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FIRST COMMITTEE  
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held on  
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at 10 a.m.  
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 43rd MEETING

Chairman: Mr. BAGBENT ADETTO NZENGEYA (Zaire)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

**AGENDA ITEMS 48 TO 69** (continued)

**CONSIDERATION OF AN ACTION ON DRAFT RESOLUTIONS**

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French) : I shall call first upon delegations wishing to introduce draft resolutions.

Since it appears none wish to do so, we shall now continue taking up draft resolutions dealing with agenda items on disarmament in cluster 13, cluster 14, the only outstanding draft resolution being A/C.1/42/L.60/Rev.2, and cluster 6. In the light of the progress of our work we shall see whether we will be in a position to take up any other clusters. Before the Committee proceeds to take decisions on the draft resolutions, I shall call on any delegation wishing to make a statement other than in explanation of vote.

Mr. DJOKIC (Yugoslavia) : I wish to introduce orally an amendment to draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.69, on the report of the Conference on Disarmament. On behalf of the sponsors of that draft resolution I should like to propose that after the present operative paragraph 5 a new operative paragraph - paragraph 6 - be inserted, to read as follows:

"Requests the Conference on Disarmament to submit a special report on the status of its negotiations and its work to the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament."

(Mr. Djokic, Yugoslavia)

Consequently, the original operative paragraph 6 and 7 should now be renumbered as 7 and 8.

The **sponsors** of the draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.69 believe it would be very useful for the third **special** session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament to have a **special** report in the **Conference** on Disarmament, because the issues that will be considered at the third **special session** would **certainly** be linked with those issues which are **discussed** and negotiated in the Conference on Disarmament.

Having that in mind, the **sponsors** of the draft resolution believe that these paragraphs will not **create** difficulties for **any member** of our Committee,

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from **French**): I shall **now** call **on those** delegations wishing to explain their **positions** before any decision or **vote is taken** on cluster 13.

Mr. CAMPORA (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): The delegation of **Argentina** will vote in favour of the draft resolutions **A/C.1/42/L.69** and **L.61**, both relating to the report of the **Conference** on Disarmament, which was adopted by **consensus** in **Conference** on Disarmament itself. We would **have** preferred a single draft resolution **that** would have represented the consensus in the Committee and avoided **the necessity** for voting.

In the circumstances, the Argentine delegation will support draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.69**, as it **has** supported similar draft resolutions in the past, **since it approaches the problem from the substantive point** of view. We will also vote in favour of draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.61/Rev.1**, which, in operative paragraphs 2 and 3 restates the character of the Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral **negotiating** forum on disarmament and **requests it to** intensify its **work**, pursuant to paragraph 120 of the Final **Document** of the tenth special session of the **General Assembly**.

Mr. MASHHADI-GHAHVEHCH (**Islamic** Republic of Iran): I **should like to** explain the views of the **Islamic** Republic of Iran on draft **resolution A/C. 1/42/L. 16**. It would have been **more** appropriate and propitious had the **sponsors** of that draft **resolution merged it with others so as** to reduce the **number** of resolutions. **This** draft resolution contains **points** embodied in other **resolutions** already adopted, particularly **resolution A/C.1/42/L.70**. **Also**, the **rules** of procedure of the Conference **on Disarmament** are questioned in **this** draft **resolution**, which we **believe will** indirectly harm the credibility of this negotiating body.

Furthermore, the **use** of terms **such** as "**misuse**" in operative paragraph 2 **is** neither discerning nor proper in **such a text**.

The **rules** of procedure **are** there to **be** applied **or not, but not to be misused**. **Those rules** cannot **be** altered to **suit** the wishes of a single country. Are we going to have **a** judge in all deliberations to determine **which rule has been correctly used and** which has **been misused**?

My delegation will therefore cast a negative vote on draft **resolution A/C. 1/42/L. 16**.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French) : The Committee will now proceed to **take** decisions on the draft resolutions **in cluster 13, beginning with** draft resolution **A/C. 1/42/L. 16**. That draft **was** introduced **by the** representative of **Iraq** at the thirty-first meeting of the Committee, on 3 November, **under** agenda **item 66**: "**Review of the** implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted **by** the General Assembly at its tenth special **session**". It is sponsored **by** the delegations of Iraq and Jordan.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: **Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, France, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Poland, Qatar, Rumania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe**

Against : **Iran (Islamic Republic of)**

Abstaining: **Austria, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Federal Republic of, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Nigeria, Portugal, Sweden, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America**

Draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.16 was adopted by 193 votes to 1, with 13 abstentions. \*

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\*Subsequently the delegations of **Djibouti**, Panama and Sudan advised the Secretariat that they had intended to vote in favour; the **delegation** of India had intended to abstain.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French) : We shall now proceed to draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.61/Rev.1, which was introduced by the representative of the Netherlands at the thirty-first meeting of the Committee, on 3 November 1987. It is under agenda item 66, "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session", and is entitled "Report of the Committee on Disarmament".

The sponsors of the draft resolution are Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: **Argentina**, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei **Darussalam**, **Bulgaria**, **Burkina Faso**, Burma, Byelorussian **Soviet Socialist** Republic, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, **Côte d'Ivoire**, Czechoslovakia, **Democratic Kampuchea**, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Finland, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal **Republic** of, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, **Honduras**, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, **Kenya**, **Kuwait**, Lao **People's** Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, **Luxembourg**, Malaysia, **Maldives**, Malta, Mongolia, Morocco, Nepal, Netherlands, **New Zealand**, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, **Papua** New Guinea, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, **Spain**, Sweden, **Switzerland**, **Togo**, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, **Union of Soviet** Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Zaire

Against : **None**

Abstaining: Algeria, Angola, Brazil, Burundi, Cameroon, Congo, Cuba, **Cyprus**, Democratic **Yemen**, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guyana, **India**, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Libyan **Arab** Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Mali, Mexico, **Nicaragua**, **Peru**, **Romania**, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.61/Rev.1 was adopted by 87 votes to none, with 32 abstentions.\*

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\*Subsequently the **delegations** of Djibouti and Panama advised the Secretariat that they had **intended to** vote in **favour**; Sudan had intended to abstain.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French) : We turn now to draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.69**, introduced **by the** representative of Yugoslavia at the 34th meeting of the First Committee on 6 November, as orally revised this morning by the representative **of** Yugoslavia. It has been submitted under **agenda** item 66, entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session", and is entitled "Report **of** the Conference on Disarmament", .

The following countries are sponsoring this draft resolution: Algeria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Burma, Colombia, **Cuba**, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Islamic Republic of Iran, Kenya, Madagascar, Mexico, Morocco, Nigeria, Pakistan, Peru, Romania, Sri Lanka, Suda. , Sweden, Tunisia, Venezuela, **Viet Nam**, Yugoslavia and Zaire.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote **was taken**.

In favour: Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, **Bhutan**, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, **Byelorussian** Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, **Costa Rica**, **Côte d'Ivoire**, **Cuba**, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Kampuchea, **Democratic Yemen**, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of) , Iraq, Ireland, Jordan, Kenya, **Kuwait**, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab **Jamahiriyah**, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, **Peru**, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, **Uganda**, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, **Viet Nam**, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, **Zimbabwe**

Against: **Belgium**, France, Portugal, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America



Abstaining Australia, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Federal Republic of, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, **Norway**, Spain, Turkey

Draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.69, as orally amended, was adopted by 104 votes to 5, with 14 abstentions.\*

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French) : I shall now call on those representatives who wish to explain their vote,

Mr. MOREL (France) (interpretation from French) : In voting in favour of draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.16**, the French delegation wished **to stress its** agreement with the general objective of the draft resolution. It believes that all States **Members** of the United Nations should have the right to **speak** in plenary meeting before the Conference on Disarmament. This **seems** to us **in** accordance with the spirit of the Final **Document** of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and, more generally speaking, in **accordance** with the right of all States to **take a stand** on disarmament **matters**.

However, the French delegation wishes expressly to emphasize its reservations regarding the formulation of **operative** paragraph 2, which might in fact **be** interpreted as an invitation to States **members** of the Conference on Disarmament to renounce the rules of procedure dealing with decisions, and we cannot accept that. It would have **been** preferable, in our view, for the General **Assembly to** limit itself to expressing **the** wish that States members of the Conference **on** Disarmament would respond favourably to requests **by** non-member States to speak in plenary meetings of the Conference.

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\*Subsequently the delegations of Djibouti, Panama and the Sudan advised the Secretariat that they had **intended** to vote in favour.

Mr. DJOKIC (Yugoslavia) : At last year's session of the General Assembly my delegation explained its vote on a draft resolution related to the report of the Conference on Disarmament similar to draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.61/Rev.1. We pointed out on that occasion that Yugoslavia attaches the greatest importance to the work of the Conference on Disarmament and that the Conference, as a single multilateral negotiating body on disarmament, no doubt had an exceptionally important role in the negotiations on certain questions of disarmament, in particular those to which we accorded priority at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We are convinced that there is also no doubt that the priority issues of disarmament in the present-day world are those questions that concern the halting of the arms race, nuclear disarmament, prevention of nuclear war and the extension of the arms race into outer space - in a nutshell, those questions that affect the very survival of mankind.

We continue to believe that the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is quite explicit in this regard. We consider that the Conference on Disarmament should not be a body in which, selectively, only certain questions of disarmament may be considered or a body in which we are primarily considering disarmament issues. We are convinced that the Conference should be a body for negotiations on all the disarmament issues on its agenda - in other words, on all questions that concern the security of all countries.

It is with regret that we have this year noted also that such an approach to the Conference on Disarmament and to its role in the negotiations is not to be found in draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.61/Rev.1. We very much appreciate the efforts made by its sponsors this time again to ensure that their draft resolution should

(Mr. Djokic, Yugoslavia)

be met with understanding and support on the part of the members of our Committee. We have today considered with great attention a revised text which undoubtedly represents a step forward in comparison with the initial draft, but unfortunately, even the revised text was not able to satisfy our reservations regarding the essence of the draft resolution and its relation to the Conference on Disarmament as a negotiating body on disarmament issues.

In operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution the Conference on Disarmament is requested to intensify its work in accordance with the relevant provisions set forth in paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, we consider that the General Assembly should not be satisfied with such a request. It can and should stress the priority issues of disarmament and request the Conference on Disarmament to negotiate on them. Therefore we could not agree this time, either, with the essence of the request contained in operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution.

(Mr. Djokic, Yugoslavia)

What we **should** like to **see is a clear message to the Conference on Disarmament to address itself** to negotiating the key **issues** of disarmament. We consider it **necessary precisely** because of the **importance** we attach to the **Conference on Disarmament** and the role it should play in multilateral **negotiations on disarmament**.

**For these reasons**, my delegation **was** unable **to** support draft **resolution A/C.1/42/L.61/Rev.1** and abstained in the voting.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom) : I should like briefly to explain the vote of my delegation on draft **resolution A/C.1/42/L.16** dealing with **participation in the Conference on Disarmament by States which are not members**.

My delegation has, of **course**, no **wish** to prevent **States not members of the Conference** from expressing **views** in plenary **session**. This is particularly true when the **concerns** of **those States** are under **discussion**. Despite this, we believe that the **entire** question **is** a matter for the Conference **itself to decide**. This is an important principle and **is** why we have **abstained** on the draft **resolution in question**.

Mr. NANNA (Nigeria) : I wish to explain my delegation's vote on draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.61/Rev.1**. In an explanation of vote on last year's draft resolution on Friday, 14 November 1986, my **delegation expressed regret at the fact** that the draft did not **address** matters of **interest** to the majority of members of the Conference on **Disarmament**. Very vital **subjects** on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, such as prevention of an arms race in outer space, nuclear weapons and a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, were **conspicuously absent** from the **draft**. We expressed the hope that the spirit of co-operation and flexibility would **prevail** in the Conference on **Disarmament**, so that **progress** could be made on all **subjects** on its agenda, in particular **those** that **were** most important and urgent. Unfortunately, reasonable progress on those **subjects** again proved impossible. My

(Mr. Nanna , Niger ia)

delegation is distressed by such lack of progress and the routine approach to key subjects at the Conference on Disarmament.

My delegation considers commitment to the negotiations on key disarmament items in the Conference on Disarmament to be total. We would have liked any resolution on the work of the Conference on Disarmament to reflect progress or lack of progress on vital items and to highlight the importance attached to key subjects.

This year the revised draft resolution, A/C.1/42/L. 61/Rev. 1, has again been merely procedural. However, that also explains my delegation's positive vote on the draft resolution, which was devoid of contentious concepts or principles. MY delegation hopes that future resolutions on the work of the Conference on Disarmament will address certain matters or subjects of vital interest to the international community. In the same vein, I hope that the spirit of co-operation and flexibility which my delegation has shown will prevail in future negotiations on various disarmament subjects at the Conference on Disarmament.

Ms. BORSTIN-BONNIER (Sweden) : I wish to explain the vote Of the Swedish delegation on draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.16, on which it has abstained.

The Swedish delegation reiterates its firm support for the participation of all States in the work of the Conference on Disarmament, in accordance with the rules of procedure of the Conference. However, participation in the work of the Conference on Disarmament is to be decided upon by the Conference itself on the basis of its rules of procedure while the draft resolution implies that States not members of the Conference on Disarmament have the right to participate in the work of its plenary session, the rules of procedure of the Conference notwithstanding.

Furthermore, the Conference on Disarmament reports yearly to the General Assembly on all aspects of its work. Last year my delegation said it did not believe that a further report by the Secretary-General would add much to the report

(Ms. Borsiin-Bonnier, Sweden)

of the Conference itself, considering that the Secretary-General's report on the issue to this Assembly, that is, document A/42/552, consists of a reference to the relevant paragraphs of the report of the Conference. My delegation continues to believe that no further report by the Secretary-General is needed.

Mr. GRANGER (United States of America): My delegation has asked to speak in explanation of our votes on draft resolutions A/C. 1/42/L.61/Rev.1 and A/C.1/42/L.69, concerning the report of the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation has often expressed its view that, because the report of the Conference on Disarmament is a consensus document and because the resolution presenting that report to the General Assembly should foster a spirit of co-operation instead of airing old controversies, this resolution should be a simple, business-like document, free of polemics and partisan views. However, in keeping with its unfortunate position, the draft resolution bearing the number A/C. 1/42/L.69 this year attempts to superimpose the views of certain States on what was collectively developed and agreed upon by consensus among the participants in the Conference on Disarmament. As a result, this draft resolution remains a Christmas tree adorned with all sorts of garish, discordant and inappropriate ornaments.

Turning to the other draft resolution relating to the report of the Conference on Disarmament, my delegation deeply regrets that we could not support draft resolution A/C. 1/42/L.61/L. 1/Rev. 1. Its sponsors have taken a much more constructive approach to this matter, and it is noteworthy that many of those supporting draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.69 did not see fit to support draft resolution A/C. 1/42/L. 61/Rev. 1. From the standpoint of the United States, draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.61/Rev.1 is by far a more appropriate document than the other one. Unfortunately it still falls short of our goal of a strictly procedural resolution. For that reason my delegation felt compelled to abstain on it.

**Mr. RODRIGO (Sri Lanka) :** I wish to make some very brief explanatory comments in respect of draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.61/Rev. 1. These comments are in many ways directly related to Sri Lanka's sponsorship of draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.69.

A single resolution on the work of the Conference on Disarmament would, of course, have been ideal, in keeping with the Conference's own method of work by consensus. Unfortunately, this has not been possible. Draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.61 more closely and more comprehensively reflects our position on the past work of the Conference on Disarmament and on what remains of expectations for its future work. Draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.61 in its original form was described as procedural. If that were the case, its purpose would have been subsumed in draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.69, and we would not have seen a need for its revision in draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.61/Rev. 1. The revision has introduced some additions which we can welcome. They make affirmations about the role of the Conference on Disarmament as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum of the international community. However, the draft resolution still presents a somewhat limited and partial picture which makes no real comment on the work of the Conference on Disarmament during the past year.

(Mr. Rodrigo, Sri Lanka)

Furthermore, in **respect of** the future, **draft resolution L.61/Rev. 1** does not **request the Conference** on Disarmament to undertake in the coming year negotiations on issues before **it. However**, that draft resolution does request the **Conference on Disarmament** to intensify its **work** in accordance with **paragraph 120** of the **Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly** devoted to **disarmament**. That is certainly helpful, but the reference to the **negotiating** mandate of the **Conference on Disarmament** falls short of our expectations.

In that **sense**, draft resolution L.69 presents, from my delegation's **perspective**, a more complete and substantive index of the **work** of the Conference on Disarmament in the past, as well **as** recommendations for **its** future work.

In respect of draft **resolution L.61/Rev.1**, the difficulty for my delegation is **not** so much **as** what **it** says as what remains unsaid in it. Had the **draft** resolution provided more specific and positive encouragement to the Conference on Disarmament **to fulfil** its responsibilities and **proceed to** negotiate on the **vital issues** before it, in accordance with its working methods, **my** delegation **would** have found it possible to support **it. We** would not have regarded such encouragement **as** usurpation **of** the Conference's special role.

Nevertheless, I wish to acknowledge the considerable efforts of the sponsors **of** that draft resolution, particularly the representative of the Netherlands, Mr. van Schaik, to **meet the** concerns of the sponsors of draft resolution L.69. Perhaps with more time and a greater sense of political **accommodation** a different **vote will be possible in the future**.

Mr. van SCHAXK (Netherlands) : **I** should like to say a few words in explanation of **my** delegation's vote on draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.69. We** abstained **because we** think a **procedural** consensus resolution would be justified after the hard work done and the consensus reached in the Conference on **Disarmament** at Geneva.



(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

We also abstained because various paragraphs contain language, on the negotiations to be conducted and on other subjects, which does not reflect our views.

Lastly, and perhaps moot important, we have difficulties with the argument of some - including the representative of Yugoslavia this morning - that the draft resolution in itself would prevent them from voting in favour of the procedural draft resolution L. 61/Rev. 1. It has been, and will remain, the objective of the Netherlands delegation to achieve a consensus resolution on the report adopted each year by consensus in the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva.

The vote that has just taken place encourages us to continue in that direction. we are also encouraged by the words of some delegations - and here I mention in particular Mr. Rodrigo of Sri Lanka. Now that the vote has taken place in the Committee, it seems to us that the time has come for all delegations to reflect on the best ways and means to recognize the work done in the Conference on Disarmament and to restore consensus.

Mr. ROYLE (Australia) : The Australian delegation had hoped that the efforts of the principal sponsors of the two draft resolutions on the report of the Conference on Disarmament, draft resolutions A/C.1/42/L.61/Rev. 1 and L.69, might result in a single text that could be adopted by consensus. we regret that that result was not achieved this year.

The operative part of draft resolution L.69, in our view, draws selectively on arguments and proposals made and conclusions then reached by consensus in the process of drawing up the report of the Conference on Disarmament on its 1987 session. we believe that such an approach is inevitably distorted. The Conference on Disarmament works by consensus. The report that it adopts at the end of its year's work is adopted by consensus. The content of that report reflects

(Mr. Rowe, Australia)

completely and adequately the proposals, differences, recommendations, agreement<sup>8</sup> and disagreements that were characteristic of the **Conference's work** during the year **being** reported on. That is all clearly recorded. **But in toto** the point is that the report **is** adopted by **consensus**.

**Now**, when we **are** attempting to **rationalize this Committee's work**, it makes no **sense** to my delegation to do anything **about** the draft **resolution** on the **report** Of **the Conference on Disarmament other than to act on the basis of consensus**, which **characterized the** adoption of **that** report by the Conference.

In these circumstances, **it is self-evident** that draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.61/Rev.1** was preferable in **my delegation's** view, since we sponsored **it**. **We** firmly believe that that **draft** resolution provide<sup>8</sup> for the appropriate action by **the General Assembly on the report** of **the** Conference on Disarmament on its work in 1987.

**We** urge that concerted effort<sup>8</sup> should **be** made next **year** to achieve a **single** draft resolution which deals with the report of the **Conference** on Disarmament and which **can** be adopted **by consensus**. We are encouraged by **some** of the **statements** this morning in explanation of **vote, by** representatives who obviously share this important **objective**.

**Mr. NAZARKIN** (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from **Russian**): The Soviet delegation **wishes to** explain its vote on draft **resolutions** **A/C.1/42/L.69** and **L.61/Rev.1**, which it supported.

Naturally, we prefer draft resolution **L.69**, which quite **clearly and precisely** **states** the role and **objective<sup>8</sup> of the Conference** on Disarmament **as** the **sole** multilateral **body** for conducting negotiations in the field of disarmament **and** **stresses** the need for stepping up its work and holding negotiation<sup>8</sup> on the **substance** of priority questions on its agenda. **Such** a formulation of **the question** **is** one in which we see a reaffirmation **of** political will for **the** full use of the

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

**Conference's** potential and **the stepping up** of its work in the **most important areas**. The **conclusion**, calling for intensification of the **Conference's work**, is in keeping with the contents of the document regarding enhancement of the Conference's effectiveness adopted at the **recent** Prague meeting of the Committee **of Foreign Ministers** of States parties **to** the Warsaw **Treaty**. That document includes inter alia proposals for **a comprehensive** discussion, **during the** third special **session** of the General **Assembly** devoted to disarmament, of all aspects of the **work** Of the Conference on Disarmament, designed to enhance its effectiveness, and for agreement on concrete, practical **measures** to achieve that end. We are ready **to participate** constructively in the consideration and implementation of any concrete proposals aimed at stepping up and enhancing **the** effectiveness of the Geneva forum.

As for draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.61/Rev. 1**, although it does not contain provisions to which we would object, it does not raise with sufficient clarity the **question** of enhancing the effectiveness of the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

At the same time, we note that draft resolution **L.61/Rev.1** states - albeit, as I have already noted, in a general form - the need to step up the **work** of the Conference. **In** the second preambular **paragraph** it **rightly states that** in the **field** of disarmament considerable and urgent work - I stress "**urgent**" - remains to be accomplished. That statement is then developed in paragraph 3, dealing with intensification of the work of the Conference. We hope that those provisions of the **draft resolution will** not remain **merely on paper**, but **will be reaffirmed by** practical action during the next session **of** the Conference.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (interpretation from Spanish) : I **wish** briefly **to explain** my delegation's vote in favour of draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.61/Rev.1**.

Last year **the** Committee had before it a similar draft resolution, and we then abstained. This year's text no longer contained the **elements that** we found unacceptable last year, and we wish to express our appreciation to Mr. van **Schaik** for the steps he took and his endeavours **to** ensure that his draft resolution should receive broader support.

The two texts that we have adopted are not incompatible. One is purely procedural, taking note of the report **of** the Conference on Disarmament, which **was** adopted by consensus **in** that body. We would have preferred draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.61/Rev.1** to contain clearer and more specific references to the negotiating activities that the Conference should carry on. Moreover, when the Conference on Disarmament is requested, in paragraph 3, to intensify its work in accordance with the relevant provisions of paragraph 120 of the Final Document of the Tenth Special Session of the General Assembly, we understand that to mean intensifying its efforts to carry out negotiations **on** its agenda items in accordance with the priorities laid down in that paragraph of the **Final Document** and entrusted to the Conference on Disarmament.

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

I turn now to draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.69, of which my delegation was a sponsor. It may be regarded as a substantive document) it is an assessment of the work of the Conference, and, as is stated in the last preambular paragraph, it expresses concern and disappointment over the meagre results achieved. As I said in the general debate, in our view the lack of results in the Conference on Disarmament is very closely connected with the prevailing international climate. While there is a climate of conflict and the situation is tense, it is an illusion to think that the Conference can make any headway. I repeat the statement I made at our 18th meeting, when I said:

"Now that there is the beginning of a constructive and harmonious climate in relations between the two super-Powers and there seems to be a genuine will to overcome obstacles and facilitate the attainment of results in the field of disarmament, it should be possible also to undertake substantive work in the Conference on Disarmament oriented towards the elaboration of concrete measures concerning the various items on the Conference's agenda. We hope that during next year's session of the Conference its work will indeed benefit from the signs of political will that we have seen in bilateral Soviet-United States negotiation: The best contribution that could be made towards improving the effectiveness and productivity of the Conference consists precisely in facilitating the progress of its work by making efforts to overcome the artificial obstacles which frequently hinder its activities."

(A/C.1/42/PV.18, p. 24-25)

**Mr. GYI (Burma) :** My delegation **wishes** to express **its** views on draft resolutions A/C.1/42/L.61 and L.69.

We voted for both draft resolutions. we wish to point out that Burma was one of the sponsors of draft resolution L.69. In sponsoring it, we took the same position as we did last year.

We believe that draft resolution L.61 is procedural, and its provisions are only general, whereas draft resolution L.69 gives an assessment of the situation in the Conference on Disarmament and calls on the Conference to take further action.

**(Mr. Gyi, Burma)**

In a spirit of co-operation, we voted for both draft resolutions, L.69 and L.61. We believe that the two are not mutually exclusive; they are supportive of each other.

**The CHAIRMAN** (interpretation from French) : We have heard the last speaker in explanation of vote on cluster 13.

We shall now take up the last draft resolution in cluster 14, draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.60/Rev.2.

**Mr. PUNUNGWE** (Zimbabwe) : On behalf of the non-aligned members, I wish to inform the Committee that, following intensive consultations with the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.60/Rev. 1, entitled "United Nations disarmament studies", we have decided to withdraw our amendments contained in document A/C.1/42/L.82. In this regard I wish to thank the sponsors of draft resolution L.60/Rev.1, particularly the delegation of the United Kingdom, for the spirit of compromise and co-operation they showed during our consultations, and also the delegation of Mexico for its efforts on behalf of the non-aligned countries.

The new draft resolution, L.60/Rev.2, reflects the interests of a large part of the international community. It is therefore our wish that it be adopted without a vote.

**Miss SOLESBY** (United Kingdom) : I should like to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.60/Rev.2, on United Nations disarmament studies, on behalf of the sponsors - Cameroon, France, the German Democratic Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Norway, Poland, Romania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and my own country.

In introducing our original draft resolution, I drew attention to the various recommendations contained in the report of the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies. We believe that these recommendations include much that is helpful, and we commend them to Member States when they are considering proposals for study.

(Miss Solesby, United Kingdom)

That is the main thrust of the draft resolution now before the Committee as L.60/Rev.2. It has been amended to accommodate the concerns of a number of delegations. I welcome the announcement by the representative of Zimbabwe that the amendments in document L.82 have been withdrawn. I thank the representative of Zimbabwe for the spirit of compromise in which that has been done.

We believe it particularly important that a draft resolution of this nature should be adopted by consensus. We also hope that the Committee will now proceed in that way.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): We shall now take a decision on draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.60/Rev.2. The original draft resolution - L.60 - was introduced by the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland at the 35th meeting of the First Committee, on 6 November. It was submitted under agenda item 66 (h), entitled "Review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session". The sponsors are: Cameroon, Federal Republic of Germany, France, the German Democratic Republic, Italy, Japan, Norway, Poland, Romania, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The sponsors have expressed the wish that the Committee adopt the draft resolution without a vote,

Draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.60/Rev.2 was adopted without a vote.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): We shall now proceed to cluster 6, which had been kept in abeyance pending consultations. It was agreed that on Friday morning we would take up for consideration the draft resolutions contained in this cluster, draft resolutions A/C.1/42/L.6, L.29, L.38 and L.77.

I shall call first on those representatives who wish to make statements before we take any decision on this cluster.



Mr. McDOWELL (New Zealand): I felt I should report to the Committee on an aspect of the **consideration** of ~~the~~ cluster of nuclear-test-ban draft **resolutions**, which have attracted wide **interest**. You have just referred, Sir, **to** the consultations. I refer to the endeavour to achieve a single, consolidated **text** on the issue.

When we introduced draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.77** at the beginning of last week, we noted that 1987 had been a **year** of mixed results in progress towards the **achievement** of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. I suggested that a clear, **strong** signal to all involved was needed in **order** to get real movement towards a comprehensive treaty.

(Mr. McDowell, New Zealand)

My delegation was also very conscious of calls made by a large number of delegations in this Committee, including the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.77, for there to be endeavours made to produce a single text on a comprehensive test ban treaty which would insure that the international community spoke with one voice at this time on the need for the conclusion of a treaty and at an early stage.

My delegation agreed with this position and we accordingly negotiated diligently with the lead sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.29 to explore the possibility of a unified draft resolution. My delegation was under firm instructions from my Minister for Disarmament and Arms Control to seek to achieve the goal of a unified text,

I want to take this opportunity to express deep-felt thanks to Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico for the very substantial effort he put into those negotiations. I want to report that good progress was being made towards a common text and I am sure that I speak for him also. Indeed, I checked to make sure of this a moment ago when I note with regret that, in the short time available, we were not able to present the Committee with a consolidated draft resolution. We did not wish to draw out unreasonably the Committee's deliberations and so, reluctantly, we have agreed with our colleague from Mexico that a joint text must await next year's deliberations.

So there are still two draft resolutions before the First Committee on this issue. I want to make perfectly clear that my delegation, for one, will be voting for both of these draft resolutions and we trust and expect that together they will stimulate the international community in various forums in 1988 to make progress towards the goal of achieving at an early date a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Mr. TOTI (Hungary) : The Hungarian delegation has repeatedly **expressed its standpoint** on the question of a comprehensive **nuclear-test** ban, **according to** which the conclusion of a **multilateral treaty** on the prohibition of **all** nuclear-weapon tests by **all** States in all environments would **constitute** an **indispensable element for the success of the talks to halt and reverse the** nuclear-arms race, **to** stop the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and to prevent the **expansion of existing nuclear arsenals, as well as the spread of nuclear weapons to additional** countries, thus contributing to the achievement of the final goal **of** the complete elimination of nuclear weapons under appropriate verification.

My delegation has repeatedly urged the appropriate multilateral disarmament **negotiating forum** to proceed to practical work on all aspects **of this matter**. The last **time the** Hungarian delegation **gave** expression to its **views on a comprehensive** nuclear-test ban was on 3 November in this **Committee**. In this statement, my delegation made **it** known that this year the **countries** sponsoring the draft resolution on the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests did **not intend to submit** a separate draft resolution under this **agenda** item. **We** expressed the underlying **reasons** for **taking** such **a** step on an agenda item which the **sponsors** regarded as one **of** the **highest priority**.

**Proceeding from the** intention of allowing the will of the world community to **be** expressed on this matter in the concentrated form of only one draft resolution, the Hungarian **delegation** and the sponsors of **the** earlier separate draft resolution urged other delegations to follow **suit** and to chart a **common** course for future action. **As** the **forthcoming** procedure **on** two separate draft resolutions will show, those expectations did not **come** to fulfilment. **Although** opinions might differ on the causes for not being **able** to make such an important step **forward**, the **task** remains the **same**. Member States have to come to a **common** denominator in order to

(Mr. Toth, Hungary)

give expression to their political view of proceeding towards the complete cessation and prohibition of nuclear testing. In such circumstances, all delegations, including those of the sponsors of the earlier separate draft resolution, will have to redefine the best course of future action to face that challenge.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): Before we proceed to take decisions on the draft resolutions incorporated in document 6, I should like to address in a brief statement the two main draft resolutions which are presented in that cluster concerned with a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, that is, with the cessation of all nuclear tests. These are the texts contained in draft resolutions A/C. 1/42/L.29 and L.77.

Last year a remarkable process of convergence began here in the Assembly on the issue of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. Last year, three main texts were presented, and then we saw a process of amendment, which led to their terms moving closer together. This process of convergence was then reflected in an unusual and changed voting pattern on those draft resolutions, so that we came away from last year's Assembly with the clear perception that the international community was moving towards speaking with a single voice on the vital issue of bringing about an end to all nuclear tests.

We went to Geneva to the Conference on Disarmament strengthened in that phenomenon of convergence, believing that what we saw here at the last Assembly would bring about progress in our work at the Conference on Disarmament. Unfortunately, to some extent, we were disappointed. There was progress during the last year. There was progress in the technical work of the group of scientific experts at the Conference on Disarmament. There was also progress in bilateral discussions of the issue of an end to nuclear testing, and I think we should also always recognize, too, that we in this system do not constitute the known world.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

There are many other people and organizations in this world concerned with the issue of nuclear testing and in those organizations, in the parliaments of the world and in non-governmental organizations, we saw progress last year towards exploring the issues and continuing to call for a resolution of the issues which would bring about a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

So we are back here now this year armed with the convergence we saw last year, strengthened by what we have seen in other forums and in non-governmental organizations, in the hope that we would have seen further convergence this year towards a single draft resolution on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. And when we held our general debate in this Committee, many delegations, for the first time, held out the prospect that this year we might have a single draft resolution. What we have instead are two draft resolutions, not one.

To some extent, the process of convergence has continued. Obviously that is the case, because last year there were three draft resolutions. But the goal of a single draft resolution has continued to elude us and, as others have pointed out, in particular the Ambassador of New Zealand, work was undertaken during this session towards a single draft resolution. It was strong, clear and productive work based on the firmly held belief that on this subject we should speak with one voice and that this year was the year in which that one voice could have been expressed. In fact, we failed, and I must express and record here the very great disappointment of my Government that we failed to produce this year a single draft resolution on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

That disappointment rests upon the irreducibly high priority that **my** Government gives to a treaty which would bring about an end to all nuclear testing. But we are also conscious of the fact - and I want to say this carefully - that another issue is at stake in the question of a merger on this subject, and that is our will and our wish to assert that there is a role for the multilateral body, there **is** a role for the **multilateral** community in forging a treaty such as one which would bring about an end to all nuclear **tests**.

I **said** we are disappointed, but let that not be misinterpreted. My **Government** will continue in **these** efforts and we will start as soon as this session is finished **to** work with our **partners** again towards a single resolution on this **subject**, which we hope **will** be adopted at next year's **session**.

**So** this year we have two main draft **resolutions**. My delegation will vote in favour of the one of which we are not a sponsor. Clearly our position on our own draft resolution is known. When we vote on draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L. 29**, of which we are not a sponsor, we will find it necessary to make a small explanation of vote after the vote.

In **conclusion**, I would want to draw attention to two points with regard to draft resolutions **A/C.1/42/L.29** and **L.77**.

**Draft** resolution **A/C.1/42/L. 29** does present a particular problem with regard to the scope of any future comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. I can **illustrate** this familiar problem by simply making the following comment. We have been informed that some Member States will vote for the Mexican non-aligned draft **resolution** in document **A/C.1/42/L. 29**, because they believe **it** sanctions or accepts so-called peace **ful** nuclear explosions. **We** do not believe that all sponsors of that draft resolution see it as sanctioning so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. **But** we do attach importance to a text on a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty that allows no ambiguity on that issue.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

In contrast, the text given in draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.77, introduced last week by the Ambassador of New Zealand and of which my delegation is a sponsor, contains no such ambiguity. And more to the point, our draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.77 takes account of the policies of all members of the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament. For that reason, we believe it is entitled to receive universal support and that any opposition to it would be incomprehensible.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): As was stated a few moments ago by the representative of New Zealand, and on behalf of his delegation, my delegation likewise regrets that the lack of time has not enabled us to merge into one single draft the two that we submitted, as we have done in the past. Indeed, I share his view that perhaps next year there will be more propitious circumstances in that we will see our common aim materialize.

My delegation will vote in favour of both draft resolutions - our5 and the one that the delegation5 of New Zealand and Australia and other delegations have submitted. That is to say, when we vote on draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.77, my delegation will make a brief explanation of its vote with regard to one of the paragraphs therein.

Mr. RATH (India): I have asked to speak in order to address the cluster of draft resolutions relating to the nuclear-test ban.

Proposals for a ban on nuclear testing have been central elements on the disarmament agenda for more than 30 years. In the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, more than 125 nations have solemnly pledged to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time and to continue negotiations to this end. This objective has since been repeatedly stated in numerous documents adopted unanimously by the United Nations, including the Final Document of the first

(Mr. Rath, India)

special **session** of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We find **this** concern **once again reflected** in draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.29**.

Despi te this commitment , in recent years the nuclear-arms race has been intensified in both qualitative and quantitative terms. Last year, in **its** consideration of this very agenda item, our Commit **tee** took action on a **number of** **r** eolutions. Only one of those resolutions has been transformed into a draft mandate for the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva. I refer to last year's resolution **41/46 A**.

On the basis of **Mexico's** draft resolution, its sponsor **s** at the Conference on Disarmament, which included Indonesia, Kenya, Peru, **Sri Lanka**, Sweden, **Venezuela**, and Yugoslavia, our draft mandate for the establishment of an **ad hoc commi ttee** was presented to the Conference on Disarmament on 16 July 1987. This, too, was not a sudden move. **It** had been discussed earlier in informal consultations.

Nevertheless, the Conference on Disarmament was unable to take a decision.

MY delegation attaches critical importance to this item. As was stated in the Mexico Declaration of 7 August 1966, issued by the six leaders of **Argentina**, **Greece**, India, **Mexico**, Sweden, and the United **Republic of** Tanzania, we remain convinced that no issue is more urgent and crucial **today than** bringing to an **end** nuclear tests, **Both** the qualitative and quantitative **development** of nuclear weapons exacerbate the arms **race**, and both would be inhibited by the **complete** , abolishment of nuclear-weapons testing. Others **may not share** the priority, but as long as we share a common objective , we must begin to negotiate.

**Commencement** of negotiations is the acid test of **our commitment** to our stated objective. It has become clear that the technical issues of verification **etc., can** **no** longer be used to divert attention from the central **issue of negotiations**. The excellent work done by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts bears testimony to **this**.



(Mt. Rath, India)

Given the **consensus** approach which guides our work in **disarmament** negotiations, the Mexican draft resolution we had hoped would have offered a credible compromise. My delegation notes, however, that the scope of the **treaty**, as envisaged in draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.29 is at variance** with the **generally** accepted scope of **such** a treaty during the past **three** decades. Nevertheless, it is clear that negotiations guided by the objective of general and complete disarmament under effective international **control**, would determine suitably the scope of such a treaty.

Any ban on nuclear weapons should not only prevent qualitative **advances in the** character of **nuclear** explosives, but also prohibit the development of new types of weapons which use nuclear components. **New military** applications of nuclear technologies take us in the direction quite opposite of that chartered **out in these** Premises by President Eisenhower in 1953, in **his** famous address "Atoms for peace". My delegation, therefore, would like to support the draft resolution contained in G.29. Admittedly it would be realistic to **assume** that such negotiations would take time before a treaty could be concluded. To provide the appropriate atmosphere for the conduct of such negotiations, my delegation would like to state that, **pending** their conclusion, all nuclear-weapon States should suspend the **testing** of **nuclear** weapons. Such a moratorium would immeasurably **facilitate negotiations** for a treaty

My delegation's views on the other draft resolutions are as follows: **on** **A/C.1/42/L.77**, we note that the sponsors of that draft resolution have endeavoured to **meet** some of the misgivings we had **on** last year's text, particularly regarding the manner in **which** the Conference on Disarmament should **tackle this** problem **this year**. **But** the draft does **not yet mention the** formation of an ad hoc committee, which my delegation would consider to be essential for negotiations.

(Mr. Rath, India)

My delegation's views on the draft resolution on the notification of nuclear tests is as follows. We are not yet convinced that notification of nuclear tests, per se, serves a useful purpose in the context of seeking nuclear disarmament.

Mr. TAYLHARDAT (Venezuela) (interpretation from Spanish): Without any doubt the most appropriate path to bringing about the cessation of nuclear testing would be through the signing of a treaty in whose implementation all States would participate: those that have the capacity to carry out tests, those that have attained the degree of technological knowledge that places them at the threshold of such a capacity, and all the others, whatever the level or degree they have attained in the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Moreover, we believe that the cessation of nuclear tests is the most effective step that can be taken immediately to contribute to making existing nuclear weapons obsolete, to curbing the development of such weapons, to lessening the risk of horizontal proliferation and to preventing the development of new weapons, based on new technology, which could be used in strategic defence systems.

Venezuela will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.77 despite the fact that we are not totally satisfied with the approach taken in this draft to the activity to be carried out by the Conference on Disarmament with regard to prohibiting nuclear tests. In our view, the sole activity that should be carried out by the Conference is the initiation as soon as possible of substantive negotiations aimed at the conclusion of a comprehensive treaty to ban nuclear tests. Accordingly, we are doubtful about the activities that are being requested of the Conference in paragraphs 3 (a) and 3 (c) , since they do not appear to tally with its function of a negotiating forum on specific disarmament measures. We have doubts as to how the Conference on Disarmament would perform everything stipulated in those paragraphs. The implementation of the mandate given to the Conference requires the adoption of a series of actions; some of them have financial implications which, as mentioned earlier, go beyond the mandate of a negotiating body on specific nuclear disarmament measures.

(Mr. Taylhardat, Venezuela)

We should like to raise these concerns and misgivings, so that they will be reflected when the Conference has to implement the provisions of this draft resolution.

We do not wish to hamper the adoption of this draft resolution, and my delegation, in keeping with its policy of furthering any effort that could directly or indirectly help to bring about a comprehensive test ban will, as I have said, vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.77.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French) : We have heard the last speaker in the general debate. I shall now call on those delegations wishing to explain their vote before the voting on the draft resolutions in cluster 6.

Mr. LUNDBO (Norway) : A comprehensive test ban would play a key role in promoting the nuclear disarmament process. It would also prevent further horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons. For those reasons, a committee on a nuclear-test ban should be established without delay in the Conference on Disarmament, which should resume its work on a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Having participated in a group which elaborated draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.77, entitled "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty", I should like to explain Norway's vote on the other draft resolutions dealing with this issue.

Norway will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.9, concerning notification of nuclear tests. This draft resolution urges each of the States conducting nuclear explosions to provide to the Secretary-General relevant information concerning each new nuclear explosion, in conformity with resolution 41/59 N. In addition, all other States are invited to provide to the Secretary-General any such data on nuclear explosions which they may have

(Mr. Lundbo, Norway)

available. Through the Norwegian Seismic Array (NORSAR), which is one of the world's largest seismological institutions, Norway has special competence in this field. The monthly bulletin of NORSAR, which contains data on earthquakes and underground nuclear explosions detected and located by the arrays in Norway, is distributed to seismological institutions in more than 30 countries.

Norway will also vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.29, entitled "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions" and introduced by Mexico. This draft resolution specifies interrelated questions which could be dealt with by a committee on a nuclear-test ban in the Conference on Disarmament. Norway is abstaining on draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.38, also introduced by Mexico and entitled "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions". It is, in our opinion, neither feasible nor practical to consider amendments that would convert the partial test-ban Treaty into a comprehensive one. The partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 is an important disarmament agreement which should be maintained and strengthened through the accession of additional States Parties. At the same time, all efforts should be made to advance the work towards a comprehensive test ban. Norway therefore welcomes the full-scale, stage-by-stage negotiations which were initiated between the United States and the Soviet Union at Geneva on 9 November.

Mr. KUNDA (Zambia): I wish to explain my delegation's vote on draft resolutions A/C.1/42/L.29 and L.38, which refer to the cessation of all nuclear test explosions.

Zambia believes in the efficacy of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, for such a treaty does indeed promise to have a great effect on limiting the further refinement of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, that test ban, we believe, would also be a litmus test of real willingness to pursue nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Kunda, Zambia)

Rut in the light of tho fact that the two draft resolutions refer to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, or some parts of it, in their preambular and operative paregraphe, Zambia will abstain, since Zambia is not a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty régime because of its discriminatory nature.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): The Committee will now take a decision on the group of draft resolutions in cluster 6. The Committee will first take a decision on draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.9, which was submitted under agenda item 62 (h), "General and complete disarmament: Notification of nuclear tests". It was introduced by the representative of Australia at the 33rd meeting of the First Committee, on 4 November and is sponsored by Australia, Austria, Cameroon, Fiji, Finland, Iceland, Ireland, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Samoa and Sweden.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

France

Abstaining:

Angola, Brazil, China, India, Mexico, Nicaragua, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.9 was adopted by 121 votes to 1, with

8 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from **French**) : The Committee will **now take a decision** on draft **resolution A/C.1/42/L.29**, which was submitted under agenda item 49, "**Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions**". It was introduced by the representative **of Mexico** at the 29th meeting **of** the First Committee, on **2 November**, and **is sponsored by** Finland, Indoneeia, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Pakistan, **Peru**, **Romania**, **Sri Lanka**, Sweden, **Uruguay**, **Venezuela** and Yugoslavia.

A recorded vote has **been** requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: **Afghanistan**, Albania, **Algeria**, **Angola**, Argentina, Auatralia, Auatria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, **Bolivia**, **Botswana**, **Brunei Darussalam**, Bulgaria, Burkina **Faso**, **Burma**, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet **Socialist** Republic, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, **Colombia**, Comoros, Congo, Costa **Rica**, **Côte d'Ivoire**, **Cuba**, Cypruo, Czechoslovakia, **Democratic Yemen**, Denmark, Djibouti, **Dominican** Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji , Finland, German Democratic Republic, **Ghana**, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, **Guyana**, **Honduras**, Hungary, Iceland, India, **Indonesia**, Iran (**Islamic Republic of**), Iraq, Ireland, Jamaica, Jordan, **Kenya**, Kuwait, **Lao People' s Democratic Republic**, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan **Arab Jamahir iya**, **Madagascar**, Malawi, **Malaysia**, Maldives, Mali, Malta, **Mexico**, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, **Nepal**, **New Zealand**, Nicaragua, **Nigeria**, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru , Philippines, **Poland**, Qatar , **Romania**, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, **Senegal**, Singapore, Somalia, **Sri Lanka**, **Sudan**, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian **Arab Republic**, **Thailand**, Toyo, Trinidad and **Tobago**, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet **Socialist Republic**, Union of **Soviet Socialist Republics**, United **Arab** Emirates, United Republic of **Tanzania**, **Uruguay**, **Venezuela**, **Viet Nam**, Yemen, Yugoslavia, **Zaire**, **Zimbabwe**

Against: **France**, United Kingdom of Great **Britain** and Northern Ireland, United **States of America**

Abstaining: **Belgium**, **Brazil**, **Canada**, **China**, **Germany**, Federal Republic of, **Israel**, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, **Portugal**, **Spain**, Turkey, **Zambia**

Draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.29 was adopted by 116 votes to \_\_\_\_\_ h

1.4 abstentions.



The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French) : The Committee will next take a decision on draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.38, which was submitted under agenda item 49, "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions". It was introduced by the representative of Mexico at the Committee's 29th meeting, on 2 November, and is sponsored by Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela and Yugoslavia.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burma, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Ethiopia, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zimbabwe

Against: France, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Abstaining: Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Equatorial Guinea, Finland, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Zambia

Draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.38 was adopted by 101 votes to 3, with

24 abstentions.\*

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\*Subsequently the delegation of Hungary advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): The Committee will now take a decision on draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.77, which was submitted under agenda item SO, "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty". It was introduced by the representative of New Zealand at the Committee's 29th meeting, on 2 November 1987, and is sponsored by Australia, Austria, the Bahamas, Barbados, Brunei Darussalam, Cameroon, Canada, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Liberia, Malaysia, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Rwanda, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sweden, Thailand, Vanuatu and Zaire.

A separate vote has been requested on operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C. 1/42/L.77.

A recorded vote has been requested.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour: Afghanistan, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbadoe, **Belgium**, Benin, **Bhutan**, Bolivia, **Botswana**, **Brunei Darussalam**, **Bulgaria**, Burundi, **Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic**, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Hepublic, Chile, Colombia, **Comoros**, Congo, Costa **Rica**, **Côte d'Ivoire**, Czechoslovakia, **Denmark**, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, German **Democratic Republic**, Germany, Federal **Republic** of, Ghana, **Greece**, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, **Hungary**, Iceland, Indonesia, **Iran** (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, **Kuwait**, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, **Morocco**, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New **Zealand**, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, **Oman**, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, **Romania**, Hwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, **Sri Lanka**, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Ukrainian **Soviet Socialist Republic**, Union of **Soviet** socialist Hepublics, United Arab **Emirates**, United **Republic of Tanzania**, **United** States of America, Uruguay, **Viet Nam**, Yemen, **Zaire**, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against: None

Abstaining: Algeria, **Angola**, Argentina, **Brazil**, **Burkina Faso**, **Burma**, Cuba, Cyprus, France, India, Syrian **Arab Republic**, Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Venezuela, Yugoslavia

Operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.77 was adopted by 114

votes to none, with 15 abstentions.

The **CHAIRMAN** (interpretation from French): Lastly, the Committee will **take a decision on draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.77 as a whole.**

A **recorded vote** has been **requested,**

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour : Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, **Australia,** Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia, **Botswana,** Brunei **Darussalam,** Bulgaria, Burkina **Faso,** Burma, Burundi, **Byelorussian** Soviet Socialist Republic, **Cameroon,** Canada, Central African Republic, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, **Costa** Rica, **Côte d'Ivoire,** Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao **People's Democratic** Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Mongolia, **Morocco,** Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger la, Norway, **Uman,** Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian Soviet **Socialist** Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, **Uruguay,** Venezuela, **Viet** Nam, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against France, United States of America

Abstaining: Angola, Argentina, Brazil, China, Cuba, India, Israel, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland

Draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.77 was adopted by 122 votes to 2, with 8 abstentions.

The **CHAIRMAN** (interpretation from French) : I shall now call upon those representatives who wish to explain their votes.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia) : Because a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty banning all nuclear tests by all States in all environments for all time is **a key priority** of the Australian Government, we have been able to vote **in** favour of draft **resolution A/C.1/42/L.29.** That draft resolution has as its central **thrust the**

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

entry into **force** at the earliest possible time of Such a **comprehensive** nuclear-test-ban treaty. I am obliged, however, to **make this brief explanation** of our vote on that **draft** resolution.

We are concerned that the terms of some of the **operative paragraphs** of the draft resolution could **be taken** as implying that **there** is a less-than-equal **concern** for the testing programmes of **some** nuclear-testing States. Our policy **is one** of concern **about** the **testing** programmes of all **States** that conduct **nuclear tests**. Secondly, as I mentioned in **the statement** I made prior to the **voting**, we are concerned that **some States may** interpret the scope of **draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.29** as implying that a treaty drawn up pursuant to its terms would not exclude nuclear **tests** conducted for so-called peaceful **purposes**.

Thirdly, the draft **resolution** does refer to **moratoria on nuclear tests**. The **position** of my Government is **that** the single objective must be a **comprehensive nuclear-test-ban** treaty. It may be the case that moratoria **on testing could**, in certain **circumstances**, facilitate a **move** towards a **comprehensive nuclear-test-ban** treaty, **but** we want it to **be** clear that no moratorium **arrangements can be or ever** should **be** a Substitute for the main goal, **namely, an end** to all nuclear **testing**.

I must **also** take **this** opportunity to **comment briefly on our vote of abstention** on draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.38**. We were **not** able to support the proposal for a conference to consider amendments to the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space **and** under water **because** of our commitment to **direct** multilateral and bilateral **negotiations leading to a comprehensive** nuclear-test-ban treaty. I do, **however**, want to record my Government's knowledge of the **Very valuable work that has been conducted** in exploring the **idea of an amendment conference**, work **conducted** principally by the **global** action of parliamentarians. **We see that work as valuable; we know that it is elucidating the**

(Mr. Butler, Austra) la)

issu s that are involved in the bringing into existence of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, and we are grateful for that work and for the contribution that it is making towards the vital goal of an end to all nuclear testing for all time,

Ma. NIELSEN (Denmark) : I would like to explain my delegation's vote on draft resolution in cluster 6 concerning the realization of a comprehensive nuclear-teat-ban treaty. Denmark is encouraged by recent developmento in the bilateral contacts between the United States and the Soviet Union and by tho fact that the two States have agreed to commence negotiations in 1987 on nuclear testing issues. The achievement of a nuclear-test ban remains a vital issue on the international arms-control and dieurmament agenda. While not an end in itself, a comprehensive nuclear-test ban is considered a very important means in the process of nuclear disarmament.

Agreement on a comprehensive test-ban is envioaged in, and would serve to reinforce, the non-proliferation régime, to which Denmark attaches crucial importance, Denmark has therefore over the years supported the earliest possible conclusion of a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear testing by all Stated in all environments and for all time. Those are four basic conditions a test-ban treaty must meet. Needless to say, a compreheneivo test-ban must in a satisfactory way deal with th qestions of scope, ver if icat ion and compliance.

Consistent with that view, Denmark has not only voted in favour of, but has also been one of the sponsors of, draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.77 submitted by Australia and New Zealand on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In our view, it offers the most constructive and realistic approach towards the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty. The draft resolution focuses particularly on the role of the Conference on Disarmament. It urges the Conference on

(Ma. Nielsen, Denmark)

Disarmament to initiate substantive work on all aspects of a nuclear-test-ban treaty at the beginning of its 1988 session and refers to the progress made by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts.

(Ma. Nielsen, Denmark)

Denmark also cast a positive vote on draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.29, submitted by Mexico and Sweden. As we stated last year, we find the Formulation of that draft resolution, especially as regards operative paragraph 5, a movement in the right direction. It is our hope that this will also be reflected in the positions taken in the Conference on Disarmament and that it will indeed be possible to establish an ad hoc committee on the question of a comprehensive test ban at the beginning of next year's session.

As we did last year, Denmark voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.9, on notification of nuclear tests. We share the view of the sponsors of that draft resolution that the measure in question will be conducive to both the technical and the political drive towards a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

On the remaining draft resolution in cluster 6, the Mexican draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.38, my delegation abstained. We do of course support the final goal of a comprehensive test-ban treaty envisaged in the draft resolution but we do not share the view that the methods suggested would be the right way to work towards it.

As I stated earlier, we consider that the approach proposed in draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.77 offers the most constructive and realistic approach towards a comprehensive test ban,

Mr. PETERS (Federal Republic of Germany): My delegation would like to explain its vote on the draft resolutions in cluster 6, on which the Committee has just taken action. We voted in favour of draft resolutions A/C.1/42/L.9 and L.77 to emphasize our commitment to the realization of a comprehensive nuclear-test ban, which we would like to see materialize at the earliest possible date.

The Head of the Federal Government, Chancellor Kohl, has reaffirmed this urgent desire on various occasions, but what the Federal Republic of Germany advocates is a stop-by-step approach. We read encouraging signs of a like



(Mr. Peters, Federal Republic  
of Germany)

intention in the joint United States-Soviet statement on nuclear testing issued On 17 September 1987. We also welcome the commencement of negotiations on nuclear testing between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and wish them every success. One should not, however, make the mistake of considering such an end to testing or any intermediate measure in the direction Of a comprehensive test ban as a substitute for substantial reductions of existing nuclear arsenals. For my Government, reliable verification of any end to testing, including a limited or intermediate one, is a conditio sine qua non for such a measure.

We are convinced that the technical problems related to such verification can be solved, since the necessary techniques are on the way to being successfully developed.

An important element in this process will be a global seismic monitoring system. In 1985 we proposed its establishment in Geneva. In March 1986 we demonstrated also in Geneva the capabilities of the seismic data centre established at Grafenberg, near the city of Nuremberg, to delegations and seismic experts Of the Conference on Disarmament. One of the key features of this system is its free accessibility from everywhere in the world by a dedicated public network data link enabling any scientific entity elsewhere on the globe to retrieve stored seismic data from the Grafenberg station for a period of 15 days prior to the date of request.

In this context, we interpret operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.9 as an invitation already fulfilled by the above-mentioned government-financed data centre.

(Mr. Peters, Federal Republic  
of Germany)

We will continue to contribute to **the speedy** development and installation of a global **seismic** verification network. It **is in** the context of the **establishment of** such a **system** that my Government will be able **actively to communicate seismic** data **related to possible nuclear** explosions to the Secretary-General via diplomatic **channels.**

What we do not support, however, is **the** installation of unilateral **test moratoriums, nor hastening into** full-fledged multilateral negotiations without the **necessary** groundwork having been laid. Therefore **we did** not vote for **those draft resolutions** which **favoured** those approaches. What we **do** advocate are legally binding, reliably verifiable undertakings **of** interested parties. A **step-by-step** approach, ultimately leading to a complete cessation of nuclear tests, is, as far **as** we understand the formulation, contained in operative paragraph 2 (c) of draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.77**, within the **range** of solutions envisaged in the draft **resolutions**, on which we voted favourably.

Mr. MLLOJA (Albania) : The delegation of Albania voted in favour of the draft **resolutions** in cluster **6**, namely **A/C.1/42/L.9**, L.29, **L.38** and L.77. Our positive vote **expresses the** concern of my delegation with **regard** to the **intensification** of the nuclear-arms race and the continuance of nuclear-weapon testing. The delegation of Albania would however like to state **for the record that** it has reservations in **so** far as the relevant draft **resolutions** fail to point out clearly the fact that the two **super-Powers**, the United **States** and the Soviet Union, are **responsible** for, **and** are the prime movers in, the **intensification** of the nuclear-arms **race** with the parallel continuance of nuclear-weapon **testing, thus** increasing the dangers of a nuclear war. When **we speak of the** prevention of a nuclear war, which **is** one of the most important **concerns** of all peoples, it **is**, in

(Mr. Milloja, Albania)

our opinion, the super-Powers, with their huge accumulation of weapons of mass destruction, that constitute a threat, to the very existence of our planet.

Mr. MOREL (France) (interpretation from French) : I wish to explain the negative vote of the French delegation on draft resolutions A/C.1/42/L.9, L.29, L.38 and L.77, pertaining to the nuclear tests. These various texts do not, in our view, reflect appropriate treatment of the question of nuclear tests. The banning of nuclear tests must be part of an effective process of nuclear disarmament, which is moreover stipulated in paragraph 51 of the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly, held in 1978. This can only happen when progress in nuclear disarmament will have made it possible without jeopardizing the bases of international security. It could not therefore be termed a prerequisite, nor even be given priority in the very substantial reduction of the nuclear arsenals of the Powers with the largest arsenals. Therefore, France will keep its deterrence force to the minimum level required to maintain its security.

Mr. NAZARKIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian) : Naturally, the appeal of the General Assembly for the speedy and of nuclear testing would carry more weight if we had been able to adopt a single draft resolution on this matter. We regret that this was not so. Nevertheless, the Soviet delegation supported draft resolutions A/C.1/42/L.9, L.29, L.38 and L.77, which, to a greater or lesser extent, are aimed at putting an end to nuclear tests.

We note with satisfaction that draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.29 is most in accordance with our position, because it is aimed at a speedy ban on nuclear-test explosions.

We support the recommendation for the establishment at the Conference on Disarmament of an ad hoc committee on the banning of nuclear tests and of two working groups on questions of compliance and verification.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

It seems to us that our proposals regarding the establishment of a group of scientific experts entrusted with submitting to the Conference well-founded and agreed recommendations regarding the structure and functioning of the system of Verification for any possible agreement on a cessation of nuclear-weapon tests would be a contribution to the work of the working group on verification.

With regard to draft resolution L.38, we reiterate our readiness to take practical steps regarding the extension of the 1963 Moscow Treaty to underground tests. We note that in draft resolution L.77 it is reaffirmed that the conclusion of a Treaty aimed at ensuring a ban on all types of nuclear-test explosions by all States in all environments for all time is a matter of fundamental importance and that the draft resolution contains an urgent appeal to the Conference on Disarmament to initiate substantive work on such a treaty at the beginning of its session next year. We believe that that work should begin as soon as possible and that the necessary basis is provided by the proposals that we, with other socialist countries, have made at the Conference on Disarmament in a document on the basic provisions of a Treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests.

With regard to draft resolution L.9, we reaffirm that we shall send the United Nations information through the appropriate TASS publications. On 9 November bilateral Soviet-American negotiations began on the limitations and, finally, the total cessation of nuclear tests. The initiation of those negotiations does not mean that our interest in comprehensive efforts at the Conference on Disarmament has lessened. We consider our bilateral negotiations to be a contribution to the efforts of the international community to achieve a ban on nuclear tests.

(Mr. Nazarkin, USSR)

Moreover, we believe that a dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union, despite its great importance, cannot, because of its bilateral nature, ensure the fundamental resolution of the question of the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Therefore, we hope that the Conference on Disarmament will be able, at the start of its 1988 session, to agree upon a mandate for an ad hoc committee on a nuclear-test ban and begin as soon as possible to make progress towards the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. We view their total cessation not as a separate goal, but as part of the effective process of disarmament.

Mr. CAPPAGLI (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): The Argentine delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.29, on the cessation of all nuclear-test explosions, believing that it clarifies the mandate to the Conference on Disarmament to initiate action on the matter. We also voted for draft resolution L.38, which proposes amendment of the 1963 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water. We wish to express our preference for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty to be worked out in the Conference on Disarmament, as a multilateral forum in which the five nuclear-weapon States are represented - conditions which did not exist when the 1963 Treaty was drafted.

We also voted in favour of draft resolution L.9, on notification of nuclear tests, because we believe that such notification would provide the United Nations with information of the greatest interest.

The Argentine delegation abstained on draft resolution L.77, because it does not explicitly call for the immediate initiation of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a nuclear-test ban.

Mr. van SCHAIK (Netherlands) : My delegation voted in favour of draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.77 on a nuclear-test ban**. we continue to **consider such** a hen to be an important goal.

Since the Committee last **expressed** itself on the **issues** of nuclear testing important developments **have taken** place. I refer to the text of the joint **communiqué** of the **United States** and the Soviet **Union of** 17 September 1987. We are happy to note that as a result of the agreement reached between those two **States** full-scale negotiation<sup>6</sup> have begun on nuclear-testing **issues** in the context of an effective disarmament **process**. The stage-by-stage approach, which we **have** advocated **as** a **means** of achieving our goal of the cessation of **tests, has acquired** a **certain momentum**. We are hopeful that we shall **see result&** from **those** negot **iations**. The stage-by-atage approach a8 now agreed **between the two** major nuclear Powers **seems** to be a **more** promising and effective **road** towards a total ban than a declaratory one. Such **new approach deserves our full support**, and in our **view this is not sufficiently** reflected in the draft resolution. **As a result**, the Netherlands **was not in a position to sponsor this year's** draft resolution on this **subject**.

We are convinced that **nuclear** disarmament and a comprehensive test ban could be achieved in parallel, **using such interim steps as limitations** on the number and size of tests. We **hope that the** Conference on Disarmament can play **its** complementary, **hut essential**, role and will **be in a position soon to engage in** **constructive** and practical work on **scope**, verification and compliance.

My delegation also **wishes to explain its position on** draft **resolutions** L.29 and L.38, **on both of which we abstained**. **Draft resolution L. 29 contains** language **similar to that of resolution 41/46 A** of laet year. Important now **developments to** which I have **just** referred **are not** reflected in **the text**, In **operative** paragraph 7 of the text **emphasis is placed on the need for an agreed moratorium or for**

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

unilateral moratoriums on nuclear-weapon explosions. We do not consider moratoriums to be an adequate approach to the problem of how to realize an effectively verifiable agreement on the elimination of nuclear tests.

In resolution C.38 the idea is expressed of the cessation of nuclear-test explosions on the basis of an amendment to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water. We do not consider this to be a realistic approach. A comprehensive test-ban cannot be achieved via the detour of amending the partial test-ban Treaty. It would be tantamount to a denial of 25 years of comprehensive-test-ban negotiating history. Quite apart from the question whether according to the letter and the spirit of the Treaty an amendment significantly broadening its scope is possible, we fear that such an effort would merely detract from more realistic work leading to a test ban.

Mr. GRANGER (United States of America): The United States delegation would like to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.77, entitled "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty".

The United States is unable to support draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.77 because in some respects it is in fundamental conflict with United States policy regarding nuclear testing limitations.

United States policy on nuclear testing issues is quite clear. We have agreed with the Soviet Union to stage-by-stage negotiations on nuclear testing issues, and these negotiations are now under way in Geneva. In these negotiations, the first step will be agreement on effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the United States-USSR threshold test-ban treaty of 1974 and the peaceful nuclear explosions treaty of 1976. Once our verification concerns have been satisfied, and the treaties have been ratified, the President will propose that the United States and the USSR immediately enter into negotiations on ways to implement a step-by-step parallel programme - in association with a programme to reduce and ultimately eliminate all nuclear weapons - of limiting and ultimately ending nuclear testing. This Administration has been forthright in explaining the national security requirement for continued nuclear testing. For its security, the United States must ensure that those weapons are safe, reliable, effective and survivable - in short, that our deterrent remains credible. This requires underground testing as permitted by existing treaties.

The United States believes that a comprehensive nuclear test ban must be viewed in the context of a time when we do not need to depend on nuclear deterrence to ensure international security and stability and when we have achieved broad, deep and verifiable arms reductions, substantially improved verification capabilities, expanded confidence-building measures and greater balance in conventional forces.



(Mr. Granger, United States)

We do **not share** the view expressed in draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.77** that a comprehensive nuclear test **ban is an urgent matter** that **should be** implemented first, before **substantial** reductions in nuclear arsenals have **been** achieved and the other **conditions just** mentioned have been satisfied.

Turning to the Conference on Disarmament, the United States believes that it can make a contribution to the nuclear-test-ban issues, but not by beginning negotiations on a multilateral comprehensive test ban itself. Instead, the Conference on Disarmament should continue the valuable work of its group of scientific experts and undertake practical work on the issues of scope, compliance and verification.

Regarding our vote on operative paragraph 3, we support further work on a possible international seismic monitoring network and have made our support for such work clear in the Conference on Disarmament, but we believe that additional work is needed before such a network should actually be established. While such a network can be expected to contribute to the monitoring and verification of compliance, it alone would not be sufficient to monitor and effectively verify an eventual comprehensive test ban.

In conclusion, the United States does not wish to perpetuate the mistaken impression that a comprehensive test ban is one of the most urgent arms control issues. It is not. Reducing the number of deployed nuclear weapons and eventually ridding the world of the nuclear threat is far more urgent - and far more critical.

Draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.77 reflects neither that view nor the approach to nuclear testing issues that the Soviet Union and we have agreed to pursue, and we therefore were compelled to vote against it.

The United States would also like to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.9, entitled "Notification of nuclear tests".

(Mr. Granger, United States)

The United States **was** unable to support draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.9** and its purpose of furthering or accelerating the drive towards a comprehensive test ban. I have already described the context within which such a ban must be considered and will only urge States to work with us to make that context a reality,

As is well known, the United States routinely announces information about nuclear explosions. In addition, we do not rule out the possibility of confidence-building measures that involve the reciprocal exchange of information concerning nuclear explosions. The modalities and specific context of such exchanges would need to be worked out in advance.

For these reasons, the United States abstained on draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.9**.

Mr. YAMADA (Japan) a With regard to Japan's vote in favour of draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.77** and its abstention on draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.29**, I wish to state for the record, the following position of Japan on the nuclear test ban issue.

Japan considers the early realization of a comprehensive nuclear test ban to be a step of high priority in the promotion of nuclear disarmament and has been working consistently towards this goal.

Japan warmly welcomes the beginning, only a few days ago, of the full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations on nuclear testing between the United States and the Soviet Union and earnestly hopes that early and fruitful progress will be achieved through these negotiations. In the view of my delegation, there is also an important role to be played by the multilateral forum in complementing and reinforcing the bilateral negotiations on nuclear testing. Therefore we believe it is important that substantive work be undertaken at the Conference on Disarmament on the many problems relating to a comprehensive test ban and we regret that the initiation of such work is long overdue.

(Mr. Yamada, Japan)

We must continue to work strenuously to bridge the differences between various groups of States - the nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States. Japan calls on all the States concerned to make full use of the momentum created by the beginning of the United States-Soviet negotiations to demonstrate maximum flexibility, without clinging to officially pronounced positions, and thus to start substantive work by establishing an ad hoc committee on this agenda item at the beginning of next year's session of the Conference on Disarmament.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish) : I should like clearly to state Mexico's position with regard to the fourth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.77, submitted by New Zealand and co-sponsored by various other delegations. In this connection, I should like to make it perfectly clear that we do welcome, as the draft states, the agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union to commence negotiations in 1987 on this issue, but not the procedure established for such negotiations in the joint statement, which might produce results in the next century when in our opinion the issues require urgent and immediate attention.

We also wish to address something to which the representative of Australia referred a few moments ago. He said that a freeze could not be a substitute for a ban on nuclear weapons. I wish to clarify that neither draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.57 nor A/C.1/42/L.29 - I think he was referring to L.29 - proposes that a freeze be a substitute for the banning of nuclear weapons and the cessation of nuclear tests. To illustrate this point I shall now read out paragraph 7 of draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.29:

"Calls upon the States depositaries of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, by virtue of their special responsibilities under those two Treaties and" -  
this is the most important part -

"as a provisional measure, to bring to a halt without delay all nuclear-test explosions, either through a trilaterally agreed moratorium or through three unilateral moratoria ..."

Should any doubts remain, they will be dispelled by reading draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.57, submitted by Indonesia, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru and Sweden. One of its preambular paragraphs reads as follows:

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

\*Considering that a nuclear-arms freeze, while not an end in itself, would constitute the most effective first step to prevent the continued increase and qualitative improvement of existing nuclear weaponry during the period when the negotiations take place, and that at the same time it would provide a favourable environment for the conduct of negotiations to reduce and eventually eliminate nuclear weapons". (A/C.1/42/L. 57, fourth preambular para.)

Mr. McDOWELL (New Zealand): I wish to explain my delegation's vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/42/L. 29, relating to the cessation of all nuclear-test explosions. We were pleased to support this draft resolution. We believe that the text is, in large part, a good one. It echoes the call in our own draft resolution for the Conference on Disarmament to take up again its responsibilities concerning a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It acknowledges the need for adequate verification and the usefulness of the work of the ad hoc seismic group.

To the degree that we do have reservations, they relate to two aspects. The first is that we would have liked to have seen greater emphasis placed upon the responsibilities of nuclear-weapon States which are not parties to the limited test-ban treaty. It is true that operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution makes clear that it is talking about a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time. But there is an element in other paragraphs which appears to give greater emphasis to the responsibilities of three of the five nuclear-weapon States. We would have liked it to have been absolutely explicit that we are talking to all five nuclear-weapon States.

Our second reservation relates to our belief that a comprehensive test-ban treaty must cover all nuclear-test explosions whether they are stated to be tests of nuclear weapons or of explosive devices which are claimed to have peaceful

(Mr. McDowell, New Zealand)

application. The characteristics of this latter class of devices are in many respects shared with nuclear warheads. There is widespread apprehension about the development of some nuclear programmes, particularly in the absence of appropriate international safeguards. Unrestricted flexibility to develop nuclear explosive devices, whatever their purposes, can only feed that apprehension.

We would accordingly have preferred it had draft resolution A/C. 1/42/L. 29 contained no possible ambiguity that it applied across the board to all nuclear tests, whether these relate to weapons or to so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. It is because we interpret the text in this latter way that New Zealand was able to support it.

I would note that the draft resolution sponsored by Mexico and others has no reference to the fact that the United States and the soviet Union have again begun talks on nuclear-testing issues. It seems to us unrealistic not to acknowledge - indeed, not to welcome - the fact of the talks, however substantial one's reservations may be about the agenda, the sequence and the timetable for those talks. Our view is that 'a comprehensive test ban should provide impetus for rather than simply be consequent upon the disarmament process. A test ban must also draw in the other nuclear Powers and near-nuclear Powers.

So while we welcome the fact that the current bilateral talks are taking place, we wish to make the point firmly that such talks must complement, not replace, the negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty in the Conference on Disarmament. The complementary argument works both ways. Measures being discussed by the super-Powers, particularly perhaps in relation to verification, may well assist the Conference on Disarmament in its deliberations. All States, particularly the super-Powers, have to work constructively in the Conference on Disarmament in 1988. We want the Conference to initiate substantive work next year - not simply confine itself to the scientific aspects.

(Mr. McDowell, New Zealand)

In the light of this desire, clearly shared by an overwhelming majority of the membership, it is all the more disappointing that four of the major nuclear weapon States have felt unable to support either of the test-ban draft resolutions before the Committee today, and indeed that two of those States have voted against both draft resolutions. We have to say that this stance casts doubt on whether there is a commitment to realistic progress in this important area of arms control. We were not reassured to hear a few minutes ago from the United States delegation that draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.77 is in fundamental conflict with the United States policy on nuclear-testing issues.

The ultimate reality is that even the elimination of whole classes of nuclear weaponry, greatly welcome though that would be, will prove of little consequence if the development of new and more exotic nuclear technologies is not restrained. It is undeniable that one of the surest ways to restrain such developments is to negotiate a comprehensive nuclear-test ban. The enhanced degree of support for the test-ban draft resolutions in this Committee illustrates yet again that a great majority of the countries which make up the world community, across the entire political spectrum, share that belief.

(Mr. McDowell, New Zealand)

I wish **also** briefly to **comment** on draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.38**, entitled "Cessation of all nuclear-test explosions". New Zealand abstained in the vote on **that** draft resolution. I have to say that **New** Zealand prefers to put its trust in the ability of the **Conference** on Disarmament to make progress towards negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. New Zealand will support the avenue that **appears** most likely to **yield** practical and useful results on this **most** important issue.

Mr. DOLEJS (Czechoslovakia) : My delegation voted in favour of all four draft resolutions contained in cluster 6 concerning the cessation of nuclear **testing because we** consider this question to be one of the priorities of present disarmament negotiations and one of the basic conditions for creating a non-nuclear world. In this connection we also voted in favour of draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.9** with the understanding that notification of **nuclear** tests is not an end in itself but one of the **measures** facilitating the process of reaching the final goal, that is, a comprehensive test-ban **treaty**.

Mr. NIEUWENHUYIS (Belgium) (interpretation from French) : My delegation was able to support draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.9 and A/C.1/42/L.77 since they meet **concerns** expressed on several occasions.

The Belgian delegation would have hoped that the beginning of bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on **nuclear** tests would have been stressed even further in draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.77**. I should like to recall that since the forty-first session of the General Assembly, at which Belgium's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Tindemans, addressed the Assembly, Belgium has supported limiting the number of nuclear tests as a means of achieving **more** complete and **recognized** measures, and I **should** like to recall this here on this occasion.



(Mr. Nieuwenhuys, Belgium)

**The other** provisions of draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.77** seem to **us** to **be** based on an approach that is both constructive and realistic, and that has enabled us to support this **draft** resolution.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French) : We have now concluded the explanations of vote after the vote on cluster **6**.

Mr. NUNEZ (Cuba) (interpretation from Spanish) : Briefly I should like to put on record my delegation's position with regard to chemical weapons.

Two drafts have been adopted by **consensus**, which we trust will facilitate the prompt adoption of **a** convention **on** the **subject** in the Conference **on Disarmament** in Geneva.

With regard to the non-proliferation of chemical weapons, for it to **be** genuine and complete **it must be** reflected in the actions of those States possessing these weapons, States now producing and stockpiling them and **thus** impeding progress in the negotiations.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French) : We have continued our meeting beyond 1 **o'clock** out of a desire to finish our **work on two** important clusters, **15** and 16, on which intensive consultations are still under way. We hope that those consultations will finish this afternoon. We shall leave this afternoon free to facilitate their completion, and on Monday we shall **be** in a position **to take** decisions on the two clusters.

However, two draft resolutions remain under cluster 11, and in that regard I call on the representative of France.

**Mr. MOREL (France)** (interpretation from French) : In view of the contacts that quickly **took place** between the delegations of France **and Poland**, my delegation has refrained from **submitting on behalf** of its sponsors - **Canada**, Denmark, France, the Federal Republic of **Germany**, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, **Spain**, Turkey **and the United Kingdom** - draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.54**, entitled "Confidence building **measures** and security-building measures and conventional disarmament".

I think **it useful at the outset to recall that last year**, following the Stockholm **agreement**, several **countries** directly involved wished to **stress its** importance to Europe's security and possible progress in conventional disarmament. Following a tripartite exercise carried **out** by Poland, Sweden and **France**, a **joint text** was adopted by the General **Assembly**, namely, **resolution A/41/59 E**.

Since **then the questions** of confidence-building **measures** and conventional disarmament have not **lost** their importance; indeed, quite the opposite. Implementation of **the Stockholm** documents in the **course** of this **year** has **been** satisfactory. For the first time, the 35 States that participated in the **Conference** implemented a set of procedures for notification, **information** and the exchange of data that is already **contributing** to the strengthening of confidence **and thus to the security** of Europe. **At the same time** those countries decided to **go ahead and** prepare in Vienna for negotiations on new confidence- and security-building **measures** and conventional stability.

Given that **very positive development**, **we thought** it necessary this year to prepare **a text** fully taking **it** into **account** and setting forth **some** prospects without prejudging the negotiations now under way **in Vienna**.

(Mr. Morel, France)

Immediately after having deposited the text of A/C.1/42/L.54, we began consultations with Poland in order, if possible, to come up with a common text that could be substituted for draft resolutions A/C.1/42/L.54 and A/C.1/42/L.66. Those exchanges were carried out in a spirit of openness, and I should like to thank Ambassador Noworyta, the representative of Poland to the United Nations, for his effort8 in that joint exercise. On several important items it was possible to note the reconciliation of positions and better mutual understanding.

(Mr. Morel, France)

On other **aspects** the questions became more sensitive, and those **question8** are **still** under discussion at the Conference in Vienna. In those circumstances, **it** **became clear that** it wa8 not **possible** to settle in New York questions that had not Yet been **settled** in Vienna. It is up to the **negotiator8** there to settle **questions that are basic to the future of Europe and to any future** progress in conventional disarmament. Here, **we should take** particular care not to complicate their task.

For those **reasons, after having** noted the **interesting** convergence8 in our **positions**, we also noted that the effort8 at rapprochement begun **here** in New York **three weeks** ago could not **be** completed, **at least not this year.**

**Therefore**, in full agreement with the Polish delegation, which **is** taking a **similar step**, we have decided purely and simply to withdraw the draft resolution We submitted. **In 80** doing, we do not wish this to **be** recorded as a **failure**. **On the contrary, we will** meet **again** next year with **the assumption that by that time the** appropriate negotiating mandates will **have been** given.

Obviously, many delegations may **be** disappointed to note that no substa<sup>n</sup>tive **text** for a draft resolution **on** confidence-building and security-building **measures** and conventional disarmament in Europe has **been** submitted to the First Committee this **year**, but they should recall that the text adopted last year **continues** to remain fully valid. Upon rereading that text and in the light of the work currently under way in Vienna, I **would** even **say** that it has **become** more relevant. After a year of the effective practice of **confidence-bu<sup>i</sup>lding** and security-building measures among the 35, there can no longer be any doubt that **this is** a fundamental factor in everything relating to conventional disarmament, **which is no less necessary** than nuclear disarmament,

Last **year's** resolution contain6 matter for reflection **for** all States, not only those participating in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. **We** believe, indeed, **that it** is now **possible** to reenter into negotiations and

(Mr. Morel, France)

reflection in this area, and we hope that the next **special session** of the General **Assembly** devoted to disarmament **will** confirm the **progress** and efforts made in **this** area **without technical**, doctrinal, military or geographical **problems**. Conventional disarmament **must** be the **concern** of all,

In deciding to meet again on this **question** next year, I should like to emphasize that the withdrawal of draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.54** in no way **establishes** a rule **that** no draft resolution can **be** submitted to the Committee while negotiations are under way. On that **score**, many - if not virtually all - draft **resolutions** submitted would have to **be** abandoned. The withdrawal of draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.54**, which **is** a result of General Assembly **resolution 41/59 E**, is directly related to specific contemporary circumstances and in no **way prejudices** our attitude at the forty-third session Of the Assembly, Indeed, everything points to the fact that, after the adoption of the **mandates** negotiated in Vienna and after the third **special** session, with an additional year for the implementation of the Stockholm **documents**, the time will be ripe to **sum up and lay** down plans for confidence- and security-building measures and conventional disarmament.

Mr. NOWOHYTA (Poland): My delegation would like to make a statement with **regard to our** text on confidence-building and security-building measures and conventional disarmament in Europe. It is well known that, because **of its** historical experience, Poland has spared no efforts **to make** Europe a safe place in which to live. Thirty years ago Adam Rapacki put forward a plan whose ideas are **today more** valid than ever. A few months ago, **Wojciech** Jaruzelski put forward a new Polish initiative aimed at decreasing armaments and increasing **confidence** in Central Europe. That **is** also why we have proposed at Vienna **a** supplement to the mandate of the Stockholm Conference in order that specific discussions would **be** held on **disarmament** matters, leading to an integral system covering **confidence and security-building measures and disarmament**.

(MC. Noworyta, Poland)

It is of fundamental importance that substantial reductions in armed forces and conventional armaments in Europe be achieved. Further encouraged by the satisfactory implementation of the provisions of the document of the Stockholm Conference, which first contributed to the enhancement of mutual understanding and to confidence- and security-building in Europe, the Polish delegation submitted draft resolution A, C. 1/42/L.66, on confidence-building and security-building measures and conventional disarmament in Europe. As another draft resolution has been submitted on the same subject, my delegation joined in efforts to obtain a single compromise draft resolution. I am particularly grateful to Ambassador Pierre Morel of France for his constructive approach and tireless efforts in that undertaking. It has been a constructive continuation of our experience last year with the delegations of France and Sweden, which resulted in a substantive text, adopted as General Assembly resolution 41/59 E.

Nevertheless, it has proved impossible at this stage to reach a commonly agreed text. That is why, together with the sponsors of draft resolution A/C. 1/42/L.54, we have decided to withdraw both that draft resolution and draft resolution A/C. 1/42/L.66, with a view to returning to those ideas and, at the next session of the General Assembly, to arriving at an agreed mandate for the Vienna negotiations. I am deeply convinced that the efforts we have undertaken have not been useless, since they have helped us better to understand each other's position. Our discussions were not easy, for their substance is not an easy one. At the same time, however, we have a great many common approaches, which we hope may bear fruit next year.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French) : The Committee has now completed its consideration of all the draft resolutions in cluster 11. We therefore have only draft resolution A/C. 1/42/L.65 and Corr. 1 in cluster 9,

(The Chairman)

followed by the draft resolutions in clusters 15 and cluster 16. As delegations are aware, draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.55 and Corr.1 and the draft resolutions in clusters 15 and 16 are the subjects of continuing consultations, so we will devote our time this afternoon.

(The Chairman)

Since we **have** no meeting this afternoon, I shall **now call** on those representatives who wish to speak in exercise of the *right* of reply,

**May I remind members** that, in accordance with General Assembly decision **34/401, statements** in exercise of the right of reply are limited to 10 minutes and should be made by delegations from their seats.

Mr. MOHAMMED (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic); I had intended not to speak in exercise of the right of **reply** at this late hour. However, the representative of Iran, as is his wont tried this morning **to** mislead members **regarding the negotiations in the Conference** on Disarmament. In doing this, Iran **exploits** the rules of procedure of the Conference on Disarmament, which are designed to give members the right to contribute constructively to disarmament **negotiations** and not to turn the Conference into a forum for defaming other countries and depriving other Member States **from expressing their views** and from rebutting **false** accusations.

**In certain instances** the rules of procedure have been used to prevent the representative of Iraq from speaking **on** an issue that has nothing to do with the Iran-Iraq war. Isn't this a blatant misuse of the rules of procedure **of** the **Conference? My delegation believes** that all members should be given the opportunity to speak in the Conference.

It was on this basis that Iraq introduced draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.16**, which, I am pleased to note, has **been** adopted by 104 votes to 1, a very favourable **majority** indeed. The vote against was cast by the member which continually misuses the rules of procedure **of** the Conference on Disarmament. In addition, the few States which abstained, when ~~they~~ spoke in explanation of vote on draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.16**, took a position **that** upheld the right of all Member States to participate in the plenary meeting of the Conference.



Mr. MASHHADI-GHAHVEHCHI (Islamic Republic of **Iran**): Other **delegations** **here** have **expressed their views with regard to** the same draft resolution, and using **such** words as “misuse” in such text is not proper, **as** I have said earlier. I am Sorry to have to speak at this time, but I **must**, since the name of my country has been repeated here. We should **know** that the **rules** of procedure are there to **be** applied, **and I reiterate**, if any other delegation would like to turn the rules of procedure of the Conference on Disarmament upside down in **order** to **prevent its views**, it would do better to **use** other channels to change the rules of procedure and not to use such **words as** “misuse”.

The meeting **rose** at 1.45 p.m.