



**FIRST COMMITTEE**  
**12th meeting**  
**held on**  
**Tuesday, 20 October 1987**  
**at 10 a.m.**  
**New York**

**VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 12th MEETING**

Chairman: Mr. BAGRENI ADEITO NZENGEYA (Zaire)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.20 a.m.

STATEMENT BY THE CHAIRMAN

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): Yesterday afternoon I intended to speak at the end of our meeting to inform members of the sad news of the death of His Excellency Mr. Ian Cromartie, Ambassador of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the Conference on Disarmament at Geneva.

Unfortunately the consultations which I was then holding prevented me from so doing. Therefore I should like now, on behalf of the entire Committee and on my own behalf, to present our most sincere condolences to the family of Ambassador Cromartie as well as to the delegation of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

Miss SOLESBY (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that kind expression of condolences and I take this opportunity to thank the many other representatives who have expressed to me their sympathy over the death of Ian Cromartie.

He had worked, as members know, for many years in the field of disarmament in both Geneva and New York, and I have myself learned in the last few days how popular he had been and how much affection there has been for him. He was deeply committed to the cause of disarmament, in particular to the search for a chemical weapons convention. It was a personal commitment as well as an official one. We in the United Kingdom delegation of course take the news particularly to heart.

I shall certainly pass on to Jenny Cromartie your kind condolences, Sir, and those of all the other representatives who have expressed them. Thank you again, Mr. Chairman, for your words.

## AGENDA ITEMS 48 TO 69 (continued)

## GENERAL DEBATE ON ALL DISARMAMENT ITEMS

Mr. RODRIGO (Sri Lanka): Let me at the outset **extend** on behalf of the Sri Lanka **delegation** our **sincere** condolences to the family of the **late** Ambassador Cromar **of** the United Kingdom. I would be grateful if the representative of the United **Kingdom** would convey these sentiments to his **family**.

Let me **extend** to you, Mr. chairman, and to other officers of **the Committee** the congratulations and good wishes of Sri Lanka on your election. **Your own personal** skills, diplomatic experience and your record here at the United Nations are excellent qualifications for the work ahead in what **seems** to be a promising **session**.

what appears **different** during this session is the calmer **atmosphere** in which we deal with our agenda and the sense of what the United States **representative** **described** as "a time of increased **expectations**". It is **academic** to debate **whether** the present international mood is the cause or the **consequence** of! a **series** of favourable **developments**. It is imperative that this Committee benefit from this mood.

The **agreement** in principle between the United States of America and the Soviet Union **for** the elimination of their land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles **is** to be welcomed, not merely because it removes an entire class of nuclear **weapons** but because **it** represents, even if in a small way, a **realization** of the **efficacy** of security-building by means of divesting rather than accumulating **armaments**. Further, efforts **are** to be intensified between the two **Powers** to tackle problems standing **in** the way of a 50 per cent reduction in **strategic** offensive arms. The Soviet Union and the United States have also agreed to **commence** full-scale, though step-by-step, **negotiations** on nuclear testing issues.

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A convention on chemical **weapons** seems now only a **matter of time**. **Important conclusions** on the nexus between **disarmament** and development **have** been reached **affirming** the reality of both the **military** and non-military dimension to the **security** Of individual States **as well as** to international peace and **security**.

An **important** region<sup>81</sup> peace **initiative**, the South **Pacific** nuclear-free-zone, **has** found legal form in the Treaty of Rarotonga.

The Stockholm Conference on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures and **Disarmament** in Europe has helped to dispel clouds **of** suspicion and mistrust that have been **said** to obstruct the way to **disarmament** measures. **Policies** of openness **have** helped to develop greater confidence among mutually exclusive military **alliances**.

**In about 48** hours the Foreign **Ministers** of the Soviet Union and the United **States** will be coming **together** to prepare for a **summit** meeting between their **Heads** of State, which holds much promise.

Despite these favourable developments it is not yet time for joy to be unconfined. To rest complacent would be to hold back further **development** of the trends that are being hailed with **so much** enthusiasm.

**For** <sup>81</sup>its pioneering spirit, the intermediate-range nuclear forces agreement represent<sup>8</sup> only some 3 per cent of the **nuclear** armoury. **We** can, **of** course, take consolation in the fact that we have only 97 per cent of the way still before **us**. **Curiously** enough, 97 is **also** the number of brackets that Ambassador Garcia **Robles** of Mexico has identified as cluttering the text submitted by the Ad Hoc Committee to the Conference on Disarmament. The three steps forward which the intermediate-range nuclear forces agreement represent should not be shadowed by other **new** deployments in the nuclear armoury or by qualitative developments that would negate the undoubted achievement in the field of intermediate nuclear forces.

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The nuclear overkill capacity still looms as menacingly as before as the greatest threat to human survival.

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The fearful prospect of being subject to nuclear attack or blackmail is a major apprehension contributing to the insecurity of non-nuclear-weapon States. Not all nuclear-weapon States have been willing to give effective assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. This has also served to weaken the non-proliferation régime.

Despite a welcome but unrequited moratorium on nuclear testing by the Soviet Union, there is now little restraint on tooting. The United States-Soviet agreement to negotiate is welcome, but it is only a start, with the ultimate goal of a complete ban on nuclear testing being projected far into the future. A definite deadline for ending testing by all nuclear Powers would end speculation and misgiving<sup>8</sup> that much-vaunted agreements on nuclear disarmament are being negated by the testing of perhaps deadlier types of nuclear weapons. The Conference on Disarmament, endowed with an appropriate mandate, could facilitate progress to a comprehensive test ban and supplement the effort<sup>8</sup> of United States and Soviet negotiators.

There would indeed be more than cause for jubilation should the intermediate-range nuclear forces agreement be a prelude to significant reductions in Strategic nuclear weapons, to concrete steps irrevocably leading to a comprehensive test ban in which all nuclear Powers join and to earnest negotiations and agreements to prevent an arms race in outer space.

Today outer space, despite its remaining mysteries, is the province of all mankind, and, given the efforts of the scientists, open to the promise of peaceful development and co-operation in the interests of all humanity. Its "weaponization" could curdle that promise. Progress in the space talks between the United States and the Soviet Union has been described as less remarkable than progress in respect of the intermediate-range nuclear forces issues. Outer space must not be converted

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into an amphitheatre for great-Power gladiatorial contests. As long as the two great space Powers perceive threat8 from each other, there will continue to be confusion between whst are considered defensive and what are considered offensive weapons, with the end result being increased suspicion, insecurity and tension between the two Powers and grave threat8 to us all.

Existing legal treaties relating to outer space, despite their limitations, should be strictly honoured, with such limitations being dealt with by additional agreements. Technological advances have rendered some areas of space law obsolete. The anti-ballistic-missile Treaty needs to be strengthened to include a ban on anti-satellite weapons in space.

In the Conference on Disarmament, complex issues relating to outer space have been examined in some depth. It is necessary now to move from this analytical and exploratory phase to a direct study of measures and initiatives that have been proposed, and to bestow on the Conference on Disarmament the necessary mandate for this purpose.

In this Committee, Egypt and Sri Lanka, in co-operation with the non-aligned and other delegations, will seek, if possible by consensus, to reach agreement on a resolution for the prevention of an arms race in outer space and the promotion of the peaceful development of space for the benefit of all.

Another initiative on which my delegation has sought the co-operation of all concerns the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. The 1971 Declaration seeks, inter alia, to eliminate from the Indian Ocean area the tensions generated by great-Power naval and military confrontation, which has had an adverse effect on the security of Indian Ocean States. In 1979 the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, meeting in New York, adopted a set of principles of agreement for the implementation of the Declaration. Those principles included the

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non-use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes, non-interference in the internal affairs of States, and freedom of peaceful navigation - principles, regrettably, not always observed.

It is our expectation that, should the preparatory work for the Conference on the Indian Ocean to be held in Colombo not be completed in time to permit its convening in 1988, the Conference would be convened at an early date, not later than 1990. During the past year, work has been intensified on issues of substance relating to the establishment of a zone of peace. The issues involved are complex and are not being underestimated. The Conference in Colombo would be the most effective forum for securing and promoting the cooperation of the permanent members of the Security Council, the major users of the ocean and the regional States to realize the objectives of the peace zone and to establish conditions of peace and security in the area, eventually through appropriate arrangements for any international agreement that may be reached. The Government of Sri Lanka has offered to host one of the preparatory sessions of the Ad Hoc Committee next year in Colombo, and consultations are proceeding.

The consideration of issues relating to the naval arms race bears a close relationship to the Indian Ocean zone of peace, and Sri Lanka was one of the sponsors of resolution 41/59 K, on naval armaments and disarmament. Around 25 per cent of nuclear weapons are for naval deployment, in itself a clear indication of the importance of the issue, and ample justification for its closer scrutiny, including measures of naval disarmament and questions such as freedom of peaceful navigation, conflict-prevention and confidence-building at sea, exchange of information and so on.

The attention paid to conventional weapons does not imply a diminution of the priority accorded to nuclear weapons. The acquisition and production of



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conventional weaponry beyond the legitimate defence and security needs of a State could only create suspicion and mistrust and constitute a destabilising factor at the regional and other levels. Allied to this is the concern of small countries such as my own about international transfers of conventional weapons to irregular forces and secessionist elements that can threaten the very territorial integrity of States and sap their development potential by forcing a diversion of resources for defence. Some such transfers are commercially motivated, but the threat remains the same, whatever the source of the illegal supplier. It would be worthwhile to consider all aspects of this complex question in some depth at the Conference on Disarmament and eventually at the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

Chemical weapons have not yet become obsolete. The opportunity now exists to outlaw them by multilateral action. A convention banning their use is virtually a certainty, although complex issues still remain to be settled. Happily, as the representative of Sweden has reported, there are no insurmountable political obstacles to a convention, and, with determination and flexibility, the arduous work of the negotiators may soon be crowned with success.

For the Conference on Disarmament, at which the negotiations on chemical weapons have proceeded, the emerging convention is a clear vindication of its Capacity as the single multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament. The reluctance to bestow a negotiating mandate on the Conference on Disarmament in respect of most of the vital issues before it has been a major factor in its impotence and its reduction to the de facto status of being little more than a deliberative body on these issues.

The Conference on Disarmament includes among its representative membership the militarily most powerful States as well as representatives of small States such as

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my own, **symbolizing** in a sense that **consideration** of, and negotiation on, **disarmament issues** is a matter of concern - both a **r**ight and a **duty** - **for all States**. The Conference on Disarmament cannot live up to **its** high purpose if **it is** not **invested** with a capacity to negotiate,

We are on the eve of the third special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. During this forty-second session we need to set precise dates for the special session. It takes place **10 years** after the **first** special session of the General Assembly **devoted** to disarmament. We shall **need** to review **progress on the implementation** of the Final Document of that historic **first special session** as well **as** the anti-climactic **second**. If our verdict veers towards **the negative**, it **will** still be an endorsement of the **validity** of **the** decisions and recommendations of the 1978 Document. The **Document** must remain unassailed as the **classic standard** by which we **must** judge the scant achievements **of** the last decade, examine the present and re-establish goals for the **future**. To slide back from **the** imperatives of that Document on the argument that its **sights** were set too high, **or** that its goals were too noble, is to weaken our resolve to safeguard the generations that **follow**. **Realism** can sometimes mean taking **the** easy way. Let us not compromise on agreement **reached**. It is better **to acknowledge** shortcomings in implementation than **to** adjust our sights to easily attainable targets. Times have indeed changed. The **1978** Document, if it is also to be changed, must be strengthened, not compromised. **If** we compromise on the Document we may well be compromising our future.

Mr. TORNUDE (Finland) : Before beginning my statement, I should like to join other delegations in expressing our condolences on the death of Ian Cromartie.

I should also like to congratulate you, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee and to express our congratulations to the officers of the Committee as well.

For several years, the First Committee has had the dubious privilege of listening to disquieting statements on the continuing global arms race. This year, the situation is somewhat different. As numerous statements made during the general debate have shown, a belief in the possibility of a real breakthrough in the field of disarmament is gaining ground.

A treaty abolishing all American and Soviet ground-launched intermediate-range nuclear weapons could become a turning-point in the history of nuclear weaponry. In concluding such a treaty, both signatories would also agree that their security could be maintained at a lower level of armaments. This could start a process leading to a diminished role for both nuclear and conventional weapons in the maintenance of peace and security.

Although the treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) would eliminate only some 3 to 4 per cent of all existing nuclear weapons, its political impact could be much greater. As a treaty stipulating real reductions in nuclear armaments, it could act as a catalyst in other areas of disarmament. We urge both the United States and the Soviet Union to continue their efforts to reach agreement on strategic and space arms, conventional forces and nuclear testing. Their joint achievements would undoubtedly not only enhance the security of the parties concerned but would also be in the interest of the security of all nations.

The emerging INF treaty is historic also from a disarmament-verification point of view. The treaty would create a stringent verification régime built on the practice of on-site inspection. That régime could serve as a model for compliance

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control arrangements in other areas. An **adequate** and effective verification **system** **is** of critical importance **to disarmament agreements** and confidence-building in **itself**.

The **positive effect** of an INF treaty **should** be felt most strongly in Europe, where its military impact would be considerable. This **also** concerns northern Europe, **since** the **prospective** treaty would abolish a **significant** number of nuclear **weapons now capable** of reaching that area.

**Against this** background, it might sound inappropriate **to** express a few **words** of caution. Finland warmly welcomes **reductions** in nuclear armaments, **both** intermediate and strategic, but in **assessing the** impact of prospective disarmament agreements, my Government **must** also take into account regional and comparative considerationa.

In addition to their overall importance, **arms** limitation agreements might influence different **regions** or subregions in different ways. Agreements have an impact on military capabilities and can change deployment patterns. Agreements might **also** influence military **research** and development, weapon **construction** and procurement plans. They might even influence military doctrines. **such consequences** demand our attention. They might in some cases even have negative regional effects.

The **potential** regional impact of future disarmament agreements **is** of course difficult to **foresee**, especially **before** those agreements have been signed and have **come** into force. Our assumption **today** regarding future **developments** must be based on existing and known arms programmes. Any discernible **trends are** therefore for the **most** part independent of the new **programmes** currently envisaged. Our concern is not caused directly by these prospective **agreements** but rather **by** some on-going negative trends.

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One of the more prraiatent of there trends is the increased deployment, by the principal military Powers of air- and sea-launched cruise missiles carrying both conventional and nuclear warheads. Those missiles are inherently destabilizing owing to difficulties of verification in regard to quantity, quality and deployment. Recent developments enhancing their penetration capability have intensified those problems. In addition, cruise missiles - because of their trajectory - constitute an indirect security problem to neutral countries like Finland. Since 1978, my Government has therefore been appealing to all nuclear Powers for limitations in the deployment and development of long-range cruise missiles.

Another trend in the acceleration of military research and development. The continuing technological arms race is a perpetual process with its own inner logic, constantly producing new generation of more effective weapons. The qualitative arms race takes on particular importance, when nuclear weapons are involved. This qualitative arms race is also assuming increased significance in the field of conventional weapons. It contributes to international tension in both cases by creating more sophisticated systems and counter-systems. Agreed limitations in one area may accelerate the speed of development in other areas. The need for meaningful restraints on the qualitative aspect of the arms race is obvious.

Furthermore, the possible reduction of nuclear weapons - which, as I have said, we warmly welcome and support - may have perceptible consequences in Europe for the role of conventional forces. While giving those forces a more central role in the overall balance between the two alliances, possible agreements at the same time highlight the need for negotiations aimed at greater stability through reductions in conventional forces.

Our concern at possible changes in the relative importance given to specific regions, in arms deployment patterns and in the qualitative arms race, is linked to

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our secur ity interests. Every nation has a legitimate right to, and a responsibility for, peace and ● oourity. The Finnish Government has therefore consistently stressed the need for self-restraint end ● tibility in northern Europe and the sea areas in end ● djaoent to it. Our initiatives in the domain of naval arms control aim at concrete aonfidenoe-building measures, am indicated in the wor king paper presented by Finland at the Disarmament Commiraion last ● pring. Such measures range from the possible multilateralization of the so-called incident agreement to notification end observation of naval ● xercieoe, as well as to a greater openness on naval matters through a more regular exchange of information.

Let me now turn to some of the issues more directly related to the items on our multilateral disarmament agenda. Finland has consistently argued in favour of a complete ban on nuclear testing. A comprehensive nuclear-teat ban would set real limitations on the qualitative improvement of nuclear weaponr. It would also help to strengthen the world-wide non-proliferation régime. We therefore welcome the recent announcement by the Soviet Union and the United States that full-scale etage-by-tege negotiations on nuclear-testing issues would begin before 1 December of this year.

(Mr. Tor nudd, Finland)

We **continue to** believe that a **comprehensive nuclear-test-ban** treaty with effective verification **provisions** ought to be negotiable right nw. However **we also recognize** the validity of a gradual approach as long as it is firmly **based on** the ultimate goal, the ending **of** all nuclear **tests** in all environment<sup>8</sup> for all time.

The new Swiet-American **talks** complement the multilateral **efforts** that have boen under way at the Conference on **Disarmament** in Geneva for quite **some** time, with regrettably **scant results**. We hope that the multilateral **efforts** in **this** field will nw gain nw **momentum**.

Finland **has**, for **its** part, contributed to the multilateral **efforts** for a **comprehensive** nuclear-teat-ban treaty by making available **its** technical expertise in **the** field of **seismic verification**. Finland **is** taking an active part in the **development of an** international **data** exchange ayatem, which would **constitute** the **necessary technical groundwork** for reliable monitoring **of seismic events for verification purposes**. We welcome the steady **progress** being made in **this** area.

In our **view** another priority **issue** for **multilateral** disarmament diplomacy **is** a complete prohibition of chemical **weapons**. Finland, for **its** part, **does not possess** chemical **weapons** and will never **acquire such weapons**. Instead, Finland **has** for the past 15 years devoted **considerable resources** to developing technical **means** for verifying **chemical** diarmament. The **results of our research have** been regularly placed at the disposal of the Conference on Disarmament. They are available **to** all others as well.

**Considerable** progress **has** been made in the negotiations on **chemical weapons**. The **complete and** verifiable prohibition of **such** weapons on a global **basis is, if not** Yet within immediate reach, much **closer** at hand **than** even a year ago. On the key issue of verification **differences have** nw **been narrowed, we hope** decisively. Finland welcomes the emerging agreement on mandatory **on-site inspections** upon

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challenge. In view of the grave consequences that supicion of undeclared chemical-weapons stocks would have for international security if not promptly and satisfactorily removed, such inspections are clearly necessary.

Although unrelated to the question of chemical weapons as such, the recent demonstrations of the workability of the inspection provisions of the Stockholm Conference document are encouraging. We also look forward, as I have already mentioned, to any impetus that the verification régime of a prospective agreement on intermediate-range nuclear forces between the United States and the USSR may give to the chemical-weapons negotiations in this regard.

In our view, the United Nations Disarmament Commission plays an important role as a global forum for testing new ideas on disarmament. We note with satisfaction that such issues as conventional and naval disarmament, as well as verification, have been taken up for serious discussion at the Disarmament commission. We look forward to continuing that discussion.

It is clear from what I have already said that Finland attaches particular importance to the fact that naval armaments and disarmament are on the agenda of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. This aspect of disarmament has long been overlooked, despite venerable historical precedents. We intend to revert to this subject at the next session of the Commission.

The discussion of verification in all its aspects that began this year in the Disarmament Commission is a welcome development. Although verification is always, by definition, connected with specific disarmament agreements, we believe that there are also common elements to verification that can be considered at a general level.

We also believe that the role of the United Nations in verification of multilateral disarmament agreements needs to be enhanced. Our proposal at the Disarmament Commission for creating a verification data base to be compiled and



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**managed** by the United Nations emanates from this belief. We are pleased by the response **to** our proposal. We will continue to work for it at the United Nations Disarmament **Commission** with a view to elaborating a **concrete** recommendation on which the General **Assembly** could act.

One of the few successes in the recent history of disarmament-related conferences is the result of the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and **Development**. Finland participated actively in the Conference. We welcome the adoption of the Final Document by consensus. It was encouraging that, despite the varying views of the participating countries, it was possible to overcome differences and produce a substantive document. The Conference reached a number of important conclusions regarding the relationship between disarmament and development, two processes that ought to support and stimulate each other. The Final Document signals a new approach, a fresh start to the efforts **of** tackling grave problems. It conforms perfectly to the Finnish view that every human being has the right to pursue a **reasonable** standard of living and live in peace. The important thing is that the international **community** has **moved** towards a wider understanding **of** how to pursue **security**. In **the** Final Document we agreed that security played a key role in the complex and difficult relationship between disarmament and **development** and that disarmament, **development** and security formed the three pillars **of** peace. The Government of Finland is ready to participate in the work towards the **implementation** of the Final Document.

The General Assembly decided last year to convene its third special session devoted to disarmament in **1988**. The Preparatory Committee for the special session has already adopted a draft agenda. Like the agendas of previous special sessions, it **is** a compromise which makes it possible to **organize** the work of the session in a flexible manner.

(Mr. **Tor** nudd , Fin land)

Finland look6 forward **to** the special **session** as a **universal** and authoritative forum. Its purpose should be to outline an international disarmament strategy based on the Final Document of the first special session of the General **Assembly** devoted to disarmament, as well as on the results, meagre as they may have been, of the second.

The Particular task of the third special **session** should he to enhance the role of the United Nations in multilateral disarmament endeavours. There is need for a review of the United Nations disarmament machinery, with regard to procedural questions, working practices and the composition **of** some of the **main** disarmament bodies. **Rationalization** and innovation in **these** fields could permit the resources **of** the world **Organization** to he more affectively focused on the central issues of international disarmament, to the **bencfit** of international peace and **security**.\*

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\*Mr. Nashashibi (Jordan), Vice-Chairman, took the **Chair**.

Mrs. MULAMULA (United Republic of Tanzania): My delegation has learned with deep sorrow of the untimely death of Ambassador **Cromartie**. We **wish** to extend our deepest sympathy to the United Kingdom delegation.

**May I**, on my own behalf and on behalf of my delegation, congratulate you, Sir, on your election **to** the chairmanship of this Committee. My delegation is particularly pleased to see an illustrious **&on** of Africa preside over **this** important Committee, a Committee which deliberates on issues that are the corner-stone of the maintenance of international peace and security. **We** also wish to express our deep appreciation to your predecessor, Ambassador Zachmann **of** the German Democratic Republic, for the **dedication** with which he effectively conducted the proceedings of the Committee during the forty-first session.

The Committee is meeting against the background of heightened expectations as to the outcome of the protracted negotiations between the super-Powers with regard to the elimination of deadly weapons of mass destruction. Analysts **have** given reasons for the agreements reached between the United States of America and the Soviet Union. Notwithstanding the reasons advanced, the fact that **the** two super-Powers are talking to each other and not at each other is an encouraging sign offering promising prospects. For the **same** reason we welcome the agreement in principle to conclude a treaty on the elimination of **intermediate-** and shorter-range missiles in Europe and elsewhere. It **is** to be **hoped** that an agreement will be signed; but by itself, without total and comprehensive disarmament, the agreement will solve neither the global nuclear arms problem nor the controversies surrounding the issues. Therefore, my delegation looks forward, with guarded optimism, to the forthcoming summit meeting between the leaders of the two super-Powers, in the hope that **they** will give legal form to a treaty on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) . We **urge them** also to consider total nuclear disarmament.

(Mrs. Mulamula, United Republic  
of Tanzania)

While we welcome the bilateral efforts in the disarmament ~~negotiations~~ towards general and complete disarmament, we share the view expressed by other delegations that however useful and meaningful bilateral negotiations may be, they are not a substitute for multilateral ~~negotiations~~; each ~~must~~ complement the other, and not hinder or preclude it. As was stressed in the 1986 Harare Declaration ~~of the Heads~~ of State or Government of non-aligned countries, we expect the two Powers to keep the General Assembly and the international community at large fully and officially informed of the progress made in the negotiations, rather than compel us to pick the titbits of information from the media.

In that respect, my delegation expresses its disappointment at the state ~~of~~ affairs in the only multilateral negotiating body on disarmament - the Conference on Disarmament. Heading through its report, it is clear that the work done by the Conference on Disarmament *leaves* much to be desired. *The Conference has once again* demonstrated its inability to **establish** ad hoc committees on the priority items listed on its agenda: the nuclear-test ban, cessation of the nuclear-arms race, nuclear disarmament, prevention of nuclear war and **all** related matters. The obstinate position ~~Of~~ certain **nuclear-weapons States**, members of the ~~Conference~~ on Disarmament, has regrettably crippled the smooth functioning of that body. *We* are informed that the only area in which there have been positive ~~mood~~ in the Conference on Disarmament - as acknowledged by the Secretary-General in his report on the work of the Organization (A/42/1) - is on chemical weapons. However, as in previous reports of the Conference on Disarmament, which note that the draft **texts** do not bind any delegation, the opening statement in ~~the~~ appended draft convention diminishes the underlying positive note in the respective reports. Equally disturbing are the endless brackets in the text.

(Mrs. Mulamula, United Republic  
of Tanzania)

The report and the statement made before the Committee by the Chairman of the Disarmament Commission at the last spring session demonstrate yet another discouraging outcome of multilateral efforts of United Nations **bodies** in deliberations on disarmament.

My delegation **is particularly** concerned with the **insignificant** progress made on an item of great importance to our **region**, and indeed to all peace-loving nations in the world - the issue of the nuclear capability of South Africa. **I need** not remind delegations of the danger **facing** the international community in the event that South Africa, in **desperate** on and armed with nuclear weapons, might unleash a major regional war, which could precipitate a global **confrontation**. The underlying danger was brought to our **attention initially** by the **Secretary-General** in his report, which stated:

"Without **underestimating** the extreme dangers **of** nuclear **weapons** in general, they take on especially **ominous** dimensions if in the hands of a **régime** **desperate** to preserve white supremacy." (A/35/402, para. 91)

In retrospect, therefore, the question of South Africa's nuclear capability cannot be separated from the intentions of the **apartheid régime**, whose policy has been condemned by this body as a crime against humanity. In the same vein, we **urge** those members who have been standing in the way **of a** consensus **decision** on this matter, to reconsider their positions in the interests of humanity, for in the **eyes** of the victims of **apartheid** the issue is one of life or death. "The recent pressures put on South Africa and its announcement that it would sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NW) **is** only a "c **ot** on a stick" intended to try to pacify opponents of the **régime** who want it expelled from the International Atomic Energy **Agency**. **For my delegation, these efforts** are only

(Mrs. Mulamula, United Republic  
of Tanzania)

cosmetic for they obscure the nature of the problem but unfortunately some **countries represented** at the **annual** meeting in Vienna in September were appeased. By becoming a signatory to the NPT, South Africa will acquire a clear licence to join the exclusive nuclear club for it already possesses a nuclear weapons capability. While the **NPT** has **tied** the hands of the non-nuclear States that are parties to **it**, it has allowed **horizontal** proliferation of nuclear **weapons** by **nuclear-weapons** States. To date, my Government has therefore found no justifiable reason for joining this treaty **régime**.

If I have devoted **considerable** time to this **issue**, it is because the issue of South African nuclear weapons capabilities has frustrated all our efforts to **translate** into practice the **Declaration** on the **Denuclearization** of Africa long since adopted **by** the OAU. Above all, it is an expression of our concern at the continued nuclear blackmail of independent African States by the racist **régime** which, through its **destabilizing** policies, has kept neighbouring **countries** in a state of perpetual siege.

Another area of concern to my delegation is the **continued militarization** of the Indian Ocean and the military presence there of super-Powers and other maritime Powers. Efforts to implement the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a **Zone** of Peace through the convening of a United Nations conference have thus far been **frustrated** by those same **Powers**. The report of the **Ad Hoc** Committee on the Indian Ocean to the General Assembly at this session is clear testimony to the deadlock confronting the Committee with regard to the **convening** of an international conference in **Colombo** on the Indian Ocean **as** a zone of peace. Once again, the Committee is requesting a possible **postponement** of the long-awaited conference. While Tanzania, a member of the **Ad Hoc** Committee, joined the consensus in favour of the draft resolution **recommended** to the General Assembly at its forty-second

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session, as contained in its report (A/42/29), we wish to place on record our disappointment with the decision taken to postpone the conference to an undetermined date. My Government particularly deplores the deliberate attempts by certain countries to frustrate all efforts to hold that conference and to protract its preparation ad infinitum. One can only conclude that those stalling actions reflect the adamant refusal of those countries to even contemplate withdrawing from the Indian Ocean.

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The danger facing the littoral and hinterland States owing to ~~the~~ military rivalry in the ocean needs no elaboration, for the danger ~~is~~ at our front door. There ~~is a~~ need for practical action to rid the Indian Ocean of the menacing presence of great Powers, which ~~have blocked~~ the work of the Committee. My delegation was equally dismayed by the ~~refusal~~ to endorse even the ~~offer~~ by the Government of Sri Lanka to host one of the pre-conference sessions in Colombo. Nevertheless, my delegation ~~is optimistic~~ that reason will prevail in our endeavours in this Committee that will lead to the ~~convening~~ of that important ~~conference~~. After all, it is in ~~the interest~~ of us all to navigate through safe ~~waters~~ and the aim of the conference ~~is~~ to pave the way for the restoration of peace in the stormy waters of the Indian Ocean.

In stating our ~~disappointment~~ we are ~~not~~ saying that there have been no positive developments in other areas. The holding ~~of~~ the International Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development was a ~~valuable~~ achievement in the multilateral efforts of the United ~~Nations~~ in the field of ~~disarmament~~, however modest the outcome. In the words ~~of~~ the President of the ~~Conference~~, Mr. Natwar Singh,

“the Conference struck the ~~right~~ blow for the right reason ~~at~~ the right time and in the right forum”.

Unfortunately, the ~~Final~~ Document, ~~which was~~ adopted by ~~consensus~~, did not live up to the ~~expectations~~ and ~~wishes~~ of many delegations, including my own. It did, however, endorse for the ~~first~~ time the close ~~and~~ multidimensional ~~relationship~~ between disarmament and development. Therefore I suggest that the document be considered as our invaluable starting-point for future action and orientation ~~with~~ regard to the attainment of the objective of disarmament and development. We the



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developing countries have to build on what **has** been achieved by our concerted **efforts** and actions in the Committee.

Another significant development was a consensus decision to hold the third **special session** of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1988 and to agree **on** the agenda. **It is** the hope of my delegation that the **establisment** of the dates and venue for the special session will not be made an issue and thus waste the valuable time of **the** Committee.

**In conclusion**, Mr. Chairman, I wish to express once again my **delegation's** **displeasure** with the working methods of the Committee. We are disappointed that **consultations held by** your predecessor **with** regard to the **rationalization** of the work of the Committee have not borne results. We therefore find ourselves in the same precarious situation of having to **endure listening to repetitive** statements in the general debate and again in the debate on specific items. It is our hope that **YOU will** reconsider the **duplication** involved in the **organization** of work and certainly continue from where Ambassador **Zachmann** left his consultations, as **indicated** in your **first** statement on the **organization** of our **work**. I wish to assure you, Sir, of my delegation's full co-operation in this endeavour.

**MAH-BANG** (Singapore) : On behalf of my **delegation** I should **like** to **extend our** warm congratulations to you, Sir, on your unanimous election as **Chairman** of the **First** Committee. My **delegation** also extends its felicitations to the **other officers** of the Committee on their election.

A year ago at about this time United States President **Reagan** and Soviet General Secretary **Gorbachev** met at **Reykjavik** in a serious effort to narrow their differences **over** disarmament and other **issues**. A **few weeks** ago the United States and the Soviet Union arrived at an agreement in principle on the elimination of two Classes of medium- and shorter-range nuclear missiles - the **intermediate-range**

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nuclear **forces** agreement. By the end of this **session** of the General **Assembly**, President **Reagan** and Soviet leader Gorbachev will **be** having another summit, the third in two years, to confirm this agreement and perhaps reach other new agreements.

**These events** do not take place **accidentally**. They reflect **some** fundamental changes in super-Power relations and hence international politics. They **are** the marking-stones of a changing world. No **longer are** the Super-Powers threatening to **swallow** each other, as they claimed earlier in their rhetoric of the cold war era. **They** have now agreed to talk and to **create**, it is **hoped**, a peaceful and stable world. Whatever the outcome of this change in their relations, it will have a profound effect on all nations and on world politics. This new **era is** one in which there is a greater convergence of views and interests of the two super-powers, an era in which they will **settle** their own problems and **those** of the world directly, perhaps leaving little room for the voice of the third world.

The following anecdote from **Lewis Carroll**, author of Through the Looking-Glass, best describes the now, changing world:

"The **room** they had entered had a tall mirror standing in one corner. **Dodgson** gave his cousin an orange and asked her which hand she held it in. When **she** replied 'The right', he asked her to **stand before** the **glass** and tell him in which hand the little girl in the mirror **was** holding it. 'The Left hand', came the puzzled reply. 'Exactly', **said Dodgson**, 'and how do you explain that?' Alice replied, '**If I was on the other side of the glass**'.

This anecdote illustrates that the concepts of the right and the left depend on one's perspective. **United States-Soviet** relations so far have been **colored** by this mirror image each has of the other. However, after more than **40** years of

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gazing at each other from **opposite** ends, they have decided to walk through their **respective** mirrors to **see** each other in order to yet a **correct perspective** of each other.

What have been the **causes** of this **change**? Until recently the United States had a nuclear advantage over the Soviet Union. From the Soviet perspective at the time, so long as this imbalance existed they would have to strive hard to **narrow** the gap. The United States naturally tried to maintain **its** nuclear lead through the development of advanced *nuclear* technology **and** weapons **systems** in response to what was perceived as **a** massive Soviet nuclear build-up. This inevitably led to the nuclear-arms race, which over the **years** could not be maintained without **severe** strain on their respective economies. Though the Soviet Union did finally achieve nuclear parity with the United States, this **was achieved** at tremendous **economic** cost. For some time there was a **realization** by both super-Powers **of** the futility of the arms race. **However**, both sides tread cautiously on the **disarmament issue**, until recently, when the new Soviet **leadership**, loose bound by the dogmas **of** the cold-war era, **emerged**.

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A reassessment of Soviet national interests and foreign policy followed. A new style of international diplomacy - that of glasnost - was introduced.

"Glasnost" can be roughly translated to mean "openness" or "transparency". Glasnost has led to new approaches on disarmament issues. For the first time the Soviet Union has gone beyond what the two super-Powers were prepared to offer each other in the past. It has accepted the zero-zero option and has advanced a doctrine of reasonable sufficiency in military forces that calls for maintaining an adequate defence, but not investing money in an endless arms race. The result is the recent intermediate-range nuclear forces agreement.

In this new era of improved super-Power relations, are we likely to see a better and more hopeful world? What implications will this have for Europe, Asia and the rest of the world? The new United States-Soviet relationship will first and foremost have serious implications for the balance of forces in Europe, where any small shift in East-West relations is most felt. The Atlantic Alliance was based on its reliance on the United States nuclear umbrella to maintain the strategic balance with the Warsaw Pact, which has superiority in conventional arms. Without this vital United States nuclear umbrella, the delicate strategic balance in Europe would be upset. Faced with this likelihood, the Western European countries may have to make a fundamental reassessment of their security and the basic assumptions on which it is based.

There is little doubt that both the Western and Eastern European groupings would like to see a more stable Europe. However, for the Western European countries this stability is seen to be one based on a balance of forces between the two blocs. In their reassessment of their security, Western European countries are likely to be faced with two broad options - rearming, both with nuclear and conventional weapons, or negotiating with their Eastern European counterparts a mutual reduction of forces. It is significant that in response to the

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intermediate-range nuclear **forces** agreement the Western European **countries do not** want to link European security and **disarmament** to any **accord** reached between the two super-Powers on a bilateral **basis**.

The balance of forces in Asia from a broad strategic perspective **is** not as delicate **as** that in Europe. However, since the **1970s** Asia has not been **spared** the super-Power rivalry, **as** witness the **serious** efforts **made** by one party to make **inroads** into this region, where traditionally it had little influence. Any **future** balance of forces configuration in Asia will undoubtedly have to take China into consideration. From all **accounts**, it has the potential to be a super-Power. **However**, it is significant that the Chinese **leadership** has opted for economic development rather than **militarization**. It has taken the initiative to cut down its conventional forces by a million men. According to a United **Nations** information paper giving questions and **answers** on the relationship between disarmament and development,

“Chinese military expenditures as a percentage of national output are estimated to have dropped by one third from 1979 to **1983**. Modernisation of agriculture, industry and science and **technology** is given precedence **over** military **modernization**, and a rapid growth in **China's** **economy** and living standards is reported.”

**China's** example should be a model **for** other big **Powers** to follow.

Elsewhere in the world similar dilemmas face countries, should both super-Powers decide to take a stand-off position in **localized** regional affairs following **glasnost**. In a bipolar cold-war world, the super-Powers actively courted the third world for alignment in their **struggle** for supremacy. However, **this is** likely to change, **as** ideological alignment becomes **less** relevant to the new super-Power relationship. The third world countries may have to **reassess** their role in the new, changing world: do they **still** want to hold on to the old **ways** or

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will they **strike** out on their own **to a** relatively **independent** line? Each country Will have **to** decide what **is** best for **itself**. However, if the **small States still** want to be in **the mainstream** of **international politics**, they will have to keep **in step** with **the new changing** world.

**As** the threat of nuclear war **diminishes** following glasnost diplomacy and changed super-Power **relations**, **this does** not **necessarily** mean that order and stability in the world will automatically follow. **As** I have **illustrated**, new equations of balance of **forces** at the regional level emerge, and countries other than the two super-Powers will have to find **new** alternatives for their security. There **are three** likely **choices**: **first**, the countries could rearm, which **is** not a welcome **alternative**; **secondly**, they could agree **to** regional disarmament for both conventional and nuclear forces) and, **thirdly**, they could form new regional **groupings to solve** regional problems by themselves, without the use of force and without the involvement of the major **Powers**.

The sentiments expressed in **debates** both in the **General Assembly** debates and in this Committee clearly **suggest** that rearmament **is** not a solution **to** the problem of world peace and stability. I share the views of many delegates that glasnost diplomacy should not be **confined** to the two super-Powers. It **should** permeate downwards **to** the regional level as well, **and regional** disarmament, both conventional and nuclear, **should** be pursued **as** the key to a **stabilized** and balanced world. Coupled with this **is** the **establishment** of regional groupings, not for the purpose of military **alliances**, but for **the peaceful** settlement of disputes. The recent peace **proposals** initiated by the **group of** Central American countries themselves to solve their own regional problems **is** a move in the right direction.

One successful story, **of course**, **is** the **Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN)**. Before **its** formation, relations between the **non-Communist** South-East Asian countries were characterized by **mistrust**, envy and even **conflict**.

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Through regional co-operation, following the formation of ASEAN, a more positive and understanding relationship has been forged between its members. Discord has been replaced with regional harmony, stability and economic prosperity.

War and peace are the result of human wills and intentions, and not of weapons. Weapons are the means to wage war, but are not in themselves the causes of war. The deliberation on disarmament and arms control will not be complete if there is little discussion on the causes of wars and the ways to eliminate them.

(Mr. Ah-Bang, Singapore)

As **most** members of the First Committee are non-nuclear-weapon **States**, Our strength lies in our credibility and being taken seriously. I **share** the view **of** the representative of Ghana that we should avoid turning **this** into a forum for propayanda **purposes** or allow it to **be** an instrument for bloc or ideological politics. **We** should **strive** to make this Committee a respected arms control forum, discussing and recommending tangible **proposals** on disarmament and verification and **means** to world peace and stability. The number of resolutions we adopt **is** not a reflection of the credibility of the First Committee, but the quality of those resolutions is. If we in this forum can arrange for resolutions of better quality to be proposed and adopted, we will have set a high standard for ourselves and for future deliberations.

**We** look forward to your able **leadership**, Mr. Chairman, to guide the committee to a discussion of substantive issues concerning disarmament and arms control.

Mr. van SCHAIK (Netherlands) : Permit me **first** of all, Sir, to congratulate you, **as** well as the other members of the Bureau, on the assumption of important **posts** in the Committee. I also wish to express my gratitude to Ambassador Zachmann of the German Democratic Republic for **his** excellent work as last year's Chairman.

**My** delegation fully subscribes to the statement made in this Committee by **the** representative of Denmark **speaking** on behalf of the member States of the European Community. Indeed, the themes we are **discussing** here these days are **increasingly** within the purview of the political co-operation among the 12 **European** member countries.

For the Netherlands Government, the **objectives** of peace and security, prosperity and justice are intertwined. Disarmament policies should in fact be placed within a broad context. Disarmament cannot be achieved if no progress **is** made in other **areas**.



(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

Salvador de Madariaga, at the time a senior advisor for the League of Nations, once wrote:

"The Solution of the problem of disarmament cannot be found within the **problem** itself, but only outside it."

He continued:

"In fact, the **problem** of disarmament is not the problem of disarmament. It really is the problem of the organisation of the world community."

In the light of such wise remarks, it is most fortunate that we can discern some favourable developments in the current international **situation**. We **are registering** signals of reform and transparency in countries where until recently the status quo and stagnation presented obstacles, including on the road to international co-operation. We are witnessing important new developments in the East-West context. The old patterns of East-West relations have proved to be less static than was believed possible only a short time ago.

Of course, uncertainties and rigidities of various sorts cannot be dispelled overnight. In certain areas of the world, devastating war and armed **conflicts** **rage** on. Yet there now seems to be clear perspective for progress. In arms control **negotiations** in particular, attitudes have changed, **the climate** has improved and concrete achievements are a prospect.

The Netherlands Government is highly satisfied with the agreement **in principle** reached on intermediate-range nuclear forces - the so-called **INF** agreement - on 18 September. The elimination of all American and Soviet intermediate long-range and short-range nuclear missiles will be of historic significance. **For the first** time in the post-war period, whole categories of **nuclear** weapons, including some of the most modern ones, would be dismantled.

The Netherlands Government is also encouraged by the progress that is being made in the field of reductions of **strategic** weapons. We strongly hope that deep

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and verifiable reductions to equal levels, properly structured to enhance stability, will soon follow upon an INF agreement.

We consider it of great importance that the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed to start full-scale step-by-step negotiations on limiting and ultimately ending nuclear tests before 1 December 1987. We hope that early progress will be made towards the shared objective of a comprehensive test ban.

We trust that negotiations on the verification issue in relation to the threshold test-ban Treaty of 1974 and the peaceful nuclear explosions Treaty of 1976 will soon be crowned with success. Strict verification is in essence technically feasible and need therefore no longer block the way towards test reductions.

In our efforts to reach the important objective of a comprehensive test ban, we support the idea of a step-by-step programme of limiting and subsequently ending nuclear tests, parallel with a programme to reduce and ultimately eliminate categories of nuclear weapons. It is encouraging that recent developments point in this direction, thus confirming the validity of an approach the Netherlands has often advocated in the past.

This brings me to a few general observations on the relationship between the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union and multilateral efforts in arms control. The improved international climate creates opportunities for progress in multilateral consultation and negotiations on arms control and disarmament.

All nations should in fact cooperate in constructive proposals for disarmament and should make a contribution in the search for agreements on balanced reductions in armaments, armed forces and military budgets. Bilateral and multilateral arms control and disarmament are in fact complementary. We should see current negotiations taking place in various forums as a combined effort.

(Mr. van Schaik Nether lands)

For various reasons, most problems of arms control and disarmament have a multilateral dimension. For the effective execution of certain programmes of arms control, the co-operation or participation of many countries may even be essential. yet in the present state of power relations, the United States and the Soviet Union should, as key actors, play a special role.

We are all conscious of the fact that the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on nuclear and space matters are taking place against a background of widespread global concern. That is one of the reasons why disarmament talks should also, when appropriate, take place in a broad context. Besides dealing with negotiations on a regional basis, the Conference on Disarmament should serve as the appropriate global forum where, parallel to the bilateral talks in Geneva, negotiations are conducted that are partly independent of and partly complementary to the bilateral talks.

(Mr. VdII Schaik, Netherlands)

This relationship between the Conference on Disarmament and the bilateral talks does not **only** require a certain dovetailing of the two to avoid **duplication**; it also **requires** wisdom on the part of **all** parties **concerned**. We **see** for instance no **Use in** actions undertaken in the Conference on Disarmament that would **interfere** with the detailed negotiations between the **super-Powers**. On the other hand, we **hope** that those countries will **continue** to **realize** that they are **dealing** with matters **of global** concern. The Conference, **as well as** the General Assembly, should continue to be informed about the recent developments in the **bilateral negotiations**. Proper room should **be** given **for** the Conference on Disarmament to undertake useful complementary work at the **appropriate** moment. The test-ban issue is a case in **point**, where the bilateral and multilateral approach should be **complementary**.

This brings me to the **subject of** outer space. The realm of outer **space** holds out great promise of scientific co-operation and achievements for the benefit of mankind. The world community should take care **that military** competition and **destabilizing** military activities do not **become** prime characteristics of this **vast expanse** surrounding our globe. Prevention of an **arms race** in outer space **relates** as much to Earth as it does to space. In fact, the only operational missile defence in existence at **this** moment is ground **based**. The issue of **defensive** systems cannot be seen in isolation from the so-called offensive systems. We have been witness to **some destabilizing first-strike** tendencies in the latter **category** over past decades.

My Government **attaches** great importance to an approach which, as part of the 50 per cent cuts, seeks to **counter** such developments. We **also** wish to **stress** the importance of continued adherence to the 1972 Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and on understanding between the two countries concerned on **permitted activities** under the Treaty.

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

Progress in arms control in space is, of course, greatly dependent on progress in the bilateral discussions on the subject of space, but the Conference on Disarmament should also play its role. For two years now, the Conference's Ad Hoc Committee on the Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer space has been deliberating. The debate, apart from interesting and detailed technical information given by one or two delegations, was for the most part in general terms. The discussion, useful in itself, did not reach the stage of orderly and systematic efforts to define the issues to be addressed in detail. In particular, the Ad Hoc Committee did not succeed in identifying the problems to which the Conference on Disarmament should try to find solutions. The much-discussed question of definitions is only part of this basic problem. In short, there is still a lot of work to be done.

Next to defining subject-matters as such, it would seem possible that the Conference on Disarmament could play a useful complementary role in the bilateral negotiations by exploring the possibility of partial or interim solutions. The Conference could, for example, discuss the substance of coherent arms-control measures in the field of protection of satellites, as far as such satellites are of a stabilizing nature.

The essential underlying idea of such efforts would be the protection of the many satellites that fulfil a stabilizing role as instruments of verification and crisis management, early warning and communication. The exact nature of the stabilizing satellites to be protected would have to be determined. We would also favour exploring the possibility of prohibiting attacks on high-orbit satellites.

I turn now to chemical weapons. I must first of all say that my delegation was shocked to hear of the untimely death of our friend and colleague Ian Cromactic, who, among other things, as Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee in Geneva played such a crucial role at a crucial phase of the negotiations. He was d

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great friend, and we hope that Ambassador Solesby will convey my delegation's condolences to his wife Jenny and to other members of the family.

The use of chemical weapons is a sad reality. These weapons continue to be used, and their actual and potential impact is horrendous. My Government remains greatly concerned by reports, recently once again confirmed, of the use of chemical weapons in the context of the Iran-Iraq conflict. This is the more important in that over the past year significant progress has been made in the negotiations on chemical weapons, notably in the hitherto much-disputed and most sensitive area of verification.

An evolution in the position of some countries made it possible to cover a lot of common ground on such issues as the declaration of locations of chemical-weapons stocks, the monitoring of non-production in the civil chemical industry and on-site challenge inspections. After years of stagnation the wide acceptance of mandatory challenge inspections is particularly gratifying.

Looking ahead, it seems to me that these developments are encouraging signs for the pursuit of negotiations. I share the assessment of the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Committee, Ambassador Ekeus, at the end of the summer session that "the convention is no longer a distant goal, but a real possibility".

None the less, it is the last straw that can break the camel's back, and I am convinced that it is not only straws that we will have to carry on the slippery road leading to the convention. I mention only the unresolved problems in the area of control of the civil chemical industry, the régime for the destruction of chemical-weapons stocks and various institutional issues.

A major concern that we shall have to address in the period ahead is the exchange of data before the signing of the convention. Timely exchange of information on size and composition of existing chemical-weapons stocks and on the

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size of the production of chemical weapons, as well as information on the actual production and use of chemical-weapons key precursors by the civil industry, would be very useful, if not essential. Such information will not only serve as a confidence-building measure encouraging States parties to accede to the convention, but also help us in filling out the details of the draft convention and making its provisions more realistic.

(Mr. van Ychaik, Netherlands)

Speaking about confidence-building measures, I should like to take **this** opportunity to extend my **Government's** very sincere appreciation and that of my **delegation** to **the** authorities of the **Soviet** Union for **their** hospitality during **our** **recent** stay in **Moscow** and **Shikhany**. We also compliment them on the very effective organization of the visit. We **consider** this visit **an** important first **step**, a confidence-building measure, which it is hoped will lead to a follow-up in the **sense** I have just indicated. **We also** look forward to further **discussions** on the information supplied - if possible in written form - in the Conference on Disarmament **in** Geneva. Western countries have taken similar steps in the past **and** will continue to do so. We hope that the results of the coming Soviet visits to the **ohsmiosl** weapons facilities at **Tooele**, Utah, and future bilateral **visits** to **facilities** in other countries will also be brought back to the Conference.

Chemical weapons, **as** I have said, are actually used. **I** add that proliferation of chemical weapons is actually taking place. In those circumstances, it **is** **difficult** to remain patient. Negotiations must lead to **success**. We call upon all **countries** to demonstrate courage and inventiveness in overcoming the remaining **serious** obstacles on the road to agreement. After the conclusion of the important **INF** negotiations, chemical weapons negotiations **should** get the priority they **deserve**.

**INF** and chemical weapons are illustrations of an **as** yet only faintly discernible trend in disarmament talks towards efforts to bring about the complete elimination of whole categories of weapons. The Convention on biological **weapons** will, we hope, prove to be a forerunner **in** **this** respect.

The **1986** Review Conference of the parties to the biological weapons Convention **and** the meeting of scientific and technical experts in early April of this year **showed** that in the field of verification the **régime** under the treaty can be



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strengthened by introducing meaningful confidence-building measures. Exchange of information on research, for instance, may help to instil confidence that the development of new types of weapons is unlikely.

The Government of the Netherlands attaches great importance to progress in the field of conventional-arms control. In Europe, where the memory of the devastations of the Second World War is still vivid, time has not in fact healed the wounds inflicted by the massive use of conventional weapons. Conventional-arms control and balanced cuts in conventional armaments go to the heart of the peoples in Europe. In fact, in Europe, the continent with the largest concentration of arms and forces in the world, conventional-arms control has, with the prospect of substantial reductions in nuclear weapons, become more urgent than ever before. Imbalances that threaten stability and security should be eliminated, while cuts are made in the levels of conventional forces.

Against that background, the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance have put forward a proposal for a mandate for negotiations with the aim of establishing a stable conventional balance at lower levels in the area from the Atlantic Ocean to the Urals. In those negotiations we seek, inter alia, to eliminate the capability for launching surprise attacks and initiating large-scale offensive action. In parallel, we want to build upon and expand on the Stockholm agreement on confidence- and security-building measures.

Emphasis on conventional weapons should, of course, in no way be limited to Europe. Eighty per cent of all world military expenditure goes on conventional weapons. Expenditure rises fastest in the developing world, in countries where poverty is greatest. In the course of the last two decades military expenditure in the third world has grown annually by 10 per cent as compared to an annual world growth of 3 per cent.

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

We appreciate **statements** made in the Committee that **testify** to a growing **recognition** of the urgency of the problem. **Conventional** weapons **are not** conventional, in the **sense** of **customary**, in their impact. Their capacity to **kill**, **inflict** wounds and **destroy** has far **surpassed** the already dramatic and horrendous proportions **of the past**; 25 million people are estimated to have been killed by conventional **arms since** 1945.

Favourable conditions **should** be created for regional or subregional agreements on the reduction of armaments. Confidence-building measures, **such** as rapid Communication **systems**, should go hand in hand with agreements to bring down the **levels** of **armaments**. In short, more **openness** and effectively verifiable arms-control **treaties** are needed, also in the third world.

We noted from the report **of** the Secretary-General (A/42/611) that in **his** letter to **the** Secretary-General the Chairman of the Board of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) **expressed** the wish of some members of the Board that the former Director of UNIDIR should as soon **as possible** be enabled to be **present** to **assist** the Secretary-General in the requisite transfer of **powers** to the new Director of the Institute before the next **session** of the Board. We strongly support the view that Mr. Bota should be enabled to report in person to the Secretary-General.

In **his** opening **speech** to the Conference on the Relationship between Disarmament and Development, the Secretary-General expressed the hope that the Conference would clarify the issue of the relationship between disarmament and development. The Conference, in fact, **succeeded** in reaching a **consensus** on a **Final Document** in which the interrelationship of disarmament and development has been spelt out. It **is** the concept of security in the **broadest** sense that should **guide** the international community in parallel **efforts** to promote disarmament and development.

(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)

Apart from the broad policy function fulfilled by the First Committee, the world community fortunately has at its disposal two organs uniquely dealing with disarmament matters: the Disarmament Commission and the Conference on Disarmament. The Disarmament Commission should serve as a forum in which the deliberations would help to shape future orientations. The Conference on Disarmament, necessarily a more restricted forum, is - as it is rightly called - the single multilateral negotiating body.

As is recognized in the Final Act of the first special session on disarmament, the machinery of the Disarmament Commission is an indispensable tool. It can and should foster the disarmament process in a global dialogue by conceptualizing problems, by mobilizing public opinion, by adopting recommendations and, last, but most essential, by the preparation of global treaties.

However, whatever its usefulness, many people doubt whether the machinery has worked sufficiently well so far. As in other parts of the United Nations system, the time has come for streamlining, for considering possibilities of increasing the efficiency of the organs and their procedures, for steering a course leading to less repetition and more concentration on the real issues.

**(Mr. van Schaik, Netherlands)**

My delegation hopes that the Disarmament **Commission**, which has on its agenda **the consideration** of that very United Nations **disarmament** machinery, will succeed **in advising on** the appropriate mode for achieving greater efficiency. Allow me in **this** context also to underline the policy-oriented contributions that UNIDIR **can** make on ways to raise the standard of United **Nations** disarmament endeavours.

The forthcoming third special **session** of the General Assembly devoted to **disarmament** will provide us with a major opportunity to take stock of disarmament efforts. That session will also have the very important task of building and strengthening support by Governments and public opinion for the cause of arms **control** and the reduction of armaments. We also hope that that session will give **US guidance on ways to make our** deliberations **more** effective and directed **at areas** where there is potential for substantive **progress**, preferably in **the form** of **arms-control** agreements **or** at least substantive **recommendations**.

Such a task **can** be accomplished only when it is tackled in a **businesslike** and orderly **way**, without propaganda and **rhetoric**. In that spirit, the Netherlands intends to **make** a pragmatic and **constructive** contribution to the special session.

Politics **is** the art of the possible in **an** arena **of** conflicting interests. The **possible** will never coincide with the ideal. But, **as** has been said:

“This **Organization** [the United Nations] **is** created to prevent you from going to hell. It **isn't** created to take you to heaven.”

Mr. ADAM (Sudan) (interpretation from Arabic): We should like to **congratulate you**, Sir, on your election as Chairman of this **important** Committee dealing **with** issues **of** disarmament and security. **Your** positive contribution in **this** connection is well known to all. We also congratulate the other officers of the Committee on the trust placed in them. We should also like to congratulate Mr. Akadhi on the assumption of his new high post and wish him every **buccaaa**.

(Mr. Adam, Sudan)

We shall always remember 1997 as the year in which everything seemed quite possible: there appears to be a chance for arms limitation, which was not foreseen within the framework of prevailing international circumstances and of existing serious conflicts that might undermine international co-operation on security issues; the two super-Powers have shown a new interest in negotiating to reach an important agreement; leaders in Europe have started an intensive dialogue with a view to reaching agreement on prerequisites for their countries' security; and an important State - China - has begun to demobilize 1 million of its military forces as a positive initiative.

On the other hand, in this atmosphere of the relaxation of tension, some big Powers are undertaking certain steps that could undermine existing agreements; some circles are questioning the validity of the idea of disarmament itself; third world countries are accelerating the arms race at an alarming pace; the flames of regional conflicts are raging; and the world also finds itself in a grey area as regards its security.

We are therefore faced at this session with a more complex task, and the First Committee must deal with this reality with more care and objectivity. It should also refrain from past practices that were sometimes characterized by a drive to achieve certain gain and a desire to prove the validity of narrow strategic and military doctrines and rules.

The future of international security has acquired a new dimension since the convening of the Reykjavik summit of last October. We must admit here that we have embarked upon a new path that may not be very clear; however, on 18 September that path led the Soviet Union and the United States of America to agree in principle on the elimination of their intermediate- and shorter-range nuclear weapons from Europe. Chances for concluding broader agreements seem possible. Leaders of the

(Mr. Adam, Sudan)

two countries **have exercised** patience and made **concessions** that may extend to other areas, **such as** the conducting of nuclear tests, nuclear **proliferation and incidents** on the **high seas**. We should **like here** to cite one positive **example**, that is, the agreement reached this year **at the Stockholm** Conference on Confidence- and Security-building **Measures and Disarmament** in Europe, which aims at **strengthening** trust between European **countries** and **minimizing** the chances of surprise attack.

In this short statement my delegation will not be able to deal with all the important **items** before the Committee; therefore, we hope to be able to comment on **some** of them at a later stage. **The** Sudan, a developing, non-aligned country, striving like the great majority of **countries** to halt the nuclear-arms race and to prevent **once and for all** the proliferation of nuclear **weapons, attaches** the utmost **importance** to questions of disarmament and **security**. With that in mind, we shall concentrate on the following issues.

The **cessation** of **all** nuclear-test **explosions is, in our view**, the first step towards curbing the **nuclear-arms** race and putting a stop to the production of new generations of such weapons, which **may be even more effective** and lethal. **Despite** the fact that the General Assembly has been discussing **this** item since its ninth session, we **have** not yet elaborated a treaty **prohibiting** all nuclear-test explosions, **by all States, in all environments and for ever**. Therefore, nuclear explosions **are** taking place contrary to the wish of the overwhelming majority of Member **States**.

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the nuclear-weapon States have not yet acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty. The Conference on Disarmament has not succeeded in carrying out its mandate, because of the excuses given by some big nuclear-weapon States. While we support the view of the Group of 21 and the Conference on Disarmament, we also agree that existing means of verification are sufficient to ensure compliance. The argument that such means are not yet available cannot be used as an excuse to continue to improve nuclear weapons and produce new generations of them. We do not reject the principle of developing means of verification within a reliable regime of verification and monitoring in the framework of an international agreement based on complete trust.

Immediate cessation of nuclear-weapon tests and their prohibition have become a priority need. Therefore, all countries must agree without delay to establish an international system for monitoring compliance with a moratorium, especially as one Member State applied such a moratorium for some time, on the basis of its estimate of the accelerating arms race.

Secondly, I come to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and denuclearized zones. Although an effective international convention to ensure the security of non-nuclear weapon States against the threat or the use of such weapons has not yet been concluded, the call for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and denuclearized zones is gaining strength day by day.

We are witnessing renewed efforts by the countries of the Middle East to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in the region, especially since Israel alone possesses nuclear weapons and insists on continuing development, production and testing, without acceding to the non-proliferation Treaty and without agreeing so far to subject all its nuclear activities to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system, and also without approving the establishment of a

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nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. Because of that position, we are far from achieving and strengthening peace and security in an economically and strategically important region. For all those reasons, we support the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones also in Latin America, the South Pacific, the Indian Ocean and Central Europe.

What I have just said also applies to Africa. The 1964 Cairo Declaration on the denuclearization of Africa has been supported by the General Assembly at successive sessions since 1965. At its last session the General Assembly renewed its call to all States to consider and respect the continent of Africa and its surrounding areas as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, since the implementation of the Declaration would be an important measure to ensure the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and promote international peace and security.

At that session it also expressed grave concern about South Africa's possession of a nuclear-weapon capability and its continuation of the development of such a capability. It condemned South Africa in that respect and also condemned all forms of nuclear co-operation with that racist régime by any State, corporation, institution or individual. However, countries with the technical means refuse to help the international community to expose that activity and do not provide any official information on the research carried out by South Africa. Racist South Africa does not subject its nuclear facilities to inspection by the IAEA. We face a clear threat to international peace and security, with a serious escalation of the threat and blackmail practised by that racist State against all the peoples of Africa. We should treat with all seriousness the conclusions reached by the report of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research on South Africa's nuclear capability. The Security Council is still duty-bound to



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plug the **present** hole in the arms embargo against South **Africa**, in order to make the embargo more **effective** in all areas, including co-operation with North Africa in the nuclear **field**.

I turn now to biological and chemical weapons. The **international** community **is** **still** closely following the negotiations at the **Conference** on Disarmament on the **conclusion** of a multilateral convention on the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. Despite the **progress** achieved last year, the convention has not been elaborated, although it **is** imminent.

There are other important **issues** - including **confidence-building** measures, security and conventional disarmament, prevention of an **arms** race in outer space, the naval arms race, the relationship between disarmament and development - on which my delegation would like to present its **views** at a later **stage**. However, we **should** like now to express our view on the role played by the United **Nations** and its **subsidiary bodies** in the field of disarmament. In his report on the work of the Organization, issued on 9 September **this** year, the **Secretary-General** says:

"The Charter of the **United Nations** defines the principles to be followed in gaining peace in the fullest meaning of what true peace entails. 'These principles have lost none of their **relevance** or validity. What has too often been lacking is the readiness of Member States to put aside national differences and national ambitions and **work** together within the United **Nations** in accordance with these principles towards common **goals**.'" (A/42/1, p.17)

The Disarmament **Commission's** report this year **has** emphasized that the main objective of the United Nations **is** to **safeguard** international peace and **security**. It **refers** explicitly to the fact that true and **lasting** peace can be achieved only

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through the ● effective **implementation of** the security system provided for in the Charter. **It also emphasises** the important role played by multilateral agreements in connection with **disarmament measures to safeguard international peace and security**, and **pays** due attention to **the effectiveness** of the **key role** played by the Security Council in **that regard**.

Although **we appreciate all the efforts at** the bilateral and regional levels in the field **of** conventional and **nuclear** disarmament, we **consider** it important that **such efforts** complement **those made** by the **international** community and **its** negotiating and **deliberative bodies**, so that the **Organization** may not **be** deprived of its **most** sacred duty, provided for by the Charter, **especially** when **those negotiations are related** to the wider **objectives** and interests of other **countries** and of the international community in general.

We do not want our **Organization** to be turned into a forum for **rhetorical** speeches and a **safety valve** for the majority of **its** Members, **which** have no say, in present circumstances, in many **of** the important international issues.

The meeting rose at 12.20 p.m.