

United Nations
**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**

THIRTY-THIRD SESSION

Official Records*



FIRST COMMITTEE
41st meeting
held on
Thursday, 16 November 1978
at 3 p.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 41ST MEETING

Chairman: Mr. PASTINEN (Finland)

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Distr. GENERAL

A/C.1/33/PV.41

17 November 1978

ENGLISH

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Mr. RAJAKOSKI (Finland): In the statement I intend to make now I shall limit myself to nuclear disarmament. With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will address myself to other disarmament questions at a later stage.

Without trying to create unfounded illusions, I think it is right to say that the year 1978, which will soon end, has been an exceptionally active year in the field of disarmament. With regard to the special session on disarmament, which we discussed previously, I would only like to say that one of the main achievements of the special session was the fact that it focused the interest of not only many Governments but also a vast public opinion, as well as international organizations, on the importance of the primordial problem of mankind today: the arms race. The new impetus which is given by the special session on disarmament should be fully used also in the endeavours of this First Committee.

The Final Document and especially its Programme of Action provide a new platform for disarmament efforts. They clearly indicate the ultimate goals and underline the priorities, and that nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization. There are, however, some vital areas where the Final Document is not comprehensive enough. This is particularly true in regard to the issues of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, including the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones.

To arrive at a text adopted by consensus on such a delicate problem as non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is undeniably an achievement per se. In our view, however, many formulations are fairly weak and ambiguous. We would have preferred a stronger text. In the formulations there seems to be an assumption that a safeguards system would hinder the utilization of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. On the contrary, we think that one of the biggest

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obstacles to international co-operation in the field of nuclear energy is the fact that the non-proliferation régime and the accompanying safeguards arrangements are not yet comprehensive. Last year we had an extensive debate on the whole issue of non-proliferation, which resulted in resolution 32/87 F. While stressing the need to guard against the diversion of nuclear energy to military purposes, the resolution also recognized the right of all countries to develop and use nuclear energy for their economic and social development.

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Thus the only right track to follow is to strengthen the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by enhancing the effectiveness of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and its safeguards system. We are happy to note that some positive developments have taken place in this field. The participation in the non-proliferation Treaty has been steadily increasing, and we welcome the announcements by countries like Indonesia and Turkey that their Governments intend to ratify the Treaty before long. This will further strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The number of safeguard agreements between parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency has been growing as well. This has widened the scope of the Agency's work in ensuring that nuclear energy is used for peaceful purposes only. The strengthening of the safeguard system of the Agency is also needed because of the rapid technological development in the field of nuclear sciences. Therefore we note with satisfaction that the budget of the Agency for 1979 was adopted in a form that will strengthen its controlling arm so as to enable it to keep pace with its growing responsibilities under its statute and the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Some additional measures aimed at the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime seem to be advancing favourably. It is to be expected that a draft agreement on physical security will be concluded during the first half of 1979. Furthermore, the idea of international management of plutonium has received wide support.

The Government of Finland sees the International Fuel Cycle Evaluation Programme as an important measure with the purpose of effectively ensuring intensified peaceful use of nuclear energy without proliferation risks. The appropriate preparations for the second Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty should start next year. Finland stands ready to participate in the preparations and the work of the Review Conference in order to tackle the important task of reviewing the operation of the Treaty with a view to ensuring that the purposes of the preamble and the provisions of the Treaty are being realized.

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It is being argued that all the nuclear-weapon States, and particularly those among them which possess qualitatively and quantitatively the most powerful nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility in the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament. It is right, therefore, that those countries which actually possess the real object of the negotiations should negotiate. Hence we think that the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) are by far the most important negotiating process at the moment. The SALT II agreement and immediate further negotiations heading for a SALT III agreement could, we believe, set off a chain reaction of many other positive results. We can only hope that a SALT II agreement can be concluded before the end of this year as we have heard in the statements of both the main parties. Because of the accelerating technological development in the field of strategic nuclear armaments, we think that immediate efforts to bring about a SALT III agreement are badly needed.

In spite of meagre results so far and even some temporary setbacks in the negotiations between the two Powers, there seems to be full awareness of a vital need and a political will to negotiate. The argument that political détente provides the only realistic framework for international coexistence and co-operation is completely well-founded. Conversely, concrete results in disarmament favour the general atmosphere of détente, help to build more confidence and thus enhance international security. Recent developments have shown, however, that the interaction between disarmament and détente does not imply that measures towards disarmament would automatically ensue from relaxation of political tension.

In the view of the Finnish Government, another item of highest priority is the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban. Last fall the General Assembly noted with satisfaction that the negotiations had begun among three nuclear-weapon States and urged them to expedite their negotiations with a view to bringing them to a positive conclusion as soon as possible. The tripartite negotiations are being held even at this time, and the information emanating from those talks sustains the hope that the elusive goal of a comprehensive test ban at last appears to be near. In our view, the cessation of nuclear testing within the framework of an effective treaty would be in the interest of mankind, and it would have two-fold effects. It would make a significant contribution to realization of the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear

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weapons and the development of new types of such weapons, but it would also, at the same time, be an effective measure to strengthen the non-proliferation Treaty. Furthermore, it would demonstrate the political will and preparedness of the nuclear Powers to fulfil the provisions of article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It is my Government's earnest hope that the draft treaty could be urgently concluded by the three nuclear Powers and submitted for the full consideration of the negotiating body, the Committee on Disarmament.

In this context I should like to emphasize the importance of the work of the expert group on seismological detection which has been preparing the ground for a world-wide remote-control monitoring system for verification of a comprehensive test ban. Finland has actively participated in the work of the expert group and developed its national seismic detection capabilities. Together with the geologically stable primary rock in Finland, this will enable us to contribute to the eventual international detection system.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones constitutes an important disarmament measure. This was fully recognized in the special session on disarmament and in its Final Document. While pursuing this objective, it will be useful to recall the conclusions of the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects which was initiated by the Government of Finland and carried out by a group of governmental experts in 1975 within the framework of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

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Vigorous testimony to the usefulness and effectiveness of the method of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones is provided by the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Through the recent action and declaration of intention of some nuclear-weapon States, the additional Protocols to the Treaty are expected to be fully completed in the near future. As far as adherence to the Treaty is concerned, the prospects are equally good. After these developments the Latin American countries will constitute a zone in which the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is firmly secured. I should like on this occasion to pay a tribute to the creators of the Treaty of Tlatelolco and to the organization administering the only nuclear-weapon-free zone in existence so far in an inhabited area of the world - the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL).

It has been stated by many delegations here that the development of new armaments is constantly overtaking any arms-control or disarmament measure. The qualitative arms race has already led us into a situation where a broad sector of weapons is in danger of falling outside any negotiating forum. This is the case with tactical nuclear weapons, including the so-called mini-nuclear-weapons and the neutron weapon, as well as intermediate and medium-range missiles. This serious dilemma confronting all disarmament efforts should be studied and appropriate conclusions drawn. The Finnish Government shares the concern expressed by the Swedish Foreign Minister in her statement to the General Assembly on 26 September this year concerning the so-called grey-area systems. We think that they should be included within the framework of negotiations already initiated or that, if appropriate, new bodies should be created for the consideration of this question.

My Government has in various contexts expressed the view that all approaches and avenues to disarmament should be explored. Although the most urgent disarmament issues are global in character, a regional approach may prove fruitful where proper politico-geographical conditions exist. At the regional level the objective should be to ensure the security of all States at as low a level of armaments as possible and without detrimental effects on the security of States outside the region.

The regional approach has its merits, in particular in Europe, where some 10,000 nuclear warheads are ready for action in a small region in global terms. While we recognize the global character of the European problems of disarmament, the regional perspective can make the negotiations more substantial

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and productive. The Finnish Government has been observing with deep concern developments in military technology over the past few years which tend to affect adversely the situation in our own region. An alarming factor is that nuclear weapons - both warheads and accurate means of their delivery - have been developed with the possibility of a limited nuclear war in mind. The Finnish Minister for Foreign Affairs developed this point in his statement on 1 June 1978 during the special session devoted to disarmament by saying:

"... it is important to recognize the political trend behind the theories of limited nuclear warfare. A limited nuclear war could in plain language mean the Europeanization of nuclear war; and no one anywhere in Europe would be immune from the effects of such strategies". (A/S-10/PV.13, p. 66)

Against the background of the developments in nuclear-weapon technology and doctrines that I have just outlined, the President of Finland, Mr. Urho Kekkonen, departing from the idea of a Nordic nuclear-weapon-free zone originally put forward as early as 1963, recently suggested negotiations on a Nordic arms control arrangement. The main purpose of this arrangement would be to isolate the Nordic countries as completely as possible from the effects of nuclear strategy in general and new nuclear weapons in particular. I should like to emphasize the following considerations, which we believe to be important. Only the Government of the country concerned can be qualified to interpret the security needs of that country. And it is clear that the initiative for negotiations must come from the States in the area and that they must themselves conduct the negotiations in good faith, without coercion or pressure. Furthermore, the necessary arrangements can be made within the framework of the existing security policy solutions. Because a security arrangement concerning the Nordic countries would, come to affect in one way or another the security interests of the leading nuclear-weapon States, it is most natural that the leading Powers could participate in the negotiations at an early stage. Lastly, the countries in the area have to receive an assurance that the weapons they have committed themselves not to acquire or to station in their territories will not be turned against them, and that they will not be threatened with those weapons.

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Finally, while we believe that measures to halt and reverse nuclear-arms build-up, both qualitative and quantitative, retain their high priority, it is also important that other available means be used to minimize the risk and danger of a war in which nuclear weapons would be employed. This question was extensively debated in connexion with the special session devoted to disarmament. One aspect of it, that is, the question concerning security guarantees for the non-nuclear-weapon countries, has already been discussed by the Committee, and my delegation has had the opportunity to present its views on it. Methods of preventing the outbreak of nuclear war are primarily a matter for the nuclear-weapon States, but it should be borne in mind that the devastating results of a nuclear war would affect belligerents and non-belligerents alike. Some nuclear-weapon States have already taken steps in their bilateral relations with this in mind. I refer to agreements on the prevention of an accidental nuclear war between the major nuclear Powers.

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Accordingly, they have agreed to act in a manner such as to prevent the development of situations capable of causing dangerous exacerbations of their relations, to avoid military confrontation and to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between them and between either of the parties and other countries. While responsibility for the prevention of nuclear war lies primarily with the nuclear Powers it is a matter of vital concern for all States, nuclear as well as non-nuclear. Indeed, the Final Document of the special session devoted to disarmament called on all States, and in particular nuclear-weapon States, to consider as soon as possible various proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons, the prevention of nuclear war, and related objectives, where possible, through international agreement. My delegation considers that to be a reasonable proposition. We think that the spirit and outline of the Soviet-American agreement of 1973 on the prevention of nuclear war should be kept in mind when considering an eventual international multilateral agreement in accordance with the recommendations of the Final Document.

That concludes my statement today, but I should like to deal with other disarmament problems on a later occasion.

Mr. MATANE (Papua New Guinea): I shall begin by quoting from the statement delivered to the current session of the General Assembly on 27 September by my Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade. He said:

"Man has always sought a peaceful existence within secure boundaries; in order to achieve this, he has always had arms. However, man has, through the arms build-up, particularly that of nuclear weapons, created a situation where he is no longer secure. Each State now seeks to have more advanced and sophisticated weapons in case of attack by others. As we all know, this process is threatening the existence of mankind." (A/33/PV.11, p. 76)

The time has come for this world body to act positively towards reversing this dangerous trend. We should put a halt to the arms race immediately. We agree with those who say that political will is needed for the achievement of real disarmament. However, we feel that a certain amount

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of trust and perhaps faith is needed in our endeavours towards the mammoth and complicated task of disarmament. It is now time to abandon the use of force in international relations and to seek security in disarmament through a gradual but effective process commencing with a reduction in the present level of armaments. Unless genuine and immediate steps are taken to prevent the further development and stockpiling of nuclear as well as conventional weapons, the continued arms race will mean a growing threat to international peace and security and even to the very survival of the human race.

The Disarmament Decade is coming to an end. Unfortunately, the objectives established on that occasion by the General Assembly appear not to have been fully achieved because the arms race is not diminishing but increasing at a faster pace than the efforts to curb it. Although some limited agreements have been reached on effective efforts in relation to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament, it is somewhat disappointing to note that the urgent need to implement these measures has been largely ignored.

The ending of the arms race and the achievement of real disarmament are the very important and urgent tasks facing us today. The arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race, is an obstacle to efforts to achieve the further relaxation of international tension. That relaxation of international tension is necessary for the establishment of international relations based on peaceful co-existence and trust between States.

Paragraph 12 of the Final Document of the tenth special session states:

"The arms race, particularly in its nuclear aspect, runs counter to efforts to achieve further relaxation of international tension, to establish international relations based on peaceful coexistence and trust between all States, and to develop broad international co-operation and understanding. The arms race impedes the realization of the purposes, and is incompatible with the principles, of the Charter of the United Nations ...".

(resolution S-10/2)

Lasting international peace and security cannot be built only on the accumulation of weaponry by military alliances or be achieved by the signing

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of treaties and conventions alone. Real peace can be created only through the effective implementation of the security system provided for in the Charter of the United Nations. Effective international control is necessary for a speedy and substantial reduction of arms leading ultimately to complete disarmament. At the same time, the causes of the arms race and threats to peace must be reduced and to this end effective action should be taken to eliminate tensions by peaceful means.

In this world of limited resources there is a close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. Military expenditures are increasing at an alarming rate, particularly in the field of the production of nuclear weapons. Those of us in the developing world are faced with the problem of having enough resources for the development of our peoples. Needless to say, there are people starving, people in need of medical care, people in need of education, and people in need of good housing. We are not saying that resources from the disarmament process will solve all problems. What we are saying is that our burdens will be lightened if some of those resources can be used for those purposes. That will also contribute to the realization of some of the goals of the New International Economic Order. Thus, the economic and social consequences of the arms race are not conducive to a favourable economic climate.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of each region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure. In the process of establishing such zones, the characteristics of each region should be taken into account. States participating in such zones should undertake to comply fully with all the objectives, purposes and principles of the agreements or arrangements establishing the zones, thus ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons or the testing of nuclear weapons.

It is the desire of those of us in the South Pacific to keep the region free from nuclear pollution and big-Power rivalry. This desire was clearly stated by the representative of Fiji on 9 November 1978:

"Delegations may recall that the Heads of Government of independent and self-governing States members of the South Pacific Forum emphasized in their Nukualofa communiqué of 3 July 1975 the importance of keeping the South Pacific region free from the risk of nuclear contamination and of involvement in a nuclear conflict. The Heads of Government commended the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific as a means of achieving that aim. That agreement was followed by the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 3477 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, which deals with the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific." (A/C.1/33/PV.33, p. 24-25)

Such a regional arrangement and other similar arrangements in other regions would be in conformity with the objectives of the Final Document of the tenth special session, devoted to disarmament.

Unfortunately, there are those who argue that the end of nuclear testing will not bring about disarmament. My delegation disagrees. We are opposed to nuclear testing because, first, we strongly believe that it is a step towards disarmament and, secondly, no one is able to tell us - at least up to the present time - the effects of radiation on man and his environment. The latter point concerns us most because we are in that part of the world, the South Pacific, where nuclear testing takes place. In fact, the latest test took place in June this year, while the tenth special session of the United Nations was meeting here on the very question of disarmament.

My delegation finds this very difficult to understand. How can we achieve disarmament when testing of nuclear weapons goes on? Further, why carry out such tests in the backyards of other peoples, which enjoy a non-polluted land, sea and air environment? We have on many occasions and repeatedly protested at such activities, but our protests have fallen on deaf ears. We therefore once again call on those responsible for this unforgivable state of affairs to cease their irresponsible activities. They just cannot go on like this.

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Papua New Guinea wishes to see the nuclear-weapon States take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, however, we take note of the declarations made by the nuclear-weapon States, and we appeal to them to pursue efforts to conclude appropriate and effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons.

In view of the foregoing, we should like to see the negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty considered in the light of the present situation. We have been informed time and again that the procedures involved have been difficult. However, we believe that those difficulties can be overcome if all parties involved are prepared to discuss the issues with a common objective. We join the majority of Member States in supporting resolution 32/78, in which the General Assembly, inter alia, noted with satisfaction that negotiations had begun among three of the five nuclear-weapon States in order to arrive at a draft agreement on this subject. In that same resolution, those three nuclear-weapon States were urged to expedite their negotiations so that, after the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament had fully considered the proposals arising from these negotiations, the treaty could be opened for signature before the next special session on disarmament. We hope that the other two nuclear-weapon States would also become parties to the treaty.

Papua New Guinea is following with great interest the course of the Soviet-American dialogue. My delegation hopes that a SALT II agreement setting concrete limits on strategic offensive weapons systems will be concluded, for we see in this a real possibility of stopping the nuclear arms race. However, we also view with great concern the fact that, while negotiations on a SALT II agreement are in progress, new forms of weapons are being developed. The cycle will not be broken.

My delegation fully supports efforts directed at the complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction, because we see this as one of the most urgent disarmament

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measures. Consequently we should like to see negotiations on a convention to this end given serious consideration. After its conclusion, all States should contribute to ensuring the broadest possible application of the convention through its early signature and ratification. My delegation recognizes that the primary responsibility rests with the big Powers. But the countries not possessing vast nuclear and missile arsenals would benefit from and have an obligation to bring about controlled disarmament.

In conclusion, my delegation is of the view that international tensions must be eased by peaceful means and through reducing the development, production and stockpiling of weapons, in particular nuclear weapons. Disarmament under a system of effective controls could always encounter problems caused by fear and mistrust, but we believe that disarmament is the key to man's survival on this planet.

Mr. WONG (Singapore): At the tenth special session of the General Assembly, my delegation posed the following question: if all of us are against the arms race, then who is responsible for the arms race? We concluded that we were all responsible.

Today I should like to look at the two basic questions we face in the problem of the arms race: first, what causes the arms race; and secondly, what can be done to curb it?

In examining the causes of the arms race I propose to look at five different but related issues. They are: first, the perception of national security and threats to national security; secondly, the enhancement of a State's power and status; thirdly, the advance of technology; fourthly, vested interests in the arms race; and, fifthly, public understanding of the arms race and response to it.

It is often said that nations arm themselves because they feel insecure. There are many reasons for such feelings of insecurity, but the first and most obvious one is that we live in a world in which violence is a fact of life. The second reason is that feelings of national insecurity

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stem from mistrust and suspicion among States. Often, historical animosities and fears form the basis of one State's perception of another's intentions and motives. Opposing national aspirations also influence such perception. States belonging to the same region often view each other with suspicion, each suspecting the other of harbouring ambitions for political domination or military conquest.

How this comes about has been interestingly described by Mr. Donald Keys, a well-known proponent of disarmament, as the "psychological aspects" of the arms race. The theory is that we tend to believe what we want to believe. For example, if we fear our neighbours and believe that they are unfriendly, we are likely to project these fears into our perception of their intentions towards us.

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Further, our perception is based on a "worst-case" situation, in which the worst that can happen is expected to happen. The possibility that such a perception may be altered by evidence refuting the basis for any such threat is also reduced by the process of what Keys called "information filtration". People tend to accept only the kind of information that reinforces their own beliefs and preconceived notions, especially those that confirm their worst fears and prejudices. Thus, convinced that the worst will happen, a State feels impelled to acquire arms to meet the contingency of protecting itself against attack by a potential adversary. That leads to a national defence policy based on a build-up of weapons and troops. Such action by one State is not likely to be ignored by other States in the region, particularly if the region is already riven by historical conflicts and rivalry. Hence, the acquiring of arms by one State spurs other States to acquire them. The cumulative effect is the start of an arms race among all those States that look upon each other as potential enemies.

The third reason for the arms race is the use of military might as a means of enhancing the power and status of a State. Rightly or wrongly, weapons and large military forces are two of the indices of a nation's status and power. I need hardly remind this Committee that the five permanent members of the Security Council are also the five biggest military Powers of the world and that they are also the five nuclear-weapon States. Since status and power are always regarded as desirable, that provides a strong incentive for acquiring military muscle. A State's military power can do two things: it can act as a deterrent against external attack; it can also be used to intimidate others. Even in the period since the United Nations was established, there have been numerous instances of States' using their military power to achieve their political objectives. Furthermore, the possession of superior military strength is often assumed to give one negotiating weight and political leverage.

Another reason for the arms race arises from the fact that so much of the world's scientific brain power, especially in the United States and in the Soviet Union, is being devoted to military-related

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research and development. The advance of military technology with ever greater destructive power quickly renders weapons obsolete. States therefore feel under pressure constantly to replace their existing weaponry by purchases of the newest and most sophisticated armaments and weapons systems available in the market. Such action, in time, becomes self-justifying and is often tenuously linked to the perception of any actual threat to national security. A scholar in disarmament matters, Ervin Laszlo, called that the operation of the "technological imperative". The advance of science and technology is not, regrettably, dependent on any set of moral values. New-weapon technology often behaves like an amoral Frankenstein, and, once developed, can become uncontrollable.

The vested interests that are served by the arms race constitute another reason for its perpetuation. The makers and sellers of weapons have to ensure a growing, or at least a continuing, demand for their deadly products, unless their productive capacities can be converted to peaceful industrial uses. Disarmament may also be anathema to the military establishment, as a reduction in military expenditure may diminish the importance and influence of the military in government. The result is that the power of the military-industrial complex often overrides the greater claims of education, health and housing in a country and the advocates of economic and social advancement have less say in the conduct of national affairs than the military establishment.

I come now to the question of public understanding of the dangers of the arms race. Recently, at a seminar organized by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research, Mrs. Inge Thorsson of the Swedish delegation, speaking on "humanizing the approach to disarmament", suggested several reasons why there was no loud and organized public outcry against the dangers of the escalating arms race. If the general public were aware of the gravity of the threat posed to the survival of humankind by the arms race, then it would be reasonable to expect pressure around the world to make Governments take serious steps towards disarmament. Mrs. Thorsson observed that that did not happen and had not happened because most people just did not realize what the so-called arms race and disarmament were all about and those who did despaired as to whether anything could be done to halt the arms

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race. As for the uninformed, some might naively believe that even if a nuclear war were to take place the human race would survive and nations would rebuild themselves after the war, perhaps a little wiser for the experience. Such people simply do not realize the devastating scale of a general nuclear war, which would so destroy the planet earth that survivors, if any, would be left only with the choice of either slow death or a return to a primitive level of civilization.

So, what is the solution? Obviously, there is need for better understanding of this problem by every person and, to that end, the education of the public on the meaning of "MIRVs" multiple independently-targeted re-entry vehicles, and "MARVs", manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles, and on the facts and figures of the arms race should be given wide support and attention.

I shall now examine the question of what can realistically be done to curb the arms race. First, I shall discuss the problem of the nuclear arms race, as we are all agreed that the potential for a world nuclear conflict presents the greatest threat to mankind. The nuclear arms race has two aspects, one vertical and the other horizontal. On the first aspect, concerning the quantitative and qualitative arms race among the existing nuclear-weapon States, my delegation sees some hope in some of the proposals and measures that are being considered. One such measure is the proposal by Canada on the negotiation of an agreement to stop all production of fissionable materials for weapon purposes. We believe that is one way of approaching the problem and we would commend its consideration.

Another measure is the negotiations in the second round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II) between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. That represents a genuine attempt on the part of the two most powerful nuclear-weapon States to reduce the dangers of nuclear warfare and mutual annihilation. We can only hope their current negotiations will result in the early conclusion of a SALT II agreement and that they will proceed soon thereafter to start negotiations on a SALT III agreement, focussing on qualitative curbs of their nuclear-arms race as well as on the actual reduction of their nuclear arsenals.

(Mr. Wong, Singapore)

Regarding the qualitative arms race among the nuclear-weapon States, William Epstein, a distinguished Canadian diplomat and scholar, has argued convincingly that it is not meaningful or useful to arrive at any agreement on how many nuclear weapons and delivery systems can be deployed without agreeing to restrain the qualitative improvement of such weapons and their delivery systems, as well as restraining the development of new kinds of weapons systems. We now have in our vocabulary terms such as cruise missiles, the SS-20, the "Backfire" bomber, neutron bombs, Trident submarines, weapons that use laser beams and electron rays. Where do they all end? We understand that missiles can be designed to attain an accuracy of within a few hundred feet of target, though launched from distances of thousands of miles. Some can be used even for destruction of satellites, thus bringing the arms race to the outer space. What next? To end this madness, the following measures are the minimum that ought to be taken.

First, all States should agree on a moratorium on the testing of all nuclear weapons and nuclear devices, pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Secondly, we would urge the three nuclear-weapon States currently engaged in negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban treaty to arrive at an early agreement. Until the treaty is completed, we would support the proposal to observe a moratorium against tests in any environment.

Thirdly, my delegation supports the Swedish proposal for the establishment of an international seismological data centre for better verification of the observance, and enforcement, of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Fourthly, we also support efforts towards an agreement to ban flight-testing of nuclear warheads delivery systems, and lastly, an agreement to limit, or to reduce progressively, military spending on development of new strategic nuclear-weapon systems.

Let me now focus my analysis on what can be done to curb horizontal proliferation. The most immediate concern is an agreement on better and non-discriminatory safeguards, under International Atomic Energy Agency auspices, against the proliferation of nuclear fissionable materials, and to control their use for peaceful purposes. We believe a full nuclear fuel-cycle evaluation exercise will contribute towards this objective.

(Mr. Wong, Singapore)

Yet another initiative to curb the spread of nuclear weapons is for States in a region to declare, and for the nuclear-weapon States to observe, a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The Tlatelolco Treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America, which was signed in 1967 and which now enjoys almost full acceptance by the Latin American States and the five nuclear-weapon States, is a model for similar efforts in other regions or sub-regions.

Though we must not lose sight of the importance of concerted efforts at curbing the nuclear arms race and nuclear proliferation, we should not, however, belittle the impact and consequences of wars fought with conventional weapons. Since the catastrophic events at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, mankind has so far been mercifully spared more horrors of the use of nuclear weapons. But in the period since 1945, 133 wars have been fought, all with conventional weapons, resulting in the killing of 25 million people. Also, it is a fact that about 80 per cent of global military expenditures are spent on conventional weapons. As annual global expenditures are currently running at about \$400 billion, this makes the total sum spent on conventional weapons to be about \$320 billion. This speaks for the urgency of the need for the world community to recognize the problem we have with the conventional arms race, and to find means to check the momentum of world spending on conventional weapons.

It is heartening to see that some efforts are beginning to be made to check this conventional arms race, both by supplier and recipient States. The objective of suppliers of conventional weapons should be an agreement to restrain production and transfer of such weapons. We note that bilateral talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on this question have begun. We welcome the initiative they have taken and we look forward to further progress in their consultations. While it is obviously important for the two largest suppliers of arms to hold such talks, we believe that other major suppliers should eventually be involved. If not, restraint exercised by the United States and the Soviet Union will simply be exploited by other suppliers of arms, which will take over the markets and expand their sales.

(Mr. Wong, Singapore)

Going now to the recipient side, my delegation believes the initiative must be taken together by States in a region or sub-region. Initiatives must be taken to reduce tensions and increase confidence among States in a region. Peaceful means must be found for resolution of regional disputes and conflicts. And discussions must begin on putting a limit on both quantitative and qualitative aspects of arms imports into a region.

It is always easy to suggest solutions, but if the solutions are to have any utility, they must take into account the stark realities of the world in which we live. For example, we must recognize the reality of a divided world with its opposing ideological, political and national interests. With détente, we have the passing of the worst period of the cold war. But East-West rivalry and competition for influence is still very much a dominant factor in international relations, and the supply, or withholding, of arms to recipient States is often used to extract political or military advantage for the supplier State. I had earlier mentioned how economic advantage from arms sales also poses an obstacle to voluntary restraints on exports. Apart from the easily understandable relationship of "more sales and more profits", there is also the oft-mentioned economy-of-scale factor in arms production, which makes unit costs lower in production for large markets than in production only for smaller domestic markets.

On the other side, the recipients are of course not without their share of problems. The world is torn by regional conflicts, most between third world countries themselves. These conflicts, together with distrust and suspicion, desire for image-building and leadership ambitions, all provide incentives for increasing arms purchases.

(Mr. Wong, Singapore)

Turning to a brighter prospect, I should like to cite the initiative which has been taken by a number of Latin American countries to deal with this problem. I refer to the Latin American States' Declaration of Ayacucho of 1974. In that Declaration eight Latin American States made known their intentions to halt the acquisition of offensive weapons and to eliminate excessive expenditures on arms in general. During the special session the President of Venezuela invited all Latin American States to consider the possibility of pursuing the subject further. Then in August of this year representatives of 20 Latin American countries met at Mexico City to hold consultations on the question of transfer of conventional weapons. This initiative by the Latin Americans is greatly welcomed by my delegation. We wish them success and hope that in the field of conventional arms, as in the field of nuclear arms, they will point the way for the rest of the third world to follow.

Another area where regional differences have become muted through co-operation in common pursuits is the subregion of South-East Asia, through the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN), comprising Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and my own country, Singapore. Formed 11 years ago, ASEAN has gone a long way towards promoting understanding, peace and stability in the subregion. Economic co-operation among the five member States is now a concrete fact; mutual consultations have become a habit and a valuable aspect of their conduct of relations with each other and with States outside the Association. So a positive move towards confidence-building has already been made by ASEAN. We strongly urge developing countries in other regions of the world to consider establishing such organizations for economic co-operation.

Lastly, I should like to examine what other measures are available for curbing the arms race and containing conflict among States. At the United Nations level the question of banning chemical weapons has been discussed for the past 20 years. To date we still have no agreement on the question, although substantial progress has been made. My delegation hopes that the new Committee on Disarmament will speed up its negotiations on a chemical weapons ban and that agreement will be reached in the near future.

(Mr. Wong, Singapore)

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons, concluded in 1971, is an important measure taken to ban conventional weapons that are particularly cruel and dangerous. It is encouraging that efforts continue to be made to reach agreement on a ban on other such weapons. In this area, my delegation looks hopefully to the proposed United Nations Conference next year on the question of a ban on the production and use of incendiary weapons and other conventional weapons that are excessively injurious or have indiscriminate effects.

Another possibility for action at the United Nations level is towards a more effective United Nations system for maintaining international peace and security. As the United Nations can only be what its Member States want it to be, we should all contribute to strengthening the peace-keeping and peace-making role of the Organization.

To sum up, the first step towards solving the problem of the arms race should be that we must all seek a better understanding of its causes. Next, in order to curb the nuclear arms race all States must support meaningful and realistic measures towards that end. On the problem of the conventional arms race, restraints must be exercised to the extent possible by both suppliers and recipients. And, lastly, outside the United Nations and at the level of the general public, more should be done to promote interest, awareness and concern in the problem of massive build-up of both nuclear and conventional armaments. A better understanding and appreciation by all of us of the causes of the arms race and the threat it poses to our survival would create a saner approach to living in a politically and ideologically divided world.

Mr. VASILYEV (Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic)(interpretation from Russian): Our delegation has already spelt out its position on a number of major issues connected with the cessation of the arms race and disarmament. In our statement today we should like to touch on agenda item 44, "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons".

Aiming at a speedy solution of the problem of disarmament is imperative both because of the dangers and pernicious nature of the arms race and because

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new dangerous signs of an accelerated and ever-broadening process of the development, manufacture and deployment of new types of weapons and systems of mass destruction are appearing. It is as if the world is standing on the threshold of a new spiral in the arms race which, if it is given rein, could topple the relative balance that exists in the field of armaments and could thus increase the danger of war.

A specific solution to the problem of banning the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction requires active collective efforts by many States. Experience in negotiating on problems of disarmament shows that it is much easier to ban weapons which have not left the laboratory stage and which have not undergone missile-range testing than to ban existing armaments. The conclusion of an agreement banning the development and manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction could significantly narrow the uses of the latest achievements and scientific and technological progress in the military sphere.

Way back in 1975 the Soviet Union made a specific proposal to conclude an international agreement on that question. Since then the problem has been examined in the United Nations in the Committee on Disarmament. Last year the General Assembly, in its resolution 32/84 A, requested

"the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue negotiations, with the assistance of qualified governmental experts, aimed at working out the text of an agreement on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, and, when necessary, specific agreements on this subject."

Much attention was devoted to that problem during the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Many delegations mentioned it in their statements and it was discussed during the drafting of the Final Document. In paragraph 77 of the Final Document, the following is emphasized in particular:

"In order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements may ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements. Efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction." (resolution A/S-10/2)

(Mr. Vasilyev, Byelorussian SSR)

A certain amount of work on the question of banning the development and the manufacture of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction has gone on in the Committee on Disarmament. An active contribution to this work has been made by the Soviet Union and other countries of the Socialist community. Last year, the Soviet Union put before the Committee on Disarmament a revised draft agreement on the banning of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The thoughts of a number of countries were included on defining the concept of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction.

In our document the definition of what is to be banned comes as close as possible to the well-known formula used in the United Nations Committee on Conventional Weapons of 1948 which has attained a broad degree of consensus. That draft agreement also takes into consideration the opinions of a number of countries on the banning of specific types of weapons of mass destruction on the basis of separate agreements. Thus, the draft contains specific provisions which, in parallel with the comprehensive agreement, will make it possible to conclude special agreements to ban specific types of that kind of weapon. It also contains a statement that the agreement will have an annex giving an actual list of banned types of weapons of mass destruction, and that that list could be added to as new fields appear where the development and manufacture of weapons of mass destruction are possible after the agreement comes into force. The document takes into account the proposals of those countries in favour of a general formula for a ban and of those preferring the achievement of separate agreements on various types of weapons of mass destruction. It covers both approaches.

In March this year the Soviet Union made one more constructive step to meet the wishes of the Western countries, proposing the creation under the aegis of the Committee on Disarmament of an ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts to examine the question of possible trends which might lead to the creation of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction to be included in the initial list of banned weapons of mass destruction. That group could constantly monitor the development of events in that sphere and, at the very earliest stage of the emergence of the possibility that new types of weapons

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of mass destruction might be created, could call for appropriate recommendations in the Committee to ban them. In the opinion of my delegation the present session of the General Assembly should speak out in favour of speeding up the solution to the question of banning the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction. An appeal to the Committee on Disarmament should be included in the draft convention which will be discussed in our Committee.

As we see from the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the present session of the General Assembly, document A/33/27, negotiations have continued this year between the USSR and the United States of America on working out an agreement to ban radiological weapons, and on a possible joint initiative on that question in the Committee on Disarmament. My delegation notes with satisfaction that, as a result of the exchange of views, the two sides have succeeded in bringing their approaches to the problem closer, and that, as the report states, they have:

"... now practically reached agreement on the provisions of a possible instrument on the prohibition of radiological weapons ...".

(A/33/27, para. 215)

New means of mass destruction include the neutron weapon. The discussion of the question of banning that weapon took place recently in various international forums, among the public, and among the most eminent scientists of our day. The results of that discussion allow us to make some quite definite conclusions.

There is no doubt that the neutron weapon is a particularly inhuman means of the mass extermination of people. It will certainly lower the threshold of the nuclear war and, therefore, will make the unleashing of such a war more probable. The adoption of the neutron weapon by one group of States will obviously lead to its adoption by another group of States. The emergence of one type of neutron weapon can only be the beginning of that race. The first type automatically will lead to other types emerging. Mindful of these irrefutable facts, the Socialist States put forward for examination by the Committee on Disarmament a draft international convention on the banning of the

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production, stockpiling, deployment and use of the nuclear neutron weapon.

Our delegation considers that the implementation of that proposal of the Socialist countries responds to the needs of our time in the interests of strengthening peace and security of peoples, and not only would be a major factor in curbing the nuclear arms race but would be a significant contribution to staving off the danger of the use of scientific and technological achievements to create new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. The movement against the development and deployment of the neutron weapon has assumed enormous proportions. Tens of millions of ordinary people are now included in it, and the most varied kinds of inter-governmental organizations as well.

Notwithstanding all this, however, the United States has not shown willingness to relinquish its plans. Furthermore, quite recently the United States took a decision to produce the component parts of the neutron weapon, which is tantamount to preparing for production of that weapon. The peoples of the whole world decisively favour the banning of the neutron weapon, and demand measures to be taken to stop its emergence in the arsenals of States. The United Nations must not remain on the sidelines in this important matter. To our mind, it should take effective action in order to ban that barbaric weapon.

Mr. NYIRENDA (Zambia): The struggle to attain the objective of general and complete disarmament is the theme which underlies the inclusion of fifteen agenda items which we are now discussing. In this statement I shall address myself briefly to those items which deal with how disarmament could be achieved by reducing and eventually eliminating the killing capacity of weapons of war and death.

Civilized mankind has been preoccupied with the methods for reducing the killing capacity of weapons for centuries. It has been consciously realized that disarmament can only be achieved if war-makers are deprived of the instruments with which to fight. But before achieving that noble goal, certain intermediate measures have to be enforced to preserve human life.

(Mr. Nyirenda, Zambia)

Zambia welcomes the decision to convene in 1979, a conference to prohibit or restrict the use of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Since achieving independence in 1964, Zambia has witnessed nothing but violent conflicts all around its borders. These conflicts, which arise from the struggles by the oppressed peoples to liberate their occupied countries, have naturally spilt over into Zambia.

The racist minority régimes of southern Africa and Rhodesia have never hesitated to use excessively injurious weapons against civilians under their control and combatants alike. The indiscriminate massacres of innocent schoolchildren in Soweto in 1976 is a case in point. It is the hope and expectation of my delegation therefore that the conference that I have referred to will devise concrete measures which would effectively prohibit the use of weapons of mass destruction. Such a measure would go a long way towards curbing genocide the world over.

What I have just said leads me to comment on the problems that are created by the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons covered by agenda item 37.

(Mr. Nyirenda, Zambia)

Discussion of the harmful effects of chemical warfare is not new. Attempts to curb or even eliminate the use of chemical warfare in conflicts predate the founding of the United Nations. In December 1930 the then Preparatory Committee for the Disarmament Conference reached qualified agreement on the renunciation of chemical and bacteriological warfare. Despite all these efforts, this vexing problem still remains unresolved. The reconstituted Committee on Disarmament has the responsibility of dealing with these issues as a matter of urgency.

The international community has a duty to devise adequate measures for punishing those countries which resort to chemical warfare in conflict situations. We in Zambia have witnessed the indiscriminate use of chemical warfare against Africans by the racist minority régimes, both inside and outside the countries under their control. Napalm and other defoliant incendiary weapons continue to be used against the people of Namibia, Zimbabwe and South Africa in attacks on refugee camps in neighbouring countries. In March this year the Rhodesian Air Force dropped several napalm and other incendiary bombs in the Luangwa area of Zambia. These acts resulted in the death of several innocent people and the destruction of property, crops and water supplies, and, as this Committee may be aware, those barbaric bombings have been repeated at Sesheke, Lusaka and Mkushi. Similar indiscriminate killing has continued to take place in the Middle East.

I ask pardon for giving all these examples. It is the contention of my delegation that we must understand the situation on the ground if our discussions here are to be of any value. It is not enough to condemn those régimes which resort to the use of chemical warfare. This Committee, which has been entrusted with the responsibility for initiating action on security matters, has a duty to establish measures for dealing with the culprits.

In conclusion, I wish to express the views of my delegation on agenda item 44, which relates to the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

(Mr. Nyirenda, Zambia)

In our statement on item 125 my delegation urged the Committee on Disarmament to be future-oriented in its handling of disarmament issues. We would submit that this is not an easy task, especially since the development of new weapons of mass destruction is shrouded in a veil of secrecy. We hardly know what weapons are being produced by the military-industrial complexes of the super-Powers until the world is told about them. One may even wonder whether we know all about the types of weapons in the custody of the major military Powers.

What is even more frightening is that the invention of new weapons by countries engaged in an arms race triggers off another new race. We are all too familiar with the reactions which greeted the development of the neutron bomb. What new weapon systems may be on the drawing boards of militarily significant States remains a secret.

Our sober conclusion is that the arms race may be impossible to control if States, particularly the militarily strong ones, do not have the necessary political will to share information with concerned members of the international community, under the auspices of the United Nations. The struggle to prohibit the development and manufacture of new types of weapons remains a formidable challenge to the Committee on Disarmament and the United Nations as a whole. The resolution of the problem calls for imagination and innovation on the part of us all.

Mr. AZIZI (Afghanistan): Disarmament is closely linked with mankind's struggle to eradicate economic and social impediments, at the root of which lies the military threat. The proliferation of arms, both horizontally and vertically, and the development of technology geared to mass destruction only exacerbate the existing situation. During the tenth special session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament, the majority of States conceded that nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war should be given the highest priority.

(Mr. Azizi, Afghanistan)

General and complete disarmament would make détente irreversible. In this context, a special responsibility rests with those States that already possess nuclear weapons. In this connexion, my delegation wishes to express once again its satisfaction with the constructive proposal made by the Soviet Union concerning the conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States, as a goodwill gesture on the part of a nuclear Power and a positive step towards enhancing the possibilities of the further improvement of international understanding in the field of disarmament. My delegation, while earnestly drawing the full attention of the Committee to this, believes that other nuclear-weapon States, for their part, will come forward with constructive proposals, as clearly called for in paragraph 59 of the Final Document. In the Final Document the urgent need is stressed for negotiations concerning the cessation of the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery and the preparation of a comprehensive, phased programme for a progressive and balanced reduction of nuclear stockpiles, leading to their ultimate elimination.

We look forward with high expectations to the early conclusion of the second agreement between the two leading nuclear Powers, and hope that the third round of Strategic Arms Limitations Talks will follow shortly, with as its objective the limitation of strategic arsenals.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is the mainstay of every effort to prevent the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are of the opinion that a second review conference of the States parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, to be held in 1980, and universal commitment to the NPT should be actively sought. Those States that have not yet signed and ratified the Treaty must be urged to do so. Under article VI of the Treaty, the nuclear-weapon States have certain obligations, inter alia, which must not be lost sight of during the second review Conference.

Since its adoption by the General Assembly at its twenty-sixth session the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace has received the support of the majority of Member States of this Organization. During the

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tenth special session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament after the adoption of other resolutions subsequent to 1971, this concept was once again considered.

Resolution 32/86 of 12 November 1977, in which the convening of a meeting of the littoral and hinterland States was decided upon, represents a positive step towards the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

(Mr. Azizi, Afghanistan)

The conclusion of an agreement among the littoral and hinterland States will pave the way for the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean with the participation of all interested States.

To ensure implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, a basis of agreement should be sought. This will be the central objective of the preparatory meeting of the littoral and hinterland States, which is to be convened in the near future. This meeting, by harmonizing the different viewpoints of the States, will contribute to the successful conclusion of the conference.

My delegation is of the opinion that the resumption of the discussion between the two major Powers will be of great benefit in the establishment of an accord. We further believe that the success of the meeting of littoral and hinterland States will further the cause of disarmament and contribute to international peace and security.

With regard to fixing the date and duration of the conference of the littoral and hinterland States, allowing for adequate preparation, my delegation urges that the meeting be held at the earliest possible date in 1979, to prepare the ground for holding the Conference on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace in 1980.

With regard to the possibility of convening a world conference on disarmament, as described in paragraph 122 of the Final Document, my delegation would like to draw attention to the fact that the conference has received broad support since 1971, particularly in the wake of the tenth special session, which was devoted to disarmament, and at the recent Belgrade meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries. That world conference should be convened with universal participation and with adequate preparation and should persist in the aim of adopting effective and binding decisions on specific disarmament problems.

The Final Document calls for negotiations on the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons. These objectives should be resolutely pursued, together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures. The qualitative and quantitative increase in the production of conventional weapons is of grave concern to all progressive and peace-loving nations, for these weapons serve as instruments

(Mr. Azizi, Afghanistan)

of suppression in areas where peoples are struggling for the attainment of their legitimate rights against colonialism and alien domination, and they help to perpetuate and expand the areas of conflict. While unconditionally supporting the struggle of all the liberation movements, in all its forms and manifestations, for independence and self-determination, my delegation believes that efforts must be made to adopt urgent measures conducive to the sizable limitation of all types of weapons.

The General Assembly, in its resolution 32/78, noted with satisfaction that negotiations had begun among the three nuclear-weapon States with a view to drafting an agreement on the question of a comprehensive test-ban agreement and urged those three States to bring their negotiations to a positive conclusion as soon as possible. My delegation, while hoping for the early conclusion of the agreement, believes that any long-term objectives of such a comprehensive treaty cannot be secured without the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States.

The possession by South Africa and Israel of nuclear technology threatens not only security in regions concerned but the security of the entire world. To prepare the ground for nuclear arms development in South Africa and Israel is a crime against humanity and a serious setback to the realization of the legitimate aspirations of the people. Without wiping out the roots of colonialism, neo-colonialism and imperialism in Africa and elsewhere, genuine disarmament will not be achieved and international peace and security will not be maintained.

Turning to the question of the elimination of chemical weapons, which is a matter of international concern, my delegation welcomes the recent joint statements of the Soviet Union and the United States of America on the progress of their negotiations. While urging a speedy conclusion of the negotiations, we believe that the agreement should be comprehensive in scope, prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and calling for the destruction of the stockpiles of such weapons.

The special session on disarmament, in its Final Document, recognizes that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East

(Mr. Azizi, Afghanistan)

would be especially desirable in enhancing international peace and security. In the Middle East, the concept of disarmament also implies the elimination of Zionism and the restitution of all the rights of the Palestinian people, including their right to self-determination.

Disarmament and development are by far the most urgent problems facing the world today. Vast resources, badly needed for development, are being consumed as countries make greater sacrifices for military gains. Five years have elapsed since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 3093 (XXVIII) calling for the reduction of the military budgets of the permanent members of the Security Council and utilization of part of the funds thus saved for assistance to developing countries. The matter was again raised during the tenth special session of the General Assembly, which was devoted to disarmament. In this regard, we are looking forward to the proposal of practical measures by the governmental experts on the relationship between development and disarmament.

In fact the dark clouds of peril that hang over humanity can be diverted only when the huge expenditures and the scientific and technical resources devoted to destruction are redirected to development purposes. Thus the New International Economic Order, without which international peace and security cannot be achieved, will come into being.

The strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament with a view to conducting future negotiations under its auspices and keeping the Organization informed of progress in the implementation of disarmament measures and other related issues is of paramount importance.

Disarmament by itself cannot ensure peace. Equitable, progressive social, political and economic changes must take place among nations, on the basis of mutual respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political and economic independence of every nation, including its right to choose its own social and economic system, and the non-use of force in the conduct of international relations. In short, of full respect for the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter.

In conclusion, I wish to stress that every effort must be exerted for the attainment of the supreme goal of all mankind, which is peace and

(Mr. Zizi, Afghanistan)

progress -- peace under the rule of law, and peace for the progress of all peoples. We all can and must contribute to the attainment of general and complete disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those representatives who wish to speak in exercise of the right of reply.

Mr. NILIN (Israel). In taking the floor in the exercise of my right of reply to the statement made this morning by the representative of Syria, I have no wish to reciprocate in an exchange of accusations. The subject we are dealing with is too serious to emulate practices more suitable to a student debate than to an international conference. I shall instead address myself to whatever substance can be gathered from his statement.

The representative of Syria mentioned Israel's abstention on resolution 32/81 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. As a matter of record, I should like to remind the Committee that Israel was not the only country that in various ways and for a variety of reasons expressed reservations about the wording of the resolution. In the voting in the Committee on two of the operative paragraphs of the draft resolution there were 14 and 10 abstentions respectively by other States. Why, then, does the representative of Syria not censure also all those States instead of singling out Israel?

(Mr. Wilson, Israel)

The representative of Syria is banking heavily on the failure of the collective memory of this Committee. It is Israel, and not Syria, which has repeatedly, from the rostrum of the plenary Assembly during the general debate and in this Committee, proposed negotiations leading to the conclusion of a formal contractual multilateral convention between all States of the Middle East along the lines of such notable precedents as the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and proposals for similar agreements in other parts of the world.

Unless conventions are mutually binding, they are hardly worth the paper they are written on. However, mutually binding agreements can be arrived at only through direct negotiations. Why does not the representative of Syria spell out the whole and unadorned truth? Syria, not recognizing Israel and waging war against Israel, does not wish to negotiate with Israel. It therefore seeks a way of establishing a so-called nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East that would not entail mutual negotiations but would carry unilateral obligations. To put it in over-the-top language, Syria, in fact, wants to have its cake and eat it too.

If Syria is in earnest about the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, let it respond favourably to Israel's offer and enter with Israel and with all other States in the region into a constructive consideration of how best to free our region from the dangers of a nuclear war.

Mr. GLAIEL (Syrian Arab Republic) (interpretation from Arabic). I should not like to involve myself in a controversy in this Committee. I do not know whether the Israeli representative has information from sources outside the United Nations, but what I did this morning was to refer to United Nations documents. As regards Israel's recognition, that is a matter that will be considered when we take up the questions of Palestine, the Middle East and Israeli aggression.

Mr. HARMON (Liberia). Immediately after our meeting this morning, I met with the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.4. I wish to inform the Committee that we have reached a satisfactory conclusion. A final draft has been prepared and I therefore give formal notice of the withdrawal of my amendments to this particular draft resolution.

The CHAIRMAN. I should like to announce that India has become a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.12/Rev.1 and A/C.1/33/L.14, and the United Kingdom has become a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.14.

The meeting rose at 4.55 p.m.