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Chairman: Mr. NAIK (Pakistan)

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Statements were made by:

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Mr. Adeniji (Nigeria)

Mr. Petrovsky (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 31 TO 49 AND 121 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. ENE (Romania) (interpretation from French): In my statement today, I should like, on behalf of the Romanian delegation, to make a few preliminary comments on the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and its preparation.

As we have already stressed, preparations for the second special session will, in our view, be the central event of concern to the United Nations in the disarmament field in 1981. In the present international circumstances, one senses more than ever before the need to provide a strong political impetus that will re-establish the basis for active co-operation among States in order to solve the serious problems confronting mankind - the arms race and disarmament being among the most important.

We must ensure the resumption and continuation of the policy of detente and co-operation. This requires the mobilization of all forces advocating new, democratic relations among States and the ever more active commitment of those forces. Debates on the subject thus far have indicated the substantial contribution that a clear-sighted, energetic disarmament policy - aimed, first and foremost, at nuclear disarmament - could make towards preventing a deterioration of the international situation and creating conditions in which all peoples could devote their efforts and resources to economic and social development.

The first special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament provided such impetus. It marked an important step in the new approach to disarmament problems; it allowed thorough debate, with the participation of all States it provided a more democratic framework for the solution of problems; and it strengthened the United Nations role and responsibility in the matter.

Thus the special session created a new political climate which, had certain untoward events not occurred, would have held out the prospect of real progress towards cessation of the arms race and the achievement of disarmament.

(Mr. Ene, Romania)

The Final Document of that session in unequivocal terms stresses that:

"... the special session marks not the end but rather the beginning of a new phase of the efforts of the United Nations in the field of disarmament." (resolution S-10/2, para. 128)

Disarmament proceeds by stages and each stage is characterized by specific conditions and priorities. In our opinion, the essential orientation of the second special session devoted to disarmament should be towards a restoration of confidence in the possibility of achieving disarmament and an encouragement of practical actions aimed at translating into reality the decisions and recommendations of the first session.

We believe that this orientation should lead to the concrete objectives of the session and the ways and means of achieving them. The same orientation should inspire action with a view to preparing adequately for the session.

The second session should, we believe, proceed to a collective evaluation, with the participation of all States, of the results obtained in disarmament negotiations, bearing in mind the objectives set forth in the Final Document adopted four years ago.

An analysis of the period that has passed since the adoption of the Final Document shows that results have not been up to expectations and that there is an urgent need for contemporary society to put a stop to the arms race and achieve disarmament, first and foremost nuclear disarmament. The debates that take place at the special session will undoubtedly bring out this state of affairs, if the situation has not markedly improved between now and 1982.

But we believe what is essential is not to pass judgement on the past but to hold debates leading to clear conclusions regarding ways and means of bringing about radical changes in the present situation. We have the necessary documents whose contents need to be reconfirmed, we have more democratic machinery for debates and negotiations and we have valuable experience and expertise on the international level. All that material should be brought together in such a way as to help to mobilize the political will of States and encourage the urgent adoption of concrete actions leading to practical results. The essential task is to equip ourselves with an understanding and with means of practical action that are more clearly defined.

(Mr. Ene, Romania)

Bearing those thoughts in mind, we believe that the special session should resolve the problem of integrating international efforts in the area of disarmament into a broader perspective, organizing and directing them with greater awareness so as to increase the effectiveness of disarmament negotiations and to speed them up. It is essential to co-ordinate and correlate partial and collateral measures within the framework of a programme providing the necessary perspective for the achievement of the final goal, that is, general and complete disarmament.

The adoption of a global disarmament programme, which is being prepared, in the Committee on Disarmament at Geneva will constitute a primary goal of the special session.

Thirdly, we believe that the session should give special attention to actions to encourage and mobilize the political will of States, to help them commit themselves to a course leading to the cessation of the arms race and to take practical disarmament measures, especially in the nuclear area.

Although it comes within the sovereignty of each State, it is well known that political will is formed and affirmed to a very considerable extent in an international framework as part of a common effort to understand and harmonize the interests of all by means of free co-operation, based on respect for the principles and norms of international law which are the pillars of peace and security in the world. In this connexion, we believe that the special session can lay the foundation for new forms of action which will contribute to the general effort to encourage the political will of States.

In this regard, the first special session took a first positive step when it identified areas whose study and better understanding would help us to appreciate certain phenomena pertaining to disarmament in contemporary international life, and to identify actions and initiatives to promote disarmament. Among such areas are the relationships between disarmament and development and between disarmament and international security, the effects of nuclear weapons, confidence-building measures, regional disarmament, the question of the verification of disarmament agreements, and so on.

(Mr. Ene, Romania)

Studies that have been made on these subjects and are available to the special session provide ideas and suggestions for action which, if implemented, could be very useful for the creation of a political climate to promote progress on the path towards disarmament. The action to which those studies might give rise could contribute in a significant manner to the strengthening of confidence and the establishment of new relations among States, the elimination of force and the threat of force in international life, the settlement of disputes by peaceful means alone and the promotion of broader co-operation to solve the major problems confronting mankind.

In this connexion, a more thorough understanding of the relationship between disarmament and development, oriented towards the formulation of policies would be of special value. Within a broad framework of far-reaching action to eliminate underdevelopment and establish a new international economic order, the reduction of military expenditures would offer a resource as yet untapped but which would be of unique importance. A freezing and reduction of military budgets would release enormous funds that could be used for the economic and social development of each nation and, first and foremost, of developing countries. That is why the affirmation of the problem of the freezing and reduction of military expenditures as one of the primary active concerns of the United Nations, together with action that will be recommended by the study on disarmament and development - which study must be completed in time for the second special session - could mark a new departure associating the disarmament process with the satisfaction of the economic and social needs of all countries. Such an approach might stimulate a broad international movement to curb the reprehensible waste of material and human resources.

(Mr. Ene, Romania)

We also believe that the special Assembly session should forge ahead with the strengthening and the democratization of the deliberative and negotiating machinery for disarmament by increasing the effectiveness of that machinery and by streamlining the functions of the various bodies and speeding up their activities.

The Disarmament Commission has given clear proof of its usefulness as a body for debate within the United Nations disarmament system. Its role and activities should be consolidated so as to make full use of the advantages offered by the participation of all States in its activities. Better use could be made of the Commission by strengthening its ties with other multilateral, regional and bilateral negotiating bodies.

On the other hand the Committee on Disarmament, as a unique multilateral negotiating forum, must, to a greater extent, respect United Nations resolutions and commit itself to negotiations on substantive problems and carry out those negotiations at an accelerated pace. It should at the same time further develop and consolidate the democratic nature of its rules of procedure. We are thinking of measures to ensure the effective participation of all States members on an equal footing in all aspects of the Committee's activities, as well as of access by non-member countries to the work of the Committee.

To reach a radical turning point in the work of disarmament we need not only appropriate deliberating negotiating machinery but also a single, well co-ordinated structure which would allow for an increase in the contribution of the United Nations, of its specialized agencies, of other governmental or non-governmental organizations and of public opinion in general to the mobilization of disarmament efforts. The United Nations Centre for Disarmament and its subsidiary units should play an increasingly important role in that system. We are equally concerned with the activities of the new United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, as well as with the definition and broadening of the functions of the United Nations Secretary-General's Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies.

The second special session must take a new step towards strengthening the role of the United Nations in the area of disarmament in keeping with its responsibilities under the Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security.

(Mr. Ene, Romania)

In this sphere, we consider that closer consideration must also be given to ways of approaching disarmament problems in the real context of their interdependence with the other major problems of contemporary life. The declaration of the Second Disarmament Decade, together with the third United Nations development decade, will provide an appropriate framework for putting into practice, as we have already mentioned, some of the conclusions arising from the study of disarmament and development. By adopting such measures, the special Assembly session could open up new prospects for greater international awareness in favour of disarmament thus contributing to the economic and social progress of all countries, and especially of the developing countries.

We consider that during the preparatory process for the special Assembly session - which we believe should begin without delay - attention should be focused both on organizational matters and, above all, on substantive matters including the documents which are to be adopted. It is, of course, difficult to say here and now which documents should be adopted by the session and what its decisions should consist of. Answers to these questions will emerge as preparations proceed, with the participation of all States. For such decisions to be authentically collective it is necessary that the Preparatory Committee be guided in all its activities by respect for democratic principles and practices and for it to ensure participation on a perfectly equal footing by all member States in its work.

These same principles must prevail in all the bodies which, in one way or another, will be taking part at this time in the proper preparations for the special Assembly session. Aside from the Preparatory Committee we are thinking first of all of the United Nations Disarmament Commission and of the Geneva Disarmament Committee. In cases where the membership of those bodies is of a limited character, an essential condition will be for participation in their work to be guaranteed for all who wish to make a contribution. As far as we are concerned, I should like to reaffirm Romania's desire to take part in all preparations for the special Assembly session as a member of the Preparatory Committee.

Finally, preparatory activities should, as they did for the first special Assembly session, benefit from the invaluable expertise of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament, which for this purpose should receive the financial support it needs.

In conclusion I should like to stress that the success of the special Assembly session will depend above all on the participation, in a constructive spirit, of all States concerned, both in the preparatory stage and in the work of the session. It is our firm conviction that this task can only be carried out successfully with the joint and resolute effort of all States.

Mr. BURWIN (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (interpretation from Arabic):

On behalf of the Libyan Arab delegation, I am pleased to express to the officers of the Committee and to you, Sir, our most sincere congratulations and our best wishes for success as you conduct the affairs of this Committee. I am sure you will bring to bear your experience and your great skill in conducting our deliberations.

Here we are at the thirty-fifth session of the General Assembly. We note that the United Nations has since its creation made considerable efforts through the holding of various meetings and conferences, by the creation of numerous committees and by the adoption of a number of recommendations and resolutions to control armaments and to bring about disarmament.

However, United Nations activities have not led to the attainment of the goals and objectives of the international community. In fact, military expenditures have exceeded \$500 billion and the number of those starving in the world is more than 400 million. The world continues to live in a state of tension, while the number of trouble-spots are increasing and certain circles are encouraging limited warfare in various parts of the world that will surely one day lead to a world war whose evil consequences will affect all mankind. International relations today, far from being based on justice and equality, are based on injustice, oppression, selfishness, exploitation and the division of the world into blocs and military alliances, as well as on the pursuit of domination and interference in the internal affairs of States. There are a number of factors which do not help to promote confidence among peoples. I might add that some major Powers compete with each other as they increase their military budgets. The United States has deployed its rockets in Europe and its bases in Africa and in other countries. In 1978, the United States, together with certain European countries, decided to deploy its rockets and revived the idea of establishing military bases in the Arab homeland in the Mediterranean in particular,

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Jamahiriya)

and in Africa. Those bases, whose numbers had begun to decrease thanks to liberation struggles, are a source of great concern and are a serious threat to the security of those regions where domination and political, economic and military hegemony are in evidence and there has been a take-over of the destiny of those peoples whose Governments have allowed the installation of such bases. We call for the elimination of these bases, especially in the Arab homeland, in the Mediterranean and in Africa.

Among the obstacles to disarmament is the existence of racist régimes in South Africa and in occupied Palestine, which enjoy the support of the forces of imperialism. Mondale, the Vice-President of the United States, said that Israel had received \$11 billion in the form of economic assistance during President Carter's term of office. In addition, the United States has pledged to guarantee Israel's oil supplies, in addition to the military and technical assistance and gifts given to Israel. That is not all. There are other obstacles and hindrances to disarmament, especially the persistence of imperialist nuclear-weapon countries in building up their nuclear arsenals and perfecting weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, they do not seek to share their nuclear technology with the countries of the third world to help the developing countries to make use of nuclear power for peaceful purposes. On the contrary, the nuclear-weapon countries are trying to take advantage of certain privileges provided in disarmament agreements such as the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968, and those same countries are not discharging their obligations under these agreements. They have a monopoly on nuclear technology and refuse to transfer it to the countries of the third world. Sometimes they resort to the pretext of saying that they are trying to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons, yet, at the same time, those countries do not limit their own nuclear weapons.

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The exhaustive study on nuclear weapons contained in the Secretary-General's report on general and complete disarmament in document A/35/392 of 12 September 1980 says:

Published figures indicate, however, that the total may be in excess of 40,000. In explosive power these warheads are reported to range from about 100 tons up to more than 20 million tons equivalent of chemical high explosive. The largest weapon ever tested released an energy approximately 4,000 times that of the atomic bomb that levelled Hiroshima." (para. 9)

Certain major Powers have been pursuing a policy of pressure and threats and have been interfering in the territorial waters of other countries by sending their ships and military aircraft through these areas. There are threats of interference in the internal affairs of the raw-materials exporting countries of the third world such as the oil-producing countries, and attempts are being made to impose a policy on these countries that would permit the Powers involved to appropriate the raw materials and impose the prices that suit them for certain essential products such as wheat.

These acts committed by certain major Powers and a feeling of insecurity force the countries of the third world to strengthen themselves militarily in order to cope with the policy of interference and to protect their independence and natural resources, and this naturally is to the detriment of their economic and social development.

Notwithstanding the fact that the responsibility for peace and security rests with all the countries of the world, the major Powers and, in particular, the nuclear-weapon countries, must bear the primary responsibility.

Disarmament must take place by stages, beginning with nuclear disarmament and then must follow the elimination of weapons of mass destruction which cause unnecessary suffering. We stress the importance of the contents of the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament convened on the initiative of the non-aligned countries. We also stress the importance of the role played by the Committee on Disarmament which has held this year about 100 formal and informal

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meetings dealing with disarmament questions. We further stress the importance of the role of the Disarmament Commission.

General Assembly resolution 34/75 proclaiming the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade was an appropriate step in promoting general awareness in the international community and drawing attention to the dangers of the arms race and its negative effects. In this area I should like to state that my country, in keeping with its desire to see peace reign and to prevent the danger of nuclear weapons, has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, as well as an agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with a view to applying the peace guarantees it offers in Libya which relate to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. At this juncture we wish to stress the danger of Israel's acquisition of nuclear weapons and the dangers posed by nuclear weapons in South Africa. Co-operation between South Africa and Israel in this field, we should stress, is a great danger to the African and Arab peoples and to peace in the world in general.

In conclusion, we should like to express the hope that this Committee and other bodies concerned with disarmament will help to achieve the noble objectives of the international community.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): Sir, it is a pleasure for me and for my delegation to see you, a man of talent and great diplomatic skill, presiding over the deliberations of the First Committee. Having so recently watched you guide our deliberations with such masterful skill in the arduous task of elaborating the strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade, we feel that your chairmanship of this Committee is a vivid reminder of the close interrelationship existing between disarmament and development.

As we are painfully aware today, the decade of the 1970s turned out to be neither a decade for disarmament nor one for development, contrary to the hopes for disarmament embodied in General Assembly resolution 2602 E (XXIV). The threat to the very survival of mankind is underscored by the unbelievable accumulation of such a vast quantity of nuclear arsenals that to each man, woman and child on earth can be assigned three tons of TNT. According to the expert study entitled "Comprehensive study on nuclear weapons" submitted to the General Assembly in document A/35/392, the total number of nuclear warheads in the arsenals of the nuclear Powers may be in excess of 40,000, with a total strength of 13,000 million tons of TNT or the equivalent of 1 million Hiroshima bombs. Simultaneously, the same nuclear-weapon States and their allies have embarked on the development, production and accumulation of large quantities of conventional weapons. In terms of military expenditure, the annual figure at the end of the Disarmament Decade stood at \$500 billion, compared with only \$180 billion spent on armaments in 1970, when the Disarmament Decade was supposed to have started, and that figure of \$500 billion for armaments is being spent at a time of great economic difficulties. Need I recall, therefore, that, while no constraint is allowed to hinder the precipitous race for the accumulation of instruments of death and destruction, every international effort for the preservation of life and the ensuring of a tolerable level of existence for the great majority of mankind that is living in abject poverty is starved of funds.

The Assembly is quite familiar with the very penetrating remarks in the report of the Brandt Commission on the North-South dialogue. Although the report was commissioned specifically on international development issues, in the introduction to that report Mr. Brandt himself drew in a vivid manner the contrast between the vast expenditure on armaments and the

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comparatively paltry sum needed to cure much of the world's economic and social problems - a paltry sum which, of course, cannot be found. In December 1979 Mr. Brandt in that introduction wrote the following:

"The annual military bill is now approaching \$450 billion, while official development aid accounts for less than 5 per cent of this figure."

He went on to give the following examples of what could be done with a very insignificant part of the amount spent on arms:

"The military expenditure of only half a day would suffice to finance the whole malaria eradication programme of the World Health Organization and less would be needed to conquer river blindness, which is still the scourge of millions.

"A modern tank costs about \$1 million; that amount could improve storage facilities for 100,000 tons of rice and thus save 4,000 tons or more annually. The same sum of money could provide 1,000 classrooms for 30,000 children.

"For the price of one jet fighter" - which he estimated as \$20 million - "one could set up about 40,000 village pharmacies.

"One-half of one per cent of one year's world military expenditure would pay for all the farm equipment needed to increase food production and approach self-sufficiency in food-deficit low-income countries by 1990."

Then he noted rather significantly:

"Could one be content to call something a new world economic order if it did not include major progress towards disarmament?"

Another member of the Brandt Commission, Mr. Shridath Ramphal, Secretary-General of the Commonwealth, in an inspiring statement on 23 October 1980 at the commencement of Disarmament Week referred to another aspect of the relationship between disarmament and development. He said:

"The extent of misuse of the world's resources, the contradiction between human needs and response, bears repetition. Military expenditure now exceeds the total income of all the people - more than 2 billion - in 37 low-income countries, including China. In effect, the developed

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countries of East And West spend annually on arms some \$365 for every one of their citizens - an amount substantially higher than the average annual income of people in low-income countries. They spend on the means of destruction more than billions of the world's poorest spend each year on the means of survival."

At the beginning of the third United Nations development decade, the amount spent on official development assistance (ODA) is only \$20 billion or a mere 4 per cent of annual military spending. At the same time, which is also the beginning of the Second Disarmament Decade, the world is confronted with a tense situation in which international peace and security are threatened from many sides with the resulting prospect of a further intensification of the arms race among the major military Powers. The grossly increased international tension has affected disarmament negotiations in a way which further demonstrates the irrationality of the accumulation of weapons, for, if peace and security can be guaranteed only by military arsenals, then there is already enough in the possession of the major military Powers to ensure their security. Indeed, it is clear now, as it was two years ago when the General Assembly held its first special session on disarmament, that, according to its Final Document:

"Enduring international peace and security cannot be built on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances nor be sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence or doctrines of strategic superiority. Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations and the speedy and substantial reduction of arms and armed forces, by international agreement and mutual example, leading... to general and complete disarmament under effective international control." (resolution S-10/2, para. 13)

Happily -- even if no result has yet been achieved -- willingness to return to negotiations rather than confrontation has of late been shown by the major nuclear-weapon States. We welcome the dialogue begun by the United States and the USSR aimed at working out ground rules for future negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons as part, perhaps, of future SALT negotiations. The accumulation and

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concentration of nuclear weapons in Europe and the plan for modernization and further deployment of a new generation of nuclear weapons in this region pose further extreme danger to world peace and security, for they can only signal a fresh round in the nuclear arms race at a time when the world yearns for measures of nuclear disarmament. It is, however, not enough to resume talks about negotiations. Practical steps have to be taken in demonstration of the commitment of the two super-Powers to reach agreements quickly and to implement them.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

In that connexion the non-ratification of the SALT II agreement is a matter of great concern to my delegation, as it is to other delegations. When it welcomed the signing of the agreement last year the international community generally pointed out the very slow pace at which it had been negotiated as well as its limited scope. Indeed, it was generally pointed out that SALT II was not a disarmament measure, but a measure that derived its value from its promise of providing the basis for future far reaching agreement on an actual reduction of strategic nuclear weapons and, hopefully, on a reduction of tactical nuclear weapons as well. If therefore such a preliminary or tentative agreement is not brought into force through failure to ratify it the question will arise as to what will be the fate of any real agreement on nuclear disarmament. Negotiations in good faith imply an undertaking to implement the results achieved. The General Assembly of the United Nations, whose forum was used by the SALT negotiators to obtain the stamp of approval of the international community on their limited achievement, has a duty to ensure that the commitment undertaken in SALT II does not fade away with the applause conjured up in the General Assembly.

The stagnation in the SALT process has of course typified the stagnation in the wider area of nuclear disarmament. The hope that the sole multilateral negotiating organ - the Committee on Disarmament - would actively commence negotiations on that priority item of its agenda was not fulfilled, owing obviously to the strong opposition of some nuclear-weapon States. Apart from the directive contained in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, significant initiatives were submitted to the Committee on Disarmament by the socialist States and by the delegation of India. Thus the Committee had sufficient materials to enable it to commence negotiations in a working group. Unfortunately, such a development was blocked, and now the international community is being persuaded again that a nuclear war is conceivable, can be survived and can even be won. The doctrine of flexible and limited response can only lead to a sense of false security, hinder the commencement of active negotiations aimed at nuclear disarmament and increase the danger of the total destruction that a nuclear war will cause. It is a doctrine that must be exposed before it becomes part of conventional wisdom.

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A nuclear war between two nuclear-weapon States, and in particular between the two super-Powers, cannot be confined or limited. It should constantly be seen for what it would really be; a total nuclear war that, in the words of the comprehensive study on nuclear weapons, is "the highest level of human madness".

The surprising disregard shown by the nuclear-weapon States for the urgency of steps to remove the threat of nuclear weapons has had as its most recent effect the failure of the Second Review Conference of Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. It may be too early to assess the total impact of the failure of the Second Review Conference. It is obvious, however, that the hope of attracting more non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly the significant ones, to the Treaty will, in the immediate future at least, be unable to be fulfilled. If the nuclear-weapon States parties to such a Treaty - a very important element in the régime of non-proliferation - show patent unwillingness to discharge the obligation they assumed, then they have to bear the responsibility for helping to sustain the criticism of States that are not parties to the Treaty that that Treaty is elitist and discriminatory. The nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty have thereby ensured that the Treaty will hardly be totally effective.

Thus my delegation is further convinced, as we have already said on several previous occasions, that non-proliferation in the 1980s cannot be sustained by great reliance as in the past on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is clearer than ever to my delegation that an alternative multilateral instrument will have to be concluded urgently that will prevent both horizontal and vertical proliferation and enable countries that find the Non-Proliferation Treaty objectionable to undertake legally binding international commitments against the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The conclusion of such a treaty on the complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests has for long been considered the most urgent task before the multilateral negotiating organ, yet the report of the Committee shows that it was not able to take the preliminary step needed for effective negotiation of that priority item.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

In the 1980 session of the Committee on Disarmament members of the Group of 21 presented two proposals and made at least three statements on the necessity of setting up without delay an ad hoc working group to negotiate the prohibition of all nuclear-test explosions by all States for all time. My delegation and other delegations within the Committee have even suggested areas of a proposed comprehensive test ban on which an ad hoc working group could usefully initiate preliminary negotiations. It is a matter for regret that such positive initiatives were not taken up by the Committee.

The only major development on this question this year is the report of the trilateral negotiators submitted to the Committee towards the end of its session on 31 July 1980 and contained in document CD/130. When compared with the tripartite reports of previous years the report does represent a major step forward in work towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty. It is the view of my delegation that the report can facilitate the primary responsibility of the Committee on Disarmament in elaborating such a treaty. In past years we have always requested the tripartite negotiators to present a structured report. For the first time they have attempted to present their report in such a form.

Nevertheless the insistence by the trilateral negotiators that their restricted negotiations represent the best forum for this item suggested an insensitivity to the demand for the multilateral negotiation of this important subject. Perhaps one positive result can still be salvaged from the Second Review Conference of Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in that respect; perhaps the trilateral negotiators, who are also the depositaries of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, will reaffirm their agreement to multilateral negotiation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty at the next session of the Committee on Disarmament. Such a reaffirmation, reflected in the draft resolution that will be adopted in this Committee, will facilitate the setting up of a working group at the beginning of the 1981 session of the Committee on Disarmament. It will make possible the completion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty in line with the priority envisaged in the activities for the Second Disarmament Decade.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

For those who are always unwilling to commit themselves to a rigid timetable. I hope that the danger of delay in this particular case will overcome their reluctance, otherwise the possibility is very real that while the necessary political will that alone obstructs the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty is being withheld, South Africa will formally join the nuclear club and unleash a nuclear arms race on the continent of Africa.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

At the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly last year, the report that South Africa might have detonated a nuclear explosion in the South Atlantic area became public knowledge. Since South Africa was known to have made preparations for conducting such a test in the Kalahari desert in 1977, my delegation took the initiative of calling for a thorough investigation of the reported explosion. We did so fully conscious of the danger to the peace and security of the African continent which the South African nuclear programme had posed all along and to which we had called attention. A régime which by its policy of apartheid has made itself the outcast of the international community is capable of any irrational act, including the use of threat of use of nuclear weapons to protect its criminal policy of apartheid.

In keeping with operative paragraph 4 of resolution 34/76 B, the Secretary-General has submitted a comprehensive report on South Africa's plan and capability in the nuclear field. I wish to pay a tribute to the Secretary-General and to the Assistant Secretary-General in charge of the Disarmament Centre for their dedication in ensuring that the report was prepared with the urgency which it deserves. I also wish to convey my delegation's gratitude to the experts who assisted the Secretary-General in preparing the report.

The painstaking assessment of South Africa's nuclear capability fully confirmed the fears of my delegation that South Africa has a nuclear weapon capability, which it has developed with, unfortunately, the collaboration of a good number of countries. The Secretary-General's report states:

"Discovery of a reported nuclear weapon test site in the Kalahari desert in 1977 strongly suggests that preparation for a nuclear explosive test was under way in South Africa in 1977. The event of 22 September 1979, without a scientifically indisputable explanation, further strengthened suspicions in the world community of South Africa's plans and intentions. By August 1977, South Africa could have had sufficient material to make a fission bomb, and by mid-1979 it could have produced sufficient weapon grade uranium for at least a few nuclear weapons." (A/35/402, para. 88)

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

Thus, even if doubts have been cast on the test of 22 September 1979 - there have been quite a number of disputes as to the exact origin of the signals that were picked up by the American satellite - it has nevertheless been shown that South Africa possesses the capability of conducting such a test. In addition, the Secretary-General's report observed that though the initial presumption that there had been a nuclear explosion by South Africa or any other country in the South Atlantic area had not been substantiated, it had not been fully disproved either. Indeed, the lack of persuasive corroborative evidence may reflect not that no explosion occurred but that South Africa tested a nuclear device and went to great pains, which is possible, to cover its tracks.

Particular attention must be paid to the salient conclusions drawn in the report:

"The diplomatic and political costs of South African acquisition and deployment of nuclear weapons would be high, and quite possibly disastrous, if those weapons were ever used. Nevertheless, desperate to preserve the apartheid system, South Africa's leaders may eschew a rational weighing of costs and gains. Instead, they might try to justify the acquisition of nuclear weapons as a last resort to attempt to preserve white supremacy by intimidating neighbouring countries or as a device to demoralize black South African and, conversely, to buttress the morale of the white population." (ibid., para. 89)

"The proliferation of nuclear weapons to any country is a matter of serious concern to the world. The introduction of nuclear weapons to the African continent, and particularly in such a volatile region as southern Africa, not only would be a severe blow to worldwide efforts at non-proliferation but also would upset many years' efforts to spare the African continent from the nuclear arms race and to make it a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Judgements of the consequences of that development only can be pessimistic." ibid., para. 92)

Finally, the report contained a very pertinent recommendation:

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

"...bearing in mind the unrelenting action of the United Nations in condemning the policies and practices of South Africa's apartheid régime, and in particular the recent imposition by the Security Council of an arms embargo and its call for cessation of co-operation in developing nuclear weapons, it is still the primary responsibility of the Members of the United Nations and of the international community as a whole to continue to follow closely South Africa's activity in this field and to take whatever necessary action aimed both at the eradication of apartheid and the prevention of further proliferation of nuclear weapons." (ibid., para. 94)

The lessons to be drawn from the Secretary-General's report on the nuclear capability of South Africa ought to be reflected in the decisions of the General Assembly and in its consideration of all the aspects of the challenge to the international community which South Africa has always posed. That is the great contribution that can be made by this session towards the strengthening of the security of African countries.

In another expert report submitted by the Secretary-General containing the study on all aspects of regional disarmament, the intimate link between national security and regional conditions has been clearly emphasized. The experts stated in their report:

"For the great majority of States, the perceived threats to their security and the need for military preparedness is primarily connected with conditions in their own region. Some of the problems which stand in the way of progress in disarmament are therefore regional in nature."  
(A/35/416, para. 136)

At the appropriate time, my delegation will draw the well-merited attention of the First Committee to that important study on regional aspects of disarmament. For the present, I shall refer only to the pertinent remarks of the experts on the hindrance to progress on an important regional initiative - the denuclearization of Africa. The experts stated:

"The progressive consideration by OAU of the modalities for implementing the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa has in the past three years been jeopardized by reports on a South African

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

nuclear weapons programme. At the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, the reported preparations by South Africa in the summer of 1977 to test a nuclear weapon were given serious consideration, both in its regional aspect as a danger to the African continent, and in its global aspect as an imminent proliferation of nuclear weapons and a severe threat to the nuclear non-proliferation régime as it existed." (ibid., para. 95)

Obviously, therefore, more effective steps will have to be taken to remove the potent threat posed by the South African nuclear programme if the contribution to international non-proliferation efforts implicit in the denuclearization of Africa is to be fully realized.

The commemoration of Disarmament Week is another reminder of the long road ahead. Very little progress has been made in any of the constituent parts of the international disarmament programme. Whether in the area of nuclear disarmament, to which I have devoted a substantial part of my statement today, or in the effort to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and ensure their destruction; whether in the prevention of the development of weapons of mass destruction or in the reduction of military expenditures; whether in the creation of zones of peace or in promotion of the inter-relationship between disarmament and development, very little progress indeed has been made.

The disappointment of the past, however, must not be allowed to perpetuate itself in the new decade ahead of us. The Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade, adopted by the General Assembly at its thirty-fourth session on the initiative of my delegation, should not be taken as another routine exercise in pious declarations. Rather a set of result-oriented activities should be adopted so as to ensure discernible progress in the course of the decade. The result of the effort of the Disarmament Commission in elaborating the elements of the Declaration of the 1980s as the Second Disarmament Decade provides us with a step in the right direction. At this session the General Assembly, therefore, should consolidate the agreement which was almost concluded in the Disarmament Commission on the activities envisaged during the Decade.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

It is particularly important that the following measures be completed not later than the second special session devoted to disarmament, scheduled for 1982: a comprehensive programme of disarmament; ratification of SALT II and progress towards SALT III; a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty; a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and on their destruction; a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and use of radiological weapons; the conclusion of a binding international legal instrument to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons; and agreement on negotiations on nuclear disarmament in the Committee on Disarmament.

As an important milestone during the Disarmament Decade, the second special session, in 1982, should give an impetus to further negotiations leading to agreements on nuclear disarmament, on conventional weapons and armed forces, on confidence-building measures and on the diversion of resources from the unproductive arms race towards social and economic development through measures of disarmament and through the reduction of military expenditures.

I shall have the opportunity during the course of our work to go into more detail on these various issues. In the meantime, it is gratifying that I can conclude this statement on a note of optimism. The United Nations Conference on specific conventional weapons which met in Geneva from 15 September to 10 October 1980 achieved results which should convince us all in this Committee that given the necessary political will progress can be made in the many areas where negotiations have reached deadlock. For, in the final analysis, it was the will of participants to achieve results that turned what seemed like another abortive negotiation into a successful Conference. The Conference adopted a Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects and three Protocols: on non-detectable fragments, on mines and booby traps and on incendiaries.

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While no disarmament measure is involved, it is pertinent to point out that no other such restriction on the use of weapons in warfare as is contained in the Protocols has been agreed upon in the last 50 years. Moreover, the particular significance of the main Convention lies in the provision which it makes for further progress in the development of international law permitting the further prohibition or restriction of use of more categories of specific conventional weapons, as well as the expansion of the scope of the existing Protocols. I commend the Convention and the Protocols to all delegations for recommendation to their Governments.

Finally, let me join you, Mr. Chairman, in recognizing, as you did at the beginning of the work of this Committee, the presence among us of the 20 young men and women who are the recipients of this year's fellowships on disarmament. They are the second group in the chain of activists for disarmament which the programme is expected to create. According to the report of the Secretary-General, the enthusiasm which the programme has generated in many foreign ministries, judging by the number of applicants from among whom the Secretary-General had to select the 20 recipients, is cause for great satisfaction. The Nigerian delegation's perception of a gap that needed to be filled in disarmament negotiations was the main motivation for proposing the fellowships programme at the first special session devoted to disarmament. The annual outlay by the General Assembly may well prove to be some of the Organization's most productive expenditure.

Mr. PETROVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation has already had an opportunity to state its views on draft resolution A/C.1/35/L.1, entitled "Certain urgent measures for reducing the danger of war." The proposals contained in the framework of this new Soviet initiative are the minimum necessary to put an end to the dangerous trend towards increased international tension which has recently become evident in inter-State relations because of the

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

imperialist forces, which do not want to accept today's realities or to take account of the balance of power that has been created in the world. The range of measures proposed by the Soviet Union to reduce the danger of war do not require complicated and lengthy talks or a technical study of the questions. Only the political will of States is required for their implementation, the desire to return to normal peaceful coexistence and to revive mutually advantageous co-operation. We are convinced, therefore, that the implementation of these important measures would facilitate the achievement of a decision in other fields of disarmament and the curbing of the arms race.

In submitting our proposal on certain urgent measures for reducing the danger of war to the General Assembly, the Soviet Union is emphasizing the importance of other, more far-reaching measures as well, measures designed to curb the danger of war and to move towards real disarmament. Proof of this was the submission by the Soviet Union to this session of the General Assembly of a memorandum on peace, disarmament and the guarantee of international security, contained in document A/35/482. That document does not simply recall proposals previously made by the Soviet Union and other countries and United Nations decisions that have not yet been implemented; it also contains constructive ideas with regard to the improvement of the practical implementation of all substantive aspects of the struggle to limit and to halt the arms race. In its approach to disarmament problems the Soviet Union has taken into account the fact that at this junction between the 1970s and the 1980s, the international situation has become a great deal more complicated. That this has happened is the fault of the imperialist Powers, which see détente as an obstacle to their aggressive designs.

The attempts by certain States to demonstrate that the main reason for the deterioration of the international climate and the increase in the threat of war is the events in Afghanistan represent a gross distortion of the real situation. The truth is that the policy of stepping up the arms race and sabotaging détente was adopted in imperialist circles long before those events. I would recall that in the summer of 1977 the United States issued Presidential Directive 18, which proclaimed the beginning of a new period in international relations, "Era 2", a period marked by a departure from the policy of détente.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

Before the Afghanistan events, in May 1978 NATO adopted a decision regarding the automatic growth of the military budgets of States members of the bloc; in December 1979, they decided to station new American missiles in Western Europe aimed at the Soviet Union. I would recall also that, long before the events in Afghanistan, the talks on the Indian Ocean were suspended and broken off; talks on the arms trade and the process of ratification of SALT II were stymied. The basis of all those actions by the imperialist Powers was their desire to alter the strategic balance in the world to their advantage. That, I stress, is the real reason - not an invented one - for the worsening international situation in which we now find ourselves.

Notwithstanding the continuing attempts by the imperialist and hegemonistic Powers to complicate the international situation and increase the threat of war, the Soviet Union is deeply convinced that world war is not inevitable and that it can be staved off, and that in the present-day world there is no sensible alternative to the policy of détente or to efforts to halt the arms race.

We are also profoundly convinced that the 1980s should become years in which substantial progress is made in the struggle to create a world without weapons - a world without wars. The Soviet Union views the main task of the new decade as being to preserve, consolidate and further develop the positive achievements of the 1970s in curbing the arms race and making real practical progress in that field.

As was emphasized in the communiqué of the recently concluded meeting of the Committee of Foreign Ministers of States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty of 20 October this year, the socialist countries are convinced that there are no types of weapons concerning the limitation and elimination of which agreement is impossible, on the basis of mutual advantage and in strict compliance with the principle of equality and of equal and undiminished security for all States.

Obviously, the priority issues in the disarmament field are those of halting the nuclear arms race and the non-use of force in international relations. It is the nuclear arms race which is the greatest danger to mankind and to the future existence of civilization. That is an incontrovertible fact, and we can only express our gratitude to the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Garcia Robles, who, on the opening day of the general debate on disarmament questions in this Committee, thoroughly and convincingly demonstrated this with facts in hand.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

As regards the Soviet Union, I would recall that back in 1946 we took the initiative in proposing the conclusion of an international convention to prohibit for all time the manufacture and use of atomic weapons so that the great scientific discoveries implicit in the splitting of the atom might be used exclusively for purposes of increasing the well-being of peoples.

But in response to those proposals by the Soviet Union - imbued, as they were, by concern for mankind's future - other Powers which were the prime object of these proposals adopted a policy of stepping-up the arms race, in the indeed naive hope of retaining their monopoly on that type of weapon of mass destruction. As a result, the problem of prohibiting and destroying nuclear weapons has become far more complicated.

This does not mean that the problem cannot be solved. From our point of view, the true path to its solution lies in the speedy start of negotiations on halting the production of all types of nuclear weapons and gradually reducing their stockpiles until they are fully eliminated.

That is precisely what the Soviet Union has been striving to do for many years. As you know, together with other States of the socialist community, the Soviet Union submitted to the Committee on Disarmament specific proposals regarding the start of such talks and the way in which they should be conducted. But because of the negative position taken by a number of States members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) - in particular, the United States and also China, it has not proved possible to start constructive talks, or even, at least, to start consultations with the aim of starting the talks. While we appreciate the complexities of the problem of nuclear disarmament, we do feel that we cannot be taken in by those who are reluctant even to discuss the matter. Nuclear weapons have been created by people, and people can and should find a way of saving mankind from the catastrophe involved in the threat of the use of nuclear weapons. And this must be done as soon as possible, before it is too late.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The Soviet Union urgently emphasizes that the elaboration and implementation of arms limitation measures and nuclear disarmament must go hand in hand with strengthening the political and international legal guarantees of the security of States. The renunciation of the use of force must become an immutable law in international life.

Some important work has already been done in this field, but, as experience has shown, it has proven insufficient. That is why the Soviet Union proposed in 1976 the elaboration and conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations. Indeed, a special body was established within the United Nations to elaborate such a treaty. Unfortunately, the practical work along those lines over a number of years has not made any progress. Those who are hindering that work obviously do not want to renounce the use of force or the policy of diktat in their relations with independent countries and wish to wreck the elaboration of such a treaty, thus placing themselves at odds with the overwhelming majority of States of the world.

Obstacles have been placed in the way of implementation of other decisions taken on the initiative of the Soviet Union at the United Nations aimed at strengthening the political and legal guarantees of the States of the world. In 1947, for example, the General Assembly adopted a resolution prohibiting war propaganda, in whatever form it might appear. Nevertheless, to this very day in many countries, aggressive propaganda, as well as chauvinistic and expansionistic propaganda, is being spread.

In this respect, we cannot overlook the adoption by the United States, in August of this year, of Presidential Directive 59, aimed at creating the illusion among peoples of the admissibility and possibility of nuclear war. What is that, if not obvious war propaganda elevated to the status of official military strategy? This dangerous turn of events once again shows quite convincingly the decisive importance, for reducing the threat of nuclear war, of halting the further growth of the strategic nuclear arsenals of States and the subsequent unswerving quantitative reduction and qualitative limitation of strategic nuclear-weapon systems.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

As representatives know, throughout the 1970s important progress was achieved in this direction. Following the conclusion in 1972 of the treaty limiting anti-missile defence systems and provisional agreements on certain measures in the field of limiting strategic offensive weapons (SALT I), the Soviet Union and the United States in June 1979 signed the strategic arms limitation treaty (SALT II), which was a measure for realistic disarmament and was to have become the next important step limiting the strategic arms race. But that treaty has not yet been put into force, and it is well known who bears responsibility for this situation.

As for the Soviet Union, it, as heretofore, is prepared to take part in the process of limiting and reducing strategic weapons in strict compliance with the principle of equality and equal security. The Soviet Union is prepared to ratify SALT II and to implement all its provisions, if the United States of America acts in the same way. But we should be quite clear about the serious damage that would be done to the cause of peace and further efforts to avert nuclear war if the implementation of SALT II is wrecked by the American side.

With regard to efforts to limit the arms race in its most dangerous field, the nuclear field, I should like to draw the attention of Member States to another problem requiring immediate solution. The Soviet Union, as representatives know, has repeatedly and insistently raised the question of the need for elaborating measures to prevent the possibility of sudden attack. Today, in conditions marked by the arms race, not only a quantitative but also a qualitative arms race, this question is becoming even more important. As was emphasized in the memorandum that I mentioned before - the problem of preventing unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons is still very acute; the importance of this has been pointed out several times by the Soviet Union. Recent events connected with the repeated sounding of a false nuclear alarm among the military forces of the United States of America induce troubled thoughts. The present discussion on problems of disarmament in the First Committee reaffirms this. The Soviet Union is ready for a serious and responsible discussion of these problems on a multilateral and bilateral basis and is ready to co-operate in any measures aimed at preventing the danger of a sudden or unauthorized emergence of a nuclear war.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The Soviet Union considers it important to conduct a meticulous search for partial decisions which could limit the arms race and cut off the channel for its deployment one by one. Thus, on the initiative of the Soviet Union and with its active participation, important international agreements have been concluded to prohibit nuclear-weapon tests in three environments: the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the non-stationing of nuclear weapons in outer space, the sea-bed and the ocean floor. Obviously, those agreements create a basis for further progress towards limiting and halting the nuclear arms race.

Today, in view of efforts that have been made in this field, the question of a general and complete ban on nuclear-weapon testing is of particular importance. In the mid-1970s a certain amount of progress was made in resolving this important question: tripartite talks were started with the participation of the Soviet Union, the United States of America, and the United Kingdom. In trying to ensure speedy progress to provide a mutually acceptable agreement, the Soviet Union took important steps to accommodate its partners in those talks. The constructive efforts made by our country created all the conditions needed so that given the corresponding goodwill of the other sides in the talks we could reach agreement without delay. But now the United States and the United Kingdom are obviously pursuing a policy to hold up the talks, renegeing in a number of cases on the proposals that they made before; but, in the meantime, the tests go on.

We are profoundly concerned at the fact that China conducted another nuclear explosion in the atmosphere on 16 October 1980, threatening a large area of the earth with radioactive contamination and reaching as far as the American continent. The size of that explosion was reported yesterday in The New York Times in its "Letters from readers" column in a section under a very typical heading where Richard Liboff, Professor of Applied Physics at Cornell University, mentioned the fact that the radioactive fallout from China was not that harmless.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

He said:

(spoke in English)

"One week after the Chinese atmospheric nuclear test on March 14, 1978, radiation levels measured in Syracuse, N.Y., rose to 10 times the normal value. In Denver and in Cheyenne, Wyo., the levels rose to 30 times the normal value.

"We may expect a sharper rise in radiation levels to occur in the United States as a result of the latest Chinese atmospheric nuclear test, on Oct. 16, estimated to be at least 10 times stronger than the 1978 blast..." (The New York Times, October 26, 1980, p. 18 E)

(continued in Russian)

In an attempt to reduce the danger of war and provide another impetus to the talks on a general and complete ban on nuclear-weapon testing, the Soviet Union has proposed at the present session that all - and I stress "all" - the nuclear Powers should declare an annual moratorium on all nuclear explosions. This step would obviously have a positive influence on international efforts being made to prohibit nuclear-weapon testing. We note with satisfaction that the Soviet proposal has been welcomed with interest by many delegations, but we must recognize that the proposal was obviously not to the liking of those who use any pretext to try to avoid taking concrete steps in the field of limiting the nuclear arms race.

As we have learned from many years of experience, one of the favourite pretexts is the question of verification. Thus, we are not surprised at the attempts of certain Western delegations to make out that at this particular stage the moratorium proposed by the USSR cannot help, but will on the contrary prevent or impede agreement on a general and complete ban on nuclear weapons testing because it does not provide for verification procedures. These arguments are obviously far-fetched. Practice shows that a moratorium, by its nature, does not require verification procedures. And how could it impede a general and complete ban on nuclear weapons testing - especially as it was stated in the Secretary-General's study on a comprehensive nuclear test ban that

"Verification of compliance no longer seems to be an obstacle to reaching agreement" (A/35/257, para. 154).

So what is the matter? It is obviously not a matter of any fear that a moratorium might hamper speedy agreement on a treaty on the general and complete banning of nuclear weapons tests, but is rather to do with a lack of political will on the part of certain States to take practical steps to reach agreement on this question.

Another problem on which the elimination of the threat of nuclear war depends to a large extent is the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. There can be no doubt in anyone's mind about the threat to the world posed by the emergence of nuclear weapons, in particular to countries which are situated in regions where there is an increased danger of war and among other States which are trying to acquire nuclear weapons for aggressive purposes. In trying to promote the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime, the Soviet Union stated in 1978 that it would never - and I stress never - use nuclear weapons against States which renounced the acquisition and production of such weapons and did not possess them on their territory. We proposed the conclusion on that basis of an international convention to strengthen the security guarantees for non-nuclear countries. In that proposal entitled "Urgent measures for reducing the danger of war" the Soviet Union expressed its readiness, given the same readiness by the other nuclear Powers, to examine other possible ways of resolving the problem of strengthening the security guarantees for non-nuclear States.

The main point is strengthening the security guarantees for non-nuclear States. The Soviet Union is also in favour of reaching agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States not at present possessing such weapons. Such an agreement could envisage a simple, clear obligation undertaken by the nuclear Powers not to station nuclear weapons on the territories of countries not yet possessing such weapons irrespective of whether those countries have alliances with any of the nuclear States.

Through the provisions of resolution 34/87 C, the necessary preparatory work has already been done in the United Nations to resolve the problem in practical terms. The present session of the General Assembly, to our mind, would be acting correctly if it were to take the next step in this direction, for example, calling upon the Committee on Disarmament to start talks without delay on the drafting of an international agreement on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present.

The creation of nuclear weapon-free zones is an important question in the field of nuclear arms limitation and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. There exist proposals to create nuclear weapon-free zones in many regions of the world, for example, Africa, the Middle East and northern Europe. The desire of the States of those regions to preserve their peoples from the threat of involvement in a nuclear conflict deserves full support. That precisely is the position of the Soviet Union and, as members know, in 1978 it signed and ratified Additional Protocol II to the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

While nuclear weapons are very dangerous, they are not the only ones in the arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. Attempts to limit or ban other types of weapons of mass destruction have so far led only to one real success: in 1972, bacteriological (biological) and toxin weapons were prohibited. That is a major success, but it only covers one type of weapon of mass destruction.

In close co-operation with other States, the Soviet Union made a proposal in the early 1970s to conclude an international convention banning the

manufacture, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles. Talks have been going on for many years on this question, but agreement has not yet been reached. In a number of countries, meanwhile, new types of chemical weapons are being developed, including those with binary charges and costly programmes for expanding the production of these weapons are being undertaken. This is a type of weapon which killed or maimed many thousands of people in the First World War.

We must be troubled by the attempts of certain countries to make an undue fuss about rumours concerning their allegations that the Soviet Union and Viet Nam have not complied with the Geneva Protocol of 1925 . Who benefits from this unpardonable slander? Obviously, those who themselves, for many years, used chemical weapons against the peoples of Indo-China, and who are supplying such weapons to the gangs which are pouring into the territory of Afghanistan from abroad. That slander is also being used to hide from the public at large their own feverish programmes of building up and modernizing their arsenals of chemical weapons. And last, but not at all least, it is being used to undermine the process of elaborating an international convention on the banning of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The Soviet delegation fully and completely repudiates these malicious attempts to cast a slur on the clear consistent policy of the Soviet State and fraternal Viet Nam. As was stated by member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR Andrei A. Gromyko, in his address during the general debate of the present session of the General Assembly:

"But in the contest between truth and deception, truth has always been victorious sooner or later. The Soviet Union has not violated one single international agreement and it does not intend to do so".

(A/35/PV.6 p. 53-55)

The Soviet Union consistently advocates excluding the possibility of adding new types and systems of mass destruction to the arsenals of States. We must, however, take note of the fact that the solution to this important problem has not made any progress because of the negative position adopted by certain States which, obviously, would like to retain for themselves the possibility of creating basically new means of annihilation, clearly banking on changing the strategic balance of power to their own advantage. The adventuristic nature of such plans is so obvious, as, indeed, is the fact that they are in vain.

In advocating a comprehensive ban on new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, the Soviet Union is prepared at the same time to reach agreement on prohibiting individual new types of such weapons. First and foremost I am referring to neutron weapons, the threat of whose emergence in the arsenals of States is increasing.

The Soviet side has stated that the Soviet Union would not embark upon the production of neutron weapons if the United States also did not do so. That position of the USSR remains valid and at the present time relates to the possibility that the neutron weapon will emerge in the arsenal of any other State. The USSR, however, still considers that the best solution would be to ban the neutron weapon under a treaty, using as a basis the draft international convention submitted by the socialist countries regarding the banning of the production, stockpiling and deployment and use of that weapon of mass destruction.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

In the Committee on Disarmament, as Members know, work is going on to draft a treaty on the banning of one type of weapon of mass destruction, namely, the radiological weapon, that is, a weapon which strikes living organisms as a result of radioactive radiation caused by non-explosive disintegration of radioactive material. The USSR does not see any reason why that work could not be completed in the very near future. The present session of the General Assembly could call on the Committee on Disarmament to complete its work without delay on the draft treaty on the banning of radiological weapons.

At the various stages in talks on disarmament the question of reducing armed forces and conventional weapons has been taken up on an all-round basis. Soon after the end of the Second World War, in 1948, the Soviet Union introduced a proposal in the United Nations that, together with the ban on nuclear weapons, States permanent members of the Security Council should in the course of a year substantially reduce their land, naval and air forces. The USSR and other States of the Warsaw Treaty made further concrete proposals on the questions of reducing armed forces and conventional weapons of States, particularly major States.

However, so far there has been no progress in resolving that issue. Certain major Powers have even refused to start serious negotiations on this score. That is why the Soviet Union considers it necessary to reaffirm the continuing validity of its proposals, which were put forward two years ago, to stop the production of new types of conventional weapons with great destructive power and to reach agreement so that States permanent members of the Security Council and also countries linked by military agreements with those countries should undertake not to expand their armies and their conventional weapons arsenals.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

A certain time ago efforts were undertaken to reach agreement on limiting the sale and deliveries of conventional weapons which, as Members know, account for deals of many billions of dollars and have led to the saturation of crisis regions with dangerous means of waging war. At the Soviet-American talks of 1978 on this question, the elaboration was begun of political, legal and military-technological criteria for the admissibility or non-admissibility of deliveries of arms. Reaching an agreement seemed to be within the bounds of possibility, but the talks were suspended by the American side, which then refused to continue them altogether. At the same time, the scale of American arms exports has risen sharply. All this runs counter to the interests of peace.

One of the promising trends of efforts for disarmament is the cessation of the arms race on a regional basis. In this context, Europe is of particular importance, since it is there that the most numerous and powerful armed forces and armaments of the two military-political groupings of States are concentrated and confront each other. At the present time there are several main routes towards the taking of real steps to reduce military confrontation in Europe. On each of them the Soviet Union, in co-operation with other socialist States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, has been acting with initiative and in a constructive manner.

The Soviet Union attaches great importance to the speedy holding of a conference on military détente and disarmament in Europe which, at its first stage, could start expanding confidence-building measures on the understanding that subsequently the conference could deal with harmonized measures to limit military activity and reduce armed forces and armaments. An important role in the achievement of general agreement on the holding of the conference and the nature of its work will be played by the Madrid meeting of States members of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe which opens on 11 November of this year. The Soviet Union staunchly advocates that that meeting should be pragmatic and should conclude with positive results on all - and I stress all - sections of the Helsinki Final Act.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

Making progress in the Vienna talks on reducing armed forces and armaments in Europe would promote the reduction of military confrontation in Europe and progress in the field of disarmament as well. Those talks have now been going on for about seven years without any tangible results, and that is due to the reluctance of the countries of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to give their consent to mutually acceptable agreements. Their desire to use the talks to give themselves military advantages runs counter to the legitimate security interests of the socialist States. Obvious proof of this are the proposals made by the Western partners at the conference table. Furthermore, I should like to point out that the proposals made in December 1979 on a number of important points - which I cannot actually quote here - in fact disavow previous proposals, which reflects the present policy being pursued by the NATO countries significantly to build up their own military preparations.

Nevertheless, the Soviet Union still believes that the possibilities to break the impasse in the Vienna talks have not been exhausted and that the concentration of troops and armaments in Central Europe can be lowered to everyone's mutual advantage without destroying the parity of forces. For that to be possible, the Western Powers should stop claiming any one-sided military advantages and show a political will to make a genuine search for co-ordinated decisions.

A solid basis for agreement in Vienna would be provided by the comprehensive proposals of the socialist countries. These compromise proposals envisage a reduction, at the first stage, of the troops and armaments of the United States and the USSR in Central Europe as well as establishing a clear link, at the second stage, proportionately to their military potential, with a reduction of their troops and armaments and the attainment, in the final analysis, of a reduction of equal collective levels of the strength of armed forces of the NATO and the Warsaw Treaty countries in that region.

In July this year the Soviet Union and other socialist countries made proposals in Vienna allowing for speedier progress to be made at the talks there. The idea was to cut back, at the first stage, by 13,000 United States troops and 20,000 Soviet troops, in addition to the Soviet Union's military contingent of 20,000 whose withdrawal from the territory of the German Democratic Republic was completed by 1 August this year. Thus the reduction of Soviet troops

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

was virtually 40,000 men, which was 10,000 more than what was envisaged by the July 1978 proposal of the socialist countries and the December 1979 proposal of the NATO countries.

An important step in reducing the threat of nuclear war and in providing a peaceful life for European peoples could be the successful conclusion of the practical discussions started in October this year between the Soviet Union and the United States of questions dealing with the limitation of nuclear weapons in Europe.

In the opinion of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, it would be of great significance for strengthening peace - and this has been noted in the USSR memorandum - if measures were taken to reduce military tension in the Mediterranean Sea region, which washes the shores of three continents of the world, Europe, Africa and Asia. On 15 May 1980 the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty put forward in their declaration a broad-based programme of action in that direction. It includes extending confidence-building measures to the Mediterranean region, reducing armed forces in the region, withdrawal from the Mediterranean Sea of military ships carrying nuclear weapons and a pledge not to station nuclear weapons on the territories of Mediterranean European and non-European non-nuclear-weapon countries. We are awaiting the reaction of other States concerned to those proposals of ours.

In recent years the problem of strengthening security and reducing military tension in the Indian Ocean has become particularly relevant in that part of the world where peoples that have been freed from colonial domination live.

The Soviet Union consistently supports the aspirations of those peoples to turn their region into a zone of peace where all foreign military bases would be eliminated and where no one could threaten the security, independence and sovereignty of the coastal States. To that end, 1977 and 1978 the Soviet Union held bilateral talks with the United States regarding the limitation and subsequent reduction of military activities in the Indian Ocean. But the American side broke off those talks as well. The serious build-up of its military presence in the Indian Ocean now being pursued by the United States and the creation there of military bases, in particular the enormous navy and army base on the island of Diego Garcia, runs counter to the will of the peoples of that region of the world, increases tension and creates the threat of dangerous military confrontations.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

Those actions undertaken by the United States are in direct contradiction to the proposals adopted by the United Nations to make of the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, and represent a direct threat to the security and independence of the coastal countries.

Allegations which are sometimes made that the basis of the tense situation in the Indian Ocean region is "great Power rivalry", in which it is claimed that the Soviet Union participates as well, has nothing to do with the real facts. It is obviously playing into the hands of those who are in fact trying to establish their own diktat in that region.

The Soviet Union decisively condemns the militaristic policies of the United States in that region and insists that Washington resume the Soviet-American talks which were broken off regarding the limitation and subsequent reduction of military activities in the Indian Ocean. It states that it is fully prepared to promote, including at the forthcoming 1981 International Conference on the Indian Ocean, the creation of zones of peace, on the understanding that the central issue will be the elimination of foreign military bases.

We also support the proposal of the President of the Democratic Republic of Madagascar, Didier Ratsiraka, regarding the holding of a summit conference of all countries concerned about preserving peace and security in the Indian Ocean region.

The Soviet Union and the other socialist countries parties to the Warsaw Treaty have, in addition, proposed that in the context of the United Nations a start be made on the consideration of the question of limiting and reducing the levels of military presence and military activities in various regions - whether in the Atlantic, Indian or Pacific Oceans, the Mediterranean Sea or the Persian Gulf - taking into account the interests of peace and securing a reliable and unimpeded use of these highly important international sea routes. Recent events reaffirm the relevance of the raising of this question.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

Naturally an important place in the work of this Committee of the General Assembly belongs to the question of starting preparatory work for the second special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament. We express the hope that the opportunity to participate directly in that preparatory work will be given to all States that wish to do so. The first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament that was held in 1978 adopted a Final Document on the basis of general agreement, a document that is a good foundation for reaching practical results in the field of disarmament. We feel that the task of the second special session should be to strive to promote the implementation of those important decisions.

The Soviet Union is also in favour of holding a world disarmament conference after the second special session devoted to disarmament, that could take effective decisions truly binding on all States.

Finally I should like to refer to one of the most simple and at the same time most effective ways of halting the arms race and moving on to disarmament - cutting down on military expenditures. The Soviet Union many years ago favoured the reduction of the military budgets of all States, particularly the big Powers. That is our position today as well. The Soviet Union is prepared at any time to embark on talks with other States that have great economic and military potential, as well as with all Member States that are permanent members of the Security Council, on the concrete proportion by which each military budget would be reduced, either in percentage or in absolute terms. The Soviet Union is also prepared to try to reach agreement on the amount of money that would be granted to increase economic assistance to the developing countries by each State that would reduce its military budget.

We should also be prepared to agree that the monies freed as a result of implementing measures to limit nuclear weapons should be harnessed only for peaceful purposes and they could not be used for expenditures under other items of military budgets of States.

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

The Soviet Union adopts a highly responsible attitude towards resolving problems of disarmament. We share the concern of the Secretary-General of this Organization, Mr. Kurt Waldheim, that

"...disarmament activities seem to remain largely confined to organizational and procedural matters rather than substantive ones."

(A/35/1, p.12)

In our opinion the effectiveness of efforts in the field of disarmament is borne out not by the quantity of resolutions adopted or the number of various studies that are made, but by practical matters that are tangible in effect. There are no insuperable objective obstacles towards attaining generally acceptable agreement in the field of curbing the arms race and of disarmament. Attempts artificially to link the solution to questions of disarmament with completely extraneous problems, as the experience of talks has shown us, are nothing more than ruses of those who are not interested in real - and I stress real - progress in this major area of the struggle for peace and security. The main obstacle - and here I fully agree with what was just said by the representative of Nigeria, Ambassador Adeniji - is the lack of political will among certain States, and that obstacle should be eliminated. The 1980s can be a decade of substantial progress in the field of disarmament if the States Members of the United Nations and the leaders of all States without exception demonstrate a true feeling of responsibility, goodwill and resolve to reverse the arms race. For that one needs to discard any short-term considerations and plans, whether of an internal or external nature. One needs to renounce any attempts to try to obtain military strategic superiority. One needs to renounce any striving for hegemony on a global or regional scale and realize that the vital interests of all peoples lie in eliminating the threat of a nuclear catastrophe and in providing for a peaceful future.

As was recently stated by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev:

"Nowadays there cannot be a foreign policy that is more moral, more ethical in the best sense of that word, more near to the hearts and minds of people than the policy of peace, détente and curbing the arms race."

(Mr. Petrovsky, USSR)

That was and remains the Leninist foreign policy of peace which has been consistently implemented by the Soviet Union regarding matters of disarmament as well.

The CHAIRMAN: Before I adjourn the meeting I should like to recall that the Committee has not yet decided on the deadline for the submission of draft resolutions. I intend to discuss that matter with the members of the Bureau and submit a recommendation for consideration by the Committee shortly.

I should like to add, however, that those draft resolutions that are ready for submission should be presented as soon as possible, especially those containing financial implications. As I informed the Committee earlier in the session, draft resolutions containing financial implications must also be considered by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, as well as by the Fifth Committee, before they can be taken up by the General Assembly. It is my hope that those draft resolutions containing financial implications can be disposed of early during our consideration of draft resolutions so that the requirements needed for their consideration by the plenary Assembly can be met.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.