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Chairman: Mr. HEPBURN (Bahamas)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.30 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 30 TO 45, 120 AND 121 (continued)

GENERAL DEBATE

Mr. PEARSON (Canada): The difference between the goals of disarmament and the realities of international security has always been wide. The common objective of virtually all Governments is to achieve undiminished security at lower levels of armaments. Yet our common practice has been to seek greater security at higher levels of armaments. Eighteen months after the special session on disarmament, this discrepancy is especially glaring. That session helped to raise the hopes of many people that the dangers of modern weapons and of the arms race would be more fully taken into account in the policies of Governments. They have been disappointed. This disappointment may turn into cynicism and indifference unless we are better able to keep these goals and realities in balance. The goals of disarmament can be articulated and explained with greater modesty and realism without giving them up. Expenditures on defence can be reconciled with initiatives in arms control without the need for apology. History does not bear out the view that peace is always to be found in strength. But neither has it been achieved through weakness. Propaganda and slogans mislead Governments as much as they confuse the public.

Of one thing we can be sure, however. A nuclear war involving the weapons now available would destroy civilization as we know it. This has been true for at least a generation. It is this fact which has given special urgency to our annual debate on disarmament, but it is also this fact which has convinced many people that nuclear war will never happen. We all know that this technology cannot be made to disappear. On the contrary, we know that nuclear energy is widely regarded as a possible escape from a situation where the traditional sources of energy become inadequate to modern needs.

(Mr. Pearson, Canada)

Even if this were not the case, we could not abolish fissionable materials or the knowledge of how to make use of them for weapons purposes. Our immediate tasks are rather to improve the means of control of these weapons and associated technologies, and to reduce their numbers by the negotiation of agreements among the nuclear-weapons Powers in the first instance. We hope very much in this respect that China will take its place soon in the Committee on Disarmament.

(Mr. Pearson, Canada)

The United States-Soviet Treaty on strategic offensive arms of last June is an example of such an agreement amongst the nuclear-weapon Powers. Canada has welcomed the Treaty as a measure to help to ensure the stability of the strategic balance between East and West. We look forward to its coming into force at an early date. In our view, the Treaty will help to minimize the risk of nuclear war, to lay the basis for greater confidence between the major nuclear Powers and to encourage further arms control agreements between them. We have noted in particular the fact that the Treaty places restraints on the modernization of strategic offensive systems. We have long believed that such restraints are important if a credible balance of strategic deterrence is to be maintained. The inclusion of an agreed data base and counting rules is also a step forward in arms control.

That is why we think a comprehensive test ban is also important, and why we have advocated the opening at an appropriate stage of negotiations on a cessation and prohibition of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes. These kinds of agreements would help to slow the momentum of weapons development in nuclear weapon States. They would also make a contribution to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Both objectives are vital to the maintenance of global stability in the years ahead.

We regret that the Committee on Disarmament has not yet been given the opportunity to begin work on a comprehensive test ban. While we do not think that calls by this Assembly for a negotiating timetable are always helpful, we do believe that concrete action towards a complete ban is necessary soon, especially in view of the convening of the second Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty in August 1980. According to authoritative public sources, there were more tests of nuclear weapons in 1978 than in any year since 1970. At the least, the numbers of tests must be reduced if confidence in the objectives agreed as long ago as 1963 is to be maintained.

A further step along the road to nuclear disarmament would be a cessation and ban on the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and other nuclear explosive devices. Partial measures of nuclear

(Mr. Pearson, Canada)

arms control, including a so-called "cut-off", are to be preferred to comprehensive negotiations which have little prospect of success. We acknowledge that the verification of an agreement not to produce such material for weapons purposes would pose difficult technical and political questions. These questions need examination, even if negotiations are deemed inappropriate for the time being, and we may wish to consider how to bring this examination about.

We are pleased that the Committee on Disarmament has looked into the question of security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States, and has made some modest progress. We think the Committee should return to this subject early in 1980. It is entirely understandable that non-nuclear-weapon States not part of a system of nuclear deterrence should be interested in assurances against nuclear attack. These weapons, as I have said, are not soon going to disappear. That being the case, pledges of non-use by those States that possess nuclear weapons are of considerable significance, even in the carefully defined circumstances which each nuclear-weapon State has put on the record. It may now be feasible to work out international arrangements which would strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States. It is important to increase confidence amongst all States that they will not be the object of surprise attack or the victims of miscalculation. A condition of such confidence is information. Reliable information about these matters and some structure of agreed and specific restrictions on use will help to increase confidence that nuclear war can be avoided.

Canada's views about other items on our agenda will be stated at the appropriate time. Our general approach to arms control and disarmament negotiations will, however, be influenced by the following general objectives. First, we shall give preference to initiatives which involve real measures of restraint, reduction or elimination of weapons and armed forces and which, therefore, qualify the actual capabilities of States to wage war.

(Mr. Pearson, Canada)

Secondly, we believe the Committee on Disarmament should be more involved in dealing with the main issues. Negotiations on some types of weapon systems are appropriately conducted outside the Committee at least in the initial stages, but as others have pointed out here, it is also the case that weapons of mass destruction threaten the lives of people everywhere, whether they are citizens of large or small States in any part of the globe. We believe, therefore, that the Committee on Disarmament should establish soon a working group on a chemical-weapon treaty, as already proposed by many members of the Committee. It is important that all members of the Committee should know what are the main questions in dispute concerning the scope of a treaty and its verification, if they are to have a hand in resolving these issues and especially if they are to accept fully the obligations which a treaty will impose on the signatories.

Thirdly, we shall continue to attach importance to methods of verification which give confidence that agreements are being observed. They are more likely to do so if impartial and competent international agencies are also involved. The administration of safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities by the International Atomic Energy Agency is a good example. We therefore accept the principle of an international satellite monitoring agency under the authority of the United Nations, even though there are formidable financial and political obstacles to the establishment of such an agency, and we shall support the recommendation of the Group of Experts studying this subject that a comprehensive report be completed by 1981.

Fourthly, we are disposed, in principle, to support other initiatives which help to strengthen the role of this Organization as an important source of information and expertise on arrangements for the control of arms. It is unsatisfactory, in our view, that so much of the information in the public domain on military forces and arms should be published by semi-private institutions and not by the United Nations, despite the high calibre of many of these institutions.

(Mr. Pearson, Canada)

We are glad, therefore, that consideration is now being given to proposals that the United Nations gather more information on conventional weapons, including information on the transfer of such weapons. Some of that information would be derived from the completion by States of the reporting instrument on military expenditures which has been prepared by the ad hoc panel of experts and distributed by the Secretary-General. We hope it will receive attention from States in all regions.

Other current United Nations studies will also help to achieve this purpose. We have in mind especially the studies on disarmament and development, on nuclear weapons, and on regional disarmament. We also support the proposal that experts follow up the work already done on confidence-building measures. It has been said that the study of a subject is a poor substitute for disarmament. But without impartial elucidation of the facts, wider understanding of the issues and mutual confidence, we may not have any substantial progress on disarmament. We accordingly favour in principle the undertaking of expert studies by the Secretary-General which could contribute to progress in any area of arms control and disarmament. We recognize that these studies place a heavy burden on the Centre for Disarmament, and that thought must be given to the future resources and role of the Centre. A separate research programme on disarmament within the framework of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) might help to relieve the strain, and could be financed by voluntary means.

I should like to say a word in conclusion about the efforts my Government is making to facilitate the dissemination of information on disarmament. We are financing two research projects on aspects of Canada's economy for the study on disarmament and development. The Canadians serving on the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies and on the nuclear weapons study both teach at Canadian universities; their experience will be of benefit to students. We have formed a consultative group of representatives of prominent non-governmental organizations to give advice on matters of education and research, as well as to exchange

(Mr. Pearson, Canada)

views on policy questions. There have been a number of meetings and symposia to which the Government has given support. We also intend to promote research into public opinion. It is often assumed that disarmament goals are popular. That may not always be the case. But in any event, our activities here will not be understood unless Governments can convert goals into realistic agreements which actually do lessen the dangers of war.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): In this first statement of the Netherlands delegation in the general debate in this Committee, I intend to limit myself to some comments on the performance, and the non-performance, of the Geneva Committee on Disarmament during the first year of its new existence, and in that context I shall also have some remarks to make about chemical weapons. I shall therefore not tax the endurance of this Committee of the General Assembly by going through a catalogue of all the disarmament objectives that the Netherlands feels should be dealt with, sooner or later. We have stated our views on all those issues quite recently and they are all to be found in the Final Document of the special session of the General Assembly on disarmament to which we too subscribed. Later on in this general debate, on some other occasion, I intend to address myself to another area of particular concern to my Government: that of nuclear arms control. I shall therefore not say much about that area in this statement today, although the Geneva Committee did of course also discuss nuclear disarmament and related matters to a certain extent.

Ambassador Garcia Robles of Mexico, who has been called the godfather of disarmament and who is certainly the dean of the Geneva Committee has, with his usual eloquence, reported in detail on the performance of the Committee on Disarmament over the last year. He pointed out that at its spring session the Committee did at last succeed in agreeing on rules of procedure and even on a detailed and phased agenda. We are equally proud of that achievement but I must confess that, with the benefit of hindsight, there is a gnawing suspicion that there may have been a reason why the predecessors of the Committee on Disarmament did not bother to have rules of procedure, or an agenda. Were we forgetting that the Committee on Disarmament was a

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

negotiating body, not a deliberative body, and therefore basically and essentially different from deliberative United Nations bodies that are, of course, properly equipped with rules of procedure, agendas and work programmes? Do parties that meet in a diplomatic conference to negotiate treaties also really require rules of procedure? Was not the fundamental difference between a deliberative body and a negotiating conference being blurred?

I leave that question with you, Mr. Chairman, but in parentheses, I should like to remark that to the best of my knowledge none of the bilateral and trilateral talks going on or recently concluded were governed by rules of procedure. The most recent multilateral diplomatic negotiating conference, the one in Geneva on inhumane weapons, which adjourned a few weeks ago without too many results, also attempted to devise rules of procedure of its own and, indeed, almost succeeded in doing so except that it failed in the most essential rule, that of the decision-taking procedure.

Now the reason I have dwelt at some length on this seemingly unimportant issue is that it leads me to another phenomenon which we have witnessed in the Committee on Disarmament, which seems related and could be a bit more worrying.

The Committee on Disarmament, in its previous incarnations, was not always composed as it is today, either in the absolute or in the relative strength of the political components. In the original Geneva disarmament negotiating conference the two main military alliances were equally represented, but the rest of the world, comprising the non-aligned, was hardly there. Although unsatisfactory, that situation was understandable because in those days the arms race was going on in those two military alliances and not so much in the developing world.

In the course of various metamorphoses that situation changed and the composition of the Geneva negotiating body was adjusted: countries not belonging to either of the two blocks were brought in, partly because they rightfully belonged there but also with the purpose of serving as a bridge, or as mediators, between the two heavily armed camps.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

But the Committee on Disarmament in its latest incarnation, after again a number of new members have been added, seems to have a tendency to develop into quite a different animal. The members who do not belong to one of the two military alliances tend to manifest themselves as a more or less cohesive group that pursues goals of its own that are sometimes quite unrelated to the positions taken by the two military alliances. Now this is, of course, quite legitimate and understandable, especially in view of the arms race that is now, unfortunately, also taking place in their part of the world, the developing world. This tendency could also be explained by an understandable impatience, which we all share, at the embargo placed by the two super-Powers on substantive negotiations on chemical weapons.

Nevertheless, this phenomenon of a three-way polarization, if I may use such an unscientific expression, is also reminiscent of the situation we find in many United Nations deliberative bodies, and the question seems justified whether such a situation - I refer to the three-way polarization as well as to the imposed embargo on negotiations on chemical weapons -- is beneficial to a negotiating body that carries such a heavy burden of responsibility.

We leave also this question with the Committee, but here again I should like to make a foot-note. It is not surprising that a body that grows to number almost 40 members finds it necessary to organize itself in a somewhat more orderly manner, establishing rules of procedure, an agenda and like-minded groups. But in doing so, one must recognize the danger of rigidity and of polarization, possibly leading to paralysis. We strongly hope that all individual members will be prepared to continue to work with each other in search of areas of agreement leading to a breakthrough and that membership of any particular group will not prevent this.

In other words, we must not allow the Committee on Disarmament to weaken its main distinguishing feature, that of a negotiating body, and to evolve into something more like a deliberative body, such as this First Committee of the General Assembly or the United Nations Disarmament Commission.

I now come to the second part of my statement concerning the performance of the Committee on Disarmament in the summer session and, particularly, the strong efforts made by many to achieve some progress on chemical weapons. Here, indeed,

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

the Committee on Disarmament witnessed a remarkable phenomenon. In all three groups there was an evident desire to make some progress. It was therefore most unfortunate, as I have already indicated earlier in my statement, that the two main Powers that are engaged in bilateral negotiations on chemical weapons still did not see their way clear to turning over to the Committee on Disarmament the results they had obtained so far.

While it is quite understandable that they are reluctant to jeopardize the partial results they have achieved so painstakingly until now by opening them up to public scrutiny and debate, nevertheless it is also unacceptable that the Committee on Disarmament should be denied the opportunity of starting work on this issue, particularly since chemical weapons represent an area where the interests of all more or less industrialized nations are directly concerned and whose co-operation will be indispensable for the implementation of an eventual agreement.

The Netherlands delegation made a major effort to get things going. We introduced, either on our own or with others, no less than four papers in a logical sequence of progress - first, some suggestions on how to proceed in our task; secondly, a series of pertinent questions; thirdly, answers to those questions; and, finally, more or less in desperation at the lack of progress, our own interpretation of the areas of agreement and disagreement.

We were dismayed at the inability of the various members of the groups to find common ground at least on the manner in which to approach the problem. Although the Netherlands, too, favoured the setting up of a working group to which our Canadian colleague referred just now, it was in our view a waste of time to insist against all odds on such a step, because, although desirable, it was certainly not indispensable.

And even if the establishment of a working group had been accepted in principle, there was the evident risk that the Committee on Disarmament would have become entangled in an endless discussion of the terms of reference of such an ad hoc working group, while the available time could have been used more usefully by discussing substantive issues, for instance in informal meetings of the Committee itself, thus breaking the embargo.

While it is not up to this First Committee of the General Assembly to tell the Geneva Committee on Disarmament how to conduct its business, the

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

General Assembly is, of course, entirely justified in requesting the Committee on Disarmament to observe certain priorities.

We believe the General Assembly should request the Committee on Disarmament to deal immediately, as a matter of overriding priority, with a trilateral comprehensive test ban draft treaty whenever it is presented to the Committee on Disarmament, which we hope and expect to be the case in the course of the coming year, if at all possible, before the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. Secondly, the Committee on Disarmament should take up substantive negotiations on chemical weapons as a matter of high priority and continue to do so throughout the year. Thirdly, the question of negative security guarantees should be dealt with as expeditiously as possible, also in view of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. Fourthly, the Committee on Disarmament should deal with the text on radiological weapons submitted by the United States and the Soviet Union to the Committee on Disarmament. Lastly, the Committee on Disarmament should have some preliminary exploratory exchanges of view on other matters such as, for instance, the prohibition of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes.

In conclusion, we do not believe that the Committee on Disarmament should indulge too much in discussing long-term proposals that do not realistically promise any results and that by their nature are part and parcel of general and complete disarmament. The Committee on Disarmament should concentrate on questions that are more or less ripe for negotiations of concrete treaty texts and leave the longer term affairs to the deliberative bodies.

Mr. BENITES (Ecuador) (interpretation from Spanish): Sir, 26 years ago - in 1953, in fact - I came for the first time to this Committee to deal with the problems of disarmament. Since then, representing Ecuador, I have been present at 18 sessions and I have seen the chairmanship go to wise and eminent diplomats and jurists. I know from personal experience how difficult it is to conduct the business of this Committee, and I believe it my duty to state that the way in which you are doing so is most skilful. Since I am not allowed to congratulate you, I do believe that I can take the liberty of congratulating the Committee on its wisdom in electing you.

(Mr. Benites, Ecuador)

I am speaking, of course, on behalf of my delegation, but I also feel that to a certain extent I am speaking as an eyewitness to a tragedy. In 1953, the year in which I first came to this Committee, the Soviet Union exploded its first thermonuclear or light-atom fusion device. The previous year, the United States had exploded history's first thermonuclear device in the Nevada desert during the course of Operations Tumbler and Snapper. Two years later, the United Kingdom joined the thermonuclear club by exploding two bombs in the Christmas Islands in May and June 1957. From these beginnings up to the present time, the use of nuclear power for death and destruction has grown to astronomical proportions. According to one of the most important world weapons research centres, it is believed that the United States possesses 9,000 nuclear warheads with an explosive power equivalent to 3.5 billion tons of TNT. It is further believed that the Soviet Union probably possesses some 5,000 nuclear warheads with an approximate power of 6 billion tons of TNT. And it is estimated that the explosive power of so-called tactical weapons may be as much as 3 billion tons of TNT - in other words, a total of 12 billion tons, which averages out to 3 tons of TNT for every man, woman and child on earth.

This increase in nuclear power, plus the expenditures on other types of weapons, explains the enormous world expenditures that - as Mr. George M. Seignious, Director of the United States Weapons Control and Disarmament Agency, informed us at the eighth meeting on 18 October - has risen to over \$450 billion per year. If we recall that in 1970 the Secretary-General, U Thant, informed us that world expenditure on armaments in 1969 amounted to some \$200 billion, we are faced with the awesome conclusion that in the decade from 1969 to 1979, military expenditures have more than doubled.

Obviously, since this Organization first began to take steps in this direction, it has had the dual goal of slowing the nuclear arms race (resolution 1 (I)) and the conventional arms race (resolution 41 (I)). It was not until 1959, however,

(Mr. Benites, Ecuador)

that a single goal of general and complete disarmament was set (resolution 1378 (XIV)). Many lengthy negotiations, proposals and counter-proposals led to the need to create a negotiating body, and this was established by creating the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in General Assembly resolution 1722 (XVI), under the co-chairmanship of the two super-Powers.

I do not believe we need recount the not always happy history of that negotiating body, which was replaced - by a praiseworthy decision - at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament. Suffice it to note that the problem was shifted from general and complete disarmament to collateral measures designed to leave a door open for the super-Powers to pursue their race to produce weapons of mass destruction. My delegation considers that the decision taken at the tenth special session to return to the problem of general and complete disarmament was highly appropriate.

My delegation also considers that the most pressing problem is the cessation of nuclear testing. The Moscow Treaty of 5 August 1963 left the way open to the underground testing of nuclear weapons, and because of this the most sophisticated weapons have been tested, including multiple-target nuclear warheads. We took heart at the statement by the Soviet representative, Mr. Troyanovsky, on 18 October that prospects in this area were most encouraging.

My delegation is keenly interested in the conclusion of a treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons. At the meeting on 18 October the United States representative reminded us of the men who returned from the front lines in the First World War with shattered lungs. From that first day when the yellowish clouds of mustard gas rose over the trenches at Ypres to the defoliant chemicals, napalm bombs and white phosphorus explosives dropped over Viet Nam, a long chapter has been written in the tale of science placed at the service of cruelty and death, a chapter that must be closed. This is all the more urgent in that the production and use of chemical weapons is technically and economically cheaper and more feasible, and therefore within the reach of medium-sized Powers. Where chemical weapons are concerned, we endorse the statements made a short while ago by the representatives of Canada and of the Netherlands.

(Mr. Benites, Ecuador)

The prohibition of the manufacture and use of radiological weapons is another matter that is of serious concern to my delegation. So far as we laymen can tell, radiological weapons are attractive because they can be used for tactical purposes. Nuclear bombs, whether of the fission or fusion type, have three effects: a shock wave capable of demolishing the most solid structures, a heat wave measured at approximately 1million degrees centigrade that can melt any metal structure, and a fall-out of radioactive isotopes with a long half-life, such as strontium 90, carbon 14, radioactive iodine and caesium, that remain in the environment and produce lethal effects that render the territory uninhabitable.

(Mr. Benites, Ecuador)

In the case of radiological weapons the first two effects of heat and compression are missing, but the use of lethal isotopes with a short half-life generates deadly waves of radiation. That is their enormous danger, and any effort to prevent their manufacture and use must be urgently considered for the benefit of mankind.

In conclusion, I should like to refer to one last point: the link between the arms race and economic development. Mr. Robert McNamara in his annual report to the Board of Governors of the World Bank in 1975 declared that 900 million persons were living in conditions of abject poverty, that is, disease, illiteracy and malnutrition. At this time the figure must be nearing 1 billion human beings. In The New York Times of 18 October, it was stated that there were 25 million needy inhabitants in the United States. Meanwhile, each minute \$1 million is being spent on weapons.

This insane expenditure on armaments is not the sole monopoly of the developed countries; there is also a considerable increase in the military expenditures of the third world. According to reliable information, 27 per cent of national income is being spent on armaments in Asia, whereas in Africa and Latin America the figure is 14 per cent. It is a fact that the majority of the most recent wars have taken place in the so-called third world, and this might explain why the total of more than \$20 billion has been spent on armaments which, for the greater part, the major producers of conventional weapons consider obsolete.

My delegation is awaiting with great interest the study on the relationship between disarmament and development, and we are gratified at the decision embodied in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament, with respect to the control of the sale or transfer of armaments.

I trust, Mr. Chairman, that you will be kind enough to allow me to speak again, should I deem it necessary, on other items with which I should like to deal separately, particularly the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

Mr. YANKOV (Bulgaria): I should like at the outset of my statement to emphasize the ever-growing importance which matters relating to disarmament are assuming in the discussions during sessions of the General Assembly. This development mirrors the increased awareness of nations to come to grips with the imperative need to halt the arms race and remove the danger of a thermo-nuclear world conflict.

Because of this legitimate concern for the future, my country notes with satisfaction the definite surge in activity in the past years with respect to negotiations and talks on disarmament. There can be no doubt that this has been made possible by, on the one hand, the expanding positive processes in political relations among States and the reaffirmation of the process of détente as a leading trend in international relations, and, on the other hand, the heightened concern for the evolving danger caused by the arms race. In assessing the merits of détente, it should be pointed out that, though by itself it was not enough to stop the arms race, it has been highly beneficial in promoting extensive and fruitful discussions on topical world issues, including disarmament problems. The influence of world public opinion which emerged from numerous important international conferences, within the framework of the United Nations and outside it, also has proved highly beneficial for that same purpose.

The tenth special session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament, has played a very positive role in this entire process. It focused the attention of States on the threat arising out of the continuous stockpiling of means of mass destruction and strengthened the conviction of the urgent need to undertake practical actions to curb the arms race and bring about disarmament. The tenth special session provided a strong impetus to the efforts of the United Nations to identify and implement efficient measures for the attainment of these objectives. With the adoption of its Final Document, the session succeeded not only in systematizing a large number of constructive proposals made by States in this respect but also in providing a vigorous impetus to the taking of new and more comprehensive and effective initiatives. As we know, the Final Document defined the basic principles, the immediate tasks and the long-term goals, and at the same time it established the priorities for joint actions by States in the field of disarmament.

(Mr. Yankov, Bulgaria)

In addition, it contains a number of practical recommendations and decisions concerning the international machinery for the conduct of disarmament negotiations. To sum up, the conclusions we arrived at support the overwhelming view that the special session has created good prerequisites for carrying the process of disarmament on to a more advanced stage.

The topical and immediate task that comes to the fore is formulated in the Final Document itself, which states:

"The pressing need now is to translate into practical terms the provisions of this Final Document and to proceed along the road of binding and effective international agreements in the field of disarmament." (resolution S-10/2, para. 17)

The latest developments in international relations and in the disarmament negotiations that have accompanied them have clearly demonstrated the existence of favourable opportunities for the fulfilment of this task.

To take but one convincing example in this respect, a case in point is the USSR-United States second strategic arms limitation treaty. SALT II is an act of major political importance opening up new avenues for the further qualitative and quantitative limitation of such weapons. My Government considers it to be the most significant and prospective of all measures thus far adopted to restrain the armaments drive, as well as an important connecting link in the process of détente corresponding to the interests not only of the signatory States but also of all nations of the world.

In our view, a timely ratification and entry into force of SALT II will encourage further action directed towards achieving more telling successes in the limitation of strategic weapons, as well as stimulating the negotiations on other major problems of disarmament.

(Mr. Yankov, Bulgaria)

The trend to accelerate the work on disarmament issues has reflected on the work of nearly all bilateral and multilateral bodies and forums concerned with various aspects of these problems. The main task at this juncture, as has just been mentioned, is to make the best use of the impetus thus achieved with a view to channeling the efforts of all States concerned towards the practical solution of these problems, that is, to walking the distance from general statements and declarations to concrete deeds.

It is precisely this turning-point in disarmament negotiations that the socialist countries, Bulgaria included, have striven to attain. Their numerous and realistic proposals, containing partial as well as far-reaching measures for military détente and disarmament, are widely known. Many of those proposals, including the Soviet proposal concerning the practical ways to halt the armaments race, have found their place in the Final Document of the special session. A broad set of proposals has been submitted in the Declaration adopted by the Political Consultative Committee of the Member States of the Warsaw Treaty at its meeting held in Moscow on 23 November 1978. These proposals have been reaffirmed and further elaborated in the Communiqué adopted at the meeting of the Committee of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Warsaw Treaty Member States held at Budapest on 14 and 15 May 1979. New initiatives have also been taken at the current General Assembly session.

In the efforts aimed at fostering a propitious climate for carrying out effective disarmament measures, we all recognize the important role of certain initiatives of a general political significance. That is why my delegation whole-heartedly supports the Czechoslovak initiative of proposing the adoption of a declaration on international co-operation for disarmament, being convinced that such a declaration will assist the development of international co-operation aimed at mobilizing the efforts of the international community at large for the achievement of genuine disarmament.

(Mr. Yankov, Bulgaria)

The emphasis we place on the positive impact of a number of factors upon the process of détente and disarmament should not, however, induce us to lose sight of the phenomena and tendencies whose effect is in the opposite direction. I shall refrain from dwelling in detail on well-known facts, namely, that while disarmament negotiations are being conducted certain milieux persist in their demands for further increases in military budgets and for the manufacture and deployment of new weapons, including weapons of mass destruction, using as a pretext the so-called military threat from the East. Nor can we obviate the fact that the ambitions of those same circles to add fuel to the armaments race are being increasingly felt at the disarmament negotiations themselves. Policies whose real target is the intensification of qualitative and quantitative rearmament are now frequently concealed by negative criticism or total negation of the partial and collateral measures for disarmament, measures which - partial as they may be - are none the less important steps towards arms limitation and disarmament.

It is obvious that such policies and actions run counter to the spirit of the special session's Final Document, which urges all States to keep in mind that

'In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, all States should strictly abide by the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, [and] refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament...' (A/S-10/4, para. 41)

In our submission, this statement of the special session of what is required of States concerns precisely the policies of obstructions and the search for ostensible grounds for refusing to join the disarmament negotiations and for opposing certain parallel and partial measures under the pretext of their insufficiency. The doctrine of "all or nothing" in this case is a poor smoke-screen for the unwillingness to go ahead with real measures for disarmament.

(Mr. Yankov, Bulgaria)

We strongly believe that the possibilities for halting the armaments race and for stimulating the process of disarmament leading to the final goal - general and complete disarmament - do exist today.

To achieve this it is necessary, taking into account the objective realities, to elaborate and carry out much-needed disarmament measures.

As to the priority goals of the disarmament negotiations, the Final Document provides a lucid and categorical answer; and we find this in the Final Document itself, which states:

"Removing the threat of a world war - a nuclear war - is the most acute and urgent task of the present day." (ibid., para. 18)

The Government of the People's Republic of Bulgaria attaches exclusive importance to the solution of the whole complex of issues of nuclear disarmament. We have welcomed, as very timely and in complete harmony with the decisions of the special session, the proposal put forth by the Soviet Union on the initiation of urgent talks on the termination of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of stockpiles thereof until they are completely liquidated. Bulgaria co-sponsored the relevant document submitted by the countries of the socialist community at this year's session of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. The active and useful discussion which ensued in this respect has revealed the advantages of the constructive and realistic approach of that proposal towards the nuclear disarmament issues. This prompts us, as co-sponsors, to express our regret that the Committee has not yet embarked on a substantive consideration of the proposal. My delegation is nevertheless convinced that the broad support which it has received in the Committee, particularly from the non-aligned States, reflects the viewpoint of the international community

(Mr. Yankov, Bulgaria)

as a whole. We consider that pessimism and arguments against the initiation of the proposed talks should yield to realism and political will when what is at stake is the solution of an issue of vital importance to mankind. Therefore, we should not hesitate to start without delay purposeful and consistent efforts, beginning with concrete negotiations during which many of the questions which raise doubts at present will surely be elucidated.

My delegation is hopeful that the coming year will witness the beginning of the process of negotiations which will gradually but steadily move forward the efforts to achieve the complete liquidation of all nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Yankov, Bulgaria)

Taking due account of the complicated nature of the nuclear weapons problem, my delegation is of the view that the pertinent negotiations would be considerably alleviated if, along with them, adequate attempts were made to strengthen the political and international-legal guarantees of States. This should explain why we attach such importance to the conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations.

In the present-day international situation, the problem of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons assumes increasing urgency. In this connexion I wish to express the readiness of my delegation to contribute to the success of the forthcoming non-proliferation treaty review conference so that that conference may be of maximum assistance in the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime and the enhancement of its universality.

The universalization of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the enhancement of the effectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency's system of guarantees will provide us with the most dependable means of reducing the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons and of fostering broadly-based international co-operation for the peaceful uses of atomic energy.

In our view, the general problem of rendering universal all international treaties and agreements that are enacted acquires an increasing importance and urgency. We maintain our standpoint, expressed on numerous occasions, that the United Nations should pay greater attention to this problem and give a strong impulse to its solution.

To strengthen the guarantees of non-nuclear States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is a matter which demands a comprehensive approach of a nature conducive to the reduction of the threat of nuclear war and the consolidation of world peace and security. This approach should meet such important requirements as genuine enhancement of the security of States in line with the principle of equal security of all States; considerable raising of the threshold of nuclear weapon proliferation; and stimulation of the process of reducing the presence of nuclear weapons on foreign territories.

(Mr. Yankov, Bulgaria)

In our submission, a genuine strengthening of the security of non-nuclear States is indeed feasible through effective guarantees, generally agreed upon by the nuclear States and embodied in a binding international instrument of a universal nature. This instrument has to determine clearly and precisely the rights and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear States.

It should be open to all non-nuclear States which stand ready to abide by its provisions. We consider that the initiative of the Soviet Union made at the thirty-third session corresponds most to the requirements I have indicated and can serve as a basis for the solution of that issue.

My Government has acknowledged with considerable interest and has lent its full support to the proposal of the Soviet Union on the non-deployment of nuclear weapons on territories where there are no such weapons. The task that lies ahead now is to bring this initiative to fruition in a concrete and efficient way.

The desire to discover and deploy so-called "super weapons", or weapons aiming at achieving "military supremacy", conceals grave dangers for the fate of nations not only because it leads to a devastating war, but because it is accompanied by the channeling of enormous resources away from the aims of social and economic development. On the other hand, this desire can truly bring us to a point where the armaments race will outgrow any form of control whatsoever and will become completely unmanageable by political means. It is this awareness that underlies our firm position on the pressing necessity to achieve a preventive, general and stable prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

We voice our concern at the fact that these problems are still not being paid the attention they deserve in their political, scientific and technical aspects. There is an obvious need, therefore, to set up in conjunction with the Committee on Disarmament a group of highly qualified governmental experts with the task of studying in detail the question of possible trends in the creation of new types and systems of weapons for mass destruction. Such a move will help to enhance the awareness of the international community on this problem and will contribute to meaningful disarmament negotiations.

(Mr. Yankov, Bulgaria)

The possibility of elaborating and concluding a comprehensive agreement on the problem of new types of weapons is evidenced by the joint Soviet-United States proposal presented in the Committee on Disarmament concerning the basic elements of a treaty banning radiological weapons. We value the joint draft of the two countries, which itself is the result of long negotiations, as a good basis for a treaty imposing a total ban on yet another type of mass destruction weapon before it has entered the military arsenals.

The encouraging progress of the preliminary negotiations gives us grounds for believing in the effect of the efforts to prohibit the manufacture, stockpiling, deployment and use of another weapon of mass destruction, notorious for its exceptional anti-humane character - the neutron weapon. We should strongly welcome a display of willingness for an unconditional renunciation of the production of such a type of nuclear weapon as a first step towards its full prohibition.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria has always supported the view that the problem of the complete and universal prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests is of prime importance and requires a speedy solution. The conclusion of a relevant treaty with the participation of all nuclear States will represent a major step forward along the road to terminating the arms race, especially in its qualitative aspects. The immediate result of such an act will be to strengthen the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Bearing in mind the specific features of that problem, we share the view that the achievement of agreement by the three negotiating parties will be of substantial importance. Evidently, most of the distance leading towards such an agreement has already been negotiated. In order to overcome the remaining obstacles, it is necessary to manifest readiness and political will to come finally to an agreement.

The extremely complex but equally important problem of chemical weapons awaits its solution as well. In our opinion, a great deal has been accomplished at the talks between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the co-ordination of a large number of elements of a future joint initiative. The communication submitted by the two countries in the

(Mr. Yankov, Bulgaria)

Committee on Disarmament on the pace of negotiations has confirmed the complex nature of the problems. But it has also demonstrated that at the current stage the Committee can make a substantial contribution in the preparation of a future international convention if it takes up the elaboration of its basic elements.

(Mr. Yankov, Bulgaria)

As Members know, the first Review Conference of the Convention Banning the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (biological) Weapons and on their Destruction will take place in 1980. We are confident that the Conference will again confirm the effectiveness of the Convention and the absence of any violations of its prohibitory provisions on the part of the States participants. This will provide another convincing proof that verification methods based on national means and complemented by generally acceptable international procedures corresponding to the pertinent agreement on disarmament are quite sufficient.

One of the basic tasks of the Conference is, in our view, to assist to the highest degree in the strengthening of the legal régime established with the 1925 Geneva Protocol and the Convention, as well as to provide a vigorous impetus for the adherence of more States to these two important international instruments that ought to become universal in their scope.

There are a number of other disarmament problems on the agenda, such as the creation of non-nuclear zones and zones of peace, the reduction of military budgets, problems relating to conventional weapons and so forth, and the search for a solution to these is also topical and pressing. Without dwelling on them in detail, I should like to point out the great importance which my delegation attaches to the problem of genuinely reducing military budgets. This measure would have as an immediate effect the restriction of the arms race and would accelerate the socio-economic development of States.

My country has repeatedly voiced its opinion that the creation of non-nuclear-weapon zones as well as zones of peace represents an effective means for reducing the threat of a nuclear war and for preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As to the idea of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, its implementation is subject first of all to the elimination of the military bases existing there, and secondly to the renunciation of the intention to build new ones.

(Mr. Yankov, Bulgaria)

I should like briefly to touch upon some questions related to the functioning of the machinery for the conduct of negotiations on disarmament, now that the respective recommendations and decisions of the special session are practically implemented.

The principal body for conducting negotiations on disarmament, that is, the Committee on Disarmament, has already completed its annual session. This has shown that with its enlarged and more representative membership the Committee possesses considerable leverage for the conduct of active negotiations aimed at drafting relevant international agreements on the most complicated problems of disarmament. Of particular importance to us is the fact that the Committee has been recognized as the most adequate body for conducting negotiations on nuclear disarmament issues. Its agenda includes a number of other important questions of global significance which need to be resolved. Looking at things in their proper perspective, we expected that annual session to be marked with greater and predominantly practical results. Despite this, it is of great importance that the Committee successfully solved all questions connected with the organization of its work, which will enable it to concentrate its attention on the substance of the disarmament issues.

In our view, the annual session has set a good beginning for the activities of the Disarmament Commission as well, in conformity with the terms of the mandate given to it. The work that has been carried out by the Disarmament Commission on the elaboration of various elements of the Comprehensive Programme on Disarmament has shown that this programme can play a useful role and can contribute to the practical solution of the problems of disarmament.

By examining the functioning of the machinery for the conduct of negotiations on disarmament, we have become convinced once again that the achievement of serious positive changes in the development of the disarmament process requires us to hold also a world disarmament conference.

On the basis of this understanding my delegation is of the view that, following the second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, and after adequate preparations, the United Nations should render its assistance for the convening of a world disarmament conference.

(Mr. Yankov, Bulgaria)

To conclude my statement, I should like to emphasize the exceptional importance which the People's Republic of Bulgaria attaches to the questions related to disarmament and military détente in Europe. In our submission, primary attention should be given at this stage to the need successfully to conclude the Vienna talks for the mutual reduction of armaments and armed forces in Central Europe. Having in mind the initiatives and proposals made by the socialist countries, I consider that they have covered their part of the road to the meeting point for the achievement of an agreement and that it is now up to their North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners to cover theirs.

My country supports resolutely the joint proposals of the Warsaw Treaty Member States calling for the conclusion between the signatory States of the All-European Conference a Treaty on the non-first-use against each other of both nuclear and conventional weapons, as well as for the holding of a Conference at a political level with the participation of all European countries, the United States and Canada in order to consider and adopt measures for strengthening mutual confidence, lessening military confrontation in Europe and subsequently diminishing the concentration of and reducing the armaments and armed forces on the continent.

The consistent and sincere endeavour of the socialist countries to reduce armaments and to deepen military détente in Europe found new reaffirmation in the speech delivered by Leonid Brezhnev in Berlin on 6 October this year. My country has given full and unqualified support to the constructive proposals made in that speech. The decision of the Soviet Union to curtail unilaterally its armaments and armed forces in Central Europe - and to go even further and reduce those armaments and armed forces - is an example that nothing can refute of what it means to move on to practical deeds.

In all honesty, this new expression of goodwill on the part of the socialist countries should not be ignored or belittled. For this is also a call to the Western States to manifest their willingness to undertake in common practical actions in order to strengthen confidence, security and peace in Europe and the whole world.

The CHAIRMAN: We have heard the last speaker for this morning, and I think it appropriate at this juncture, before adjourning the meeting, to make a very brief statement concerning the progress of our work.

(The Chairman)

As representatives will remember, at the outset of our meetings I mentioned the importance of beginning on time and ending on time. I must say that in the first respect members have been extremely co-operative, and for this I am very grateful and very thankful. However, we are faced with a problem, if I can call it that that we are ending our meetings very early. This is due in some part to the fact that many representatives who have inscribed their names at the very last minute then make cancellations, and this poses a problem for the Committee, in the sense that, towards the end of our debate, we shall have a large number of speakers, as is customary, and it may be very difficult for representatives to make a change towards the end of the debate, because there will be no space available in order to accommodate them. In this way, representatives will not have the opportunity of expressing their Government's views on disarmament questions.

So I should like to urge representatives that, once they have inscribed their names, they will not make any change, especially at the very last minute, because this will upset the pattern that the General Committee has presented to us and which this Committee is planning to follow. We have been doing this to a great extent, and it has been working very well. I should like to see this continue.

Similarly, I should like to remind representatives that 16 November is the deadline for the presentation of draft resolutions. I sincerely hope that in the spare time available today and on other days, representatives will be involved in consultations and negotiations, in order for the draft resolutions to be submitted on time. If that is the case, then the Chair is willing to overlook the so-called problem of having our meetings end earlier than one o'clock or six o'clock.

I should like to thank the Committee very much for its past, present and future co-operation in this regard, and I am sure that all representatives will continue to lend their co-operation as they have so generously done in the past.

The meeting rose at 12 noon.