United Nations GENERAL ASSEMBLY

THIRTY-THIRD SESSION
Official Records*



FIRST COMMITTEE
6th meeting
held on
Wednesday, 18 October 1978
at 10.30 a.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 6TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. PASTINEN (Finland)

later: Mr. CHERKAOUI (Morocco)

(Vice-Chairman)

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Distr. GENERAL

A/C.1/33/PV.6

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The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m.

AGENDA ITEM 125 (continued)

REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (A/33/279, A/33/305, A/33/312)

Mr. ROMULO (Philippines): May I congratulate you, Sir, and may you be an example to all the other Chairmen in that you begin the meetings of this Committee punctually. I believe the work of the United Nations would be carried out more expeditiously if all Chairmen made it clear to members that they would begin meetings as punctually as you have done today.

May I also tell you how highly we in the Philippines admire your country. Your country is highly admired and respected there because of its punctuality in meeting its financial obligations, a fact which we believe should serve as a good example to all countries which are Members of the United Nations.

We are meeting in the aftermath of the historic tenth special session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament. It was not only the greatest gathering ever to be seized with the question, but also one of the most important and hopeful. Whatever its short-comings - and they were substantial - there is no doubt that the causes of disarmament and world peace were considerably advanced by the special session. For the first time in the history of the United Nations, adequate machinery for deliberations, for negotiations and for the taking of decisions has been established. In the balance of functions between the Disarmament Commission, the new Committee on Disarmament and the changed mandate of this First Committee, all the needs for appropriate forums have been met.

To deal first with the last body, we have long believed that the agenda of the First Committee should be restricted to two major aims of the Charter of the United Nations - disarmament and the maintenance of international peace and security - in order to assure truly adequate time and attention for these life and death issues.

The Committee on Disarmament is a marked improvement on the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), in terms of its membership and chairmanship and its relationship to the United Nations. All militarily significant States are enabled to take part in negotiations, and in particular all the nuclear Powers. We do not hesitate to express the hope, which is generally shared, that all nuclear Powers will soon become active members of the Committee on Disarmament for the benefit of world peace. The complete membership of the Committee has already been determined - an essential first step prior to the organization of work.

The Disarmament Commission, unlike its predecessor, has already been assigned a most significant mandate - to consider the elements of a comprehensive programme for disarmament, for approval by the General Assembly and negotiation in the Committee on Disarmament - among other responsibilities. With the establishment of an advisory board of eminent persons to advise the Secretary-General on aspects of studies to be made, and the mandate for further strengthening of the Centre for Disarmament, the United Nations is in a much better position than previously to contribute creatively to the achievement of disarmament. These are most welcome and potentially significant developments. I say "potentially" because it always remains to be seen to what uses new machinery will be put. The Disarmament Commission has met for its inaugural session and has adopted its report to the current session of the General Assembly. It is now up to us to act on the recommendations contained in the report.

The Declaration and Programme of Action of the Final Document stand as major historic and comprehensive statements on the principles and steps that could lead to a secure, peaceful and disarmed world. Beyond their own validity, which is substantial, is the fact that they have been universally agreed upon. We would have preferred a stronger reiteration of the goal of general and complete disarmament. We would have preferred a stronger reference to the continuing lack of a comprehensive test ban, and to the failure of the major nuclear Powers to achieve any cutbacks in strategic weapons systems.

We are struck by the number of memoranda, working papers and proposals not incorporated into the Final Document or dealt with at the special session, some 35 in number, all of which, I am proud to say, I have read. Their quantity is a good indication of the seriousness of intent of the members in facing the dilemmas that beset disarmament. Their quality requires that they be considered most seriously - that is, those that were not merely procedural and related to the conduct of the special session itself. We trust that this Assembly will forward the appropriate proposals to the Disarmament Commission for serious study.

In this connexion, we note the significance of the overlapping proposals of France on a satellite surveillance agency, of Sri Lanka on a world disarmament authority, and of the Netherlands on an international disarmament organization. While these proposals are by no means identical, they serve to illustrate a growing feeling that the study and effort for peace in our time should be elevated to the agency level in the United Nations system. With this we totally agree. It is our view also that the Centre for Disarmament, which is demonstrating not only its high value but also its capability for expanded responsibilities, should be regarded as the nucleus of a United Nations disarmament agency, which could rationalize and subsume within its activities various responsibilities at present foreseen and others that will become apparent at a later time.

Many other important suggestions, too numerous to discuss, await the detailed attention of the appropriate bodies. We applaud this important legacy of the special session on disarmament.

One important aspect of the Final Document seems particularly significant. There is, if one may so interpret the content of the document, a growing recognition and acceptance of the relationship not only between disarmament and resources for development, but also between disarmament and modalities for maintenance of international peace and security. Thus the Final Document takes note that

"Genuine and lasting peace can only be created through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations ..." (A/RES/S-10/2, para, 13)

We had before us in the special session the report of the Secretary-General on the interrelationship between disarmament and international security, and we note that the Final Document directs the Secretary-General to continue this study, with the assistance of consultant experts. The interim report contains some very interesting, and in our view, very valid statements. Thus we read:

"To break that vicious circle /of the arms race/ involves a two-fold task: the cessation of the arms race and disarmament, on the one hand, and the building up of a system of world order based on collective responsibility, on the other hand. This may require greater efforts to seek a common understanding of the causes and mechanisms that sustain the arms race and, at an appropriate stage, the development of more reliable means for the maintenance of international peace and security."

(A/S-10/7 and Corr.1, para. 12)

We welcome the growing recognition of this relationship. We have often stated that States will not, and cannot be expected to, disarm into a void not containing adequate security guarantees. These guarantees cannot be sought or achieved unilaterally or bilaterally; they can be achieved only through the utilization of the United Nations for the purposes for which it was established, relative to peace-keeping and peaceful settlement of disputes. What level of confidence is required, what level of commitment to mutually agreed international processes is required, to provide States assurances of security in a disarming or disarmed world?

These are the "software" issues of disarmament. Because they are more subtle, we have overlooked them. Because they are more difficult than the hardware problems of arms reductions, we have ignored them. I submit that the international community, and the disarmament experts in particular, are now required to deal not only with the hardware questions but also with these software questions which go to the root of our difficulties. Who will disarm before the United Nations is capable of keeping the peace and of settling disputes? Furthermore, who will disarm before they can transfer their trust from their own force of arms, no matter how frail a reed that may be in today's world, to international mechanisms which have earned and deserve the confidence of all? These questions cannot be treated by refusing to face them or, successfully, by indirection. The instrumenting of the world community for peace and for disarmament depends equally on logical and sequential measures for the elimination of arms and on the successful evolution of the now embryonic capabilities of the United Nations for peace-keeping and peace-making.

This evolution is the responsibility of all States if we wish to live in a peaceful and secure world. No State or group of States can hold aloof from the next steps in construction of a system for effective world security. We await with interest the further report of the Secretary-General on this important question when it comes before the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly. We also note with interest the observation in the interim report that the Special Committee on the Charter of the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization is presently seized of questions in this area, including, particularly, peaceful settlement of disputes, and that the findings of the Special Committee may be of benefit in understanding the interrelationship between disarmament and international security. My delegation has a particular and continuing interest in the contributions that the Special Committee can make in paving the way for further progress in the cause of disarmament.

In the Final Document of the special session we have at once a set of goals and a universal criterion - a device against which we can measure our progress or the lack of it. We express here our gratitude and our indebtedness to all who made the special session possible and brought it to a successful conclusion.

Turning now to the world scene, the picture appears, as far as disarmament is concerned, to be as sombre as ever. Have any aircraft been dismantled, any missiles scrapped, any plans for new submarines withdrawn? Have any plans for new weapon systems been dropped? Do we have a comprehensive test ban treaty? Is a treaty on chemical warfare open for signature? Have the major nuclear Powers succeeded in agreeing even to limit the upward spiral of their own investment in arms? Has there been any agreement of supplier nations and recipient nations, or any agreements within regional groups of States, to limit or reduce the heavy and growing investment in conventional weaponry? Have States forsworn the export and import of complete nuclear cycle installations as an earnest of their interest in curtailing the spread of nuclear weapon potential? These are questions that this Committee must consider and study. These are questions that the world would like to have answered. I have been asking these questions in this Committee for several years, and we have not yet received any answer. I have been discussing disarmament in the United Nations for many years now, and I would ask members to review the records of this Committee and the statements I have made on this subject. I believe this is a subject that we should consider more seriously than we have in the past. We should address our questions to the nuclear Powers, the super-Powers, since they are the ones most concerned.

There appears to be a monstrous gulf between word, or, more properly, "wish", and deed, or action. We all wish for a more secure and less dangerous world; but deeds belie wishes, and as a result of this humanity faces new terrors.

It takes two to conduct an arms race. Once they have invested in mutual arming, it is, of course difficult for States to withdraw from the competition. I wish to declare, however, that these are not their only two options. There is a third, and most significant, option. It is the option of setting into motion a trend of events which leads in the opposite direction. Initiatives of restraint, initiatives of good faith, perhaps of little consequence in their military content, can be of the greatest consequence in their psychological content. A policy of restraint, vigorously pursued, will necessarily lower the level of perceived threat between parties. It will successfully disrupt

the "worst possible case" definitions applied to the actions of one by the other. It will, in time, provide that minimal basis of trust and mutual confidence upon which any hope for further steps in arms limitation or reduction depends.

What statesmen - I say "statesmen" in the plural - are sufficiently far-sighted to initiate a campaign of restraint? What statesmen are prepared to stand firm against the insanity of the "conventional wisdom" that "more is better" and creates more security, when it is obvious to all that the reverse is true? Here lies a major task in education. Peoples and their political leaders must come to understand that, in the nuclear era, increasing armament heightens tension, makes war more likely and guarantees its utter destructiveness.

Initiatives of restraint have led directly to significant gains for peace and security, and even to important treaties, as in the case of bacteriological and biological weapons. Yet the value and usefulness of this approach has not been fully explored and certainly has not been consciously employed as a strategy to facilitate arms agreements. A major nuclear Power could today announce a cut-off in production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes and the availability of some portion of stockpiles for peaceful uses by developing countries. It could announce an end to the production and stockpiling of nerve gas and the commencement of destruction of existing stockpiles in anticipation of completion of a treaty. The existence of these hideous weapons, a redundancy in the face of the stockpiles of nuclear weapons, is a blight on the conscience of humanity. Such a Power could announce an end to all nuclear tests in all environments in anticipation of the completion of a comprehensive test ban. It could announce a halt in testing, production and deployment of all new nuclear weapons systems pending agreements to curtail existing systems. It could announce a policy of the abandonment of high-velocity small arms, restriction of the use of incendiary weapons, including napalm, and of other weapons which cause unnecessary suffering, to indicate a willingness and a desire to humanize armed conflict to the degree possible. It could announce a willingness to develop mutual restraints on the circulation of advanced weapon systems to additional countries.

No single such step will be effective in dramatically changing the atmosphere in which arms limitation discussions are proceeding. However, a series of such steps will greatly alter the way in which motivations are perceived. They are apt, in fact, to be welcomed by a perceived adversary as the basis for modification of its own policies. Pursuing this new option most surely challenges the conventional wisdom and the existing momentum, and thus requires a certain investment of leadership. But on what basis can further additions to present "overkill" capacity be justified? To answer what needs, real or imagined, are more redundant systems of destruction required? Under the umbrella of present capacity for global devastation, there is no security loss in taking steps which can assure the success of arms negotiations and lead at last to a reversal of the insane spiral which threatens all of us. Of course, the world is grateful for any small progress which is registered, but at the same time it quite clear that we are being offered far too little in relation to the total jeopardy in which we all live.

The arms race has resisted all approaches, whether piecemeal and related to specific weapons systems, or general and related to its over-all character. Yet we hold some hope that the approach of reduction in military budgets remains one of the most promising avenues. With a reduction in available funds the sources start to dry up, and military planners must learn to manage with less and to make choices regarding that which they believe to be of the utmost importance. Thus, the report of the Secretary-General on the reaction of States concerning the Pilot Test of the reporting instrument of military expenditures is significant. It is also not encouraging, since not many States have responded to the enquiry of the Secretary-General. In order to make progress toward equitable cutbacks in military budgets, it will be necessary to establish an atmosphere of trust and confidence. This atmosphere can be engendered by utilization of an instrument such as that devised by the Secretary-General at the request of the General Assembly. It will, however, require wider participation, and particularly the participation of at least one State from each political system or geographical area in the pilot test of the instrument. The good faith of States in pursuing budget-cut approaches can be established and illustrated by their participation in the pilot test.

The greatest contemporary tragedy is the fact that while the world can afford what it needs in meeting social requirements, its capacity to do so is being squandered on purchase and production of arms, and primarily on arms which it dare not use. We are all painfully aware of the facts and figures, and there is no need to repeat them here. At the same time it appears necessary to remind ourselves that we cannot persist in this paradox, a paradox of our own creation and one which we completely understand, without encountering the gravest consequences, and without perpetrating upon humanity a truly monstrous crime, even if no bomb were ever to fall.

In the last analysis, we do not believe that any particular proposal or gimmick will set the world on a new course toward peace. A conscious decision is required, in which there is wide participation, a decision to move forward from an era of contesting States to new historical processes which alone are sufficient to respond to global needs, including most particularly the needs for international security and an equitable international economic order. In a word, disarmament can only be understood and accomplished as part of the process of moving from the present relative anarchy to a responsible global society, focused through the instrumentalities of our United Nations.

In sum, the tenth special session of the General Assembly has produced its own momentum which we cannot fail to recognize and which is now our responsibility to pursue with a strengthened thrust in order that what was achieved in the special session may be the starting point of future developments leading to the objectives the world has been yearning for all these years.

I have spoken on this subject for at least 15 years now, and I must announce that I shall continue to speak on this subject until we have achieved our objectives.

Mr. WYZNER (Poland): Mr. Chairman, I shall not risk being declared out of order by addressing well reserved congratulations to you and the members of the Bureau. Permit me only to say how happy my delegation is to work under your firm and as always friendly leadership in this Committee.

It is probably too early for a full evaluation of the results and all the implications of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, particularly with regard to its real impact on the efforts to halt the arms race and promote genuine disarmament. There is no doubt, however, that the special session devoted to disarmament has been an important and positive event, and so far the most universal gathering of its kind. Its political success should also be viewed in the context of the adoption by consensus of the Final Document, reflecting a comprehensive approach of virtually the entire international community towards the most crucial and burning issue of the contemporary world, that of disarmament.

The special session defined basic principles and priorities of disarmament negotiations, and at the same time helped to identify the most difficult problems which should be the subject of further discussions and negotiations. It proved that given the necessary political will, in spite of differences in approach to the solution of many important questions, there is a possibility of broad international co-operation in the field of disarmament on terms acceptable to all countries.

The outcome of the special session has also confirmed once again that in dealing with such extremely complex questions as disarmament which relate directly to the sphere of national security, any attempts to gain unilateral advantages or to impose solutions incompatible with the principle of undiminished security of all parties is inevitably doomed to failure. It has proved the validity of the principle of consensus as the only realistic method of taking decisions in this field, thus opening up prospects for their practical implementation.

The special session demonstrated a growing awareness of the close interrelationship between disarmament, detente and the strengthening of international peace and security. One of the first provisions of the Final Document states explicitly:

"Dynamic development of détente, encompassing all spheres of international relations in all regions of the world, with the participation of all countries, would create conditions conducive to the efforts of States to end the arms race... Progress on détente and progress on disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other." (A/S-10/23, para. 3)

In equally strong terms the Final Document of the special session underlines the incompatibility of further continuation of the arms race with the implementation of the New International Economic Order based on justice, equity and co-operation.

The Final Document adopted by the special session is, as we all know, the result of lengthy, difficult and painstaking negotiations during which many compromises had to be made to accommodate different positions. Consequently not all provisions of that document, particularly those in its Programme of Action, are as concrete and far-reaching as we would have wished. However, on the whole, the document is realistic, well balanced and can be used as an effective instrument to stimulate endeavours in the field of disarmament.

The socialist countries, including Poland, spared no effort to bring about a positive outcome of the special session. Indeed, of particular importance were the proposals submitted by the Soviet Union in a document on practical measures for ending the arms race. Many of those proposals and suggestions subsequently became the core of the Final Document. Others, in accordance with paragraph 125 of that document, should also be transmitted to the appropriate deliberative and negotiating disarmament organs for further consideration.

The question of nuclear disarmament and prevention of the danger of a nuclear war occupied a central place in the deliberations of the special session. The Final Document emphasizes that it is essential to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race in all its aspects in order to avert the danger of war involving nuclear weapons. That provision fully corresponds to the long-standing position of Poland and other socialist countries. My delegation considers as one of the most important recommendations adopted by the special session the one contained in paragraph 50 of the Final Document pertaining to the achievement of nuclear disarmament. We consider that practical steps should be taken without further delay to effect implementation of that extremely important recommendation.

My country also attaches great importance to the earliest possible implementation of the recommendation contained in paragraph 51 of the Final Document concerning the need for an urgent conclusion of negotiations on a treaty prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests. We welcome the reassuring note contained in the tripartite statement on the progress made in those negotiations and strongly hope for their successful completion. Here again, however, we deem it necessary to stress that, if the ban on all nuclear-weapon tests is to be really comprehensive and permanent, it must eventually be adhered to by all nuclear Powers.

With equal hope and impatience we are awaiting the results of the Soviet-American talks on strategic arms limitations, recognizing the critical importance of the early elaboration and signing of the SALT II agreement for the general political climate of the world and for the creation of more favourable conditions for disarmament negotiations in other forums.

My delegation fully understands the concern voiced by many non-nuclearweapon States over their own security. That concern is reflected in paragraph 59 of the Final Document, in which

"... the nuclear-weapon States are called upon to take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons."

There could hardly be a more constructive and timely response to that appeal than that of the USSR in the form of yet another important initiative stipulating the conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees for the security of non-nuclear States. My delegation welcomes that new proposal and will accordingly support it during the consideration of the relevant agenda item.

On a similar subject, may I be allowed to refer to paragraph 54 of the Final Document which indicates, <u>inter alia</u>, that significant progress in nuclear disarmament could be facilitated by parallel political or international legal measures to strengthen the security of States. It is beyond any doubt that one of the really significant measures of the kind would be an early conclusion of a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations.

The question of the most effective ways to strengthen the régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons was a subject of detailed discussions during the special session and held a prominent place among the recommendations in the Final Document. My delegation views it as a question of paramount importance. We feel that the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons constitutes one of the most pressing tasks facing the international community. Universalization of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the further strengthening and enhancing of the effectiveness of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAMA) safeguards system represent the best means of reducing the danger of the spread of nuclear weapons and promoting broad international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In fact, that is the main objective of my country's activities in both the so-called London Club and in the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Conducive to the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime is the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in different parts of the world, enhanced as it was by the special session, which recognized the establishment of such zones as an important disarmament measure. Poland, which is the author of the first comprehensive plan for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones, will also in the future give its support to similar actions.

A similar direction is followed by the important initiative submitted by the USSR at the special session, and further elaborated by the Soviet delegation at the present session, concerning the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on territories where there are no such weapons at present.

One of the most dangerous phenomena of our time is the technological arms race. Huge sums are spent on development and production of ever more sophisticated, costly and destructive weapons in both nuclear and conventional fields. The technological arms race surpasses the pace of disarmament negotiations and constitutes one of the major threats to world peace and stability. It is being intensified by militaristic circles in certain countries, which either engage in the search for elusive "military superiority" or, as the case may be, use the threat of such alleged "superiority" on the part of others as an argument for increasing the qualitative arms race in their own countries. The Final Document of the special session underlines in unequivocal terms that efforts should be pursued at prohibiting new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. In the opinion of my delegation, which actively participated in the negotiations on the subject in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, there are no insurmountable difficulties in concluding an appropriate comprehensive agreement, as well as specific agreements on particular types of such weapons which may be identified, as is the case with radiological weapons. We have reason to expect that the Committee on Disarmament will accord high priority to the question of new weapons of mass destruction and to the long overdue ban on development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons. question, to which the Polish delegation traditionally attaches particular importance, will be the subject of a draft resolution; together with some like minded delegations, we intend to submit it later during the session under the relevant agenda item.

While dealing with the subject of weapons of mass destruction, my delegation cannot fail to stress its particular concern over the insistence of certain quarters within the NATO Alliance on developing, producing and deploying nuclear neutron weapons. We earnestly appeal to those concerned finally and unequivocally to abandon any such plans.

Bearing in mind the provisions of the Declaration adopted at the 1977
Review Conference of States Parties to the Sea-Bed Treaty and the relevant
resolution of the thirty second session of the United Nations General Assembly,
we hope that the Committee on Disarmament will be able to proceed promptly

with the consideration of further measures to prevent an arms race in that environment, thus discharging itself of the mandate given to it by the special session of the General Assembly in paragraph 79 of its Final Document.

In recognizing the paramount importance and critical urgency of the intensive efforts to halt the nuclear arms race, Poland does not overlook the necessity of taking adequate steps aiming at the limitation and reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons, having particularly in mind that conventional weapons account for about 80 per cent of the world's military expenditure.

Naturally, the primary interest of my country lies in a successful conclusion of the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe - an area with a particularly high concentration of military potential. The importance of reaching agreement in those talks, not only for Europe, but for the enhancement of international peace and security at large, was recognized by the special session and duly reflected in its Final Document, which calls for the most energetic continuation of efforts to this end. We believe that as a result of the new initiative put forward by the socialist countries, including my own, in Vienna on 8 June last, favourable conditions have been created to make tangible and more rapid progress in those talks. The proposals of the socialist countries meet more than half way the positions of our Western partners and open up the way for elaboration of a concrete and equitable agreement which would reduce the level of military confrontation in Central Europe, without prejudice to the security of its signatories or any other State. May we venture to expect that our negotiating partners will choose to respond positively to those constructive proposals.

Another important recommendation of the special session, to which my delegation would like to refer, deals with the problem of reduction of military budgets. Here we see the need for a straightforward approach in coming to grips with this problem by taking appropriate political decisions without directing the whole issue along the road of endless technical studies. We therefore support the proposal that States with a large economic and military potential, including all the permanent members of the Security Council, agree on specific reductions in their military budgets in absolute figures, with a substantial part of the funds thus released to be devoted to increased aid to developing countries.

Allow me now to refer to paragraph 93 of the Final Document, which states, among other things, that in order to facilitate the process of disarmament it is necessary to take measures and pursue policies to strengthen international peace and security and to build confidence among States -- matters which the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Philippines called, a few moments ago, the "software issues" of disarmament. As it is so well known, wars begin in the minds of men and it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed. My delegation indeed feels that the elimination of distrust and prejudice, as well as the building of confidence among States, constitutes one of the important elements of treating not only the symptoms but also the causes of the arms race. For, as experience shows, the insufficient degree of reciprocal trust considerably complicates the achievement of meaningful progress in disarmament negotiations. This is the underlying reason why Poland's Minister for Foreign Affairs, Emil Wojtaszek, has put forward at the current session of the General Assembly a proposal that the Assembly adopt a Declaration on the Preparation of Societies for Life in Peace. We shall elaborate further upon this subject at a later stage of our deliberations under item 50, "Implementation of the Declaration on the Strengthening of International Security".

In the same context, may I also report to this Committee that Poland is fully implementing the relevant recommendations of the special session, contained in paragraphs 98, 101, 105 and 106 of the Final Document, designed to increase the dissemination of information about the armaments race and about the efforts to halt and reverse it. Our mass media and the curricula of our educational institutions accord due attention to exposing the dangers of the arms race and emphasizing the need for effective disarmament measures, special coverage being given to the Final Document of the tenth special session.

Those were the views of my delegation concerning the implementation of the provisions of section III of the Final Document, embodying the Programme of Action for disarmament. Naturally, the Programme is not a disarmament treaty. Its realization can be brought about only by way of intensive negotiations in appropriate negotiating forums towards conclusion of concrete and legally binding disarmament agreements.

IP/sc

(Mr. Wyzner, Poland)

In conclusion, I should like to offer some observations relating to the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the special session contained in section IV of the Final Document, dealing with matters pertaining to the machinery for disarmament negotiations and deliberations.

Some of these decisions have already been implemented. A deliberative body, the Disarmament Commission, has been established, and held its first organizational session last week in a constructive and purposeful atmosphere.

As far as the negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament, is concerned, we wish to welcome its new members and to offer them our assurances of close co-operation in arriving at fruitful results in discharging the mandate given to that organ by the international community.

Among the decisions still awaiting implementation my delegation gives particular weight to the provision of paragraph 122 of the Final Document to the effect that

"At the earliest appropriate time, a world disarmament conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation". (A/RES/S-10/2, para. 122)

for, although a special session was an important event, my Government believes that the convening of a world disarmament conference as the most authoritative and universal forum could bring about a real breakthrough in disarmament negotiations, eventually paving the way to general and complete disarmament. We therefore deem it necessary that the current session of the General Assembly should take a decision on the organizational arrangements to start, without delay, concrete preparations for holding a world disarmament conference.

Finally, in connexion with paragraph 124 of the Final Document, we hope that the advisory board of eminent persons set up to advise the Secretary-General on various aspects of studies of studies to be made in the field of disarmament and arms limitations will outline a programme of studies corresponding to the requirements of adequate and expeditious implementation of the recommendations adopted by the special session.

Having said this, I cannot fail to re-emphasize what many speakers have already stressed, both during the special session and in the general debate of the current session, namely, that no institutional arrangements will be a substitute for the political goodwill of States. The latter, in fact, remains the main determining factor of success or failure of disarmament negotiations.

The attitude of my country in those negotiations - be they held in Geneva, Vienna or New York - will continue to be constructive. More than once we have given proof of our patience and flexibility in seeking mutually acceptable solutions. To achieve real progress, all States must respect the agreed principles for conducting disarmament negotiations and, notably, must not try to gain unilateral advantages at the expense of others. Equally important is the principle of universality of disarmament efforts and universal adherence to disarmament agreements. In the long run, it is difficult to conceive of any significant progress in the field of disarmament if certain States, particularly those with a large military potential, remain outside disarmament agreements.

The task of the translation of the recommendations adopted by the special session into the language of concrete disarmament treaties requires, on the part of all of us, perserverance, determination and the most energetic efforts to fulfil the hopes and legitimate expectations of our respective Governments and peoples. Poland is ready to meet those requirements.

Mr. KOMATINA (Yugoslavia): Mr. Chairman, I am very pleased, on behalf of my delegation and in my own name, to congratulate you on your election as Chairman of the First Committee and to assure you that in carrying out your duties you may depend on the closest co-operation of the Yugoslav delegation. My congratulations are also addressed to the Vice-Chairmen and the Rapporteur.

The very fact that such a representative gathering as the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to the question of disarmament was held is an encouraging sign of profound changes in the present-day world, which is becoming ever more conscious of the need not only to make fresh efforts but also to avail itself of the possibilities for setting in motion the process of solving this acute problem with which the international community is faced.

Although the results of the special session do not give cause for exaggerated optimism as they could not provide answers to some key problems, we can nevertheless draw from the session some important lessons and messages of a lasting character.

First, the very convening of the session shows, on a broad political plane, that the international community does not wish to accept any longer the policy of proceeding from a position of strength which constantly produces dangers and threats to the survival of mankind. The session expressed the growing conviction that the continuation of the arms race and the massive increase of weapons, in particular nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, undermine the very foundations on which international peace and security are based.

Secondly, the special session emphasized to an even greater extent the close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development which affects, in particular, the developing countries whose economic development and independence are constantly being brought into jeopardy. It is evident that the arms race is at variance with the objectives of the New International Economic Order.

Thirdly, the session noted that the efforts to halt the arms race and to advance constantly towards general and complete disarmament have become the imperative and most urgent task of the international community in the solution of which all countries of the world should take part. In this connexion, we do not, of course, lose sight of the fact that the primary responsibility rests with the militarily most significant Powers. The session also confirmed the readiness of the international community to be even more actively involved along this path.

Fourthly, on the conceptual plane the session clearly indicated that all that is being done in the field of disarmament should lead not merely to a limitation of armaments but to general and complete disarmament under strict international control as the final goal.

Fifthly, the special session did not deal only with generalities. It determined the objectives to be achieved, indicated the responsibilities for their implementation, laid down the principles on the basis of which future disarmament negotiations should be conducted and adopted the Programme of Action. And, finally, the central role and the primary responsibility of the United Nations were confirmed and strengthened; the deliberative machinery was re-established and rendered more democratic and representative.

The results of the special session have provided, no doubt, an important incentive and also a source of encouragement in many domains for the continuation and intensification of broad international action for disarmament. The momentum achieved should be constantly reinforced if we wish to attain the objectives that we have set ourselves. Therefore, it is very important that the General Assembly should devote primary attention at this session to the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the tenth special session and should take such steps as will further promote what was achieved at that session.

It would not be realistic to expect the implementation of substantive measures in so short a time after the tenth special session of the Assembly. However, we must voice our concern over the fact that the expected results have not been achieved with regard to some issues, despite promises made at the special session to the effect that agreements were to be reached soon. This applies to negotiations on the comprehensive test ban treaty, to negotiations on SALT II and to the agreement on the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stocks. We rightly expect that the countries involved in these negotiations will keep the General Assembly informed of the course of the negotiations and the results achieved. That is actually an obligation that all countries have assumed in the Final Document. It is also in harmony with the general demand for the democratization of all the processes of negotiation. The General Assembly cannot remain either indifferent or passive in the face of these problems. In keeping with the decision of the ministerial Conference of non-aligned countries in Belgrade, my delegation will support the draft resolution submitted by India during the special session on the imposition of a moratorium on the underground testing of nuclear weapons pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

The Yugoslav delegation attaches particular importance to the re-establishment of the United Nations Disarmament Commission. It views this decision as a genuine contribution to the strengthening of the role and responsibility of the United Nations and as an expression of the imperative need to democratize the negotiating process on disarmament with the participation of all States. In these conditions the Commission should become an important instrument for accelerating the process of disarmament by making concrete contributions toward the solving of problems and by opening up new avenues and launching new initiatives for the achievement of set goals. Its deliberative function should be complementary to the function of the negotiating organ. Briefly, it should, as stated by the Secretary-General, stimulate the transformation of ideas into actions. Therefore, a correct orientation of the work of the Commission and the creation of favourable conditions for its activity should be the object of close attention.

From the report of the Commission on the work of its first session it emerges that the Commission has effected the necessary organizational preparations for its first substantive session to be held at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 14 May to 8 June 1979. As this document was endorsed by consensus, we do not expect any difficulty with regard to its adoption.

At its tenth special session the General Assembly laid down a very broad framework for the activity of the Commission which can, as a matter of fact, consider and make recommendations with regard to all questions and problems in the field of disarmament and with respect to all the decisions and recommendations of the special session devoted to disarmament. Furthermore, the Commission should consider the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament and submit recommendations about them to the General Assembly and, through it, to the negotiating body, that is, to the Committee on Disarmament.

Such a broadly conceived mandate makes it imperative for the General Assembly specifically to determine and orientate the work of the Commission at this session so as to avoid the Commission wasting the whole of its next session in discussing and establishing its agenda. Precisely for that reason, provision has been made for the possibility of the Commission holding, towards the end of the present session of the General Assembly, a short organizational session for the purpose of drafting the agenda for its May session in the light of the decisions of this current Assembly session. That would enable the May session to take up as a matter of urgency the consideration of substantive problems of disarmament.

In view of the complex character and magnitude of the work lying before us and of the fact that with regard to a number of aspects we are undertaking the solution of disarmament problems in new conditions, the Yugoslav delegation considers that it is necessary to determine as clearly as possible, at this session of the Assembly, the competences and priority tasks of the Commission. There is no doubt that it is necessary to avoid the Commission's duplicating the work of the First Committee or assuming its role. The Commission should include in its agenda those questions that the General Assembly will assign to it as its subsidiary organ. It was decided at the tenth special session that the Commission should consider the elements of a comprehensive programme for disarmament and there is no doubt that this question should figure on the agenda of its May session. However, the function of the Commission cannot be reduced to the consideration of a comprehensive programme - whose importance, however, we do not wish to diminish. The Commission should include in its agenda some other disarmament questions with a view to promoting new steps and reviewing the progress achieved in the field of disarmament. It seems to us particularly important that in determining additional issues the following three elements should be taken into account: first, the work of the Commission should be viewed as a long-term process in the course of which a number of disarmament problems are examined successively; secondly, the number of items on the agenda of the sessions of the Commission should be a function of the content of its work, that is, concentration on and the in-depth study of various questions and problems, and of the making on this basis of recommendations to the General Assembly and, through it, to the Committee on Disarmament for the taking of decisions on them; and, thirdly, in choosing items to be assigned to the Commission

for consideration, we should be guided by the objective set forth in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, namely, that the Commission should examine, as a matter of priority, those measures of disarmament the implementation of which is liable to contribute most rapidly to the slowing down and cessation of the arms race, both nuclear and conventional, as well as to the lessening and the elimination of the danger of a world war.

The Programme of Action adopted at the tenth special session has established an order of priorities with regard to measures in this field. The following measures were indicated as being the most urgent for halting the nuclear arms race: cessation of all underground tests; conclusions of SALT II; and an early start of negotiations on SALT III. Furthermore, measures whose implementation would lead to the halting of the nuclear arms race were also determined. We have in mind in particular the measures listed in paragraph 50 of the Final Document. In addition to that, my delegation also attaches great significance to measures concerned with the limitation and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons.

Specific measures have also been proposed within the complex of conventional weapons. We attach particular importance to the reduction of the armaments and armed forces of military alliances and to all efforts on a regional plane aimed at achieving effective disarmament within the context of the recommendations of the tenth special session. Measures relating to disarmament and development are undoubtedly among those that the Commission should consider. We have in mind here, first, the need to reduce expenditures on armaments and to reallocate resources to economic and social development. This would not only have a positive impact with regard to halting the arms race but would also contribute to the creation of favourable conditions for setting the process of disarmament in motion.

We believe that it is realistic to single out, within the framework of these priorities, the problems that the Commission could consider. In this respect, to our mind, the highest order of priority should be accorded to problems relating to the nuclear complex and to disarmament and development. We feel that the time has come to start consultations on the choice of priorities for the May session also. My delegation is prepared to exchange views on this matter.

Through the establishment of the Committee on Disarmament, the first part of an important decision of the special session has been implemented. I should like to avail myself of this opportunity to welcome the new States members of the Committee on Disarmament and to wish them success in the performance of their responsible duties. Through the inclusion of Algeria, Cuba, Indonesia, Kenya, Sri Lanka and Venezuela, the membership of countries belonging to the non-aligned movement has been considerably increased and the democratization of disarmament negotiations enhanced. I also wish to commend the decision of France to belong to this organ, in the same way as we would welcome a similar decision by the People's Republic of China.

Preparatory work is under way in order to enable the normal setting up and functioning of the new negotiating body. We attach special importance to the timely adoption of the rules of procedure and agenda of the Committee on Disarmament. The rules of procedure are, of course, to be adopted by the Committee itself, and our interest in this question is due merely to our desire to stimulate an early fulfilment of this task. We feel that we should reach agreement during the thirty-third session on the priorities that the General Assembly will recommend to the Committee on Disarmament, leaving to the Committee, of course, the task of drawing up its own agenda.

The tenth special session of the General Assembly initiated a broad international action directed at halting the arms race and starting the process of genuine disarmament. This action should be conducted unremittingly. In this sense it was agreed at the tenth special session that the General Assembly should take a decision at its thirty-third session on convening a second special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. This confirms our conviction that the international community demands constant action aimed at changing the present unsatisfactory state of affairs.

There was broad consensus that the next special session should be held within two to three years of the first. We are convinced that the holding of the next session in 1981 would make it possible to maintain the momentum engendered by the tenth special session. A period of three years is sufficiently long for appraising intentions and for assessing the results of the implementation of decisions adopted. Prolongation of this term could unfavourably affect the very objective for which the decision was adopted. I think that a decision concerning this matter could be taken at the current session, whilst a decision on the establishment of a preparatory committee and the fixing of its mandate could be adopted at the thirty-fourth regular session of the Assembly next year.

Finally, I wish to refer briefly to the decision on the new programme and framework of activity of the First Committee. In our opinion, the First Committee is the central body for co-ordinating international activities in the field of disarmament. Into this body flow all the reports on the course and results of negotiations on, or studies of, problems of disarmament and questions of security. The Committee is competent to consider and appraise matters and made recommendations to all bodies dealing with questions of disarmament, including recommendations to Member States.

To what extent the Member States avail themselves of this opportunity will, of course, depend on a number of circumstances. It is clear that in the absence of political will on the part of States to open the process of disarmament no organizational forms will be of any help. However, the creation of the political will of States is not separated from international action and from the activity of countries both within and outside the United Nations.

At the end of the consideration of this item on the agenda, we should sum up the results and draw conclusions, in order to be in a position to make appropriate recommendations for the successful and rapid implementation of the decisions of the tenth special session.

It is obvious that the results of the thirty-third regular session will be judged primarily from the point of view of the extent to which we ensure the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, namely: the extent to which we prove that declarations in favour of disarmament do not amount to empty phrases but reflect a genuine readiness for action; the extent to which there is a political will to reinforce and intensify concrete international actions aimed at halting the arms race and achieving general and complete disarmament; and, finally, the extent to which we are ready to ensure that measures for the democratization of the decision-making process actually take root and that our organisms function normally.

We are conscious of the complexity of these tasks, but we must constantly keep before our eyes the fact that every lost month, not to speak of year, takes us further away from our objectives, and that it is ever more difficult to make up for the time lost.

Mr. OGISO (Japan): The special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, which was held last May, at a time when the Disarmament Decade was nearing its end, marked a new beginning in the history of disarmament. Taking this opportunity, when our memories of the special session are still vivid, I should like to appeal to all the representatives present to ensure that the aspirations and goals set forth in the Final Document of the special session are gradually realized through the accumulation of effective measures in future disarmament negotiations. The special session must by no means be judged by future historians to have been merely a forum for an academic exchange of views.

The first step along the new road to disarmament was taken with regard to machinery. The long-dormant United Nations Disarmament Commission has been revitalized and henceforth will play the role of a deliberative body enjoying the participation of all Members of the United Nations.

It is most welcome that France has decided to participate in the Committee on Disarmament, which is making a fresh start as the negotiating body. I strongly hope that China, too, will participate in the Committee as soon as possible, since without China the Committee cannot be regarded as being complete as a negotiating body.

It is most urgent that, making full use of the achievements of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, the Committee on Disarmament should enter as soon as possible into concrete negotiations on such priority items as a comprehensive nuclear test ban and a chemical-weapon ban. Japan fully intends to participate in the new disarmament bodies and to continue to make active contributions towards the ultimate goals of general and complete disarmament.

Reflecting the unanimous desire of the Government and the people of Japan, Foreign Minister Sunao Sonoda strongly appealed for the abolition of nuclear weapons at the special session. The Government and the people alike have emphasized this point in their appeal on every possible occasion. Recognizing, however, that the ultimate goal of nuclear disarmament cannot be achieved immediately and can be realized only by first halting the nuclear arms race and then gradually reducing nuclear armaments, my country has repeatedly appealed for progress in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, for the early realization of a comprehensive nuclear test ban and for a cut-off of the production of nuclear fissionable materials for weapon purposes. Furthermore, it has also emphasized the need to strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation system.

Paragraph 48 of the Programme of Action refers to the special responsibility to be borne by the nuclear-weapon States in the task of nuclear disarmament. The most urgent question in nuclear disarmament is the early conclusion of the Second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II). Unless SALT II is concluded promptly, the race between the United States and the Soviet Union for qualitative improvements and quantitative increases in strategic arms is likely to be intensified still further.

My country takes note of the fact that the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Vance, stated before the General Assembly on 29 September, "We hope that we may conclude a SALT II agreement before the end of this year" (A/33/PV.14, p. 57), and also that the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, was reported to have made a statement at his press conference in Moscow on 6 October to the effect that the SALT negotiations undertaken during his visit to the United States had been useful and full of initiatives.

My country strongly hopes that the United States and the Soviet Union, which bear a special responsibility in the field of nuclear disarmament, will at an early date conclude SALT II, which has been in the process of negotiation for more than five years, and will without delay start SALT III negotiations aimed at the substantial reduction of strategic arms.

My country has consistently appealed both for the prevention of the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons - that is to say, for the prohibition of qualitative improvements in nuclear-weapon systems - and for the prevention of the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons - the latter through the strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation régime. From this point of view, paragraph 51 of the Programme of Action emphasizes the urgency of the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

In my statement at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 2 March of this year, I emphasized the importance of the early realization of a comprehensive nuclear test ban and called for the halting of all nuclear testing, including nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, even before the conclusion of a treaty on such a comprehensive nuclear test ban. Now that more than one year has passed since the commencement of the trilateral negotiations, I cannot help observing that it is deeply regrettable that the results of the trilateral negotiations have not yet been brought before the negotiating body, and therefore I wish once again to request that the three negotiating parties make the utmost efforts to conclude their negotiations.

It is frustrating that, despite our appeal for a comprehensive nuclear test ban, a variety of nuclear tests are being conducted. We think it is deeply regrettable that during the year since the last session of the General Assembly the Soviet Union, the United States, France and the United Kingdom have continued to conduct underground nuclear testing and that China has conducted an atmospheric nuclear test. Japan has taken the position of opposing any nuclear testing by any country, and therefore it wishes once again to voice a strong appeal for an immediate halt to all nuclear tests.

One of the reasons why agreement has not yet been reached on a comprehensive test ban, despite such appeals, is the difficulty of verification. As one means of verifying objectively whether or not the obligation of a comprehensive nuclear test ban is satisfactorily complied with, the Ad Hoc Group of seismic experts of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmement has explored the possibility of establishing an international seismological data exchange system. We understand that due consideration has been given in the trilateral negotiations to the idea of a verification system employing the automatic exchange of seismological data. The Ad Hoc Group of seismic experts is to submit its final report to the Committee on Disarmament, the new negotiating body, next February. According to the views of these experts, it is necessary that an experimental exercise of the international seismological data exchange system should be conducted at an early date if the system is to operate effectively, and it is also reported that such an experimental exercise will require at least six months of preparatory work and one year for its implementation and evaluation.

My country believes that the continued work of the Group of Experts under the aegis of the new Committee on Disarmament is vital for successfully conducting the experimental exercise, and that such an exercise is indispensable for progress in the conclusion and implementation of the treaty on a comprehensive nucleartest ban.

An unofficial meeting of experts was held in Tokyo early this month in the hope of indirectly assisting such preparatory work. Seventeen experts from 12 countries participated in this meeting and conducted a variety of technical discussions on the implementation of the experimental exercise. I am convinced that the results of this meeting will make a useful contribution to the studies at the Committee on Disarmament concerning the establishment of the seismological data exchange system.

In connexion with the comprehensive nuclear-test ban, my country has strongly maintained the position that until appropriate international supervision and procedures are established, no State party to the treaty on a comprehensive nuclear-test ban should conduct nuclear explosions under the guise of their being for peaceful purposes. I believe that due consideration has been given to this view in the trilateral negotiations.

Paragraph 50 (b) under the Programme of Action of the Final Document refers to the "Cessation of the production of all types of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, and of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes". (resolution S-10/2)

Japan has suggested the cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes as a necessary measure for achieving nuclear disamrmanet ever since 1969.

The measures provided in paragraph 50 (b) are all mutually related. Taking the view that the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes is necessary as a first step towards the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, my country requests that the United States and the Soviet Union promptly begin exploratory talks on this question. The representative of the United States stated at the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee in 1969 that his country was ready to discuss this question. Furthermore, the

representative of the Soviet Union, admitting the necessity for such a measure, stated at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 31 August of this year that "at the negotiations which we propose the question of the cessation of the production of fissionable materials could also be considered".

(CCD/PV.805, p. 17) Therefore, I think that the conditions necessary for exploratory talks by the United States and the Soviet Union already exist.

If all the nuclear-weapon States would accept the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards which are applied to non-nuclear-weapon States under the nuclear non-proliferation Treaty and other treaties, it would facilitate the varification of the cut-off of the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes.

In connexion with paragraphs 50 (a) and (b), if a consultation among the nuclear-weapon States is conducted at appropriate stages on the control of delivery means, such as, for example the restriction of flight-testing of the delivery means of nuclear weapons, it may well be useful as a means of limiting the qualitative and quantitative aspects of the nuclear arms race.

The prohibition of certain types of identifiable weapons of mass destruction should be kept under review. In particular, the question of banning chemical weapons has, in accordance with a series of resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly, been discussed at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as a priority item next in importance to a comprehensive nuclear-test ban.

Paragraph 75 of the Programme of Action states that this question represents one of the most urgent disarmament measures. In the course of these discussions, a number of working papers have been submitted to the CCD, and the Soviet Union and other socialist States, and Japan and the United Kingdom, have introduced their respective versions of the draft treaty. Several rounds of discussion on this question have also been conducted between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is desirable that a general agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union be submitted to the Committee on Disarmament as soon as possible, so that it can carry out effective treaty negotiations in response to the strong desires of the international community.

Since it is understood that every country hopes for a detailed examination of the draft treaty which takes account of its implication on its own civil chemical industrial activity, this draft treaty should be discussed by as many countries as possible, including all the militarily significant countries. In this connexion, my country has expressed the view that, in order to give the negotiating body sufficient time for discussion, the United States and the Soviet Union should, in the event that there are some technical points blocking a comprehensive agreement between the two countries, submit to the Committee on Disarmament whatever points they have already agreed upon. They could then seek the opinions of other countries with a view to hammering out such differences on the technical points. The two negotiating parties have not yet agreed with this. However, we understand that there remain almost no differences of opinion between the parties on the scope of those agents whose development, production, and so forth, should be banned. I should like once again to express our hope that at least a draft on this point will be submitted to the Committee on Disarmament for its early examination.

My country wishes to emphasize the importance of nuclear disarmament as the highest priority in the field of disarmament, but at the same time wishes to point out the importance of conventional arms control and disarmament, including the reduction of armed forces. I assume that it is the common understanding of every representative here that the world's military expenditures, which are 20 times as much as the total amount of the official development assistance to the developing countries, constitute an obstacle to economic and social development of the international community and are having a serious impact on the peace and stability of some areas of the world. Moreover, roughly 80 per cent of those huge military expenditures are poured into conventional armaments.

The problem of conventional weapons disarmament and armed forces reduction is both wide-ranging and complicated, particularly since an increase in the inflow of conventional weapons into areas of conflict or areas with a high probability of conflict is entangled with the political climate in the regions concerned and with the interests of both major arms recipient and supplier countries. Furthermore, since the qualitative improvement of conventional weapons has increased their accuracy and destructiveness, and thus their over-all capabilities, the system of conventional weapons has become more sophisticated. We must therefore recognize that the question of how to handle the conventional weapons aspect of the disarmament problem is becoming increasingly difficult.

Although the mutual and balanced reduction of forces is an extremely desirable measure in certain regions in which appropriate conditions exist, it might be questionable whether, in the event that such a measure leads either party to devote its surplus to the increase of military forces in another area, such a regional reduction of forces actually contributes to the progress of peace in the world as a whole.

Notwithstanding the various problems involved in conventional disarmament, the Final Document emphasizes the necessity of conventional as well as nuclear disarmament. At the same time, the provisions of paragraph 85 of the Programme of Action state that

"Consultations should be carried out among major arms supplier and recipient countries on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons...". (resolution S-10/2)

My country's position is in complete agreement with those views.

Based on its fundamental position of a devotion to peace, Japan has prohibited the export of weapons, particularly to the parties to international disputes or to countries which might become involved in such disputes. It thus maintains a unique position which is highly exceptional among the advanced industrialized countries. Based on that policy, moreover, my country has appealed to the major arms suppliers to start consultations to restrain unlimited arms exports to areas of conflict and to begin international studies with the aim of restraining the unlimited international transfer of conventional arms.

We appreciate the fact that the United States and the Soviet Union have begun consultations aimed at restraining arms transfer and have held such consultations three times since the latter part of last year, including one round in Helsinki this past July, and we await further progress in their consultations. At the same time, we are paying great attention to the efforts for voluntary restraint in Latin America.

My country hopes that an international study within the framework of the United Nations on the question of disarmament in armed forces and conventional weapons, including restraints on the international transfer of conventional weapons, will be started as soon as possible. Such studies should be conducted with due consideration of all relevant factors, including the security interests of individual countries. I expect that the current session of the General Assembly will decide on the commencement of such an international study and will achieve a consensus on such concrete action as, for example, requesting the Secretary-General, with the assistance of the Advisory Board set up in accordance with paragraph 124 of the Final Document, to formulate a working programme for carrying out such studies.

In view of the fact that the lack of trust among countries constitutes one of the reasons for the arms race, my country believes it important to remove such distrust in order to facilitate the progress of disarmament. It is to be expected that effective confidence-building measures will make a great contribution to the progress of disarmament negotiations.

Japan requests, therefore, that each country should conduct ample studies on a variety of confidence-building measures, including the three measures referred to in paragraph 93 of the Final Document adopted at the special session.

Before concluding my statement, I should like to point out the necessity for public information on disarmament. Paragraph 96 and several subsequent paragraphs of the Final Document provide for a number of public information measures to facilitate the understanding of all peoples of the extremely specialized questions of disarmament, which include both the political aspect of the relationship of disarmament to security and technical aspects. The Disarmament Week decided upon by the special session gives us a good opportunity for public information activities. The Government of Japan also plans to sponsor a programme for such activities on the occasion of Disarmament Week.

If we are to advance further along the new path of disarmament upon which we took our first steps at the special session, then we will have to have the understanding and support of all people on the question of disarmament, as well as the further efforts of all of us - whether Governments or non-governmental organizations - that are directly involved in this matter.

I would be most grateful if my statement today could be of some help in promoting the goal of development of our disarmament activities which is emphasized in the Final Document.

The meeting rose at 12.30 p.m.