a long-term strengthening of positive trends or of a breakthrough until the efforts made in connection with them are translated into concrete disarmament and arms limitation accords, the sympathetic assessments by representatives of great Powers and the implementation of concrete, far-reaching measures may show that the favourable trends will continue in the longer run as well.

The conclusion of the agreement in principle on the elimination of Soviet and American medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles is an event of the utmost importance. Sharing the aspirations of the world's peoples and Governments, the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic is convinced that full implementation of the double-zero option may lead to a breakthrough in disarmament. The agreement may prove more convincingly than any reached so far that even modern nuclear

(Mr. Horn, Hungary)

weapons can be eliminated, if the parties succeed in dealing with the security of the countries of the continent concerned on a unified basis, disregarding the narrow approach of national security interests.

My Government is glad to share the view that the agreement is indeed of historic significance, as it is the first accord ever negotiated since the appearance of the atomic bomb on the elimination of two categories of nuclear weapons. It accentuates the importance of continuing a process which started amid extraordinary difficulties. The ultimate goal, the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, cannot remain a mere aspiration, and further efforts must be made to secure it.

Another positive consequence of the double-zero option agreement is that, in the light of recent experience, it may serve as a new point of departure for multilateral disarmament negotiations. This possibility could be strengthened if significant progress were made, in the wake of the current accord, in several fields of the Soviet-American arms limitation and disarmament talks. It would be an extremely important step forward if at the summit meeting the parties could sign an agreement in principle on a 50 per cent cut in strategic offensive weapons and on strengthening the anti-ballistic-missile Treaty.

Strengthening détente by substantive measures in the military field could be significant by giving an impulse to the continuing Process in several other key areas of disarmament and arms limitation. Preventing the deployment of weapons in space and creating guarantees of the use of outer space for peaceful purposes are issues of decisive importance in this context. Another such area is the Complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests, for which a good basis is provided by the agreement in principle on starting substantive bilateral talks on a broad range of

(Mr. Horn, Hungary)

questions and resolving outstanding problems of verification. In this field, too, multilateral disarmament diplomacy certainly has much to contribute to the solution of outstanding problems.

My Government is convinced that there is a close link between bilateral and multilateral efforts, but in neither area should progress be held up while we wait for results to be achieved in the other. Multilateral diplomacy has an important part to play in reaching a complete ban on nuclear-weapon tests; it can contribute greatly to making a reality of the desire for great-Power co-operation in moving closer to the ultimate goal.

In the field of security policy more and more regional issues are seen to have global relevance. Therefore, studying their interrelationships is growing in importance.

(Mr. Horn, Hungary)

In recent years there have been some rather lively debates about the concepts of security policy. The causes of related polemics are to be sought in the unprecedented acceleration of changes in mankind's overall development and in the belated responses given to it in security policy practice. Those changes affect the security of States so profoundly that practice must draw from theory the urgent conclusion that the approach based only on selfish interests of national security has become obsolete.

The contradictory nature of specific changes is manifest in, among others, the constantly changing effects of issues within the scope of multilateral security policy. At the same time, the development processes of civilization cause a number of formerly marginal problems to be treated as ones of strategic importance.

Thus, for instance, it is now clear to almost all nations that action against terrorism and the safety of peaceful nuclear or chemical plants or of satellites for peaceful purposes are questions of strategic significance and that their safety can be satisfactorily guaranteed only by way of negotiated agreements. There are more and more activities and installations on our planet whose undisturbed, faultless and continuous operation is a strategic requirement, which can, to a lesser and lesser degree, be secured within national or regional frameworks. The varying scope, but increasing degree of strategic vulnerability or sensitivity, of national societies are important features of these processes.

It is becoming more and more obvious that the concept of international security is steadily widening and now extends beyond the direct military sphere to the political, economic, environmental, humanitarian and human rights fields. Therefore the establishment of a modern comprehensive system of international peace and security based on existing political, institutional and financial frameworks is becoming a matter of increasing urgency.

(Mr. Horn, Hungary)

AS a result of appropriate international effort this system could be made capable of identifying, on a continuing basis within the framework of the world organisation, those conflicts and focal points of tension that pose global threats, the easing and settlement of which call for concerted international action. In our view, the task would be to help create, by mutual agreement, a set of specific conditions required for the management of such conflicts and hotbeds of tension.

In the light of last year's debate on this question in the First Committee, we support the position of the sponsors that the United Nations is the most appropriate international forum for assessing the various concepts of security and for defining and taking whatever political steps might be deemed necessary. The international community is fully capable of ensuring that the interests of all the parties concerned are properly expressed and that no single country feels itself excluded from participation in advancing this process.

We think that the consideration of this item provides an opportunity for a substantive dialogue on the comprehensive issues and concrete problems of international security as well as for mapping out concrete courses of action in accordance with the principles of mutual interest and consensus.

Thus, for instance, the sensitive issues of a global nature which, in our opinion, justify an exchange of views include different security policy concepts, military doctrines, and questions concerning the restriction of military activities in time of peace, verification of compliance with the existing arms limitation and disarmament accords or sufficient military openness.

The basis of the proposed system - and the essential pre-condition - is the system of collective security provided for in the United Nations Charter. The threats to international peace and security are constant. They grow in intensity and become of global scope and, consequently, the methods of, and the frameworks

(Mr. horn, Hungary)

for, resolving or eliminating them are also subject to change. The search for appropriate methods and structures can be based only on the principles and purposes of the Charter and cannot be effective except in close interaction with them.

Even now, the United Nations is constantly searching for and creating for itself the most suitable form of action, in full compliance with the letter and spirit of its Charter. In the Charter as well as in the covenants, declarations and resolutions adopted by Member States on the basis of consensus the United Nations has created broad frameworks for all factors in international politics to set out on efforts to solve or alleviate their problems by peaceful means at the early stage of their emergence. For further progress, what is needed is the systematizing, strengthening and constant updating of those possibilities.

Modernization naturally presupposes a certain change of function and gradual shifts in the mechanism of disarmament forums. Accordingly, following the agreement on arms limitation, the disarmament forums should also deal with military development programmes, national as well as regional, and address questions of registering the established levels of armaments and preventing the deployment of new systems of weapons. The United Nations would be the best forum for discussion of these problems, including the co-ordination, control and registration of military data and military doctrines. In view of its democratic character, the world Organization could guarantee international confidence in respect of these delicate problems, and create a climate of confidence which might even lead to the dismantling of military blocks.

Historical experience shows that the cause of disarmament is a true reflection of the pattern of relations between countries with different socio-economic systems and between the leading great Powers.

(Mr. Horn, Hungary)

From the standpoint of eliminating the threat of nuclear war, the cessation and total prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is still the decisive question that cannot be avoided. It is a source of concern that multilateral negotiations on the complete cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests are still being delayed at the Geneva Conference on disarmament, although the wealth of experience accumulated at that forum would, given the necessary political will, make it possible to start successful negotiations.

We are encouraged to note the narrowing of the range of issues still hindering the successful conclusion of negotiations that have gone on for more than 10 years on the complete prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons. In the wake of the latest Soviet initiatives, the significance of which was also welcomed in the report of the Geneva Conference on disarmament, it is now necessary to speed up the negotiations and to take the political decisions still required. It may thus become possible to eliminate, before long, another category of weapons of mass destruction.

(Mr. Horn, Hungary)

In the summer of last year two international agreements on nuclear safety were elaborated at Vienna in less than one month, under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Those agreements have already entered into force and clearly testify to the possibility of solving even the most complicated problems if the necessary political will exists. Such a spirit and such an approach are also required in negotiations on the prohibition of radiological weapons and on the creation of guarantees for the safety of nuclear installations.

Confidence- and security-building measures have become an independent and sovereign domain of arms limitation and disarmament and an effective instrument for strengthening security by political means. The Stockholm document of last year has opened a new chapter in the promotion of disarmament in Europe. Its implementation could offer concrete practical experience for other regions of the world as well.

Military *détente* in Europe, its promotion, and the strengthening of global security have become matters arousing special attention and growing interest. It is now evident that a reduction in East-West military confrontation can contribute substantially to a relaxation of tension in other parts of the world as well.

Although they are progressing more slowly than desired, the talks among 23 States within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), on the basis of the Budapest Appeal of June 1986 by the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty and the response to it by the countries or members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) hold out the possibility of beginning negotiations of paramount importance on disarmament in Europe in the near future, as well as on the strengthening of security and confidence. The success of such negotiations could result in a far-reaching breakthrough, similar to that made by the great-Power accord, towards a radical reduction in East-West military

(Mr. Horn, Hungary)

confrontation. Given the quality and quantity of the armed forces and armaments involved, a multilateral agreement on convention³¹ disarmament and on the strengthening of security and confidence could also result in a genuine renewal with regard to global security.

On the basis of its historical experience, national conditions and foreign-policy principles, the Hungarian People's Republic has a vested interest in seeing such a breakthrough as soon as possible and in seeing it continue. We have been working towards such a breakthrough in recent decades in our immediate area and also in United Nations forums, even during periods when real chances of success were much slimmer than they are now. A constructive dialogue among the great Powers, systems of alliance and countries with different social systems have by now become a reality. This may lead to the establishment of mutual confidence, which is indispensable to lasting co-operation. The United Nations and other disarmament forums must be involved in such co-operation and, by achieving concrete results, elaborating multilateral disarmament accords and co-ordinating security interests, must contribute to the attainment of the objective set forth in the Charter: to save present and succeeding generations from the scourge of war.

The meeting rose at 1.05 p.m.