


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**GENERAL  
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FIRST COMMITTEE  
34th meeting  
held on  
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at 10.30 a.m.  
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 34TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. GBEHO (Ghana)

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The meeting was called to order at 11.a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 39 TO 57, 133, 136, 138 AND 139 (continued)

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will now continue its consideration of and action upon draft resolutions under all disarmament items. Before we do so, however, I should like to call upon the Secretary of the Committee to make an announcement.

Mr. RATHORE (Secretary of the Committee): I should like to announce that the following countries have become additional sponsors of the following draft resolutions: A/C.1/37/L.1, Liberia and Mali; A/C.1/37/L.2, Liberia and Ecuador; A/C.1/37/L.3/Rev.1, Ecuador; A/C.1/37/L.4/Rev.1, Congo; A/C.1/37/L.9, Sri Lanka and Viet Nam; A/C.1/37/L.10, Congo, Ecuador, Mali, Pakistan, Panama, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Viet Nam and Zaire; A/C.1/37/L.16, Congo; A/C.1/37/L.17, Congo, Ecuador, Kenya, Mali, Malta, Rwanda and Zaire; A/C.1/37/L.21, Mongolia; A/C.1/37/L.22, Federal Republic of Germany and Ireland; A/C.1/37/L.24, Viet Nam; A/C.1/37/L.26, Madagascar; A/C.1/37/L.27, Madagascar.

Mr. THIELICKE (German Democratic Republic): I have the honour to introduce the draft resolution on "Prohibition of the nuclear neutron weapon" contained in document A/C.1/37/L.25. This draft is also sponsored by the delegations of Afghanistan, Angola, Bulgaria, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, Grenada, Hungary, Jordan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Romania, Sao Tome and Principe, Syrian Arab Republic, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Viet Nam and Zimbabwe.

(Mr. Diehlicke, German  
Democratic Republic)

Implementing the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament requires above all reaching concrete and substantial international agreements in the field of nuclear weapons.

The agreed prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons would constitute an important step in this direction.

At the thirty-sixth session, the General Assembly, in resolution 36/92 K of 9 December 1981, requested the Committee on Disarmament to start negotiations on the conclusion of a relevant convention. For reasons which I need not explain in detail, such negotiations did not materialize. Therefore, it seems necessary for the General Assembly to reaffirm this demand at its thirty-seventh session.

My delegation made a statement on the nature and background of this matter on 27 October. May I, therefore, confine my remarks to the following: the first and second preambular paragraphs recall paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, wherein all participants unanimously oppose the qualitative improvement and development of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Thielicke, German Democratic Republic)

The start of production of nuclear neutron weapons is in direct contradiction to this demand. That it is indeed a further development in qualitative terms has been observed, for example, by The New York Times. That paper has written that

"The enhanced radiation warhead or neutron bomb, which is designed to kill personnel on the battlefield with radiation while minimizing the blast effects, is cited by officials as a 'crude forerunner' of a third-generation weapon". (The New York Times, 29 October 1982, p. A19)

Many scientists regard the nuclear neutron weapon as the first type of a new third generation of nuclear weapons, which is characterized by such special features as enhanced radiation in the case of the neutron weapon, and enhanced blast effects and so on in the case of other weapons. The introduction of the nuclear neutron weapon into arsenals will be followed by the creation of other new types of such so-called specialized nuclear weapons. The consequences of such a course of action cannot yet be foreseen. One thing is clear however: if not stopped in time, it will lead to a new round in the nuclear arms race.

Thus to seek a special agreement on the prohibition of nuclear neutron weapons is not only legitimate, but absolutely imperative. In this connection, the danger arising from the further development and proliferation of this weapon should not be overlooked, nor should one overlook the fact that the South African racist régime, for instance, is already capable of producing suitable means of delivery. The representative of the People's Republic of Angola stressed that fact in his statement to this Committee on 28 October.

The fourth preambular paragraph refers to the deep concern of many States, non-governmental organizations and peace movements about the production of nuclear neutron weapons and the intention of deploying them in other countries.

In this connection, I should like to refer to the 69th Annual Conference of the Inter-Parliamentary Union which was held in Rome a few months ago. This Conference, too, which included parliamentarians from the United States and other Western countries -- advocated urgent measures to **prohibit** nuclear neutron weapons.

(Mr. Thielicke, German  
Democratic Republic)

Operative paragraph 1 requests the Committee on Disarmament to initiate negotiations immediately with the aim of drafting a convention on the prohibition of the development, production, stockpiling deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. The draft resolution does not set up a framework for such negotiations, but leaves it to the Committee to make the appropriate arrangements.

The draft resolution does not condemn any party, but proceeds from the expectation that it will be in the best interests of all States and peoples to ban nuclear neutron weapons.

We therefore hope that the draft resolution will win the support of this Committee. I should like to take this opportunity to thank all those delegations which have co-operated with us in a constructive manner in the preparation of this draft resolution.

Mr. MARINESCU (Romania) (interpretation from French): In an earlier statement we spoke more fully about the concern aroused by the staggering growth of military expenses and the complex and extremely adverse political economic and social effects of this phenomenon.

It is Romania's firm and unswerving conviction that in the overall efforts aimed at the adoption of true measures for disarmament - first and foremost nuclear disarmament - agreed adoption of measures for a freeze and reduction of military budgets would help to curb the arms race, strengthen confidence among States and create a propitious climate for genuine disarmament negotiations.

We wish to emphasize strongly the urgent need now to act on the conclusions which has emerged from the General Assembly's debates on this topic over the years, from the resolutions which have been adopted, and from the studies carried out by the Organization: namely, that the reduction of military expenditures would have a favourable impact on the economic and social development of all States and on the world economy as a whole. Reallocation to peaceful purposes of a portion of the vast resources swallowed up by the senseless arms race would make it possible to survive the present crisis, to redress the economic situation and at the same time to support the economic and social development efforts of all States, especially the developing countries.

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

The Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament, whose validity was unanimously and categorically reaffirmed at the second special session, as well as a number of resolutions adopted by the General Assembly in recent years, have called on all States to take urgent measures with a view to arriving at international agreements on the freezing and reduction of military expenditures and the reallocation for economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries, of the funds thus saved. The development of the political and economic situation in the world confirms the validity of that appeal, while making it even more relevant and urgent.

The Romanian delegation has the honour of introducing draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.20 on behalf of the sponsors: Austria, Bangladesh, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Indonesia, Ireland, Nigeria, Peru, Rwanda, Senegal, Sudan, Sweden, Uruguay and Romania. The draft resolution responds to the need to pursue action undertaken in the United Nations to facilitate efforts to arrive at specific agreements on the reduction of military budgets, and restates a series of important ideas contained in previous resolutions on the subject adopted by consensus.

Like earlier resolutions, the draft resolution views this action from two angles.

First, given the vast scale of military expenditures, the sponsors consider that the General Assembly should reiterate its appeal addressed in three successive years to all States, in particular the most heavily armed States, pending the conclusion of agreements on the reduction of such expenditures to exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures.

Secondly, the General Assembly would request the Disarmament Commission to continue its activities aimed at identifying and elaborating the principles which should govern further actions of States in freezing and reducing military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles in a suitable document at an appropriate stage. This request to the Disarmament Commission to continue its efforts in this area at its 1983 session is of particular importance, for the adoption of such principles would help to harmonize the position of States and enhance the confidence which is needed to reach agreements on the reduction of military budgets.

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

In its preambular part, the draft resolution expresses the concern of Member States about the spiralling arms race and growing military expenditures, and emphasizes that a new impetus should be given to endeavours to achieve agreements to freeze or reduce in a balanced manner military expenditures, including adequate measures of verification satisfactory to all parties concerned.

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

It also reaffirms the provisions of the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament and of the Declaration on the Second Disarmament Decade, which include among the priority objectives the adoption of specific measures for the reduction of military budgets and the reallocation to economic and social development, especially for the benefit of the developing countries, of the funds thus saved.

One of the important stipulations in the preamble provides that the process of the definition and elaboration of the principles which would guide the future actions of States in regard to the freezing and reduction of military budgets, as well as other activities within the purview of the United Nations related to the reduction of such budgets, should be regarded as having the fundamental objective of reaching international agreements on a reduction of military expenditures.

The operative part of the draft resolution contains a series of provisions aimed at the consolidation, bearing in mind the stage reached in the consideration of the question, of a series of basic ideas, including the conviction that it is possible to reach agreements on the reduction of military budgets without prejudice to the right of every State to undiminished security, legitimate self-defence and sovereignty. It is also reaffirmed that the human and material resources released through the reduction of military expenditures should be reallocated to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.

The following paragraphs contain provisions relating to measures to be undertaken at the next stage. Thus, paragraph 3 emphasizes the need to reinforce the endeavours of all States and international actions in the reduction of military budgets, with a view to reaching international agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain military expenditures. The next paragraph reiterates the appeal contained in a number of resolutions adopted by consensus at previous sessions of the General Assembly, urging all States, in particular the most heavily armed States, pending the conclusion of agreements on the reduction of military expenditures, to exercise self-restraint in their military expenditures, with a view to reallocating the funds thus saved to economic and social development, particularly for the

(Mr. Marinescu, Romania)

benefit of developing countries. We cannot fail to emphasize once again the particular importance of that appeal. There is no doubt that, in conditions in which military expenditures, which are both a consequence and a factor of the aggravation of the international situation, are increasing at an unprecedented rate, the appeal to self-restraint addressed to States acquires a high political significance.

In paragraph 5 the Disarmament Commission is requested in conformity with its recommendation adopted by consensus at this year's session, to continue at its next session the consideration of the background paper as well as other proposals and ideas on the subject, with a view to identifying and elaborating the principles which should govern further actions of States in freezing and reducing military expenditures, keeping in mind the possibility of embodying such principles in a suitable document at an appropriate stage.

The Disarmament Commission is also requested to consider at its next substantive session other proposals and ideas as well as recommendations submitted by Member States for reducing military budgets.

The last paragraph provides for the inclusion on the provisional agenda of the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly of the item entitled "Reduction of military budgets".

As will be noted, the sponsoring delegations have sought to include in the document non-controversial ideas and provisions, such as are included in the resolutions adopted by consensus at previous sessions. Thus we seek to contribute to taking a step forward towards the reduction of military budgets and we express the hope that the Disarmament Commission at its next session will make marked progress in carrying out the task entrusted to it.

In conclusion, the Romanian delegation wishes to thank all those delegations which participated in the preparation of the draft resolution and particularly the sponsoring delegations. The broad consultations we held on the text of the draft, as well as the non-controversial nature of its provisions, lead us to hope that it will be adopted by consensus.

Mr. LIDGARD (Sweden): I am introducing draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.22, on the reduction of military budgets, on behalf of the sponsors, which are Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium, Canada, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Finland, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Mexico, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Romania, Rwanda, Sudan, Uruguay and my own country.

The item "Reduction of military budgets" has been on the agenda of this Committee for quite some time. Some progress has been made in this field over the years. One example of this was the adoption in 1980 by the General Assembly of a carefully elaborated system for international reporting of military expenditures.

It is true that not very many States have yet complied with the recommendations of the Assembly to participate in the reporting. It must, however, be realized that the system is still at its first stage of implementation and that the number of participating States will, it is hoped, grow in the years to come.

It is, of course, highly desirable to achieve active and growing participation on the part of States of all geographic regions and with differing economic and budgeting systems. Apart from the important confidence-building impact such a development would have, it would also serve the purpose of enabling a further refinement of the reporting system.

It is my Government's firm opinion that participating States would not be well advised to discontinue their reporting because of the fact that certain other States have so far chosen not to participate. On the contrary, now is the time when we should consider in what way we can give a fresh impetus towards the achievement of the broadest possible participation, and this must be supported by continuous reporting by all those that have done so hitherto.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

We should not forget that the main objective of this whole reporting exercise is not to provide better statistics with regard to military expenditures but to promote international agreements to freeze, reduce or otherwise restrain such expenditures. If and when Member States, and in particular the most heavily armed States, decide to try seriously to negotiate such agreements, they would need to know what the military expenditures are, how they could be defined and reported in the framework of such an agreement. The existing reporting instrument as adopted by the General Assembly could in this context provide a valuable basis for the negotiations. It is, therefore, important to preserve the reporting system and to improve it further by a continuous and possibly growing participation.

No doubt, future negotiations will also have to deal with the problems of comparing and verifying military expenditures. Any agreement lasting more than one year will have to take into account that national rates of inflation may be very different, and each negotiating party will of course require sufficient assurance that the other party or parties does or do comply with the stipulations of the agreement.

For that purpose the Secretary-General was requested by the General Assembly in 1980 to study those problems with the assistance of an ad hoc group of qualified experts. That group's report was presented to the General Assembly at its second special session devoted to disarmament earlier this year in document A/S-12/7.

The report contains an in-depth analysis of different means and methods of comparing and verifying military expenditures as well as some interesting conclusions and a number of specific recommendations. The group has inter alia concluded that price changes within the State's military sector may be quite different from those in other sectors and that prevailing exchange rates may badly reflect the purchasing power of different currencies with regard to each State's military sector. Because of this there is a need, for comparison purposes, to construct military price deflators and military purchasing power parities. Since several procedures for the construction of such devices may be used, a common understanding would be needed among participating or negotiating parties. Given such understanding, however, it should be possible to resolve the technical problems in a way satisfactory to all parties.

(Mr. Lidgard, Sweden)

That statement by a group of experts that could be expected not to overlook but rather to stress the technical problems is to my mind most encouraging. The message is clear. If Governments are prepared to start negotiations on the basis of a firm political determination to arrive at agreements, then experts will be able to provide the satisfactory technical means necessary for the successful conclusion of such agreements.

The group has further concluded that the successful demonstration of the feasibility of constructing military price indexes and purchasing power parities for different States would contribute much to preparing the ground for future negotiations on the reduction of military expenditures.

On the conclusion of the study by this group of experts it seems now to be a logical step that the General Assembly should invite Member States to participate in a practical exercise as suggested both in the report by the experts and in the draft resolution that I have now introduced.

Mr. SUJA (Czechoslovakia): On behalf of the group of sponsors, namely, the delegations of Afghanistan, Angola, Benin, Congo, Cuba, Democratic Yemen, Ethiopia, the German Democratic Republic, Grenada, Guinea, Hungary, Indonesia, Jordan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Mongolia, Mozambique, Poland, Syrian Arab Republic, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Viet Nam, Yemen and Czechoslovakia, I have the honour today to introduce a draft resolution relating to the question of international co-operation for disarmament. This draft resolution is contained in document A/C.1/37/L.19, submitted under agenda item 50.

The main purpose of that draft resolution is to contribute to invigorating constructive co-operation among States aimed at implementing the objectives of disarmament. Special emphasis in that respect is given to the objectives specified by the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament in 1978 and reaffirmed again this year by the second special session on disarmament. And precisely because the main purpose of that draft is to facilitate the implementation of the recommendations and decisions unanimously adopted at the 1978 session, the text of the draft follows closely the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament. Furthermore, it is designed to facilitate the implementation of the tasks on which the international community may agree in the future.

(Mr. Suja, Czechoslovakia)

The draft proceeds from the conviction that mutual constructive, fruitful and creative co-operation among States based on the principles of equality and undiminished security and non-use of force in international relations, while at the same time States refrain from developing new directions and channels of the arms race, is essential for achieving progress in the field of disarmament as a whole, as well as in each specific disarmament negotiation. We are firmly convinced that co-operation based on those principles should lead to the achievement of a constructive solution of the problems under discussion and would find practical expression in the adoption of specific and generally acceptable disarmament agreements.

In the view of sponsors, the problem of effective international co-operation for disarmament is now becoming more timely than ever before. It is generally known, as the majority of speakers in the general debate in our Committee pointed out, that the situation in disarmament negotiations has been considerably complicated. However, we proceed from the premise that it is possible to overcome the existing difficulties and to reach effective disarmament measures, agreements and treaties, provided there is sincere co-operation based on the political good will of all States parties to the negotiations. It is precisely the endeavour to mobilize this political good will that constitutes the central idea of this draft resolution.

The content of the draft resolution itself is based entirely on the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament adopted on the basis of a proposal by Czechoslovakia and a number of other States in 1979.

(Mr. Suja, Czechoslovakia)

It furthermore proceeds from resolution 36/92 D adopted on this issue by last year's decision of the General Assembly which both reaffirmed the unchanging timeliness of the principal provisions of the Declaration and stressed their growing importance. During the consideration of the draft text of the resolution, its authors showed maximum flexibility and accepted a number of valuable views, comments and amendments by many delegations, particularly from the ranks of the non-aligned countries.

The draft contains a total of 10 preambular and six operative paragraphs. The first two paragraphs stress again the urgent need for intensified efforts aimed at implementing the recommendations and decisions adopted at the first special session devoted to disarmament as contained in the Final Document of that session and confirmed by the second special session on disarmament. In that context, the draft underlines the importance of the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament and of resolution 36/92 D.

The following two preambular paragraphs express deep concern about the danger of a nuclear war and the continued arms race reaching qualitatively new levels, "which have extraordinarily negative impact on the international situation". They also stress:

"... the vital importance of eliminating the danger of a nuclear war, halting the nuclear arms race and attaining disarmament, particularly in the nuclear field, for the preservation of peace and the strengthening of international security".

The next three preambular paragraphs point out the vital interest of all nations in the attainment of effective disarmament measures because, apart from significantly strengthening international peace and security, they would also release considerable financial and material resources to be used for the economic and social development of all States, in particular developing countries. They refer to the importance of the growing peace and anti-nuclear movement throughout the world and to the need to strengthen constructive international co-operation based on the political good will of States for successful negotiations on disarmament in accordance with the Final Document of the first special session devoted to disarmament.

(Mr. Suja, Czechoslovakia)

The last three paragraphs of the preambular part of the draft resolution emphasize the duty of the States to co-operate mutually for the preservation of international peace and security in accordance with the Charter as is confirmed in the Declaration of the Principles of Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States of 24 October 1970. They furthermore express the conviction that concrete manifestations of political goodwill, including unilateral measures such as an obligation not to make first use of nuclear weapons, improve conditions for resolving disarmament issues in the spirit of co-operation among States. Finally, they draw attention to the central role and primary responsibility of the United Nations in developing active co-operation among States aimed at the solution of disarmament problems.

The first operative paragraph of the draft resolution calls upon all States, in implementing the Final Document of the first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to make active use of the principles and ideas contained in the Declaration on International Co-operation for Disarmament and, in actively participating in disarmament negotiations, to strive for the achievement of concrete results and to conduct such negotiations on the basis of equality and undiminished security, proceeding from the principle of the non-use of force in international relations, and refraining from developing new directions and channels of the arms race.

The second operative paragraph stresses the fact that the elaboration and dissemination of any doctrines and concepts justifying the unleashing of nuclear war endanger world peace and lead to the deterioration of the international situation and the further intensification of the arms race, all of which in its totality runs counter to the generally recognized principle of international co-operation for disarmament.

The third operative paragraph declares that the use of force in international relations as well as attempts to prevent the full implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples are incompatible with the ideas of international co-operation for disarmament. Such a declaration seems to be an adequate reflection of the deep concern in the international community over the growing tension in relations among States resulting from the use of force in a context which, on the other hand, makes joint efforts for disarmament substantially more difficult.

(Mr. Suja, Czechoslovakia)

The fourth operative paragraph appeals to States members of military-political groupings to promote, in the spirit of international co-operation for disarmament, gradual mutual limitation of military activities of those groupings, thus creating conditions for their dissolution.

The fifth operative paragraph calls upon States to cultivate and disseminate, particularly in connection with the World Disarmament Campaign, the ideas of international co-operation for disarmament, inter alia through their educational systems, mass media and cultural policies.

The last operative paragraph of the draft resolution calls upon the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization to continue mobilizing world public opinion on behalf of disarmament and, in that context, to consider measures aimed at strengthening the ideas of international co-operation for disarmament through research, education, information, communication and culture.

The Czechoslovak delegation, together with the other sponsors of the draft resolution, believe firmly that today the highly topical idea of resuming and strengthening fruitful international co-operation for the attainment of the deeply humane objectives of preventing nuclear war, halting the arms race, reaching concrete results in disarmament negotiations and thus strengthening international security, will find a positive response and that this draft resolution will be adopted by our Committee with the broadest support of the member States.

Mr. VRAALSEN (Norway): I take pleasure in introducing a draft resolution on the future status of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR), as circulated in document A/C.1/37/L.23.

Based on a proposal by the Government of France during the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and pursuant to General Assembly resolution 34/83 M of 11 December 1979, the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research was set up within the framework of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), as an interim arrangement, for the period until the second special session devoted to disarmament. Against this background, Norway proposed during the second special session that UNIDIR should be an autonomous institute, with headquarters in Geneva. The draft resolution, L.23, is a follow-up of the Norwegian proposal put forward during the second special session in document A/S-12/AC.1/32.

Upon adoption of resolution 34/83 M, UNIDIR was established in October 1980 as an institute within the framework of UNITAR. The work done by the Institute during its two years of existence represents a significant strengthening of the research activities of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

In order to illustrate the broad range of activities of UNIDIR I shall point to some of the projects which have been initiated. Within the framework of a research project entitled "Security of States and lowering the level of armaments", nine studies have been completed. A comparative analysis of multilateral negotiations on global issues has been carried out. The Institute has published a study on "Risks of Unintentional Nuclear War" and a repertory of current disarmament research. Prior to the second special session UNIDIR organized in Geneva a conference of directors of research institutes on disarmament with wide international participation.

The development of the Institute and the results so far obtained indicate the timeliness of making UNIDIR a permanent autonomous institution. Such a status would enable UNIDIR to co-operate more closely with research institutes, particularly in the developing countries. An independent institute can also better serve the various United Nations organs.

(Mr. Vraalsen, Norway)

The change of status of UNIDIR is referred to in the draft resolution's operative paragraph 3. In this paragraph it is also stated that the headquarters of UNIDIR should continue to be in Geneva, and that the Institute should work in close relationship with the United Nations Centre for Disarmament. The Institute is to undertake independent research on disarmament and related security issues.

It is further proposed that the Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies shall function as the board of trustees of UNIDIR. In operative paragraph 6 the Board is requested to draft the statute of UNIDIR on the basis of the Institute's present mandate.

In accordance with the draft resolution, UNIDIR is to be funded by contributions from States, as well as by public and private contributions. The Secretary-General is requested only to give UNIDIR administrative and other support.

Finally, the Director of the Institute is invited to report to the thirty-eighth session of the General Assembly on the implementation of this resolution and the activities carried out by UNIDIR.

I hope that the draft resolution can be adopted by consensus. May I in this connection draw the Committee's attention to the fact that it is now sponsored by 41 countries from all regional groups.

Mr. O'CONNOR (Ireland): In a statement during the general debate in this Committee, the Irish delegation referred to the overriding importance of the issue of nuclear weapons for humanity's survival. On that occasion we also set out a number of steps which, if taken, would, in our view, at least help to avoid a further deterioration of the position. Prominent among those steps was a complete end to nuclear testing and a moratorium pending the negotiation of a treaty on nuclear testing. Over the years we have joined with other States in this forum in calling for a test ban. Today we wish to underline yet again the importance for our delegation of this issue, which arises under three items on our agenda.

(Mr. O'Connor, Ireland)

Two decades ago, when the partial test-ban Treaty of 1963 was agreed, we felt that at last something was beginning to be done to deal with the nuclear threat. We can be grateful, perhaps, to some extent, that tests in the atmosphere were stopped by the nuclear Powers which were parties to that agreement. However, the position remains that far more tests have been carried out since 1963 than had been carried out before that date, notwithstanding the existence of the Treaty and its provision committing the signatories to negotiate a comprehensive test ban. Further commitments were entered into by the same nuclear-weapon States in article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968. In our view, the Non-Proliferation Treaty has made a valuable contribution to the efforts of the international community to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. We are, however, rapidly approaching the stage where nuclear weapons capability is no longer the preserve of a few countries, and we can say that, at this stage, the non-proliferation of these weapons rests only on the sustained political will of States. In this context, my delegation wishes to congratulate Uganda on its recent announcement of its intention to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Agreement now by the existing nuclear-weapon Powers to end testing would show that they, too, are willing to accept restraints, and would give encouragement to those of us who want to see a Non-Proliferation Treaty accepted and implemented by all.

We have watched the efforts of the Committee on Disarmament over the years to come to grips with the issue of a comprehensive test ban treaty. This year, the Committee succeeded in establishing a Working Group to deal with the matter. My delegation very much favours multilateral involvement in the question of a comprehensive test ban. This is more urgent in view of the unfortunate interruption in the trilateral talks, but it is also necessary because, logically, universal acceptance of a multilateral instrument requires truly multilateral negotiation.

We consider that during the negotiation the Committee on Disarmament should consider all initiatives put forward. Had the trilateral negotiations advanced further, and had the parties engaged in them drawn up a draft treaty for the assistance of the Committee, as happened previously in

(Mr. O'Connor, Ireland)

the case of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, matters might have been considerably expedited and the work burden of the Committee lessened. We note now, however, that one of the parties to the trilateral negotiations has presented a draft treaty to the General Assembly, to be forwarded to the Committee, and we have also noted that another member of the Committee on Disarmament has announced its intention of submitting the text of a draft treaty to the Committee in the new year. We hope that these initiatives and any others which come forward will be considered by the Committee during its 1983 session.

(Mr. O'Connor, Ireland)

During the last session of the Committee on Disarmament, the Working Group was unfortunately unable to agree on a work programme. However, the discussion in the Group drew attention to certain approaches with which we concur - in particular, the need for a truly international verification system in any eventual treaty. We believe that multilateral disarmament agreements must be truly non-discriminatory and in our view this is only possible when implementation is international. A multilateral comprehensive test-ban treaty is no longer the concern of only a few States and it should therefore have universal application and credibility.

Another lesson we should draw from the deliberations at Geneva is the ongoing nature of the work on the modalities of verification - in particular, the question of seismic monitoring. We would envisage this exercise continuing after the conclusion of a treaty. We would share the view expressed by the Chairman of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to the effect that, given determination to conclude a treaty, a state-of-the-art verification mechanism could be rapidly concluded for immediate application. It is not our intention here to criticize the ongoing efforts being made to improve verification as regards atmospheric monitoring, new levels of information and proposals for moving the seismic discussion into an experimental phase. However, it is our view that, just as the International Atomic Energy Agency perfects and improves its safeguard mechanisms, similarly, in the case of a comprehensive test ban, subsequent refinement of verification mechanisms should not be precluded. After all, the very areas under discussion are undergoing rapid advance and refinement.

There are, in short, two points we would make. The first is that we should not wait until we have found an infallible verification method before we agree on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The second point is that the margin of error in verification is constantly being reduced by scientific developments

(Mr. O'Connor, Ireland)

in detection and identification, and there is no reason why, in the future, after the treaty is in force, improvements should not be made regarding verification of the treaty in the light of such developments. In the more immediate future, however, we must be prepared to seek a balanced solution.

Another question that has been raised during discussion of this matter in the Committee on Disarmament is that of so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. Ireland is of course prepared to consider the question of the peaceful application of nuclear explosions. In the context of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, however, we have always had difficulty in accepting a distinction between peaceful and non-peaceful explosions and devices. We agree that the non-proliferation régime is discriminatory in reserving to five nuclear Powers the right to possess nuclear weapons. However, we are not prepared to change this for a régime that would further extend that discrimination in favour of countries that have not accepted the safeguards and self-imposed discipline which result from adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Above all, we would not wish a comprehensive test ban to be delayed by a problem that is extraneous to its main purpose. Nor do we wish to see, following the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, a state of affairs in which nuclear-weapon capability could be developed under the guise of so-called peaceful nuclear explosions. For this reason, and in order to enhance the prospects of the speedy conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the Irish delegation to the Second NPT Review Conference proposed a moratorium on all tests to facilitate conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and we feel that recent developments confirm the need for such an arrangement.

Mr. NARIKHUU (Mongolia): My delegation has asked to speak today in order to introduce a draft resolution on Disarmament Week, contained in document A/C.1/37/L.24. I do so on behalf of the delegations of Afghanistan, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, India, Japan, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, Mozambique, Viet Nam and my own delegation.

(Mr. Narkhuu, Mongolia)

Disarmament Week, proclaimed by the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, is conceived as an effort to increase public awareness of the dangers inherent in the escalation of the arms race, to mobilize world public opinion in support of disarmament and to create an atmosphere conducive to progress in disarmament negotiations.

The General Assembly, at its thirty-third and thirty-fourth sessions, took follow-up action, including the adoption of the elements of a model programme for Disarmament Week. Most recently, the second special session on disarmament, recognizing the important role of Disarmament Week in fostering the objectives of disarmament, recommended that:

"...the week starting 24 October should continue to be widely observed as Disarmament Week."

Disarmament Week is now observed world-wide at the national and international levels. In fact, it has become a regular and established practice. This can be seen from the reports of the Secretary-General containing information about activities undertaken by Governments and international organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, as well as from the messages of the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General and statements made at the annual ceremonial meetings of the First Committee.

In submitting the draft resolution, its sponsors have borne in mind the recommendation of the second special session which emphasized the need for continued and wider observance of Disarmament Week. This draft resolution was formulated along the lines of this recommendation and the resolutions previously adopted.

I should add here that the draft resolution recognizes the important role United Nations mass information organs can play in promoting more active involvement of governmental and public organizations in Disarmament Week. It requests the Secretary-General to prepare annually, within existing resources, a compilation of information collected by the relevant departments at United Nations Headquarters as well as United Nations information centres pertaining to the holding of Disarmament Week in the preceding year.

(Mr. Harkhuu, Mongolia)

As has been done before, the draft resolution expressly invites Governments, relevant specialized agencies, the International Atomic Energy Agency and international non-governmental organizations to take an active part in Disarmament Week and to inform the Secretary-General of the activities undertaken.

These are the main points which my delegation, on behalf of the sponsors, wishes to make in introducing the draft resolution on Disarmament Week.

I take this opportunity to announce that the Government of Mongolia pledges to contribute \$1,000, payable in national currency, to the World Disarmament Campaign.

In conclusion, may I express the hope that this draft resolution will receive broad support from the members of this Committee.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Committee has before it draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.15 on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons, and the Soviet delegation would like to make some comments on the issue of the prohibition of chemical weapons in general and on this draft resolution in particular, especially since consultations are still under way between interested delegations on preparing another draft on this very issue.

Draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.15 is intended to intensify the efforts of States to prohibit and destroy chemical weapons, one of the most urgent tasks in disarmament today. We would note that the draft contains useful provisions such as confirmation of the need to elaborate as swiftly as possible and conclude an appropriate international convention, and also an appeal to all States to do all they can to promote this.

For many years now the Soviet Union has consistently advocated a comprehensive and effective prohibition of chemical weapons. Frequently we have made specific proposals. At the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament the Soviet Union proposed draft basic provisions of a convention prohibiting the development, production

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction thereof, and that set forth in a very concise way our position on the substance of this issue. We consider that the future convention should make it binding on every State party never under any circumstances whatever to develop, produce or acquire in any other way, or to stockpile, keep or transfer chemical weapons. This prohibition would extend also to chemicals and their precursors and the special warheads and devices, and also the equipment which is specially designed to be used directly in connection with the use of such warheads or devices.

We attach particular importance to the future convention's prohibitions, along with the traditional poisons and warheads, binary or multi-component chemical weapons as well. The point is that the binary form of chemical weapons, made possible thanks to the latest achievements in science and technology, not only creates the danger of a qualitatively new stage in the chemical arms race, but also creates great difficulties, hampering monitoring of the prohibition of chemical weapons and makes significantly more difficult the so-called problem of secret stocks and secret production of chemical weapons.

It is important that now, while talks are under way on prohibiting chemical weapons, States should refrain from the development and production of new kinds of chemical weapons, particularly binary ones. We support the provision relating to this point in draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.15.

As well as the prohibition on transferring chemical weapons to anybody at all, we believe that the future convention should make it binding on States not to place chemical weapons in the territory of other countries, and to remove such weapons from the territory of foreign States if such weapons were placed there earlier.

In order to lessen the likelihood of States non-parties to the convention developing such chemical weapons, we would also propose that there be a prohibition of the transfer to such States of a number of categories of chemicals.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

As for the use of chemical weapons, we proceed from the premise that it has been prohibited once and for all in the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and there is no need at all to duplicate the prohibition in the convention now being elaborated.

The Soviet draft basic provisions for the convention envisaged a whole series of measures designed to eliminate the military chemical potential of States parties. These include the destruction or conversion to permitted purposes, in a given time period, of all stocks of chemical weapons and also the destruction or dismantling of the facilities for producing them. In prohibiting chemical weapons, the future convention, we believe, should also promote the establishment of favourable conditions for the economic and technical development of the parties to it, and international co-operation in the area of peaceful chemical activities. We should exclude the possibility of interference in areas which are not related to the purposes of the convention. States parties should be entitled to keep and to use for permitted purposes any toxic chemicals and precursors in such forms and quantities as are required for those permitted purposes. Special limitations should be introduced here in respect of the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals, that is, such substances as would create particular dangers from the viewpoint of their possible conversion to military purposes.

The Soviet Union attaches great importance to ensuring mutual trust among all States parties to the future convention in respect of complying with the provisions. This would be promoted by declarations and notifications which would be made by States parties in accordance with the convention. Immediately after the entry into force of the convention, every State party would be obliged to report or declare whether it has chemical weapons, the quantity of the stocks of such weapons and its production capacity, the quantity of such weapons transferred to anyone, and to whom, and the technological equipment for production and the technical documentation relating thereto, and it would also have to report the presence or absence on its territory of stocks of chemical weapons and the relevant facilities controlled by other States or persons.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

This information on the military chemical potential of States would have to be submitted no later than 30 days after the entry into force of the convention for that State. It would be necessary to submit the relevant information relating to the preparation for the process of destroying the military chemical potential and report on the actual destruction thereof. Here we refer to plans for the destruction or conversion to permitted purposes of these stocks of chemical weapons, plans for destroying and dismantling the facilities for the production of chemical weapons and also regular notification on how these plans are being implemented.

Another point of great significance would be the submission of data on the permitted production of various chemicals which could be dangerous from the viewpoint of possible conversion to unlawful use. The implementation of these measures would enable all States parties to have a sufficiently detailed picture as to how the convention is being implemented.

We would also like to emphasize that these declarations and notifications would take place in close link with monitoring measures. We advocate strict effective monitoring to prohibit chemical weapons, but this would not be monitoring only for the purpose of monitoring. Such monitoring would ensure that States are certain that the convention is being complied with, at the same time would prevent any suspicion from arising, and would not lead to any exacerbation or worsening of relations between States.

In the view of the Soviet Union, effective implementation of the convention would be ensured using national and international monitoring methods and they would both be used in a balanced manner, in a way that would not place undue emphasis on one or the other form of verification.

The Soviet draft basic provisions of the convention provide for the possibility of establishing in States national monitoring organizations and the use of national technical means for monitoring, and also the submission of the information obtained by these means to those parties that do not have such means available to them.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In our view, international procedures would include provisions on holding consultations and on co-operation, and also for the establishment of a consultative committee of States parties. That committee, which would be convened as necessary, and also on the request of any party during a period of 30 days following receipt of such request, would include among its tasks ensuring full implementation of international consultations and co-operation, exchange of information, and encouragement of verification.

We propose that the possibility be considered of holding on-site verifications on a voluntary basis or, as is often said, on request, or on challenge in the event of suspicions regarding violation of the convention. Verification could also be carried out on a regular basis to monitor the destruction of the stocks of chemical weapons and the production of super-toxic lethal chemicals for permitted purposes.

The Soviet draft basic provisions of the convention on the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons aroused interest on the part of many States during the special session and also at meetings of the Committee on Disarmament during the summer of 1982. The discussion that has already taken place on this proposal by the Soviet Union shows that it opens up fairly good prospects for progress in the negotiations.

The Soviet delegation would express its appreciation to those representatives, also here in the First Committee, who have responded in this spirit to the Soviet proposals to prohibit chemical weapons. Of considerable importance toward intensifying efforts to prohibit chemical weapons would be agreement reached in the Committee on Disarmament on extending the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group on this issue. Under the able Chairmanship of the Chairman of the group, the representative of the Polish People's Republic, Comrade Sujka, it was possible to start concrete negotiations on a broad range of aspects of this problem. The work done in the various contact groups set up on the initiative of Comrade Sujka, and the document prepared by him as Chairman, will undoubtedly serve as a good basis for future negotiations.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

At the same time we cannot be fully satisfied with the state of affairs regarding talks in the Committee on Disarmament on prohibiting chemical weapons. Despite the intensiveness of the work done, the actual output of agreed provisions of a future convention is still minimal. There are some people who just keep trying to take up the already limited time available to the Committee with endless debate on all sorts of scientific or technical issues, and simply will not allow the Committee to discharge its role as a forum for elaborating multilateral treaties on disarmament.

One can also be concerned by the attempts that are often made to replace reaching agreement on provisions in the convention to prohibit chemical weapons and bringing closer together the various positions with a kind of game of questions and answers that drone on like a barrel organ. This trend has recently reached such a scale that one might wonder whether the purpose is, in fact, to delay the elaboration of a convention.

The Soviet Union takes a serious approach to these talks on prohibiting chemical weapons and expects that all other States will take the same serious approach to this problem, not forgetting - and I would emphasize this point - that talks mean that there will be a process of moving the positions closer together, and this is something which has to be done on a mutual basis, not unilaterally. We also maintain that all States parties to the talks should reach agreement on a time limit for completing them. Such an agreement would undoubtedly give an incentive to the talks and stimulate them, all the more so since we should not forget that prohibiting chemical weapons is, according to the consensus documents we have all approved, a task of high priority.

We have drawn attention to the fact that draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.15 includes a number of new provisions relating to the question of chemical-weapon-free zones. As members are aware, this question was raised in the report of the Commission chaired by Mr. Palme, and we are in agreement with those who consider that it deserves serious consideration. There is still time to ban chemical weapons. There is still time before the chemical-arms race gets out of control. But time does not stand still.

(Mr. Israelyan, USSR)

Approval by the General Assembly of draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.15 would promote progress in this matter of prohibiting chemical weapons and the Soviet delegation intends to vote in favour of this draft resolution.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to remind members of the Committee that the deadline for the submission of draft resolutions under all disarmament items is Wednesday 17 November at 1 p.m.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.