



**VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 29th MEETING**

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The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 48 TO 69 (continued)

STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE, AS NECESSARY

Mr. OKUN (United States of America) : As Ambassador Friedersdorf promised last week, I should like to summarize briefly for the Committee's benefit the discussions which took place last Friday and Saturday between Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State Shultz.

From President Reagan's announcement of last Friday, members already know the main developments in the talks in Washington: an agreement that General Secretary Gorbachev will visit Washington beginning 7 December and an agreement that President Reagan will visit the Soviet Union in the first half of next year.

The joint statement also sets objectives for the two visits: to discuss and make progress on the full range of issues in United States-Soviet relations, and to sign an intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) treaty at the Washington summit meeting, and a strategic arms reduction treaty (START) at the Moscow summit meeting.

At this point, we do not have either of these treaties, so a major focus in the talks in Washington was the work that should take place to turn these treaties into reality. As a result, Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze developed a general concept for the development of relations in the coming months, starting right now and leading through President Reagan's visit to the Soviet Union next year.

We had been told after the Moscow ministerial meetings that General Secretary Gorbachev would be sending President Reagan a letter, and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze brought it with him. The President described MK. Gorbachev's letter as statesmanlike and positive, and said that he welcomed it. We are at present studying the letter carefully.

. Okun, United States)

With respect to arms control, Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze discussed at length the nuclear and space talks (NW). The thrust of the discussions was to review the major issues, clarify positions, reach a meeting of minds on how we will proceed, and set objectives for the two summit meetings.

We accomplished much on this. The next step is to tackle the substantive differences. Given the time constraints on the meetings, there was only passing discussion of arms control matters other than the NST negotiations.

With respect to INF, the Soviet side seemed relatively optimistic that an agreement could be completed in the next two or three weeks. We would like nothing better, but we made it clear that this schedule would not be met at the current pace of work on verification issues. As the President said in his press conference, verification is a very important dream for us. Consequently, the Secretary and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze had a thorough discussion of the state of affairs in Geneva. We urged the Soviet side to give instructions to their Geneva delegation so that agreement could be reached on the many critical verification details which remain.

With respect to strategic offensive arms, discussions focused on two main issues: sublimits on ballistic missile warheads and verification.

The United States side told the Soviet side that this sublimit was very important for the United States and sought clarification of the sublimit proposals made by General Secretary Gorbachev in Moscow. We noted that we could not agree to the specific limits the General Secretary had suggested but that, if these numbers indicated the force structure the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics desired in the context of START cuts, they should be able to accommodate that structure within the 4,800 ballistic missile warhead sublimit we had proposed on 8 May 1987.

(Mr. Okun, United States)

The Soviet aide **has suggested some** flexibility regarding the **sublimits**. In Washington, we **sought** to clarify whether **this** flexibility applied to the 4,600 **sublimit**. The **discussion** ended **inconclusively**, but with a **general** understanding that the **issue** would **be** taken up **by** experts.

We **also stressed** the importance of getting to work on START verification issues. Foreign **Minister** Shevardnadze was responsive, and the two sides will **consider** how best to **get** going on **this** subject in **Geneva**.

The **Ministers also** spent a **good** deal of time on defence and space issues, with both **sides describing** their positions. Neither side altered its position, but the sides had a **constructive** exchange about how to proceed.

Foreign **Minister** Shevardnadze stressed that he did not want to debate **about** strategic defence initiative (**SDI**) or anti-ballistic missile (ABM) treaty interpretation. Rather, he indicated we should tackle the **issue** in terms of strategic stability. Secretary Shultz welcomed **this** kind of conceptual approach. We have **long** thought that strategic stability is a major objective, and it has been the **driving** consideration behind our START proposals and our SDI programme.

Secretary Shultz and **Foreign Minister Shevardnadze also discussed** in general terms the issue of compliance with arms control agreements. Secretary Shultz agreed to a suggestion made by the Foreign Minister in Moscow that there be discussions at the Deputy Foreign Minister level. on now to deal **more** effectively with these issues.

Regarding the forthcoming summit, President Hagan and General Secretary Gorbachev will meet in Washington beginning on 7 December.

There are two primary objectives for the **summit: first**, they will sign the INF **treaty**; just as important, they will consider how to move ahead on the rest of our agenda.

**(Mr. Okun, United States)**

Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary Shultz **agreed** that the full range of **issues between** us will **be** discussed - that is, arms reductions, human **rights**, regional **issues**, and bilateral relations.

They also agreed that our leaders will **focus** on ways to achieve a START treaty for 50 per cent reductions in **offensive forces**, to **be** signed at **a** Moscow summit meeting in the first half of **1988**. Secretary Shultz **and** Foreign Minister **Shevardnadze** have both said that START is the **most** important priority. The task now is to find a way forward.

(Mr. Okun, United States)

We expect that as a result of the discussions the President and the General Secretary could issue instructions to our delegations in Geneva on ways to move ahead, both in START and in defence and space.

General Secretary Gorbachev's programme in the United States will also include time for serious discussions with the President and senior administration officials, as well as an opportunity for him to meet other American political leaders. We will be working intensively on the details of his programme in the weeks to come.

Mr. AL-KETAL (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic) : I wish to speak on agenda item 62, sub-item (a), "Prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons".

The use of nuclear energy is a **fact of life** today, but its peaceful use is by no means risk-free as it could involve wide-scale tragedy and even mass destruction if, despite human intentions, nuclear power was used for hostile action against nations.

Armed attacks on nuclear installations have many implications, including the undermining of the inalienable right of States to make peaceful use of atomic power. Of the principles of nuclear non-proliferation and of the safeguards system of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which provides early warning of disasters resulting from radiological effects. A military attack on nuclear facilities releases radioactive material into the environment, causing radioactive contamination, not only in the immediate area of the attack but in adjacent regions. Even if carried out with conventional weapons, such attacks may have the same consequences and implications as attacks using radiological weapons.

Therefore, the question should be examined in the context of global endeavours to

(Mr. Al-Ketal, Iraq)

promote the concluding of an international agreement prohibiting radiological weapons.

During the negotiations at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, most delegations **recognized** the radiological dangers inherent in such attacks and the **destructive** effects on the environment **that** could result. Moreover, **many** States expressed their conviction that such military **attacks** were, in terms of the **consequences** and **the** damage inflicted, **tantamount to radiological** war.

The report prepared by the **Group** of Experts appointed by the Secretary-General to study **the** implicationa of the Israeli military attack against, the Iraqi nuclear ins **talla** tiona devoted to peaceful purposes, issued in 1983, **s ealed :**

"intentional destruction, **by** either conventional or nuclear weapons, of nuclear power plants and **some other** kinds of nuclear installations might. **caus**^ the release into the environment of huge **amounts** of radioactive material and may result in **radioactive** contamination of large areas.

"An attack **on** nuclear facilities could **have gr tve consequences not only** for the State sub **jected** to **such an** attack, but also for neighbouring **states**, since the radioactive mater **ial** released **by an attack might** travel far beyond the borders of the State attacked." (A/38/337, paras. 119, 120)

**Iraq is** the **only country** to **have** had a peaceful nuclear reactor **attacked** by **conven tional** weapons. Having suffered greatly from that **attack and** wishing to forestall another such, and **in** the absence of inter national arrangements prohibiting **such military** actions, Iraq firmly believes in the important role of **the specialized international agencies** in upholding the principles of the peaceful **uses** of nuclear **energy and nuclear non-proliferation** that fall within their **r espective** ter ms of r efer ence . Iraq wishes to stress in par ticular the major role

(Mr. Al-Ke tal, Iraq)

of **both the IAEA** and the Conference on **Disarmament** in the concluding of an international convention prohibiting military attacks on nuclear facilities.

The preamble to draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.17** recalls previous **resolutions** adopted **by** the General **Assembly** and the General Conference of the **International Atomic Energy Agency** on the **prohibition** of the development, production, stockpiling **and use** of radiological weapons, and urges **States** to reach an **international** agreement that prohibits armed **attacks** against **nuclear** installations devoted to **peaceful** purposes. In the preamble, also, grave concern is expressed that armed attacks against nuclear facilities, **though** carried **out with** conventional **weapons**, **could be tantamount** to the use of radiological weapons. **It** is also stated that the Israeli attack against **the** safeguarded nuclear **facilities** in Iraq constitutes an unprecedented danger to **international** peace and **security**.

The **key** points in the operative part of the draft resolution are as **follows**. Paragraph 1 reaffirms that **armed attacks** of any kind against nuclear facilities are **tantamount to the use** of radiological weapons, **owing to** the dangerous radioactive forces that such **attacks cause** to **be** released. Paragraph 2 **requests** the Conference on Disarmament to reach an agreement **prohibiting** armed **attacks** against **nuclear facilities**. That is in order to ensure the inviolability of peaceful nuclear installations and to ensure the safe **use** of nuclear power, Paragraph 3 **requests** the **International Atomic Energy Agency** to **provide** the Conference on Disarmament with the technical studies which would facilitate the **conclusion** of **such an agreement**.

**Obviously**, the draft resolution is of a general **nature**, **but** it is important. The world watched with concern the ramifications of the Chernobyl accident, **with its serious consequences** for human life and the environment, both inside the **Soviet Union** and far outside it. Indeed, it affected several other countries and



(Mr. Al-Ketani, Iraq)

regions. We now clearly recognise the genuine radiological effects of any nuclear accident, whether resulting from a technical, operational fault or from intentional sabotage or destruction. Such harmful effects go beyond national borders and could be harmful far from the scene of the accident.

Therefore, my delegation hopes that the draft resolution that it has submitted will have the widest possible support, both in the Committee and in the General Assembly.

Mr. McDOWELL (New Zealand) : I wish to introduce draft **resolution**

**A/C.1/42/L.77** entitled "**Urgent** need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty".

The draft **is** sponsored by **New Zealand** and Australia, as well **as** Austria, the Bahamas, Brunei Darussalam, Barbados, Cameroon, Canada, Denmark, Fiji, Finland, **Greece**, Iceland, Ireland, Jamaica, Japan, Liberia, Malaysia, Norway, Papua **New** Guinea, the Philippines, Samoa, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sweden, **Thailand**, Vanuatu and Zaire.

The 28 sponsors of the draft **resolution** share the conviction - **as** we hope do all the other members of the Committee - that a nuclear war cannot be won and **must** never be fought. We believe that **there** is an **urgent** need for the nuclear-arms race to **be brought** to an end, that the number of nuclear weapons must be immediately reduced and that, in the end, they must be **eliminated**. In our view, a treaty to ban the conduct of nuclear **tests** by all States in all environments for all time is a Step that has to be taken if the continued advance of **nuclear-weapons** technology is to be stopped, if the **proliferation** of nuclear weapons is to be **prevented** and if these weapons are finally to **be eliminated**.

For that reason, this group of 28 countries has submitted a draft resolution that we **believe** offers the best way **forward** to the early conclusion of a **comprehensive** test-ban treaty. In its **preambular** part it reaffirms the particular responsibilities **of** the Conference on Disarmament in this regard; **in** its **operative** **@art** it urges the Conference on Disarmament to **act**.

The Conference must, in the **words of** the draft **resolution**, initiate substantive work on all aspects of a treaty right at the start of its next session in 1988. It must take immediate step; for the establishment of **an** international seismic-monitoring network. That will help **to** enhance our ability to verify **compliance** with the treaty. The Conference must **investigate other measures** that will help to ensure compliance with the treaty.

(Mr. McDowell, New Zealand)

The **draft** resolution **also** identifies steps that should be taken by the nuclear-weapon States. They should, in the view of the sponsors, agree to appropriate, **ver if iable**, interim **measures**. These agreements should **lead to the realization** of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty.

We also urge **China** and France to adhere to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in **Outer** Space and Under Water.

The year that has nearly passed has been one of **mixed progress** towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We have heard the announcement **by the United States** of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that in only a few days' time they will commence neyotiations on nuclear-testing issues. Our draft resolution welcomes **the joint statement**. We have seen other initiatives taken to further the international community's confidence **in its ability** to verify a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Particular mention is made in the draft **resolution of the** proposals by the leaders of the sir-nation initiative to **promote an end** to nuclear testing. **But** it remains highly regrettable that, while during **1987** there **continued** to be constructive work at the scientific and technical level in **Geneva**, the Conference on Disarmament failed **to** establish an **a hoc** committee on its priority **item - item I** of its agenda. This **seems** to the sponsors to be **inconsistent** with the pronounced **degree** of convergence that emerged at last year's session of the **General Assembly**. There **has been** further and even clearer **evidence of suc**.convergence **during** this year's debates in this Committee.

The international **community** wants progress towards an early realization of the goal of a **comprehensive** test-ban treaty and finds it **diff icul** to comprehend why **this does not** happen. **Draft** resolution A/C.1/42/L.77 embodies a practical programme **by** which real movement towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty can be **achieved**. A clear strong signal to all involved is needed. On behalf of the 28 **sponsors**, New Zealand is pleased to **commend** this text to the **First** Committee.

Mr. BUTLER (Australia): I speak in support of the statement Just made by the Ambassador of New Zealand introducing draft resolution **A/C.1/42/L.77** on the "Urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty". The case for such a treaty is clear as it has been for **some** time, indeed for too long. In supporting the remarks made by the Ambassador of New Zealand I want briefly to add the following points which are relevant to the urgent need for **a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty** and which are addressed in the draft resolution.

First, the nuclear-weapon States, especially those which continue to carry out the bulk of nuclear-test explosions, have **a** fundamental responsibility for **action** towards the early conclusion of a verifiable, comprehensive, nuclear-test-ban **treaty** open to and capable of attracting the adherence of all States. Thus our **draft** resolution adverts to their particular responsibility and in addition welcomes the decision taken in September by the United States and the Soviet Union to the effect that they will commence negotiating this year on nuclear-testing **issues**.

Secondly, **because** of the nature of such a treaty - that it should be comprehensive and global in its effect - it is essential that multilateral action **also** take place with a view to the conclusion of a treaty at an early date. The Conference on Disarmament - the single multilateral disarmament negotiating forum - **is** the place at which such action **must be taken**. Accordingly our draft **resolution** urges the Conference on Disarmament to initiate substantive **work** on **all** aspects of a nuclear-test-ban treaty at the beginning of its **1988 session**.

Thirdly, because **an** effective treaty **would need** to be able to be verified, our draft resolution calls for immediate steps towards the establishment of **an** international **seismic** monitoring network and for detailed **investigation** of other measures **to** monitor and verify compliance with **a** comprehensive **test-ban** treaty.

(Mr. Butler, Australia)

Those three elements are the core of this draft resolution. They hold the key to practical progress towards a treaty. They embrace all aspects of what is required to make a comprehensive test-ban treaty a reality - no more and no less.

I draw particular attention to the fact that our draft resolution is free of declaratory or condemnatory language. In this respect the sponsors of the draft resolution have chosen specifically to set aside issues or ideas that may be contentious and instead to strive for agreement. Equally, our draft resolution preserves the politically appropriate and procedurally correct approach towards the relationship between the General Assembly and the Conference on Disarmament. We do not attempt to dictate to the Conference a mandate for an ad hoc committee on a test-ban treaty or to instruct it on how it should conduct its work. It is sufficient for the mind of the Assembly on this vital issue of a nuclear-test ban to be expressed and for that view to be conveyed to the Conference on Disarmament - and that is achieved in our draft resolution. Similarly it envisages a constructive relationship, rather than an adversarial one, between what is taking place - what must take place - bilaterally and what must be achieved multilaterally.

(Mr . Butler, Australia)

For the reasons I have outlined, I think it is fair to say that this draft resolution is the one that is focused sharply on the objective of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and on the practical steps required to move us towards that objective. There can be little doubt that if this draft resolution is widely supported throughout the Assembly it will then be permitted to have its practical effect. My delegation commends this draft resolution to the First Committee and to such wide support.

Mr. PHAM NGAC (Viet Nam): My delegation wishes to address today some specific disarmament issues.

This afternoon we have heard a statement by the United States delegation on the bilateral negotiations between the United States of America and the USSR. The international community indeed expects a great deal from the third summit meeting between General Secretary Gorbachev and President Reagan, and hopes that the first agreement on the reduction of nuclear weapons will inaugurate the deeper and more substantial process of removing the universal nuclear threat.

We are gratified, and we are looking forward to that meeting in the expectation that the momentum towards international co-operation in strengthening international security and promoting conditions of peace and stability will be further stimulated. It is our hope that it will become possible to finalize the negotiated commitments, not only as far as the intermediate-range nuclear forces are concerned but also in a broader field of disarmament and that their negotiations on effective measures for putting a halt to the nuclear-arms race and for nuclear disarmament, as well as to the prevention of an arms race in outer space, will have another chance for success.

(Mr. Pham Ngac, Viet Nam)

In view of our common concern at the fact that disarmament negotiation has always **been** overtaken **by the** arms race, **my** delegation strongly believes that political will should **be** exerted **constantly to** bring closer the **process** Of practical nuclear disarmament, **namely,** the elimination **of** intermediate- **and** shorter-range **missiles;** key provisions of agreements to strengthen the **régime** of the Treaty on the Limitation of **Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems;** the reduction **by** half of the **strategic** offensive **arms** of the Soviet Union and the United States) and the opening of talks on the stage-by-stage cessation **of** nuclear tests.

An important step towards curbing the nuclear-arms race and preventing **its** extension into outer space would be to ban nuclear tests. This **issue has been on** the agenda of this international forum for more than 30 years **and** has now **become a** priority. **Since July 1986,** Soviet and **American** experts have **been holding** negotiations in **Geneva** with a view **to** reaching an agreement on the opening of full-scale talks on a **complete** ban. With the possibility of verification **of** nuclear tests, there is now no **excuse to avoid** the ratification of the two partial **test-ban** agreements of 1974 and 1976, as the **first** step in these negotiations. As an immediate practical measure in connection **with these talks,** the **Soviet Union** has stated its **readiness** to reach an interim agreement with the American side on **limiting** underground nuclear explosions to one **kiloton** and the number of nuclear tests to three **or four** a year. **Such moves** are to be encouraged.

In multilateral consideration **and** negotiation of the nuclear testing issue, **at** the Conference on **Disarmament** in Geneva **in** particular, there have been further **moves** towards a narrowing of the differences. It is necessary to lead the Conference out of the procedural **deadlock and begin** so'ving the substantive issues. The United Nations will not allow the shelving of what it has identified as a milestone in the definition of a government's attitude towards disarmament.

(Mr. Pham Ngac, Viet Nam)

We welcome all the **initiatives** and **proposals** for accelerating the **process** leading to the complete **ban** of **nuclear tests**. We view the agreement on a comprehensive **test-ban** treaty as an **essential** element in reducing the nuclear threat.

of **great** importance in halting the **arms race** and bringing about **disarmament** is the banning and elimination of chemical weapons. The United Nations has adopted a **number** of resolutions *to this effect*, and a **consensus** has been reached on **some** of them. **This means** that **States** Members of the United Nations **supporting those** resolutions have undertaken a moral and political commitment to work for the **conclusion** of a convention on **this** matter at an **early** date.

At the Conference on Disarmament, the **number** of unresolved questions has been reduced to a minimum and the **differences** on them have been narrowed considerably. There is now a real possibility that a convention on **banning** chemical weapons will be concluded at an early date. In **this** context, it is particularly important to prevent any **steps** that would complicate the **reaching of** agreement on the convention. My delegation **shares** the **legitimate** concern of other delegations on the development and production of binary weapons.

Standing as it does for a **constructive** dialogue between all the parties to the **talks** and for the early conclusion of an international convention on the prohibition and elimination of chemical weapons, Viet Nam reiterates its **support** for the **establishment** of chemical weapon-free zones in Central Europe and in the Balkans. We **welcome** the continuing **confidence-building** measures undertaken by the Soviet Union in the **process** of **drafting** a convention, **such as** the recent visit to Shikhany where the **technology** of **destroying** chemical weapons was demonstrated and other relevant information was also **provided**. We hope that the carrying out of other similar arrangements being planned in Tooele, Utah, in the United States of America, Gunter in the Federal Republic of Germany, and Porton Down in the



(Mr. Pham Ngac, Viet Nam)

United Kingdom will enhance an atmosphere of mutual confidence, thus providing a good impetus for the fruitful conclusion of the convention.

The convocation at an early date of the international Conference on the Indian Ocean remains one of the outstanding issues on which urgent measures are required. That Conference could take practical steps to implement the United Nations Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. Through the commendable and untiring efforts made by the Ad Hoc Committee and the co-operation of all Member States, major progress has, it seems, been achieved in organizational matters as well as on substantive issues. But, regrettably, the convening of the Conference has been inordinately delayed. We whole-heartedly support the continued endeavours to ensure that the Conference on the Indian Ocean will be held at Colombo at the earliest possible date, but not later than 1990. In this context, we share the common view of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries in calling for:

“full and active participation in the Conference by all the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users, as well as co-operation by those States with the littoral and hinterland States, which was essential for the success of the Conference.” (A/41/697, pp. 93-94)

Nearly a decade has passed since the first special session devoted to disarmament. Since then the objectives, principles and priorities laid down in the Final Document have helped to guide all multilateral efforts in the field of disarmament. It is our hope that the third special session of the General Assembly on disarmament will encourage a dialogue on methods of achieving security for all in the military sphere.

(Mr. Pham Ngac, Viet Nam)

The **session** will be called upon to determine the main **guidelines** for a nuclear-weapon free and secure world and to specify **measures** leading to **such a world**. **This** will involve the creation of a favourable political atmosphere of confidence and understanding with regard to world affairs.

**Notwithstanding** our differences on disarmament **issues**, this year the general debate in our Committee **has been** conducted in an atmosphere of constructive dialogue. My delegation believes that ~~the~~ effort of merging draft resolutions and adopting them **by consensus** will **result** in the preparation of a good **groundwork** for disarmament negotiations. We are **convinced** that **such a spirit** will prevail **not only** in the work of our Committee **but also** in the disarmament talks held within and outside the United Nations **system**.

Mr. KORSGAARD-PEDERSEN (Denmark) : My **statement** this afternoon falls into two parts. The first part **is a statement on item 69** of the agenda.

Speaking **on behalf** of the 12 member States of the European Community, I **should** like to address **the subject** of the **relationship between** disarmament and development. For the Twelve, disarmament **and** development **both** constitute fundamental objectives. We **should like to see** military **expenditure restrained** to the **levels** justified **by** security needs, **and** greater **efforts** to **meet the** demands for social and economic development. ~~We~~ share the widespread concern over the disproportion **between arms** expenditure and development efforts. The cost involved in the high levels of military expenditure ~~all~~ over **the** world is difficult to reconcile with **the unacceptable** conditions in which a significant **proportion** of the population of the globe **now lives**, particularly in the developing **countries**.

Consideration of the relationship **between** disarmament **and** development has been on the international agenda for many years. ~~The~~ convening ~~of~~ the International Conference on the subject in August-September this year was, in our view, a

(Mr. Korsgaard-Pedersen, Denmark)

significant event. The Conference gave the international community an opportunity to address at a high political level the complex relationship between disarmament, development and security and to move towards a more substantial and comprehensive understanding of the subject-matter.

The Twelve participated actively and constructively in that process, and we welcomed the fact that it proved possible to strike a balance that enabled the Conference to adopt a Final Document by consensus, a document which, inter alia, states that

"Disarmament and development are two of the most urgent challenges facing the world today. They constitute priority concerns of the international community in which all nations - developed and developing, big and small, nuclear and non-nuclear - have a common and equal stake. Disarmament and development are two pillars on which enduring international peace and security can be built." (A/CONF.130/39, p. 2)

The Conference reaffirmed and expanded the international understanding of the crucial importance of the question of security in any detailed analysis of the relationship between disarmament and development, security being understood as a concept encompassing social, humanitarian, environmental, developmental and military aspects.

The reference in the Final Document to the importance to facilitating progress in both disarmament and development of greater openness, transparency and confidence among nations is, in our view, very pertinent. Likewise, we welcome the recognition of the need for an improved data base on military expenditures and the call to this end for the broadest possible number of States to provide objective information on their military budgets using the standardized reporting system of the United Nations. We hope to see the implicit willingness that lay behind the

(Mr. Korsgaard-Pedersen, Denmark)

acceptance of the relevant formulations in the action programme on these questions evidenced, inter alia, in wider participation in the reporting **system** and finding expression also in the **work** of the United **Nations** Disarmament Commission on the outstanding paragraphs of the guidelines for the reduction of military budgets. In the field of military spending, from the point of view of the Twelve, it could be useful to **utilize** the **expertise** of the United **Nations Institute** for Disarmament Research (**UNIDIR**) .

The relationship **between** disarmament and development is often seen, first and foremost, in the perspective of international financial reallocations. This, in our view, is a simplification. While we should all **promote** the transfer of any resources released through arms-control and disarmament measures for economic and social development, especially in the developing countries, it **should be recognized** that disarmament **measures** will not automatically lead to savings, particularly in the short run.

The Twelve believe that the reallocation **most** likely to have **an** early impact on development is that at the national level of resources from **the** military to the civilian sector where **the assessment** of the local or regional security situation permits a country to move towards disarmament. It is **a** huge challenge to the world community to create conditions enabling the present negative relationship of arms build-up and unattained development to **be** turned into a positive interaction of security, disarmament **and** development.

We are encouraged that it **is stated so** clearly in the Final Document that disarmament and development are **two** distinct processes and that each should be pursued vigorously regardless of progress in the other. **Thus**, lack of progress in the disarmament field can never justify not living up to internationally agreed **commitments** in the development field. One of the achievements of the Conference,

(Mr. Korsgaard-Pedersen, Denmark)

therefore, was the **focusing** on the ~~complexity~~ of the relationship and the attempt to give a more comprehensive description **of** its dimensions.

The Conference showed a remarkable will to compromise. The Final Document thus constitutes a **delicate** balance **of** differing interests and viewpoints. When receiving that document the General Assembly should **bear** this in mind. It is important to **preserve** what has been achieved.

The second part of **my statement is on sub-items** (d) and **(e)** of agenda item 66.

I speak on behalf of the 12 **member** States **of** the **European** Community concerning the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research.

The Twelve have a long and consistent record of supporting the concept and objectives of the United **Nations** disarmament studies **programme**, as we consider that United Nations studies can make a valuable contribution to the discussion and consideration of disarmament **issues**.

The 12 member States of the European Community have submitted their views and proposals on how the work of the United Nations in the field of disarmament studies can **be** further improved in response to General **Assembly** resolution **41/86**. I should like to refer **to** document **A/42/363**.

(Mr. Korsgaard-Pedersen, Denmark)

In its resolution 40/152 K, which was introduced by two members of the Twelve, the General Assembly, inter alia, requested the Secretary-General to invite the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies to prepare a comprehensive report on those matters for submission to the General Assembly at its forty-second session. The Twelve are pleased to note that the Advisory Board was able to agree upon a report (A/42/300, annex), and welcome the comprehensive and detailed conclusions and recommendation proposed by the Board.

In the introduction to the report, It is pointed out that the establishment of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research makes available new machinery that, in appropriate circumstances, provides useful opportunities for other ways of carrying out disarmament studies and research. As the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies also acts as the Board of Trustees of the Institute, the report also addresses the co-ordinating role that the Board might play to facilitate study and research activities. In this connection, and as also mentioned in the conclusions of the report, the question of careful selection of subjects for study and the matter of costs are of special importance, taking into account the increase in recent years in the number of resolutions calling for studies. The recommendation made by the Board that Member States are requested to present proposals for disarmament studies or research to the Secretary-General by 1. September annually is welcomed by the Twelve. On the basis of the proposals received, the Board should recommend whether a study should be carried out by a group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General or as part of the ongoing work programme of the Institute or as an additional task of the Institute requiring an allocation of funds by the General Assembly.

(Mr. Korsgaard-Pedersen, Denmark)

The Twelve have noted with **satisfaction** that the Board has found that it **is** important to maintain the consensus rule in the drafting of studies, **but** that **this** **does** not necessarily mean **that** there must be consensus on every **sentence** of a study. As also **previously stated** by the Twelve, there may be occasions on which it is **preferable** for **dif fering views** to receive **equal weight and** attention in the **body** of the report without the **need** to resort to **the lowest** common denominator of agreement at every point.

Before concluding, I **should** like to express the support of the Twelve for draft **resolution A/C.1/42/L.60**, submitted by some member States of the Twelve.

The Twelve welcome Mr. Dhanapala as the new Director **of** the Institute. In section III of the report **of** the Secretary-General regarding the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies of **the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (A/42/611)**, it is stated that the circumstances of **the** former Director of the Institute, Mr. Bota, have remained **unchanged since** the submission of the Board's previous report. The Twelve would like to **recall** that **we** have taken and continue to take a **strong interest** in the case of Mr. Bota and **support** the continuing efforts of **the Secretary-General** to bring this matter to a speedy **and** satisfactory conclusion.

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish) : I have the honour of **introducing** two **draft** resolutions, both sponsored by the Mexican delegation, dealing with the item entitled "Cessation **of** all nuclear-test **explos ions**".

The preamble to the first of these **draft** resolutions (A/C.1/42/L.29), which is sponsored by the delegations of Finland, Indonesia, Ireland, Kenya, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Venezuela and Yugoslavia, **summarizes, in a** manner upon which it would be difficult to improve, the **following** main

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

consideration to be borne in mind with regard to this subject if one wishes to have an objective view of it.

The complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests has been examined for more than 30 years, and the General Assembly has adopted more than 50 resolutions on the subject. This is a basic objective of the United Nations in the sphere of disarmament, to the attainment of which the Organization has repeatedly assigned the highest priority. On eight different occasions, the Assembly has condemned such tests in the strongest terms and, since 1974, it has stated its conviction that the continuance of such testing would intensify the arms race, thus increasing the danger of nuclear war.

It should be recalled that the Secretary-General, addressing a plenary meeting of the General Assembly on 12 December 1984, emphasized that no single multilateral agreement could have a greater effect on limiting the further refinement of nuclear weapons and that a comprehensive test-ban treaty was the litmus test of the real willingness to pursue nuclear disarmament.

The preamble to this draft resolution also recalls that the three nuclear-weapon States which act as depositaries of the 1963 Treaty - the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union - undertook, in article I of that Treaty, to conclude another treaty resulting in the permanent banning of all nuclear-test explosions, including all underground explosions, and that such an undertaking was reiterated in 1968 in the preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, article VI of which further embodies their solemn and legally binding commitment to take effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.

It also states that the same three nuclear-weapon States, in the report they submitted to the Committee on Disarmament on 30 July 1980, after four years of



(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

**trilateral negotiations**, stated, inter alia, that they **were** "mindful of the **great** value for all mankind that the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon-toot **explosions** in all environments will have" **as** well **as** "**conscious of** the important **responsibility** placed upon them to find **solutions** to the **remaining** problems", adding **furthermore** that they were "determined to exert their beet **efforts** and" **demonstrate** the "necessary **will** and **persistence** to briny the negotiations to an **early** and successful **conclusion**". (CD/139/Appendix II/Vol. II, document CD/130, para. 25)

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

It was perhaps for that reason that the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, in its Final Declaration adopted on 21 September 1985, called on the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to resume trilateral negotiations in 1985 and urged all nuclear-weapon States to participate in the urgent negotiation and conclusion in the Conference on Disarmament of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty as a matter of the highest priority.

The final part of the preamble to the draft resolution takes note with satisfaction of the progress made by the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts in the Conference on Disarmament on the seismic verification of a comprehensive test ban and recalls that the leaders of the six countries associated under the five-continent peace and disarmament initiative affirmed in the Mexico Declaration adopted on 7 August 1986 that they remained convinced that

"no issue is more urgent and crucial today than bringing to an end all nuclear tests",

adding that

"both the qualitative and quantitative development of nuclear weapons exacerbate the arms race, and both would be inhibited by the complete abolition of nuclear weapons testing".

The operative part of the draft resolution that I am introducing proposes that the Assembly reiterate

"once again its grave concern that nuclear-weapon testing continues unabated, against the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States".

It also reaffirms the conviction

"that a treaty to achieve the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time is a matter of the highest priority",

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

and that such a treaty

"would constitute a contribution of the utmost importance to the cessation of the nuclear-arms race".

The draft resolution ends with the usual request for the inclusion in the provisional agenda of the forty-third session of the Assembly of an item on the question. Before that last paragraph there are four paragraphs which can be considered to be the main part of the draft resolution since their purpose is that the Assembly should take the following steps.

First, that it should urge once more the three depositary Powers, in particular the Soviet Union and the United States,

"to abide strictly by their undertakings to seek to achieve the early discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons . . . and to expedite negotiations to this end, keeping the Conference on Disarmament regularly informed of their negotiations".

Secondly, that it should appeal to all States members of the Conference on Disarmament, in particular the three depositary Powers, to

"promote the establishment by the Conference at the beginning of its 1988 session of an ad hoc committee with the objective of carrying out the multilateral negotiation of a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear-test explosions".

Thirdly, that it should recommend to the Conference on Disarmament that such an ad hoc committee

"should comprise two working groups dealing, respectively, with the following interrelated questions: contents and scope of the treaty, and compliance and verification.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

Fourthly, that it should call upon the States depositaries of the partial test-ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation Treaty, by virtue of their special responsibilities under those two Treaties and as a provisional measure,

"to bring to a halt without delay all nuclear-test explosions, either through a trilaterally agreed moratorium or through three unilateral moratoria, which should include appropriate means of verification".

The second of the two draft resolutions (A/C.1/42/L.38) is sponsored by six delegations: Indonesia, Peru, Sri Lanka, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Mexico. Its preamble is intended to highlight the commitment entered into under the partial test-ban Treaty, of 1963, and under the Non-Proliferation Treaty, of 1968, to seek to achieve the permanent discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons by holding urgent negotiations to that end. Furthermore, it notes that article II of the 1963 Treaty specifically provides for a procedure for the consideration and eventual adoption of amendments to the Treaty by a conference of all its parties to be immediately convened by the depositary Government if so requested by at least one third of the parties.

On the basis of what I have just outlined the draft resolution proposes that the General Assembly should recommend

"that the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water formally submit an amendment proposal to the depositary Governments with a view to convening a conference at the earliest possible date to consider amendments to the Treaty that would convert it into a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty".

We should note here with reference to this draft resolution that this is no improvisation but a matter which the Assembly has been discussing since its fortieth session, for on 12 December 1985 it adopted resolution 40/80 B, which recommends to the States parties to the partial test-ban Treaty that they should

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

“carry out urgent consultations among themselves as to the **advisability** and most appropriate method of **taking advantage of the provisions of its** article II for conversion of the partial **nuclear-test-ban** Treaty into a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban Treaty”.

A year Later, on 3 **December 1986**, in resolution **41/46 B**, the Assembly took a step in the same direction and **recommended**

“that the States parties to the Treaty **Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere**, in Outer Space **and** under Water **undertake** practical **steps** leading to the convening of a conference to consider amendments to the Treaty that **would convert** it into a comprehensive **nuclear-test-ban** Treaty”.

In adopting the draft resolution which I **am** introducing the General **Assembly** would, therefore, **be reaching** the culmination **of** the process referred to in the two earlier resolutions that I **have quoted**.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French) : I now call on the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. KHERADI (Secretary of the Committee) : I wish to inform the Committee that the following countries have become sponsors of the following draft resolutions8 A/C.1/42/L.7 and L.26: Bulgaria; A/C.1/42/L.28: Madagascar ; A/C.1/42/L.29: Romania) A/C.1/42/L.32/Rev.1: Indonesia; A/C.1/42/L.50, L.51 and L.57: Romania; A/C.1/42/L.59: Mongolia; A/C.1/42/L.68: Mongolia and the Netherlands8 A/C.1/42/L.71: France and the Philippines) A/C.1/42/L.74: Greece and Bolivia; A/C.1/42/L.77: Barbados and Thailand.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French) : I have just received a number of requests from various members wishing to exercise their right of reply at the end of this afternoon's meeting. Before calling upon them, I should like to remind the Committee of the procedure approved at one of our previous meetings.

I shall now call on those members who wish to exercise their right of reply.

Mr. SHEIKH (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (interpretation from Arabic) : It is the custom of the representative of the racist Zionist régime which occupies Palestine to make his contribution to the Committee's discussion of Israel's nuclear armaments in the form of false allegations and distorted fact. That is exactly what that representative has done this morning when he made false allegations against my country in this Committee. I should like to clarify the following points, in this respect.

The style of the Zionist representative is too well known to need elaboration. It is, to distract the attention of the international community and obscure the facts concerning the nuclear armaments of his racist régime and their serious impact on international peace and security. The acquisition and production of nuclear weapons by the racist Zionist régime in occupied Palestine and its collaboration with the racist régime in South Africa are facts which have been

(Mr. Sheikh, Libyan Arab  
Jamahiriya)

**established**, and amply documented by various reports and **accounts**, including those of the Secretary-General of the United Nations. The representative of that **régime** has tried to play down the conclusions reached by those reports and the **many** warnings therein concerning the grave threats posed by the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the Zionist **régime**. What **makes** this **régime's** acquisition of **nuclear** weapons especially ominous is its consistent policy of **aggression**. Its record is full of acts of aggression. To mention only a few examples of that policy of **force** and aggression, let us dwell a little on the usurpation of Palestine, the uprooting of its people, the expansionism and annexation of Arab territories and the inhuman policies pursued against the Palestinian people and Arab neighbours. In addition, let us not forget the Israeli Zionist **régime's** adamant rejection of the numerous resolutions adopted by the **international** community and its refusal to accede to the non-proliferation treaty and place its nuclear activities under the safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. All these **acts** bespeak the aggressive nature of that racist **régime** and make it abundantly clear that the acquisition of nuclear weapons by such a **régime** poses a very grave threat, not only to Arab nations but also to international peace and **security**. Let us be in no doubt of the fact that the **acquisition** by the racist **régimes** in occupied Palestine and in South Africa and their collaboration in the **nuclear** field pose a serious threat to the Arab nation and the African nations. This makes it the responsibility of the international community to bring **pressure** to bear on those two racist **régimes** and force them to comply with the relevant international resolutions.

In conclusion, I should like to stress that my country has consistently supported the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and is a signatory of the non-proliferation treaty.

**Mr. AL KETAL (Iraq)** : I shall limit my reply to a few points raised this morning by the **representative** of **Israel**. First, the representative of **Israel** spoke with great affection for the United Nations Charter and of the obligation of all States to respect the Charter. I should like to remind members of the Committee of the Israeli conduct with regard to the annexation of Jerusalem, the **Syrian Golan Heights**, the occupation of the West Bank and the **Gaza Strip**, the occupation of **Lebanese lands**, the attack on the Iraqi nuclear reactor, the attack on Tunisia and numerous other events which testify to the sheer **hypocrisy** of the **Israeli** representative when he speaks of respect for the United Nations Charter.

Secondly, I wish to set the record straight with respect to a few things said by the **Israeli** representative concerning the International Atomic Energy **Agency** (IAEA). He spoke of the commitment undertaken by Israel not to attack ~~or~~ **threaten to attack nuclear facilities devoted** to peaceful purposes, and he cited resolution GC (XXIX)/RES/443 adopted by the **General** Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency at its twenty-ninth session. I have a few remarks to **make** concerning that point. First, that resolution was adopted by 31 votes out of a total number of almost 100 members present at the General Conference. Secondly, we must also point out that **Israel** itself abstained in the vote on that resolution, that is to say, **Israel** abstained on the vote on its own words claiming that it had undertaken not to **attack nuclear** facilities. **Thirdly**, I must also point out that another resolution which calls for the rejection of this Israeli claim received 41 **affirmative votes** at the **same General** Conference, but it was not adopted as the result of a procedural motion, which was highly questionable from a legal point of view.



(Mr. Al Ketat, Iraq)

**Thus**, the Israeli contention that Israel has undertaken not to attack nuclear facilities has not been taken seriously by **any** international body.

I come now to my fourth **point**, which relates to the last paragraph of the statement made this morning by the **representative** of **Israel**. He said that

“At the (recent] General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) , 28 member States rose to the occasion on a similar **draft** resolution”. (A/C.1/42/PV.28, p. 14)

The representative **of** Israel meant that 28 States had opposed resolution **GC (XXXI)/RES/470** adopted in connection with an agenda item entitled “Israeli **nuclear** capabilities and threat”. He conveniently forgot to tell the Committee that 48 member States at the General Conference had voted in favour of that resolution.

Mr. NASHASHIBI (Jordan) : The Israeli representatives at the United Nations have persistently denied that Israel possesses, produces and stockpiles nuclear weapons and that there is any collaboration between Israel and South Africa - despite the mounting evidence to the contrary, which has been widely reported by Israeli, South African and Western **media**. The General Assembly, in the light of the serious information contained in those reports, has adopted many **resolutions** on this subject. The latest is resolution **41/35 C**, of 10 November 1986, in which the Assembly again strongly condemned the continuing and increasing collaboration of Israel with South Africa and requested the Special Committee against Apartheid to keep the **matter under** constant review and to report to the General Assembly and the **Security** Council as appropriate.

The Secretary-General's report (A/36/431) of 18 September 1981 contained a general **exposé** of Israel's nuclear military armament **programme** - a programme which Israel brandishes in the face of the Arab countries in an attempt to **terrorize** them and force them to accept the fait accompli and abandon their legitimate rights.

(Mr. Nashashibi, Jordan)

The information in that report was supported and confirmed by a former Israeli President, Mr. Avraham Sharir, in an interview with the Washington Post on 3 December 1984. In that interview, he stated that **Israel** was capable of **manufacturing** nuclear weapons and could do so in a very reasonable **period** of time.

**Furthermore**, in a **book** entitled "Two Minutes Over Baghdad", which was authored by Israelis and released by the Israeli **military** censors and was published in June 1982, Israel's nuclear capabilities are verified, as well as its **ability** to deliver these weapons to targets in collaboration with the South African apartheid **régime**.

The most serious aspect of the collaboration between Israel and South Africa is in the nuclear field, with its military implications. It has been reported that South **African** scientists have frequently **worked** at Israeli nuclear facilities in Dimona.

According to the London Observer, South Africa is **planning to** build a runway costing 4 million pounds on the remote Antarctic territory of Marion Island. The **secret** airstrip is considered to be a military **asset and could be used** to develop the site for testing nuclear missiles. Scientists based on the island **stated** that South African and Israeli military officers **had** visited the island and had **examined** the airstrip.

The Financial Times of London reported that Pretoria was planning to build an airstrip on Marion Island in the Antarctic. The article **quoted** Mr. Frank **Barnaby**, a British nuclear expert, as having **stated that the** airstrip "is very likely to have military implications".

The Special Committee against Apartheid referred to this **serious matter** in the statement it issued at the **conclusion** of the **strategy** session and **consultations** with non-governmental **organizations** held on 26 and 27 February 1987. It stated that

**(Mr. Nashashibi, Jordan)**

**"The participants were alarmed at the increasing collaboration between Israel and South Africa and, in particular, their joint collaboration in military and nuclear matters.**

**The recent reports of the preparation of a major runway on Marion Island in the South Atlantic by Israel and South Africa for military use and as part of South Africa's nuclear-weapons programme were matters of serious concern to the international community. The Special Committee draws the attention of the international community to the serious implications of this collaboration and these developments".**

**While South African nuclear development is regarded as being parallel to the Israeli nuclear programme, they differ in terms of the availability of raw Uranium in South Africa and the advancement of Israeli nuclear technology. Those two factors have motivated them to co-operate closely. As a result, many Israeli nuclear scientists travel frequently to South Africa. Furthermore, Israel has supplied South Africa with the Jericho missile, which is able to carry a nuclear warhead.**

**It was also stated that**

**"The real achievements of the joint Israeli-South African nuclear programme are possibly beyond anybody's dreams, or nightmares. The programme has achieved major technological breakthroughs in response to the specific challenges posed by the two countries' special problems in using nuclear weapons. Such co-operation between two countries in the development of nuclear weapons demonstrates an extremely high level of trust and intimacy in the relations between them. Most nuclear countries jealously guard the secrets of their activities and their technology. For two countries to**

(Mr. Naqhashibi, Jordan)

collaborate on such matters is proof of unusual trust. A nuclear alliance is the height of bilateral relations today. An alliance cemented in plutonium is sealed in blood and should be taken very seriously".

Mr. FREIER (Israel): I do not wish to engage in a verbal slugging match with the three representatives who have just spoken. I would merely bring a few facts to the Committee's attention.

First, it will have been noticed that in my presentation this morning I quoted nothing but authentic sources. The three preceding speakers have based themselves on quotations from newspapers, rumours, and so forth. That is not the kind of thing which I or the Committee can take into consideration.

Secondly, the speakers have referred to purported nuclear co-operation with South Africa. This morning I spoke about this. I said that there is no such co-operation with South Africa. I appealed, in particular, to our friends in Africa not to allow our relations with them to be vitiated by falsehoods of this kind. I also mentioned that the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who had once been enjoined to look into this matter, had also stated that he could find no evidence of such co-operation.

I know that the representatives who spoke before me, and others, would like to revert to this subject again and again, as they have done in the past, because the régime in South Africa is obnoxious and they would like to paint Israel as having a similar image. But I repeat once again: there is no co-operation in the nuclear field between Israel and South Africa; there never has been. I would suggest that the members of the Committee disregard any further comments by the Arab States on this subject.

(Mr. Freier, Israel)

Another point I wish to make is that, as I told the Committee this morning, if anybody in the Middle East poses a threat, it is the Arabs. They would like to see Israel in their mirror image - as though Israel threatened anyone. I challenged them this morning to show when and where Israel had threatened any Arab country. I would say that they have certainly produced no evidence on that, except to invite the First Committee to go along with whatever charges they wish to level against Israel in order to lend legitimacy to the threats they themselves issue morning and evening against Israel.

The representative of Iraq made reference to two points, on which I wish to conclude. First, he was very unhappy about the resolution of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), expressing its satisfaction with the Israeli delegation's declaration on the inviolability of nuclear installations dedicated to peaceful purposes, and he told the Committee why it was adopted. I think that is rather immaterial. What is material and important is that the IAEA decided to divest itself of the matter. It adopted the resolution and has not reverted to the subject since.

As my last point, I wish to thank the representative of Iraq for pointing out that on a resolution similar to draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.15, with which we are faced here, I mentioned at the end of my statement this morning that 28 States rose to the occasion and voted against the Arab draft resolution at the IAEA and I expressed my expectation that a similar number of delegations could be found in the First Committee to register their objection to draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.15. He was perfectly right when he said that 28 objected but 48 were in favour.

This morning I told the Committee that Israel hardly had a chance, or never had a chance in this Committee, of commanding a majority. Just look at the 20 sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.15 and all their Committee associates who,

(Mr. Freier, Israel)

as a bloc, vote against Israel. I shall be happy to realize that all those countries that feel there is merit in Israel's case and that Israel is a victim of these massive voting blocs on any subject and on any occasion will indeed vote in the First Committee in accordance with their conscience.

**STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN**

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French) : Members will recall that in a previous statement I notified the Committee that I intended usefully to have recourse to the clustering of draft resolutions - a procedure which has evolved in recent years on the initiative of my predecessors.

I should like at this stage to inform members that the officers of the Committee have held various consultations and have undertaken, as appropriate, to include all draft resolutions on disarmament agenda items in various clusters, on the basis of logic and practicality. The officers of the Committee are now giving the matter close scrutiny and they should be able to arrive at a final decision on all the concrete suggestions in this regard at their next meeting, to be held tomorrow morning immediately following the meeting of the Committee.

I believe that after the officers of the Committee have completed their next series of consultations I shall be in a better position to offer concrete suggestions on the matter, and on 4 November to provide members with the proposed list of clusters. I shall then also give members the appropriate clarifications and directives relating to the Committee's programme of work for the third stage of its work, that is, consideration and action upon draft resolutions on disarmament agenda items.

The meeting rose at 4.55 p.m.