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## VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 46TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. PALMA (Peru)

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ENGLISH

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Mr. NEIL (Jamaica): Over the past year the issue of disarmament received increased attention by the world community, in particular by the holding of a special session on the subject. We heard numerous declarations of intent and found our way through a mass of paper work and proposals to adopt a common position reflected in the Final Document of that session. The nations of the world cannot be accused of failure to debate the issues or failure to seek the adoption of texts to reflect a collective concern. But developments in the field of disarmament have followed the traditional course. In short, there has been no disarmament. Instead there has been the continued growth in the accumulation of armaments and increased allocation of resources to that end. There is a great danger that we may soon accept this feature of international life as permanent, irreversible and inevitable. Annually, in this Committee, we have had to resist the feeling of futility created by the daunting realities of the continued arms race, and consciously seek to preserve our ideals so that our efforts on behalf of disarmament are not abandoned. To this extent, my delegation finds it necessary and desirable to participate in the debate on disarmament to restate our commitment to the goal of general and complete disarmament and to reaffirm the validity of this strategy for the preservation of international peace and security and, indeed, for the survival of mankind.

In the light of those considerations, my delegation cannot but express our disappointment at the slow progress and meagre results of the negotiations conducted this year as reflected in the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in document A/33/27. From our examination of the report, it is apparent that not much negotiation had taken place at all in the CCD. In this connexion, it appears to us that less emphasis might be placed on debate in that body and much more time devoted to actual negotiation of texts.

(Mr. Neil, Jamaica)

We believe that thorough consideration should be given to the adoption of procedures which can improve the effectiveness of the negotiating body. In this context we are, of course aware that, following the adoption of recommendations of the tenth special session, important reforms are being carried out, which we hope will contribute towards the effectiveness of the Committee as a negotiating body; but we must recognize also that adequate machinery is not enough and a change of attitude on the part of countries with major responsibilities in the field of disarmament is vitally important if progress is to be achieved, particularly in the field of nuclear disarmament.

In this regard, the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty is an urgent necessity. This matter is still the subject of trilateral negotiations, and we note the joint statement of the three parties concerning the status of these negotiations. We share the feeling of disappointment of the Group of 15 on this matter since the joint statement summarized in paragraph 79 of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) does not reveal much. We should have liked to see a more detailed indication of the areas of agreement and the substantive areas of disagreement, to be able to assess the progress achieved. This would also have allowed the full membership of the CCD to participate in the negotiating process and assist in ensuring the widest possible support for the draft treaty. We hope that more information will be provided in the near future. In the meantime, pending the outcome of the negotiations on a comprehensive test ban, a moratorium on further nuclear testing should be declared. This would contribute to an improved climate of confidence and provide assurance of the good intentions of the nuclear-weapon Powers. In this connexion, my delegation supports the initiative taken by the Indian delegation and other delegations in the draft resolution in document A/33/C.1/L.3 for a moratorium on nuclear-weapon tests.

With regard to the other matters of high priority on the agenda of the CCD - in particular, the conclusion of a chemical-weapon convention - we can only hope that a breakthrough will be possible in the near future, as a result of the bilateral negotiations being conducted.

(Mr. Neil, Jamaica)

The progress made towards preserving the Latin American region as a nuclear-weapon-free zone is a matter of great satisfaction to us. As a member State of that region, we wish to express our appreciation of the decisions taken by the Soviet Union and France to sign the relevant protocols of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. We continue to hope that effective arrangements will be made to meet the aspirations of other regions to be free from the menace of nuclear weapons, thereby contributing towards the régime of non-proliferation. We have to warn, however, that great dangers exist as far as the African continent is concerned. There, the ambition of the racist régime of Pretoria to become a nuclear Power poses a great danger to the continent. My delegation believes that Member States have a crucial role to play in averting this danger, by the termination of the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to South Africa.

As was stated by the representative of Singapore at the 41st meeting of this Committee, our efforts to halt and reverse the arms race must be based on an understanding of its causes. Initiatives towards the promotion of co-operation, goodwill and mutual trust and confidence should be encouraged and promoted. The danger and futility of seeking security through massive accumulation of arms and strategic deterrence have been amply demonstrated. We believe that the pressures exerted by those vested interests that profit from the constant menace of tension and armed confrontation should be resisted. The alternatives of peaceful co-existence, recourse to the peaceful settlement of disputes and over-all adherence to the principles of the Charter, in our view, provide the basis for real security and peace.

We also need a collective effort to take preventive action to contain the growing sophistication of weaponry. In this regard the proposal made by the Soviet Union in 1975 for a convention banning the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction has great value. Qualitative improvements in weaponry can only lead to countermeasures and a never-ending cycle, fuelling the arms race. We continue to urge that negotiations be undertaken to prevent the perverted use of the genius of mankind for the purpose of inventing and perfecting new tools of destruction.

(Mr. Neil, Jamaica)

It is our belief that the scientific skills and material resources being devoted to arms accumulation should be diverted towards combatting the true enemies of mankind: hunger, disease and poverty. The estimated \$400 billion devoted to military uses would go a long way towards meeting some of the urgent needs for development assistance in the developing countries. In this regard, we look forward to a more serious approach to bringing about such a transfer of resources in the new Development Decade in the 1980s, which would coincide with the second Disarmament Decade. It is our earnest hope that sanity can be introduced into the perceptions of national security and a reordering of priorities established to ensure that the challenges of the 1980s in the fields of disarmament and development can be met.

Mrs. GORDAH (Tunisia) (interpretation from French): The large number of disarmament items on the agenda of our Committee is evidence once again not only of the preoccupation of the international community at the extent of the arms race but also of the small amount of progress achieved in this field.

At each session my delegation, together with the majority of the other delegations, has expressed its concern at this situation and has emphasized the urgent need to adopt specific measures to achieve true, rapid and progressive disarmament. The special session made it possible to go more deeply into these questions but, nevertheless, has not resolved them.

At present it is unanimously recognized that priority should be accorded to nuclear disarmament so as to eliminate the most serious threat that hangs heavily over the very survival of mankind. Stress placed upon this priority is not, in our view, inconsistent with the growing importance to be attached to limitation of conventional weapons, because technical competition and technological progress in this field make them so sophisticated that their destructive power is frequently close to that of nuclear weapons. Disarmament measures must also be adopted within this context, subject to the right of States to safeguard their defence and national security, without overlooking the right of peoples struggling for their liberation.

(Mrs. Gordah, Tunisia)

The conclusion of an agreement aimed at putting a brake on the manufacture, development and transfer of this category of weapons would likewise be a concrete disarmament measure, the present state of the arms race being a constant challenge to international security. It is dangerous to believe that the way to a process of détente must be through continuation of an arms race based on the theory of deterrence. The only realistic criterion for evaluating specific disarmament measures is the principle of mutual security. This principle requires the two great Powers to leave aside their political, strategic and technological differences in all disarmament negotiations, be they bilateral or multilateral, so as to take into account the desire of all peoples of the world to live in security.

The progress achieved in the implementation of the Treaty of Tlatelolco prohibiting nuclear weapons in Latin America is encouraging. This example should pave the way for the rapid establishment of additional denuclearized zones, especially in Africa and in the Middle East where all the countries of those regions have already declared themselves in favour of such zones.

In Africa, the Heads of State or Government adopted in 1964 the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa, which the General Assembly has endorsed, and since then we have adopted other resolutions in favour of the implementation of that Declaration.

But how can one achieve the objective set by all African States when the South African régime is continuing its nuclear programme and increasing its ability to secure weapons, both conventional and nuclear, in defiance of General Assembly and Security Council resolutions?

Although South Africa is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and its nuclear installations are not subject to the security safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), that same aggressive and racist régime continues to receive increasing nuclear and technological aid from certain countries which make it possible for it to maintain and consolidate, not only its nuclear potential but an important arms industry while developing countries are subjected to a series of controls and restrictions. This situation is not peculiar to Africa; it is to be found likewise in the Middle East where the will of States to establish a nuclear-free zone in that area is once again coming up against Israel's potential in the matter of weaponry of all kinds. Israel is unfortunately receiving assistance of the kind being granted to South Africa.

(Mrs. Gordah, Tunisia)

This discredits not only the credibility of international accords and agreements but also that of countries supplying such assistance.

Concerning the Declaration to convert the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace, the lack of progress in the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union to implement this Declaration is unfortunate. The Chairman of the Special Committee on the Indian Ocean, in presenting its report to this Committee, could merely reiterate the sense of disappointment felt by the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries held in Belgrade last July at the lack of enthusiasm of the two Powers to enter into negotiations conducive to progress towards the stated objective.

My delegation attaches great importance to the establishment of zones of peace, being convinced that regional disarmament constitutes a realistic approach that should lead us to general and complete disarmament.

To disarm is to act on the sources of tension, particularly when it is observed that conflicts occur mainly on a regional basis. The feeling of security is not prevalent - far from it, indeed - in the majority of the regions of the world, and this state of affairs generates distrust and, therefore, tensions.

The process of détente must be firmly rendered obvious so as to remove the fears and suspicions that compel countries, particularly developing countries, to increase their acquisition of arms at the expense of resources that should be devoted to development.

Our efforts to achieve détente and disarmament must necessarily be linked to those aimed at establishing a just international society and a New International Economic Order and at fighting apartheid, colonialism and all other forms of exploitation and domination.

My country has always expressed its interest in regional disarmament measures, and particularly those concerning the transfer of and trade in weapons in the developing countries. The industrialized supplier countries find there a highly profitable market, and the importing countries are embarking in turn on a race to acquire conventional weapons which are very likely to be used for settling regional conflicts.



(Mrs. Gordah, Tunisia)

If this trend were to continue, the countries which are least inclined to arm themselves at the expense of their development needs would therefore be compelled to do so.

Tunisia is therefore disposed to consider with interest any realistic proposal that would contribute to the search for an equitable solution in terms of regional disarmament, subject to the right of States to safeguard their national defence and security.

Today it is a commonplace to state that a very small proportion of resources devoted to armament would make a decisive contribution to development.

The United Nations is about to start on its third Development Decade. The aims of that Decade will not be met by the resources now available if priorities are not reversed by placing disarmament in the service of development. The time has therefore come for the States responsible for vast military expenditures to translate into reality their political will to reduce military budgets and to transfer the funds thus saved to programmes of economic and social co-operation with the developing countries.

Mr. ANWAR SANI (Indonesia): As is well known, the rate of progress in disarmament negotiations has been inversely proportionate to the amount of words and documents produced by them. Nevertheless, greater efforts should be exerted since the problem of disarmament is an inseparable part of the problem of the survival of mankind. The representative of the United States, in his statement of 19 October, rightly pointed out that the question of disarmament is closely related to the survival and prosperity of mankind. Although the Disarmament Decade proclaimed in 1969 by the United Nations is coming to an end, the objectives of that declaration are still far from realization. The convening of the special session devoted to disarmament has, however, alerted the international community to the dangers of the arms race and the need for urgent action to end that race before it engulfs the world with incalculable consequences.

Much has already been said about the special session. Indonesia regards it as successful in identifying a broad range of issues that were generally supported by Member States.

While we are fully aware of the complexities that are attendant upon problems concerning disarmament, the international community is none the less committed to the implementation of these decisions in good faith.

One of the constructive results of the special session is the establishment of a negotiating machinery to deal with disarmament matters. My delegation is pleased to note that this new body has been set up to replace the old organ. We are gratified that France has indicated its willingness to take part and we hope that the People's Republic of China will also participate in its deliberations. I should like to take this opportunity to express the appreciation of my delegation for the kind words of felicitation extended to us by several delegations upon our election to the Committee on Disarmament. As a new member of this Committee, Indonesia will endeavour to play a constructive role in its activities.

Regarding the proposal to hold a second special session devoted to disarmament, Indonesia shares the view of those who have emphasized the need for adequate preparations before such a session is convened. Additionally, we feel that the stage of implementation of the results of the first special session should also be taken into account before a decision is made on the question of convening a second session.

(Mr. Anwar Sani, Indonesia)

With regard to the proposals for disarmament studies under the auspices of the United Nations, we agree with the Secretary-General that such studies, to be useful, should primarily assist in the identification of specific issues and facilitate the negotiating process. Furthermore, they should also be geared towards the process of implementing the decisions that have already been taken in our Organization.

Indonesia supports the decision to establish a programme of fellowships for future studies on disarmament. Such a programme is particularly needed in the developing countries. In view of the importance that we all attach to questions relating to disarmament, we hope that such a programme will be implemented on a continuous basis in the years ahead.

(Mr. Anwar Sani, Indonesia)

It is now generally accepted that nuclear disarmament is an issue of highest priority. There is also general recognition that the threat of nuclear war is the greatest peril to the survival of mankind. Consequently, nuclear disarmament remains the overriding concern. Responsibility for progress in this field falls on the nuclear Powers, and on the two largest in particular. In this regard, the success of the strategic arms limitation talks is of importance in helping to build an atmosphere of confidence. The present stockpiles are far beyond the level of minimum deterrence and their reduction could set the stage for the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. We hope that SALT II will be concluded soon and will enable the parties to continue their efforts to reach agreements on significant reductions of their nuclear arsenals.

Negotiations for a comprehensive ban on nuclear testing is extraordinarily important to prevent qualitative improvements and the development of new types of weapons. The achievement of such a ban would be a significant step forward. It would reduce the likelihood of further nuclear proliferation both by demonstrating the seriousness of the nuclear States in accepting restraints and by preventing testing by all parties, nuclear and non-nuclear States alike. In this context, Indonesia welcomes the expressions of optimism concerning the ongoing trilateral negotiations and hopes that these will be brought to an early and successful conclusion. As verification constitutes one of the important elements for a comprehensive test ban, an attempt to overcome this difficulty would be an agreement for international seismic data exchange. We also see considerable merit in the proposal advanced by France for the establishment of an international satellite monitoring agency for purposes of verification.

One of the most pressing challenges confronting the international community is the strengthening of the régime against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. A significant contribution to the success of non-proliferation would be the curbing of vertical proliferation to lend credence to the viability of limiting horizontal proliferation. The non-nuclear States which have accepted onerous and one-sided obligations in good faith are

(Mr. Anwar Sani, Indonesia)

entitled to expect the fulfilment of the obligations undertaken in article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by the nuclear States. Furthermore, measures in this regard must be consistent with the rights of all States, without discrimination, to develop nuclear technology for peaceful uses and to determine their peaceful nuclear programmes in accordance with their national needs. As emphasized by the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, the Non-Proliferation Treaty should become universal, with equal rights and obligations being assumed by all members of the international community.

The question of the establishment of regional zones of denuclearization or zones of peace was not accorded sufficient importance during the tenth special session on disarmament. In this regard the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which is already binding on much of Latin America, is making a major contribution to halting nuclear proliferation. A joint declaration by the nuclear Powers in support of nuclear-free zones would constitute one of the most promising approaches toward preventing nuclear proliferation.

Indonesia would like to reaffirm its support for the efforts of the States bordering on the Indian Ocean and of the South-east Asian nations to establish in those regions zones of peace and co-operation. It was with this objective that we endorsed the proposal for a meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean, to be convened next year. However, as the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean makes clear, the negotiations between the big Powers towards the absence of competitive expansion and for restraint in their military activities have not led to much progress. We hope that the talks between them will be resumed soon and will contribute to the realization of the objectives of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

As regards conventional weapons, we agree that these have recently become increasingly sophisticated and approach the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons. We further agree that prohibitions or restrictions should be imposed on those conventional weapons which cause indiscriminate suffering. We hope that the preparatory conference on the prohibition of certain

(Mr. Anwar Sani, Indonesia)

conventional weapons will agree on banning or curbing weapons which are considered to be excessively injurious and indiscriminate in their effects. It should be realized, however, that measures for the limitation or reduction of conventional weapons can hardly begin until after the initiation of a phased reduction of nuclear weapon stockpiles, as it would place inequitable constraints on the non-nuclear States. Furthermore, such measures should ensure and take into consideration the security needs of every country.

In conclusion, disarmament has become the most urgent need of the international community. However, no real progress has been made so far in the reduction of armaments. Partial and collateral measures have done little to bring the world closer to the goal of general and complete disarmament. The special session on disarmament succeeded in outlining the objectives and priority tasks and set forth fundamental principles for negotiations. However, the decisive factor for achieving real measures of disarmament is the political will of States backed by strong moral motivations. While it is evident that an increase in international tension will further speed up the arms race, it is equally clear that an improvement in the international climate is not in itself sufficient to slow it down. Thus we have seen a continuation of the arms race in the midst of political détente. Disarmament considerations must, therefore, become an integral part of international efforts towards détente. It is for these reasons that Indonesia supports an over-all involvement of the United Nations in all efforts to achieve disarmament.

Mr. GANGA-MBALA (Congo) (interpretation from French): At a time when our Committee is dealing once again with such important aspects of disarmament as those included in agenda items 35 to 49, it is necessary, in the opinion of my delegation, to put forward a few considerations concerning the results achieved by our Organization so far in its efforts towards disarmament, with a view to putting a new face upon the world which would be a face of peace. This evaluation is necessary, because it makes it possible for us to establish our future prospects, to make such changes as are necessary and to adapt our various measures to the situation which is required by a world in a constant state of flux.

(Mr. Ganga-Mbala, Congo)

It is quite edifying already to observe that several of the questions under discussion in this debate on disarmament go back to the fourteenth regular session of the General Assembly. At present we are holding the thirty-third regular session, so almost twenty years have now elapsed without any concrete and final solution having been found.

This is all the more disturbing because, while the whole world declares itself ready to work against the arms race, apparently no one among those who have the means of taking up that challenge is ready to make the decisive step, either through selfishness or through political blindness. For twenty years we have been lulling ourselves with illusions. Of course, there is the concept of détente, which is better than that of the cold war. But what would détente be worth if its only foundation were the balance between the arsenals of the great Powers? And since these great Powers impose upon us the theory according to which the process of disarmament is long, we are reduced for the most part to witnessing simple procedural manoeuvres which replace the actual general and complete disarmament process itself.

In any event, in order to display its good intentions, the People's Republic of Congo, well before the special session on disarmament, proceeded to the ratification of various important texts relating to disarmament. To recapitulate these are: the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof; the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction; and, lastly, the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques.

It is certainly not in any vain gesture that we have recalled these various texts. Like many others, they are of considerable importance for the international community.

(Mr. Ganga-Mbala, Congo)

They are a platform which should help, in the short or the long run, to halt the arms race.

Resolution 32/87 A of the General Assembly, which was adopted at the thirty-second session, appeared as one more effort to reinforce the Treaty on the sea-bed, to which more than 60 States are party. This is one more link in the chain of efforts by the international community to put an end to nuclear weapons, because it limits the possibility of deploying these arms in an environment which covers the greater part of the earth's surface. Also, it establishes the necessary conditions for making it possible to exclude completely from the field of the arms race the sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof because it obliges the States parties to continue their negotiations with a view to a more developed demilitarization of the ocean floor.

It is also necessary to emphasize the very important task assigned to the Committee on Disarmament of continuing negotiations for the purpose of achieving a total prohibition of all nuclear tests both in the atmosphere and in outer space, as well as under water, in conformity with General Assembly resolution 1910 (XVIII). In fact, it is necessary to reach general agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction, while bearing in mind the possibility of future agreements to prohibit given types and forms of weapons. Our world must be spared for all time the threat of the use of chemical weapons. In fact, a lasting solution is essential, starting with the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the Treaty on which still has not been accepted by the principal nuclear-weapon States, a circumstance whose immediate consequence is the reticence on the part of non-nuclear countries to adhere to that Treaty.

My delegation would like to express its concern and its disapproval regarding the policy of several nuclear Powers, which consists quite simply of preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons by States which do not at present have them, while they themselves continue to mass and consolidate nuclear armaments. It is quite clear that such a conception cannot promote the cessation of the arms race. Quite the contrary, it induces non-nuclear countries to seek to obtain nuclear weapons.



(Mr. Ganga-Mbala, Congo)

We should like to come to the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones. We are certain that one of the positive elements of the Programme of Action appearing in the Final Document of the tenth special session is the recognition of the usefulness of nuclear-weapon-free zones as an important disarmament measure. This question is of direct interest to us because, as certain other parts of the world, Africa is not at all today spared the nuclear weapon.

It is appropriate to recall that 1974 saw a decisive step forward on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones. It was the twenty-ninth session of the General Assembly in 1974, during the examination of the question of general and complete disarmament, that the Assembly dealt in greater detail with the question of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in South Asia and in the Middle East region. In the spirit of its resolutions 1652 (XVI) and 2033 (XX), the General Assembly re-examined the question of the application of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa.

The nuclear programme of South Africa is a flagrant threat to the security of our continent. This programme has been conducted for more than 15 years, and my delegation has already had occasion to denounce it before the United Nations. Since 1961 South Africa has had a research and test reactor of 20 thermal megawatts, Safari I, supplied by the United States, which uses military grade uranium, as well as another reactor of the same type, Lelindaba-zero, which became critical about 1965. While the United States has since then supplied to that country approximately 104 kilograms of highly enriched uranium and other materials, including small quantities of plutonium, part of which could have been diverted towards an armaments programme, South Africa has recently developed its own process for enriching uranium. The enrichment plant, the over-all capacity of which is probably in the neighbourhood of 2,400 tons spread over several separation units, is already under construction in east Transvaal, 140 kilometres to the east of Johannesburg near Trichard Village. The construction is being kept secret and it is alleged to be a plant for liquifying coal. This enrichment plant will come into operation in 1980 or 1981, and should be completed in 1982, although the Pretoria Government had

(Mr. Ganga-Mbala, Congo)

announced that would not be completed until 1986 or 1987. Thus, by using its own deposits and those of Namibia, whose uranium reserves rank third in the world, South Africa could have accumulated very highly enriched uranium, treated on the spot, and capable of being used for its arms programme, avoiding altogether the control system of a bilateral trade partner or of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Right now, West German, French, Belgian, Swiss and Japanese companies are involved in the construction of this enormous plant for the production of enriched uranium. Therefore, South Africa would be able henceforth to respond to the threat to its security - the security of the white minority population - represented by the black majority in rebellion inside the country, and by the international community.

The pressure exercised by the international community, guided by the Organization of African Unity since 1963, thanks to the setting up of a programme of sanctions which resulted in the compulsory embargo on the supply of arms of 4 November 1977, has reinforced South Africa's determination to equip itself with an absolute means of defence.

South Africa is now clearly making serious preparations to perfect its capacity in the field of nuclear explosions. Its action has no peaceful purpose; these are military projects. There is no doubt that Pretoria will receive from MAN-GHH special compressors having a North Atlantic Treaty Organization code number, which has been given by the Federal Republic of Germany to non-member States only for strategic material.

Moreover, in 1977 the Franco-German company Steigerwald received from the South African Atomic Energy Board an order relating to an electric drilling instrument for its factory for the producing of enriched uranium. This delivery was approved by the secret organization of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization at Paris, the COCOM. All these data are well known throughout the world but we felt it necessary to mention them briefly here so that once again the international community might truly realize the ever increasing danger constantly threatening Africa, our continent, and that all those who in one way or another are aiding South Africa to equip itself with nuclear weapons might assume their responsibilities. The danger threatening us is even greater when it is remembered that above us Israel, which is a steadfast ally of the apartheid régime, is also tirelessly and steadily continuing its nuclear programme.

(Mr. Ganga-Mbala, Congo)

We must act effectively and promptly in order to stop South Africa from becoming the promoter of the arms race in Africa where wretchedness and hunger hold sway, and which has to devote itself peacefully to its own development.

The programme of nuclear-weapon-free zones in South Asia and in the Middle East region must be scrupulously respected. Once again, we know that here and there foreign hands, particularly Western hands, are working to establish and perpetuate this tragic situation to ensure the survival of their economies, their monopolies, and their Machiavellian and selfish interests.

(Mr. Ganga-Mbala, Congo)

Such partial measures as may be adopted through agreements, treaties and conventions stemming from various General Assembly resolutions, should lead us in the near future towards general and complete disarmament. That is the only possible outcome if we are to live in a world of peace. As we have already had occasion to state here, that is not a utopian wish or desire. The world is naturally a world of peace and it must recover its peace totally.

We must oppose categorically the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. We are thinking in terms of the manufacture and development of reduced blast and intensified radiation weapons - that is to say, the neutron bomb - or any other military weapon which may be manufactured in the dark cellars of a particular country.

Efforts to reduce military budgets must perforce be continued. It is indeed distressing to note that vast resources are devoted to military arsenals at a time when crucial problems arise throughout the world and urgently await solutions.

May we hope that the world disarmament conference which is to be convened within the next two years will help us to take a further step in the search for solutions to all the questions facing us so that genuine disarmament may be achieved.

Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) (interpretation from Spanish): The United Nations has devoted considerable effort to disarmament and - although this may seem paradoxical - considerable too are the resources that some States have invested and continue to invest in expanding their arsenals of armaments of all kinds and the necessary means to use them with greater effectiveness and precision.

We are referring, of course, to the activities undertaken by the wealthier countries which have the most advanced technology, especially those producing, developing and amassing nuclear weapons, headed by the two super-Powers - the United States of America and the Soviet Union.

(Mr. Urquía, El Salvador)

All the members of the international community without exception acknowledge the need for disarmament as the appropriate means - together with others which would virtually flow therefrom - to attain and enjoy without despair or fear the well-being to which all are entitled and which would be the result of a system of coexistence based on peace, friendship and co-operation among peoples.

Whether we like it or not, the developments which constitute the history of the last three decades, have made us understand the reasons for the arms race and for the great difficulties encountered in halting it, in reversing its upward trend and in achieving some day the goal of disarmament - or to speak in realistic rather than utopian terms - of general and complete disarmament in the area of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and of limited disarmament, that is to say, of a reasonable general reduction of other types of weapons, in both cases with adequate guarantees of inspection and verification.

The present situation and its very varied circumstances lead us to believe with a certain measure of confidence that the great Powers are not arming themselves because they are bent upon unleashing a war of conquest, as has occurred in the past, or because they intend to impose by force their ideologies or political or socio-economic systems. One of the most outstanding results achieved, thanks to the efforts, and under the aegis, of the United Nations - namely, decolonization - is undoubtedly an irreversible historic phenomenon. There may continue to be spheres of influence but there will no longer be any colonies.

Land, sea and air forces exist and are strengthened daily for avowed purposes of defence. They are the response to the fear of Governments of finding themselves insufficiently prepared to meet probable or possible aggression against themselves or against their allies or protégés.

This fear, this mistrust, this insecurity and uncertainty are the factors which prompt the great Powers to continue to arm while preventing them from achieving positive and effective disarmament agreements. They understand full well that if nuclear weapons are used there will be no victors as in the pre-nuclear era: that all the opposing forces will be victims and that mankind will suffer the consequences.

(Mr. Urquia, El Salvador)

Many of the crises, of acute antagonistic and explosive situations and conflicts, occur today not between the most powerful, those that could wipe each other out, but between medium-sized and small States unable to resolve their differences by the peaceful means and procedures laid down in international law. Instead they resort to violent struggle behind which we almost always find the hands of the great Powers; if they do not ostensibly lend material or human assistance to the contending parties, we often see them in the multinational diplomatic field when they are raised in exercise of the right of veto, thus preventing the adoption by the Security Council of resolutions that are detrimental to one or other of the parties.

The 15 items ranging from items 35 to 49 on the agenda of the General Assembly at present under consideration in this First Committee are all of equal importance. But we do not find among these or among any of the other items that have already been considered, any which sets forth or proposes positive action towards the creation of a different climate from the one to which we have referred, a climate of mutual confidence among the leaders of the great Powers or rather those which possess nuclear weapons. They are very few in number, of course, and this in itself is an advantage. Horizontal proliferation of that kind of weapon, like its vertical proliferation, would obviously increase the dangers of their deliberate use by one of the countries possessing such weapons, of a third world war breaking out by accident or error, or any other nefarious circumstance, a war in which millions of innocent human beings would be the victims, many of them in fact the inhabitants of States and regions in no way involved in the conflict.

The delegation of El Salvador has already referred to some aspects of the items grouped together in the present debate. We did so at the tenth special session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament, in the general debate of the current session of the General Assembly, and recently in this Committee.

(Mr. Urquia, El Salvador)

With regard to most of the draft resolutions on disarmament already before us, the delegation of El Salvador wishes to announce that it is ready to contribute to the consensus if there is one, or to support those draft resolutions by casting an affirmative vote. In those very few cases where we cannot support the draft resolutions we shall in due course explain our abstention or our negative vote.

We should like to refer now, succinctly, to the items on the creation of nuclear-free zones, beginning with those concerning the signature and ratification of the two Additional Protocols to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, not only because El Salvador is a Latin American country, and one of the original parties to that instrument, but because of the intrinsic importance of that document and of the instruments annexed thereto.

(Mr. Urquía, El Salvador)

As stated in a 1978 special report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament:

"The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) is the only instrument concluded so far establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in a densely populated area," and "is also the first agreement on arms limitation, disarmament and collateral disarmament measures to establish an effective system of control under a permanent supervisory organ ...". (A/10027/Add.1, para. 16)

Of the two Additional Protocols, the first provides that the nuclear-weapon-free zone should be extended to certain given territories lying within the area covered by the Treaty and that, de jure or de facto, are under the jurisdiction of States outside the area - namely, the United States, France, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom. The last two have already ratified that Protocol, and it is to be hoped that shortly the other two will also become parties thereto. That is the intent of one of the draft resolutions that El Salvador is pleased to co-sponsor.

Similarly, we are co-sponsoring the draft resolution relating to Protocol II, pursuant to which instrument nuclear-weapon States, by acceding thereto, will be bound to respect the militarily-denuclearized status of Latin America, as defined, delimited and enunciated in the provisions of the Treaty; they will be bound also not to use or threaten to use such weapons against any of the parties to the Treaty.

Despite certain interpretative statements which might perhaps be regarded as reservations, the United States, France and the United Kingdom have acceded to Protocol II, whereas the People's Republic of China has done so outright. The draft resolution to which I referred earlier invites the Soviet Union, which already subscribed to Protocol II, to endeavour shortly to deposit the instrument of ratification.

The wholesome intent of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones, which in Latin America is already reflected in an international instrument in force, and its two Additional Protocols, is contemplated with growing interest by other regions of the world as well. The special report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to which I referred earlier



(Mr. Urquia, El Salvador)

abounds in very valuable information on this point. Among the items currently under consideration by this Committee there are three - 41, 42 and 43 - to which we are sincerely sympathetic, and which are aimed, respectively, at freeing Africa, the Middle East and southern Asia of nuclear weapons. Similarly, item 46 relates to implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. Nothing would be more gratifying to our Government and delegation than to see those and other regions converted into nuclear-weapon-free zones of the kind we in the Latin American community have, happily, established in our region.

The last point I wish to deal with on this occasion is item 48, relating to the World Disarmament Conference, and in particular to the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on that Conference. That report, which was based essentially on the position of nuclear-weapon States, is very far from being final. Its conclusions and recommendations are imprecise. They end with the following words:

"... the Assembly may wish to consider taking any possible steps thereon, pursuant to the above paragraphs, as well as the renewal of the mandate of the Ad Hoc Committee." (A/33/28, para. 13)

Do we find in those words a true conclusion or recommendation? We do not think so. Rather, they contain the overt or covert assertion that the matter is not yet ripe and should continue to be studied, because that is indeed the truth.

In order to arrive at the holding of a plenipotentiary conference where multilateral instruments on disarmament can be signed or concluded, much remains to be done; a considerable amount of preparation and negotiation is still necessary.

With the Final Act of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, the old procedures were left behind and a new phase was opened in the area of disarmament which could prove fruitful if all the powerful States manage to overcome their mistrust and suspicions and contribute in good faith to the conclusion of serious and important instruments on the subject.

(Mr. Urquia, El Salvador)

The process must and will go on with the debates in the Committee on Disarmament and the negotiations in the Disarmament Committee, as well as with the activities of the General Assembly at future sessions, including, of course, the work of this First Committee. How much longer will this process last? No one can say, and no one is in a position to forecast accurately.

Let us not forget that in respect of disarmament, as in regard to many other matters discussed in the United Nations, the consent of the great Powers - in this case the nuclear-weapon States - is essential and decisive.

The early convening of a world disarmament conference would mean exposing ourselves if not to failure at least to delays similar to those we have been witnessing in the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.

Nor should we forget the wise counsel of Emperor Augustus: "festina lente" - make haste slowly - which centuries later was paraphrased by Napoleon in addressing his aide de camp.

Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): Today I wish to make some remarks on problems connected with controlling and reducing conventional arms. These conventional non-nuclear weapons represent, in terms of expenditure, by far the largest part of all existing weapons. They also happen to be the weapons that have been used in all wars and in all armed conflicts since the Second World War. Controlling and reducing conventional arms is, therefore, of immediate relevance to the prevention of war and the maintenance of peace.

These two considerations - that is, on the one hand, the gigantic and growing arsenals of conventional weapons, and, on the other hand, the fact that it is those weapons that are actually being used in wars and armed conflicts today - have perhaps not received sufficient attention in the interventions of those of our colleagues who consider that a genuine effort by all States to control and reduce existing conventional armaments should only be undertaken after important nuclear disarmament measures have been agreed upon.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

My Government considers progress in nuclear and conventional disarmament of equal importance, and regards the present situation in both areas as a matter of grave concern. I may recall in this connexion paragraph 46 of the Final Document of the special session devoted to disarmament in which it is stated that:

"Nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items [for disarmament negotiations] concurrently."  
(resolution S-10/2)

Conventional weapons are, according to paragraph 45 of that same document, amongst those items.

All States are affected by the quantitative growth or the qualitative improvement of conventional arsenals in other States, and all States, for that reason, have a common responsibility in trying to control the dynamics of that process. The more important the armaments of a particular State are the greater its contribution to our common efforts to arrive at general and complete disarmament should be. As long as the achievement of that goal is not in sight a more immediate goal should be the lowering of the level of military potential on a reciprocal and agreed basis. Of course we do not deny the inherent right of each sovereign State to acquire the means it finds necessary for its self-defence.

The enormous increase of the international trade in conventional weapons that we have witnessed during the last few years can, however, hardly be considered a rational development. Essentially we are witnessing a tremendous waste of resources which could have been applied to far better purposes. In addition, the accumulation of weapons tends to aggravate situations of tension. It is indeed most desirable that this spiralling development be brought to a halt. As we see it, one can only expect States to exercise self-restraint in this respect if the political will to avoid armed conflicts is present and if States can be confident that other States exercise the same self-restraint. As to that last condition - that is, the question of how the international community might succeed in significantly reducing the arms trade and arms production - we quite frankly must admit not to have a ready answer. It would,

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

seem however that after the special session on disarmament the political climate has become somewhat more favourable to a common effort to arrive at international measures for controlling and reducing the transfer and production of conventional arms.

Here I may recall paragraphs 83 through 85 of the Final Document of the special session on disarmament, in which we have committed ourselves to strive for agreements on the limitation and reduction of armed forces and of conventional weapons; to hold bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations and conferences for the consideration of different aspects of conventional disarmament; and, finally, to carry out consultations among major arms suppliers and recipient countries on the limitation of all types of international transfer of conventional weapons. This whole process is still in its first stage, and very little has been achieved up till now.

However, we welcome two recent initiatives in Latin America in this field: Venezuela seeks to review the 1974 Ayacucho Declaration calling for restraint, and Mexico convened a 20-nation conference last August also for considering restraint in the conventional field. My Government would strongly favour an enhanced effort in this area and is willing to continue its participation in this process.

After those observations of a more general nature, I now wish to turn to a number of specific issues in this area which we have on our agenda.

Some of our colleagues have already pointed to what seems a promising approach in the field of conventional disarmament. I refer to the concept of regional disarmament. The present arms race does indeed have many regional aspects, as a consequence of which one might also speak in the plural of arms races.

Regional arms races have their own impulses and characteristics. Efforts to control and subsequently reverse those arms races should therefore take those regional aspects into consideration. However, one should not lose sight of the fact that in most regions of the world the security situation, to a greater or lesser extent, is also dependent on militarily important States outside those regions. The Netherlands Government believes, however, that

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

regional measures of arms control and disarmament will positively contribute to regional and international security if the following conditions are met. The initiative for a regional arrangement should come from within the region itself; it should be sufficiently supported by the States in the region and there should be appropriate verification measures agreed upon; and, finally, States outside the region should not take advantage of such arrangements or otherwise contravene the objectives thereof.

My Government also believes that the United Nations General Assembly should play a stimulating role in this field by deciding to undertake a study and by adopting resolutions supporting initiatives for regional arrangements. With that in mind my Government supports the draft resolution on this subject that, as I understand from our Belgian colleague, will be submitted by him and in which the Secretary-General is requested to carry out a study on the regional aspects of disarmament.

At this point may I also inform the Committee of my Government's willingness to join in sponsoring draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.21 on confidence-building measures which has been submitted to us by our colleague from the Federal Republic of Germany. The significance of those measures is not restricted to the regional context, as in the case of the Belgian draft resolution.

The conventional arms race should be "suffocated" - to use an expression of my Canadian colleague - by reducing on a mutually agreed basis the means available for military expenditures. Besides being a collateral disarmament measure, the reduction of military budgets would also open up the possibility of reallocating resources now being used for military purposes to social and economic development. Another important advantage of this measure would be that it would increase confidence among States. Since the report on the question of comparing military budgets among different countries that was presented to us by the Secretary-General in 1975, unfortunately there has been no real progress in this area.

A first step to facilitate the reduction of military budgets would be the testing and further development of an instrument for standardized reporting on military expenditures which in a following stage should receive

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

a world-wide application and thus form the basis for actual reductions. The Netherlands Government has offered to submit its defence budget to a pilot test of the reporting instrument, and that offer still stands. We hope that the participation in that test will be truly representative and that the General Assembly at this session will take the decision to carry out such a practical test as a first step to the world-wide application of the reporting instrument.

May I therefore recommend to the Committee draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.18 on the reduction of military budgets, in the operative part of which the Secretary-General is requested to carry out such a pilot test. I am happy to inform the Committee that my Government is willing to join in sponsoring that draft resolution.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

It is difficult to indicate to what extent disarmament and development are connected, although it is certain that significant reductions of military expenditures should increase the possibility of using human and often scarce natural resources for social and economic development. These objectives, although linked, should, in the opinion of my Government, also be pursued each independently, on their own account. Lack of progress in the field of disarmament, therefore, should never be considered a valid reason for less than serious efforts for economic and social co-operation with the developing countries.

It is against this background that the Netherlands has supported the activities of, and has been represented in, the group of governmental experts on the relationship between disarmament and development. We welcome the start of the work by the group of experts, and as a co-sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.17, my Government hopes that the General Assembly will take the appropriate decisions to ensure the success of this expert study.

In conclusion, I wish to turn to the report of the Preparatory Conference for the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects. We are confident that during the second session of the Preparatory Conference next spring the work can and will be completed with regard to the remaining organizational matters and that simultaneously substantive issues can be dealt with. After lengthy discussions and negotiations on the category of inhumane weapons during the past few years, we hope that the United Nations Conference will result in tangible and meaningful agreements which take due account of humanitarian considerations. In our view, draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.26, which deals with this subject and which my delegation is co-sponsoring, would deserve the unanimous support of all members of the Committee.

Mr. PEARSON (Canada): To prevent war and to maintain international stability, most Members of the United Nations believe that they must be prepared to defend themselves, either singly or collectively. This means

(Mr. Pearson, Canada)

that unless and until there is a radical change of attitudes amongst peoples and Governments, which we cannot realistically anticipate soon, the goal of general and complete disarmament is bound to continue to seem a distant one.

Deterrence has been an important, perhaps decisive, factor in preventing a global war during the past three decades, but there is no assurance that deterrence will continue indefinitely to provide stability if the nuclear arms race continues. The appearance of new, more accurate and more efficient systems of weapons may upset the present balance or create perceptions and fears that it will do so. At the same time, the proliferation of nuclear weapons could increase the risk of war by accident or miscalculation, as well as make arms control agreements more difficult to achieve and verify. For example, 10 years ago the United States and the USSR possessed approximately 2,700 strategic missile warheads. Today, this number is reported to be close to 15,000. In addition, new weapons can erode the viability of, and confidence in, existing arms control treaties. Thus, continuing development and production of nuclear weapons is fraught with such dangers that at some point in the near future the factors weighing against the use of nuclear weapons may be undermined.

We believe there cannot be any long-term solution to the problem of so-called horizontal proliferation unless the two major nuclear Powers succeed in halting and reversing vertical proliferation, as they are pledged to do by article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Even in the short term, failure by the United States and the USSR to reach agreement to curb substantially their strategic nuclear-weapon systems can seriously jeopardize the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime. We know that the two major nuclear-weapon Powers are conscious of these realities; otherwise they would not be committed to seeking agreement in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). We understand, too, that the SALT negotiations deal with the vital security interests of the United States and the USSR and their allies, and that in these circumstances progress cannot easily be made. However, we must confess that we find the pace of these negotiations very slow in view of the vital interest that we all have in their successful conclusion.



(Mr. Pearson, Canada)

My Government reiterates its earnest hope that the talks will soon lead to agreement. Our attitude towards them is and will be guided by the following factors. First, negotiations should be pursued as an ongoing process, with each successful agreement setting the stage for the next round of negotiations. Secondly, SALT should seek not only restraints but also substantially reduced ceilings on strategic nuclear weapons. Thirdly, SALT should seek not only quantitative limitations and reductions but also far-reaching limitations and prohibitions on qualitative improvements and innovations in such weaponry. Fourthly, agreements must be verifiable and thus give assurance they will be observed. Fifthly, we understand that a ban on the flight-testing of strategic delivery vehicles can be verified by national technical means and thus may be one useful and feasible way to seek to curtail the qualitative aspects of the arms race. With those thoughts in mind, my delegation fully supported the language of paragraphs 50 and 52 of the Final Document of the special session on disarmament, with their emphasis on both qualitative and quantitative limitations. We also supported resolution 32/87 G adopted by the Assembly last year, and we continue to do so.

I wish to repeat here the views of Canada on a comprehensive test ban, which was the first of the four points outlined by my Prime Minister in his "strategy of suffocation" to arrest the dynamics of the nuclear arms race. A treaty prohibition of nuclear tests, with effective verification to provide adequate assurance of compliance, would be an additional qualitative restraint on the nuclear weapon development process and thus have an impact on vertical proliferation. As a multilateral treaty to which non-nuclear-weapon States as well as nuclear-weapon States might adhere, it would also have value in reinforcing the international system to prevent horizontal proliferation. We believe that a comprehensive test ban should be pursued as a matter of urgency as stipulated in paragraph 51 of the Final Document of the special session. We understand that the negotiations now being pursued by the United States, the United Kingdom and the USSR are close to conclusion and we can look forward to early consideration of the results in the Committee on Disarmament.

(Mr. Pearson, Canada)

On many occasions, and most recently during the special session, Canada and many other States have drawn attention to the fact that agreement on the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapon purposes would also contribute to the ending of the nuclear arms race. We welcome the explicit recognition of this approach in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the special session. Obviously, as is the case with many other measures in the disarmament field, the usefulness of such an agreement would depend on the application of effective verification measures, which in this instance should include acceptance of full-scope or comprehensive safeguards under IAEA or some equivalent system.

(Mr. Pearson, Canada)

The objective, in our opinion, should be the elaboration by the Committee on Disarmament of a multilateral treaty, to which both non-nuclear and nuclear-weapon States might adhere, prohibiting the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and prohibiting the diversion for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices of any fissionable material produced in connexion with peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Such a measure would have the advantage of focussing in the same instrument on both the vertical and horizontal dimensions of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, before negotiations could proceed very far in the multilateral phase, it would be desirable for the two major nuclear Powers, and any other nuclear-weapon States willing to participate, to explore the cut-off aspects, including the verification aspects applying particularly to nuclear-weapon States. Verification backed up by full-scope safeguards would ensure that all parties to such an eventual treaty would be bound essentially to the safeguards accepted by the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Canada therefore believes that it would be appropriate, especially in view of the renewed interest shown in this subject, that this question be given early consideration in the Committee on Disarmament.

My remarks so far have been directed mostly to actual or potential negotiations about agreements on nuclear-arms control. I have, in the context of the comprehensive test ban and the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, already recalled the "strategy of suffocation" which my Prime Minister outlined before the special session devoted to disarmament. Two other elements of that strategy, as he noted them, would be agreements to stop flight-testing of all new strategic delivery vehicles and to limit and then progressively to reduce military spending on all new strategic nuclear-weapon systems, subject to the proper verification procedures. All four of these elements remain important and should not be put aside. Even if at the present moment concrete steps towards implementation of the whole strategy may be premature, nevertheless they can and should be studied, either individually or as part of a concerted approach. The special session has already commissioned a somewhat similar study on disarmament and international security. We are also looking forward to the recommendations of the Secretary-General's Advisory Board

(Mr. Pearson, Canada)

concerning a United Nations Studies Programme. We would expect that a part of this programme would include the constructive proposal by Sweden for a study of nuclear-weapon systems. Such a study would provide a further opportunity to examine the kind of approach proposed by Canada that I have just recalled.

Clearly, balanced reductions of military expenditures in a bilateral, regional or even world-wide context would also have considerable benefits. As I mentioned earlier in my statement on agenda item 125 on 27 October, the development of a standardized system of reporting could open the way to the possibility of creating measures for the reduction of military expenditures. We ought to consider the possibility of multilateral discussions on how and in what fields of military spending these reductions could be implemented. The necessary conditions for progress would be a greater willingness to make information available and the need for adequate verification. I do express disappointment that support for a pilot study of a standardized reporting system has been limited so far to a very small number of countries. Without the participation of countries from different geo-political groups, including all nuclear-weapon States, any such test would be of limited value.

Four fifths of the \$400 billion or so spent on weapons each year is spent on so-called conventional weapons. In our opinion, the time has come for an examination of all aspects of the problem of conventional disarmament, including the transfer of arms. We are aware that such transfers are now the object of bilateral talks between the United States and the USSR. We assume that these talks will involve, at a later stage, other major suppliers. However, it seems to us that this approach could usefully be complemented by multilateral and regional approaches involving importers. The Committee on Disarmament should give more attention to this subject. The objective would be to achieve the same security at a lower level of armaments and to introduce some qualitative and quantitative restraints on production as well as on transfers.

We also hope that the Conference on the prohibition or restriction of the use of certain conventional weapons will be able to complete its task next year by producing meaningful agreements prohibiting or limiting the use of various weapons. Military and security considerations are, of course, legitimate, but they must also be weighed against humanitarian concerns. If we cannot prevent war, at least we can try to limit its effects.

(Mr. Pearson, Canada)

The Latin American countries have given the rest of the international community a unique example in the field of regional approaches to disarmament. The Treaty of Tlatelolco has so far established the only nuclear-weapon-free zone in a populated area and constitutes a rare success. We are particularly pleased by the willingness of all the nuclear-weapon Powers to enter into the formal and binding obligations required by Additional Protocols I and II of the Treaty. We strongly hope that the few remaining countries of that zone which have not yet done so will ratify the Treaty in the near future and waive the conditions for its entry into force for themselves also, so that the objectives of the Treaty are completely and universally achieved.

Latin America is also to be commended for its efforts to agree on self-restraints in the field of conventional weapons. If the signatories of the Ayacucho Declaration succeed in their enterprise, they will have once more achieved another "first" in disarmament. I wish to reiterate our full support for this promising undertaking.

Another example of the regional approach is to be found in the confidence-building measures agreed to among the signatories of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe. We hope that those measures so far agreed can be extended and that other regions of the world will be able to initiate similar efforts.

The negotiation of a treaty on chemical weapons has been given high priority by this Assembly for many years, and intensive bilateral discussions are going on between the USSR and the United States to produce, as requested, a joint initiative for submission to the Conference on Disarmament. We understand that progress is being made but that it may take some time before the key elements of a treaty can be submitted to the Committee on Disarmament by their two sponsors. We should like to express here the strong hope that when the Committee meets it will start work on areas where there is already a large measure of agreement, such as the scope of a future treaty, whether or not the bilateral negotiations are complete. It is obvious that there will be considerable work to be done before we begin the negotiation of a multilateral treaty on chemical weapons. We believe that the Committee on Disarmament could usefully begin this task by establishing a working group which, for example, could deal with the definition of chemical weapons.

(Mr. Pearson, Canada)

I have commented briefly on some of the items listed on our agenda. Each of them deserves more time than it is possible to give in this debate, even though some have been the subject of intense scrutiny for many years. We know that oratory will not bring agreement. We also know that very real differences of view are the cause of stalemate or of slow progress. But in the absence of genuine negotiation on a multilateral basis, there is little alternative to the making of speeches. We express at the United Nations our collective sense of urgency. As Dag Hammarskjöld put it over twenty years ago:

"... people might rightly feel that it is not in keeping with their reasonable rights to life to have to live under the kind of threat which ... emerges from the total situation as it develops while the discussions are going on".

That threat is greater now, and we therefore welcome the fact that prospects of agreement on further measures to restrain the strategic arms race appear to be good. Arms control measures are clearly vital. But we must move on and move soon to real disarmament if we are to keep control of the human future itself.

The CHAIRMAN (Interpretation from Spanish): The next speaker is the representative of Iran, who will formally introduce the draft resolution in document A/C.1/33/L.31.

Mr. HOVEYDA (Iran): The last four regular sessions of the General Assembly have seen consecutive presentation and almost unanimous adoption of the proposal dealing with the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. The special session of the General Assembly on disarmament also devoted a considerable amount of time to this subject. The host of existing resolutions, recommendations, reports and articles bearing on the subject obviate the need to redefine the scope and significance of this proposal. The support it is receiving from all countries concerned, both within and outside the region, suggests also that the concerns underlying this proposal need hardly be further justified.

(Mr. Hoveyda, Iran)

These facts notwithstanding, progress towards the implementation of the proposal has unfortunately been non-existent; nor has the desire of the co-sponsors and the supporters to get the proposal off the ground so far met with any measure of success. This is a classic example of an important and indeed crucial proposal on whose validity and basic premises all concerned, parties and non-parties alike, claim agreement, but with little success in moving it forward.

To be sure, complexities involved in the implementation of the proposal are foreboding. Nor can the advocacy of conventional means and methods for the realization of the idea stand the test of credibility in the face of the particular setting of the region the proposal purports to cover. This background does not offer a welcome augury for the continuation of the endeavours towards the implementation of a nuclear-weapon-zonal scheme in the Middle East. However, in this area where stakes are so high, we dare not succumb to disillusionment or despair. On the contrary, the world is witnessing the emergence of a new era in the Middle East. The implements of diplomacy are at work to explore new possibilities in this embittered region. At this stage of hectic diplomatic activity seeking to ensure a just and durable peace, more than at any other time we can ill afford the introduction of nuclear weapons into this area which are bound seriously to undermine chances of peace. It would constitute a most dangerous step towards nuclear-weapon proliferation in the world. The implication of such a turn of events would go far beyond the mere spectre of another ruinous arms race. And the consequences of allowing nuclear weapons into the region would far transcend the peace and the security of the immediate area under consideration.

It is this acute sense of responsibility and responsiveness to the situation in the Middle East that has once again prompted the delegations of Bahrain, Egypt and Iran to produce a new draft resolution, which I now have the honour to introduce. It is also the encouragement that this proposal and its potentialities have received from the special session that has led us once again to pursue this undertaking.

In this connexion the Committee will recall that the idea of the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in general received a new lease of

(Mr. Hoveyda, Iran)

life during the special session on disarmament. The approach was recognized as constituting an important disarmament measure. Hence, the necessity of taking practical steps for the promotion of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East was given a particular emphasis.

The present draft resolution consists of six preambular paragraphs. The first four paragraphs trace the background to the present draft resolution. The general thrust of previous resolutions is incorporated in these paragraphs and does not, as such, require explanation. The fifth preambular paragraph refers in general terms to the recommendations contained in the Final Document of the special session, while the last paragraph draws on a specific theme that is also covered in the same document.

The contents of the operative paragraphs follow the pattern of thought in the previous resolutions. In terms of structure, due care has been taken to preserve the general trends followed in past decisions. The modifications in format in the first three operative paragraphs have not been formulated to project new ideas; they have only been necessitated in order to recapitulate and reflect already accepted themes contained both in previous resolutions and in the Final Document of the special session.

The only notable substantive change in the operative part appears in paragraph four. It invites parties directly concerned to declare their support for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and to deposit these declarations with the Security Council.

The idea emanates from paragraph 63 (d) of the Final Document of the special session and involves the elaboration of a Security Council role in the advancement of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, envisaged therein. The declarations of support from all parties directly concerned are, in one way or another, a matter of record with the only additional element being their deposition with the Security Council, which could place the whole undertaking on a more solid foundation. As is clearly evident, the consideration of the Security Council role is perceived in a flexible manner. This flexibility applies both to the methods by which it is hoped the purport of the said paragraph will be implemented and the time frame and the necessary stages towards the advancement of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, within which the carrying out of the suggested procedure is invited.



(Mr. Hoveyda, Iran)

The paragraph should not, as such, create any undue difficulties for the parties concerned and it is hoped that it will be welcomed as a new impetus for its realization. The invitation to the Secretary-General to continue his efforts is renewed in operative paragraph 6. Here again the pattern follows previous decisions and the sponsors agree that he should have full freedom of action with respect to his mandate.

As in the past four years, the sponsors have been careful to eschew, in terms of form as well as content, anything that might give legitimate cause for dissension on the part of any member of this Committee. Therefore it is our hope that all sides concerned, as well as each and every Member of the Organization, will concur in this opinion and adopt the resolution unanimously.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): The next speaker is the representative of France, who will introduce formally to the Committee the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/33/L.12/Rev.1, A/C.1/33/L.13/Rev.1 and A/C.1/33/L.14.

Mr. LEPRETTE (France) (interpretation from French): It is my privilege today to present to the First Committee of the present session of the General Assembly three draft resolutions which the French delegation has submitted under agenda item 125 on a review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session.

These drafts deal with three essential subjects discussed in the disarmament debate, namely, specific measures to be undertaken to channel a part of the resources unjustly swallowed up by the arms race to the benefit of the developing countries which require them most - draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.12/Rev.1; secondly, to contribute to and encourage disarmament agreements through systematic recourse to means of control on advanced observation techniques by satellite - draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.13/Rev.1; and lastly, to give the international community the international instrument on conceptual and applied research which should promote negotiations on disarmament and security - draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.14.

(Mr. Leprette, France)

Some were surprised to find that the three proposals made by the President of the French Republic from the rostrum of this Organization on 25 May last should have been the subject of specific resolutions at the current session. I should like to recall in this connexion that those proposals, like the procedures required for their consideration, are quite old and have been sufficiently thought out to enable the First Committee to take such further action as is necessary. In the Preparatory Committee for the tenth special session of the General Assembly, I already explained on 24 February 1978 the reasons and the philosophy behind them. Consideration was sufficiently advanced last May for the successive versions of the Final Document, which was to be adopted on 30 June 1978, to include the relevant paragraphs relating to their consideration.

At that time we took account of the objection of a delegation to the adoption by the special session of decisions involving financial implications, however small they might be, and we did not wish to destroy the consensus that was emerging. We therefore confined ourselves to mentioning in paragraph 125 of the Final Document the existence of the three proposals made by France.

It appears to me quite obvious that in the last nine months everyone here has been in a position to assess the merits of the proposals made by the head of the French State. Therefore, it appears to me both proper and quite in keeping with the recommendations contained in paragraph 125 of the Final Document to follow up during the current session the memoranda issued as official documents last June.

It is not my intention to tax the patience of the Committee by explaining those proposals again in detail. However, I believe it useful to draw the attention of this Committee to some of the features of the draft resolutions now before it. First of all, it will be noted that we have not sought to establish an identical procedure for the action to be taken on each of the three proposals. We have not done so for reasons of economy and in order to take into account the special nature of the bodies which we wish to establish.

(Mr. Leprette, France)

Thus, with respect to the international satellite monitoring agency, we assess the boldness and novelty of our initiative. We believe that it requires consideration at two levels: at the political level, first of all, Member States will have to reply to an inquiry by the Secretary-General which could and should sum up the advantages and disadvantages that Governments may see in the establishment of an international monitoring system based on their security requirements. Then it will be necessary to convene a group of experts who will undertake what has been called a feasibility study. In other words, in the light of the Secretary-General's inquiry, that group will study the conditions for the possible establishment of a satellite monitoring agency, bearing in mind the legal, economic, financial and technical implications of the establishment of such a body. It is not certain that the study will be concluded before the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly, but in any case it should be undertaken by then because, in the opinion of the French delegation, the international community would be failing in its duty if it did not make use of the most advanced technological advances to promote a climate of mutual confidence without which there can be neither disarmament nor security.

If we compare the enormous sums spent on developing means of destruction and the derisory sums devoted to research and to the implementation of disarmament instruments we would not hesitate to undertake in good faith the inquiries and studies requested by the French Government.

Observation of earth by satellite is a widespread practice. In the next 10 years many countries, including France, will master those techniques and will have that method at their disposal. Therefore, the whole of the international community must benefit from that progress in a spirit of peace and co-operation.

(Mr. Leprette, France)

May I point out, moreover, that the President of one of the countries which possesses those means recently and publicly recognized that their use would serve to ensure the security of his country. Further, I should like to point out that the specialized press and certain important universities have undertaken studies, the conclusions of which are positive as to the control of disarmament agreements by observation satellites. Finally, we should recall that certain members of the Security Council of the United Nations this year recognized, through their most authorized spokesmen, that that fundamental body of our Organization could derive the greatest benefits from means of satellite control under Article 34 of the United Nations Charter.

To turn now to the possible establishment of a disarmament fund for development, the First Committee will note that the French delegation did not feel it necessary to call for a study by a new group of experts as it had initially envisaged. Neither has it maintained the idea of calling directly on the Committee on Disarmament, aware as it is of the heavy programme of work of that body and of its important priorities. Noting, however, that the General Assembly had already set up a group of governmental experts who were to study the complex relationship between disarmament and development, which group held its first meeting in Geneva last September, and having determined that its Chairman would welcome the study that we proposed, the French delegation felt it pertinent to request of the Group of Experts set up under paragraph 94 of the Final Document the inclusion on its agenda of the question of the establishment of a disarmament fund for development pursuant to the ways and means laid down in the memorandum issued as document A/S-10/AC.1/28. We have no doubt that that group, attended by so many distinguished personalities who work with conviction in favour of disarmament and who come from countries which show in an exemplary manner their desire to assist the developing countries, will give the French proposal the priority and attention we feel it deserves.

Finally, I come to the International Institute for Disarmament Research. This new body which, in order to be useful, should enjoy the greatest scientific autonomy while being attached to our Organization from the administrative point of view, could not overburden the existing structures. We want to avoid duplication

(Mr. Leprette, France)

or conflicts of competence. The Secretary-General of our Organization already has at his disposal the Centre for Disarmament and the Advisory Board on research in the field of disarmament. But it is equally obvious that if the Centre for Disarmament is to remain the pillar of the disarmament negotiations, thanks to the summaries and studies it can prepare for the negotiations, there are no ways or means of pursuing a permanent programme of conceptual and applied research on all questions of disarmament and security, in particular when we must determine the consequences of the emergence of new military technologies, and the fate of international security as a result of the implementation of new strategies, in other words, a number of problems which deserve a perspective and continued approach, which is so far something that has only been possible in the partial framework of certain national institutions whose authority is not questioned. In the view of the French delegation the establishment of an international institute where, in complete independence, the different views depending on military systems or regional conditions could be compared is fully justified. That is why draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.14, which we are submitting to the General Assembly for adoption, requests the Secretary-General to report on this question at the thirty-fourth session. Mr. Kurt Waldheim will of course have the benefit of the opinion of the Advisory Board, the establishment of which he has requested, and which is to hold its first session in New York.

I hope I have shown that while the French proposals in draft resolutions A/C.1/33/L.12/Rev.1, A/C.1/33/L.13/Rev.1, and A/C.1/33/L.14, pursue ambitious aims, my delegation has, however, provided for realistic and progressive implementation procedures. My delegation is gratified that our actions should have been apparently understood since we are in a position to announce that a number of countries have sought to co-sponsor these draft resolutions. I wish to thank them in particular and I have no doubt that their active support will enable us to adopt by consensus the texts that they have sponsored.

The countries are as follows: draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.12/Rev.1, "Disarmament and development" - Botswana, Cameroon, Canada, Congo, Denmark, Egypt, France, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Senegal, Sweden, Turkey, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zaire; draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.13/Rev.1,

(Mr. Leprette, France)

"Monitoring of Disarmament Agreements and Strengthening of Security" - Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Egypt, France, Ghana, Greece, Haiti, India, Indonesia, Italy, Liberia, Peru, Portugal, Senegal, Tunisia, Turkey and Yugoslavia; and draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.14, "Programme of research and studies on disarmament" - Argentina, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany (Federal Republic of), Ghana, Greece, Haiti, India, Ireland, Italy, Jordan, the Netherlands, the Philippines, Portugal, Romania, Turkey, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Yugoslavia and Zambia.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I call next on the representative of Nigeria, who will formally introduce draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.23.

Mr. ADENIJI (Nigeria): On behalf of the delegations of Ethiopia, India, Liberia, Mexico, Nigeria, Norway, Romania, Sweden, and Venezuela, who have now been joined by the delegations of Afghanistan, Egypt, Jamaica, Jordan and Yugoslavia, I wish to introduce briefly the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/33/L.23 entitled "Effective measures to implement the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade".

The draft resolution is simple and straightforward, and we would hope it is forward-looking since it is designed to promote as much as possible in the future efforts to implement the elements of the Disarmament Decade and to make it possible to continue action beyond the end of the present Decade.

If it recalls the gloomy but accurate assessment of the Final Document of the special session regarding the objectives of the Decade, it is not in a spirit of recrimination or self-deprecation. Were it otherwise the co-sponsors would have inserted an operative paragraph condemning the lack of accomplishment of the objectives of the Decade.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

We believe that the special session devoted to disarmament having undertaken the necessary assessment of the implementation or non-implementation of the objectives of the Decade, the resolution of the thirty-third session should be forward-looking.

In its preambular paragraphs, therefore, the draft resolution reaffirms the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade, recalls the assessment of the special session - although these objectives are far from being accomplished, since the arms race is increasing rather than diminishing - and it expresses concern at the continued wastage of resources on armaments and the consequent detrimental effect on international security and the attainment of the New International Economic Order.

As a basis for its operative paragraphs the draft resolution recalls the decisions of the special session on the elements in the Programme of Action of the Decade - namely, the comprehensive programme of disarmament and the expert study on disarmament and development.

In completing its preambular part, the draft resolution affirms the basic objective of the Programme of Action of the special session, which is the urgent need for the promotion of negotiations on effective measures for the cessation of the arms race, especially in the nuclear field, leading to general and complete disarmament.

In its operative paragraphs the draft resolution gives expression to the urgent need for a co-ordinated programme of disarmament. In keeping with the decision of the special session, operative paragraph 1 calls upon the Disarmament Commission - which should have the first say - to give priority consideration to the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament at its 1979 session and to transmit its recommendations through the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly to the Committee on Disarmament.

(Mr. Adeniji, Nigeria)

There is a widely-held view that the comprehensive programme of disarmament ought to be ready for adoption by the next special session devoted to disarmament which, it is to be hoped, will be held in 1982. If this target is to be met, then the negotiations on the comprehensive programme in the Committee on Disarmament will have to start by 1980. This can only happen if the Disarmament Commission is given the opportunity during its 1979 session to consider the elements of the comprehensive programme as we all agreed during the special session devoted to disarmament.

Operative paragraph 3 of the draft resolution takes note of the preparations for the strategy for the Third United Nations Development Decade and stresses the need to continue to promote the link between the strategy for disarmament and the strategy for development. It will be recalled, in this connexion, that the special session in paragraph 35 of its Final Document stated that:

'There is ... a close relationship between disarmament and development. Progress in the former would help greatly in the realization of the latter.' (A/RES/S-10/2, para. 35)

Finally, the draft resolution in consideration of the impending end of the First Disarmament Decade, and in order to enable the United Nations to promote in a concerted manner the objectives of the strategy for disarmament and of the strategy for development, has made provision, in operative paragraph 4, for the 'Consideration of the Declaration of the 1980s as a Disarmament Decade'. This item on the agenda of the thirty-fourth session should give the First Committee the opportunity of considering the strategy for the Second Disarmament Decade, to run concurrently with the Third United Nations Development Decade.

It is the hope of the co-sponsors that the draft resolution will be adopted by consensus.

I wish also to announce that the delegation of Kenya wishes to be a co-sponsor of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/33/L.23.



Mr. URQUIA (El Salvador) (interpretation from Spanish): If there is no objection, I should like to state that my delegation wishes to sponsor the three draft resolutions introduced this afternoon by the representative of France: A/C.1/33/L.12/Rev.1, L.13/Rev.1, and L.14.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from Spanish): I wish to inform the Committee that the delegation of Jordan has expressed its desire to become a sponsor of the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/33/L.30 and L.31.

The meeting rose at 5.20 p.m.