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Chairman: Mr. HEPBURN (Bahamas)

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ENGLISH

The meeting was called to order at 3.00 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 30 TO 45, 120 and 121 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. SAHLOUL (Sudan) (interpretation from Arabic): Approximately a year and one half ago, in May 1978, the General Assembly held its tenth special session, devoted to disarmament; that session was followed by the thirty-third regular session of the General Assembly. It was decided at the time to complete certain administrative and organizational measures relating to some of the important recommendations adopted at the tenth special session, among which was one concerning the establishment of a multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament, with limited membership and where decisions would be taken by consensus. Of course, I am referring to the Committee on Disarmament, a negotiating body established at the thirty-third session of the General Assembly.

That Committee held two sessions: one from 24 January to 27 April, and the other from 14 June to 14 August 1979. In the course of those two sessions, certain organizational aspects and the rules of procedure were adopted. In addition, other matters, relating to the arms race and disarmament, were discussed, in accordance with the programme of work adopted at the first session.

In this connexion, we should, first and foremost, express appreciation for the seriousness and effectiveness of all those who took part in the work of the Committee, as borne out by the organizational measures taken in the course of a rather short lapse of time.

(Mr. Sahloul, Sudan)

We also wish to stress the interest we attach to the meetings of the Committee on Disarmament, in view of its repercussions on world peace and security. Sudan maintains its position concerning the need to enable all States to take part in the work of that Committee by creating the necessary conditions which would enable countries to become members on a rotational basis.

We wish to see the work and discussions of that Committee benefit from the participation and interest of all United Nations Member States in order that the interests of members of that Committee should not be restricted to those of the present membership. We also wish to point out that we support the principle that nuclear-weapon States and States manufacturers of conventional weapons should be members of that negotiating body. Otherwise, its negotiations on general and complete disarmament would be meaningless if the States involved in the manufacture of nuclear and conventional weapons failed to contribute constantly to the achievement of the objectives sought for in these negotiations.

It is a good omen that this session is being held immediately after the last Summit Conference of Non-Aligned States. The Havana Declaration, issued at the end of that Conference, contains a number of paragraphs which reflect the particular importance that the non-aligned countries attach to efforts made by the international community in respect of disarmament questions. It might be well here to reiterate that the support given to such efforts by the non-aligned countries gave rise to the holding of the tenth special session of the General Assembly. Further substantial medium and long-term progress may be achieved in view of the constant interest shown by the Non-Aligned Movement in the problems of the arms race and of disarmament, and of the major role the States members of the Movement feel that the United Nations should play in the matter, particularly the role assigned to the Committee on Disarmament in preparing the comprehensive disarmament programme, and the holding of a second special session of the General Assembly on disarmament in 1982.

(Mr. Sahloul, Sudan)

A comprehensive programme of disarmament calls in its initial stages for a choice of objectives, programmes and implementation measures to be covered by that programme and the elaboration of draft conventions and protocols, to be submitted to the negotiation Committee to which it should give final form in order that those instruments may be signed by all States. Accordingly, it is desirable for the two deliberating and negotiating bodies to complement each other, which in turn calls for a high degree of co-ordination and co-operation. The United Nations General Assembly should also be in a position continuously to supervise the consultations, deliberations and negotiations held in those two organs so that the international community, acting through them, may elaborate the comprehensive Programme of Action on disarmament in good time, since it is to be considered at the second special session to be held in 1982 or as soon as possible.

We hope that the great Powers will draw inspiration from the same spirit that prevails among the non-aligned countries in order that our efforts may be fruitful and constructive and that the international community may find the required framework for the development of all activities aimed at the halting of the arms race and the achievement of general and complete disarmament on an international scale, the objective we are all hoping for.

The halting of the nuclear arms race and the achievement of nuclear disarmament must take priority among the matters included in the comprehensive disarmament programme because the danger represented by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, especially in certain areas where there is tension and instability, shows that the international community should spare no effort to implement the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Efforts made in this connexion should not be limited to certain countries or regions of the world. And here we should in particular mention the dangers threatening the Middle Eastern region and Africa in view of the increased nuclear capacity of Israel and South Africa. That is nothing new for this Committee, because at past sessions there have been lengthy discussions on the subject. We should in particular point out here the resolution adopted by the General Assembly at the thirty-third session that deals with Israel's nuclear armaments. We note that that resolution has not

(Mr. Sahloul, Sudan)

been implemented and that the situation therefore remains unchanged. In view of the fact that the Middle East region is the scene of developments that could lead to war if prevailing political conditions continue, resulting from the possession of nuclear capacity by a country that continues to occupy the territory of neighbouring States and the territory of the Palestinians and seeks to extend its hegemony over the whole area of the Middle East. This situation is a threat to the whole region. There will be no change until the international community, and in particular the great Powers, put an end to the threat represented by the nuclear capacity of the Israeli military system. Other countries of the region might find themselves compelled to develop a similar capacity, which would place the Middle East region in a dangerous position that would move from the current political and military confrontation in the area of conventional weapons to nuclear confrontation the repercussions of which are incalculable.

We realize that Israel's obstinacy and expansionist ambitions will keep things as they are for a long time to come, to the detriment of others.

On the other hand, South Africa has achieved nuclear capacity, and is on the list of countries about to enter the nuclear era, which strategic centres for international scientific research publish from time to time. Pretoria was able to acquire the vast means needed to develop its capacity, not because it belongs to any particular nuclear club, but because it considers that use of that capacity is included in the calculation of the great Powers regarding the armed African struggle against the racist régime in the southern part of our continent.

We are convinced that the African countries, once they realize this, will be compelled to earmark much of their meagre resources to the development of similar capacity in order to put an end to this interference in the affairs of States in the region. If they cannot acquire it, they will seek a nuclear cover wherever they may find it. This will increase interference in African affairs, an evil from which we are now suffering.

In the past, the General Assembly has addressed a number of appeals to the countries concerned and to those interested in Africa, asking them to prevent South Africa from manufacturing nuclear weapons. They were invited to put

(Mr. Sahloul, Sudan)

an end to the assistance rendered to the Pretoria régime while attempting to persuade South Africa to allow the International Atomic Energy Agency to exercise supervision over the nuclear reactors in South Africa. If that country refuses to abide by the resolutions of the General Assembly, the major Powers should adopt towards it a sufficiently firm attitude. This leads us to repeat once again our support and endorsement of various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, especially the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa. We ask the Security Council to take decisive measures that would ensure the success of those efforts and that would, in particular, enable the Organization of African Unity to achieve great success in the matter.

We have given examples of nuclear proliferation and of the irresponsible actions in this field by some régimes members of our Organization. We must at the same time express appreciation for the constructive steps taken by the two super-Powers to limit their strategic weapons, which led to the signing of SALT II. We hope that in the near future supplementary measures will be taken that will allow for the immediate implementation of that agreement. This in turn will pave the way for new important strategic negotiations between the two great Powers. We hope that the three great Powers - the United States, the USSR and the United Kingdom - will complete their talks aimed at reaching a comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of nuclear tests. Their success will encourage the other nuclear-weapon States to accede to that agreement, and thus the international community will make great progress towards nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Sahloul, Sudan)

As regards other measures for limiting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, some progress has been achieved. I refer to the promotion of the programmes of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the possibility of the signature of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in the near future by a larger number of countries, at least those which understand their responsibility, to measures which are still being studied and which are the subject of negotiations in various forums and at various levels and to the putting into effect of suitable measures for the transfer of nuclear technology for peaceful uses.

We attach great importance to the opportunity given to the recently established deliberative and negotiating bodies to follow closely and encourage the discussions and negotiations being carried out in these various fields so that the General Assembly, at the forthcoming special session, will be able to assess the progress achieved in the short and medium term in the period preceding the session and to adopt the resolutions necessary to ensure that the international efforts undertaken in the period following the meeting are of a rational character.

We believe that the efforts undertaken at the international level should cover various fields in order to guarantee the peace and security of the contemporary world, particularly since the instability of the small and medium-sized countries, many of which are beset by local wars or difficulties caused by tension or uncertainty, results from the existing rivalry between the great Powers aimed at gaining strategic advantage or trying to impose a hegemony which consolidates that advantage. But much of this uncertainty and instability stems from the legacy of colonialism and the social and economic conditions, which are aggravated by the economic crisis afflicting the world today. Consequently, international efforts must not deal exclusively with the dangers of confrontation, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the ill effects of nuclear tests on the environment and other questions directly linked to nuclear energy, but must cover all the other fields, such as the cessation of the proliferation of conventional weapons, their development and their production, particularly in areas of tension.

(Mr. Sahloul, Sudan)

Zones of peace, nuclear-free zones, must be established. In particular, such zones must be established in continents or oceans where there is confrontation or rivalry between the great Powers and in areas where the great Powers have vital interests. We should address ourselves in particular to those regions that are of special interest to us and which concern our security and the stability of our countries.

The first such region, of course, is Africa, and then comes the Middle East, to which we have referred in connexion with the nuclear armament of Israel. The third region which is of interest to us is that of the Indian Ocean and its declaration as a zone of peace, free of all tension or instability. The constant interest shown by the littoral and hinterland countries has undoubtedly assisted the adoption of many measures designed to promote stability and peace in the area of that ocean. I refer in particular in this connexion to the meetings held at the level of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean and to the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States held at United Nations Headquarters in New York last July in preparation for a periodic reunion of all those interested in the Indian Ocean and in the shipping and oil-transporting lines which use it. We must point out that the efforts which the world devotes to the Indian Ocean region will not be fruitful unless they extend also to the access to and egress from that ocean represented by the Red Sea, the Gulf and the straits which link it to other oceans. Any study of the question of the Indian Ocean that does not include these areas will be incomplete and any measures adopted will be ineffective if the conditions which exist in the Red Sea, the Gulf and the Straits continue to be exposed to tension and instability.

In joining those States which have expressed interest in questions relating to the Indian Ocean we take this opportunity to say that it is necessary that the interest of the international community be realistically demonstrated by the consideration of these problems in their correct perspective. That is why we support the proposal of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean to convene an international conference in Sri Lanka in 1981 in order to declare the Indian Ocean a zone of peace, as well as the convening of the meetings to prepare that conference in New York and Mauritius. We wish to express our

(Mr. Sahloul, Sudan)

thanks to Ambassador Fernando, the Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka to the United Nations and President of the Ad Hoc Committee, for his constructive efforts in this connexion. We believe that the holding of that conference in the capital of Sri Lanka will reflect appreciation of the efforts made by Sri Lanka and its Ambassador to secure the implementation of the United Nations resolutions on the Indian Ocean.

We believe that the questions of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the attainment of disarmament concern the entire world because they are linked with the stability and security of all States and with the efforts to find suitable solutions to the political questions which are of continuous concern to the contemporary world. Therefore these questions cannot be considered without the participation of all States. These discussions cannot be dissociated from the political efforts to find solutions to all existing problems with the aim of putting an end to confrontation.

We reaffirm our interest in the work being carried out in this Committee and the bodies set up by it. We invite all countries, including small and medium-sized countries, to contribute to the best of their ability to the efforts to ensure the success of these discussions.

The CHAIRMAN: Before calling on the next speaker, I should like to draw the attention of the Committee to two draft resolutions submitted by the delegation of Pakistan, the first in document A/C.1/34/L.2, under agenda item 37, entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia", and the second in document A/C.1/34/L.3, under agenda item 44, entitled "Strengthening of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons".

Mr. SHAH NAWAZ (Pakistan): I welcome this opportunity of addressing the First Committee. We attach special importance to the deliberations of this Committee since we perceive Pakistan's security and progress as being inextricably linked with the attainment of the goals of disarmament.

The achievement of disarmament is today a prerequisite for the continued survival of human civilization and a peaceful, stable and prosperous world. The question of disarmament continues to engage the attention of all nations and is now a central issue in world politics. This Committee has deliberated over it year after year in the hope of curbing the arms race and diverting scarce human and material resources towards alleviating the sufferings of the underprivileged and promoting their well-being.

Yet much remains to be achieved to fulfil these universally shared aspirations. The arms race is escalating at a relentless pace. The annual expenditure on armaments has now reached the colossal figure of \$450 billion and is continuing to rise. The rivalries and tensions which fuel the arms race have not subsided. Technological innovations are adding more lethal and destructive systems to the arsenals of the major nuclear Powers. These grim realities make the problem of disarmament even more intractable and cloud the prospect of achieving a progressive and balanced reduction of armaments. Notwithstanding that, we are encouraged by the heightened awareness and concern about the imperative of securing disarmament so strikingly manifested at the special session of the General Assembly last year.

(Mr. Shah Nawaz, Pakistan)

The conclusion of the SALT II treaty is an encouraging development. The agreement reached by the super Powers to maintain strategic equivalence with each other may create greater stability in their relations, leading to a reduction in international tensions. We hope that the treaty will be speedily ratified by both the parties.

We are aware of the rationale for maintaining a military balance. However, a consensus already exists that this balance must be sought at lower rather than higher levels of armaments. Reduction in the nuclear arsenals of the super-Powers is also indispensable since their immense destructive capabilities constitute a pervasive threat to the security of all nations.

We urge the super-Powers to examine carefully the implications of taking decisions to develop or deploy new kinds of nuclear weapons and delivery systems which have not been precluded by the SALT II treaty. This could lead to a new spiral in the nuclear arms race. It is our hope that SALT III will achieve significant and meaningful reductions in nuclear weapons and will decisively halt their qualitative improvement. Sufficient progress in this direction could make it possible for other nuclear Powers to join in the process of nuclear disarmament.

The rivalry between the two major military alliances in Europe is at the centre of the global arms race. We hope that both sides will refrain from deploying new weapons in Europe and that the proposals made for reduction of forces and armaments will open the way for progress in the Vienna talks and in SALT III. The proposal for a disarmament conference in Europe advanced by France could also serve these objectives.

Nuclear-weapon tests, principally by the two major nuclear Powers, have continued. Contrary to the desire and expectation of the international community, the tripartite negotiations on the test-ban treaty have remained inconclusive. This is a matter of deep regret. We once again urge the three parties to the negotiations to accelerate their efforts to reach an agreement and to convey to the Committee on Disarmament without further delay the final outcome of their endeavours.

(Mr. Shah Nawaz, Pakistan)

Nuclear weapons threaten the security and well-being of all peoples and States. It is the fundamental right of each nation to participate in the efforts towards global nuclear disarmament. The Committee on Disarmament, the single forum for multilateral negotiations, is the most appropriate body in which nuclear disarmament can be promoted. In this context, Pakistan has welcomed the proposal submitted by the socialist countries to open talks on nuclear disarmament in the Committee.

A most effective way of preventing the outbreak of nuclear war is to outlaw the use of nuclear weapons altogether. There is considerable legal justification for the proposition, reaffirmed at the last session of the General Assembly, that the use of nuclear weapons would be a violation of the Charter of the United Nations and constitute a crime against humanity. Until complete prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons is accepted there should be as an interim step an agreement among the nuclear Powers on the non-first-use of nuclear weapons. The proposal regarding the non-first-use of nuclear weapons in Europe should be enlarged into a general and universal commitment against the non-first-use of nuclear weapons. Such an agreement would be facilitated by the balanced reduction of conventional forces in Europe.

Until nuclear weapons are eliminated or their use totally prohibited the nuclear Powers are under an obligation to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Pakistan has sought international endorsement for this proposition for over a decade. We are happy that in response to the General Assembly's request last year the Committee on Disarmament considered this subject in depth at its first session. As the Committee's report indicates, there is no objection in principle to the idea of an international convention, such as is proposed by Pakistan, to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. The Sixth Summit Conference of the non-aligned countries in Havana called on the Committee on Disarmament to conclude this international convention at its next session, in 1980.

My delegation believes that a common and uniform formula which can

(Mr. Shah Nawaz, Pakistan)

convincingly assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the nuclear threat can be evolved through further negotiations. The formula submitted in Pakistan's draft convention, as reflected in resolution 31/109 C, is widely accepted by Member States and forms a good basis for an agreement.

The Pakistan delegation has submitted a draft resolution in this Committee noting the progress made in the consideration of the question of security assurances and calling upon the Committee on Disarmament to conclude an international convention on the subject during its next session. We hope that this draft resolution will receive unanimous support in this Committee.

Pakistan supports the objective of nuclear non-proliferation which it regards as an integral part of the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. Pakistan has made strenuous efforts to evolve regional arrangements for non-proliferation. We are most gratified by the overwhelming support which our proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia has received. As a first step, we have suggested the adoption of a joint declaration by the States of South Asia on the renunciation of nuclear weapons. We have also proposed reciprocal inspection of our nuclear facilities. Furthermore, we are prepared to explore with our neighbours other ways and means of ensuring non-proliferation in South Asia. It has been recognized that these measures, far from deflecting attention from the objectives of disarmament, will strengthen the security of the regional States and promote those very objectives.

My delegation has submitted a draft resolution proposing that the General Assembly once again endorse the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free-zone in South Asia and urging the States of the region to continue their efforts to achieve this objective. We hope that this resolution will be supported by all Members of the General Assembly, especially those which have voiced their concern, here and elsewhere, about the dangers of nuclear-weapon proliferation in South Asia.

(Mr. Shah Nawaz, Pakistan)

Apart from unilateral, bilateral and regional measures, Pakistan has also embarked upon a number of initiatives in international forums which have the objective of creating an effective system of nuclear non-proliferation on a non-discriminatory basis and facilitating the development of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Unfortunately our efforts have not so far achieved the measure of success that they deserve. On the contrary, our entirely peaceful nuclear programme has been subjected to vilification in certain sections of the international media, and Pakistan has encountered diplomatic and economic pressures of the most intensive nature. In this connection, let me recall what President Zia-ul-Haq declared at the Havana Summit Conference:

"Pakistan will not succumb to such pressures and propaganda. Our nuclear programme is peaceful. Pakistan's dependence on nuclear energy in the absence of adequate fossil fuels is inescapable. A developing country should not be required to forgo the attainment of a modicum of self-reliance in this vital field."

Let me take this opportunity to reiterate the position expressed by the President of Pakistan. He has repeatedly enunciated the peaceful nature of our nuclear programme not only in public statements but, more specifically, in letters to the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of India. I do not propose to elaborate on this point, the details of which are sufficiently known to the members of the Committee.

It is a disturbing thought that the relentless pressures on Pakistan and the hue and cry raised in regard to its perfectly legitimate pursuit of peaceful nuclear technology may have served to deflect attention from the real threat of nuclear proliferation in the likeliest quarters. There have been ominous reports of a nuclear explosion in the vicinity of South Africa. My delegation fully supports the Nigerian proposal, made on behalf of the African countries, that the Secretary-General should conduct an immediate investigation and report his findings to the General Assembly at its current session.

(Mr. Shah Nawaz, Pakistan)

The official records of a number of international conferences will bear testimony to the fact that for years Pakistan has been warning the world community about the real threat to nuclear non-proliferation from countries such as South Africa and Israel. Those countries have been able to maintain collaboration in the nuclear field with some of the most vociferous advocates of non-proliferation and to obtain uninterrupted economic and other forms of assistance from them.

Our preoccupation with nuclear disarmament should not diminish our concern over the consequences of the conventional arms race, which consumes over 80 per cent of the world's expenditure on armaments. The expenditure on armaments in the third world has been the subject of comment in the developed countries. The focus on this phenomenon to the exclusion of the much more immediate and much greater danger which is posed to the world by the arms race among the most advanced nations of the world is misplaced. It is not possible to understand why the talks between the two super-Powers on conventional armaments should be directed to the question of arms transfers rather than to the reduction of their own military arsenals, which has a higher priority among the objectives cited in the Final Document of the special session. The onus of initiating progress in conventional arms reduction also rests on the major nuclear Powers and other militarily significant States.

The intensification of the military rivalry between the super-Powers in the Indian Ocean is a matter of special concern to Pakistan as a littoral State. This rivalry exerts an adverse influence on the climate of peace and security in the region. It is Pakistan's hope that the talks on the Indian Ocean between the super-Powers will be resumed without delay and that their scope will be enlarged to bring about a phased reduction of the military presence of those Powers, leading to its total elimination from the Indian Ocean.

Pakistan hopes that the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee to convene the conference on the Indian Ocean in 1981 will be universally endorsed

(Mr. Shah Nawaz, Pakistan)

and that the major Powers will accept the invitation to participate in preparations for the conference. The proposal to convene that conference in Colombo is a fitting tribute to the historic initiative launched by Sri Lanka and the unremitting efforts of that country for the attainment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean.

Pakistan is equally concerned at the growth of tensions in the Indian Ocean area and the outbreak of armed conflicts among some States in the region. My delegation is, however, gratified at the progress achieved by the Meeting of the Littoral and Hinterland States of the Indian Ocean last July in successfully harmonizing positions on various elements of the zone of peace. These include the concept of maintaining a military balance at reduced levels among the regional States on the basis of undiminished security of all States, the denuclearization of the Indian Ocean, the need for efforts by regional States to keep the area free of tension and conflict and the establishment of regional mechanisms to ensure peace and stability in the Indian Ocean.

Pakistan favours regional efforts for the balanced and mutual reduction of armaments. It is also ready to evolve appropriate confidence-building measures among the States in our region. We welcome the proposals on this subject put forward by the Federal Republic of Germany. This initiative will provide strong support for the strict application of the principles of the United Nations Charter and those of peaceful coexistence, and for the implementation of the resolutions and decisions of the world Organization, which are the most important confidence-building measures.

The United Nations has an indispensable and central role in the promotion of the goals of disarmament. The Disarmament Commission and the Committee on Disarmament, which were created by the tenth special session of the General Assembly, are important instruments for securing our common objective. We welcome the agreement reached by the Commission

(Mr. Shah Nawaz, Pakistan)

on the elements of a comprehensive programme on disarmament. Although the work of the Committee on Disarmament during the first year has not fulfilled our expectations, grounds for optimism remain. In particular, we welcome China's intention to participate directly in the Committee in due time next year.

Permit me to suggest that success in achieving the objectives of disarmament requires a change in some of the basic premises traditionally adopted in disarmament negotiations. In a world composed of sovereign States and free peoples, a truly stable peace can only result from an arrangement which accords equal and full security to each and every State, irrespective of its size, power or level of development.

Our stake in the success of our efforts is so high that we cannot afford to be pessimistic about their outcome. As the slogan adopted for Disarmament Week says, "Mankind is confronted with a choice; we must halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation."

Mr. ULLSTEN (Sweden): As the Committee may know, Sweden has recently acquired a new Government. As the Committee may also know, that does not mean that we have a new foreign policy. On the contrary, I should like to reaffirm that the foreign policy of Sweden remains unchanged.

We shall continue our policy of neutrality. We shall also pursue our strong involvement in the activities of the United Nations and in the international debate on questions such as: the preservation of international peace and security; the protection of human rights, wherever they may be threatened; economic redistribution between developed and developing countries, in order to alleviate the hunger and suffering of millions; and the human environment, in order to stop the degradation of land, water and air and to save scarce resources.

Sweden also has a long-standing interest in international disarmament efforts. A reduction of armaments is, obviously, very much in the interest of our own national security. Sweden lies near one of the most heavily armed areas of the world. The whole military situation in central Europe is of grave concern. In particular, we find the continuing modernization of nuclear arms worrisome. It could well result in making tactical use of such weapons legitimate and could, as a consequence, lead to a lowering of the so-called nuclear threshold.

We appeal for a reversal of the present trend and for effective negotiations dealing with this issue. In particular, we stress the need to limit the deployment of nuclear medium-range and intermediate-range systems and of tactical nuclear weapons, which are at present not at all or only partly included in ongoing negotiations.

The recent commitment of President Brezhnev to withdraw military personnel and equipment from central Europe is most interesting. It will not in itself alter the balance of forces in Europe, but it could have a beneficial effect on current European negotiations. The further suggestion of President Brezhnev to limit the deployment of nuclear weapons also merits our full attention.

(Mr. Ullsten, Sweden)

We shall likewise study the corresponding proposals which may be forthcoming from the other military alliance. A balanced reduction of both nuclear and conventional weapons in Europe is necessary. But the futility and madness of the arms race is equally manifest and troubling on a global scale.

Verbal commitments to disarmament have all the time been accompanied by a constant escalation in armaments. This has resulted in the almost unimaginable annual spending of more than \$US 400 billion. What is often said but still true and striking is that only a sum corresponding to one twentieth of this is spent on international assistance to the world's hundreds of millions of destitute people. This situation represents the greatest anomaly of our time, a fundamental lack of balance between defence and development budgets but also between the words and deeds of the politicians of our time. Such an anomaly is simply unbearable and must be redressed. The scarce resources of this earth must be turned to productive uses and not squandered on armaments which already surpass human imagination.

Some States, the richest and most powerful, have shown beyond any doubt that they are capable of completely destroying each other and all the rest of us as well. Would it be too much to ask that they now also devote, let us say, the equivalent of one month's military spending on additional efforts to improve people's life on earth rather than threaten it with extinction? It is a fact that this would mean almost a doubling of what the richest countries are offering today to the less fortunate.

Most States are wasting money on armaments. But the absurdity of the situation is most apparent in the case of the super-Powers. They are leading the course towards ever higher levels of military spending. Thus it is they also who must carry the heaviest responsibility to change that course.

The time has now come to pull out of the present torpor and aimlessness and reach for concrete achievement in at least a few key areas, in which results are long overdue.

(Mr. Ullsten, Sweden)

All of us who have been engaged in the Geneva disarmament talks will recall the inscription over the entrance to the conference hall in the Palais des Nations: "The world must disarm or perish". That message is becoming more and more true. Indeed, it is becoming a motto for the survival of mankind.

The conclusion of the SALT II agreement is the most significant event in the area of arms limitation and disarmament this year. My Government welcomes this agreement because of its importance for the political climate and détente in general and for the future efforts in the disarmament field in particular. It is, therefore, vitally important that this agreement enter into force in the near future. Should this fail and the SALT process not be pursued further to substantial results, the effects on confidence and stability in the world are likely to be serious. New stages in the nuclear arms race will be reached. Without concerted efforts in order to slow down this process greater insecurity will be the unavoidable result.

The SALT II agreement was supposed to herald the start of real nuclear disarmament. It is therefore paradoxical to see that the present ratification process seems to have resulted in a new speeding up of the arms race and the procurement of yet deadlier and more invulnerable weapons. This process resembles a somnambulistic march towards mutual destruction.

Certainly, the nuclear arms race remains the major threat against international peace and security. It is, however, also most distressing to observe the pace of production of conventional armaments. True, there is a clear concentration of such armaments in certain regions of the world, where tension runs high. But the trend is noticeable everywhere.

The need to limit and gradually reduce armed forces and conventional weapons everywhere is, therefore, obvious. In this context, the role of the arms trade and of arms transfers must receive increased attention.

It is estimated that annual export orders for new conventional weapons approach \$20 billion and that some 75 per cent of current arms transfers in major conventional weapons go to developing countries.

(Mr. Ullsten, Sweden)

The Swedish Government considers it essential that the United Nations should study ways to bring about a reduction of the arms trade and of arms transfers. We note with satisfaction that the Final Document adopted at the special session makes particular reference to this problem and that it will be addressed in the course of this session of the Assembly. In our view, this is an area where regional solutions could be feasible.

The question how to convert resources used for military purposes to productive uses in the civilian sector is a highly complex matter. Most researchers today agree, however, that conversion should be feasible from an economic point of view, if the necessary political preconditions are established. It is therefore not futile but highly important, not least for a continued North-South dialogue, to outline a mechanism to bring about the great productive potential of a disarmament process.

The work going on in the Group of Governmental Experts established by the General Assembly to investigate the relationship between disarmament and development will provide further insight into these questions.

It is also to be expected that the independent North-South Commission chaired by Mr. Willy Brandt will address this problem.

(Mr. Ullsten, Sweden)

Among the few tangible results of the tenth special session, devoted to disarmament, was the reform of the deliberative and negotiating disarmament machinery of the United Nations.

Certainly, the procedure has changed, but work has hardly become more productive. In this as in other United Nations fields, too much time is spent on procedure while the substance is decided elsewhere. In fact, with respect to this very substance, the reins are still held firmly by the super-Powers with little regard for the legitimate views and desires of other States.

Even though a certain time may be needed for the new Committee on Disarmament to establish itself, the Swedish Government views with grave concern the continued stalemate on all main items of our agenda, such as a comprehensive test ban, nuclear disarmament, a chemical weapons convention and so forth.

There is no need to elaborate on the extreme importance of a comprehensive test ban treaty. In early 1977 the Swedish Government submitted a draft treaty on such a ban to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Then in mid-1977 we welcomed the announcement of preparatory tripartite talks on the subject - talks which have since been repeatedly represented as approaching definite results.

Lately these talks seem to have come to a standstill and there is disturbing information that the envisaged comprehensive test ban may be neither comprehensive nor permanent. While the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban is being delayed, the testing of nuclear explosions continues.

Observations and analyses made at the Hagfors seismic observatory in Sweden show that at least 48 nuclear explosions were conducted in 1978. Data for this year indicate that the nuclear Powers are further stepping up their testing activity. Until 29 October, 45 nuclear explosions have been recorded, identified and located, compared with about 37 tests during the same time span last year.

The testing intensity in the Soviet Union last year was higher than ever since 1963, when the partial test ban treaty came into force. The testings remain at the same high level: while 20 tests were observed up to 29 October last year, 23 tests have so far been observed this year. Also the United States testing rate remains high. Last year 10 explosions were observed, compared with 13 so far this year.

(Mr. Ullsten, Sweden)

France has already doubled its testing and eight nuclear explosions in the Pacific have so far been observed this year. One British test has been reported. China, which according to our information last year conducted two explosions, has so far this year not carried out any tests.

These activities highlight the predicament: while multilateral talks drag on week after week, year after year, the nuclear Powers test nuclear weapons at a rate of roughly one per week.

The enormous amounts of data thus accumulated from nuclear testing pave the way for the further development of increasingly sophisticated and effective nuclear weapons and weapons systems. Such activity can only undermine present and future efforts to reach agreements in the field of nuclear disarmament. It might also weaken the possibility of stopping the proliferation of nuclear weapons to new countries.

It is beyond doubt that the technical problem of verification of a comprehensive test ban can be resolved. The stage has long since been reached where the real key to a comprehensive test ban lies exclusively in political decisions on the part of the nuclear-weapon Powers. Once the SALT II agreement has been ratified there should be no pretext for further delaying such decisions.

More than 100 non-nuclear-weapon States are entitled to participate next year in the Second Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. They have all demonstrated to the international community their clear political will to refrain from acquiring nuclear explosives. In accordance with article VI of the treaty they also have a perfect right to request that negotiations between the nuclear-weapon States will, at long last, bring about a reduction in their stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

A universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty remains an objective of international efforts to promote trust in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Yet it has become perhaps an even more important international objective to emphasize the need for increased coverage, efficiency and support of comprehensive safeguards systems.

(Mr. Ullsten, Sweden)

There has been international consideration of a number of measures directed at minimizing the risk that the peaceful use of nuclear energy might increase the capacity for development or construction of nuclear explosives.

That is one essential objective. What is equally important is to strengthen nuclear safety systems and international standards in this field. An intensive debate is going on today on the risks involved in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Without detracting from the merits of that debate, one should not forget that similar risks may occur in the production, testing and handling of nuclear weapons. This problem deserves increased attention.

In the field of the nuclear arms race another matter has attracted considerable attention this year. Again, it is not in itself a disarmament measure. I have in mind the so-called negative security guarantees.

The form of a convention seems to rest on the assumption that all States concerned - nuclear and non-nuclear - would enter into some kind of reciprocal obligations. But the vast majority of non-nuclear-weapon States have already accepted their share in adhering to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. There is no reason for them to repeat this obligation. The responsibility to formulate a binding set of assurances acceptable to all States must therefore primarily rest with the nuclear Powers themselves.

It has been suggested that such assurances could be embodied in a General Assembly resolution. Given the propensity of States to disregard such non-binding resolutions, we think that this would be an unsatisfactory solution. Our preference would be that co-ordinated guarantees be worked out by the nuclear Powers and thereafter endorsed by the Security Council. We thus do not object to such assurances, if properly enacted. But they obviously cannot replace real nuclear disarmament.

Assurances of this type have one logical and important consequence, without which they would lose all credibility. The term "guarantee" implies a degree of security for those who would be the beneficiaries of such guarantees, and certain responsibilities should the objectives of the guarantees be threatened.

(Mr. Ullsten, Sweden)

As has been stated so often, it is incompatible with Sweden's foreign policy to accept that the maintenance of our neutrality should depend upon any kind of responsibility on the part of any other country. I must therefore voice certain doubts about the use of the term "security guarantee" in this context.

(Mr. Ullsten, Sweden)

Having said that, I reiterate that Sweden is in principle in favour of assurances by nuclear-weapon Powers not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or in nuclear-weapon-free zones. Such assurances, if binding on all nuclear-weapon Powers and if they accommodate the interests and need of all countries, could play a role in the process of strengthening international security.

There are some basic elements that are imperative, among them the fact that assurances must be made without reservations and must thus be unconditional. Various forms of assurances have been discussed, including an international convention. The Swedish Government has reservations with regard to this idea. Such assurances must entail the withdrawal or dismantling of nuclear weapons systems that are aimed at or could be used mainly against the non-nuclear-weapon States whose security such assurances are intended to promote.

I have discussed at some length the highest priority item on the disarmament agenda, namely, nuclear disarmament. A second priority area is the convention to ban the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. The Swedish Government is of the opinion that, over and over again, opportunities for real and multilateral negotiations on this issue are being lost as a result of the super-Powers' political reluctance to engage the Committee on Disarmament in this matter.

Thus, it was only at the end of the Committee on Disarmament's summer session that the United States and the Soviet Union submitted a joint statement on the present status of their bilateral talks on chemical weapons. Certain points in that statement will require our particular attention in the coming work of the Committee on Disarmament on this matter.

Among these points are the scope of the convention, restrictions on the organization, planning and training for chemical warfare and time limits for the destruction of stockpiles and production facilities. The joint United States-Soviet Union statement raises certain problems and leaves some questions unanswered on those issues. It is imperative that multilateral negotiations on a chemical weapons convention start in the Committee on Disarmament at its next session.

(Mr. Ullsten, Sweden)

I take note of the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have submitted to the Committee on Disarmament a draft text containing the main elements of a convention on radiological weapons. I should like to express the view that the emergence of militarily useful radiological weapons does not seem to be an immediate and serious threat. Again, this proposed treaty does not substitute for genuine nuclear disarmament. The greatest radiological danger is, of course, constituted by the monstrous arsenals of nuclear explosive weapons.

We will, however, study the draft text on radiological weapons carefully and be prepared to discuss its substance at the next session of the Committee on Disarmament. Such a discussion, however, should not divert resources and attention from other more immediate and important issues.

In this general picture of stalled and unsuccessful disarmament negotiations, it is encouraging to note at least one area where some progress is being made, namely, in the field of particularly inhumane weapons.

Certainly, final results were not obtained on all issues at the United Nations Conference that met at Geneva in September under the very effective and able leadership of Ambassador Adeniji of Nigeria. But there was virtual agreement on the restriction of the use of land mines and booby-traps and a considerable narrowing of positions with regard to incendiary weapons.

Sweden shares the view of those who hold that a far-reaching protection against the use of incendiaries is necessary, in particular for the civilian population. All States should prepare themselves to contribute to such a solution during the second session of the Conference in 1980.

We shall also, for our part, continue to argue against the unnecessarily injurious effects of certain small-calibre projectile systems. It is gratifying that the United Nations Conference adopted a unanimous resolution on this subject that, inter alia, enjoins States to take utmost care in their small arms development in order to avoid the unnecessary, injurious effects of such weapons, which indeed resemble those of the outlawed dumdum bullet.

(Mr. Ullsten, Sweden)

In this connexion, I should like to emphasize that the banning of certain weapons as particularly inhumane does not in itself justify the use of others.

I should now like to conclude with some observations on the institutional aspects of disarmament.

In the history of disarmament negotiations, a number of proposals have been made for the creation of an international institution for disarmament. The idea was discussed in the early 1960s in the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Commission. A decade later, a number of countries, inter alia the Netherlands, Yugoslavia, Japan and Sweden, made separate but similar suggestions for a disarmament organization. During the preparations for the special session on disarmament, several delegations, among them the Netherlands and Sri Lanka, again made proposals in this regard. In addition, French suggestions with regard to an international satellite monitoring agency touch upon this institutional aspect. Sweden feels that the institutional requirements should now be studied further in a comprehensive manner.

Let me make it quite clear that I am not talking of any change in the existing intergovernmental deliberative or negotiating bodies. But what we have in mind is to examine the possibilities of establishing a United Nations disarmament organization, the main task of which would be the promotion, implementation and control of disarmament. Some of these functions are today carried out by the United Nations Centre for Disarmament. However, the capacity of the Centre should be seen in relation to developments in the disarmament field during recent years. As a larger number of countries become actively involved in disarmament efforts, and as an increasing number of questions and proposals are discussed with growing intensity, the institutional requirements correspondingly increase.

(Mr. Ullsten, Sweden)

It would seem appropriate to us that the feasibility of improving and developing the disarmament organization of the United Nations system should be given further comprehensive study. My delegation intends to consult with other interested delegations in order to ascertain their views on this matter.

Disarmament is both a result of and a prerequisite for continued détente. Lately, there has occurred a certain stagnation in this process. Fundamentally, this is caused by the mutual distrust and fear of change which again seem to get the upper hand in world politics. The vicious circle of armaments must be broken. A continued dialogue and increased peaceful co-operation in all spheres may create the trust which is so vital for disarmament. The United Nations and the small nations have a vital role to play in this process. This must not only be a concern of a small group of politicians and technocrats but must also involve a wide spectrum of organs representative of public opinion.

What it takes is a lot of patient work to bring about peaceful change and co-operation. There is really no viable alternative to this road, even if it sometimes looks long and the results seem very uncertain.

Mr. WAPENYI (Uganda): One of the significant achievements of this decade has been the convening of the tenth special session on disarmament. Paragraph 45 of the Final Document sets out in a practical way the priorities and framework on which disarmament negotiations should be conducted in the next few years: by focusing especially on the need to effect nuclear disarmament, to eliminate other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, and to reduce conventional weapons and the budgets of the armed forces.

The importance of the special session on disarmament could be viewed also as marking an end to two decades of inaction by establishing a new and expanded negotiating body - the Committee on Disarmament. In our view, the Committee on Disarmament could carry out its task more effectively if its work is not hampered by existing interest groups that prevailed in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Commission (ENDC).

(Mr. Wapenyi, Uganda)

We have noted with satisfaction that during the two sessions held this year the Committee was able to draw up and agree on its rules of procedure. We hope that negotiations will be conducted on the basis of equality, as stated in the rules of procedure. As I have noted, the Committee on Disarmament was able to grapple with the task entrusted to it with a certain amount of success.

If the Committee on Disarmament is to succeed in its work, it must enjoy the support of all the nuclear-weapon States. On this note I should like to state that we are gratified to note that France has joined the Committee on Disarmament. I should, however, appeal to those nuclear-weapon States that have not yet joined the Committee on Disarmament to do so at the next session of that Committee.

Secondly, while it might be useful for the Committee on Disarmament to receive texts already accepted or negotiated outside its framework, it might be equally useful, where agreement cannot be reached, to submit areas of disagreement to the Committee on Disarmament so that ways and means can be found to deal with any misunderstandings. In other words, we believe that, whatever negotiations may be going on behind doors, such negotiations should not be allowed in any way to hinder the discussion of any particular item in the Committee itself. We feel that if such a tendency is promoted, some issues which have already been agreed upon as calling for urgent measures might be shelved for years, thereby frustrating any breakthrough that could otherwise be made.

Thirdly, in our view, if the Committee is to succeed in its work, the old policy of secrecy should be discouraged. The Committee should encourage the spirit of togetherness. There should be no attempt to divide the Committee into blocs or groups of "haves" and "have-nots", nor should there be any suggestion of one group taking the upper hand; for the Committee's success will very much depend on its ability to create an atmosphere of equality as envisaged in its rules of procedure.

Looking at the report on the sessions of the Committee on Disarmament this year one gets the impression that member States and non-member States have the willingness to make meaningful contributions to the complex issues

(Mr. Wapenyi, Uganda)

of disarmament before it. Working papers, draft treaties and draft conventions were submitted by a large number of countries concerning various items on its agenda. We believe, however, that, to increase the pace with which some matters can be handled more effectively, States members or non-members of the Committee on Disarmament submitting draft texts of treaties, conventions or declarations on the same item or subject matter should endeavour to negotiate a single acceptable document and submit it to the Committee as a pre-negotiated single document. We hope that such an arrangement could be made by any current Chairman of the Committee on Disarmament by inviting States submitting such draft proposals to come together and agree on a single text which could then be presented to the Committee for negotiation. We make this humble proposal because we feel that this would not only facilitate the work of the Committee but would also reduce the possibilities of duplication of its efforts in the limited time at its disposal, and with so many issues to negotiate.

On the question of chemical weapons, it is unfortunate that the Committee on Disarmament could not reach agreement on the methods and procedures for dealing with that problem. We urge the Committee on Disarmament at its session next year to exert greater effort to set up a working group to continue negotiations on the subject of chemical weapons, which we consider to be vital in the field of disarmament. We realize the difficulties involved. The parties interested in the attractions offered by the chemical weapons industry are many, but there is an urgent need to surmount these difficulties if the spread of such chemical weapons is to be checked and averted.

While we welcome the joint United States-Soviet initiative on agreed proposals on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, we hope that agreement in this field will not lead the Committee on Disarmament to overlook the urgency of negotiating a convention or treaty banning all new types of weapons of mass destruction. This is an area where the international community is focusing most of its attention out of fear and anxiety over the impact that the manufacture or production of such types of weapons could have on the already existing

(Mr. Wapenyi, Uganda)

stockpiles of deadly weapons. We believe that the problem of defining new types of weapons of mass destruction should not hold up negotiations in this important area. The Committee does not have to be reminded that existing stockpiles are more than sufficient to destroy the human race.

(Mr. Wapenyi, Uganda)

Another important area that should in my view be looked into is the establishment of effective measures of verification. Today there are no internationally controlled means of verifying compliance or non-compliance with existing treaties and conventions. Record has it that in the last two decades a number of treaties and conventions aimed at regulating armaments have been negotiated, signed and ratified by Member States. What is lacking within the United Nations system, however, is a mechanism to check compliance with and adherence to the provisions of those treaties and conventions. Nuclear-weapons tests have continued unabated since 10 October 1963, when the partial test ban Treaty, which did not exclude underground tests, came into force. There have been more nuclear tests than were ever envisaged when that Treaty was signed even by those States which have continued to violate its objectives. It should be remembered that in the third preambular paragraph of the partial test-ban treaty the States parties to that Treaty declared that they would seek to achieve the discontinuance of all test explosions of nuclear weapons for all time.

But 16 years have now passed, and what do we see? We see an unprecedented arms race and continuance of nuclear-weapon tests, which man can neither explain nor justify. That is why there is a need to work towards the objective that we set for ourselves in 1963 in the partial test-ban Treaty - namely, the discontinuance of all tests of nuclear weapons in all environments: in outer space, under ground or under water. On the other hand, if such a ban on nuclear-weapon tests is to succeed we must be equipped with reliable means of enforcing compliance, of identifying those who would tolerate the violation of such a ban.

A proposal has been made to establish an international monitoring satellite agency. This proposal deserves some serious thought in the light of some recent events, including those in my own continent. In the first place, it would be a first step towards the creation of an effective system of surveillance. We know that this proposal is not to the taste of some States because an internationally controlled satellite network would reveal what some States would not like others to know. But if disarmament is accepted as the responsibility of all there is no reason why verification should not be the responsibility of the United Nations. If the United Nations is to succeed in its task of making a reality of the objective, general and complete disarmament under effective international control, then one of the prerequisites must be a viable system of verification. We feel that once such a system is

(Mr. Wapenyi, Uganda)

established it should immediately be followed by a comprehensive test-ban treaty to replace the partial test-ban Treaty, which has been ineffective in controlling or preventing the arms race.

The Committee on Disarmament therefore has the very important responsibility of negotiating a comprehensive test ban. How comprehensive can that treaty be? How viable should it be? These are questions that must be borne in mind, but we must make a start. The Committee on Disarmament therefore must watch out for diversions that might take place under the cover of agreed texts and proposals coming from interested parties. We call them diversions because examples are not lacking. We have seen how the partial test-ban Treaty was aimed at promoting the interests of a few, how nuclear tests continued, and how we have arrived at the dilemma that mankind faces today. Later on we were told to undertake not to receive nuclear weapons under the Non-Proliferation Treaty régime. Of course, we are not interested in receiving or having them, but those who have not accepted the Non-Proliferation Treaty régime are put on the carpet as if they do have nuclear weapons. These are the diversions to which we are referring.

We are encouraged to accept the argument that instead of a comprehensive test ban we should have a treaty banning radiological weapons - weapons that are not yet in production. We are told that before we can have a treaty banning the production and stockpiling of new types of weapons systems and the means of their delivery a definition of such weapons has to be accepted. We do not have to wait until new types of weapons are produced to consider placing a ban on them or their manufacture.

That is why my delegation is of the view that a comprehensive test ban is a measure that must be dealt with seriously and with a certain amount of urgency by the Committee on Disarmament.

We do not share the view, expressed in this Committee on 17 October that because four fifths of the total amount spent on armaments annually represents expenditures on conventional weapons it is therefore necessary to deal with the elimination of those weapons as a matter of priority. We have also heard that millions of people have died as victims of conventional weapons. In our view, such arguments are calculated to sidetrack or disguise our avowed aim of effecting nuclear disarmament. The Committee on Disarmament should therefore abide by the priorities set out at the special session.

(Mr. Wapenyi, Uganda)

Uganda welcomed the signing of SALT II, and we share the view that that treaty will come into force and give rise to fresh negotiations which, in the words of the Final Document of the special session,

"should be followed promptly by further strategic arms limitation ...

between the two parties, leading to agreed significant reductions of, and qualitative limitations on, strategic arms." (S-10/2, para. 52)

My country has drawn the attention of this Committee to the need for nuclear-weapon-free zones and the role such zones could play in preventing the spread or proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was in that spirit that my delegation sponsored resolution 2832 (XXVI) of the General Assembly, which called upon major maritime States to respect the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. We have always called upon the super-Powers not to use the Indian Ocean as a centre for displaying their military might or as a testing-ground for determining the effectiveness of their submarines and other naval vessels, because we hoped that their not doing so would tremendously reduce tension in that region.

We note with dismay the continuing collaboration between some States and the racist régime of South Africa in the military and especially in the nuclear-weapon field. In that respect we share the apprehensions expressed last week by the representative of Nigeria on this particular topic. To us, that collaboration represents a betrayal of the cause of the majority of the people of South Africa, which the racist régime continues to oppress. By that collaboration, those States ignore the various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on the denuclearization of Africa. We condemn all those States that assist the racist régime in its bid to acquire nuclear capability. They should know, however, that they are assisting a régime whose arrogance knows no parallel today. It is a régime that has of late carried out illegal invasions of neighbouring States - a clear violation of the territorial integrity of front-line States and States members of the Organization of African Unity.

(Mr. Wapenyi, Uganda)

In conclusion, I should like to remind the Committee that today we are living in a world filled with secrecy, suspicion, tension and, at times, misunderstandings. The First Disarmament Decade will soon wither away leaving behind it a record of violations and non-compliance with existing disarmament measures. But as we enter a new decade, we, as Members of the United Nations, should accept the challenges ahead with fresh determination and hope - the hope that one day disarmament will become a reality and peace will reign supreme.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, if I did not congratulate you and all the members of the Bureau at the beginning of my statement it was because I wanted to heed your appeal. But I cannot resist the urge to express my personal satisfaction and happiness at seeing you in the Chair conducting the work of this Committee.

Mr. BAYANDOR (Iran): The opportunity to participate in the deliberations of this Committee bears a special significance for my delegation for it marks the first opportunity for the Islamic Republic of Iran to appear here in this forum to address itself to the vital issues of arms control and disarmament.

We speak on these issues with no claim to novelty yet with a clear conscience. For no longer do our words seek to disguise an adventurous military build-up under the euphemism of national defence. No longer are they phrased to justify the plundering of the main source of our national livelihood in exchange for military hardware.

Our only claim is to echo the true voice of our liberated masses, who genuinely aspire to peace. This voice is clear of any tint of hypocrisy, as it is also devoid of palatable niceties at the expense of candour.

Over the years we have held this annual exercise on disarmament in this Committee, which has indeed been the rallying point of the arms-control bureaucracies of the world Governments. We have absorbed the literature put out by the international arms-control élite and applied our minds to it. New forums for deliberations and negotiations have been formed and

(Mr. Bayandor, Iran)

and reformed. New procedures and guidelines have been devised to create new momentum. Yet the balance sheet of our cumulative efforts on the substance of disarmament has remained a record of consistent failures and only incidental gains.

This, needless to say, has been due to no lack of enthusiasm, dearth of talent or absence of an abundance of ideas and solutions. The simple truth is that we have been operating in an international enclave with little or no input into the mainstream of political decisions. The voices which echo in this room vanish into stacks of documents, never allowed to bother the conscience of those whose judgements and decisions matter in shaping world events.

To be sure, disarmament as a goal has been given support by the great Powers at a high level of rhetorical consistency. But the political will to act has failed to emerge through what John Kenneth Galbraith once described as "powerful military bureaucracies, influential and richly financed weapon industries, their lobbies, their captive legislators, those for whom paranoia or past wars are a way of life".

This basic truism remains central to the evaluation of the performance of the major Powers, whose representatives here often try to infuse the illusion of a forward movement into a process that is essentially retreating.

This can best be illustrated in the simple language of figures. The 1970s, designated the Disarmament Decade by the United Nations, has brought in its wake a doubling of the over-all military expenditure from \$200 billion to the present estimated expenditure of \$450 billion. After allowing for inflation, this means that yearly outlays have risen 15 per cent above the 1970 level, 60 per cent above 1960. Armed forces increased to 23 million, about 2 million more than in 1970 and 7 million more than in 1960. The strategic stockpiles of the two super-Powers have risen to 14,000 warheads, an increase of 8,000 since 1970. The explosive charge of these inventories are said to be the equivalent of several tons of TNT for every person living on earth. As if this were not enough to satisfy the insatiable appetite of the great Powers, the production of warheads has continued at the rate of three bombs a day.

(Mr. Bayandor, Iran)

It is against the grim backdrop of such realities that the arms control agreements achieved in the course of the past several years, valuable and welcome as they are, appear dwarfed, like twigs on the surface of a river, wind-blown against its main current.

Of 15 such agreements reached over the past two decades almost none has involved actual reductions of arms or expenditures. If we take SALT II as an exception, we may remember that its ratification is being made dependent on specific and net percentage increases in the already colossal military budget of one of the two signatories, which invariably triggers a corresponding increase in the equally colossal spending of the other in a spiral of mutual escalation.

Other agreements have had for the most part the nature of pre-empting new fields of the arms race or banning the already phased-out and obsolete weapon systems or tests.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, almost 10 years after its entry into force, remains a lopsided and unfulfilled instrument. The obligations assumed by the nuclear-weapon parties to the Treaty under article VI have yet to be discharged. That article was originally conceived as the core element in the balance of mutual obligations and responsibilities between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. Together with the question of security assurances, that article was to provide an incentive to non-nuclear States to forgo the nuclear option. In neither case can the nuclear Powers claim to have genuinely lived up to the requirements of a sound non-proliferation régime. It may be argued that the SALT I and SALT II agreements combined provide enough substance to support the claim of the nuclear Powers that they have indeed done enough to meet their obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This is a fallacy that should not go unchecked. The main SALT I agreement, with the excessively high ceilings that it placed on the number of ICBMs, did, in effect, codify rather than curb the arms race. It led to an exacerbation of qualitative nuclear arms competition. As for SALT II, while it envisages certain reductions, it nevertheless spurs arms expenditure in other areas.

(Mr. Bayandor, Iran)

I have already referred to one aspect of this problem. The mobile MX missile, the only planned new ICBM in the United States, and the Soviet Backfire bomber remain outside the scope of this agreement. To have some idea of what a feature like this could involve in terms of expenditure, I can cite some figures on mobile MX missiles. According to a recent issue of Time magazine the over-all cost of this project is estimated at \$33 billion over a period of 10 years. Another study published in the United States concludes:

"For the estimated cost of a new mobile intercontinental missile (the MX) 50 million malnourished children in developing countries could be adequately fed, 65,000 health care centers and 340,000 primary schools built."

All this is not to say that we do not regard the signing of SALT II as a welcome development and one that may lead to more meaningful accords in future. The point is to draw a line of distinction between what has been done and what is yet required. In essence, SALT agreements have had the function of striking a strategic balance between the two super-Powers, lest one may gain the upper hand in the perilous power game they play. This has not halted the arms race much less reversed it.

The international community has charted the route towards that goal. Guidelines and priorities have been set. It has been made clear that the signing of a comprehensive test ban treaty and a chemical weapons convention are the two major steps to set this process in motion. Back in the early 1970s there was already a consensus among impartial, authoritative arms control experts that seismological techniques of detection designed to verify a comprehensive test ban had already advanced to a degree that it would require merely a political decision on the part of nuclear weapon States to conclude a comprehensive test ban convention. The decade is drawing to a close, yet bickering over verification, among other things, has not ended. We are being reassured, however, that as a result of the trilateral talks, an agreement might be in the offing. We like to believe that that is indeed the case, and that disagreements would not linger beyond the approaching Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

(Mr. Bayandor, Iran)

The mounting evidence of acquisition of nuclear weapons by South Africa and Israel has added a most disturbing dimension to the conflicts waged by these racist and aggressive Powers in southern Africa and in the Middle East. A high degree of alertness is called for, as stronger evidence of a clandestine nuclear arms collaboration between the two comes to the surface. We regard it as an urgent task of the international community and the responsible security organs of the United Nations to look into these problems with all the care and attention they require. It is on this basis that we support a thorough examination of the item originally proposed by Iraq on the subject of Israeli nuclear arms acquisitions, and the proposal made a few days ago by Nigeria. We urge all States, in particular the great Powers, to place at the disposal of the international community all data and documentation relevant to both these cases so that the problem could be discussed in all its aspects, including their implications for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and in the Middle East. My delegation wishes to reserve its right to speak separately on this subject, if necessary.

The vast increases in military spending by the great Powers has enabled them to project their power in a more menacing way than before, over the vast horizons of distant oceans and beyond their own immediate hemispheres. Third world nations are being drawn into big Power conflicts and fight their wars as proxies.

The recent escalation of the United States presence in the Indian Ocean and its extension to the Persian Gulf is a glaring example of imperialistic pursuits aimed at harassment and intimidation of people who strive to protect their dignity and independence. Ominous voices and signs point to the revival of a psychology reminiscent of the cold war era. Increasingly, we see less inhibitions on the part of responsible officials to show off capabilities to apply brute force under such headings as "contingency force", "rapid deployment forces", "unilateral corps", and so on. The propensity for adventurism seems more pronounced than at any time in the recent past. The time, however, for this style of diplomacy has long gone by. Such actions do not contribute to the creation of a climate of peace, stability and understanding. It heightens mutual suspicions and leads to further aggravation of the arms race at both the global and regional levels.

(Mr. Bayandor, Iran)

A sad feature of this power play is the part imposed on the third world countries that often unwittingly are dragged into similar arms race patterns. A glance at the volume of arms imports by the third world nations shows the figure of \$14 billion in 1978, a staggering increase of 55 per cent over the previous year.

The implantation of foreign enclaves in lands belonging to other people, the persistence of racial and colonial domination, the imposition of ideologies alien to indigenous cultures, and manifestations of chauvinistic propensities are all instances whereby nations and entire regions are drawn into burdensome, and often senseless, programmes of arms build-up.

That my own people had the misfortune of being one of the prime victims of this malaise may perhaps give my delegation greater moral authority to be a proponent of a scale-down in arms competition in the third world countries through regional co-operation.

For over 10 years Iran was engaged in a military build-up of psychopathic proportions, diverting the much-needed human and material resources of the people of Iran to war-like purposes. Of \$39 billion in foreign military sales contracts signed by the United States from 1968 to 1978, over \$20 billion were orders placed by Iran. This does not include arms procurements from a variety of other sources, including the United Kingdom, France, West Germany, the Soviet Union and Israel. Yet all this was to no avail on the day of reckoning, as the armed forces joined ranks with the revolutionary masses.

The downfall of the monarchy in Iran amply demonstrated that even the latest innovations in weapon gadgetry could not save an infested régime from the wrath of its own people. An army that does not draw its moral strength from popular support is an army that does not have real strength. No matter how well-trained and well-equipped it may be, it is bound to disintegrate at the moment of crisis. Let this sobering experience be remembered by all those willing to learn the lessons of history.

(Mr. Bayandor, Iran)

The old scheme of things has drastically changed in post-revolutionary Iran. One of the first steps taken, following the success of the Islamic revolution, was the withdrawal of Iran from the Central Treaty Organization, a rusty relic of the cold war. This led to the immediate collapse of CENTO. We joined the ranks of the Non-Aligned Movement to pursue a policy of peace and friendship on the basis of justice, equality and mutual respect.

(Mr. Bayandor, Iran)

We oppose imperialism, colonialism, racism, zionism and all other manifestations of hegemonism, including the presence of foreign military forces and bases on the territory of other countries, especially those of the third world.

In presenting our views on matters related to world security and disarmament, we criticized certain trends and policies which we regard as ill suited for the achievement of goals which we all seek to attain. In our appraisal, we portrayed the stark reality of the arms control scene as we see it. But I should also like to say that our criticism reflects no hostility, just as our pessimism conveys no sense of despair.

As a member of the Committee on Disarmament, the Islamic Republic of Iran will continue to work for and contribute to negotiations and deliberations of the international community in this field. We know that in order to achieve disarmament in its true sense many changes in attitudes, perceptions and institutions, and much adjustment and dislocation will be required. Yet if the goal is right, a first step in that right direction must soon be taken.

Mr. BURWIN (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) (interpretation from Arabic): Mr. Chairman, in response to your remarks on the need to abide by rule 110 of the rules of procedure on the subject of congratulations, I shall confine myself to saying that I am indeed proud to be taking part in the work of the First Committee under your competent leadership.

The Charter of the United Nations states:

"We the peoples of the United Nations determined

"to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and ...

"to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbours, and

"to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security ...".

(Mr. Burwin, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

This is what is prescribed by the Charter. But the facts are quite different. The international community has seen expenditures on armaments grow more and more; they have reached a total of \$400 billion, and there are 4 million people starving in the world. Hence international relations today are based not on justice and democracy, but on injustice, persecution, unequal opportunity, selfishness and exploitation. Wealth and technology are in the hands of a minority of large countries which are seeking to hold on to them by pressure, by interference in the affairs of other countries and even by recourse to the use of force. A considerable number of countries that have gained independence are being overwhelmed by the heavy burden inherited from colonialism, which has left them a legacy of ignorance, poverty, disease and dissension, not to mention frontier problems and the continuation of economic exploitation and political constraint.

Some peoples, such as the Palestinian people and the peoples of Zimbabwe and Namibia, are still struggling for their self-determination and independence. Those same peoples are struggling also against racial and religious fanaticism, and they have been forced to take up arms to achieve their ends.

We see with concern the continuation of colonialism and the existence of hotbeds of tension in many parts of the world, and we observe also spheres of influence and hegemonism, intervention in the internal affairs of other countries, and even recourse to mercenaries, as in Benin.

There are certain other elements which make it impossible to establish confidence among the nations and which pose threats to peace and security in the world. There is the situation in the Middle East, where we see a super-Power adopting an aggressive policy against the Arab people in general and against the Palestinian people in particular, by countenancing the aggression represented by the Zionist and affording it economic, humanitarian and military assistance. The assistance it receives exceeds \$2.8 billion a year. The same entity is asking for more assistance, as was stated by its Minister of Defence, Mr. Weizman, during his last visit to the United States.

(Mr. Burwin, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

Certain great Powers also are adopting a policy of pressure, threatening to intervene in the territorial waters of other countries by the dispatching to them of their warships and military aircraft. That was the policy adopted against Cuba, as is shown by the statements made recently by the President of a super-Power to the effect that Cuba must abstain from intervening in the internal affairs of other countries. That same President, on the other hand, is seeking to reinforce his country's presence in the Caribbean, at the Guantánamo base installed on Cuban territory against the wishes of the Cuban people. Faced with these facts, one cannot but ask whether there is not a flagrant contradiction there.

We see also the threat to intervene in the affairs of the petroleum-producing countries with the aim of imposing a certain policy on them, of laying hands on their oil and of enforcing prices that are to the liking of the aggressors, who, for their part, refuse to countenance any discussion of the prices they charge for goods they manufacture or for the vital commodities they produce, such as wheat.

The mass media of the industrialized countries write unceasingly of the energy crisis and seek to blame the petroleum-producing countries and marshal world public opinion against them.

It should be noted that most if not all of the countries of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) depend on a single product, oil. The developed countries deliberately ignore the possibility of producing energy from other sources, such as the atom and its derivatives. As was emphasized by David Dietz, in his book Atomic Science, Bombs and Power, "one pound of uranium 235 contains thermal energy equal to that of 3 million pounds of coal". This shows us the possibilities that could be afforded by the peaceful use of the atom. As the same author further stressed, "President Eisenhower stated before the General Assembly that the United States strike force was capable of dropping, in a single attack, a series of atomic bombs whose explosive force would be equal to that of all the bombs dropped on Great Britain during the Second World War. That shows us the danger of nuclear armament, and the world community will have to choose between destruction and the use of nuclear techniques for peaceful purposes to the benefit of mankind.

(Mr. Burwin, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

I turn now to the subject of military bases. Military bases on the territory of other countries are a source of concern and pose a threat to the security of the region concerned and of the countries in its vicinity. They are a means of exerting pressure to influence the policies of other countries, as well as an interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and they threaten world peace and security. The dismantling of existing bases and the prohibition of the installation of new ones would contribute to the strengthening of security and the establishment of confidence.

(Mr. Burwin, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

We should also recognize the legitimate character of the struggle being waged by the peoples under the colonial yoke and under racist régimes. We must strengthen the struggle of the liberation movements and the right of peoples to obtain their liberty, defend their independence and their territory and freely to dispose of their natural resources.

We conclude, therefore, that the following factors influence the course of disarmament. We note that colonialism, whether in its old or in its new form, has not disappeared. There are also the arms race and mounting military expenditures, the impossibility of achieving agreements which would be satisfactory to the majority of countries, the failure to respect the resolutions of the General Assembly and those of the Security Council, the abuse of the privileges accorded the permanent members of the Security Council and the use of the veto. International resolutions are not based on democracy. The attempt to establish the New International Economic Order has failed. There is a threat of recourse to force and interference in the internal affairs of other countries, the division of the world into military alliances and blocs and distrust between countries.

In spite of everything, we must not look at the future with pessimism for there are some positive elements: the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water, concluded in Moscow on 5 August 1963; the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the 1971 Treaty on the Prohibition of the Erplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction; the 1972 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction; the SALT II agreement, and the tenth special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. That session was convened on the initiative of the non-aligned countries and in accordance with the relevant resolution of the General Assembly, and constituted an important step towards disarmament. The Final Document of that session contains principles of the highest importance and a Programme which reflects the aspirations of all countries.

(Mr. Burwin, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

Among the important conclusions of the special session, we would mention those contained in paragraph 118 of the Final Document, relating to the creation of a Disarmament Commission open to all the Member States of the United Nations and with a rotating chairmanship. The Commission is playing a vital role in setting forth ideas reflecting the tendencies within the international community.

At its last session, the Commission dealt with important problems, thus giving us grounds for hope of a better future in the field of disarmament. The Disarmament Commission has become a necessity, particularly because limited negotiations between the nuclear Powers have been very slow and have not yielded any major results.

The work of this session will reflect the views of the international community and will take into account the concerns of the various countries with regard to their independence, security, sovereignty and development. We have no doubt that the group of non-aligned countries will make an important contribution in this regard.

The non-aligned countries have always played a primary role in the field of disarmament. It was they who stressed the need to hold a special session, and in all their meetings the non-aligned countries have shown particular interest in disarmament, as was the case at their Summit Conference in Havana.

Responsibility for disarmament is universal, but it is particularly incumbent upon the nuclear Powers which should undertake further negotiations in the disarmament field, giving priority to nuclear weapons. In this regard we support the activities undertaken by the two great Powers, particularly regarding strategic and nuclear disarmament. We call upon the Disarmament Commission to make greater efforts to ensure the prohibition and destruction of chemical weapons and of weapons of mass destruction.

We should also create nuclear weapon-free zones. We support the Finnish proposal to the effect that northern Europe should become such a zone. We also support the declaration of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) on the need to make of Africa a nuclear weapon-free continent. We support the role assumed by the OAU in this and we share the concern expressed by that Organization with regard to the threat posed to Africa by the conduct of South Africa. The OAU

(Mr. Burwin, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

has called for an end to the assistance given to South Africa. We have now also learned that South Africa engaged in a nuclear test in September of this year. That is why we are in favour of making Africa a nuclear weapon-free continent. We should like the Secretary-General to undertake an investigation on this.

In the Middle East area, we support the idea of the Mediterranean becoming a "lake of peace", exempt from all attempts on the part of the great Powers to accumulate fleets and foreign bases.

The policy of Israel poses a very serious threat to the Palestinian people and to the whole international community, jeopardizing peace in the world at large.

The evidence produced by the mass media and supported by confidential reports emanating from well-informed sources should be considered seriously. We all know that for 13 years now there have been scandals concerning the diversion of uranium from the United States, France and the Federal Republic of Germany. We should not allow ourselves to be deluded by the scenarios invented to shift the responsibility from the States that were robbed. It is high time that the United Nations investigated these diversions. We should know the facts and what happened to the enriched uranium that disappeared from Pennsylvania in the United States and elsewhere. There should be an inquiry into the case of the German vessel Shiersburg carrying 200 tons of natural uranium, which disappeared for several days in the Mediterranean. Subsequently it was found without the uranium. It was reported by the Washington Post on 2 January 1978, that an Israeli commando had hijacked the vessel, taken it to Israel, and stolen its cargo. Payment of \$3,700,000 was subsequently made by Israel to the Federal Republic of Germany for this. We also learned of a lorry carrying 25 tons of uranium which was stolen from France in 1978. We should also mention the scandalous co-operation between the racist entities and certain foreign Powers in the field of nuclear armaments. In this connexion I refer the Committee to a very important book entitled The Nuclear Axis, the authors of which are Barbara Rogers and Zdenek Cervenka.

(Mr. Burwin, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya)

We demand also the dismantling of foreign bases in the South-East Asian region. American troops must be withdrawn from that region and American bases there must be dismantled so that the Indian Ocean shall become a zone of peace and so that the peoples of the region can live in security.

With regard to the declaration on international co-operation for disarmament, proposed by Czechoslovakia, it deserves attentive study.

In Ruth Sibberd's book World Military and Social Expenditures, it is stated that military expenditures are estimated to be \$4,500 billion, and that they are growing. That is why these vast sums ought to be freed for allocation to the development of the human community.

The information media have the moral duty to alert world public opinion so that the world can enjoy peace and security.

The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.