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Chairman: Mr. BAGBENI ADEITO NZENGEYA (Zaire)

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The meeting was called to order at 11.05 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 48 TO 69 (continued)

STATEMENTS ON SPECIFIC DISARMAMENT AGENDA ITEMS AND CONTINUATION OF THE GENERAL DEBATE, AS NECESSARY

Mr. FREIER (Israel) : It is on draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.15, entitled "Israeli Nuclear Armament", and on the report of the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/42/581), which bears the same title, that I have to speak.

Before addressing the draft resolution and the report, however, let me comment on the general setting in which these items range themselves.

On any matter pertaining to Israel and voted on in this Committee automatic majorities have ensured Israel's censure in the past. It is not the merits of Israel's case but the automatic and massive voting bloc of most of the Arab States and of their committed associates that have been put in the balance. The Arab States do not mince words. Their aim has been and continues to be the undoing of Israel, and the Committee is called upon by the Arabs to lend its prestige to a campaign which contradicts its very mission. Distortions of fact and groundless imputations have been no impediment to such unrelenting harassment or to unequitable procedures unacceptable to any other State.

(Mr. Zoller, Israel)

The First Committee and many States which entertain normal relations with Israel have acquiesced in this state of affairs. When damning or punitive anti-Israel draft resolutions have been submitted many States have registered their objection by voting against particularly obnoxious operative paragraphs, but have abstained on the draft resolutions as a whole. But it is only the vote on draft resolutions as a whole which records the feeling of the First Committee, and it is even the quality of minorities which can come to the rescue of the Committee's honour.

Indeed, were Israel to propose the Charter of the United Nations, there can be no doubt that the Charter would fall victim to the massive hostility of the Arab States, but I am equally certain that a respectable minority would still have the courage to stand up for the Charter.

I have made these remarks because it is important that all those delegations which are ready to listen know well how Israel views draft resolutions addressed to it or pertaining to it. Acquiescence by abstention runs counter to the mandate of this Committee, which is to head off dangers and threats of war and to seek peaceful accommodation. Such acquiescence, rather, tends to encourage Arab intransigence against all that this Committee stands for.

Let me dwell in some detail on what it is that moot Arab States request the Committee to sanction.

In words, the Committee and the United Nations are treated to Arab threats against Israel, for which I need produce no evidence. The Committee will look in vain for any threat against any Arab country from any authoritative quarter in Israel. The Arab words are backed up by a military potential, of which I cite only that of Syria, Iraq and Jordan as compared with Israel's. These three countries alone dispose of wartime armies amounting to 1,800,000 soldiers, as against 440,000

(Mr. Freier, Israel)

in Israel. They dispose of about 10,000 tanks, against the 4,000 of which Israel disposes, and they have 1,342 fighter aircraft, against 662 in Israel. This arms potential, arrayed by declaration against Israel, outweighs the military potentials of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact countries, which are of similar size, by a factor of 4 to 10.

Israel has to live with this constant and actual threat, and to live up to it. The First Committee should take cognizance of these facts and realize where threats come from. By blanket acquiescence in draft resolutions against Israel the First Committee will give succour and encouragement to the Arab States in the unconditional pursuit of their quarry.

I turn now to the nuclear rash. It is again the Arab States which request the Committee to recognize an Israeli threat. Competence in the nuclear field has not been made out to be a threat in any instance. It is the declared policies of Governments which determine their stance. This is true in the case of all States members of this Committee, and it applies equally in the case of Israel. Representatives have repeatedly heard this policy: it says that Israel supports non-proliferation, will not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East, and invites all the States of the Middle East freely to negotiate a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Israel is committed to non-proliferation, but every country so committed makes a sovereign decision on its non-proliferation stance by way of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons or a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

This right is not questioned with respect to any State, and Israel would not have it otherwise. Israel has elected the road of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, as conceived by the Palme Commission, sanctioned by the General Assembly, and followed in the precedents of Latin America and the South Pacific.

(Mr. Freier, Israel)

Israel has compelling reasons to insist on a nuclear-weapon-free zone, which implies free negotiations between the partners and mutual arrangements. I shall tell the Committee why.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty alone does not inhibit local wars and local wars are the bane of the Middle East. It suffices to listen to Arab invective and threats to appreciate the truth of my statement. Negotiations on a nuclear-weapon-free zone, on the other hand, and mutual arrangements built into it would definitely act as a brake on the further occurrence of local wars. For it is inconceivable that States would negotiate a nuclear-weapon-free zone and mutual arrangements and continue to contemplate intermittent, occasional wars. Let me tell the Committee, for all the value of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which of its deficiencies are pertinent in the Middle Eastern context.

On the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Dr. Blix, said on 11 December 1981:

"The safeguards do not, of course, reveal what future intention the State may have. It may change its mind on the question of nuclear weapons and wish to produce them despite possible adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty."

In confirmation of this statement, Reuters reported Colonel Qaddafi as recently as 22 June 1987 as saying:

"The Arabs must possess the atom bomb to defend themselves, until their numbers reach 1,000 million and until they learn to desalinate sea water and until they liberate Palestine."

That is a statement by a Non-Proliferation Treaty signatory. Compare those statements with the three-month abrogation clause and one may understand why a nuclear-weapon-free zone is the non-proliferation régime on which Israel insists in our region.

(Mr. Freier, Israel)

I invite the Committee to ponder why the Arab States refuse to negotiate a nuclear-weapon-free zone with Israel and what Israel is to make of such a refusal. I have told the Committee that we believe that negotiations for, and mutual arrangements within, a nuclear-weapon-free zone would at least inhibit local wars. The Arab refusal to negotiate a nuclear-weapon-free zone must needs be interpreted as a desire to maintain the option of waging war against Israel in the future as well. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, as representatives know from all current wars, presents no impediment to such a situation. Also, the Arabs' refusal to enter into mutual arrangements with Israel within a nuclear-weapon-free zone must necessarily be interpreted as an intention to avail themselves of the licence open to them under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. I referred earlier to the limitations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as seen by Dr. Blix, and to the statement by Colonel Qaddafi. To these I can also add the qualifications attached by Syria and other Arab countries to their accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. They qualify their commitment expressly by stating that their obligations under the Treaty do not imply recognition of Israel.

I put it to the Committee that it is the most urgent and pressing business of the First Committee in the Middle Eastern context to insist that the Arab States sit down with Israel and negotiate a nuclear-weapon-free zone. If prevention of war and the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East is the Committee's concern, it is not by way of castigating Israel or acquiescing in its castigation that the Committee will further its mission. Any draft resolution tending to arraign Israel will lend encouragement to Arab intransigence, which is designed to threaten - in intent, declaration and potential - the existence of my country.

We hope that delegations will contemplate the significance of their voting stance when the hour comes.

(Mr. Freier, Israel)

There is a last point of a general nature to which I should draw the attention of delegations. There are initiatives abroad which invite Israel to have faith in the international community, or part of it, to help the parties in the Middle East to arrive at an equitable settlement. The Committee is undoubtedly an important international forum, in which Israel can assess the measure of faith it may entertain in the bona fides of such international approaches. Acquiescence in the discriminatory treatment of Israel and in the licence taken by the Arab States to pursue their campaign with the aid of the Committee is no way of engendering the faith in international initiatives which is sought of Israel.

I have thus far attempted to bring home to the Committee and to such of its members as care to listen the setting in which Israel finds itself and the responsibility which attaches to their vote as members of the Committee and bearers of its mission, and I have dwelt on the wider implications of the voting stance adopted by the Committee. I shall now discuss the report which the Secretary-General was requested to submit and draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.15.

(Mr. Freier, Israel)

The very request of the Secretary-General to investigate Israel's nuclear potential and report on it is patently discriminatory. No other State which possesses nuclear competence would accept, or he expected to accept, such extraordinary treatment irrespective of whether it adheres to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or not. I challenge the Committee to institute such investigation of India, for instance, which has set off a nuclear explosion. I know it will not because it accepts India's declared policy against proliferation as an authoritative expression of its stance.

I claim the same right for Israel, as indeed every State claims for itself, and I have once again, earlier in this statement, said what Israel's policy is. The mere fact that numerous Arab sponsors and their committed associates harass Israel on any issue and on any occasion does not lend legitimacy to so inequitable a procedure.

The report gives equal weight to the declared policy of Israel and to the views Syria, Iraq and Bangladesh have of its policy. It seems preposterous to me that Syria and Iraq, which have sought legitimacy for their threats and wars against Israel in the course of 40 years, have their views on Israel's policy juxtaposed with the authoritative statements made by the Government of Israel.

Israel is not a mirror image of those Arab States which threaten it without respite, and any reference Israel has made to its nuclear competence has only pertained to co-operation with other nations and developing nations in particular. I am happy to say that such co-operation in the beneficial uses of atomic energy has flourished over the years and continues to flourish with a host of countries.

There is a reference in the report to an "ambiguity" on the part of Israel. There is certainly no ambiguity in Israel's repeated invitation to the Arab States freely to negotiate a nuclear-weapon-free zone. This is a clear and affirmative

(Mr. Freier, Israel)

statement of policy. The Committee should take note of the Arab refusal to negotiate on so vital an issue.

As a last remark on the report, let me remind members that one report is piled on top of another as the years go by, and one report at least was compiled with the express intention to consult the Arab League of Nations. What is Israel supposed to make of this treatment, so exceptional in concept and execution?

Now let me speak about draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.15. Its preambular paragraphs make reference to a nuclear-weapon-free zone. I have amply referred to this subject. Israel has joined in the consensus on a nuclear-weapon-free zone for the Middle East in the past, and will do so now but insists that the modalities sanctioned by the United Nations be observed also in the Middle East. A nuclear-weapon-free zone which excludes negotiations and mutual arrangements as envisaged by the Arabs just is no nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Also, the preamble invites deep concern

"that the declared Israeli policy of attacking and destroying nuclear facilities devoted to peaceful purpose": is a part of its nuclear armament policy". (A/C.1/42/L.15, p. 2)

This statement ignores entirely that in 1985 the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency adopted a resolution which considered that Israel's assurances in this regard, given on 23 September 1985, satisfied the requirements of the appropriate resolution of the IAEA. The IAEA was satisfied with Israel's statement on the inviolability of nuclear installations dedicated to peaceful purposes, and has not since reverted to this subject.

Other matters referred to in the preamble reappear in the operative paragraphs of the draft resolution, on which I shall now comment.

(Mr. Freier, Israel)

In operative paragraph 1 Israel is requested to give reassurances which none of the co-sponsors of the draft resolution have ever given. Even Non-Proliferation Treaty signatories insist on a three-month cancellation clause. If and when a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East is negotiated, Israel will propose commitments more binding than the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

On operative paragraph 2: there is no nuclear co-operation between Israel and South Africa. The United Nations Secretary-General is on record as saying that there is no evidence for such co-operation, and I turn especially to our friends in Africa and ask them not to allow the sponsors of the draft resolution to vitiate our relations by insisting on falsehoods. Israel's statements on its policy vis-à-vis South Africa are on record.

On operative paragraph 3: representatives may recall that I discussed earlier the inalienable right of any State to determine its non-proliferation stance and said that a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East is the stance on which Israel has decided.

Operative paragraphs 4 and 5 are contrary to the United Nations Charter and that of the IAEA. I have reason to think that those developing countries which co-operate with Israel will continue to do so. They know that all the co-sponsors combined have made no attempt, comparable to that made by Israel, to co-operate with them in scientific and technological areas to the benefit of all.

In operative paragraphs 6, 7 and 8, the Committee is invited to continue to close in on Israel, rather than turn its attention to the sponsoring States and question their motives and acts. I really have no further comment on this request.

In conclusion I wish to invite the First Committee to reject the draft resolution in its entirety. I do not plead with the Committee but invite those

(Mr. Freier, Israel)

members to whom the dignity of the Committee matters to face up to their responsibilities.

At the General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 28 member States rose to the occasion on a similar draft resolution. It should be possible to expect the First Committee to act in a similar spirit.

Mr. KHANDOGY (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian) a In today's statement the Ukrainian delegation wishes to talk about the problem of prohibiting chemical weapons, which is one of the priority tasks in the field of limiting the arms race and bringing about disarmament. As will be recalled, talks on this question have a long and complicated history. However, recently at the Geneva Disarmament Conference there have emerged clear prospects of the successful conclusion of these talks. This, in our view, is an important result of the constructive efforts of both the direct participants in the talks and the whole international community.

For a number of years, in its resolutions the General Assembly has stressed the importance of the early conclusion of work on an international convention and has called upon the States Members to refrain from any action that might hinder the attainment of that goal. Now, when the adoption of this historic international legal document is within our grasp, thoughtful and responsible approaches to the problem are particularly vital, as is the mobilization of the political will of the States involved to take the decisive step.

The socialist States, primary parties in the talks, have given concrete evidence of their readiness actively to co-operate with all the participants in the Conference on Disarmament to work for the early conclusion of a convention. At the talks, in order to find solutions to questions still hindering the conclusion of work on the convention, they have accommodated the wishes of other States. As a

(Mr. Khandogy, Ukrainian SSR)

result the number of unresolved problems has been reduced to a minimum and the differences have been narrowed radically. Now, as has been shown by the appropriate section of the report of the Conference on Disarmament, questions of notification and the elimination of stockpiles of chemical weapons and production facilities have been largely resolved and all that remain: is the juridical and technical finishing touches and the question of control and the monitoring of them processes.

(Mr. Khsndogy, Ukrainian SSR)

what is taking place is a basis for agreement also on the question of the non-production of chemical weapons in civilian industry. Fundamental for further progress in this work has been the adjustment in the position of the Soviet Union on the monitoring question, and what is at issue here is the readiness to accept the need for juridical reinforcement of the principle of obligatory inspection - challenge inspection - without the right of refusal in such inspections. Furthermore, the challenge inspection must be carried out no later than 48 hours after the challenge is issued.

In other words, all necessary conditions exist for the final finishing burst in the talks for the prohibition of chemical weapons. In this regard, we have noted with satisfaction that the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons in November-December this year will continue to work on the draft convention. In our view an important result of this work would be the reaching of agreement on a mandate for the Ad Hoc Committee which would ensure that next year work would be finally concluded on the draft convention, including its final wording. An essential pre-condition in any efforts in the field of limiting armaments and disarmament is, of course, monitoring and trust. The strengthening of trust has been demonstrated by the invitation by the Soviet Union to visit the military facility in Shikhany by experts from 45 countries who for two days observed typical examples of chemical weapons and means of destroying them. As members will recall, experts will be invited also to the special chemical-weapon destruction facility which is being built in the region of Chapayevsk. Among the concrete steps designed to strengthen trust, there is the invitation by the United States of America to visit the chemical-weapon destruction facility in Tooele in the state of Utah, and other measures.

In this regard, it is important, relevant and timely that the question of the need for strengthening trust should be reflected in the draft resolution presented

(Mr. Khardogly, Ukrainian SSR)

by a group of countries, including the Ukrainian SSR, for the consideration of our Committee (A/C. 1/42/L. 32).

An important constituent element, in international efforts to bring about a radical solution to the problem of prohibiting chemical weapons can be seen in the initiatives of a number of socialist countries to create chemical-weapon-free zones in central Europe and the Balkans. We also view in this context the appeal from the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty addressed to all countries not to produce chemical weapons, including the binary and multi-component chemical weapon, and not to deploy them outside their national territory, as well as to withdraw such weapons from all foreign territories where they exist at present.

At the same time, just when the prospects for concluding the convention have become very clear, the United States is still reluctant to give up its plans for modernizing chemical weapons by means of full-scale manufacture of the binary weapon. We cannot fail to be seriously concerned by the report from Reuters on 16 October this year that the United States President has given instructions to proceed with the final assembly of binary shells and invoked to this end the national security interests of the United States. Those efforts cannot fail to hinder work on the international convention prohibiting chemical weapons, and it is the General Assembly's duty to take a stand on the character of those efforts and do everything possible to eliminate the obstacles that still persist in the concluding stage of our work.

In the course of the general debate in our Committee, on 13 October, the representative of the Ukrainian SSR expressed the view that:

"In view of the extent to which agreement has been reached between the negotiating States and other countries concerned, it would be possible for the

(Mr. Khandogy, Ukrainian SSR)

First Committee to conclude its consideration of the question of chemical weapons by adopting a single resolution on the basis of consensus".

(A/C. 1/42/PV. 4, p. 41)

Such an outcome of our work has been supported by many delegations, both in their statements and also in the course of informal consultations. We wholeheartedly share the view in the regard of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee on Chemical Weapons, Ambassador Erikus of Sweden, when he said:

(spoke in English)

"We therefore welcome that, constructive efforts are made in this Committee to merge various initiatives into one single resolution on the issue of chemical weapons negotiations. It would be helpful to the negotiations and a message of great significance to the world community if the General Assembly this year could express itself with one voice on this issue."

(continued in Russian)

And, finally, such a step would give a practical response to the numerous appeals to reduce the number of resolutions, particularly on one and the same question. Unfortunately, what has happened is that certain delegations - primarily those who favour streamlining the Committee's work and combining draft resolutions and who urge the need for consensus - have addressed their appeals to others who do not consider it binding on them. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR called upon all interested delegations to redouble their efforts to see to it that the decisions of this session of the General Assembly give clear and unambiguous guidance for the conclusion of work on the draft convention on the comprehensive prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons.

Mr. Gyll (Burma): In the course of the deliberations in this Committee, the significance of banning nuclear tests has been stressed in the statements made by many delegations. This reflects the growing concern of the international

(Mr. Gyi, Burma)

community that, despite overwhelming international opinion and despite the efforts for that in the United Nations, the testing of nuclear weapons continues unabated and there appear to be no early prospects as yet for the realization of a comprehensive prohibition of all nuclear tests.

From the time that this issue first aroused international concern over a quarter century ago, no other disarmament measure has been sought no long with so much dedication by the non-nuclear States. The reason for this is obvious. A comprehensive test ban is considered as an essential step towards the halting of the nuclear-arms race. The competition in the qualitative aspects of nuclear weapons has been a major factor in the fuelling of such a race. Research and development of nuclear weapons, like research in other military fields, is a self-generating process in which nuclear testing plays an important role. Nuclear testing is said to be responsible for the technological momentum of such a race.

There indeed exists a link between the testing of nuclear weapons and the escalation of the nuclear-arms race, and it is believed that a comprehensive ban on nuclear tests is a prerequisite to the nuclear disarmament process. There are, indeed, assertions that had a comprehensive test-ban treaty been achieved in the early 1960s when the multilateral negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee came very near to reaching an agreement, it could have put effective constraints on the qualitative aspects of the nuclear-arms race.

It has been emphasized that the gravest problem confronting mankind today is to avert the threat of a nuclear catastrophe, and the prevention of nuclear war has become an overriding concern of the international community.

(Mt. Gyi, Burma)

A comprehensive test-ban treaty can be considered as an effective measure for the Prevention of a nuclear war. That is why, in the consideration of the prevention of a nuclear war at the Conference on Disarmament, many delegations, particularly the non-aligned and neutral delegations, have proposed that the banning of all nuclear tests be considered as a priority measure.

Of concern also is the practical feasibility of space weapons made possible through research and nuclear testing, which would spur a new dimension of the arms race in outer space.

There is now a trend of thought prevailing that a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing is a long-term objective and further testing of nuclear weapons is necessary to maintain strategic stability. It is asserted that test explosions are necessary to maintain the reliability of nuclear weapons. It is believed, however, that a test ban under effective compliance procedures could effectively curb the advancement in nuclear-weapon technology and impose equal and non-discriminatory constraints, thereby enhancing strategic stability and creating conditions favourable to further the process of nuclear disarmament.

Commitments exist on the part of the nuclear-weapon States, as expressed in international instruments, for the discontinuance of all nuclear tests for all time. Such a commitment is also important with regard to the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons as its fulfilment would constitute an effective barrier against the emergence of new nuclear-power centres with all its dire consequences.

Developments in the past have served to show that international public opinion has played an important role in the banning of nuclear tests. The mobilization of world public opinion against nuclear testing, which was first reflected in General Assembly resolution 39/148 J of 17 December 1984, has indeed played a valuable role in efforts to ban nuclear tests. For it can be said that such concerns of the international community resulted in subsequent developments in 1958, that led to

(Mr. Gyi, Burma)

negotiations at the trilateral level and We first moratorium on nuclear testing, which was short-lived.

The convolution of the course of events relating to the test-ban negotiations has shown that there has been an inter-linkage of the negotiating process at different levels, for the trilateral talks, which began in 1958, were reconstituted as a three-Power Sub-Committee of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, which came into existence in 1962. Since that time, no other disarmament measure has been subjected to negotiations, discussions and deliberations as much as the banning of nuclear tests. Past negotiations at the bilateral, trilateral and multilateral levels had defined the parameters of a treaty, particularly with regard to scope and verification, and what is now required is a political commitment to treat a test ban on its own merits and to consider it as an early objective.

The prospects for a positive outcome of negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, as in all disarmament negotiations, is susceptible to a favourable political climate. My delegation believes that present developments are conducive to beginning the process of negotiations at the multilateral level, which has been kept in abeyance for reasons that do not appear to be justifiable.

The impending agreement between the two super-Powers on the elimination of certain classes of nuclear-weapon systems are indeed a major breakthrough in the bilateral negotiations. Such an agreement would constitute a first step towards the objectives of the reduction of the remaining vast arsenals of nuclear weapons in its strategic dimensions. The banning of nuclear tests can be considered as an important Confidence-building measure for progress on further measures.

The test-ban issue needs to be considered in the light of new developments, which relate to the expressed intention by the two States that are the most significant militarily to deal with verification procedures, the objective of which

(Mr. Gyi, Burma)

would be to ratify the 1974 threshold test ban treaty and to lower progressively the threshold with the ultimate objective of banning all nuclear tests. This indeed can be considered as an important development. It has also to be said that partial measures should be considered not as an end in itself, but as a means to an end and that end is a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The need also arises to take into consideration whether a particular threshold agreed upon can effectively place constraints on nuclear testing for weapons purposes. Potential exist in partial agreements as measures for confidence-building, particularly with regard to verification and compliance, which could enhance the prospects for a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is also important to consider the role that the existing multilateral machinery could play for the realization of this objective.

A comprehensive test-ban treaty would be an international agreement of world-wide scope and, as such, it would be necessary to deal with the issue in its multilateral dimension to make it possible to transform the goal of banning all nuclear tests, as announced unilaterally, into an early objective. It is, therefore, necessary to take stock of the existing situation at the Conference on Disarmament, where negotiations on a test ban have been kept pending contrary to the United Nations mandate, as expressed in the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament (resolution S-10/2), and to start real negotiations in parallel with the bilateral initiatives that are being taken so that the stated objective to ban all nuclear tests for all time would become more meaningful.

The PRESIDENT (interpretation from French): I call on the representative of Sri Lanka, Mr. Wijewardane, who will introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean (A/42/29).

Mr. WIJEWARDANE (Sri Lanka): The report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean (A/42/29) has been prepared pursuant to resolution 41/87 of 4 December 1986.

(Mr. Wijewardane, Sri Lanka)

In accordance with its mandate, the Ad Hoc Committee held two sessions earlier this year at United Nations Headquarters. The first session took place from 23 March to 3 April 1987 and the second session from 22 June to 10 July 1987. Altogether the Ad Hoc Committee held 17 formal meetings, as well as a number of informal meetings during these two sessions. In addition, the Working Group, established in accordance with the Ad Hoc Committee's decision of 11 July 1985, held 11 meetings in the course of the two sessions in 1987.

(Mr. Wijewardane, Sri Lanka)

I am pleased to inform the **First** Committee that once again the Ad Hoc Committee, within the time allocated and the **resources** made available to it, **was** able to recommend to the General **Assembly** a **consensus** draft resolution for its adoption at this **session**. This draft resolution **is** contained in part III of the report of the Ad Hoc Committee (A/42/29) now before the Committee. Part I of the report is an introduction, while part II contains a report on the work of the Ad Hoc Committee. Permit me, at this point, to thank Member States for their sustained interest and active participation in the work of the Working Group and the Ad Hoc Committee.

Permit me also briefly to provide the First Committee with some background information on the work of the Ad Hoc Committee and that of its Working Group. As Member States may recall, the Committee decided in 1985 to establish a Working Group with a mandate to identify, expand and facilitate agreement on substantive issues relating to the establishment of a zone of peace. During the year under review the Working Group continued to work under this mandate. To facilitate its work, the Chairman of the Working Group, Ambassador Nihal Rodrigo of Sri Lanka, presented to the Working Group an informal paper which contained a list of 20 points. There were intensive negotiations and discussions within the Working Group. The Group made progress in its work, and it was agreed that the Working Group should continue to function within its mandate.

while the substance **was** being dealt with within the Working Group, the Ad Hoc Committee held discussions on various issues, including an exchange of **views** on the papers submitted by delegations to the Committee. As in previous **years**, the Ad Hoc Committee sought to give adequate time to the discussion of both procedural and substantive issues.

(Mr. Wijewardane, Sri Lanka)

The draft resolution that the Ad Hoc Committee recommends for adoption by the Assembly has only 2 preambular paragraphs and 13 operative paragraphs.

It will be noted that in operative paragraph 5 of the draft resolution the General Assembly

"Requests the Ad Hoc Committee to hold three preparatory sessions in 1988, each of a duration of one week, one session of which could be held at Colombo in accordance with a decision to be taken by the Ad Hoc Committee at its first session in 1988".

By operative paragraph 6, the General Assembly would request the Ad Hoc committee,

"should the preparatory work not be completed to enable the convening of the conference in 1988, to complete the remaining work during its subsequent sessions in order to enable the convening of the Conference at Colombo at an early date, but not later than 1990, in consultation with the host country".

The third special session devoted to disarmament is scheduled to be held next year. As indicated in operative paragraph 9 of the draft resolution, the Ad Hoc Committee is requested to present a report on its work to the special session.

It has been my good fortune as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee to have the full support and co-operation of all the members of the Committee. I fully appreciate the co-operation, goodwill, accommodation and understanding that they have extended to me. During its preparatory sessions next year, the Ad Hoc Committee will, as stated in operative paragraph 7,

"give serious consideration to ways and means of more effectively organizing work in the Ad Hoc Committee to enable it to fulfil its mandate".

(Mr. Wi jewardane, Sr i Lanka)

I am confident that, given the necessary will and spirit of co-operation, the Ad Hoc Committee will be able to discharge its mandate fully and pave the way for the opening of the Conference in Colombo at an early date - but not later than 1990.

My introduction of this year's report would not be complete unless I paid a tribute to the Secretariat for the close co-operation and assistance extended to us. I thank them all, particularly the outgoing Secretary of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, Mr. Kheradi, whose return to the Ad Hoc Committee as senior adviser was warmly welcomed,

Before concluding my introduction of the report (A/42/29) prepared by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, I should like to draw the attention of the Committee to the fact that the report and the draft resolution are the result of protracted negotiations, consultations and discussions, all in the interest of arriving at a consensus. My colleagues in the Ad Hoc Committee and I, therefore, hope that in the First Committee too we shall see acceptance of the report and the draft resolution by consensus.

Mr. KORSGAARD-PEDERSEN (Denmark) : I should like on behalf of the 12 member States of the European Community to make some comments on sub-item (b) of agenda item 62, "Objective information on military matters".

The Twelve remain convinced that a better flow of objective information on military capabilities could help to relieve international tension and contribute to the building of confidence among States on a global, regional or subregional level. It is, at the same time, an important prerequisite for the concluding of verifiable arms-control and disarmament agreements.

In the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the first special session devoted to disarmament, Member States are encouraged to ensure a better flow of information with regard to the various aspects of disarmament.

(Mr. Korsgaard-Pedersen, Denmark)

The Twelve have consistently supported a freer and more open flow of useful and objective information on military matters. The need for a better flow of objective information on military capabilities is reflected in draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.22, among whose sponsors are some members of the Twelve. We, of course, support that draft resolution. As part of the natural contribution by democratic Governments to a free and open debate on military matters, member States of the European Community have consistently implemented a wide variety of measures whose aim is to contribute to the widest possible level of openness in military matters in general. Extensive objective and publicly available information on military matters is thus provided for by some of the Twelve.

The adoption of measures contributing to greater openness and transparency helps to prevent misperceptions of the military capabilities and the intentions of others, and these constitute practical and concrete confidence-building measures of a military nature.

An important and valuable first step towards greater openness and transparency in this field in the international system for the standardized reporting of military expenditures, adopted under the auspices of the United Nations. The reporting matrix of the United Nations, established through General Assembly resolution 35/142 B, provides a universal framework whereby States with different social and economic systems can supply information about their military expenditure in a comparable and non-prejudicial form. An increasing number of States have provided annual reports on military expenditures in conformity with the international system for standardized reporting, as can be seen in the latest report of the Secretary-General on this issue.

(Mr. Korsgaard-Pedersen, Denmark)

We wish to reiterate the importance we attach to the application of the reporting instrument by the broadest possible number of States, and in particular by the major military Powers, but also by a variety of countries belonging to different regions and with different budgeting and accounting systems.

(Mr. Korhgaard-Pedersen, Denmark)

The outcome of the experts' meeting of the Review Conference of the parties to the biological weapons Convention held earlier this year in Geneva is a noteworthy contribution to the international endeavours to increase the flow of information in the disarmament field. The adoption of a number of measures for the exchange of information in matters related to the Convention will help to enhance the implementation of the provisions of the Convention and contribute to strengthening its authority. This exchange of information includes data about laboratories and research centres, biological research related to the Convention and outbreaks of unusual diseases. The exchange of such information is a useful contribution to greater openness in military matters. It is also a significant confidence-building measure which deserves full support..

Mr. MUELLER (German Democratic Republic): My delegation would like to introduce today the draft resolutions entitled "Non-rise of nuclear weapon" and prevention of nuclear war" (A/C.1/42/L.7) and "Obligations of States to contribute to effective disarmament negotiations" (A/C.1/42/L.6).

The draft resolution on the non-use of nuclear weapons and prevention of nuclear war, which is co-sponsored by Cuba, the Hungarian People's Republic and the Socialist Republic of Romania, addresses the main question of our time, namely, the averting of the danger of a nuclear inferno's threatening mankind. Proceeding from paragraph 58 of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the draft resolution calls upon all nuclear-weapon States to follow the example of the People's Republic of China and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and to undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons.

The Geneva Conference on Disarmament is requested to commence negotiations on its agenda item "Prevention of nuclear war" and to consider the elaboration of an

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international instrument of a legally binding character laying down the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The adoption of such an obligation by all nuclear-weapon States would constitute a significant confidence- and security-building measure. At the same time it is a decisive criterion for a military doctrine directed to defence.

In the conditions of our nuclear and space age, the problems facing mankind can be solved only by working together, that is by political means, by result-oriented negotiations. This recognition is taken into account in the draft resolution entitled "Obligation of States to contribute to effective disarmament negotiations". All States - large, medium and small - must contribute their share to that process; therefore, draft resolution L.6 explicitly indicates the need for bilateral and multilateral disarmament negotiations to complement and stimulate each other.

As particularly important steps to be taken in the field of disarmament, the draft resolution underlines the need to conclude an agreement on the elimination of the land-based intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear missiles of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States; to reach deep cuts in the strategic offensive arms of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States while maintaining and strengthening the anti-ballistic missiles Treaty régime; to reach a complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests; to finalize without further delay the convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons; and to intensify all efforts in the field of conventional disarmament.

The draft resolution invites the Geneva Conference on Disarmament to concentrate its work on the substantive and priority items on its agenda and to proceed to negotiations on a nuclear-test ban, on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, on the prevention of nuclear war and on the

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prevention of an arms race in outer space without further delay, as well as to finalize the draft convention on the prohibition of all chemical weapons and on their destruction.

The implementation of those requests would be in line with the ideas and proposals submitted in the document entitled "On Enhancing the Effectiveness of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament" adopted at the recent Prague meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Warsaw Treaty member States.

As in previous years, my delegation is looking forward to trustful and successful co-operation with the delegation of Yugoslavia for a merging with draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.70, thus following not only in words but also in deeds the request to reduce the number of draft resolutions on the same subject-matter and to increase the number of resolutions adopted by consensus.

Mr. ROSSIDES (Cyprus) I wish to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/42/L.13 of 23 October 1987 under item 63 of the General Assembly's agenda entitled "Review and implementation of the Concluding Document of the Twelfth Special Session of the General Assembly". Our concern is the continuing escalation of the arms race. We are now at the forty-second anniversary of the United Nations, and the arms race has been continuing for all those years. Considering that the Security Council has never dealt with the question of disarmament, this draft resolution calls upon the Council to comply with Article 26 of the Charter and hold a session of the Council for the consideration of the escalation of the arms race, with a view to bringing it to a halt.

Article 26 of the Charter provides that the Security Council

"shall be responsible for formulating . . . plans to be submitted to the Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for the regulation of armaments",

(Mr. Rossides, Cyprus)

whereas Article 11 of the Charter, dealing with disarmament, says that

"The General Assembly may consider the general principles of co-operation in the maintenance of international peace and security, including . . . the regulation of armaments".

When it speaks about the regulation of armaments it says that the Security Council shall be responsible - and I emphasize the word "shall" - for dealing with the question.

As far as I know the Security Council has ignored and bypassed the resolutions adopted by this Committee and the General Assembly, contrary to the provisions of the Charter and contrary to General Assembly resolution 39/63 K, adopted on 12 December 1984, which called upon the Security Council to comply with Article 26 and to hold a series of meetings devoted to the consideration of the escalating arms race with a view to bringing it to a halt.

The purpose of this draft resolution therefore is to bring to the attention of the Security Council its responsibility to act according to the Charter, as I have explained.

The meeting rose at 12.10 p.m.