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Chairman: Mr. GBEHO (Ghana)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.20 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 39 TO 57, 133, 136, 138 AND 139 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. BOLE (Fiji): Mr. Chairman, my delegation shares the belief that under your able leadership and that of the other officers of the Committee the First Committee will again be able to discharge its mandate successfully at this session.

We join other delegations in congratulating Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles of Mexico and Mrs. Alva Myrdal of Sweden, two stalwarts in our efforts for world peace, as recipients of the 1982 Nobel Peace Prize.

I begin by making the observation that nothing we say or that has been stated here was not stated during the second special session devoted to disarmament, held last June. And except for some small progress in the Committee on Disarmament, nothing significant in the field of disarmament has materialized in the last few years, including the second special session.

My delegation's statement in the general debate on disarmament in this Committee at this session will therefore be limited to specific agenda items which we wish to underscore again as constituting one of the biggest stumbling-blocks the removal of which would greatly enhance our collective efforts towards total disarmament. It is, if one wills, the litmus test-paper that gauges the political will of nuclear-weapon States, especially the two super-Powers, to abide by their commitment to the purposes and objectives of this Organization and ultimately to the future well-being of mankind. I refer to the issue of the cessation of the nuclear arms race and specifically to a nuclear-test ban within the framework of nuclear disarmament.

The discussion of the issue of the prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests spans a period of 20 years. The initiatives towards this end through the years are many and varied. Except for the 1963 partial test-ban Treaty and 1976 treaties limiting underground nuclear-weapon tests -

(Mr. Bole, Fiji)

both of which remain unratified - no significant breakthrough on negotiations in this field has been achieved. And the most disquieting aspect of this situation is the fact that the ongoing negotiations by three nuclear-weapon States on a comprehensive test-ban treaty, suspended in 1980 but on which Member States had hung their hopes and pleaded for their continuation, are now being aborted by one of the parties. Needless to say, that unilateral move is a source of great disappointment to my delegation. We believe that all Member States parties to the partial test-ban Treaty, and especially nuclear-weapon States, are bound by the commitment spelled out in the preamble to that Treaty to achieve "the discontinuation of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time" and to continue negotiations to this end. My delegation expresses the hope that political will and wise decision will prevail and lead to the resumption of the trilateral talks.

Within the framework of the Committee on Disarmament we note with satisfaction the establishment of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban. However, we note with regret that two nuclear-weapon States have decided not to participate in its work. It is a tactic, in the light of the discontinuation of the trilateral talks, that calls into question the special responsibility for nuclear disarmament that nuclear-weapon States bear to the world community at large. It would seem to my delegation that this special responsibility which we have conferred on nuclear-weapon States and which those States have willingly accepted may indeed in the last analysis mean a responsibility undertaken, not in the name of mankind as a whole but something less. It is a sober thought and one which my delegation views with alarm and concern.

But even without the full participation of all nuclear-weapon States, considerable work still remained to be done by the Ad Hoc Working Group on other issues, including the verification and compliance issues. However, as we have stated in the past and reiterated during the second special session, those two issues do not and should not constitute impediments to a comprehensive test-ban treaty nor to a moratorium on all nuclear tests as an immediate interim measure.

(Mr. Bole, Fiji)

My country attaches great importance to the question of a moratorium. It would seem patently clear from the public opinion that pervades the world today, including in the nuclear-weapon States, that any declaration of a moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests, unilateral or otherwise, by any of those States which possess nuclear weapons would be a beneficiary of much good will and support from the world's public, regardless of political affiliation or ideology. The world is waiting.

A comprehensive test-ban treaty is one to which my Government attaches the greatest importance in all our multilateral negotiations in the field of disarmament. Apart from the threat to human survival that the continuation of the present unsatisfactory situation offers, the road to annihilation is unfortunately at the cost to peoples who are far removed from the centre of tensions and who at any rate have no desire whatsoever to become a party to this human tragedy. The peoples of my region have unequivocally voiced their strongest disapproval at the use of the South Pacific as a testing ground to perfect nuclear weapons of some nuclear-weapon States. Each independent sovereign State of the South Pacific, as well as collectively through the South Pacific Forum, has condemned the persistence of a particular nuclear-weapon State in conducting tests in the region against the peoples' wishes.

(Mr. Bole, Fiji)

At the Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting recently concluded in Suva, Fiji, attended by 17 countries of Asia and the Pacific, our common concern was again reiterated in its Final Communiqué which my delegation has submitted as an official United Nations document. Paragraph 15 of that communiqué states:

"Heads of Government took note of the desire of the South Pacific Island States to establish their region as a nuclear-weapon-free zone, recalling the resolution already adopted on the subject by the United Nations General Assembly in 1975. They agreed that the continuation of nuclear-weapon testing in the region was a matter for deep concern. They fully supported the South Pacific Forum's strong condemnation of France's continued test programme, as well as its failure to provide information on the effects of past tests on the human and natural environment of the Pacific."

My country, together with other island nations of the South Pacific, is committed to the objective of making our region free from nuclear wars and contamination. We are committed to the preservation of our environment and of the resources of our ocean for the benefit of our people now and for the future. We are committed to preparations to ensure that succeeding generations of our people live in peace with our neighbours and in harmony with nature. We are committed to a world at peace. These commitments provide the underlying thrust of my Government's policy in the disarmament field.

The disquieting feature of the continuation of nuclear-weapon tests in the South Pacific for our people is further aggravated by the recent report that appeared in The New York Times on 15 October, stating that France has decided to go ahead with production of a neutron weapon. As in the past, no doubt the perfection of such a weaponry system will of necessity take place in an area far removed from the large concentrations of populations in Europe. And no doubt the sparse population of the islands of the South Pacific will again be advanced as the reason for choosing it as the ideal site for these tests.

(Mr. Bole, Fiji)

The addition of the neutron weapon to the arsenal of destructive devices being tested in our region adds a new dimension to the urgency of our efforts towards the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. We therefore view item 138, as reflected in document A/37/243 together with its annex and appendix, as a step in the right direction. And in this connection we urge the Committee on Disarmament and its relevant Working Group on a Nuclear-Test Ban to proceed with its mandate as expeditiously as possible.

When the threat of nuclear annihilation hangs so ominously over each and every nation and people, and the few arrogate to themselves the destiny of the human race, mankind - least of all its representatives in this hall today - cannot afford the refinements of East-West polemics, nor the rhetorics of big-Power rivalries, nor the patois of this Committee, for the simple fact is that an all-out nuclear war knows no national boundary and respects no territorial sovereignty. It is the fervent desire of my Government and of its people that no efforts be spared here and elsewhere to make meaningful and real progress towards the removal of this threat.

Mr. van WELL (Federal Republic of Germany): Mr. Chairman, before I turn to the subject of our debate, may I say how very pleased I and the members of my delegation are at seeing you preside over this session of the First Committee, our two countries having been immediate conference room neighbours ever since my country became a Member of the United Nations. We are confident that under your guidance the Committee will be able to cope with its considerable workload.

The representative of Denmark spoke on 21 October on behalf of the ten countries of the European Community, of which my country is a member. His remarks have the full support of my delegation. On the basis of those remarks I shall today elaborate on some points that are of particular importance to the Federal Republic of Germany.

First of all, I should like to present the basic elements determining our position in this field.

In his policy statement of 13 October this year, the new Federal Chancellor, Mr. Helmut Kohl, underscored the importance attaching to the dialogue in the

(Mr. van Well, Federal Republic of Germany)

United Nations' on security policy. For this reason my Government sets great store by the work done in the First Committee. My country will continue to play an active part in this Committee's endeavours to work out balanced approaches that do justice to the security interests of all countries, are capable of being adopted by consensus and can be translated into practice.

We realize, as before, that the progress that can be achieved in this forum is largely dependent on the international climate. We cannot overlook the obstacles that arise when Members of the United Nations disregard and violate the principle of the non-use of force in international relations embodied in the Charter, as has been done in Afghanistan. This General Assembly will, it is to be hoped, adopt the Manila Declaration on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. If we do so, this should give all of us occasion to recommit ourselves to the central Charter provisions of renunciation of force and the resolution of differences by peaceful means.

In Europe, the Final Act of Helsinki established similar objectives. It spelled out most extensive and detailed rules of behaviour of States externally and internally. In this context, we are following the developments in Poland closely and with great concern. The Federal Republic of Germany continues to demand that assurances given be fulfilled as they relate to the lifting of martial law, the release of all detainees, the resumption of the dialogue with the Church and the lifting of the ban on the trade union "Solidarity".

The Federal Republic of Germany will continue its existing foreign and security policy in a consistent manner. Its policy will remain calculable for everyone concerned. The precept of preserving peace will continue to be the supreme goal. Chancellor Kohl has made the task of strengthening these fundamental principles one of the main points of his government programme.

The Federal Republic of Germany is a member of an alliance that does not threaten anyone and does not aspire to superiority. At its summit in Bonn in June, the Western alliance stated,

"None of our weapons will ever be used except in response to attack".

(Mr. van Well, Federal Republic of Germany)

For my country, situated in the heart of densely populated Europe, any war, be it nuclear or conventional, would be a terrible calamity. For this reason we strive, in unison with our allies, to prevent any war and deter any form of aggression.

We do not impute hostile intentions to anyone, but we cannot overlook the fact that in Europe we are confronted with an excessive number of arms. This holds true of the excessive Soviet conventional weapons. And in particular it holds true of the new accurate intermediate-range nuclear missiles of the Soviet Union which threaten Western Europe, and hence our country too. In response to this threat, we pursue, together with our allies, a policy for a stable military balance between East and West. We want to achieve such a balance at the lowest possible level of arms through verifiable treaties. With this policy we at the same time render an important contribution to world-wide military stability.

(Mr. van Well, Federal
Republic of Germany)

In East-West relations, it has proved possible this year for the first time to incorporate the entire range of military potentials in arms-control negotiations. The deliberations within the Western Alliance have resulted in initiatives representing the most comprehensive proposals on arms control made to the Soviet Union until now.

The Federal Republic of Germany supports the proposal submitted by the United States at the START talks in Geneva to reduce substantially the number of strategic nuclear weapons possessed by the two sides.

On the subject of intermediate-range nuclear systems, which are also being negotiated in Geneva, Chancellor Kohl reaffirmed our position in his first policy statement. My Government adheres to the Western negotiating objective that the United States and the Soviet Union should agree completely to dispense with their land-based intermediate-range nuclear missiles.

At the Vienna talks on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR), the West submitted in July a comprehensive draft agreement, thus strongly emphasizing its interest in achieving concrete results through negotiation. This initiative makes concessions to the East on a number of points; we now expect the Eastern countries to contribute through tangible and practical steps towards solving the problems that are still unsettled, especially the question of force data.

Furthermore, my country advocates, within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), the establishment of a forum for arms control embracing the whole of Europe, from the Atlantic to the Urals. At the CSCE follow-up meeting in Madrid we shall strongly urge the adoption of a balanced final document and agreement on a precise mandate for a conference on disarmament in Europe, which should initially elaborate new, militarily relevant confidence-building measures for the whole of Europe.

I should now like to turn to some subjects that play a particular part in the work of the First Committee.

At the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, particular prominence was given to the subject of nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. van Well, Federal
Republic of Germany)

This is only natural. It reflects the concern of our peoples at the use of nuclear weapons; among the people in my country this concern is no less acute than elsewhere.

My delegation too is firmly convinced that nuclear disarmament is one of the vital questions of this day and age. For this reason such great importance attaches to the talks in Geneva between the United States and the Soviet Union that I just mentioned. Here at the United Nations we are dealing with the global dimensions of nuclear disarmament. They must be discussed very carefully. Concepts such as a freeze, comprehensive moratoriums, the non-use of nuclear weapons or no first-use of them, require critical examination. The problems that are essentially involved here must be made clear, and the motives underlying these concepts must be analysed. My delegation is ready to participate in such a thorough-going and critical discussion, based on the objective criteria and genuine goals of arms control and disarmament.

All considerations must proceed from the principle of refraining from the use of force, enshrined in Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations Charter. There can be no disputing the central importance of this principle. Its main rationale is the prevention of war. This applies to war in its most horrifying manifestation - namely, nuclear war - but equally to all other forms of war. It would be an unacceptable simplification to detach the problem of preventing nuclear war from its overall context. Anyone who advocates this must answer the question of whether starting a conventional war is not reprehensible. Human life must be protected, irrespective of the weapons threatening it. Moreover, nobody can foresee the course that a conflict would take once it had been sparked off. The use of nuclear weapons can be prevented effectively only if war in general, both nuclear and conventional, is ruled out as a final means of political action.

The concept of no first-use of nuclear weapons must be judged by whether it meets the supreme exigency of preventing war. Here I shall confine myself to two considerations that are of decisive importance for us:

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Republic of Germany)

First, anyone who undertakes not to make first use of a specific type of weapon obviously intends to reserve the right to use other weapons. This is the attitude of a Power which feels it is superior in those other weapons. Nobody can expect the inferior side to applaud such a position.

Secondly, declaring one's intention not to make first use of certain weapons is insufficient and futile as long as those weapons remain ready for use. Such a self-imposed obligation cannot be verified, owing to its declaratory nature. Whether the obligation is really being honoured would become clear only in the event of confrontation, at which point it might be too late for the international community to react.

Forswearing the first use of nuclear weapons is therefore not sufficient to meet this professed purpose. What we need is strict observance of the comprehensive ban on the use of force, as enshrined in the United Nations Charter, which stipulates that weapons may not be used except for self-defence in response to an armed attack.

Permit me now to look more closely at the notion of a freeze or moratorium that has been frequently propagated of late. Anyone who has carefully examined the proposals made on disarmament in recent years will not have failed to notice that the Soviet Union first made this proposal in a field in which its quantitative and qualitative superiority is quite obvious, namely in the sphere of intermediate-range nuclear systems. It goes without saying that anyone who has secured an advantage for himself in one field by building up his armaments over the years will prefer the codification of existing imbalances.

Consequently, the freeze proposals, which sound highly attractive, should be treated with caution. What we need is an effective, balanced and verifiable reduction of arsenals, and not a codification of existing imbalances. A freeze is neither a substitute for the reduction of arms, nor is it suitable as a preliminary to such action. For it must be assumed that the side in a position of superiority will, once the existing level of arms has been codified, hardly be induced to strive for parity at a lower level.

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Germany)

Furthermore, a moratorium would only be useful if it were agreed on and verifiable. What use, for instance, is a moratorium on testing and development that cannot be verified? If one thus bears in mind that a freeze too, if it is to be useful at all, will necessitate complicated and time-consuming negotiations before it can enter into force, it becomes clear that as a rule agreement on a freeze cannot be attained more quickly than agreement on disarmament.

On the question of verification I should like to add this: in this field, where something could actually be achieved to produce practical progress in disarmament negotiations, those who, clearly in their own interest, today advocate codification of the existing balance of power are the ones who are not ready to make serious contributions. This can be seen also from draft resolution A/C.1/37/L.6 on a comprehensive test ban, which would require States to participate in verification only if subject to the approval of the Security Council as well. The countries which matter most could therefore impede verification at any time.

The discussion of disarmament and the prevention of war would be incomplete without the consideration of the peace-preserving element. This is the other side of the same coin. In recent years, the international community has rightly started to examine the relationship between disarmament and international security. Particularly as a result of the growing number of conventional conflicts in the third world, the subject of safeguarding peace has gained greater prominence. In view of the increasing danger emanating from conventional weapons and the international transfer of arms, third-world countries are today becoming increasingly aware of their vulnerability.

The growing feeling of being exposed to a threat, and the great number of conflicts from which the third world has suffered, also led, at the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to a rebirth of deliberations on strengthening the international system for safeguarding peace and the mechanisms for controlling conflicts. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar has contributed to this important development with his report to the General Assembly (A/37/1). This excellent and far-sighted report focuses on the importance of the collective security system of the United Nations. It rightly stresses that:

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"Without such a system, the world community will remain powerless to deal with military adventures which threaten the very fabric of international peace, and the danger of the widening and escalation of local conflicts will be correspondingly greater. Without such a system there will be no reliable defence or shelter for the small and weak". (A/37/1, p. 5)

The Secretary-General has made a number of proposals on how greater use can be made of the United Nations Charter for the purpose of safeguarding peace. My delegation welcomes these proposals and is ready to play an active part in developing the procedures outlined for strengthening the United Nations. In addition, it considers useful the development of autonomous regional peace-preserving systems linked to the security system of the United Nations through Article 52 of its Charter.

Since the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the Federal Republic of Germany has made the worldwide promotion of confidence-building measures a major item of its work. At this session of the General Assembly, we shall again sponsor a draft resolution on the subject. Our aim is to draw conclusions from the two years of work of the group of experts, who have dealt with the subject in a comprehensive study. This study indicates ways of eliminating at least some of the causes of armaments growth, causes which include not only clashes of political interest, but also a lack of communication, of openness and transparency, and a shortage of political restraint. By agreeing on concrete measures which improve the mutual calculability of the military behaviour of States, the grounds for distrust, misunderstandings, false information and misinterpretations could be reduced and eventually eliminated in the various regions of the world. In this way, foundations would be laid upon which concrete arms limitation and arms reduction measures could be built.

We propose that the General Assembly begin by giving the United Nations Disarmament Commission the mandate to compile guidelines for the implementation of specific confidence-building measures. The task would consist of lending substance to the provisions of the United Nations Charter in this field, particularly to the ban on the use of force. To begin with, the areas particularly suited to this type of compiling of guidelines would have to be established. In our working paper, which was submitted at the second special session of the General Assembly

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Germany)

devoted to disarmament, we have already put forward several suggestions. The fields of manoeuvre-observation and information on planned manoeuvres and troop movements in peace-time might be considered first.

We shall continue to concentrate our efforts on wording the draft resolution we are proposing in a way that will make possible its adoption by consensus, in accordance with our practice in previous years.

The last meeting of the United Nations Disarmament Commission led to an important result in the approval of a mandate for the study on conventional disarmament. We shall follow closely the work of the experts. The prominence of nuclear disarmament remains undisputed, but at the same time the danger conventional armaments pose to peace and security must not be ignored. The stockpiling of conventional arms in certain parts of the world presents a considerable problem for stability. In addition, the cost of conventional arms, which account for 80 per cent of total arms expenditures, also burdens those countries whose strength should be concentrated with particular urgency on economic and social development.

Total arms expenditure in the world has reached a frightening level. The Federal Republic of Germany has been helping in the United Nations efforts to master this problem by means of arms control policy. In this respect a decisive practical step forward has been achieved, thanks to years of work by experts. First of all, financial expenditure by States for military purposes must be made transparent and comparable. Only in this way could one conceive of further steps being taken at some future date in the direction of verifiable arrangements on the reduction of arms expenditure. The United Nations Standardized Reporting System is an important prerequisite for this. But the System can only be successful if a much larger number of States take part than at present, and if all the world's various economic systems are included.

(Mr. van Well, Federal Republic
of Germany)

The Federal Republic of Germany has already submitted its figures to the Standardized Reporting System on three occasions. This year we shall also co-sponsor the resolution calling upon all Member States to participate in the System. We welcome the United Nations experts survey on the further development of this approach. We regard the promotion of transparency and comparability of military expenditure as an important contribution to the building of confidence between States.

We attach great importance to the work of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva as the only world-wide negotiating forum for disarmament and arms control treaties and regard the negotiations of this body as a necessary supplement to East-West efforts to decrease military potentials and to obtain increased transparency of military behaviour. We note with satisfaction that, in spite of its 1982 session being relatively short, the Committee on Disarmament has considerably intensified its activities.

In the foreground of its activities are, in our view, the negotiations on a comprehensive ban on all chemical weapons, as emphasized by Federal Chancellor Kohl in his policy statement of 13 October 1982. The evidence of rapprochement in some major areas is to be welcomed. The same is true of aspects of the central problem of a chemical-weapon-ban convention, that is, the question of verifying the observance of its most important provisions, even if in general the greatest obstacles to an agreement still lie in this area. In our view the problems of verifying the observance of an agreement should be tackled henceforth as a matter of priority. Encouraged by the international public interest in a comprehensive chemical-weapon ban and relying on the special experience which the Federal Republic of Germany has drawn from international verification of its renunciation of chemical weapons production in 1954, we have submitted to the Committee on Disarmament and the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament a practicable and efficient solution of the question of verification arrangements, contained in a total of three working papers. It consists of two separate procedures:

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of Germany)

one procedure to check on specific incidents should doubt exist as to the observance of the agreement, and a regular procedure to verify the implementation of the agreement, that is, of the undertaking to dispense with all chemical weapons stocks and factories, to observe the ceiling on super-toxic production contractually permitted for protection purposes, and not to produce chemical weapons. An international consultative committee is responsible for both procedures.

Verification of the undertaking not to produce chemical weapons requires the involvement of the chemicals industry. To keep a limit on the costs of regular checks in terms of staff and finance, they are confined to those branches of the industry producing organo-phosphorous substances, which are potential key precursors of super-toxic weapons, the most deadly of chemical weapons. A further limitation lies in the fact that the regular checks and on-site inspections to be carried out on a percentage basis will be decided by drawing lots. Thus our proposal is kept within reasonable bounds while still ensuring a high detection risk for possible violations of the agreement. We hope that these proposals will advance the discussion and accelerate negotiations. Since the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibits the use of chemical weapons, they should not be indispensable to States for their security and defence as long as each State is certain that no other country in the world has such weapons at its disposal.

With regard to the negotiations on radiological weapons, a speedy conclusion to the negotiations should be sought henceforth. On those questions of further improvement in the protection afforded to civil nuclear installations under international law which are still open, several proposals have been submitted which make possible appropriate treatment of this problem. Sweden in particular has drawn attention to the importance of these questions. We hope that the Committee on Disarmament can reach agreement on one of the proposals, thus clearing the way for the conclusion of the radiological-weapon negotiations.

(Mr. van Well, Federal Republic
of Germany)

In addition we welcome another important step forward in the negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament, namely, the agreement on a working group on the verification and observance of a comprehensive test ban. The Federal Republic of Germany has always been actively committed to a comprehensive test ban, which is of great importance to us, particularly with regard to the undertaking of the contracting parties in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:

" ... to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament". (General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII)).

However, we fully appreciate that a comprehensive test-ban agreement would be of questionable value unless it also settled above all the central problem of verification. Establishing the comprehensive test ban working group to clarify these questions is therefore a suitable means of further paving the way for a comprehensive test ban. We expect that working group to agree on a work programme soon and to tackle it without delay.

Since its 1982 spring meeting the Committee on Disarmament, in pursuance of two General Assembly resolutions, has been working on the question, of vital importance to all mankind, of how an arms race in outer space can be checked in time. Certain technological developments indeed give cause for great alarm: the Soviet Union's testing of non-peaceful, destructive space systems in the shape of the so-called hunter-killer satellites poses a particularly serious danger to international stability and security. We therefore expect the thirty-seventh session of the General Assembly to endorse the approach embodied in General Assembly resolution 36/97 C to concentrate discussions on the particularly destabilizing anti-satellite systems and to charge the Committee on Disarmament with further consideration of this subject. Every effort leading to a balanced and verifiable limitation of offensive and destructive weapons and activities in outer space will receive our wholehearted support.

(Mr. van Well, Federal Republic
of Germany)

In all our countries disarmament can be successful only to the extent that it receives wide public support. My Government is able to construct its policy for securing peace, for arms control and disarmament on a broad-based consensus which extends beyond party-political barriers.

The World Disarmament Campaign, launched this year, can supplement the existing activities in a practical way. We welcome the General Assembly's adoption by consensus of principles for the implementation of this project. The campaign will fulfil its purpose if it is implemented in a practical, objective and balanced manner in all regions of the world - that is, universally.

The disarmament discussion in the General Assembly and in this Committee draws public attention again to the numerous problems upon which these bodies are working and shows clearly how world-wide security policies are inter-related. We have laid emphasis upon those areas in which concrete results can be achieved in the foreseeable future. We shall continue this co-operation with all our strength.

Mrs. THEORIN (Sweden): My predecessor, Mrs. Alva Myrdal, who together with Ambassador Garcia Robles, was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for 1982, has asked me to convey her warm thanks to all those who have expressed their appreciation of her work for disarmament on that occasion. She sees the award as a recognition of the importance of disarmament efforts and as a token of support for the growing peace movements all over the world. Mrs. Myrdal has also asked me to express her joy and satisfaction over sharing the prize with her old colleague and friend.

I should like to take this opportunity to add my own personal congratulations to Ambassador Garcia Robles. The Nobel Peace Prize is a recognition of his long-standing, tireless and constructive efforts to promote a more peaceful world and above all to rid the world of the nuclear threat. I look forward to having the privilege of collaborating with Ambassador Garcia Robles in the future.

It is a great honour for me to address this Committee for the first time in my capacity as newly-appointed Chairman of the Swedish Disarmament Commission. It is with great pleasure that I congratulate you, Ambassador Gbeho, on your assumption of the chairmanship of the First Committee. I am confident that you will successfully carry out the important tasks ahead of you. I should like also to pay a tribute to the outgoing Chairman, Ambassador Ignac Golob, who presided over the previous session with great distinction and skill. This is an important forum and it deals with the most urgent and vital item on the international agenda today, the question of disarmament.

In our time the threat of war seems more terrifying than ever before. Nuclear weapons have changed the world. The development of new weapons, in particular nuclear weapons, has changed the nature of relations between the major Powers. The two super-Powers have nuclear stockpiles large enough to destroy the world and themselves several times over. No nation can achieve absolute security through military superiority. No nation can defend itself effectively against a nuclear attack. No matter how many nuclear weapons

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

a nation acquires, it will always remain vulnerable to a nuclear attack and its people will thus ultimately remain insecure. This is a central fact that all nations must realize.

Security can never be achieved through unilateral measures. It must be achieved through co-operative efforts. Political and ideological opponents must work together to avoid nuclear war. They must achieve security not by working against each other but in co-operation. Only together can they survive. Real security means common security. Thus, international peace must rest on a commitment to joint survival instead of a threat of mutual destruction. This is the main conclusion drawn in the report by the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues which was introduced to the second special session on disarmament by its Chairman, Mr. Olof Palme.

Common security means that nations should restrain themselves and renounce policies which seek advantages through armaments. The search for military superiority must be abandoned. Over-all parity between the military blocs at the lowest possible level of armaments must be the guiding principle. Once this principle has been accepted, one is committed to negotiations. The most important and most valuable tool for common security that we all possess is the United Nations. We believe that this instrument can be used in a more determined way and that the United Nations and its security role must be strengthened.

Relations between the United States and the Soviet Union have continued to deteriorate sharply. The arms race is accelerating. Disarmament efforts in recent years have failed and the pressure against the few arms control barriers is getting even stronger. Negotiations between the super-Powers on limitations and reductions of nuclear arsenals have been resumed at long last, but there is little reason for optimism that they will yield meaningful results in the near future. The multilateral efforts here in New York and in Geneva are also largely stalemated as a result of super-Power distrust and confrontation. But armaments are not simply a consequence of international tension: they are also a cause. The result is an upward spiral which acquires a dynamic of its own. This process has got to be changed.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

There are today fewer people who believe that new nuclear weapons lead to added security. Such weapons are increasingly regarded as more of a threat than a means of protection, even by those for whose defence they are intended. Long-standing concepts of national security are now being challenged. The call for disarmament is growing in strength. For an increasing number of people the arms race has become an issue of survival. The emerging movement of popular resistance against the arms race and super-Power movement of popular resistance against the arms race and super-Power rivalry gives us new grounds for optimism. It is the most promising development in the field of disarmament in recent years. Massive popular movements are perhaps our only hope. They can exert sufficient pressure on the major Powers to compel them to halt and reverse their absurd military competition. National leaders and politicians should react in a positive and constructive manner to this new wave of support for disarmament. It would be a grave mistake to dismiss the popular call for peace and disarmament as unrealistic and naive.

This call reflects the deep-rooted concern of millions of people. I am confident that the peace movement is emerging as an essential political factor in the major countries and that it will contribute to a new trend towards disarmament. The rapidly increasing involvement of the general public in many countries against growing arsenals should be met with the requisite response among the Member Governments of this Organization. It is my conviction that leaders who are not responsive to public concern over the arms race will soon lose the confidence of their own peoples. I am convinced that this will prove to be true for all States, irrespective of their political and social systems.

There is an urgent need for concerted, vigorous action in disarmament efforts, as well as in other areas. The United Nations crisis is essentially that of its Members and an expression of their antagonism and difficulties in finding common solutions to vital problems. Discussions, negotiations and decisions must now be focussed on a handful of crucial questions and all efforts must be mobilized to make headway. It is the duty of States represented in the United Nations General Assembly - even those which are not leading the arms race - to exert every effort to stop the global arms race. It is in the final analysis a question of political will.

The two super-Powers have the incomparably largest weapon arsenals. They hold the fate of the earth in their hands. That is why they bear the primary responsibility for ensuring that a change of course takes place.

A number of proposals were presented to the second special session devoted to disarmament by several Member Governments, including the Swedish Government. I shall dwell on some of those proposals today, but I should also like to draw the attention of this Committee to some concrete proposals concerning disarmament which are to be found in the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues.

Our first duty must be to agree to stop the continuing arms race in the nuclear-weapon field. The Swedish Government strongly supports the idea of freezing the arsenals of such weapons at present levels and then working for substantial balanced and verifiable reductions in all categories of nuclear weapons.

This is an expression of our own firm view, when all the different types of nuclear weapons are taken together, that there exists today a rough nuclear parity which is sufficiently stable and survivable to render unnecessary and even meaningless further attempts to modernize and develop new categories of nuclear weapons.

Should a war break out in Europe the presence of short-range and medium-range nuclear missiles would make imminent the risk of such a conflict rapidly escalating into a nuclear war. The idea that Europe might be chosen as a battlefield in a nuclear war is unacceptable to the peoples of Europe. All nuclear weapons threatening Europe should be reduced in number and ultimately eliminated. Sweden welcomes the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have commenced negotiations for this purpose and appeals to both parties to show a maximum amount of flexibility in order to stave off a further nuclearization of Europe.

We fail completely to understand that weapon systems which bring warning times down to five minutes or less can bring added security. Instead of providing a stable deterrent they might become highly destabilizing.

A decisive effort should also be made, unilaterally or through negotiation, to bring down the number of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. I recall the suggestions to that effect made in the Palme Commission report. It suggests, inter alia, that such weapons should be completely withdrawn from an area

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150 kilometres wide on each side of the East-West border running through Central Europe. Such a nuclear-weapon-free zone would have considerable confidence-building importance and contribute to a strengthening of the nuclear fire-break.

In this context, my country follows with interest the current debate on non-first use of nuclear weapons. As pointed out by observers, first use of any weapon is of course, proscribed by the United Nations Charter and by other international instruments. But in a world which still relies on the possible use of nuclear weapons to deter aggression, every effort must be made to reduce the role of nuclear weapons. It should in that context be possible as a part of a realistic disarmament policy to achieve a mutual obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. Such a restriction in nuclear doctrines would help avert further speculation on limited nuclear war which has poisoned the political climate in recent times. An enhanced reliance on conventional forces, as currently discussed, should therefore be pursued. It is our view that a rough conventional balance can and should be achieved at a lower level of armaments.

The Swedish Government is convinced that determined efforts must also be made to improve the prospects of achieving agreements which among other things will make the Nordic region a nuclear-weapon-free-zone. As Sweden's Foreign Minister pointed out in his speech in the General Assembly on 15 October 1982, agreements of this kind can ease the tensions between the blocs and reduce the risk of these countries being subjected to nuclear attack.

It is widely recognized that a comprehensive test-ban treaty is a central point in efforts to start the process of nuclear disarmament. Sweden has for many years done everything within its power to promote this goal. A complete cessation of all nuclear test explosions would be crucial, both as a means of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons and as a demonstration of the intention of the nuclear-weapon States finally to enter into an era of mutual nuclear restraint.

There are, however, some aspects of recent developments in the comprehensive test-ban issue that give rise to serious concern. At the second special session on disarmament attempts were made drastically to diminish the importance of a comprehensive test ban and even to question whether it was useful at all. And shortly after the second special session on disarmament it became known that the

United States had decided not to resume the trilateral comprehensive test-ban negotiations with the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. Judging from declared positions of the nuclear-weapon States it now seems that only one of them is prepared to consider a comprehensive test ban as a first step in the nuclear disarmament process.

The Soviet Union has submitted some basic provisions of a test-ban treaty which the Swedish Government is carefully studying. We shall make detailed comments on this document as soon as negotiations on the matter are resumed in the Committee on Disarmament. In this context I wish to add that Sweden, as part of its efforts to achieve a comprehensive test-ban treaty, intends to submit a revised version of an earlier Swedish draft comprehensive test-ban treaty during the Committee on Disarmament's spring session of 1983.

We strongly urge the other nuclear-weapon States to demonstrate that they are prepared to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a starting-point for nuclear disarmament.

The only gleam of light in this matter is the decision by the Committee on Disarmament last spring to establish an ad hoc working group on a nuclear test ban. The mandate of the Working Group is in the view of the Swedish Government clearly unsatisfactory and should be widened to allow for real negotiations of all the issues which arise in the elaboration of a test-ban treaty. It is, however, our fervent hope that the process now initiated in the Committee on Disarmament will eventually result in an agreement on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

I also wish to state that my Government supports the idea of a moratorium, that is, a test ban of limited duration as an instrument to promote negotiations on a permanent comprehensive test-ban treaty. It does not accept the notion that such a moratorium is not verifiable.

During its 1982 session the Committee on Disarmament has continued the negotiations on a ban on radiological weapons. We have noted with great satisfaction that the Swedish proposal regarding prohibition of attacks against nuclear facilities has been widely acknowledged as a legitimate matter for negotiations in the context of a treaty on radiological weapons. The number of negative or sceptical voices is diminishing as the importance of the issue becomes clearer. This trend was reflected in Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's statement

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

before the plenary Assembly, in which he called attention to the serious effects of attacks on nuclear installations, although in a declaratory context. The Swedish Government considers it important that the Committee on Disarmament should continue its negotiations on an agreement prohibiting all attacks against nuclear facilities, in the context of a treaty on radiological weapons.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

While discussing ongoing efforts in the Committee on Disarmament, let me dwell for a moment on another high-priority item on its agenda, namely, the complete prohibition of chemical weapons. A lot of useful work was performed on this subject during the last couple of years, in particular with respect to the many complex technical issues involved. There is as yet not a sufficient sense of urgency about overcoming many of those issues and reaching compromise solutions. It is nevertheless our impression that there are prospects for an agreement on chemical weapons, even if a number of important problems concerning verification still remain to be solved. All members have a responsibility to make the most of this opportunity. This is particularly true for the super-Powers and other major Powers. Without their active co-operation and clearly demonstrated political will this opportunity, too, will be lost.

At the second special session on disarmament it was agreed that all suggestions and proposals which were left in abeyance should be taken up at this session of the General Assembly for further consideration. In conformity with that decision Sweden is proposing that action should be taken on certain specific issues which, in our view, are of crucial importance for ongoing disarmament efforts. I shall briefly explain the Swedish position on some of these questions.

The relationship between disarmament and development is a matter of vital importance in our efforts to reverse the arms race and to promote a new international economic order. The final report of the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts on Disarmament and Development was submitted to the General Assembly last year and subsequently referred to the second special session on disarmament for substantive consideration. In Sweden's view it is essential to ensure an effective follow-up of that report, and the Swedish delegation will revert to this matter in detail later on in the deliberations of this Committee.

Sweden has always considered that the bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons Convention contains an unsatisfactory complaints and verification mechanism. We made that point clear when the Convention was negotiated. The

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1980 Review Conference stated, inter alia, that the adequacy of certain provisions of the Convention should be considered at an appropriate time.

Sweden now believes that the matter is ripe for such further consideration. In a proposal submitted to the second special session on disarmament, Sweden suggested that the depositary States of the biological weapons Convention should be invited to convene a special conference as soon as possible to establish a flexible, objective and non discriminatory complaints procedure applicable to the Convention. As no decision was reached on this matter during the second special session it should now be considered by this Committee.

It is our view that stronger and more effective disarmament machinery needs to be established within the United Nations system. This view is based, inter alia, on a number of considerations.

The central role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament must be reflected in United Nations disarmament machinery. In 1979 Sweden suggested in this Committee that the possibilities of establishing a United Nations disarmament organization should be studied in a comprehensive manner. The General Assembly decided in the same year to carry out an expert study on the institutional arrangements relating to the process of disarmament. In their report submitted to the General Assembly last year, the experts made a number of useful comments, but did not recommend specific action. Sweden therefore submitted a proposal to the second special session on disarmament to the effect that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be transformed into a Department for Disarmament Affairs within the United Nations Secretariat. There are strong reasons for this proposal, and my delegation will revert to it in the course of the present session.

Military research and development has become an increasingly important factor in the overall arms race. I should like to highlight two particularly disturbing aspects of this problem. The first is that military research and development consumes enormous intellectual and financial resources, much more than are devoted to research and development on health, food production, energy and environmental protection taken together. The second aspect is the

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role of military research and development in fuelling the arms race, in particular with respect to weapons of mass destruction. It is clear that in many cases technology tends to lead policy-makers instead of serve them. New weapons systems emerge mainly as a result of the technical process, not because political and military leaders had foreseen any need for them. Technology by itself is blind to the dangers of the arms race.

It has long been recognized that if we are unable to come to grips with this problem the arms race is certain to go out of control. Since hardly any action has been taken to deal with this issue in more specific terms, Sweden suggested at the second special session that a study should be carried out on military research and development and its implications for disarmament negotiations.

The Swedish Government is fully aware that the elaboration of a study on research and development will encounter many difficulties and obstacles, among them the problem of obtaining sufficiently reliable and complete data and information on current plans and programmes from all countries of interest in this context. However, Sweden considers that it is of great importance to intensify efforts to achieve an in-depth understanding and a more widespread knowledge of the role of military research and development and its impact on the arms race. In view of the acceleration of the military exploitation of research and development, time is a crucial factor. We therefore propose that at this session the General Assembly should take action on this important matter.

My delegation will at this session also pursue the efforts aimed at reducing military expenditures. We will propose further measures which we deem indispensable for achieving an agreement in this field. Greater openness as regards military expenditures, as well as other utilization of resources for military purposes, is also an important confidence-building measure.

When presenting the report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues to the second special session on disarmament, the Commission's Chairman, Mr. Olof Palme, stressed that the recommendations in the report were addressed to Governments, to the representatives of the United Nations and to those who are involved in disarmament negotiations.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

It is important that all aspects of the message that that report brings be thoroughly discussed and considered in the United Nations. In co-operation with others, Sweden will exert efforts to ensure an effective follow-up of the report within the United Nations system and in other relevant contexts. The Swedish Government proposes that, as a first step, the United Nations Disarmament Commission should be requested to take up the report for consideration at its next substantive meeting in 1983, and to elaborate recommendations and guidelines for the follow-up of the report.

(Mrs. Theorin, Sweden)

In speaking for the first time in this Committee, I have chosen to address the concept of security in today's world and to indicate some practical steps that should be taken in order to strengthen our common security. I have also pointed to the increasing pressure from public opinion. The peoples of the world now realize more clearly than ever before that our survival is in danger. It is sometimes said that the flamboyant rhetoric of popular movements must be tempered by the realism of statesmen. In these days I rather feel that the rhetoric of statesmen should be tempered by the down-to-earth realism of ordinary people, who have come to understand what nuclear war would mean and demand practical action to prevent it.

We must now go from words to deeds; we must break the vicious circle of increasing armaments, and we must search for common solutions in our common interest of survival.

Mr. WAGENMAKERS (Netherlands): Mr. Chairman, I should like to begin this statement by expressing the pleasure of the Netherlands delegation at seeing you, an outstanding diplomat from a country with which we are linked by the most friendly of ties, preside over our meetings. We trust that under your able guidance and dynamic leadership the First Committee will discharge in a responsible and successful manner the important tasks assigned to it.

I should like also to offer my congratulations to the other officers of the Committee on their election. My delegation pledges its full support and co-operation to you, Mr. Chairman, and to the other officers of the Committee.

My delegation wishes to express warm thanks to Ambassador Ignac Golob of Yugoslavia, the outgoing Chairman of the Committee, and to his colleagues for the excellent work they did.

I take this opportunity, on behalf of the Netherlands delegation and on my own personal behalf, to congratulate most warmly the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles, on his having been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. His public recognition falls in line with the admiration and respect which the Netherlands delegation has invariably entertained for the dedication and zeal of Ambassador Garcia Robles.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

I should also like to congratulate, through the Swedish delegation, Mrs. Alva Myrdal on receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. My delegation welcomes this great tribute to the inspiring and persistent efforts of Mrs. Myrdal devoted to the promotion of peace and disarmament.

This being the third opportunity within half a year for my delegation to present the views of the Government of the Netherlands on the most important questions of arms control and disarmament, I venture to start with the assumption that the main thrust of our views, including those about activities going on outside the United Nations, is known here. We believe that the general debate in this Committee would not be served were we merely to repeat ourselves. Moreover, several of our views have been presented in the statement that was delivered on 21 October 1982 by Ambassador Peter Michaelsen of Denmark on behalf of the ten member States of the European Community, whose statement I fully endorse.

While embarking on stating our position, what better course could I follow than to refer to what the Secretary-General has written in his very important report on the work of the Organization? The Secretary-General reminds us of the "chilling and unprecedented phenomenon" (A/37/1, p. 2) of the existence of "enough nuclear weapons to destroy life on our planet" (Ibid.). He also points to the existence, and use, of vast quantities of so-called conventional weapons. He analyses the evident difficulties of the Organization in keeping the peace and serving as a forum for negotiations, and he remarks, "Debate without effective action erodes the credibility of the Organization". (Ibid., p. 9)

These elements are uppermost in our minds when we set our thoughts to the functioning of this Committee. How should we tackle these problems?

The question is, what can we expect to accomplish during this session of the General Assembly? Are delegations going to repeat more or less what they said and proposed during the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament?

In the view of the delegation of the Netherlands, the most urgent tasks before this Committee are twofold: first, to analyse why so far the concrete results of disarmament talks within the United Nations, and especially at the

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

last special session of the General Assembly, are so small. Secondly, to draw our conclusions from this analysis and to seek a formula for consultations on disarmament that have better prospects of leading to concrete results.

The delegations in this forum will undoubtedly agree with me when I say that the purpose of talks about disarmament is not to talk but to disarm. Of course, the fact that we continue to talk about disarmament is in itself positive, but clearly it is not enough.

During the last few years, public interest in disarmament has grown considerably in several countries all over the world. But at the same time, the scourge of war has struck several of the countries represented here. The arms build-up has not stopped, but has continued unabated, using up vast resources that could and should have been used for better purposes. The need for an alternative use of public means and investments currently used for military purposes is felt even more urgently in a period of world-wide economic recession. The continuing qualitative improvement of weapon systems also increases the risk that these weapon systems as such constitute a threat to security, because of their negative implications for international stability. Looking at these facts, one would expect that all Governments would work actively for effective disarmament. Why is it that these expectations are not fulfilled?

The most obvious answer to this question is, of course, that international tension has made it impossible to negotiate effectively about disarmament. My delegation, however, cannot take this for an answer. Were we to accept that at a time of international tension negotiations should come to a standstill, then we would definitely undermine the foundations of the United Nations. The Charter was adopted not to celebrate peace after the Second World War, but to prevent new wars. It is vital, not only for the United Nations, but also for its Member States, that in a time of crisis efforts to enable the Organization to implement the Charter should be relentlessly pursued. We have to prevent international tensions from dictating our security policies. On the contrary, our security policies should consciously aim at stabilizing and improving the international situation.

The Government of the Netherlands considers concrete negotiations on disarmament agreements as a tool of precisely such a security policy.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

At this juncture I cannot avoid an expression of grave concern that the Geneva-based Committee on Disarmament fails in too many areas to meet the expectations related to its position as the single multilateral disarmament negotiating body. On the contrary, we observe that the Committee on Disarmament is becoming more and more a declaratory forum which merely echoes resolutions adopted by the General Assembly. Nor do the deliberations in the United Nations Disarmament Commission provide a more comforting picture. During the twelfth special session we submitted proposals to increase the effectiveness of the Committee on Disarmament. Now we should like to submit some further reflections on what we see as the root cause of this highly unsatisfactory picture.

With respect to this First Committee of the General Assembly, my delegation questions whether the tendency to tackle more and more questions and to have more and more resolutions adopted every year has a productive effect on disarmament. We are afraid that often the opposite is true: the more this Committee decides, the less decisive its work seems to be for concrete disarmament. The more resolutions this Committee produces, the fewer the actual solutions it brings forth. The number of resolutions adopted in this Committee seems to be inversely proportionate to the number of solutions reached in the field of disarmament.

The year 1977 was a hopeful one for disarmament. The environmental modification Convention and the two Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 were opened for ratification and the United States and the USSR decided to start negotiations about a list of disarmament problems, among others, a comprehensive test ban, including so-called peaceful nuclear explosions, chemical weapons, non-proliferation, conventional arms transfers, anti-satellite weapons and the Indian Ocean.

That year - 1977 - the number of resolutions on disarmament adopted in this Committee was 24. Both the United States and the USSR voted in favour of resolutions on a comprehensive test ban and on SALT. Tangible results in those fields seemed to be within reach. Since 1977, the prospects for speedy and tangible results from disarmament talks have dwindled, but the number of resolutions has boomed. In 1977 we had only 24 resolutions. Two years ago, in 1980, the number had risen to 43, and this year the number of resolutions may well be above 60.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

In spite of the growing number of good-looking and fine-sounding resolutions we adopt every year, often by consensus, we spend more than \$500 billion a year on our armed forces. Why? Because we do not trust each other well enough to rely solely on peaceful declarations. Because we do not trust each other well enough to do without armed forces, we arm ourselves. And because we arm ourselves we trust each other even less.

Of course, there are other reasons for keeping armed forces, but by far the most important single explanation of the impressive amounts we spend on our armed forces is our mutual distrust. We believe that this lack of confidence not only stands in the way of significant results in all disarmament forums, but also ignores the fact that international security should be sought much more in arms control and disarmament than in more armaments.

Specific measures to overcome distrust, such as openness about defence policies and military expenditures and adequate verification provisions, are essential for a successful disarmament process. All Members of the United Nations are bound by Article 2, paragraph 4, of the Charter to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force. Nevertheless, almost all countries, including my own, deem it necessary to spend sizeable amounts of money on their defence in order to guarantee their security. What conclusions can be drawn from these observations?

The Netherlands delegation believes that in the present international climate distrust is not removed by solemn declarations or resolutions and that these should be viewed primarily from the angle of public relations. Declarations and resolutions will lead to concrete disarmament measures only if accompanied by concrete negotiations. To be successful, openness about defence policies and military expenditures, and adequate verification provisions, are essential, because those measures strengthen the confidence that disarmament agreements will be faithfully lived up to.

My delegation sincerely hopes that other delegations can agree with this short analysis, because the conclusion to be drawn would be for this Committee to reverse the trend towards more resolutions without concrete solutions and to concentrate on the points that contain prospects for concrete disarmament.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

Our doubts about the usefulness of submitting so many resolutions will of course not prevent us from considering every draft on its own merits and giving our views on separate subjects whenever we think it necessary. But we hope that other delegations, too, will give some thought to the usefulness of new resolutions. We hope they will draw some conclusions from some of the points I have made.

The records of these and other disarmament meetings make it clear that there is no lack of willingness to disarm in theory, but a lack of willingness to seek security in disarmament in practice because of a lack of confidence that other parties to the process of disarmament will reciprocate. The conclusion from this is clear: willingness to agree to specific disarmament proposals must go hand in hand with confidence that the other parties will fulfil their obligations and that undiminished security will prevail.

The success of the Non-Proliferation Treaty as an instrument of peace policy, for instance, depends on the confidence of the nations that have become parties to the Treaty that it will be integrally implemented. My country has faithfully lived up to the Treaty obligation not to possess nuclear weapons. We have every right to insist that the nuclear-weapon States, too, after so long a time, meet their commitments, especially the one under Article VI.

It is to a great extent for this reason that the Netherlands Government, like many other Governments, attaches the greatest importance to substantial reductions of nuclear weapons and to the speedy conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty, as well as an agreement on the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

Too often, the readiness of States to disarm is measured by the number and content of their declarations. My delegation suggests that it would be more appropriate to measure this readiness in terms of the measures they take to strengthen confidence and to dispel distrust. My delegation sincerely hopes that during this General Assembly session delegations will take less pride in what they declare themselves to be willing to do in theory and more pride in their willingness to act in practice, for instance, by facilitating adequate international verification of agreements and demonstrating greater openness about their defence efforts. Willingness to facilitate verification and openness about defence efforts are so important because they strengthen confidence.

We believe that the United Nations could, and should, play an important role in this field. Since the first special session on disarmament, considerable changes and improvements have been effected in the structure of the disarmament machinery of the United Nations. However, with the exception of the important study on the implications of establishing an international satellite monitoring agency, which should itself be the subject of further consideration, the General Assembly has so far taken little specific action on the question of the implementation and verification of disarmament agreements. Nevertheless, the need has been felt in recent years for improved procedures for verifying the observance of existing agreements, such as those on biological and chemical weapons. Ongoing negotiations on a chemical weapons convention and a comprehensive nuclear test ban also have a bearing on this subject. The Netherlands therefore considers it necessary that the role of the United Nations in the important area of the implementation and verification of multilateral disarmament agreements should be further examined.

To this end we have reintroduced as document A/C.1/37/6 a working paper concerning an international disarmament organization. We submitted this working paper for the first time in May of this year to the twelfth special session. To our regret, that session was not able to reach a decision on these matters. We hope that the present session will be more productive on this point. We shall present proposals to this end, because we believe that the time has come to consider specific solutions with respect to the missing link in the present structure of the United Nations disarmament machinery.

(Mr. Wagenmakers, Netherlands)

My statement, being very general in character, has not elaborated upon individual disarmament problems. My delegation believes that this basic approach is necessary after the disappointing outcome of the second special session on disarmament. We cannot afford to waste time. I have already mentioned the urgent need for the speedy conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We feel that the time has now been reached for the Committee on Disarmament to embark on fully fledged negotiations on a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. Another subject that leaves us not much time is the need to tackle, through negotiations, the threat of an arms race in outer space.

Before ending my statement, I should like to repeat what the Netherlands Government thinks to be the central problem on the road to general and complete disarmament, that is, our mutual distrust, which also prevents us from seeking and enhancing security in arms control and disarmament. Distrust can be overcome by concrete confidence-building measures such as openness on defence policies and military expenditures, and adequate verification provisions. Distrust can be overcome also by a continuation of serious and realistic disarmament negotiations, because any progress achieved would in turn contribute to an improvement of the international political climate. Disarmament is such an urgent matter that it needs solutions instead of resolutions. We urge all delegations to contribute to this end.

Mr. SUTRESNA (Indonesia): My delegation would like to preface its statement, Sir, by associating itself with previous speakers who have congratulated you on your election to the chairmanship of this Committee. It is a source of satisfaction to my delegation to see you, a representative of the friendly and non-aligned country of Ghana, presiding over our deliberations. My delegation also extends its felicitations to the Vice-Chairmen and the Rapporteur, and pledges its full co-operation to the officers of the Committee in the discharge of our common duties.

I should like to avail myself of this opportunity also to congratulate Ambassador Alfonso Garcia Robles, who was awarded the Nobel Prize for his persistent endeavours to promote the cause of peace and international security through

disarmament. It is also a pleasure for my delegation to extend its congratulations to Mrs. Alva Myrdal of Sweden, who earned the same award for her unceasing efforts in the field of disarmament. It is the profound hope of my delegation that the distinction awarded to these eminent persons will spur the international community on to redouble its endeavours to achieve agreements relating to disarmament and to international peace and security.

An honest evaluation of the present state of affairs in the field of disarmament would inescapably lead to the conclusion that efforts aimed at implementing the disarmament strategy set out in the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament have arrived at a critical crossroads; either we lose ground, with all the obviously serious consequences to the future of mankind that this implies, or we move forward, however hard and arduous the road may be.

The second special session on disarmament, held three months ago in this very building, was unable to produce the results hoped for by the peoples of the world, that is, the adoption of a comprehensive programme of disarmament and the assessment of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the first special session on disarmament. Notwithstanding the attendance and statements by no less than 17 Heads of State or Government, the second special session devoted to disarmament failed to be a milestone in the long search for peace and international security through disarmament; instead, it became another arena for furthering antagonism among the major Powers, the super-Powers in particular. In the context of the growing demand by the international community that the second special session on disarmament deal squarely with the most urgent nuclear disarmament issues, a mere reaffirmation of the validity of the Final Document, an increase in the fellowships on disarmament programme, and the launching of the World Disarmament Campaign, constituted meagre results indeed.

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

The Committee on Disarmament in its work during the four-year period of its existence has not fulfilled the mandate expected from it as the sole multilateral disarmament negotiating body. While some significant break-throughs were made in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Chemical Weapons during its summer session, the other two important ad hoc Working Groups, on the comprehensive programme of disarmament and on negative security assurances, decided not to pursue their work during that session because of the lack of any prospect of progress. The unfortunate decision of two nuclear-weapon States not to participate in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear-Test Ban and the refusal by another nuclear-weapon State to agree to a work programme proposed by the chairman of the Working Group and accepted by other delegations rendered that Working Group practically ineffective.

On the regional scene, to date, apart from the monumental achievement of the Treaty of Tlatelolco in the Latin American region, no concrete steps have been taken towards the realization of the concept of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones in other parts of the world. Nine years of efforts in Vienna towards a mutual and balanced reduction of conventional forces in Europe have produced no tangible results.

The initiation of the intermediate-range nuclear missiles, the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Talks (INF) and the resumption of the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union have been lauded by the world at large. Yet as only scant, or no authentic, information has been made available to the international community on their respective progress or the lack of it, the impression is gained that these talks are indeed moving slowly.

It seems clear to my delegation that such a situation can no longer be allowed to continue and therefore urgent steps are required to prevent further deterioration. There must be first of all a realization that the present pace in the growth of nuclear armaments with what is already an over-kill destructive capacity will have to be checked, lest the world be faced increasingly with the threat of annihilation. While real and

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

meaningful nuclear disarmament measures may at first sight appear to constitute a risk to the interests of certain States, the risks involved will not be of such magnitude as to defeat our common purpose, which is the maintenance of the larger interest of preserving the survival of mankind. Out-dated concepts governing the principles and norms of international security need readjustment in the light of experience gained after the advent of nuclear weapons. The persistent pronouncement that the strategy of deterrence has saved the world from a more disastrous catastrophe than that of the Second World War will have to be seen also in the context of the commitment of the countries concerned to existing agreements, including their own concept of the non-proliferation régime. A new conceptual framework will have to be developed which would take into account the predominant feature of the present inter-State relations, which seeks to do away with the assumption that the maintenance of peace and international security lies in the domain of the mighty and powerful States. As it is generally realized that the outbreak of nuclear war, by design, accident or miscalculation, will affect the belligerents and non-belligerents alike, efforts to prevent it would have to consider the security interests of all States, nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear weapon States alike. In this nuclear age, the militarily significant States, nuclear-weapon States in particular, should go beyond consideration of their narrow national security interests.

The non-aligned countries, to which Indonesia belongs, far from being helpless spectators in the power game between the East and West, have made and will continue to make their contribution to that objective. Convinced of the need to create such a universally applicable conceptual framework and realizing that the search would undoubtedly take into account their destiny, the non-aligned countries need to demonstrate, as they have shown in the past, their sense of realism, because what is being sought in essence is a new order in international security which places in a subordinate position the dominance of nuclear-weapon

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States and transcends the traditional concepts of military blocs and bilateral or regional defence arrangements. Realizing the important role of the Non-Aligned Movement and the critical juncture at which the world finds itself today, it is incumbent upon the members of that Movement to persist in developing rational approaches on different disarmament issues, in particular those relating to the prevention of nuclear war and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons pending nuclear disarmament.

It is with these considerations in mind that my delegation attaches paramount importance to the deliberations of the First Committee. The apparent loss of momentum as a consequence of the failure of the second special session on disarmament makes it imperative that we rededicate ourselves to the search for concrete disarmament agreements. The results of the deliberations of this Committee on all the items under consideration will constitute an impetus for ongoing negotiations in the Committee on Disarmament and elsewhere. One of the essential tasks in our continuous efforts to streamline the proceedings in our work is the amalgamation of various draft resolutions dealing essentially with identical or similar issues. Such action would result not only in an economy in the paper work of the Secretariat but would also, in the view of my delegation, prove effective in giving useful and concrete guidance in ongoing negotiations.

Issues relating to the prevention of nuclear war and the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons pending their destruction must of necessity be accorded priority consideration. Indonesia has been and will continue to be among those who support concrete and practical measures to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. It is precisely during the present period of strained East-West relations that such action is more urgent than ever before.

As the super-Powers have reached an over-kill capacity in their nuclear arsenals, a freeze with adequate verification of the development and production of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery would not, in the view of my delegation, compromise their legitimate security concerns. On the contrary, it may help the nuclear-weapon States to regain credibility in their faithful commitments to existing agreements, which of late seems to have been waning on the part of certain non-nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

Another field in which the earnest participation of all nuclear-weapon States is regarded as indispensable is the question of the cessation of nuclear-weapon tests. The lack of such participation has been clearly manifested in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test Ban of the Committee on Disarmament. Needless to say, this situation has hampered negotiations on this long-standing issue. My delegation wishes to avail itself of this opportunity to express the hope that the two nuclear-weapon States concerned reconsider their position with a view to taking an active part in the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on a Nuclear Test-Ban at its forthcoming session early next year. The importance of the achievement of the comprehensive test-ban treaty was clearly defined in paragraph 51 of the Final Document which stated, inter alia, that such cessation would contribute significantly to the discontinuance of the qualitative nuclear-weapon arms race and to the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

More recently growing concern has been expressed on the imminent danger of the extension of the arms race into outer space and its ominous consequences. In view of the fact that efforts to halt and reverse the arms race on our planet have so far yielded no meaningful result, it is essential that effective measures be taken at this early stage to forestall a further escalation of the arms race in outer space, which is already recognized as the common heritage of mankind. If the present trend is allowed to continue, we shall undoubtedly be confronted with additional problems of greater magnitude.

In this respect, the Group of 21, to which my country belongs, in the Committee on Disarmament during its recently concluded summer session proposed the establishment of an ad hoc working group to undertake negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement or agreements, as appropriate, to prevent an arms race in outer space in all its aspects.

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

My delegation hopes that this important proposal will receive the concurrence of all the major Powers. The current General Assembly session should encourage these efforts and provide an impetus towards the establishment of that working group.

Although eleven years have elapsed since the adoption of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, no substantive progress has been made in its implementation. In the meantime, tension in the region has been heightened by the increasing rivalry between the super-Powers, resulting in the deterioration of the political and security situation. These considerations prompted my delegation and other non-aligned States to propose the convening of an international conference as the initial step. We are dismayed, however, by the fact that this call of the non-aligned countries has not yet received a positive response from some of the members of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean. We remain convinced that only through dialogue and negotiation will it be possible to resolve many of the complex issues relating to the Declaration. The Ad Hoc Committee should therefore be urged to intensify its efforts and expedite its preparatory work so that an international conference may be convened in Colombo in the near future, and thus fulfil the mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly.

Looking back at the annals of disarmament negotiations, the one important aspect which has continuously blocked their successful conclusion has been the question of establishing an effective international verification mechanism. My delegation is certain that, with the vast possibilities provided by the advance of science and technology, and with the necessary political will, such a system, at the national and international levels combined, could be agreed upon. In this connection, the study on the implications of the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency, prepared by the Secretary-General with the assistance of a group of experts, constitutes a useful basis for further negotiations on the subject.

In the light of the stagnation in practically all disarmament negotiations, views have been expressed on the need to review and improve the effectiveness of relevant machinery. While the Indonesian delegation could to a certain extent go along with such an opinion, it is our considered view that no amount of improvement of the machinery could remedy the perceptions of subjective national security interests and consequent lack of political will on the part of certain States.

(Mr. Sutresna, Indonesia)

My Foreign Minister, in his address to the General Assembly on 30 September, commenting on the Secretary-General's report relating to the erosion of the credibility and effectiveness of multilateral negotiating forums stated:

"It is only through a renewed commitment and dedication to the multilateral approach through the United Nations, through dialogue and negotiations, that we can reverse the dangerous drift towards global disorder, heightened polarization and the revival of blatant power politics." (A/37/PV.12, p. 73-75)

Such a renewed commitment and dedication must be followed up with specific deeds and actions in all multilateral negotiating forums. With regard to disarmament negotiations, my delegation wishes to remind members of this Committee that there is a consensus in the Final Document of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament to the effect that all States have the duty to contribute to efforts in the field of disarmament. Bearing in mind the existence of this consensus, it is indeed regrettable that some States still withhold their co-operation, on the pretext of not prejudicing their particular negotiating positions in other negotiating forums. By so doing they have prevented the Committee on Disarmament from effectively discharging its function as the sole multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations.

With a view to overcoming that situation, the Group of 21 in the Committee on Disarmament has submitted working paper (CD/330) the object of which is to do away with the misuse of the rule of consensus in its rules of procedure. The abuse of that rule has so far prevented the establishment of subsidiary organs for the effective performance of the Committee on Disarmament.

Those are some of Indonesia's views on some issues which my delegation believes to be of particular significance to our work. My delegation reserves its right to intervene again on those issues, as well as on other items of our agenda.

Mr. JAMAL (Qatar) (interpretation from Arabic): First of all I should like to congratulate you, Sir, on your election to the chairmanship of the First Committee. Your great political ability, and the way in which, as the representative of Ghana, a country with which Qatar has friendly relations, you deal with international political issues, is the best possible guarantee of the

success of the Committee's work. I should like also to congratulate the Vice-Chairmen and the Rapporteur on their election to their offices.

I should like also, most warmly and sincerely, to congratulate Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico and Mr. Alva Myrdal on the tribute paid to them by the award of the Nobel Peace Prize. They are two people who, in the First Committee in particular and the United Nations in general, have worked untiringly for - and shown their completely disinterested devotion to, the cause of disarmament - something which directly affects the whole human race. Perhaps the most significant effect of that award is that it has drawn the attention of the world to the importance of the work done in this Committee. That great tribute to those outstanding individuals will provide a further impetus in realizing the goals of disarmament.

My first comment goes almost without saying, that there is a tremendous contrast between the world we are trying to build to realize the hopes of peace-loving peoples through United Nations resolutions and the real world in which we live. Despite the resolutions adopted at the thirty-sixth session on disarmament issues, the situation in the world continues to deteriorate, widening the gap between what is happening in the United Nations and the actual situation, with the destructive rivalry between the two super-Powers, which are striving to extend their hegemonies. That rivalry is in itself the main obstacle to the attainment of any real progress in total nuclear disarmament, and it reflects the lack of trust among States and between those super-Powers in particular.

(Mr. Jamal, Qatar)

This paralysis of international efforts, particularly during the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, is merely a reaction to developments in the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the USSR on medium-range nuclear weapons that began in 1981 and in the strategic arms limitations talks which resumed in 1982. It is common knowledge that these discussions, which are still marking time, are making no progress whatsoever. Differences remain in the various areas of disarmament. Therefore there is a danger to international security at a time when the super-Powers are increasing their military expenditures. In view of the international situation the second special session on disarmament was a step backwards from what had been achieved at the first special session on disarmament. The frustration of the people of the world, who are most disturbed over the future of the human race, is all the greater in that absolutely no tangible progress was made at the second special session on the most urgent disarmament issues, above all on nuclear disarmament. The most devastating nuclear weapons are continuing to be stockpiled in the arsenals of the United States and of the USSR, despite all the efforts and appeals of the people of the world, who are, indeed, most deeply concerned over the possible danger of nuclear war which could erupt for one reason or another, if only through some shortcoming in sophisticated weaponry systems. This imposes on us a heavy responsibility for the fate of mankind. We can only ask: are we to survive or to perish? It is unthinkable that the future of the human race should be jeopardized in this way and should depend on the whims of the big Powers and their greed in international affairs. Yet we must be realistic in tackling these crucial issues: we must recognize at the outset that we can never get out of the deadlock in the work of this Committee without the co-operation of the super-Powers. If we do not get that co-operation, our work will be fruitless. There is one condition for reversing the present trend towards squandering natural and human resources on the stockpiling of devastating and lethal weapons. We must divert these resources to serve development throughout the developing and developed world. In the developing countries the rate of increase in military expenditures exceeds that of the gross national product.

(Mr. Jamal, Qatar)

The sum of \$30 per capita is spent on weapons in the developing world, compared with \$365 in the developed world. That figure far exceeds the annual revenue of low-income people. In other words, the growing military expenditures are stifling any hopes of the social progress to which the developing countries aspire.

In addition, the intensification of the arms race will necessarily lead to a monopoly of current and new technology, which will be used, along with human resources, to serve the arms industry. We cannot know precisely the extent of material resources used to perfect the weapons of mass destruction we refer to as sophisticated weapon systems. Although there are statistics showing that international military expenditures now exceed \$500 billion, it is nevertheless probable that although the figure is astronomical it does not in fact reflect the true situation which is even worse.

The world of today, in which most of the population is suffering the consequences of backwardness and poverty, a world in which millions of children in the third world are dying from malnutrition and lack of medical care, was shocked by a recent report in the United States showing that over the last 30 years Washington spent \$1,300 billion on armaments and propose to spend another \$1,500 billion over the next five years. The amount would be spent by the Pentagon at a time when the American economy is stagnant and unemployment is rife. If we assume that the strength of the other Power - the Soviet Union - is on a par with that of the United States, as claimed in the international press, the amount spent by these two Powers alone during that period will be twice that figure, or about \$5,000 billion. If that astronomical sum were spent on development for the betterment of mankind, imagine what a world we would have! The delegation of Qatar suggests that the Committee consider a draft resolution on an agreement on the non-first use of nuclear weapons. Such an agreement would be an act of faith by the nuclear-weapon States. We also support the proposal of the Group of 21 calling for the establishment of a working group within the Committee on Disarmament the mandate of which would be to engage in multilateral talks on the stages of nuclear disarmament, as described in the Final Document of the first special session on disarmament.

(Mr. Jamal, Qatar)

The delegation of Qatar expresses its concern over the delay in steps to convene an international conference on the implementation of the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. This matter is extremely urgent given the present explosive situation resulting from exacerbation of regional conflicts, on the one hand, and on the other, the increase in the rivalry of the super-Powers over their spheres of influence in the Indian Ocean, the Horn of Africa, the Gulf and the Middle East.

Israeli military adventurism has turned the Middle East into a testing-ground for the most lethal, internationally prohibited weapons such as napalm, cluster bombs and fragmentation bombs, provided to Israel by the United States. It is not simply a fear of future prospects for the problems we fear. Of course, they do represent a threat to the world and to its inhabitants. But they are causing direct suffering to innocent people, to the women, the elderly, the children, of the dispersed Palestinian people.

(Mr. Jamal, Qatar)

Therefore, my delegation urges this Committee to give priority to the declaration of the Middle East as a nuclear-weapon-free zone by compelling Israel, which is practising nuclear terrorism in the area, to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty and submit its nuclear facilities to international inspection.

Moreover, we urge the Committee to appeal to the countries concerned immediately to stop providing Israel and the racist Pretoria régime with fissionable material or any assistance that could help those two Governments to acquire the capacity for producing nuclear weapons.

In this context, we draw the Committee's attention to a dangerous fact that should make us give the highest priority to the proposal. So far a confrontation between the super-Powers has been avoided owing to a delicate nuclear balance, but that balance is now being jeopardized. That has allowed Israel to practise nuclear terrorism, and to get away with it. Similarly, by its recent barbarous crimes that shocked the world, Israel has proved that its racism and vengeance against the Arabs, which have turned it into a ferocious monster in the area, are now stronger than any commitment to ethics, international law, or responsibility towards the future of mankind.

The CHAIRMAN: The list of speakers in the debate for this afternoon has been exhausted.

The representative of Mexico has asked to be allowed to speak in exercise of his right of reply. Before I call on him I should like to draw the Committee's attention to the following decision of the General Assembly, taken at its thirty-fourth session:

"Delegations should exercise their right of reply at the end of the day whenever two meetings have been scheduled for that day and whenever such meetings are devoted to the consideration of the same item.

"The number of interventions in the exercise of the right of reply for any delegation at a given meeting should be limited to two per item.

"The first intervention in the exercise of the right of reply for any delegation on any item at a given meeting should be limited to 10 minutes and the second intervention should be limited to five minutes." (General Assembly decision 34/401, paras. 8-10)

Mr. GARCIA ROBLES (Mexico)(interpretation from Spanish): Rather than a right of reply, I would describe my statement as a right of clarification.

To begin with, I should like to express my gratitude to the Director of the arms control organ of the United States for his kind words when he spoke to the Committee this morning on the award conferred on me and on Mrs. Alva Myrdal, in the form of the 1982 Nobel Peace Prize. But that is not the main reason why I asked to be allowed to speak.

I did so because in Mr. Rostow's eloquent statement we find some points that, in our view, deserve clarification or correction. Among them are the two to which I shall now refer.

The first relates to the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, a question on which the present United States position is incompatible with the commitments undertaken by it in the Treaty on the partial

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

prohibition of nuclear tests almost 20 years ago which proclaims its determination to endeavour to achieve "the permanent banning of all nuclear test explosions" (ENDC/100/Rev.1, p. 2), reaffirmed five years later in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. With respect to this question, the representative of the United States, speaking specifically of the relevant Working Group in the Committee on Disarmament, said the following:

(spoke in English)

"The Soviet Union and its allies, having agreed to the mandate for the Working Group, sought to obstruct effective work in the Group. Then it put forward the proposition that the Working Group had fulfilled its mandate." (A/C.1/37/PV.13, p. 31)

(continued in Spanish)

Mexico, as is well known, is not a member or part of either of the military alliances formed around each of the two great Powers. It would thus be unfair to ignore its position which coincides with that of the Group of 21, namely, that we accept in the mandate of the Ad Hoc Working Group the specific reference to the consideration of questions relating to verification as a temporary concession which in no way renders nugatory the specific statement in the mandate to the effect that the Group:

"will take into account all existing proposals and future initiatives, and will report to the Committee on the progress of its work before the conclusion of the 1982 session. The Committee will thereafter take a decision on subsequent courses of action with a view to fulfilling its responsibilities in this regard." (A/37/27, p. 19, para. 39)

In other words, we would not be ready to agree that the alleged need for a study on verification - something that since 1972 - 10 years ago - was expressly repudiated by the Secretary-General of the United Nations - should be prolonged unnecessarily and used as a smokescreen to try and deceive world public opinion by seeking to make it believe in the carrying out of non-existent substantive negotiations.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

The second point on which I should like to make a few comments relates to the final paragraph in the statement of the representative of the United States in which, speaking about the proposed pastoral letter drawn up by the Committee on War and Peace of the National Conference of Catholic Bishops of the United States the text of which was reproduced to a very large extent in yesterday's edition of The New York Times, he chose to quote from that draft, as if it were the most important, the passage that refers to the obvious and incontrovertible fact that not only nuclear war but war itself must be prevented. Of course no one would even venture to challenge that but it would be perverting the fundamental objective of that draft to claim that that is where the essence lies

Its essence, as anyone who has read it even cursorily will realize, is an unreserved and unambiguous condemnation of nuclear war and what is generally called the first use of nuclear weapons. It was for that reason and in order to restore a proper balance and to place things in their correct perspective that I feel I ought to quote it textually - and I shall do so in English, which was the original language - by recalling some of the paragraphs in the pastoral letter, which was drawn up by the Committee mentioned by Mr. Rostow. The Chairman of that Committee is the Archbishop of Chicago, His Excellency Monsignor Joseph L. Bernadin.

(Mr. Garcia Robles, Mexico)

As regards the dangers entailed by the vast nuclear arsenals accumulated by the super-Powers, the draft pastoral letter says the following:

(spoke in English)

"In the nuclear arsenals of the United States or the Soviet Union alone, there exists a capacity to do something no other age could imagine: we can threaten the created order.... Today the destructive potential of the nuclear Powers threatens the sovereignty of God over the world he has brought into being. We could destroy his work." (The New York Times, 26 October 1982, p. A 22)

(continued in Spanish)

The repudiation of any endeavour to justify a so-called limited nuclear war is to be found in the following terms:

(spoke in English)

"Today the possibilities for placing political and moral limits on nuclear war are so infinitesimal that the moral task, like the medical, is prevention: as a people we must refuse to legitimate the idea of nuclear war." (ibid.)

(continued in Spanish)

As regards the absolutely unreserved and unequivocal condemnation of any first use of nuclear weapons, the draft on which I have been commenting says the following:

(spoke in English)

"The danger of escalation is so great that it is an unacceptable moral risk to initiate nuclear war in any form.... We find the moral responsibility of beginning nuclear war not justified by rational political objectives."

The draft goes on to say these few words with which I shall end my statement:

"We do not perceive any situation in which the deliberate initiation of nuclear warfare, on however restricted a scale, can be morally justified. Non-nuclear attacks by another State must be resisted by other than nuclear means." (ibid.)

(continued in Spanish)

Whoever is acquainted with my delegation's position on this subject will readily understand how encouraging we find the views set forth in that draft pastoral letter.

The meeting rose at 5.55 p.m.