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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 13th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. Kuchubey (Ukrainian SSR)
(Vice-Chairman)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.00 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 30 TO 45, 120 AND 121 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. KEATING (Ireland): Before turning to the specific contribution which I wish to make to this debate on behalf of my own country, I should like first to say something about the general approach of the nine member States of the European Community to disarmament issues, and to reiterate the emphasis placed by my Foreign Minister on behalf of the Nine on the General Assembly as a most important instrument for facilitating agreement among the members of the international community in the field of disarmament. The Nine are determined individually and collectively to contribute to efforts at the regional and global level to improve the climate of international relations and to ensure that real and effective progress is made within the disarmament process.

At its first special session on disarmament last year, the General Assembly adopted by common accord a Final Document which articulated the aspiration of all our peoples to end the arms race, established our objectives and priorities and decided to revitalize the disarmament process, thus properly recognizing disarmament as the most imperative and urgent task facing us all. The Nine participated actively in the deliberations of that special session and are fully committed to the principles and programme of action which it adopted. They recall that every effort at disarmament should take account of a number of essential conditions: respect for the security of States and the maintenance of necessary balances at increasingly reduced levels which this implies, adequate verification measures, balanced progress in reductions, and adequate consideration of criteria appropriate to each region. They believe that it is essential that a real effort should now be made to give practical effect to the consensus reached at the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament and with that end in view they will work for the successful utilization of the deliberative and negotiating machinery which the session re-established.

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I would also wish to recall that my Foreign Minister, speaking on behalf of the Nine, welcomed the signature at Vienna by President Brezhnev and President Carter of the recent agreement on the limitation of strategic arms and expressed the hope that that would give a new impetus to the détente process and make a positive contribution to the atmosphere in which international disarmament negotiations are pursued.

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The Nine believe that, in intensifying efforts to meet the expectations of all our peoples in the disarmament process, the international community must simultaneously make substantial progress in deepening and developing confidence between our States. Such confidence can only grow and develop from consistent adherence to the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter, from respect for international agreements and from the pursuit of policies which foster co-operation and understanding between nations. The Nine for their part are deeply committed to the continuation and expansion of détente. We have played our full part in the process of relaxation of tensions and the development of co-operation in Europe, not least within the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe.

With this I conclude my remarks on behalf of the Nine member States of the European Community, while reserving the right of my delegation to speak again in the First Committee on behalf of the Nine whenever the need arises.

I would now propose to speak on behalf of Ireland.

Ten years have passed since the late Secretary-General, U Thant, in the introduction to his annual report for 1969 proposed that the 1970s be designated a disarmament decade and called for "concerted and concentrated efforts" to contain and reverse the arms race. In those 10 years, as in the 10 years before, we have deliberated in this Committee and in the Assembly how disarmament could best be attained, under what conditions, in what forums and at what pace, and in which areas could the objective be most effectively advanced. The corpus of our deliberations, recommendations and analyses is a large and weighty and imposing volume; the record of our practical achievement is sadly a much thinner and less reassuring text.

I say this not in recrimination, but from a deeply felt sense of disappointment that we not only have proved unequal to the challenge set for us, but have allowed the possibilities offered by a decade dedicated to disarmament to slip into history with little real effort to come to grips with the complex of problems involved. When U Thant launched his appeal, global military spending was then at an annual average of \$200 billion. Today it is more than twice that figure. This doubling of the figure represents a real rise in military expenditure, particularly marked during the last five years, and not simply the impact of inflation or currency devaluations on the

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international economy. Instead of containing, far less reversing, competition in armaments during the last 10 years, we have allowed it to develop unabated and have seen its addictive compulsion spread to areas formerly strange to it.

My delegation is as aware as any other of the difficulties posed for disarmament by the political environment which we have in part inherited, in part created, and which we find consistently so difficult to manage. Efforts at disarmament of necessity take place in a world beset by hostility, suspicion and rivalry, a world in which the goal of disarmament has appeared to run in conflict with the imperative of security for States seeking to preserve their sovereignty and independence in international affairs. Insecurity and tension and the reliance on ever more perfect systems of military security have forged the vicious spiral of arms competition, armaments proliferation and weapons refinement which we must now break and have led to a massive haemorrhage of resources in a world where hunger, disease and illiteracy are urgent everyday realities for so many. Furthermore, the nature and range of the weapons we have accumulated, the pace at which new technologies and counter-technologies have been developed and the political and strategic doctrines with which the military application of these technologies have been rationalized have ensnared our modest efforts at arms control and have contained the pace and limited the scope of concrete negotiations.

The aspirations of States to protect their sovereignty and to provide for their external security is understandable and legitimate. But as my Prime Minister emphasized in his statement at the tenth special session, what we have pursued in the past decade and in the years before is merely the illusion of security where the effort to add to the security of each has served merely to add to the insecurity of all. And what has surely been clear for over 30 years and what we must now accept is the hard, cold truth that the harnessing of our creative energy and resources to the development and deployment of weapons and weapons systems with destructive capabilities beyond the needs of reasonable self-defence is the negation of security and the antithesis of efforts to manage world poverty and all that this entails. This point is stated in stark and frightening terms in the Final Document of the tenth special session which demands of us that we "halt the arms race and proceed to disarmament or face annihilation". (resolution S-10/2, para. 18)

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The responsibility for laying the preconditions for survival is, of course, a responsibility which we all share, though the obligations of the nuclear Powers are paramount. For the accumulated over-kill capability of the great nuclear Powers and the dilemmas they face in dismantling it are not simply a product of their reciprocal insecurity and global competition, though these elements are of persisting importance. They are also the consequences of the technological trap into which these nations have been led by the false notion that higher levels of armaments lead to greater security. It is this mistaken belief which above all else fuels the arms race.

As we look back over the last 10 years, we can of course note that a certain progress has been made in the area of arms control and disarmament. The Non-Proliferation Treaty, concluded in 1968, entered into force during the first year of the decade and its role as the indispensable mechanism for the prevention of nuclear-weapons proliferation has been confirmed by the encouragingly large number of States which have become party to it. Negotiations on bacteriological weapons and on the denuclearization of the sea-bed found effective Treaty expression in the early years of the decade. Efforts were also made at the multilateral level to limit the military application of environmental modification techniques. Within the bilateral framework of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), the two great nuclear Powers have sought to regulate, rationalize and stabilize their nuclear relationship.

These measures were, at one and the same time, a function of and a stimulus to a larger interest in the relaxation of tension which in Europe gave birth to the process of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and to sub-regional force reduction talks between the two alliances. But just as the political norms of moderation and self-restraint implicit in any real détente process have not found adequate application beyond Europe, so also the slow evolution of détente in the present decade did not succeed in checking the arms race or its ever-wider dissemination. Thus, the limited arms agreements in this Decade have been over-shadowed by the vast increase in the number of nuclear weapons deployed and the sophistication of their delivery systems. Throughout the 1970s, the problem of reconciling the goal of disarmament with the search for security appeared for the most part intractable.

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This dilemma of two apparently conflicting priorities - the search for security and the need for disarmament - remains to be resolved in the next decade. With the convening of the tenth special session an effort was begun to deal seriously and comprehensively with the problems involved in a global context.

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The Final Document does not, of course, itself resolve the dilemma. But by integrating aspects of the problem which had become unclear or diffuse within a single agreed text, by establishing for the first time a consensus on principles and priorities and machinery, it nevertheless points towards a solution. The priority now is to move beyond broad declarations of intent to a full and effective implementation of the Final Document.

This calls for the accelerated parallel conclusion of balanced measures of arms control and disarmament through a courageous and resourceful exploitation of the established negotiating machinery. The objective should be to enhance national and international security by maintaining necessary equilibria at reduced levels. And in this connexion we must face up frankly to the fact that proposals for disarmament or arms control which would disadvantage individual States or groups of States in respect of the military capabilities of their perceived adversaries serve only to reinforce existing insecurities and are self-defeating. Similarly, the temptation to seek endorsement, as priority goals, of items which more properly belong to a developed rather than a commencing stage on the road to general and complete disarmament merely complicates and confuses our efforts to make progress on practical priorities. Nor can we establish unrealistic, over-precise deadlines for the finalization of negotiations even on short-term priorities.

These points are important for the work of this Committee and its relationship with other disarmament forums. And if their acceptance will test our resources of patience, they are nonetheless important if our deliberations are to be effective in ensuring the best possible use of existing negotiating institutions and if they are to be successful in encouraging real progress on concrete measures. But patience has its limits. As a bare minimum, we must ask of the negotiating States that they never again proceed at the rhythm of the 1970s when the growth of weapon-linked technologies outstripped the pace of negotiations and confounded the efforts of negotiators to control them. Early agreements in priority fields are, therefore, the corollary of our patience and understanding.

I have already said that the nuclear Powers bear a special burden of responsibility for the conclusion of practical measures of arms control and disarmament. The weapons which they deploy and continue to develop pose the greatest threat to humanity. It is an encouraging first step that the two great nuclear Powers have come to accept that the unrestricted vertical proliferation of their strategic arsenals and efforts to seek precise parities for each component of

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strategic deterrence is wasteful, destabilizing and dangerous and that in this last year of the Disarmament Decade they have signed a second agreement on the limitation of their strategic arms.

Beyond the SALT II agreement, in the larger multilateral framework, my own Government continues to consider it essential that we bring an end to and formally prohibit all weapons tests in all environments. Apart from its confidence-building impact on other negotiations, a comprehensive test ban would be an essential precondition for ending further competition in the qualitative improvement of warheads, which is in itself necessary for progress towards other measures of control. This prohibition was promised by the great Powers over 16 years ago and its implementation should no longer be delayed. Whatever negotiating problems may remain should be overcome quickly and if there is some difficulty in this regard, then the least the international community is entitled to expect in the interim is a complete moratorium on nuclear testing.

Beyond the SALT II agreement, it is not sufficient merely to achieve a measure of control over the arms race. Valuable though this is, it is tenuous, its foundations are insecure, and if past experience can guide us, it is almost certain to be swept aside before very long by the pace of technological development and the mutual distrust to which this inevitably gives rise. Yet even if this danger did not exist and even though arms control, despite its limitations, is infinitely preferable to an unbridled arms race, we cannot be satisfied with arms control alone. We must see it as a necessary and welcome step along the path towards the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. For it is intolerable that mankind should continue to live under the threat of nuclear devastation. Therefore, in our view, it is of the greatest importance that the two great Powers should not only curb any further development of but should undertake substantial reductions in their nuclear arsenals. Existing or improved international safeguards arrangements should, of course, be availed of in the implementation of necessary collateral measures to prevent the future production or diversion of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and to ensure the systematic transfer of existing stockpiles for peaceful use. In this latter connexion, the Committee on Disarmament can assist in finding solutions of the problems involved.

In the area of arms control, my delegation has consistently attached high priority to the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation through universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and strict and effective implementation

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of safeguards within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency. If we have done so, it is not because we see any permanent merit in the existing nuclear balance or because we see value in restricting the advantages of civil nuclear development to a privileged few. Rather we have done so in the firmly held and sincere conviction that non-proliferation is essential if we are to preserve any possibility of effective global management of an unstable world system, of liberating ourselves from the existing balance of terror and if we are to establish the preconditions for a just and equitable transfer of nuclear technology for the good of all.

The past decade has seen the ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by 109 countries. Militarily significant Powers, however, continue to remain outside the Treaty régime and have argued against its provisions as discriminatory, while benefiting from less stringent controls than those accepted by the Treaty parties. We would hope that these objections will not be long sustained in the next decade. The uncertainties posed by the danger of covert proliferation through technology transfer have produced an inevitable recoil on the part of the technologically advanced States on whom we depend for the export of equipment, components and know-how. This has prompted them to explore in restricted sessions ways and means of strengthening safeguards and developing proliferation-free technologies and exchanges. If this recoil appears discriminatory or unacceptable to some, it has to be remembered that the danger of proliferation has been confirmed in the present decade as a reality and not a pretext.

If full confidence is to be restored in the transfer of nuclear technology and material for peaceful purposes, it is essential that all non-nuclear weapon States co-operate with the International Atomic Energy Agency in the implementation of full-scope safeguards on all facilities. The year ahead offers promising opportunities in this regard. The conclusion of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) and the convening of the second Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference will allow for renewed concentration on the problems of managing nuclear technology and provide a framework for a further international definition of the responsibilities and obligations of exporting and importing nations alike. It is to be hoped that in the period ahead we can establish stronger mechanisms of international control intimately linked to the constraints and possibilities of the Non-Proliferation Treaty system.

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The fact that so many States have voluntarily renounced the nuclear weapons option and accepted the obligations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty makes it of course all the more urgent that the nuclear Powers undertake effective efforts to reverse the arms race. And, as a corollary, it is incumbent on them to provide formal guarantees never to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. This issue has rightly emerged in recent years as important and pressing, and we have had an opportunity to take note of the statements made in this regard by the five nuclear Powers during the special session. While not ignoring these statements, my delegation has always argued that any guarantees should, if they are to be effective, be clear and unambiguous and of such a kind as to strengthen efforts towards, rather than substitute for, universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as the central mechanism for international nuclear co-operation and responsibility.

Negotiations on chemical weapons have for almost a decade foundered on the difficulties posed by new technologies with dual purpose application, both civil and military, and the problems of verification and definition which this has involved. Above all, in the chemical weapons field the growth of weapons-linked technology has been shown most clearly to develop faster than our means to manage and control it. However, despite the difficulties encountered, an early prohibition is now within our grasp if pursued with the necessary vigour, courage and imagination. We cannot outlaw the impossible nor can we provide against every possibility of abuse in a worst case situation. But we can, through a general, complete and verifiable prohibition of chemical weapons, undertake the destruction of existing stockpiles and ensure that their future production, deployment or use ceases to be a rational option in the decision-making of civilized States. We hope, therefore, that the Committee on Disarmament can bring to fruition in the period ahead the long years of analyses and negotiations devoted to the complex of problems involved and that both the great Powers will play their required role in such efforts.

There are other weapons of mass destruction within the reach of our technologies. If anything is clear it is that the danger inherent in the military exploitation of these technologies far outweighs any short-term advantage.

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The development of new weapons technologies and weapons systems or the threat of their development merely confirms others in their determination to follow suit, if not today then certainly tomorrow. The arms control problems thrown up by new technologies cannot of course be solved in the abstract, nor do they lend themselves to a generalized approach. New weapons of mass destruction and related technologies must be the subject of separate verifiable controls if they are to be effectively and permanently contained. But the problems posed by new technologies for arms limitation must be clearly identified so that the risks can be calculated and, where necessary, early controls introduced. In this framework, we welcome the initiative taken jointly by the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to present to the Committee on Disarmament major elements for a universal prohibition of radiological weapons. We hope that this proposal will receive the necessary consideration and development.

The need to control and reduce conventional armaments and spending on such armaments is a priority which directly involves all Member States, great or small, rich or poor, technologically advanced or technologically developing. The issue brooks no complacency. The wars of our time have been fought only with such weapons and each generation of weapons replaces the other only in the frightening efficiency of its power to maim, kill and destroy. It is a sad fact also that so many developing countries, whose populations face the greatest social and economic problems, have emerged as major purchasers of such weapons in the present decade. Just as the development of more sophisticated conventional armaments is justified as a security imperative, so also their ever-wider transfer is presented as an economic necessity for the defence industries of the producing States. But the unrestricted commerce in such weapons only generates new insecurities and aggravates the economic difficulties of the importing State. We must therefore, as a matter of urgency, engage in serious discussions aimed at curtailing and limiting conventional arms transfers and encouraging their systematic reduction and control.

We were disappointed that the United Nations Conference, held last month in Geneva, did not conclude its work and reach agreement on widespread and effective prohibitions and restrictions on the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. The

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suffering and devastation which the use of these weapons has inflicted on so many peoples and nations make it imperative for the international community to ensure the successful conclusion of the second phase of the United Nations Conference next year. Our failure to achieve an agreement which develops and strengthens the principles of humanitarian law in this important area would have a most disturbing effect on the confidence of our peoples in our ability to realize their practical concern in promoting humanitarian law and carry into effect, through the work of other institutions, their hopes in the area of arms control and disarmament. As the report of the Conference to the General Assembly points out, considerable work remains to be accomplished at its second phase in regard to the use of incendiary weapons. Agreement will also have to be reached and differences reconciled on the important and delicate issue of the follow-up mechanism to the United Nations Conference. However, we are confident that with the necessary political will an agreement can be reached which will give a concrete and meaningful expression to the humanitarian aspirations and expectations of our peoples and Governments.

Confidence-building and other collateral measures play an important part in assisting the over-all disarmament process. Agreed reductions of military expenditure and systems of targets and incentives to control military expenditure, based on verifiable and generally applied budgetary criteria, would help to stifle arms competition and release resources for necessary economic programmes. For its own part Ireland has proposed for study the possible adoption of voluntary targets for maximum ceilings on defence expenditure which States would be encouraged to observe and which could be adjusted downwards as progress is made towards disarmament. Moreover, as part of the larger programme of studies under way in this field, there is a need to look afresh at the social and economic problems involved in dismantling defence industries so that, in identifying and predicting the difficulties, we shall be in a position at the appropriate stage to initiate measures to overcome and resolve them.

Almost 10 years ago my delegation, together with a number of other delegations, proposed a comprehensive programme of disarmament to facilitate implementation of the objectives of the Disarmament Decade. It was hoped by the sponsors of the proposed programme that substantial progress would be made during the 1970s

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at least on a number of the measures identified therein. The reality has of course been quite different and, as I have suggested, the Disarmament Decade has been a decade of missed opportunities. We cannot risk repeating the errors of the past 10 years. We must therefore ensure that on the threshold of the 1990s the children of today, who will be the young adults of the next generation, can benefit from a more positive achievement in disarmament than it has been our lot to inherit from the past decade.

Mr. ANDERSON (Australia): We are completing the first full year in which the disarmament machinery set up by the tenth special session has been established. Although negotiations in the various disarmament bodies and in bilateral negotiations have not been without difficulties and disagreements, they have reflected a genuine desire on the part of all nations to work together towards the common goal of universal disarmament. We still have a long way to go, but no one expects all disarmament issues to be resolved at a stroke. In fact, a number of forums, both multilateral and bilateral, have been established to grapple with the complex of vital interrelated issues, all of which, when resolved and combined, hold the promise of an end to the arms race and progress towards the final goal of general and complete disarmament.

The results of the special session are the linchpin in this task. The Final Document of that session represents the outcome of difficult negotiations and is the product of a delicately balanced consensus. We should be careful not to endanger that consensus. One of the most important aspects of the Final Document is the guidance it gives for future negotiations on disarmament issues. And in this respect, the establishment of the Committee on Disarmament is of particular significance. Australia, as a new member of that Committee, has welcomed the opportunity to contribute to its work.

There has been some criticism of the results, or lack of them, at the 1979 session of the Committee on Disarmament, and Australia shares much of this concern. We do, however, consider that some progress has been made. There are hard problems to be resolved, with complex national security interests to be considered. We cannot expect the Committee to solve all disarmament problems overnight. The Committee on Disarmament is a negotiating body, and as the Australian permanent representative to the Committee on Disarmament, Sir James Plimsoll, noted in his statement to the Committee on 9 August this year, negotiations take many forms and proceed through many stages. In a Committee which works, and can only work, by consensus, we have to

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accommodate ourselves to differing priorities and also to the different stages at which questions come up for negotiation. We believe that some useful first steps have been taken and that if the Committee continues the course it has set itself, positive progress can be made. Australia will continue to play an active and constructive part in its negotiations.

In carrying out its role as the multilateral negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament is assisted by the United Nations Disarmament Commission as the multilateral deliberative body. Australia would hope that the Disarmament Commission, in following the terms of its mandate as set out in the Final Document, will examine in detail specific arms control and disarmament measures. At its session this year, the Commission attempted to identify the elements of a comprehensive program for disarmament. There were difficulties in producing this document and, although adopted by consensus, it fell short in some respects of the preferred positions of a number of States. In Australia's view, the document was deficient in its treatment of nuclear issues. It remains the view of my Government that the most authoritative agreed language on nuclear issues, and that which enjoys the broadest support of the international community, is the language contained in the Final Document of the special session.

I should now like to reflect briefly on some of the issues with which the Committee on Disarmament has been directly concerned.

The Australian Government is firmly committed to the cessation of nuclear testing by all States in all environments. In this respect, it is our belief that a comprehensive test-ban treaty will make an important contribution to efforts to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, both vertical and horizontal. The treaty would provide reassurance to States in a given region, and, indeed, to the international community as a whole, that nuclear development programmes in non-nuclear-weapon States were, in fact, directed towards peaceful purposes.

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

The conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would be significant in that all nuclear explosions would be stopped for the duration of the treaty. This would apply to explosions for military purposes as well as for peaceful purposes, and it would thus limit, and perhaps even stop, the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons by the parties to the treaty. It would make the development of new nuclear weapons, or the improvement of existing ones, very difficult. This, in turn, would strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, lead to a fuller implementation of that Treaty and help overcome the objections of those States that see the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as discriminatory in favour of the existing nuclear-weapon States.

A second benefit of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would be to prevent or at least restrain horizontal proliferation. We aim, of course, for a universally accepted treaty, under which States which do not today have nuclear weapons would not acquire them. They would undertake not to conduct tests which would make the acquisition or the effective testing of nuclear weapons possible. In this respect, it is relevant to note that States not party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty could become party to a comprehensive test-ban treaty and thus provide assurance that they would not become nuclear-weapon States.

In addition, the existence of a comprehensive test-ban treaty would be a point of pressure on States not parties to that treaty. Any such State which engaged in nuclear testing after a comprehensive test-ban treaty had been concluded would come under increased moral pressure to explain and justify its actions to international opinion.

In the Committee on Disarmament, Australia has consistently voiced its dissatisfaction that the three negotiating nuclear-weapon States have been unable to conclude their discussions on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. During last year's session of the General Assembly, Australia was active in the drafting of resolution 33/60, in which the three negotiating States were urged to conclude their negotiations and to

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transmit the results to the Committee before the beginning of its 1979 session. We share the dissatisfaction expressed here last week by the representative of Japan and by others at the failure of those States to implement resolution 33/60. We appreciate that there are complex and difficult problems involved, but we had expected the submission of a draft initiative during this year's session of the Committee on Disarmament. In the absence of such an initiative, we should at least have expected a more detailed account of negotiations than was given to the Committee this year.

Australia sees a comprehensive test-ban treaty as a vital and attainable part of an integral system of disarmament and arms control. An attempt to conclude a comprehensive test-ban treaty without the considered result of the negotiating powers' deliberations would be futile. We consider it, therefore, a matter of the utmost importance that the three negotiating States come up with a draft for consideration at the 1980 session of the Committee on Disarmament.

The effective implementation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban is dependent on adequate verification. The work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to establish an international seismic data exchange system is of the utmost importance in this regard. Australia, as a member of the Group, welcomes the decision of the Committee on Disarmament to continue the Group's mandate.

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

Australia is encouraged by the fact that over two-thirds of the Member States of the United Nations have undertaken voluntarily to renounce, through accession to the legal instrument of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, the acquisition and production of nuclear weapons. The number of States joining this instrument is increasing. Within our own region we have been particularly encouraged by the accession to the Treaty this year of Bangladesh, Indonesia and Sri Lanka.

Adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty demonstrates two important undertakings by States. The first is the political commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons, and the second is readiness to submit all nuclear facilities to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. As I have already mentioned, the treaty also places legal obligations upon its nuclear-weapon-state depositories to strive for nuclear disarmament.

The possibility of the proliferation of nuclear weapons must be regarded as one of the greatest threats to the future of mankind. It is, therefore, a matter of deep concern to my Government that there are some States, not as yet nuclear weapons States, that are improving their technological infrastructures in ways that bring them closer to having a nuclear explosive capacity. Recent developments in the Indian sub-continent have been particularly disquieting in this regard. We hope that the countries which have remained outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty will reassure the international community by affirming their acceptance either of full-scope safeguards on their nuclear industries or of some other binding and verifiable commitment.

In an energy-hungry world, Australia fully recognizes the importance to many countries, including developing countries, of adequate opportunities for the peaceful development of nuclear power. At the same time we must be mindful of the dangers of nuclear proliferation which are inherent in the uncontrolled use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. In this regard the work of the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE), of which Australia is an active member, has been and is of the utmost importance.

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

It is essential that following the conclusion of the work of INFCE early next year, international efforts be continued towards achieving compatibility between peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the prevention of nuclear proliferation.

We are all aware that a comprehensive test ban treaty is an integral part of an over-all plan for disarmament, but not an end in itself. Such a treaty would not restrain the continued construction of existing types of weapons. The Australian Government believes that another important element in an over-all disarmament plan would be the prohibition, or "cut-off", of production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. This measure would limit existing nuclear arsenals to approximately their present size and so contribute to scaling down the arms race. It would also prevent the emergence of new States with nuclear explosive capacities. We believe that "cut-off" is a practical objective and one well worth exploring. It would be non-discriminatory as between the nuclear-weapon States and other States and would apply equally to both categories of States. It would, as a consequence, carry the possibility of the development of a common set of full-scope safeguards applicable to all States.

We see "cut-off" as a gradual step towards total nuclear disarmament and perhaps a more realistic one in the early stages than the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons. Agreement by nuclear-weapon States to such a measure should provide a concrete illustration of their preparedness to cease the continuing development of new weapons systems.

I have in this statement referred to the concept of a variety of measures being agreed as a step-by-step process towards a cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. In this context, the Australian Government has welcomed the conclusion of the SALT II negotiations as a major step forward. SALT II lessens the risk of nuclear war and places verifiable limits on the strategic arsenals and delivery systems of the two super Powers. We see a continuing SALT process as a crucial element in the pursuit of peace and stability.

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

SALT is, however, only one of the elements of the arms limitation process and, although it will achieve much in controlling the arms race between the super-Powers, it does cover only two of the nuclear-weapon States. We look to the other nuclear-weapon States to participate constructively in the other areas of arms limitation and disarmament.

The Committee on Disarmament's work on nuclear issues is vital to the successful implementation of a policy of nuclear disarmament. But the Committee has also been active this year in the field of chemical weapons.

Since last year's General Assembly, the Committee on Disarmament has taken up chemical weapons as a priority item. Some progress has been made in the Committee this year, more particularly in identifying areas of agreement or disagreement. But the elaboration of a chemical weapons convention is an extremely complicated area. There are special problems in chemical warfare, perhaps even more complicated than those involved in nuclear disarmament and nuclear arms control. Any country with a chemical industry has some capacity to make chemical weapons or to contribute to their manufacture. Add to this the fact that many chemicals, chemical equipment and chemical appliances can be used for military purposes as well as for civil or peaceful purposes. How, for example, can we ensure that without interfering with the normal functioning of chemical industries for peaceful purposes, States do not use these facilities to develop chemical weapons? These are problems which face many countries, and not only the advanced industrial Powers. The task is none the less urgent for being difficult. As the Australian Foreign Minister, Mr. Andrew Peacock, said in his statement at the opening session of the Committee on Disarmament this year, "Together with the comprehensive test-ban treaty this is an immediate task for the Committee ... Australia regards this as an urgent matter". (CD/PV.2, p. 37)

Discussion in the Committee on Disarmament this year has served to identify some of the complex issues involved in the negotiation of a chemical weapons convention. It has brought home the need to identify and take full account of all the economic, political and strategic issues. The task before the Committee on Disarmament is large, but it is of great importance and one in which all States have a very real interest, both in terms of their national security and of their economic and technical development.

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

In this context, we recognize the importance of the bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union towards conclusion of a convention. We welcomed the detailed report on those negotiations which they presented to the Committee at its last session. We urge them to continue their work and we hope that they will shortly be in a position to table a joint initiative at the Committee on Disarmament. Australia does not believe, however, that it is necessary to await the tabling of this initiative before serious negotiations on chemical weapons can take place in the Committee.

The Committee on Disarmament has on its agenda consideration of radiological weapons. The fact that such weapons are not yet in production gives us an opportunity, an almost unique opportunity, to devise and enact some control before vested interests have grown up.

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

Following the submission in the Committee on Disarmament in the second half of this year of an agreed joint United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons, the Committee had the opportunity to begin detailed discussion of this subject. We are hopeful that the Committee will, by next year's General Assembly, have some concrete results to report.

I have not touched on all of the many items now under consideration by the Committee on Disarmament nor, of course, on all nuclear disarmament issues. This does not imply that Australia regards these questions as unimportant. It reflects rather the over-riding importance of, and the imperative necessity for progress, in our view, on such particular items as the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime and the elaboration and implementation of comprehensive test ban and chemical weapons treaties. My delegation will, however, be intervening at later stages in this debate on some of the other issues with which our Committee is concerned.

Mr. SHEVEL (Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic) (interpretation from Russian): Détente is the key tendency in the present stage of international life. The bases of peaceful co-operation among nations are becoming ever more firmly consolidated as the scope and the forms of mutual understanding among nations are expanding. If we take an unprejudiced look at political events which have marked the decade which is now drawing to a close, there is one irrefutable fact that we have to concede. The process of détente has not only, on the whole, promoted the improvement of the political climate of the world, but has also created a favourable foundation for resolving the most complex international problems, primarily those connected with the building of a lasting and sound foundation for universal peace.

(Mr. Shevel, Ukrainian SSR)

Now that we are on the threshold of the 1980s, our task is to make sure that this positive process becomes irreversible.

The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR entirely shares the views expressed here in the First Committee that the major danger to peace and international détente, the independence of peoples, and their socio-economic development remains the arms race. Thus, the legitimate question arises: why, in spite of universal acknowledgement of the need to place a reliable barrier on the slippery slope to nuclear catastrophe, and in spite of the existence of a large number of well thought-out and specific proposals on so many aspects of the problem of disarmament, the arms race still continues.

It is obvious that the explanation for this should be sought in the activities and influence of those elements who are unwilling to resign themselves to the fact that the policy of diktat, aggression and the intensification of tension is historically doomed. These are people who place their narrow, selfish interests in earning super-profits above the fate of the peoples of the world. As we can see, there are still quite a few people who fail to realize the fact that there is no sensible alternative to disarmament.

Unfortunately, the situation quite often arises where politicians, representatives of certain Western States, primarily the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries, pay lip service to constructive proposals designed to limit the arms race, but when it comes to actually putting these proposals into effect, they find all kinds of pretexts for not doing so.

The ultimate goal of the foreign policy of the socialist countries has always been and remains the ending of the arms race, and the creation of favourable peaceful conditions for resolving the problems of social and economic development. As was stressed by Mr. Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and President of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR,

"...to reduce the threat of the outbreak of a new world war and the mass destruction of people by means of nuclear weapons that is the thrust of our struggle for peace in the world today .

(Mr. Shevel, Ukrainian SSR)

The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR believes that there are now quite good conditions for embarking on an active search for mutually acceptable decisions on a whole range of disarmament questions. Of particular significance, in this area is the signing in Vienna by Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Carter, the President of the United States, of a treaty between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of strategic armaments and other Soviet-American documents.

The interests of the further improvement of Soviet-American relations, and, indeed, of the whole international climate require the total implementation of these important documents. This would provide powerful momentum for progress in other areas of arms race restraint and reducing the threat of war. It would also clear the way for a subsequent and even more important stage in negotiations, the purpose of which would be to work on measures for the further limitation as well as the reduction of strategic armaments, and to promote the strengthening of peace and security in all continents, including Europe.

At the present time political relations among European countries are founded on the understandings contained in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. This redounds to the considerable credit of the socialist countries, which have persistently and purposefully striven to strengthen lasting peace and stability in this continent, which was the scene of the outbreak of the two world wars. They have repeatedly come forward with initiatives designed to create here a climate of mutual trust, to scale down military confrontation and, subsequently, to reduce the concentration of and cut down the numbers of armed forces and armaments in the continent. These aims are served also by the new constructive peaceful proposals put forward by the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, President of the Praesidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, Mr. Brezhnev, in his speech made in Berlin on 6 October this year. For the implementation of these proposals, the political will of the Governments of all States, primarily Western States, is required.

(Mr. Shevel, Ukrainian SSR)

One of the most important disarmament problems is the question of how to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race. As we know, from the very first day of its existence the United Nations has been focusing its attention on nuclear disarmament measures. Certain positive results have been achieved. But with all the importance and significance of these results for averting the danger of the outbreak of nuclear war, these agreements have been only of a partial nature. Therefore, the very logic of facts today dictates that the highest priority be accorded to comprehensive talks on ceasing the manufacture and stockpiling of nuclear weapons.

In the light of the recommendations of the special session on disarmament and of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly the Soviet Union and other socialist countries have proposed that negotiations be undertaken with the participation of all nuclear Powers aimed at cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons of all kinds and the gradual reduction of stockpiles of such weapons to the point of their total elimination.

(Mr. Shevel, Ukrainian SSR)

The approach of the Socialist countries to this, we frankly acknowledge, complex problem is entirely realistic. It provides for a stage by stage implementation of appropriate measures according to a mutually acceptable and agreed timetable. In the view of the Ukrainian delegation, we must also as soon as possible get down to preparatory consultations to try to get these talks on to a practical plane. Thus, we would be able, not only in words but in actual fact, to make significant progress in the field of nuclear disarmament. The logic of the conducting of talks, particularly in the field of nuclear disarmament, requires strict observance of the principle of not doing anything detrimental to the security of the parties. The achievement of specific understandings with regard to the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons should of course be accompanied by a strengthening of the international legal guarantees for the security of States.

The delegation of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic believes that conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations would provide a powerful incentive for a search for balanced solutions and decisions in the field of disarmament, primarily nuclear disarmament. The search for multi-tiered decisions, in the view of the Socialist countries, does not mean that we should not at the same time hold other talks too, designed to solve problems in a narrower area. In particular, a discussion is in progress on the question of providing non-nuclear States with guarantees that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. At the last session of the General Assembly, the Soviet Union proposed the conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of security guarantees for non-nuclear States. The discussion of that proposal in the General Assembly and in the Committee on Disarmament, have shown that many countries are interested in bringing this about. We therefore believe that the General Assembly should appeal to the Committee on Disarmament to accelerate its work on an appropriate international draft agreement.

The lessening of the danger of the outbreak of a nuclear conflict is something which is also served by the proposal of the Soviet Union on the non-emplacement of nuclear weapons on the territory of those States where they do not

(Mr. Shevel, Ukrainian SSR)

exist at present. On this subject the General Assembly has already adopted an appropriate decision, and it would be well to go further and to take thought in common on how it would be possible to produce an international document embodying within it obligations on nuclear States not to place nuclear weapons where they do not exist at present, and on the non-nuclear States the obligation to refrain from any action which might lead to the appearance of such weapons on their territories.

With regard to the talks at present going on in the field of limiting the nuclear arms race, I should like to mention the continuation of the work by the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom on a treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons testing in all environments and its protocol relating to peaceful nuclear explosions. The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR would like to express the hope that very soon the work towards agreement on the provisions of those documents will be finalized.

As we know, talks are continuing on the prohibition of chemical weapons. At the Vienna meeting of the leaders of the USSR and the United States in June this year, the parties agreed to step up their efforts on preparations for an agreed joint proposal on the prohibition of chemical weapons for submission to the Committee on Disarmament. We note with satisfaction that in their joint communiqué to the Committee on Disarmament the Soviet Union and the United States gave detailed information about the status of the bilateral talks on the prohibition of this weapon of mass destruction. Undoubtedly, work on an agreement on this subject must be accelerated.

It has now become axiomatic that it is so much easier to ban weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, which have not yet been taken by States into their armouries, than subsequently to attempt to exclude them from their arsenals. Striking proof of this was the production by the Soviet Union and the United States of the fundamental elements of a treaty on the prohibition of the development, manufacture, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. In the view of the Ukrainian delegation, this session of the General Assembly should appeal to the Committee on Disarmament to conclude work as soon as possible

(Mr. Shevel, Ukrainian SSR)

on its preparation of such an agreement on the basis of the joint proposal submitted to the Committee. The Ukrainian SSR believes that the prohibition of radiological weapons would be an important step towards the comprehensive prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

As a result of discussions in the United Nations and in the Committee on Disarmament of this by no means theoretical question an overwhelming majority of States did evince awareness and understanding of the danger of the use of scientific and technological progress for the creation of new models of deadly weapons. The Committee on Disarmament should continue talks on preparing a comprehensive agreement on the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and also, if the need should arise, special draft agreements.

In spite of the numerous bodies which are conducting talks in the field of disarmament, it is by no means always possible to achieve realistic results. So we still remain convinced of the need for doing the necessary work to convene a world disarmament conference. Such a universal forum would make it possible to adopt effective decisions, that is to say, to get down to practical implementation on many outstanding issues.

The delegation of the Ukrainian SSR has touched on just a few of the proposals within the field of limiting the arms race and disarmament, but each of them, if it is actually put into effect, apart from its great political significance, would have concrete and tangible results in so far as it would spare States the necessity of bearing the burden of non-productive expenditures for military purposes. In this context, it is appropriate to recall the proposal of the Soviet Union for the reduction by States which possess large economic and military potential of their military budgets in absolute terms by amounts of the same order of magnitude, and the earmarking of 10 per cent of the funds so released for increasing assistance to developing countries. Carrying out that proposal would do a great deal to help restrain the arms race and would make it possible to release considerable resources for the purposes of economic development of and affording assistance to developing countries.

(Mr. Shevel, Ukrainian SSR)

We wish to express the hope that the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly will prove capable of injecting further momentum into the effective solution of the problems of halting the arms race and bringing about disarmament, and will promote the practical implementation of proposals designed to strengthen peace and security in the world and to supplement political détente by military détente. If we really want to achieve realistic measures to restrain the arms race and to bring about disarmament -- the implementation of the important provisions of the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament -- then the efforts of all States, without exception, must be considerably greater.

Mr. H. V. H. SEKYI (Ghana): The statements made by previous speakers since the commencement of the debate a week ago clearly showed the continued commitment of Member States to disarmament. What is needed now is to summon the necessary political will for the realization of our objective of general and complete disarmament. That objective may not be achieved overnight; indeed, it is quite possible that it may continue to elude the international community for several more decades. But we believe that any accomplishment, however slight, can be built upon.

As we had the opportunity to state here in this Committee and in other forums, Ghana believes that given the present levels of nuclear-weapon stockpiles and the suspicions between the East and West, it would be unrealistic to think that the goal of general and complete disarmament could be achieved overnight. There are fundamental security and political interests of States which have to be recognized. Ghana therefore believes in a step-by-step approach. Such an approach would, in our view, allow particular disarmament negotiations and related issues to be examined thoroughly and appropriate provisions for their implementation to be defined. In that way, we would be sure that a solid base for further co-ordinated advances was ensured. Attempts to take on too many issues at once may, in our view, be counter-productive.

It is the view of Ghana that successfully negotiated agreements alone cannot advance the cause of disarmament unless those involved have the necessary trust in each other. Paragraph 41 of the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament underscores this point when it states, inter alia,

"In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all States should strictly abide by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament ... "
(A/S-10/4, para. 41)

The Final Document thus places on all countries the obligation to work for a relaxation of tensions. That obligation also implies, in the opinion of my delegation, the exercise of military self-restraint to avoid arousing the apprehensions of other countries legitimately concerned about their security.

(Mr. H. V. H. Sekyi, Ghana)

Unless that is done, decisions and actions could create their own chain reactions, escalate tensions, deepen mistrust, and add further spirals to the arms race.

Genuine disarmament should aim at reducing levels of arsenals without disturbing the existing military balance; no country will disarm when it finds that others thereby gain advantages over it. In that regard, we believe that the deeply-held preference of delegations here assembled would be for the countries of the Warsaw Pact and of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to replace attempts to achieve a balance through ever-increasing and ever-more costly armed forces with a balance based on mutual reduction of their forces.

The Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly has clearly emphasized the special responsibility of the two super-Powers if meaningful progress is to be made in slowing down the arms race. The two military blocs, of course, also share that responsibility. In the opinion of the Ghanaian delegation, we should again point out at this session that they owe to humanity the duty to discharge in all sincerity the special obligation which the fact of their being powerful military blocs imposes on them.

As a direct consequence of the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, the revived United Nations Disarmament Commission met in May to June of this year to consider elements of a comprehensive disarmament programme. The report of the Commission recommending a package of measures is before the First Committee. Ghana actively participated in the proceedings of the Disarmament Commission and we are indeed aware that a number of delegations are not altogether happy about its conclusions. In our view, the recommendations of the Disarmament Commission do represent an encouraging attempt to identify areas in which the Committee on Disarmament could start work. The fact that the Disarmament Commission was able to adopt its report by consensus, albeit without three measures, was in itself a significant achievement. What is essential, in our view, is not so much what has been left out of the report as the existence of maximal political support by Member States for the basic elements which were agreed upon. Let us try them.

(Mr. H. V. H. Sekyi, Ghana)

As regards the implementation of the other provisions of the Final Document, my delegation would like to state that although not participating in any of the current disarmament negotiations, Ghana attaches the greatest importance to the efforts to achieve significant results through those negotiations which would strengthen international peace and security. In that connexion, we welcome the signing of SALT II by Presidents Carter and Brezhnev in Vienna in June. We are not in a position to assess the full impact of SALT II on the disarmament process at the present stage. My delegation would, however, hope that SALT II would help to establish a climate of trust which should reduce tensions. We are also following with interest the negotiations on the mutual reduction of forces and armaments and associated measures in central Europe. Our interest stems from our belief that peace and security are indivisible; instability and conflict in central Europe could have repercussions on other countries, including countries in the West African subregion. That has been known to happen.

It was in that spirit that my delegation joined in sponsoring resolution 33/91 B on confidence-building measures. By that resolution, the General Assembly requested Member States to state their views on the confidence-building measures which they considered appropriate. Ghana attaches the greatest importance to such measures, particularly in central Europe where there are heavy concentrations of military power combined with a degree of mutual mistrust. Differences in political and regional experiences make it clear that confidence-building measures in one particular region are not easily transferable to another. My delegation will, however, continue to support the concept since regional agreements could form the basis for an international convention on confidence-building measures.

May I now turn to the report on the substantive work of the Committee on Disarmament contained in document A/34/27, Vol. I, with particular reference to the nuclear test ban, chemical weapons and to what are termed negative assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States.

A number of General Assembly resolutions relating to the nuclear test ban clearly show the urgency attached to the question of elaborating a treaty on a comprehensive nuclear test ban. My delegation therefore shares the concern of

(Mr. H. V. H. Sekyi, Ghana)

other delegations that the Geneva Committee has yet to receive a draft text for consideration. We should like to reiterate our view that the negotiating parties should endeavour to transmit whatever texts are available to the Committee on Disarmament for consideration, indicating the areas of agreement and disagreement. We feel that the Committee on Disarmament could help to narrow areas of difference which the three negotiating parties might not easily achieve because of conflicts of interest.

(Mr. H. V. H. Sekyi, Ghana)

The Ghana delegation also feels that this Committee and the General Assembly should give the negotiating parties a clear political directive in this regard. There is no intention, in making this proposal, to disregard in any way the sovereignty of those parties, but the proposal does, we believe, reflect the concern of the international community over the delay and aims at helping the negotiating parties to overcome differences in their positions.

Regarding chemical weapons, it is the view of Ghana that the objective should be general, complete and verifiable prohibition. The scope of the prohibition should be based on general-purpose criteria. We believe we must seek to ban all means of chemical warfare, such as lethal chemical-weapon agents, incapacitating agents and others which may cause temporary disability. However, such types of toxic agents as may be necessary for legitimate technological, prophylactic or other non-military purposes, such as research and so forth, should be excluded from the ban. It is also the view of Ghana that the destruction of the existing stocks should be undertaken within a specified time-frame.

Regarding the sensitive question of verification, it is our view that we should not seek only one type of verification. We think verification should be a judicious combination of national and international means. Furthermore, verification, in our view, should not attempt to interfere in the political or social affairs of any country.

Regarding radiological weapons, my delegation notes at paragraph 57 of the Geneva Committee's report that the Soviet Union and the United States of America had submitted an agreed joint proposal on major elements of a treaty prohibiting the development, production, stockpiling and use of radiological weapons. We welcome this joint effort on the part of the Soviet Union and the United States for two reasons. First, it will bring the international community into a field of arms control which has not been substantially entered by any country, and, secondly, the USSR-United States draft treaty will serve as a basic document on which the Committee on Disarmament can start work. My delegation would hope that this joint initiative would effectively contribute to the general scheme of control and ultimate disarmament, which is our objective.

(Mr. H. V. H. Sekyi, Ghana)

I now turn to the so-called negative assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. My delegation welcomed and supported as a matter of principle both parts of resolution 33/72 relating to negative assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States. The objectives of both parts of the resolution are yet another contribution to the disarmament process and, more important, with the necessary political support the objectives could go a long way to strengthening the non-proliferation régime. Ghana does not believe that an international convention is a substitute for general and complete disarmament, which remains our ultimate objective. We do, however, feel that until this objective is achieved a legally binding instrument could be useful. For any assurances to be effective, they should be credible, uniform in scope and without any conditions or limitations and, finally, they should also be contractually and legally binding on all States.

The essence of the tenth special session was and is to establish an agreed basis for strengthening international peace and security. Counter to all this runs the race for conventional and nuclear armaments. In the language of the special session's Final Document,

"The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes, and is incompatible with the principles, of the Charter of the United Nations, especially respect for sovereignty, refraining from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, the peaceful settlement of disputes and non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of States. It also adversely affects the right of peoples freely to determine their systems of social and economic development, and hinders the struggle for self-determination and the elimination of colonial rule, racial or foreign domination or occupation. Indeed, the massive accumulation of armaments and the acquisition of armaments technology by racist régimes, as well as their possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, present a challenging and increasingly dangerous obstacle to a world community faced with the urgent need to disarm. It is, therefore, essential for purposes of disarmament to prevent any further acquisition of arms or arms technology by such régimes, especially through strict adherence by all States to relevant decisions of the Security Council". (resolution S-10/2, para. 12)

(Mr. H. V. H. Sekyi, Ghana)

And yet the racist Pretoria régime continues to build enormous arsenals through the use of still unrevoked licences and patents, despite the relevant decisions of the Security Council. It is pertinent to draw the attention of the international community again to the dangerous situation developing in our part of the world. It is well known that, through nuclear collaboration with some Members of this Organization, Pretoria is now a potential nuclear Power. Relying on superior military force, Pretoria has directly or in association with the rebel Ian Smith clique launched unprovoked attacks on neighbouring African countries. It has literally turned these countries into playgrounds where its forces go whenever they feel like flexing their muscles. It is an intolerable situation and a serious threat to international peace and security. We call upon Member States to respect the wishes of African countries and to desist from collaboration or association with the racist régimes in the military or nuclear field.

We are strongly and frankly of the view that the international community is yet to address itself to this particular problem with anything like the seriousness it calls for. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), the racist régimes of ^{South ?} southern Africa spend four times as much on military budgets as do all the other countries of the subregion put together - Angola, Mozambique, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia. This is quite apart from the huge expenditures of the apartheid régime on the achievement of its nuclear ambitions. Is this then an arms race against the countries of the subregion, or is it a race against all Africa, and more? Implied among the objectives of the tenth special session are the denuclearization of regions, the reduction of transfers of conventional arms, and universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Clearly, none of these disarmament objectives can be implemented in the particular case of Africa so long as the militarization and the nuclear ambitions of the apartheid régime continue to pose an ever more alarming threat to the entire continent and, indeed, to the world at large.

It is our view that the General Assembly at its current session and the Security Council on the recommendation of the General Assembly should address themselves to strong and effective measures to deal with the growing danger. In this regard, may we commend to the Assembly's attention the report and recommendations of the United Nations Seminar on Nuclear Collaboration with South Africa (S/13157 of 9 March 1979). The delegation of Ghana finds itself in full agreement with the seminar's findings and recommendations. These are, inter alia, that there should be a complete and immediate end to all forms of nuclear collaboration with the Pretoria régime; that the possibility of any meaningful and valid distinction between peaceful and military nuclear collaboration must be rejected in the present situation of danger; that, given the nature and record of the apartheid régime, particularly the open flouting of its Charter obligations, no international or bilateral safeguards, including the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguard system and the system of controls of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, would be adequate; and that there should be no moves to offer to the apartheid régime the benefit of international nuclear collaboration or security and other guarantees in return for adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. More specifically, an end should be put to all contracts and agreements in the nuclear field with the apartheid régime, to the training of and exchanges with South African scientists involved in the nuclear sector and the granting of visas to them, to contracts and agreements concerning uranium extraction and processing in South Africa and to the importation of South African or Namibian uranium, the reprocessing of South Africa's spent nuclear fuel, and in particular, the return to it of plutonium.

There should be an end to all financial, economic and other forms of support for South Africa's nuclear industry or any related industry, and to the transfer of technology, the supply of equipment and financial support for South Africa's enrichment programme, including isotope separation. Preferably, these measures should be reinforced by or taken within the framework of a mandatory decision by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter. We would urge that those recommendations be fully reflected in appropriate resolutions of the current session.

This year, the total amount spent on the means of mutual destruction and self-annihilation will probably equal half the combined total income of all third world countries, and more than twice that of all Africa. In the presence of this

(Mr. H. V. H. Sekyi, Ghana)

sobering statistic we cannot fail, as a developing and an African country, to draw attention once again to the link between disarmament and development. If 10 per cent of that colossal expenditure could be saved through better détente, less mistrust and the principles of non-alignment, the gain would be not merely greater security, but also greater prosperity for us all.

As we enter the Disarmament Week beginning on Wednesday 24 October, may we express the hope that we will all rededicate ourselves to the laudable ideals which inspired the founding fathers of this Organization. Perhaps there is no better way of demonstrating this resolve than by giving the necessary political support to resolutions which will be adopted at the end of this session.

The meeting rose at 4.45 p.m.