



**VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 12TH MEETING**

Chairman: Mr. GBEHO (Ghana)

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Statements were made by:

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Mr. Belaunde (Peru)  
Mr. Kravets (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic)

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**Distr. GENERAL**  
**A/C.1/37/PV.12**  
**29 October 1982**

**ENGLISH**

The meeting was called to order at 4.50 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 39 to 57, 133, 136, 158 and 139 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. HURD (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland): It gives me great pleasure, Mr. Chairman, to address the First Committee of the General Assembly under your able guidance. We are all aware of your qualifications and experience and it is already clear that the First Committee is in good hands. I should also like to offer my congratulations to the other officers of the Committee.

A year ago it was my privilege to speak at a time when my country held the presidency of the European Community. This year the representative of Denmark has already spoken on behalf of the Community and I associate myself fully with his remarks. I speak today as the Minister responsible for disarmament in the British Government.

Before I go further I must record the deep pleasure which we feel at the award of the Nobel Prize for Peace to two illustrious participants, past and present, in the multilateral work for disarmament, Ambassador Garcia Robles and Mrs. Alva Myrdal.

Since I last spoke in this Committee a year ago the second special session on disarmament has been held and the two countries with the largest arsenals of nuclear weapons have opened discussions for substantial cuts in those arsenals. These have been the two events which have done most to raise our hopes, but we must recognize that in the world outside committee rooms, the world in which people actually live or die, there has been little change in the scale of conflict and suffering. This point was made forcibly to the Committee this morning by the Secretary-General.

(Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom)

As we look around us at South-East Asia, at Afghanistan where the Soviet Union continues to keep an army of 100,000 men, at the tragic events in Lebanon, at the war in the Gulf and as we remember the recent war in the South Atlantic, we can make no other judgement. In Europe we live amidst the greatest concentration of armed forces. A difference of ideology divides East from West and on one side of that division we see a frequent and unwelcome recourse to force. But in Europe we have been spared the open and wide-ranging armed conflict which was part of the experiences of our fathers and grandfathers and which is the daily experience still of many in other parts of the world.

Now the overriding objective in our work, as my Prime Minister, Mrs. Thatcher, said at the special session, is the preservation of peace, of peace with freedom and justice. Within a framework which excludes fear and coercion each of us seeks to develop his own life. The purpose of our Charter is to provide that framework in relations between States. We stand by that Charter, It is only in well-defined circumstances, as a legitimate means of defence, that the use of force can be contemplated. Outside those circumstances its use is sinister and perhaps fatal.

The second special session on disarmament was an event of universal importance, whatever may be said of its immediate results. I think it will be generally agreed that leading statesmen from all over the world gave the debate a remarkable quality. It also attained breadth, because conventional conflict, a matter given little attention by the Committee on Disarmament, was brought within the compass of the debate. It is fair to acknowledge that the outcome of the session was seen by some as a grave disappointment. But those who take this view may wish to ask themselves whether their expectations in the first place were realistic. Peace, it seems to me, is like good health in the body and the special session was akin to a congress of eminent physicians. Points of pain, ailments, underlying imbalance, harmful growths, these were discussed at the special session. It was found impractical to seek, as some tried to do through the comprehensive programme of disarmament, an all-embracing régime which could regulate a variety of ailments. It was seen that cures could not be attained by simple declaration. In the West we attach great importance to verification, to a genuine checking of fact against claim. We were seeking - to extend the analogy - no more than the confirmation of good or improved health which each of us requires in his daily life.

(Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom)

So the verification of arms-control and disarmament agreements calls for openness and a willingness to release information which will give confidence to others. The withholding of information, of course, arouses concern and excites suspicion that plans may be made for the covert use of force. So the guidelines established at the special session for a World Disarmament Campaign were welcome to us because of their potential contribution to greater openness between States. We now look to the Secretariat for detailed proposals for ways of carrying through the guidelines in a balanced and objective manner and in all countries of the world. We look to all countries throughout the world to put into real effect these principles of openness to which they have pledged themselves and which we see as one of the keys to effective disarmament. This is one area where we hope to see the special session bear fruit.

As a nuclear-weapon State we in Britain acknowledge a particular responsibility to seek ways of ensuring that the knowledge of nuclear power is not put to destructive use in war. The responsibility which possession of these weapons imposes is widely discussed in my country and rightly so - it would be strange and unnatural if it were not. My Government shares completely the deep concern of ordinary individuals, including members of the Christian churches, and of many sections of the international community represented here, at the unparalleled destructive power of nuclear weapons. Like them, we look forward to the day when by agreement such weapons can be removed from the stockpiles of all countries. But we cannot let our natural and moral distaste shadow our judgement. Our aim is simple and straightforward; it is peace, freedom and the successful prevention of all war. This has been and will remain the objective of the Western Alliance. The countries of Western Europe were not alone in suffering unprecedented destruction and slaughter, but we did so suffer in the Second World War and so we feel that we can work for nothing less.

We are determined that never again should new generations face the horrors of war. Now none of us believes that nuclear deterrence is ideal. But until we have, through negotiation, achieved an equally safe, equally dependable system for the maintenance of peace in Europe, we see no alternative but to rely on nuclear deterrence.

(Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom)

The ethics of the deterrent are much discussed, but they cannot be considered in the abstract. They have to be considered in the context of the disordered world in which we live. It is a world in which aggression has become commonplace, in which the Charter of the United Nations is respected in words but defied in deed, a world in which millions of people live in societies and under régimes which deny them the fundamentals of freedom. In this troubled world we have managed for several decades to preserve for our peoples peace and freedom. I certainly do not feel that we should be smug or complacent about that, but we judge -- and it is a judgement hard to disprove -- that we have done this by maintaining our deterrent, including its inevitable nuclear components. We do not believe that in the real world of 1982 it is conceivable to think that conventional forces could by themselves provide a deterrent and a safeguard to peace when the potential adversary has an abundance of both conventional and nuclear weapons. We do not mean -- and no one should urge us -- to tilt the world towards uncertainty and the risk of major war by abandoning our deterrent in advance of balanced and verifiable agreements which could, as is our hope, enable us all to reduce our armaments while preserving our security.

But of course we want to move on from this position of anxious and expensive stalemate. No one can be satisfied with the present situation. The first and obvious practical requirement of nuclear disarmament is to reduce the number of nuclear weapons. It is, as this body has recognized many times, for the two countries which have by far the largest arsenals to take the lead. We welcome the fact that they have done so and we look for mutual and substantial reductions to flow from the talks on strategic weapons now being held between the United States and the Soviet Union. We believe these reductions should start with the most destabilizing element, that is to say the land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles.

We have also welcomed the bilateral talks between these two countries about intermediate-range nuclear forces. There the United States, after consulting its allies, has proposed a radical solution. We in the West would be pleased to see scrapped the weapons which the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has decided to deploy -- the American Cruise and Pershing II missiles -- if we can get an agreement to dismantle the existing missiles on the Soviet side -- that is to say the SS4, SS5 and particularly the modern SS20 with its three warheads.

That is the meaning of the zero option which President Reagan has put forward. It represents, in our view, the best chance of an equitable outcome in the intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations which are, we glad to know, continuing seriously in Geneva. In both these negotiations we believe that the West has shown its clear commitment to the real and dramatic reduction in the number of nuclear weapons in the world. We have made our position and our commitment to peace plain and we look now to the Soviet Union to do the same.

My Government is not only concerned about strategic and intermediate-range missiles. There are in Europe many thousands of shorter-range weapons of immense destructive power. The British Government, with its allies, will continue to look for ways to raise the nuclear threshold and to reduce our reliance on nuclear weapons. We shall seize every opportunity of doing so, provided that we can do this without jeopardizing the peace which must be our overriding objective.

(Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom)

Measures for the reduction of nuclear weapons should be complemented by others to restrain their development. Earlier this year the United Kingdom supported the establishment within the Committee on Disarmament of a Working Group to consider verification aspects of a nuclear test ban. The first discussions in Geneva, as is clear from the Group's report, showed notable differences in approach. The Soviet Union has now submitted a draft convention. We find it difficult to see how this draft can contribute to the resolution of differences which are well known. We fear that the draft is in essence a device to brush these differences aside. Two sustained efforts have been made, without success, to conclude a comprehensive test ban. A third attempt can succeed only if there is greater confidence and if answers are sought and found to these important questions of verification.

The destructive power of modern conventional weapons increases day by day, and the outbreak of armed conflict wherever it may occur thus becomes a matter of heightened concern to us all. We regard with particular horror the use of chemical weapons, and for us it is a matter of overriding importance to secure their total elimination.

We believe that chemical weapons have been used against defenceless civilians in South-East Asia - and this, I need hardly say, is a profoundly disturbing conclusion to reach. We have therefore to strengthen the existing international agreements, notably the Geneva Protocol of 1925 under which the use of chemical weapons is already banned, by the adoption of procedures which will make it possible to examine reports of suspicious events and which will strengthen confidence in compliance.

Continuing reports of the use of chemical weapons must impress on us the need for urgent action. If we are to go to the root of the problem we must redouble our efforts for a ban on the development and production of chemical weapons. Here, we have been encouraged by the serious and detailed nature of the discussions in the Committee on Disarmament for a convention. We note the reference to systematic on-site inspections in the basic provisions for a chemical-weapon convention submitted by the Soviet Union. At the next session of the Committee on Disarmament we look for further progress and for additional clarification from the Soviet Union of the scope of its proposals for verification.

(Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom)

The special session confirmed the interest of all countries in joining in discussions about disarmament. No Government can ignore the frequency and scale of conflict involving conventional weapons or the fact that the toll from 140 such conflicts since 1945, since the foundation of this Organization, rises to over 10 million dead. We all maintain conventional forces, and some of us maintain large forces. We would all prefer to devote to other purposes the resources which we at present spend on maintaining our conventional defence forces. Some of us would like to see a large reduction in their numbers. As the British Prime Minister said at the special session, we need a deeper and wider effort throughout the non-nuclear field to see what we can do together to lighten the risks, the burdens and the fears.

I should like to put forward three ideas on this subject today, making clear that they are not proposals by the British Government for specific measures; but I offer them for consideration as ways in which the risk of conflict might be reduced, security improved and the burden of military expenditure lightened for us all.

First, the Secretary-General's Group of Experts, under the chairmanship of Denmark, has been given the very wide commission of studying conventional disarmament. There is general concern at the accumulation throughout the world of conventional weapons, many of them infinitely more sophisticated and destructive than those used in the Second World War. We find however that we are without reliable data about this accumulation. We need to know more about production and supply. As a first step, I believe that the Group of Experts should recommend that all States report to the United Nations the value of their military production and of their imports and exports of arms. In this way the Centre for Disarmament could establish a means of monitoring in a universal, non-discriminatory manner measures taken to restrain the accumulation of conventional weapons.

Secondly, there is the question of defence spending. World spending on armed forces - now reckoned by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) at over \$600 billion per annum - is equivalent to the annual income of the poorest half of the world's population. Here, too, there is a

(Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom)

requirement for agreed data. The groundwork has been laid by the Secretary-General's Group on the reduction of military budgets. They have designed a standardized system for measuring and comparing military expenditures. What is now needed is that all States, including those in Eastern Europe, should complete the matrix and so establish the data base from which reductions in defence expenditure can be sought.

Thirdly, another of the Secretary-General's Group of Experts has concluded an important report on disarmament and development. Now we do not accept all the assumptions in that report. We do not, for example, think that the link between disarmament and development is in any way automatic. But we share with the authors of the report a fundamental belief that too much of the world's resources is dedicated to armaments and defence and too small a part to development. This is something that must concern all countries whether they give or receive economic aid. The latest issue of the publication World Military and Social Expenditure shows striking differences between the aid programmes of industrialized countries. It shows that the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, for example, allocate nine times as much to their aid programmes as the Warsaw Pact countries and other States in the Western groups over twice as much as the East. Should we not ask those countries with significant military expenditure to report in a form which would permit comparison of what they spend on defence and development?

I hope that those ideas will be thought worthy of study and consideration.

In conclusion, I would remind the Committee that in the several East-West negotiations for conventional and nuclear disarmament, the West has placed fresh proposals on the table. I think that we in Britain have played our full part in the development of these proposals and we stand ready to do what we can in accepting our responsibility to help bring the negotiations which I have described to a successful conclusion. We want to get on with this task because it is pressing for all of us. We continue to be guided by, and will hold to, the principle that if disarmament agreements are to increase security - and that must be their first aim - they must be balanced and, above all, they must be verifiable. They must give real confidence that they will be

(Mr. Hurd, United Kingdom)

observed and that as a result of them the world will be a safer place. On the basis of this principle we will continue to look carefully and constructively at any initiatives from other countries, because we certainly do not believe that we have a monopoly of wisdom in these matters. We look to the Soviet Union and its partners in the East for similarly constructive responses to our Western proposals. We look for their co-operation in showing that balanced, verifiable agreements can be achieved and that they constitute the only sensible, realistic path to peace.

Those whom we represent are looking for action in these matters, not simply for a multiplication of words. The task of ensuring a more certain peace throughout the world falls, clearly, heavily upon our shoulders. The responsibility belongs to all of us, and in our conviction we must not fail.

Mr. BELAUNDE (Peru)(interpretation from Spanish): Permit me to begin by congratulating you, Sir, on your election to the post of Chairman of the First Committee. My delegation has no doubt that your well-known professional qualities and personal qualifications make of you the most fitting person to guide our work to a fitting conclusion.

I also wish to associate myself with the many representatives who have spoken before me and to express Peru's deep satisfaction at the well-deserved award of the Nobel Peace Prize to Mrs. Myrdal and Ambassador Garcia Robles. In the case of Ambassador Garcia Robles, that prestigious prize is a source of pride to his fellow Latin Americans, since he is the chief author of the Tlatelolco Treaty which established the first nuclear-free zone in the world.

(Mr. Belaunde, Peru)

The delegation of Peru believes that the time has come to call a halt to the debates and negotiations on disarmament and to cast a critical glance at the situation as it appears today. It is a well-known fact that the march towards the goals of disarmament is hindered by many obstacles and that in the present phase the march has come to a complete halt. Indeed it may be said that the object of the partial achievements in the field of disarmament was not, strictly speaking, disarmament - that is to say, a reduction in past levels of armaments. Agreements implying effective disarmament, namely, reversal of the arms race, are the exception rather than the rule and if any were concluded in the past, this has not been the case in relatively recent times. What we have witnessed is an agreement not to exceed certain still relatively remote limits at the time of agreement or not to proliferate in certain directions in respect of certain types of weapons or not to pollute with weapons certain environments - in fact, cases that are well known. One of the foregoing has led to the effective reduction of past levels of armaments or, to use a more plastic expression, none of it thus far has led to a true reversal of the arms race.

However, despite the gravity of the present situation, which was emphasized by the Secretary-General in his report to the General Assembly, my country believes that at present we have a markedly optimistic and hopeful element and this belief is based on the fact that, while it is true that there is great uncertainty about the international situation, there is also a manifest and universal desire for peace. In other words my Government believes that no Power, large, small or medium-sized, at present nourishes the intent to solve the problems and uncertainties of the present situation through recourse to war. My Government believes that the present situation after all differs from the pre-war situation through which mankind lived in the last years of the 1930s in which a number of Powers were ostensibly preparing for a war of aggression. We believe that this is not the case today and that no State capable of unleashing a war of catastrophic consequences wishes to do so, nor is it seriously considering it as a possibility in its policy, nor is it in any sense preparing for it, in spite of the fact that never has the arms race been so

(Mr. Belaunde, Peru)

intense. The situation today is less reminiscent of the period before the 1939 war, than that preceding the war of 1914, a war nobody wanted but which nevertheless occurred as an inexorable destiny, due in part to the mechanism of the alliances themselves. At present we have an advantage over the situation prevailing 70 years ago when there was no international organization in which to discuss problems, measure consequences over actions or seek a way out that would not be disastrous for all. Perhaps we have become too accustomed to the world Organization to realize the extent to which the maintenance of peace depends on it.

If today the arms race is continuing more frenziedly than ever despite the fact that, in our view, no one nourishes the desire for a war of aggression, it is because to ensure disarmament it is not enough to desire peace. It is necessary, in addition, to create a climate of confidence out of which there may emerge for the various Powers a safer more reasonable strategic option than that of placing all trust in weapons.

The arms race responds to a natural reflect in human beings, even in those desiring peace. As the Roman saying goes, Si vis pacem para bellum.

The desire for disarmament claims to be the dialectic negation of that maxim a negation or dialectic condition that is all the more indispensable today since war is unthinkable.

But the negation or dialectic solution is not the negation as such. It is the dialectic conquest of what is assumed to be the truth and is as valid today as it ever was. That is why disarmament can only be achieved if it appears to all the parties concerned as the best possible strategic option.

The delegation of Peru believes that the much commented upon failure of the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and the as yet meagre results of disarmament negotiations stem from the fact that the problem has perhaps not been broached in an equitable manner and the disarmament debate has been allowed to form part of an element within the over-all strategic game of a sector, since it has been presented as a pernicious approach to the strategic game of the other side.

(Mr. Belaunde, Peru)

In the opinion of the delegation of Peru, such an approach could not lead to positive progress in the field of disarmament, and this explains the deadlock that marked the last stages of negotiations. We believe, however, that the state of affairs was noted by a group of delegations from the non-aligned countries towards the end of the second special session on disarmament. While it did not lead to progress, it is to be hoped that recognition of that shortcoming in the approach to the question may be a condition that will open up possibilities for important achievements in the immediate future.

I should like to elaborate somewhat on this idea in what I have still to say on this occasion. It is well known that disarmament is one of the aims of the United Nations, but that that aim has an additional value in the face of an even more fundamental purpose, namely, the prevention and condemnation of wars of aggression which make the United Nations the world system of collective security. Now there is the risk that in making too much progress unilaterally in certain initiatives on disarmament, the debate on disarmament itself, may interfere with the legal structure of the principles and true policies of collective security.

The United Nations Charter compels us to refrain from the threat or use of force, independently of the weapons used by the aggressor, whether actual or potential, and none of the texts involving the legal structure of collective security, whether it be the Charter itself, resolutions or supplementary declarations, such as for instance the definition of aggression, conditions defence to the use of particular weapons. Let us then lay stress on the essentials. Aggression is condemned not so much in terms of the weapons used to perpetrate it; defence is organized leaving the choice of weapons to the dictates of circumstances. It would be incorrect to say that in this system the qualification of weapons lacks significance, for instance, as one of the elements of judgement to be taken into account under article 2 of the definition of aggression to determine whether in fact that aggression has occurred. The delegation of Peru considers that the debate on disarmament should respect that basic legal structure of collective security, since otherwise we either move towards failure, as has happened up to now, or we tend to create a factor of insecurity highly harmful to the maintenance of peace.

(Mr. Belaunde, Peru)

The delegation of Peru is firmly convinced that it is for the medium-sized and small Powers to represent the moral conscience of mankind clamouring for disarmament - above all, nuclear disarmament - and I believe it the duty and right of our countries to call upon the nuclear Powers to follow suit in terms of the commitments we have undertaken, in particular in relation to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, to carry this duty and right to the extreme of playing a dangerous game in the system of collective security might be a suicidal exercise. In general, in any attempt to impose on the great Powers what we believe would be their best strategic option, or, what is even worse, to presume to deny them the right of free choice, there is a non sequitur which is not only sterile but politically counter-productive and, what is more, is not in keeping with the manner in which we affirm our own sovereignty in the determination of our own defence options within our own rather more limited sphere of action.

Disarmament, as we have already said, if it is to be accepted by large and small alike, can only come about in so far as it is an intrinsically valid strategic alternative, and to the extent that because of its salutary effects on the international situation it represents the best option for all of the parties concerned. The difficulties in disarmament obviously lie in this fact, and it is equally clear that any deviation from this basic line leads to deadlock. The difficulties are immense; this we know, and facts demonstrate it daily. But if we are able to pursue this course the prize will be boundless for all of us, because only thus in infinite terms can we value disarmament which may mean the salvation of mankind.

This reasoning, which applies to disarmament as a whole, is the basic postulate which, in Peru's view, should inspire every one of the aspects of a comprehensive programme of disarmament such as the one we are involved in. The fundamental aspects are its gradual nature, as well as verification and control. But we see that both aspects are closely linked. Disarmament should be gradual and verifiable throughout the entire process so that any non-compliance will not give the violator an irreversible advantage. That is obvious. But it follows that it is not possible to determine the progression or chronology of substantive disarmament measures without at the same time establishing procedural verification and control measures, not only on paper but also in terms of effective compliance.

Peru believes that all methods leading to verification of disarmament agreements should be explored and, if necessary, used, without exception. There are methods which certain great Powers possessing the necessary means, can apply on their own without the need for international co-operation directed towards that very purpose. We are already well acquainted with the importance acquired, thanks to relatively recent technological developments, by certain forms of remote sensing. But this is not enough. We believe it necessary to exercise actuarial control over expenditures on armaments and military forces, which presupposes some publicity on military budgets. Peru is keenly interested in the work done by experts at the United Nations in this field, believing as we do that it is a course that we shall have to follow if we are to achieve genuine disarmament. Lastly, at some point it will be necessary to create an international system of on-site inspections, both routine and, possibly, of a more specific nature.

In short, the problem of disarmament is not a series of independent questions of verification, control and balance, but rather a convergence of overlapping questions.

I wish to conclude by expressing my country's firm support for the goals of disarmament as one of the fundamental tasks of the United Nations. We are not afraid of the arduous task ahead, nor are we disappointed by the meagre results achieved thus far, for we believe that they were only to be expected. We believe, as we have already said, that disarmament is a most difficult objective to achieve, but it is worth the effort, because the rewards would be infinite. That is why, within its limited means, Peru will spare no effort to that end, and at the same time it views with keen interest the efforts made by other States. In particular, my country endorses the concept of the World Disarmament Campaign the object of which will be to awaken the conscience of our peoples to the risks of the arms race and to the need to put an end to it.

But more than clamouring, with the rest of mankind, for the kind of disarmament that may save us from a nuclear holocaust, my country, my President and my Government are in quest of some beacon to light our way in the pursuit of this difficult objective - of a steady hand at the helm, guided by the intelligence and will that may steer us safely through the Scylla and Charybdis of the disarmament problem and lead us into the safe haven of a stable peace which would be the best defence for all.

Mr. KRAVETS (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR congratulates you cordially, Sir, on your election to the high post of Chairman of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly. Your far-reaching knowledge and outstanding diplomatic abilities are well-known to us all, having worked together with you in other United Nations bodies. We wish you and the other officers of the Committee success in the discharge of your responsible and extremely onerous tasks.

May I also associate myself with the congratulations addressed to Ambassador Garcia Robles and Mrs. Myrdal on the occasion of the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to them.

With reference to the problems of limitation of the arms race and disarmament, we cannot fail to note that at the beginning of the 1980s the world finds itself faced with the danger of nuclear war. That threat, which it had proved possible to ease in the 1970s through the development of the process of détente and the conclusion of a number of important bilateral and multilateral agreements, has now grown as never before. This dangerous turn of events not only undermines all the positive gains made in international relations, but is bringing mankind to the brink of the nuclear abyss.

It has been the result of a sharp change in the policy of the imperialist Powers - primarily the United States. Acting at variance with the agreements assumed in the 1970s, the United States Administration has openly proclaimed the admissibility of nuclear conflict and is elaborating its various variants and scenarios. Instead of a realistic understanding of the fact that any use of nuclear weapons will invariably lead to a global catastrophe, it is building its strategy on the first-use of nuclear weapons, in the hope of emerging victorious from a nuclear clash.

Discarding the doctrine of strategic balance and stability with gradual declining levels of military arsenals, the United States is openly striving to attain military supremacy for itself, to create new types of weapons and to deploy them in various parts of the world thousands of miles from the territory of the United States.

(Mr. Kravets, Ukrainian SSR)

With that objective in mind, the United States has relegated to a subordinate position the negotiations on the limitation of the arms race and disarmament. Many of these negotiations, through the fault of the United States, have been suspended or obstructed and agreements previously reached have been ignored. That course will inevitably lead to an increase in confrontation, drawing countries into a new and even more dangerous and costly escalation of the arms race. It makes the prevention of nuclear war a vital and essential task. Resolute and prompt measures are required to halt the endless accumulation of weapons of ever-increasing destructive force and to ensure a radical change in the solution of the problem of arms limitation and disarmament, particularly in the nuclear sphere.

So far as the socialist countries are concerned, as emphasized in the communiqué of the meeting of the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty held in Moscow on 21 to 22 October 1982, they will continue to do their utmost to halt the increase in tension in the world and to remove the danger of war, and to achieve progress in the sphere of limitation and reduction of weapons, particularly nuclear weapons.

It is high time to put an end to the insanity of the arms race and demonstrate a responsible and constructive approach to the fate of the world and of mankind. In so doing, urgent and specific action is required. An example of that approach is the historic step taken by the Soviet Union in assuming on a unilateral basis the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. That step is an effective and real contribution towards the prevention of nuclear conflict and the prohibition of nuclear weapons. That was done in response to the declaration adopted last year by the General Assembly on the prevention of a nuclear catastrophe.

The General Assembly must appeal to other nuclear Powers to assume similar obligations. That would virtually eliminate the probability of an outbreak of nuclear war and would strengthen trust, build confidence and lead to progress in the field of disarmament. The great significance of such a step were it to

(Mr. Kravets, Ukrainian SSR)

be undertaken by all the nuclear Powers has been shown to in statements made in the general debate in the First Committee by the representatives of Mexico, Sri Lanka, Ethiopia and many other countries. Unfortunately, the United States has not only not followed the example of the Soviet Union but it has been trying to discredit the Soviet initiative. In particular, the United States has referred to the possibility of conflicts involving the use of conventional weapons. How is it possible to account for the negative attitude of the United States and its allies towards another Soviet proposal, that for the conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations, which would rule out the use of any weapons for purposes of aggression and would put further obstacles in the way of any kind of war. The United States and various other member countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) put matters in such a way as to make it appear that the obligation not to make the first use of nuclear weapons would in some sense undermine the security of that military bloc. What is there to prevent the United States and its NATO allies in that case from adopting the proposal made as far back as 1979 by the States members of the Warsaw Treaty to the effect that all States taking part in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe should agree not to be the first to use any weapons, nuclear or conventional, against each other? The arguments adduced by the critics of the Soviet initiative have many loose ends.

It is quite clear that any concrete initiative, any practical step in the sphere of the limitation of the arms race that affects the United States military programmes and stands in the way of the policy of attaining military supremacy is held by the United States on one pretext or another to be inappropriate, or is simply scrapped.

Also at this session a practical contribution by the United States delegation to the joint quest for ways and means of curbing the arms race has been expressed merely by introducing into the discussion a spirit of confrontation, a blatant and unceremonious interference in the internal affairs of sovereign States.

The question of not being the first to use nuclear weapons has become a political watershed which now divides those parties which see the necessity for the adoption of urgent measures to prevent another nuclear war and take concrete steps towards that end and those who, by avoiding such measures, in practice rely on the first use of nuclear weapons and on victory in a nuclear war. In this connection we would recall that in the document adopted by the second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament it is said that the prevention of nuclear war "... remains the most acute and urgent task of the present day." (A/S-12/32, para. 62) The General Assembly urges all States to consider as soon as possible relevant proposals and thereby ensure that the survival of mankind would not be endangered. That applies also to the proposal for the adoption by all nuclear States of an obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR is convinced that the sooner such obligations are undertaken the closer countries will get to a solution on the over-riding problem of our age, the maintenance of peace.

The complete cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests by all States and in all environments would also be a major step towards the lessening of the nuclear threat. In the communiqué of the member States of the Warsaw Treaty to which I have referred, those States emphasized that question particularly among disarmament problems as a whole in the light of its significance to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the fact that the negotiations are close to completion. The adoption of this long overdue measure is urged by the overwhelming majority of Member States of the United Nations and every year the resolutions of the General Assembly call for its implementation. In the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly on disarmament emphasis was laid on the need for urgent preparation of an international agreement on this question. Moreover, the provisions of the 1963 Moscow Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons contain clear obligations on the part of States parties to that Treaty to put an end to nuclear-weapon tests. The present international situation makes that a particularly urgent and relevant problem.

The positive experience accumulated in the discussions on this matter at the United Nations, the Committee on Disarmament and the tripartite negotiations provide all the necessary prerequisites for a successful and prompt solution, provided of course that the political will towards that end and a genuine desire exist - primarily on the part of the nuclear Powers.

(Mr. Kravets, Ukrainian SSR)

What is needed is concrete action and a readiness to resolve the question, a question which has been driven into a dead end as a result of the obstructionist policy of various nuclear Powers, particularly the United States, which have suspended the tripartite negotiations and embarked upon a policy of a further and unbridled accumulation, and the further improvement, of their nuclear arsenals, desiring in this way to remain free to test new types of nuclear weapons. The basic provisions of a draft treaty on the immediate cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, introduced by the Soviet Union, form a constructive and concrete contribution to the prompt attainment of an appropriate agreement and make possible to move from the present state of deadlock to the initiation of some progress on this problem.

The new Soviet proposal is directly linked to the task of the prevention of nuclear war. Its realization would erect barriers to the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and the creation of new, ever more destructive types and systems of such weapons, and promote the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime regarding nuclear weapons. This latter point is particularly important in the light of the immense danger posed by, for example, the nuclear ambitions of the militarists of Israel and the racist régime of South Africa.

As already pointed out in the Committee, the basic provisions of the draft treaty take into account all the positive elements, including the level of agreement so far achieved in the negotiations on the cessation and prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, including the tripartite talks, in which agreement has been virtually reached on the text of a draft treaty, with the exception of its individual provisions, basically of a technical nature.

Account has been taken of the considerations advanced by a number of States, particularly in respect of control questions. The relevant sections of the basic provisions of the draft treaty combine national and international control measures and provide for consultation and co-operation among States, the international exchange of information and seismic data, the establishment of a committee of experts, the use of international procedures through the United Nations, the conduct of on-site inspections on a voluntary basis, and a number of other measures, including the establishment of international centres for seismic data and so on.

(Mr. Kravets, Ukrainian SSR)

The constructive nature of this proposal is evidenced also by the fact that it provides for the entry into force of the draft treaty for a limited agreed period even if the only parties to it are the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom. The delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic calls upon all delegations to support this new initiative and to make their contribution to the solution of the problem of nuclear-weapon tests. Such a solution would also be promoted by the resumption of the tripartite negotiations and the ratification, on a dual basis, of the Treaties concluded in 1974 and 1976 between the Soviet Union and the United States, on the limitation of underground nuclear explosions of a capacity of up to 150 kilotons and on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

The creation of more favourable conditions for the elaboration and conclusion of a draft treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests would be promoted by the establishment, from an agreed date, for the period of the negotiations, of a moratorium on all nuclear explosions.

My delegation deems it essential that the text of the basic provisions of the draft treaty, after discussion in the First Committee, should be forwarded for consideration to the Committee on Disarmament, together with all the proposals and considerations put forward during the present session for the commencement, as an urgent matter, of practical negotiations on this pressing and important problem, which calls for immediate solution.

In the light of the military danger hanging over the world there is one point which is of exceptional importance and relevance, and that is the proposal to increase efforts to eliminate the threat of a nuclear war and guarantee the safe development of nuclear energy. This question is of great practical significance on account of the rapid development of nuclear energy. At a time when scientific and technological progress is resulting in a steady increase throughout the world in the number of atomic power stations, research reactors, plants producing and processing nuclear fuel, storage sites for fissionable material and other similar facilities, we believe that nuclear energy must serve only peaceful purposes, for the sake of the progress and development of all mankind.

(Mr. Kravets, Ukrainian SSR)

Therefore, the tasks involved in the prevention of the outbreak of nuclear war and the implementation of the programme of nuclear disarmament and the guarantee of safe development of nuclear energy are closely interrelated.

It has already been pointed out by experts that the destruction of one atomic power station would be equivalent, in terms of the consequent radioactive contamination, to the explosion of a nuclear bomb and from the long-term point of view it would be tens of times more serious, and that the extent of the dissemination of radiation would sometimes go beyond the boundaries of the country under attack. Taking into account the fall-out of radioactive substances and the consequent radioactive contamination of large areas, such destruction, even using conventional weapons, would in practice be equivalent to an attack with nuclear weapons, which, according to the United Nations Declaration on the Prevention of a Nuclear Catastrophe, would be "the gravest crime against humanity" (General Assembly resolution 36/100, operative para. 1).

It is not difficult to imagine the catastrophic consequences of a global nature which would occur as a result of the massive destruction of the peaceful nuclear facilities in any country or group of countries, particularly if nuclear weapons were used for that purpose. There are hundreds of peaceful nuclear facilities in the world now, and more are planned or under construction. We feel that all States, both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States, which are interested in the safe development of nuclear energy must also to an equal extent be interested in making sure that the premeditated destruction of peaceful nuclear facilities which could cause a nuclear war must not be allowed.

The bandit-like attack by Israel on Iraq's peaceful nuclear centre only confirms the need for the adoption of concrete and urgent measures in this field.

Of course, the complete provision of guarantees that nuclear energy will be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and the full elimination of even the possibility of nuclear weapons calls for the intensification of the efforts of all States in the fulfilment of the task and in the long run for the elimination of nuclear arsenals.

(Mr. Kravets, Ukrainian SSR)

The task of providing for the safe development of nuclear energy must be fulfilled in combination with other measures to eliminate the threat of nuclear war and the implementation of nuclear disarmament. Moreover, further development of international co-operation in the peaceful uses of the atom is unthinkable if the nuclear arms race continues; therefore, together with measures to prevent attacks on peaceful nuclear facilities, even with the use of conventional weapons, it is essential as a first step towards the cessation of the build-up of nuclear arsenals and their elimination to bring about a freeze by all nuclear-weapon States on the production and deployment of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery as well as on the production of fissionable materials for purposes of manufacturing nuclear weapons. Broad circles of public opinion of all continents are calling out for such measures, as is well known.

The delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic has in today's statement touched on questions relating to the problem of the prevention of nuclear war. During the discussion in this First Committee we shall again have an opportunity to outline our position on other questions relating to the limitation of the arms race and to disarmament.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.