



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 32ND MEETING

Chairman: Mr. NAIK (Pakistan)
later: Mr. MULLOY (Ireland)
(Vice-Chairman)

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PROGRAMME OF WORK

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ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 31 TO 49 AND 121 (continued)

Mr. ELLIOTT (Belgium) (interpretation from French): Belgium is a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.17, dealing with the report of the Secretary-General on regional disarmament. In fact my country has for many years been promoting a regional approach to disarmament questions and arms control.

After the hopes placed in the negotiation of general and complete disarmament were dashed for the foreseeable future, all efforts naturally shifted towards a gradual weapon-type by weapon-type approach, in the context of a broad range of arms control measures ranging from non-armament to partial disarmament. That progression, which could be termed vertical, did not fail to produce concrete and important results, particularly with respect to weapons of mass destruction. However, one cannot overlook the slow rate of progress achieved in this field, a slowness that can be gauged both subjectively, when compared with the frustrated hopes, and objectively, when compared with what would be necessary to halt the nuclear and conventional arms race.

At the same time, another approach was tried from time to time, which consisted of applying to a given region a particular set of arms control measures best suited to it without waiting for such measures to be equally acceptable to all the other regions of the world.

(Mr. Elliott, Belgium)

That progression towards the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament, which could be described as a horizontal progression, soon established its pedigree with the conclusion of the treaty on the Antarctic, as far back as 1959. It subsequently won its greatest laurels to date with the conclusion in 1967 of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the Treaty of Tlatelolco.

But what has drawn my country's particular attention to the still largely unexplored resources of a regional approach to disarmament and arms control were the efforts made in its own region in Europe, regional efforts in which Belgium participated most actively. I refer to the Final Act of the Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and the Vienna Negotiations on the Mutual Reduction of Forces and Armaments and Associated Measures in Central Europe.

It appeared to us from past experience that the regional approach could usefully prepare and favour a global approach, provided that the region were judiciously defined, that States having territories or forces in the region shared the same desire for achieving an understanding, that thorough attention were paid to the harmonization of relations between the region concerned and the rest of the world, and that measures adopted at the regional level were compatible with what is at present planned or envisaged at the world level, in the context of a future general and complete disarmament. It seemed to us that horizontal progression towards the ultimate objective of general and complete disarmament could very advantageously supplement and, to some extent bolster, the over-all attempts towards vertical progression. We arrived at the conclusion that it would be useful to promote within the international community a detailed study of the concept of regional disarmament with a view to its appropriate application wherever possible.

(Mr. Elliott, Belgium)

It was in December 1977, during the thirty-second session of the General Assembly, that we obtained sufficient support for the establishment of an enquiry to be carried out among States by the Secretary-General with respect to the regional aspects of disarmament, including measures designed to increase confidence and stability as well as means of promoting disarmament on a regional basis. The views obtained from the 28 Governments that responded to the enquiry were submitted to the General Assembly at its special session devoted to disarmament in 1978. The General Assembly, in considering the Final Document, took due note of the interest in the efforts which were made at both the regional and the global levels.

It was thus possible, in December 1978, during the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, to decide on a systematic study of all the aspects of regional disarmament. Under its resolution 33/91 E, the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to carry out the study with the assistance of a group of qualified governmental experts, appointed by him on a balanced geographical basis.

The Secretary-General appointed 10 experts, whose great competence is apparent from the fact that you, Mr. Chairman, were one of them. The group of experts completed its study in August 1980. It unanimously adopted the final draft, which is the one the Secretary-General submitted to the Assembly in his report dated 8 October 1980 (A/35/416).

That report begins with a detailed review of past and present efforts to achieve regional disarmament. The balance-sheet is an eminently healthy one and is proof of the potential fruitfulness of the concept of regional disarmament. The experts were right to have carried out an exhaustive study since experience is the primary fount of all learning.

(Mr. Elliott, Belgium)

The core of the study consists in the consideration of the very concept of regional disarmament, its objectives and its importance, of the nature of the "region" considered in the context of disarmament, the application of the principles governing disarmament in general to regional disarmament and the principles and specific guidelines of a regional approach. It is particularly in that chapter that solutions are provided to the questions of the compatibility of regional disarmament both with global disarmament and with the security needs of the countries outside the region. It is also in that chapter that there appears the golden rule of the need for initiatives within each of the States of the region itself since they are in a better position to judge their own security needs and the special conditions prevailing in the region concerned.

The study comprises, moreover, a list of disarmament and arms control measures which appear to lend themselves, some better than others, to regional application. That list, patterned as it is on the elements of a comprehensive disarmament programme prepared by the United Nations Disarmament Commission, covers the entire spectrum, ranging from the most ambitious to the most modest proposals, and includes both the nuclear and conventional fields. Finally, in their conclusions the experts recommend in particular that studies be undertaken at the level of the various regions.

The report of the Secretary-General thus constitutes a document the value of which for the cause of disarmament is beyond question. Thus the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.17 quite rightly invite the General Assembly to take note of that report with appreciation and to commend its substance to the attention of all States. Since it is now up to States to continue such efforts, each within its region, the wisest course would be to ascertain the views of individual States on that study, for submission to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth regular session.

(Mr. Elliott, Belgium)

Finally, in the light of what I have said, the sponsors of the draft resolution are fully justified in inviting the General Assembly to express the hope that the study submitted to it and the means of dissemination and thorough consideration of which it will decide upon, will encourage Governments to take initiatives and consult each other within the various regions in order to agree on appropriate regional disarmament measures.

It is appropriate to emphasize here that this draft resolution does not come from any particular region; it reflects the concerns of all regions, but it is for the individual States in each region to implement its provisions. On the basis of these considerations, our draft resolution should command the broadest co-sponsorship and obtain a consensus in this Assembly.

Belgium is deeply grateful to all the countries which, thanks to their friendly understanding and invaluable assistance, have ensured the promotion of its initiative in favour of a regional approach to disarmament and arms control questions.

The CHAIRMAN: I call upon the representative of Sri Lanka who will introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean (A/35/29).

Mr. BALASUBRAMANIAM (Sri Lanka), Chairman, Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean: It is my pleasure and privilege to introduce in the Committee today the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, which is contained in document A/35/29.

In reviewing the work of the Ad Hoc Committee during the current year it becomes apparent that it has reached a crucial stage. Although the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace remains to be translated into action, certain vital and significant steps towards the attainment of this eventual goal have been taken recently.

Among these are: first, the meeting of the littoral and hinterland States, held last year; secondly, the decision of the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session to convene a conference on the Indian Ocean in Colombo, Sri Lanka, in 1981; thirdly, the virtual doubling of the membership of the Ad Hoc Committee from 23 to 45 members, and the inclusion of all the permanent members in its membership; and, fourthly, the adoption by consensus in the Ad Hoc Committee of the draft resolution contained in the report before us.

This year marks the tenth anniversary of the introduction of the resolution on the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, and it is significant that the present draft resolution was adopted by consensus in the Ad Hoc Committee, in contrast to past years.

The four positive developments I have mentioned no doubt signify a new stage in the progress towards the realization of our objectives.

Against this background of hope and optimism, it has been sad indeed to witness the increase in tension and unrest spreading in the Indian Ocean area during the year, posing a threat to peace and stability in the region.

These developments had their inevitable repercussions on the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, as well as on the progress towards our goal. It was precisely the need to take pre-emptive action to prevent these developments which prompted certain countries to take the initiative to have the Assembly declare the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

(Mr. Balasubramaniam, Chairman,
Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean)

After the Second World War, despite the massive development of strategic weapons which could be deployed in the oceans of the world, the Indian Ocean was, until recently, largely spared the stresses exerted by great-Power military considerations that had long been endemic to some other oceans of the world. Moreover, this situation has steadily worsened, resulting in ominous new developments which are detrimental to the arms limitation and disarmament objectives and, in particular, to peace and stability in the Indian Ocean region. What we are witnessing today is, in fact, a vindication of the ideas which inspired our approach when the idea of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean was first broached.

The difficult context in which we must now endeavour to fulfil our task, including the preparations for and the holding of the Indian Ocean Conference, should be obvious to all. What I should like to stress, however, is that the deteriorating conditions in the Indian Ocean should not lead to a sense of futility and defeatism. The magnitude of the immediate problems must not be allowed to diminish our commitment to our final goals in a larger time frame.

May I now invite the Committee's attention to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee contained in document A/35/29. The Ad Hoc Committee had a very busy schedule this year. Pursuant to General Assembly resolutions 34/80 A and B, which renewed the general mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee and requested it to undertake preparatory work for the conference, the Committee met in three sessions and held a total of 39 formal as well as a number of informal meetings. As far as the Ad Hoc Committee's report is concerned, members will notice that after an introductory section, it gives an account of the work of the Ad Hoc Committee, including that related to the expansion of the Committee and the preparatory work for the conference on the Indian Ocean.

Despite the difficulties involved, the Committee, as a result of the spirit of compromise and accommodation displayed by everyone concerned, managed to implement successfully the provisions of operative paragraph 1 of resolution 34/80 B. By that resolution, the General Assembly

(Mr. Balasubramaniam, Chairman,
Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean)

decided to enlarge the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean by the addition of new members to be appointed by the President of the General Assembly on the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee. This process of enlargement of the Committee was preceded by the expansion of the Committee through the addition of the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean, who were invited by the General Assembly to serve on the expanded Committee. As a result, I am happy to report that currently all five permanent members of the Security Council participate as full members of the Committee.

And here I should like to point out that, since its establishment in 1972, one of the major concerns of the Ad Hoc Committee has been to secure the co-operation and support of the great Powers, the permanent members of the Security Council and the major maritime users of the Indian Ocean. It will be recalled that the Ad Hoc Committee had repeatedly invited those States to co-operate with it in the discharge of its functions. We are, therefore, grateful to the members who have accepted the General Assembly's invitation, and I am confident their presence in the Committee, as well as that of other new members, will contribute not only to the greater success of the Committee but also to the cause of international peace and security as a whole.

With the admission of new members, resulting in a more balanced representation and reflecting a diversity of views, the Committee has taken a significant stride towards a realistic approach to implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

Having resolved the membership issue, the Committee was also able to move on to the more substantive issues related to the preparatory work for the Conference on the Indian Ocean. It is not my intention here to recapitulate in any detail the preparatory work accomplished to date. For the necessary details I would refer members to sub-section D of Section II of the report. However, I would like to emphasize that, in this context too, the inclusion of new members in the Committee enabled it to have a wider and more intensive exchange of views on issues related to the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

(Mr. Balasubramaniam, Chairman, Ad Hoc
Committee on the Indian Ocean)

That exchange of views, in particular on certain specific topics related to preparations for the Conference, as noted in paragraph 28 of the report, demonstrated the interest of all members of the Committee in a comprehensive identification and analysis of the issues regarding the implementation of the Declaration. The discussions in that context reflected the current international situation, the sensitivity and complexity of the issues involved and the extent of the differences of view on certain fundamental points. Those discussions were useful and showed the willingness of all members to develop a better understanding of each other's views, thereby helping efforts to harmonize approaches on those issues and thus contributing towards the preparations for the Conference.

I should now like to draw the attention of members to paragraph 30 of the report, which contains a draft resolution the Committee has unanimously recommended for adoption by the General Assembly. In that connexion, I should like duly to underline the fact that the compromise text achieved in the Committee was possible only as a result of an exemplary spirit of co-operation and accommodation on the part of all members concerned. Obviously, in a matter that encompasses such intricate complexities, it would not have been possible to arrive at an agreed solution without the spirit of understanding that was displayed so abundantly and so consistently.

The preambular part of the draft resolution, besides recalling the relevant resolutions on the subject and welcoming the addition of new members to the Committee, essentially embodies an expression of the concerns and preoccupations with respect to certain developments which continue to affect the peace and stability of the region. Such concerns find manifest expression in the language of the sixth, seventh and tenth preambular paragraphs.

I referred a little while ago to the constructive nature of the negotiations that contributed to the emergence of the compromise text now before us. Obviously, that required the submergence of various individual positions and preoccupations for the sake of achieving a consensus. That was especially true of the preambular paragraphs that I referred to, as well as operative paragraphs 1 and 2.

(Mr. Balasubramaniam, Chairman, Ad Hoc
Committee on the Indian Ocean)

Operative paragraph 1 takes note, inter alia, of the fact that following the expansion of the Committee's membership, there had been a varied and useful exchange of views on important issues regarding the implementation of the Declaration as contained in General Assembly resolution 2832 (XXVI) and on other related matters. The paragraph also notes that progress had been made towards harmonizing the differing approaches on those issues, while a number of fundamental issues remained to be resolved.

In operative paragraph 2, the General Assembly would request the Ad Hoc Committee, in pursuance of the decision contained in resolution 34/80 B, to convene a Conference on the Indian Ocean during 1981 at Colombo, and, taking into consideration the exchange of views thereon, to continue its efforts for the necessary harmonization of views on the issues related to the convening of the Conference. The General Assembly would further request the Ad Hoc Committee to make every effort, in consideration of the political and security climate in the Indian Ocean area, particularly recent developments, as well as the progress made in the harmonization of views referred to earlier, to finalize, in accordance with its normal methods of work, all preparations for the Conference including the dates for its convening. The Ad Hoc Committee would also be requested to continue the preparatory work for the Conference and accordingly to hold two preparatory meetings in 1981 totalling six weeks.

The implications of operative paragraph 2 are that the question of fixing the exact dates for the convening of the Indian Ocean Conference has been left to the meetings of the Ad Hoc Committee to be held next year. The first such meeting is scheduled for February 1981 and it is imperative that that meeting fix the final dates of the Conference in order to give adequate notice to the host country, Sri Lanka, to enable it to make the necessary organizational arrangements for the Conference.

As I pointed out at the beginning of my statement, the challenges we face in trying to implement the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace are formidable. And yet the price of failure to address ourselves successfully to those challenges would be far more prohibitive.

(Mr. Balasubramaniam, Chairman,
Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian
Ocean)

In conclusion, may I remind members of the Committee that the draft resolution before them was adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee by consensus and it is my sincere hope that this Committee too will adopt the draft resolution without a vote. Such a gesture on the part of this Committee will be a source of encouragement to the Ad Hoc Committee in its preparatory work as well as to the forthcoming Indian Ocean Conference in its efforts to implement the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): I should like this morning to comment briefly on the report of the Secretary-General entitled "Study on all the aspects of regional disarmament", which was submitted under item 48 (c) of the agenda. The representative of Belgium, whose delegation took the initiative which resulted in the study ultimately being agreed upon by the General Assembly, has just introduced the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/35/L.17 - a draft which my delegation is happy to join in sponsoring.

It is pertinent to call attention to the fact that the report represents a consensus by 10 experts drawn from the five different regions. That consensus has, in the view of my delegation, enhanced the value of the report, particularly in the light of the doubts and fears which the item on regional aspects of disarmament generated when it was first introduced. Those fears and doubts were in no way unfounded; indeed, they were legitimate fears since it was clear that regional disarmament had to be seen and approached in the right perspective if it was to contribute to, not hinder, progress in the effort to achieve general and complete disarmament. It is to the credit of the experts that the study therefore laid the right emphasis on those important elements which will enhance the contribution of regional disarmament.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

General and complete disarmament under effective international control, which remains the ultimate objective of disarmament efforts, cannot be simply broken down into regional components with each region deciding for itself, at its convenience, what is feasible and what is not. That point was made at the beginning of our discussion of this item. Such a breakdown could lead to a distortion of the global disarmament efforts by ignoring the priority laid down. Such a breakdown may also be carried out in disregard of developments and conditions in other regions and the world at large, and may therefore in the end not enhance regional security. Thus it was the view of my delegation that in order to be efficient and effective regional disarmament must be seen in its global context. We are happy that that has been reflected in the report submitted by the Secretary-General. It is of course clear that while regional disarmament cannot be a substitute for general and complete disarmament it can nevertheless be an effective complement to global measures, and it can be a vital constituent in the step-by-step approach to global disarmament. In particular it can facilitate negotiations on the universal disarmament agenda items and can lend itself to initiatives in the promotion of mutual confidence and co-operation within a region.

Given that regional conditions play the primary role in the perceived threats to the security of the great majority of States, and given that such conditions differ from region to region, the flexible approach adopted in the study is inevitable. What is not in doubt and is applicable to all regions is the basic principle that the countries of a region are in the best position to determine their regional requirements. That basic condition derives from their sovereignty. Any disarmament measure should therefore emanate from the free will of the countries of a region, which may be expressed through their recognized regional organization. We hope that the co-operation of third parties whose actions have a significant influence on the security situation in a region would be forthcoming.

The role of the United Nations in regional disarmament ought also to be emphasized, and this is given adequate coverage in the study. If the United Nations meets its obligations as elaborated in the Charter it will be able to

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

create conditions conducive to disarmament efforts in general and regional disarmament efforts in particular. As the study indicates,

In the context of this study, a special importance is to be attached to United Nations efforts with a predominantly regional impact, including action relative to specific conflicts, action to uphold the principles of non-interference in the internal affairs of others and of the right of peoples to self-determination, action in support of the efforts of regional organizations to promote peace and security in their regions, action to combat colonialism, racism and apartheid ...

"The United Nations can also promote conditions conducive to progress in regional disarmament by encouraging extra-regional powers whose co-operation is required for the implementation of regional measures to assume the appropriate obligations." (A/35/416, paras. 162 and 163)

Finally, in the survey of conceivable measures contained in the study we find that there is a major contribution not only to regional efforts but also to the elaboration of the comprehensive programme of disarmament that is currently being considered by the Committee on Disarmament. It is therefore my delegation's hope that the study will encourage initiatives in different regions of the world.

Mr. HAYDAR (Syrian Arab Republic) (interpretation from Arabic): Since the end of the Second World War and the defeat of fascism and Nazism, which constituted a threat to the whole of mankind, mankind has called for peace, justice and stability. Unfortunately that dream is well beyond our grasp, if not unattainable. Contrary to the dreams and hopes of the international community, the third quarter of this century has witnessed wars which, although geographically limited, have nevertheless constituted a serious threat to international peace and stability and flagrant aggressions against the sovereignty, independence and progress of the peoples aspiring to liberty, justice and peace.

(Mr. Haydar, Syrian Arab Republic)

Under the item entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East", the first thing that occurs to us is the wretched history imposed upon the peoples of that region. One of the effects of the First World War was the imposition on the Arab East of a joint occupation under the Sykes-Picot Agreement, which divided the Arab region according to the interests of the two occupying Powers of the time. One of the results of the Second World War was the replacement of the Anglo-French occupation by a new kind of occupation - in other words, the Zionist colonization first of Palestine and then of other parts of other Arab neighbours of Palestine.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Israel on a point of order.

Mr. EILAN (Israel): On a point of elucidation, I should simply like to know whether the representative of Syria is now speaking in the framework of discussion of draft resolutions that have been submitted, and, if so, I would ask you, Mr. Chairman, to make it clear to him that all his remarks should have a direct bearing on the draft resolutions, as we are not at the moment discussing the history of the Middle East or the situation therein.

The CHAIRMAN: I would request the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to continue his statement.

Mr. HAYDAR (Syrian Arab Republic): Before continuing my statement I should like to point out that the representative of Israel's point of order is not in order. I cannot understand how I could discuss the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East without referring to the Middle East itself.
(spoke in Arabic)

This conquest began, as everyone knows, towards the end of the last century. It was internationally recognized in 1948, and it continues until this very day, contrary to all international law. The wars of

(Mr. Haydar, Syrian Arab Republic)

aggression waged by the Zionist entity against the freedom, independence and sovereignty of the Arab peoples, and particularly the Palestinian people, have made of the Middle East a hotbed of tension an explosion of which would threaten not only the region but international security as a whole, in a very direct and dangerous fashion.

(Mr. Haydar, Syrian Arab Republic)

Briefly, the tragedy of the Middle East is as follows: it is one of aggression, occupation and exploitation committed by one party against all the other parties; it is one of the denial of the rights of a whole people, on the one hand, and the occupation of the territories of independent and sovereign countries, on the other. The solution to the problem lies in the removal of its causes. On that basis we can discuss one of the items before us, agenda item 38, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

How can we transform the Middle East region into a nuclear-weapon-free zone and, consequently, guarantee peace and stability based on justice alone? Achievement of that goal is, in our view, simple yet at the same time impossible or virtually impossible, for it depends entirely on the will of all the parties concerned. The fundamental conditions which must be met before this goal can be achieved are as follows: first, the occupation and aggression must cease, their effects be removed, and the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian people realized in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly; secondly, all the parties must sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty; thirdly, all the parties must undertake to submit their nuclear activities and facilities to effective control by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); fourthly, all the parties must accept international guarantees as an alternative to the possession of nuclear weapons. Those are, in our view, the conditions which must be met to attain this goal.

What is the attitude of the various parties concerned? Only one of the parties concerned which has nuclear facilities stubbornly refuses to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty - and that party is, of course, Israel. Only one of the parties concerned refuses to submit its nuclear activities to the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency - again, that party is Israel. Only one party refuses to accept international guarantees as an alternative to the possession of nuclear weapons - and, once again, that party is Israel. Only one party rejects and defies the will of the international community represented in

(Mr. Haydar, Syrian Arab Republic)

resolutions of the United Nations relating to ending the occupation and eliminating its causes - again, that party is Israel. Those are, in our view, the basic necessary conditions for converting the Middle East into a nuclear-weapon-free zone. That is also, briefly, the attitude of the parties concerned towards those conditions.

In our view, we cannot consider disarmament independently of peace; nor can we consider stability independently of justice. I repeat: we cannot consider disarmament separate from peace or stability separate from justice.

I should like to take this opportunity to point out that the Middle East is not Latin America. The Middle East may be compared to southern Africa in this respect: in both regions there are racist and colonialist régimes which deny the indigenous inhabitants their rights, defy the international community and possess nuclear weapons, thus posing a threat to international peace and security.

My delegation believes that southern Africa cannot be expected to change of its own accord or to alter its character. That is a dream that we would do well to forget now. Comparisons and analogies between the two regions - the Middle East and southern Africa - transcend all other analogies. Therefore, we cannot compare them with the situation in Latin America.

However, we request the United Nations to adopt more resolutions on this subject because we still have confidence in the capacity of the international community to put an end to aggression. In spite of the sad experiences that we have had, our relations with the United Nations since its inception have been based on that confidence. What we are asking and quite naturally expect from the international community is a stepping up of pressure that will result in the ejection from this Organization of any entity having expansionist and occupationist aims.

The members of this Committee are nevertheless surprised by the introduction of a draft resolution, a rather curious one, on the item we are discussing today. We are sure that a majority of this Committee will reject that draft resolution, because its purpose is to endorse events which Israel believes to be entirely natural. In actual fact that draft resolution places the aggressor and the victim, the occupier and the occupied, on an equal footing.

(Mr. Haydar, Syrian Arab Republic)

Israel may consider that the international community must accept that state of affairs, in spite of the more than 500 United Nations resolutions adopted on the subject.

Furthermore, the Pretoria régime considers that the international community must recognize the faits accomplis in southern Africa. The response of the international community is quite clear and we are sure that it is aware of that response and of the correct path to follow.

Mr. AL-ALI (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic): The first special session devoted to disarmament was convened on the initiative of the non-aligned countries. The session included an invitation to the Governments of all States in the world, and in particular the States possessing the largest arsenals of weapons, in particular nuclear weapons, to discharge their responsibilities concerning the greatest threat to international peace and security. The participation of all States Members of the United Nations in that session was an important step forward.

The elaboration by that special session of a single document embodying unanimously agreed principles represents a great success. Nuclear disarmament was given first priority at that session. That was reflected in the emphasis placed by that special session on the importance of creating nuclear-free zones and of encouraging the establishment of such regions in various parts of the world, with a view to the achievement of the final objective, namely, a world completely free of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Al-Ali, Iraq)

In this connexion, a very serious situation exists in the Middle East. The Final Document of the special session reflects that situation, now calls for the implementation of the proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East, in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, and in view of the fact that there is in that region a danger represented by the actual presence of nuclear weapons. The Zionist entity has endeavoured to endow itself with powerful military forces in order to undertake active aggression and expansion to the detriment of the Arab States. Figures and statistics show that the military budget of the Zionist State is one of the largest military budgets in the world: Israel holds fourth place as regards its military budget in comparison to gross national product. In 1975, military expenditures reached \$3.7 billion, that is to say more than one third of the gross national product. In recent years, the military budget has accounted for 45 per cent of the Zionist entity's gross national product. The United States of America, the enemy of peoples and the leader of world imperialism, has played a predominant role in the increase of the Zionist entity's military budget, particularly as a result of the assistance lent it by the enemy of mankind, President Carter, who opened the United States coffers to the Zionist entity. The assistance given to Israel by the Carter administration over the last four years has reached figure of \$13 billion, that is, half the over-all assistance granted by Washington to the Zionist entity since its creation.

The Zionist entity has not confined itself to acquiring conventional weapons, but has also attempted to develop its own nuclear capability and to acquire large stockpiles of nuclear weapons. The delegation of Iraq and delegations of fraternal Arab republics have taken note of the enormous danger that threatens the Middle East region as a result of the Zionist entity's seeking to acquire nuclear weapons and the possibility of its using such weapons of destruction against the Arab nations.

(Mr. Al-Ali, Iraq)

Given that the danger from the possession of nuclear weapons by the Zionist entity threatens not just a single country or group of countries, but an entire region of strategic importance to the world, the Middle East, it follows that it imperils the world as a whole. The international community is therefore in duty bound to put an end to that situation.

Pursuant to United Nations resolutions on the prohibition of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and with a view to establishing international peace and security, the group of non-aligned countries took the initiative of submitting a draft resolution to the tenth special session of the General Assembly. That draft resolution was entitled "Military and nuclear co-operation with Israel" and it was sponsored by 33 countries. In spite of the fact that we were certain of the support that draft resolution would receive, we, like the sponsors of other draft resolutions, responded favourably to the appeal addressed to us to defer consideration of our document so that the tenth special session could elaborate a single document to be adopted by consensus. It was therefore decided to defer consideration of that draft resolution until the thirty-third session of the General Assembly, when it was adopted by an overwhelming majority as resolution A/33/71.

I should like to remind members that that resolution, both in form and substance, is identical to a resolution previously adopted by the General Assembly on military and nuclear co-operation with South Africa. Indeed, the two resolutions bear virtually the same title. At its thirty-fourth session the General Assembly adopted a further resolution entitled "Israeli nuclear armament". That resolution was put to the vote and adopted by an overwhelming majority as resolution A/34/89. Its operative paragraph 6 requests the establishment of a group of experts to prepare a study on Israeli nuclear armament. That group of experts held a single session this year and issued a preliminary report in document A/35/458. We hope that the group of experts will complete its report by the date set for next year, since the Zionist entity is continuing to intensify its efforts to increase its nuclear-weapons arsenal.

(Mr. Al-Ali, Iraq)

Today we are working on a draft resolution concerning Israeli nuclear armament. We hope that it will be put to the vote, the more so since it complements previous draft resolutions on that subject.

I should like now to read out some of the operative paragraphs of our draft resolution, which will be submitted to the members of this Committee tomorrow morning:

(spoke in English)

"Takes note of the progress report of the Secretary-General on the work of the Group of Experts to the General Assembly at its thirty-fifth session;

"Requests the Secretary-General to pursue his efforts in this regard and submit his report to the General Assembly at its thirty-sixth session;

"Decides to include in the provisional agenda of its thirty-sixth session the item entitled 'Israeli nuclear armament'."

(continued in Arabic)

After reviewing briefly the General Assembly resolutions relating to Israeli nuclear armament, we must now consider in a scientific manner a whole series of facts which attest to the fact that the Zionist entity possesses nuclear weapons.

After the great scientist Oppenheimer visited the Zionist entity, the man who is regarded as the father of the hydrogen bomb declared that nothing prevented Israel from manufacturing the nuclear bomb, which confirms what was stated by a group of experts in the nuclear field in a work called The Military Potential of Civilian Nuclear Energy. Those experts declared that the production of atomic bombs was based on two elements, and that if those elements were available they would make possession of nuclear weapons inevitable. Those elements are, first, the presence of a number of nuclear experts who have at their disposal the necessary elements for the production of the bomb; secondly, a political decision concerning the production of the nuclear weapon. The necessary expertise is available to the Zionist entity.

Dr. Theodore Tyler, in his work entitled The Curve of Binding Energy, showed how easy it was to manufacture nuclear weapons because all the elements needed to do so are well known and have been published. In addition, countries which

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themselves manufacture conventional weapons and bombs can easily produce an atomic bomb also. It is well known that the Zionist entity has been manufacturing conventional weapons for many years, as was confirmed by the representative of the Zionist entity in the statement he made in this Committee a few days ago. Therefore, the Zionist entity could easily draw up the necessary plans for the production of a nuclear bomb.

Moreover, a certain amount of experience is required to be able to handle fissile materials such as plutonium and enriched uranium. The Zionist entity has been able to acquire that expertise. Since 1949, the Weizmann Institute has been engaged in nuclear research and in the production of uranium from raw phosphate extracted, in the Negev region. In 1952, an Israeli nuclear energy commission was established under the Ministry of Defence, but its composition remained a secret until 1954, in which year its existence was revealed. As has been declared by the President of the Weizmann Institute, Dr. Ernst Berman, one of the primary objectives of that Israeli atomic energy commission is the production of heavy water used in the manufacture of nuclear weapons. In 1953, a nuclear co-operation agreement was signed between France and Israel. That co-operation has enabled the Zionist entity to acquire important technical data in the nuclear field and it has benefited from the experience of specialists.

In 1955, an agreement was concluded between the Zionist entity and the United States, according to which the two countries would exchange nuclear experience and information. Thanks to that agreement, the Zionist entity was able to buy a nuclear reactor, to obtain 6 kilogrammes of enriched uranium and to avail itself of a complete scientific bibliography composed of 6,500 manuals on nuclear research and technology, as well as summaries of articles and reports that have been published on the subject.

In 1960, the Nahal Sorikc reactor, bought by the Zionist entity from the United States, went into operation with a capacity of 1 megawatt. That capacity has increased since and has now reached 5 megawatts.

That is how the Zionist entity has been able to acquire nuclear techniques and how the Zionist experts have been able to obtain the knowledge necessary for the handling of nuclear materials, namely, fissile plutonium and enriched uranium.

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The Zionist entity was able to obtain those fissionable materials for the production of nuclear weapons by recourse to all kinds of methods, including, among others, theft, the conclusion of agreements with certain nuclear-weapon countries, and local production.

To begin with, the Zionist entity was able to obtain 6 kilogrammes of enriched uranium from the United States. Subsequently, according to Leonard, in his book entitled Must the Bomb Spread?, Israel was able to obtain 10 tons of uranium from racist South Africa. It also was able to produce 10 tons locally by using phosphates from the Dead Sea. Furthermore, it was able to acquire 4 tons of French origin.

Since the early 1960s the Zionist entity has established a programme for the local production of uranium making it possible to obtain 50 tons a year, as has been confirmed by Tseffee Catsina in the Israeli newspaper Ma'ariv of 10 October 1971, and by The Times of London of 3 December 1974. According to Tseffee Catsina, Israel possesses reserves of 220 million tons of fissile materials from which 25,000 tons of uranium can be obtained.

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Despite all this, the Zionist entity has not ceased to procure uranium abroad through illicit means. The article published in the Rolling Stone of 1 December 1977 and written by Howard Cohn and Barbara Newman revealed that there has been a series of thefts in the United States of America. Thus one of the most well-known companies to have reported a loss of uranium is Nuclear Materials and Equipment (NAMEQ), located in Pennsylvania. After the theft was discovered, the head of the company at the time, someone by the name of Shapiro, had to pay a fine of \$1.2 million for the loss of the uranium and was compelled to emigrate to Israel. That points to complicity in the theft of that uranium.

The attempts by Israel to steal enriched uranium increased in the United Kingdom and France. According to reliable sources some Western capitals were in collusion with the Zionist secret services and, in this connexion, I would mention the case of a German vessel which lost 200 tons of uranium. This was revealed by Zinick Cornell and Barbara Rogers in their book entitled The Nuclear Axis, published in London in 1978.

In order to implement its nuclear military programme, the Zionist entity built the Dimona reactor, the capacity of which was increased in 1974 and has now reached 24 megawatts. The Zionist Government has stated that the Dimona reactor is not subject to foreign or international control. When, under pressure from the United States Government, American experts were allowed to visit that reactor they filed a written complaint in 1979 in which they said that they were not sure as to the functions of the Dimona reactor, given the restrictions imposed by Israel with respect to control. Israel tried to build that reactor in absolute secrecy, but the American secret services revealed its existence in 1960. They said that what Israel claimed to be a textile factory in Dimona was in fact a nuclear reactor. The New York Times of 10 October 1970 described that reactor in Dimona and said that it could produce fissionable plutonium used in the production of a nuclear bomb. The danger represented by the Dimona reactor stems from its capacity, which amounts to 24 megawatts, enabling Israel to produce the plutonium-239 required for the production of atomic bombs, at the rate of three bombs every two years. It is therefore clear that the Zionist entity has acquired nuclear capability and that it possesses fissionable material and nuclear reactors.

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All this information shows that the Zionist entity is capable today of producing nuclear weapons.

There is a second element, namely, the political decision to produce the nuclear bomb. We know that the Zionist entity is a racist entity based on aggression and expansion. Its aggressive ambitions are unlimited, and therefore it must have nuclear weapons to carry out its expansionist ambitions and to blackmail the Arab States while proceeding with its territorial expansion to the detriment of neighbouring Arab countries, in order to realize the Zionist dream of a Greater Israel which according to the Zionist leaders, would extend from the Euphrates to the Nile.

It is an open secret that those who founded the Zionist entity have long thought of acquiring nuclear weapons in order to continue to expel the Palestinian people from their land. Conventional weapons, according to Zionist thinking and from what we are about to reveal, no longer suffice for the achievement of their objective, the more so since the Zionist entity depends on countries abroad for its supply of conventional weapons. That dependence could be subjected to foreign interests having nothing in common with Zionist interests. Moreover, the Arab States could acquire the same weapons and use them to prevent the realization of Israel's ambitions. We know that Mr. Shimon Peres, the former Israeli Defence Minister and now the head of the Israeli parliamentary opposition, said that:

"The military force of any State is measured today not only in terms of the quantity and quality of weapons that country possesses, but rather in the light of its capability to produce weapons when it needs them. This applies in particular to conventional weapons. It is perhaps easier for the secret services to obtain information on the weapons possessed by the enemy than judiciously to evaluate his research capability, and the quality and quantity of existing, new or future weapons. What matters most is the weaponry a country may suddenly use against another. It is easier to conceal production methods than to hide what is actually produced."

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In order for Zionist nuclear and military activities to remain secret, Israeli newspapers have been forbidden to deal with nuclear matters in anything but the briefest terms, and even their general discussion has been very limited. The Knesset itself has had its freedom to discuss nuclear questions restricted. Obviously, these restrictions are due to the secrecy surrounding the activities of the Israeli military-nuclear establishment.

Yet, there is another reason for which the Israeli authorities impose a veil of secrecy over nuclear matters: I refer to the possible use of the nuclear threat as an additional deterrent. As long as the dimensions of the programme and the long-term intentions of the Government are not clear, the suspicion and doubt harboured by the Arabs will result in greater precautions in their movements and plans, and they will therefore assume Israel's power to be greater than it actually is. That is why the nuclear deterrent is useful to Israel in its relations with friendly States, particularly the United States.

The nuclear option as a bargaining chip to obtain conventional weapons, such as the Hawk ground-to-air missile, according to a 1961 statement by Meyer Feldman, an aide to President Kennedy, was offered to Israel in order to dissuade it from pursuing its development of nuclear weapons. Israel's negative attitude towards the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is based on the continuation of that policy, for Israel's accession to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty would mean not only renunciation of its policy of "deterrence by doubt" in Israeli-Arab relations, but would also imply a solemn pledge not to introduce nuclear weapons or to resort to them in the foreseeable future.

Another matter which reveals Israel's intentions in its aggressive nuclear policy is that all of the neighbouring Arab States have signed and ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and despite Israel's argument in the past that Egypt had not ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the signing of the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty tends to negate that argument.

By means of vague statements open to various interpretations, Israeli leaders have avoided stating their Government's position towards the development of nuclear weapons, repeating that Israel would not be the first to introduce

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nuclear weapons into the Middle East. In this connexion, as Stephen F. Rosen, in his study entitled "Nuclear Weapons and Stability in the Middle East", said:

"Israeli leaders have repeatedly stated that Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East, but apparently no one believes them, because their statements about certain aspects are so vague as to be considered as gaps in this matter. First of all, nuclear weapons have in fact been introduced in the Middle East aboard vessels of the American Sixth Fleet and aboard Soviet ships in the Mediterranean. Secondly, the word "introduction" could be interpreted as meaning authorization to develop nuclear weapons without testing them. Thirdly, as far as nuclear weapons are concerned, Israel's possession of fissionable materials, and its facilities for manufacturing nuclear weapons may not be such as to enable it to produce guided nuclear missiles. That factor heightens doubts about Israel's attitude when it claims that it will not be the first to introduce them, because it will certainly not be the second, either."

That statement comes from the Jewish Observer and Middle East Review of 24 December 1965. It proves that Israel possesses nuclear weapons and could use them, if it saw fit to do so.

During the term of office of President Johnson, the United States Government in 1968 requested Israel to provide information on its nuclear weapons policy. William Cohn, on page 67 of his book entitled "The Adoption of Resolutions", has the following to say:

"The question of the Non-Proliferation Treaty was debated at length with the representative of Israel. What the Israeli representative stated essentially was the Israel 'would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East'. In an attempt to shed light on that expression, American leaders discovered that what the Israeli Ambassador, Mr. Rabin, meant was that Israel would not be the first to test such weapons, nor would it be the first to announce their existence."

That leaves no doubt as to the fact that Israel is making every effort to develop its nuclear capability and to acquire nuclear weapons.

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According to Ephraim Katzir, former President of the Zionist entity, in a statement published in The New York Times on 5 December 1974:

"Israel can and will manufacture nuclear weapons."

In a very interesting book on the 1967 war, written by a group of London Times reporters, the following is stated on page 282:

"Israel's stockpile of atomic bombs is small in comparison to those of the great Powers. Kissinger has secretly stated that Washington firmly believes that Israel possesses three atomic bombs. For their part, Israeli sources speak of about six bombs."

The Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) of 1972; the Daily Telegraph of London; Jane's catalogue of the world's aircraft; and the magazine Der Spiegel of 5 May - all those and other sources speak, directly or indirectly, of Israel's efforts to acquire nuclear weapons. Hendrick Smith, in The New York Times of 18 July 1970, wrote an article entitled "The United States is inclined to believe that Israel possesses the atomic bomb or parts of the bomb".

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William Bischer wrote in the same newspaper, on 5 October 1971, an article under the heading "Israel is believed to be producing bombers capable of launching atomic bombs".

In an article written by Smith, it was stated that Richard Helms, former head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), had said in 1970, at a secret meeting of the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, that Israel had the capacity to produce nuclear weapons. In 1974 and in 1976, the CIA discovered, through Richard Helms, former head of the Agency, and Carl Dakit, former Assistant Secretary of the Agency's Department of Science and Technology, that Israel had the nuclear weapon. The last-named said that Israel possessed between 10 and 20 atomic bombs. That information was published on 14 September 1974, in a five-page memorandum, in keeping with the freedom of information. That memorandum was the first official American statement in which Israel was regarded as a nuclear Power, as reported in the Herald Tribune of 28 January 1978.

The magazine Time of 4 April 1976 revealed, on the basis of information from the CIA, that Israel possessed 13 atomic bombs of a type comparable to that of the bomb dropped on Hiroshima and assembled during the 1973 war.

As for the role of Dayan in the manufacture of the nuclear weapon, the following was stated: "Dayan, secretly and against the decision of the Government, had begun in 1968 the construction of a plant to produce the fissionable material necessary for the production of an atomic bomb".

In 1973 Dayan attempted to obtain - and did obtain - authorization from the then Prime Minister Golda Meir to manufacture the first Israeli nuclear weapons. The bombs, which were ready for use in 1973, and which could have been launched by Phantom or Kfir pursuit planes or Jericho missiles, are in Israel today.

Patrick Moynihan, who was head of the United States delegation to the United Nations, declared that it was preferable for the world to know that Israel possessed between 10 and 20 atomic bombs, so that no one should have any illusion about what could happen. During a hearing before the United States Senate Foreign Affairs Committee he said that it was preferable for that reality to be public knowledge. That is what appeared in the newspaper Davar on 26 March 1976.

In these conditions, the statements made on numerous occasions by Dayan and other Israeli representatives before the General Assembly claiming that Israel

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would not be the first country to introduce nuclear weapons, are no more than semantic untruths, especially given the fact that Dayan himself, in 1976 invited Israel to announce that it possessed nuclear weapons and had the capacity to manufacture them.

The importance of the nuclear choice is stressed by Avram Schweizer in the newspaper Ha'aretz of 15 May 1976, which itself quoted SWASIA, volume III, number 14, of 9 April 1976.

All that we have cited so far bears on facts that gravely affect the explosive situation in the Middle East as it relates to the Palestinian problem and undermine the efforts of the United Nations to solve it, particularly when the effects of Israeli nuclear armament are borne in mind.

Various important sources are quoted in the 1979 Yearbook of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) as stating that the difference between States possessing nuclear weapons and States that are about to acquire them has become negligible, especially if account is taken of the fact that the time required to manufacture a nuclear warhead can now be counted in weeks or even days. This is to be found on page 305 of the 1979 SIPRI Yearbook on armaments and disarmament in the world.

If that reality is combined with the capacity of the racist entities and régimes which possess nuclear armament technology - such as South Africa and Israel - we understand the danger such a reality poses for the situation in southern Africa and the Middle East. That is all the more true when it is borne in mind that co-operation between Israel and South Africa in the nuclear armament field is already public knowledge, in the United Nations and elsewhere.

In that connexion, we should like to mention document A/35/22/Add.2, which contains the second special report of the Special Committee against Apartheid dealing with developments that have occurred in relations between Israel and South Africa, document S/13157, which contains the report of the United Nations seminar on nuclear collaboration with South Africa held in London on 24 and 25 February 1979, and General Assembly resolution 33/183 on policies of apartheid of the Government of South Africa. Because of all this, any concession made to Israel in the nuclear field in reality reinforces the efforts being made by

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South Africa in that same field, for the two régimes are but the two sides of the same coin.

On the basis of these objective truths the Iraqi delegation declares that Israel possesses the nuclear weapon and is capable of producing it and of intensifying production of it.

We therefore address an appeal to all States Members of the United Nations to take the measures necessary to put an end to all co-operation with Israel which could lead to the development of its nuclear capability.

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We further request that they deal with this situation on the basis of international commitments undertaken by Member States so as to prevent a worsening of the situation in the Middle East.

We must also take into account another fact -- namely that those States which have acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty bear special responsibility for Israel's nuclear armaments. Israel, which did not sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, now threatens to use its nuclear weapons against neighbouring States that have acceded to that Treaty and thus renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons because they clearly understood the danger represented by such weapons to the future of mankind, and because they wished to contribute to international peace and security. From the practical point of view, this special responsibility implies the application of sanctions against those States which have not acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, and steps to ensure that States which are not parties to the Treaty are not free to act against the interests of the international community. It is obvious that the international community cannot accept such a state of affairs because the credibility and future of the Treaty are at stake. The seriousness of Israel's nuclear armament is not an illusion, it is a reality, and we hope that States Members of this international Organization, consistent with its main purpose of preserving international peace and security, will increase their efforts to combat Israel's nuclear armament before we are surprised by an Israeli nuclear explosion, as happened in the case of South Africa. That case led to a debate in the General Assembly and the adoption of a resolution, though, of course, after the explosion had taken place. Objectivity demands that we give a unanimous response for the same reasons that led the General Assembly to adopt a resolution on South Africa's nuclear explosion. Those two racist entities represent the same image of colonialism based on racism and expansionism.

During the last decade we have witnessed moves by the international community to conclude agreements and protocols aimed at halting the arms race. The latest was the signing of the SALT II Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on 18 June 1979. We must here ask ourselves what diplomatic and political methods Israel is using to strengthen its nuclear

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activities and to achieve the aims of zionism. In spite of the fact that Levi Eshkol, one of Israel's former prime ministers, pretended to carry on the serious work begun by Ben Gurion in the 1950s and declared his readiness to renounce the nuclear alternative and the acquisition of nuclear weapons provided the balance of power was maintained in the region and Israel could obtain the conventional weapons Israel needed, there is proof that Israel has spared no effort scientifically and technically to develop its nuclear capability, and that it has taken major steps in the greatest secrecy, to develop its ability to produce nuclear weapons.

Mr. GURINOVICH (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic)

(interpretation from Russian): The sponsors of the draft resolution on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons (A/C.1/35/L.18) have granted the delegation of the Byelorussian SSR the honour of proposing that draft for consideration by the First Committee of the General Assembly.

So far, 21 delegations have sponsored the draft resolution. They are: the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, the People's Republic of Angola, the People's Republic of Benin, the People's Republic of Bulgaria, the Republic of Burundi, the Hungarian People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, the German Democratic Republic, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, the Republic of Cuba, the Lao People's Democratic Republic, the Democratic Republic of Madagascar, the Mongolian People's Republic, the Polish People's Republic, the Socialist Republic of Romania, the Syrian Arab Republic, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic.

We know that awareness of the need to halt the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons is shared by delegations of other countries which also recall that at previous General Assembly sessions no country voted against the draft resolution on this subject. All the sponsors are ready to welcome other countries which may wish to sponsor the draft resolution.

The question of prohibiting the development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction in the light of the whirlwind development of the scientific and technological revolution has assumed vital importance in the struggle to achieve disarmament and to safeguard the security of peoples. The immediate relevance and particular importance of that task has repeatedly been indicated in resolutions of the General Assembly and in the Final Document of its tenth special session, which contains an appeal for the adoption of effective measures to prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass

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destruction. Previous resolutions and the relevant provisions of the Final Document of the special session devoted to disarmament are the subject of the first four preambular paragraphs of the draft resolution, and in order to save time we shall not go into them in any detail. The preamble refers also to the work of the Committee on Disarmament on this problem. It should be stressed that in drafting the preamble the sponsors took into account the positions stated by representatives of Western countries last year and left out references to work on the treaty on the prohibition of the development, manufacture, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. Of course, all the sponsors, like other delegations, are in favour of the early conclusion of that treaty.

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Operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution contains a request that the Committee on Disarmament, in the light of its existing priorities, to continue negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, with a view to preparing a draft comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and draft possible agreements on particular types of such weapons.

It should be pointed out that this wording is based strictly on the determination of the peoples of the world to prevent the emergence of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction and takes into account the positions of all groups of States, which advocate somewhat differing approaches to solving this problem. The formulation provides for the preparation of both a comprehensive agreement and possible agreements on individual types of such weapons. And, in the light of the position of certain Western countries, a change was made in the provision of the draft resolution relating to individual new types of weapons of mass destruction, that is to say, we now speak of working out such possible draft agreements on individual types of this weapon, without the previous linkage through the use of the words "where necessary" in the resolution adopted last year. We have left out those words in the present draft.

In our view, the advantages of a comprehensive agreement are undeniable, because producing a preventive agreement on a comprehensive prohibition of various types of armaments before they have actually been created is easier than trying to ban them after they have actually been put into production and placed in military arsenals.

One of the sponsors of this draft resolution, the Soviet Union, in the Committee on Disarmament proposed and defined new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction.

In addition to that, another contribution to the cause of disarmament could be possible agreements on individual types of weapons, and the Committee on Disarmament could proceed to work on these. Such a solution, which is flexible and combines all possible approaches, would help to

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prevent a qualitatively new twist in the spiral of the arms race and in the final analysis would ensure the use of scientific and technical advances solely for peaceful purposes for the good of the economic and social progress of mankind.

The sponsors of the draft resolutions attach fundamental significance to the urgent appeal contained in operative paragraph 3 addressed to all States to refrain from any action which could adversely affect the negotiations already mentioned. We note with satisfaction that this approach is supported by all groups of States, and we express the hope that this appeal will be heeded by all countries without exception.

The operative part of the draft resolution contains, as did previous draft resolutions, provisions for transmitting to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the consideration of this item at this session of the General Assembly, together with a report on the results achieved, and for including this item in the agenda of the next regular session of the General Assembly.

The consultations held by the sponsors with a broad range of delegations of other countries have shown that the proposed draft resolution enjoys the widest support, since it reflects the determination to prevent the emergence of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction.

We believe that in the light of the clarifications contained in the draft resolution no one can possibly have any grounds for any doubts and every delegation will be able to support the proposed balanced approach to solving the problem of prohibiting new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction.

The scale of the problem, which could be solved once and for all through comprehensive and individual agreements, can be glimpsed from the statement of the belligerent atomic physicist Edward Teller who, according to press reports, has reported on the possibility of producing "an incalculable number of new technical devices for military purposes".

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I should like to stress once again that the proposal contained in the draft resolution is all-embracing; that it is not confined just to the idea of a comprehensive agreement, but also provides for the beginning of negotiations in order to produce possible separate agreements. Accordingly, taking into account the approach of certain Western countries, the sponsors hope that the draft resolution will be adopted by consensus and that it will be implemented by the Committee on Disarmament without any further delay. The sooner an end is put to any work in the area of creating ever newer means of mass destruction, the greater will be the conviction with which the peoples of the world will be able to look to the morrow.

PROGRAMME OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN: As announced at our 31st meeting on 13 November, the Chairman intends to put before the Committee for decision a number of draft resolutions at our meeting on Thursday, 20 November, at 10.30 a.m.

In selecting those draft resolutions, the Chairman has kept in mind that the Committee, in its consideration of draft resolutions, decided not to follow a chronological order of the items on the Committee's agenda. Instead, the Chairman took into account the following considerations: (a) the fact that some of those draft resolutions had already been introduced in the Committee; (b) the need to accord priority in the voting to those draft resolutions containing financial implications, as announced in the Committee at its 31st meeting; (c) the fact that informal consultations had already been held in connexion with those draft resolutions which it was intended to put to a vote.

(The Chairman)

In accordance with the Committee's programme of work, the decision-making process cannot be delayed, since our consideration of disarmament items should be concluded by Tuesday, 25 November. Therefore, the Chairman suggests that, beginning on Thursday morning, we take decisions on the following draft resolutions: A/C.1/35/L.7, Preparations for the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament; A/C.1/35/L.9 and L.10, Reduction of military budgets; A/C.1/35/L.11, Confidence-building measures; A/C.1/35/L.13, Non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present; A/C.1/35/L.14, United Nations programme of fellowships on Disarmament; A/C.1/35/L.15, United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects; and, finally, A/C.1/35/L.16, Economic and Social Consequences of the Armaments Race and its Extremely Harmful Effects on World Peace and Security.

Those delegations which have submitted draft resolutions are urged to inscribe their names promptly in the list of speakers for the purpose of introducing their texts, so that we may make arrangements for early decisions.

Also, the Chairman would like to inform delegations that the list of speakers for explanations of vote on those draft resolutions that are to be voted upon on Thursday is, of course, open, and would appreciate it if representatives could indicate to the Secretariat if they wish to explain their votes before or after a decision on a given draft resolution is taken on that day.

The Chairman intends to announce at our meeting tomorrow morning which draft resolution will be voted upon on Friday, 21 November, and similar announcements will be made later in connexion with the draft resolutions to be voted upon next week.

Delegations should bear in mind that the deadline for the submission of draft resolutions is 6 p.m. tomorrow, Tuesday, 18 November.

(The Chairman)

The Secretariat has prepared an unofficial document containing a compilation of indices of statements made at this session of the First Committee at its first twenty-nine meetings. A check-list of disarmament documents issued during the present session up to 7 November has also been prepared by the Secretariat. A limited number of copies of the compilation and the check-list are available for delegations at the Conference Officer's desk.

Since we have no speakers for this afternoon, the meeting that had been scheduled is cancelled. The next meeting of the Committee will be held tomorrow, Tuesday, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.