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Chairman: Mr. CHERKAoui (Morocco)
(Vice-Chairman)

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ENGLISH

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Mr. SUJKA (Poland): In its statement on 18 October last the Polish delegation presented its views on a wide range of disarmament problems under agenda item 125 concerning the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session. I therefore intend to confine my present statement to some specific issues related mainly, although not exclusively, to the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

Considering the highest priority attached by Poland to the question of nuclear disarmament, I wish to start by reiterating my Government's continued support for the very timely and important initiative by the USSR concerning the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present.

It is the considered view of the Polish delegation that the implementation of this proposal would significantly add to the efforts aimed at reducing the danger of nuclear war and promoting nuclear disarmament. The Soviet initiative meets the wishes and intentions expressed by many countries during the special session on disarmament and is in full conformity with the spirit and letter of its Final Document. The realization of the proposal would represent an additional and highly effective factor contributing to the tightening of the non-proliferation régime by ensuring that territories of States now free from nuclear weapons will not be used in the future for the deployment or for the stockpiling of any types of such weapons. Consequently, it would also diminish the possibility of destabilization of the present strategic situation and thus contribute to the strengthening of international peace and security. Naturally, this purpose will be adequately served only if the commitment not to deploy nuclear weapons on the territories of States where they do not exist at present is a universal one. It should apply to all States whose territories are free from nuclear weapons irrespective of

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whether any such State is or is not an ally of any particular nuclear Power. In our opinion, an agreement to this end could mark a first step towards the complete withdrawal of such weapons from the territories of other countries in the future.

The important advantage of the Soviet proposal lies also in its technical simplicity. All that is really needed for its implementation is just political goodwill on the part of both nuclear and non-nuclear States.

The Soviet proposal points in the same direction as and is conducive to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world. As is well known, supported by other socialist countries, and as early as some 20 years ago, Poland put forward in the United Nations General Assembly a proposal for the creation of an atom-free zone in Central Europe. Although the Polish plan was not accepted, it initiated wide international discussion and had a profound impact on the development of the concept and mechanisms of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various areas of the world. Today, it is a source of great satisfaction to us that the notion of such zones has become a universal idea, dealt with in numerous resolutions of the General Assembly and contained in several international treaties, such as the Antarctic Treaty or the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America. In Africa, the Organization of African Unity has affirmed a decision for the denuclearization of the region. There are concrete proposals for setting up nuclear-weapon-free zones or zones of peace in the Middle East, Scandinavia, the Balkans, South Asia and the Indian Ocean. Although we share the opinion that the ultimate objective should be the achieving of a world entirely free of nuclear weapons, we do feel that at the moment the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned and in conformity with generally recognized rules of international law, constitutes an important measure of regional military détente; it strengthens the non-proliferation régime and contributes to the enhancement of the security of States belonging to such zones and international peace and security at large. At the same time, we are in full agreement with the relevant provisions of the Final Document adopted by the special session

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

which point out, inter alia, that in the process of establishing such zones the characteristics of each region should be taken into account, and stress the need for ensuring that they are genuinely free from nuclear weapons.

Similarly, we support the concept of zones of peace in various parts of the world, and specifically in the Indian Ocean. We strongly hope that the Soviet-American talks on the limitation and subsequent reduction of military activities in the Indian Ocean will be promptly resumed and successfully completed, thus contributing to the strengthening of peace and security in that region.

My delegation finds it particularly gratifying that the Final Document of the special session accords high priority to an issue of longstanding and traditional interest to Poland - the elimination of chemical weapons. As will be recalled, that document states, inter alia, that

"The complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction represent one of the most urgent measures of disarmament. Consequently, the conclusion of a convention to this end, on which negotiations have been going on for several years, is one of the most urgent tasks of multilateral negotiations. ..." (Resolution S-10/2, para. 75)

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

Indeed, the United Nations has been seized of that question for well over a decade. The issue of the elimination of chemical weapons from the arsenals of States has likewise been, on the request of the General Assembly, one of the priority items on the agenda of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). As a result of long deliberations on that topic, often with the benefit of highly valuable expert opinion, its subject matter has been thoroughly explored and the position of States explicitly defined in three formal draft agreements and numerous other working documents.

In spite of that and notwithstanding the specific undertaking in article IX of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, the goal of an effective ban on chemical weapons has, regrettably, so far proved elusive. In the meantime we have come to learn new acronyms for super-toxic and super-sophisticated chemical weapons which a sustained and intensive research and development effort has added to the chemical arsenals.

In fact, striving to eliminate chemical weapons as repulsive instruments of mass annihilation, the international community has not been seeking to chart entirely new ground. It was merely urging the next logical step - to strengthen the ban on the use of chemical weapons as laid down in the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The total ban on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction would render irrelevant the distrust which led many States parties to the Protocol to make reservations with respect to the right to retaliate in kind.

That, I submit, was precisely the underlying premise behind the comprehensive ban first proposed by the socialist countries, including Poland, in their 1972 draft convention submitted to the CCD. Based on the purpose criterion, the document of the socialist countries sought to prohibit all chemical agents of types and in quantities having no justification for peaceful purposes. It goes without saying that this basic approach still stands and that the draft convention is still regarded as a valid and useful basis for the multilateral agreement in question.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

My delegation finds it auspicious that sustained and intensive bilateral discussions have been going on between the Soviet Union and the United States on a possible joint initiative on the prohibition of chemical weapons. We have been heartened the statements of the two negotiating parties that they have reached a measure of agreement on matters pertaining to both the scope of prohibition and verification. It goes without saying that a framework draft agreement elaborated through that parallel effort would stimulate and add important momentum to the endeavours which the United Nations General Assembly and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament have pursued for so long.

We strongly believe that the General Assembly should request the expanded Committee on Disarmament to continue, as a matter of high priority, its search for a broadly acceptable agreement on the effective prohibition of all chemical weapons and on their destruction. As in the past, the Polish delegation, in co-operation with other delegations, is taking an active part in elaborating an appropriate draft resolution on the subject.

During the deliberations in both the United Nations General Assembly and the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament many speakers have stressed a particular danger for international peace and security and, indeed, for the survival of mankind, stemming from the increasingly rapid pace of the technological arms race. We fully share the opinion of those who point out that if the qualitative arms race is not halted, it may well reach a point beyond which, in certain spheres of armaments, the conclusion of arms limitation agreements may virtually be excluded, for it would be impossible to assure effective reciprocal control over their observance.

The discussions held in the CCD with the participation of a representative group of experts from several countries, including Poland, and the numerous scientific and technical publications confirm the real possibility of the emergence of new types and systems of weapons of mass annihilation, such as infrasonic, electromagnetic or genetic weapons, comparable in their destructive capability to nuclear weapons.

In social and economic terms, military considerations apart, the technological arms race means the diversion of vast human and material resources

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

from productive peaceful pursuits to unproductive military ones. Close to 400,000 engineers and research workers, about one quarter of the world's total, are currently involved in one way or another in military related research and development projects. Set to work on narrow problems of weapons technology, those specialists do not contribute in any way to the expansion of the horizons of science to the benefit of man. They do not contribute to the satisfaction of the most pressing needs of man. In fact, the outlays which fuel the technological arms race are denying financial and intellectual resources to civilian research.

There can also be no doubt about the negative effects of the continuous qualitative arms build-up on the process of détente as well as on the ongoing disarmament talks. It is evident that a logical and rational solution of the problem would be through the conclusion of a comprehensive agreement, ruling out the development of new means of mass destruction.

For the last three years an initiative of the Soviet Union to ban the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons has been under active consideration both at the United Nations and in the CCD. It gained wide support not only from the socialist countries but from many other States which felt that an international agreement in that regard would play an important role in checking the qualitative arms race and in preventing the abuse of science for purposes of war.

It was therefore most gratifying that the Final Document adopted by the special session placed strong emphasis on the problem of the qualitative aspects of the arms race. Paragraph 77 of that document specifically stated that:

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

"In order to help prevent a qualitative arms race and so that scientific and technological achievements may ultimately be used solely for peaceful purposes, effective measures should be taken to avoid the danger and prevent the emergence of new types of weapons of mass destruction based on new scientific principles and achievements. Efforts should be appropriately pursued aiming at the prohibition of such new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. Specific agreements could be concluded on particular types of new weapons of mass destruction which may be identified. This question should be kept under continuing review". (resolution S-10/2, para. 77)

This broad mandate leaves no doubts either as to the timeliness, indeed urgency, of taking effective steps in that regard, or to the obligation of the Geneva Committee on Disarmament to pursue that matter most vigorously.

While regrettably no agreement on a comprehensive prohibition of the development and production of new types of weapons of mass destruction has so far proved possible, the time since the USSR first submitted its draft agreement in 1975 has not been lost. Intensive considerations and discussions on that subject have allowed the international community to gain fresh insights into the present and future potential of science and technology to produce new, still more effective means of mass annihilation. As a result, we now understand better the course of action required in order to erect an effective barrier to the further development of arms technology without in any way affecting the freedom of scientific research.

Reacting in a positive and constructive manner to the initial discussions, the USSR submitted a modified version of its draft agreement which went a long way towards meeting the position of many States. It suggested that, in parallel to a general agreement, parties may, in cases where they deem it necessary, conclude special and separate agreements to ban specific new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. This flexible approach led, as we know, to the opening of the bilateral Soviet-American talks on the prohibition of radiological weapons, an area where we can confidently await a positive solution in the days ahead.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

We believe that it is indeed imperative for the General Assembly and for the Committee on Disarmament, to approach with renewed vigour and determination the goal of slowing down or stemming altogether the qualitative arms race. The price of failure in the fulfilment of this responsibility would be not only the addition of new items to the inventory of deadly weapons but also the undermining of all disarmament efforts.

It is generally recognized that it may be easier to ban arms which are at the research and experimental stage than to eliminate those which have already found their way into the arsenals of States.

The Polish delegation would therefore like to renew its support for the standing proposal of the USSR to establish an ad hoc group of governmental experts under the auspices of the Committee on Disarmament to study the areas of science and technology where there exists a potential for or a likelihood of the emergence of new weapons. Poland is prepared to co-operate fully in such a venture, as we believe that any progress towards the prevention of new generations of weapons of mass destruction would be a significant contribution to the material infrastructure of détente and genuine international security - not a security that relies on a precarious "balance of fear".

Finally, I should like to reiterate the deep concern of my delegation over the plans and concrete preparations which have recently been undertaken for the production of nuclear neutron weapons. These plans, if put into effect would have extremely grave consequences for international peace and security, by increasing the level of military confrontation, triggering a new spiral of the arms race, undermining the régime of non-proliferation, hampering the process of détente and lowering the threshold of a nuclear war. We consider it imperative therefore to bring about, without further delay, a joint renunciation of neutron weapons. Poland was one of the eight socialist States which in March of this year submitted for the consideration of the Geneva Committee a draft convention on the prohibition of the production, stockpiling, deployment and use of nuclear neutron weapons. We trust that the Committee on Disarmament will take up the matter with all the urgency it deserves.

(Mr. Sujka, Poland)

The year ahead of us will undoubtedly be marked by intensive disarmament deliberations and negotiations on different levels and in different forums. Apart from bilateral, trilateral and regional talks, numerous multilateral discussions on disarmament are scheduled or expected, to list only the meetings of the reorganized Committee on Disarmament, the first substantive session of the Disarmament Commission, the preparations for the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons as well as the Conference itself, the preparatory work for the convening of the Biological Weapons Convention Review Conference and for the second Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference. Moreover, we earnestly hope that concrete preparations will finally be undertaken for the convening of a world disarmament conference, in conformity with paragraph 122 of the Final Document of the tenth special session.

Adequately to fulfil the tasks entrusted to us by our respective Governments and to meet the expectations of world public opinion will require on the part of all of us sustained and concerted efforts. If those efforts are to be really successful, we have to act with maximum dedication and patience, in the spirit of co-operation and consensus which prevailed during the special session. It is also necessary that all of us abide by the principles of disarmament negotiations adopted at that session and, first of all, by the principle of undiminished security and that of not seeking unilateral advantages at the expense of others. Equally important is the need to refrain from actions which might adversely affect endeavours in the field of disarmament. We are confident that if all parties display a constructive approach to negotiations and demonstrate a political will to reach agreements, the spiralling arms race can be halted and reversed. It is indeed the only alternative if we want to ensure a lasting peace for our generation and those of the future. My delegation, in line with Poland's traditional involvement in disarmament efforts, will work with determination, perseverance and the best of faith towards that overriding objective.

Mr. CARPIO CASTILLO (Venezuela) (interpretation from Spanish): Only a few weeks ago, in this same room, I said that the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament had embodied the norms and principles which in future should govern the actions of Member States designed to halt and reverse the arms race, and established the priorities and the framework within which negotiations on disarmament are to continue.

While it is true that this preliminary evaluation is encouraging for our work, it is certainly not encouraging to find in the agenda items which have come up repeatedly and which have been under study year after year.

To take part in this general debate becomes an increasingly difficult exercise. It necessarily means reviewing the present situation brought about by the arms race; it also means reviewing compliance with resolutions which have been adopted in this field. It would seem that we are in a dead-end street and that we are faced with an exercise in futility.

We know that so far it has not been possible to halt the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, and that the meagre measures which have been adopted are only of limited scope and do not for the most part represent authentic disarmament measures.

The first resolution adopted by this Organization in 1946, when it was shaken and shattered by the violence and destruction brought about by the Second World War, referred to the establishment of a Commission which would be in charge of studying problems arising from the discovery of atomic energy. Later on, in December of that same year, in General Assembly resolution 41 (I), the Assembly recognized, as an urgent objective aimed at strengthening international peace and security in conformity with the goals and purposes of the United Nations,

"... prohibiting and eliminating from national armaments atomic and all other major weapons adaptable now and in the future to mass destruction, and the early establishment of international control of atomic energy and other modern scientific discoveries and technological developments to ensure their use only for peaceful purposes".

And it recommended to the Security Council that it "expedite consideration of a draft convention or conventions for the creation of an international system of control and inspection", which would have "to include the prohibition of atomic weapons and all other major weapons" of mass destruction.

(Mr. Carpio Castillo, Venezuela)

The General Assembly also urged Member States

"... to promote the establishment and maintenance of international peace and collective security with the least diversion for armaments of the world's human and economic resources."

I have cited those resolutions only to show once again that there has been no compliance with the purposes contained in General Assembly resolution 41 (I), and that, rather, we have been spectators of the most frenzied race to self-destruction ever seen by mankind.

The first atomic bombs ushered in the nuclear age. Ever since then there has been no limit to the accumulation of nuclear weapons by the Powers which have them. Scientific discoveries and technological development have centred around the improvement and production of the most unbelievable weapons of destruction and annihilation. Enormous human and material resources are devoted to an imaginary and unacceptable war. There is no acceptable system for inspection and control and, what is even worse, there is not the awareness or political will necessary to put an end to this absurdity which undermines the very survival of the human species.

When in 1969 the Disarmament Decade was proclaimed, the General Assembly reaffirmed that, as it had discovered 10 years earlier, the question of general and complete disarmament was the most important one facing the modern world, and that it was necessary to adopt effective measures, without delay, for the cessation at an early date of the nuclear arms race and the elimination of other weapons of mass destruction, and for the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

Concerning the conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament, we know what the situation is: total and absolute stagnation. Concerning partial measures which have been achieved, they are not to be found in the nuclear field.

Over five years ago we hoped to obtain results from the second round of talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on strategic arms limitation. However, in this period of time those Powers have increased their nuclear arsenals and have brought about their qualitative improvement. We therefore ask ourselves: what happened to the proposals made by the Heads of State of those Powers contained in resolution 32/87 G? Were they merely statements of good intentions?

(Mr. Carpio Castillo, Venezuela)

Our concern is based on the fact that the continuous refinement of nuclear weapons is largely due to the impossibility of concluding a general nuclear test-ban treaty.

Last week, the Uppsala Seismological Institute recorded the second underground nuclear test in a week, a test which brought about seismic waves capable of causing great damage in a populated area. Of course the existing treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water does not include a ban on underground testing, and not all nuclear-weapon States are parties to it.

(Mr. Carpio Castillo, Venezuela)

Therefore, it is necessary as soon as possible to have an international instrument on a general prohibition of nuclear testing. This would be an important step towards controlling the development and proliferation of nuclear weapons, and would relieve the deep concern which exists as to the harmful consequences of radioactive contamination. This urgency was expressed in resolution 32/78 and in paragraph 51 of the Final Document of the special session of the Assembly. It was categorically stated in draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.7, which is before this Committee, and of which Venezuela is a co-sponsor.

On the other hand, in the preamble as well as in article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the States parties committed themselves to negotiating at an early date effective measures relative to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, as well as to negotiating a general and complete disarmament treaty. The application of these and other provisions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the first review conference of which led to questionable results, will be studied at the forthcoming review conference to be held in 1980. It is in this context that we would like briefly to refer to the question of strengthening the security of non-nuclear-weapon States.

At the first review conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, non-nuclear-weapon States had already said that the security guarantees offered by nuclear States were not sufficient. Paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the special session of the Assembly recognizes this. That is why it was more than timely to include at this session a new item, on the initiative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, entitled:

"Conclusion of an International Convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States".

We have listened carefully and with interest to the general debate on this topic which reflected the concern of non-nuclear States at the use or the threat of use by nuclear States of such weapons. As was stated by the majority of delegations, it is obviously premature to express an opinion on the Soviet draft convention, which deserves detailed study with a view to making pertinent observations. Also deserving of consideration

(Mr. Carpio Castillo, Venezuela)

is the counter proposal tabled by the delegation of Pakistan contained in draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.15, and the remarks made by other delegations. In any event, we agree with the way the item was dealt with and with the decision to transmit both drafts and all relevant documents to the Committee on Disarmament for study.

Just as we consider the Non-Proliferation Treaty to be an appropriate instrument for the avoidance of nuclear-weapon proliferation, we also believe that the establishment of nuclear-free-zones and zones of peace in various parts of the world is one of the most effective means of halting the horizontal proliferation of such weapons and of strengthening world peace and security. This was equally recognized by the special session of the Assembly in paragraph 60 et seqq. of the Final Document.

However, there has been no compliance with the resolutions on the denuclearization of Africa. An African country which has been repudiated by the international community because of its opprobrious policy of racial discrimination and oppression is in a position to produce nuclear weapons to the detriment of the collective security of that continent. We sincerely believe that the various bodies of the United Nations - in particular the Security Council - must adopt urgent and categorical measures to put an end to the nuclear threat which South Africa represents.

In the context of nuclear-weapon-free zones, Latin America still awaits ratification by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of Additional Protocols I and II respectively of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Once again, we urge France to sign and ratify Additional Protocol I to this Treaty to guarantee its full implementation.

Nuclear-weapon States and other militarily significant States continue to promise us that they will reduce their military budgets, and that they will reallocate those resources to economic and social development, particularly to benefit developing countries. This matter has gone through various stages, from the adoption of resolution 3093 (XXVIII) which recommended to all permanent members of the Security Council five years ago that they reduce their military budgets by 10 per cent, to the preparation of a report by the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified consultants, on the reduction of military budgets, which proposed

(Mr. Carpio Castillo, Venezuela)

a uniform instrument for the submission of information on military budgets. We hope that this session, concrete measures will be adopted on this matter in order to implement the recommendation contained in paragraph 89 of the Final Document of the special session of the Assembly.

As we continue to wait indefinitely for real disarmament measures, we note that bilateral negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on a treaty prohibiting chemical and bacteriological weapons have not yet been concluded. We do not think the Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (A/33/27), dispels the doubts member States have as to the present state of negotiations.

(Mr. Carpio Castillo, Venezuela)

We must overcome what continues to be the main obstacle in all negotiations on partial disarmament measures, that is, the problem of verification of compliance with a treaty. An evaluation of this matter clearly shows that if we are to come closer to the goal of general and complete disarmament political will, especially that of the major Powers, is essential to the achievement of real and specific disarmament measures.

I would not wish to conclude my statement without referring to a constant concern of the Government of Venezuela, a concern which we have mentioned on various occasions, relating to the fact that the trade in and transfer and proliferation of conventional weapons is continually increasing. It uses up valuable resources vital to the development of people and indirectly promotes regional conflicts. This traffic in arms is encouraged mainly by the producers and suppliers for whom this is a profitable business.

We are constantly constrained by this type of trade, which enables racist and colonialist regimes to continue to exist in the African continent, and which hampers the process of self-determination of peoples. It is thanks to this trade that regimes which violate human rights, regimes such as that of South Africa in the African continent and Nicaragua in our own continent, survive and maintain their harmful practices by massive purchases of weapons, which enable them not only to enslave their peoples but also to jeopardize peace and security in the region.

Mr. AL-DOY (Bahrain) (interpretation from Arabic): On behalf of my delegation I am happy to express to Mr. Pastinen our sincere congratulations on his unanimous election to the chairmanship of this very important Committee. His friendly country is well known for its support for the cause of peace in the world.

I should also like to congratulate all the officers of the Committee on the efforts they have exerted for the organization and smooth running of its work.

Mankind is at the moment passing through one of the most dangerous and serious stages in its long life and it is subjected in one way or another to the threat of extermination. This is due to the

(Mr. Al-Doy, Bahrain)

frenzied race for the stockpiling of all types of weapons, particularly those of mass destruction. Talk about the end of the world has become a matter of fact, whereas in the past it used to be stories of myths that some did not believe.

In the face of this threatening danger and on the basis of these impressions the General Assembly at its tenth Special Session, devoted to disarmament, clearly expressed itself on the dangers threatening the human race and pinpointed the determination of the international community to deal with the vital question that concerns the future of humanity - the destruction of man himself and his prosperity. The subject of disarmament and the limitation of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race has assumed an important place among the causes and questions that have been dealt with by the United Nations since its creation and is now a priority matter and one of the main items that concern the Organization.

The vast funds allocated for arms could be used to raise the standard of living of the entire developing world. Indeed, it is a source of great regret to think that the technological, financial and manpower resources devoted to the production and purchasing of arms are much greater than the technological and financial resources devoted to solving the economic problems of the world. Military expenditures have reached \$400 billion annually.

Although the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly, devoted to disarmament, did not produce definite and concrete measures to stop the arms race as we had hoped, nevertheless we truly hope that the Final Document, which was adopted by the General Assembly during that session, will be an effective contribution to the achievement of our ultimate objectives.

If we want to save the world from nuclear catastrophe we must take practical steps. Foremost amongst them is the immediate cessation of the production of nuclear weapons for a period of time, and then a gradual start on the destruction of existing stockpiles.

(Mr. Al-Doy, Bahrain)

This would contribute to the prosperity, peace and security of the international community and to the maintenance and preservation of human heritage and the civilization of mankind that are the result of the labour of successive generations.

We support the efforts exerted by two of the major Powers to reach an agreement on the control and limitation of armaments through the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. This anticipated agreement will certainly contribute to saving the world from the scourges and dangers of war and destruction.

Traditional weapons are no less dangerous than nuclear weapons. The use of napalm and cluster bombs, as well as other weapons, create infinite pain and suffering for mankind, as well as psychological harm.

My delegation hopes that the United Nations Conference on Prohibition or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate Effects, which is expected to be held in 1979, will produce documents that will permit the prevention of the use of such weapons.

The Final Document adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session, in paragraph 63, called for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in the Middle East and in Africa. My delegation supports the provisions of that paragraph, which, when implemented, will provide for the security of those areas, saving them from serious danger and threats.

My delegation is not only interested in the Middle East. Its interests extend to other matters related to items 41 and 42 of the agenda, namely, the "Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa", and "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East", because we believe that whenever the nuclear-free areas are increased throughout the world this certainly will be an effective measure for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons. As a result, the nuclear areas will be isolated and eventually they will be freed of nuclear weapons completely.

(Mr. Al-Doy, Bahrain)

Bahrain, which is one of the small States close to the Indian Ocean, has over and over again expressed its full support for the declaration of the Indian Ocean, including the Gulf area, as a zone of peace. It also welcomes the proposal for convening a conference for the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean area; in fact, the convening of such a conference would be a constructive and positive step towards the implementation of the provisions of paragraph 64 of the Final Document adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session devoted to disarmament, and would certainly open the way for the Indian Ocean to be considered a zone of peace.

The beginning of negotiations between the two super-Powers with a view to declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace will also lead to a conducive atmosphere for such a declaration. My delegation hopes that in all international efforts every available opportunity and every spark of peace will be seized on to limit the arms race, in both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon fields, and to achieve general and complete disarmament.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): I call on the representative of the Federal Republic of Germany to introduce the draft resolution in document A/C.1/33/L.21.

Mr. PFEIFFER (Federal Republic of Germany): I should like to introduce the draft resolution on confidence-building measures contained in document A/C.1/33/L.21, which has been submitted by my delegation, together with the delegations of Canada, Denmark, Ghana, Greece, Japan, Romania, Spain and Turkey, under agenda item 47, "General and complete disarmament".

A recurring argument in the international discussion on peace, security and disarmament is that progress in those areas depends to a large degree on a favourable political climate. There is a great degree of agreement on the proposition that better knowledge and understanding among States could diminish mistrust, anxiety and insecurity, and could contribute to the climate of mutual confidence necessary for real progress in the field of disarmament.

In his address to the special session on disarmament, the Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany called for a comprehensive

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal Republic
of Germany)

political partnership in the joint effort to safeguard security on a global scale as a prerequisite for a "process of genuine arms limitation and reduction". In view of the obstacles in the way of rapid progress towards that goal, the Federal Chancellor advocated a long confidence-building process to improve the political climate and to overcome fear and mistrust.

My delegation was pleased to find that in the discussions at the special session Member States shared our belief in the valuable contribution which confidence-building measures could make to further progress in disarmament and that that consensus is reflected in the Final Document.

My Government thinks the time has come to move from the general discussion of the need for confidence among States to practical and specific measures. The primary purpose is to give the States in the region more information on the military activities of their neighbours and thereby help to eliminate mistrust and create a climate of confidence as a first step to facilitating concrete agreements on arms control and disarmament.

The countries which participated in the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe were the first to discuss, to define and to adopt a specific set of such measures and to implement them in their political practice. We have applied those measures in the years since the Helsinki Conference.

This valuable experience has encouraged us to submit for the consideration of United Nations Member States the concept of regional arrangements on confidence-building measures, to be agreed upon in accordance with the specific conditions in the area. The primary purpose of such arrangements would be to give all States in the region more information and thereby help to eliminate mistrust and fear.

At this point I should like to make it very clear that the confidence-building measures agreed to in the Final Act of Helsinki are by no means an exhaustive and complete list of such measures. We see those measures only as the result of one regional experience, evolved under specific circumstances, and we are well aware of the fact that different conditions in other regions require solutions different from those in Europe. We have taken care of that in our draft resolution.

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal
Republic of Germany)

In this context we look with great interest to a region of the world which is taking a particularly active part in the disarmament discussions: I mean Latin America. The Treaty of Tlatelolco is, in our view, a unique achievement, and we follow with sympathy the current efforts to limit conventional armaments in the wake of the Declaration of Ayacucho.

The intention of the authors of this draft resolution is to draw the attention of Member States to the concept of confidence-building measures in general and to start an international debate on the many opportunities they offer to prepare the ground for further disarmament efforts.

I come now to the contents of draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.21.

The preambular part reflects the basic political approach to the problem.

The operative part contains some confidence-building measures to be considered by the Member States. They are meant as examples and are by no means exclusive. In order to make that clear, we have included operative paragraph 2, to allow consideration on a regional basis of some specific confidence-building measures defined in accordance with the specific conditions and requirements in the area.

We then invite all States to keep the Secretary-General informed of their experience, request the Secretary-General to gather the views of Member States and transmit them to the General Assembly before its thirty-fourth session, and we propose to include in its agenda an item entitled "Confidence-building measures", in order to provide for further discussion of this question.

As I have already pointed out, it is indeed for the States concerned in any particular region to evolve their own system of confidence-building measures most suited to their own needs and conditions. It may be useful in this connexion to explain briefly the significance of the specific confidence-building measures we have included in our illustrative list of measures enumerated in operative paragraph 1.

(Mr. Pfeiffer, Federal Republic
of Germany)

First, in situations of tension or crisis it is in our view essential to guarantee the technical prerequisites for effective political crisis management by Governments. We think that only permanent and previously agreed arrangements can guarantee prompt, clear and unhindered communication between Governments under any circumstances. We consider that such communication is of vital importance, that it is technically feasible and the cost negligible when compared to the benefits. We think it would be dangerous to rely on improvisation because makeshift arrangements might just not work when most needed.

Secondly, several disarmament proposals are based on a financial or budgetary approach, that of reducing military expenditure. Studies have been made in this field, and further efforts are on the way. Without prejudice to disarmament measures by reduction of expenses, we believe that, in the meantime greater openness on the defence efforts of States, as expressed in financial terms, could contribute to a more candid and fact-based discussion of security and disarmament issues. It would help to get away from mere speculations about other countries' actions, intentions and motivations. On the other hand, better information could in our view lead to a more sober and businesslike dialogue on respective security and defence policies and to a more rational assessment of disarmament problems. We think that that would contribute to international confidence and help disarmament efforts.

Thirdly, another example of the usefulness of confidence-building measures is the prior notification of major military movements and manoeuvres. Both usually imply more intense military activity in the country concerned and an unusual concentration of armed forces. Both have in the past been sources of misinterpretation of the underlying intentions and have aroused fear and suspicion and on occasion have led to international tension. Therefore, prior notification of such activities and, where appropriate, information on them in terms of dates, troop strengths and locations involved can be helpful. In view of the differences between regions, the parameters agreed to in Europe cannot be automatically transferred to other regions. The States concerned should themselves explore how best to adapt the underlying concept and what their regional parameters might be.

Fourthly, closely related to information on major manoeuvres is the idea of the exchange of official observers, by invitation, to such manoeuvres. This can further enhance confidence by taking away some of the secrecy usually surrounding

(Mr. Pfeiffer,
Federal Republic of Germany)

such military activities and by substituting eyewitness reports of official observers for assumptions, speculations and suspicions.

Fifthly, in the same vein is another proposal calling for the exchange of visits by military delegations and personnel. The idea is to go somewhat further than contacts through observers at occasional manoeuvres and to promote better understanding among the officials directly concerned.

Sixthly, another major factor in securing a climate of political trust is giving States parties to agreements designed to remove tensions and enhance security certitude by supplying evidence on adherence to measures agreed upon. We think that technical means of various types can give such certitude and thereby make an important contribution to United Nations efforts to promote peace settlements, to stabilize crisis situations and to prevent renewed outbreaks of international tension. We think it would be useful to study such arrangements, to analyse past experience in the field and to continue to search for even more effective measures in order to provide the international community with tools that might prove helpful in the future.

We expect some delegations to say the draft should not limit itself to the proposed measures in the strictly military field. They may feel it desirable to add other confidence-building measures to the catalogue as well. We are inclined to understand their position. But the draft, being the first of its kind, is deliberately limited to the military sector. We feel that in its initial phase the draft should not be overburdened with proposals covering other aspects and introducing new elements.

We would like to test the applicability and feasibility of the proposed measures first and to gather experience before we consider widening the scope by proposing other measures. That would be the next step. Therefore, we have proposed the inclusion of a new item, "Confidence-building measures", in the draft agenda of the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly.

I hope, as do the other sponsors, that the draft resolution will be favourably considered by the Committee and meet with its approval.

Mr. GLAIEL (Syrian Arab Republic) (interpretation from Arabic): In their totality the topics under discussion constitute some of the aspects of the disarmament sought by humanity in its desire to live in peace and security. The eradication of the source of a disease is one of the best remedies. If, through the bilateral and multilateral negotiations now under way on total disarmament, we achieve the results to which we aspire, that will mean that future generations can be optimistic regarding a prosperous future from which terror and anxiety have been removed.

My delegation has previously stated that as a small developing country the Syrian Arab Republic belongs to the Non-Aligned Group and has throughout its long and ancient history struggled for its freedom, independence and sovereignty and to maintain and preserve its heritage and civilization. In that capacity it is extremely interested in the achievement of all these aspirations so that its people and the rest of the peoples of the world can enjoy peace, security and prosperity. In order to achieve those aspirations, man must desire them. Without the determined will of all peoples and all States nothing of the kind will take place. If peace and justice prevail, if injustice is eradicated, and if all peoples enjoy their rights and freedoms and exercise their sovereignty, they will not hesitate to contribute constructively in building a prosperous future.

But how can peoples victims of injustice, exploitation, oppression and racial discrimination, peoples deprived of their land and their basic right to build independent States, abandon the struggle and throw down their arms so long as they remain threatened with extermination and subjugation by fierce enemies possessing destructive weapons?

Three of the items now under discussion stipulate the setting-up of nuclear-weapon-free zones in South Asia, in Africa and in the Middle East. Those three areas are the most dangerous pockets of tension for international peace and security. More than any other continent Africa has suffered from the scourges of colonialism, and it continues to feel insecure as a result of the presence of systems which serve countries having political and economic interests and ambitions.

(Mr. Glaiel, Syrian Arab Republic)

In return, they have the support of these countries in their influence and domination and in continuing to implement their racist policies, relying on the strength of their weapons and on stockpiling vast quantities. The greatest danger would reside in the racist system in South Africa acquiring nuclear weapons.

Here I should like to remind the Committee of the intervention of the representative of Nigeria on 10 November in which he talked about that phenomenon and the possible results from it that could reflect on the international community and the will of the countries of Africa to make it a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Also, the statement by the representative of Ethiopia yesterday dealt with the same topic.

The General Assembly, at its thirtieth session, commended the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. To strengthen that objective, it recommended that the Member States concerned in the region should

"proclaim solemnly and immediately their intention to refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons", and "urged all parties directly concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons".

(resolution 3474 (XXX))

Again, at its thirty-second session, the General Assembly urged

"all parties directly concerned to adhere to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons" (resolution 32/82)

with the objective of promoting the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East, and it repeated its recommendation that the Member States directly concerned, pending the establishment of such a zone, under an effective system of safeguards, should

"refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from producing, acquiring or in any other way possessing nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and from permitting the stationing of nuclear weapons on their territory or the territory under their control by any third party";

and also, that they should

(Mr. Glaiel, Syrian Arab Republic)

"Refrain, on a reciprocal basis, from any other action that would facilitate the acquisition, testing or use of such weapons, or would be in any other way detrimental to the objective of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region under an effective system of safeguards;" and

"... Agree to place all their nuclear activities under the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards;". (ibid.)

The General Assembly also went on to refer to other items in its resolution 32/82.

If we look at the results of the voting in the thirtieth, thirty-first and thirty-second sessions of the General Assembly on resolutions relating to this subject, we see that all the countries concerned in the region voted for them with the exception of Israel, which abstained, thus defying 125 States at the thirtieth session, 130 States at the thirty-first session and 131 States at the thirty-second session.

The creation and establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone requires in the first instance clear agreement between the countries of the region. Within that framework, we see Israel's abstention from adopting the resolutions of the General Assembly as it should be understood; there can be no other interpretation of this attitude, which becomes clearer day by day. The fact that Israel did not abide by these resolutions and did not adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as they urged all Member States to do merely confirms that it possesses nuclear weapons and that it is conducting nuclear weapons tests in co-operation with South Africa. That attitude does nothing to encourage the rest of the countries of the region to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons, to renounce them and to clear the area of them.

So long as the question of an occupied territory and peoples who have been expelled and unjustly treated and are threatened by a military presence armed with the most sophisticated weapons - in particular nuclear weapons - remains, then hostility will continue and the competition to acquire more powerful arms will accelerate. In this context, we can only lay at the door

(Mr. Glaiel, Syrian Arab Republic)

of some of the nuclear States the responsibility for introducing these weapons into an area which it has been proposed should become a nuclear-weapon-free zone and, therefore, the responsibility for the violation of the various resolutions of which they themselves have been in favour here.

As all the previous speakers have said, the establishment of the Middle East as a nuclear-weapon-free zone is closely - in fact, inevitably - linked to Africa, to the Indian Ocean and South-East Asia. In order that peace may prevail in that Ocean and in that part of Asia, every reason for the violation of peace and security should be removed - that is, strategic, political and economic rivalry and the establishment of military bases and their equipment with the most sophisticated weapons and equipment. The Indian Ocean is a vital strategic geographical area, for it links Asia with Africa and both with Europe through the most strategic waterways of the world. Thus we witness the rivalry between the different interests wishing to dominate these areas, leading to the use of weapons and hence creating pockets of danger and tension.

The same can also be said about South Asia, which is dotted with military and other bases.

As stated in paragraph 60 of the Final Document of the special session on disarmament:

"The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned constitutes an important disarmament measure",
until such time as we achieve our ultimate target of general and complete disarmament.

In paragraph 11 the Final Document states:

"The vast stockpiles and tremendous build-up of arms and armed forces and the competition for qualitative refinement of weapons of all kinds, to which scientific resources and technological advances are diverted, pose incalculable threats to peace. This situation both reflects and aggravates international tensions, sharpens conflicts in various regions of the world, hinders the process of détente, exacerbates the differences between opposing military alliances, jeopardizes the security of all States, heightens the sense of insecurity among all States, including the non-nuclear-weapon States, and increases the threat of nuclear war."

(Mr. Glaiel, Syrian Arab Republic)

And in paragraph 12 it adds:

"The arms race ... adversely affects the right of peoples freely to determine their systems of social and economic development, and hinders the struggle for self-determination and the elimination of colonial rule, racial or foreign domination or occupation. Indeed, the massive accumulation of armaments and the acquisition of armaments technology by racist régimes, as well as their possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, present a challenging and increasingly dangerous obstacle to a world community faced with the urgent need to disarm." (resolution S-10/2)

(Mr. Glaiel, Syrian Arab Republic)

The statement that the greatest guarantee against nuclear war and the use of nuclear weapons is nuclear disarmament and the total destruction of nuclear weapons can also be applied to conventional wars and weapons and their use since the best guarantee is total disarmament. The steps that can lead to this are accession to international treaties, and the respect thereof, such as the protocol for the banning of the military use of poisonous gases or related gases and bacteriological means, as well as the treaty to prohibit the production and stockpiling of bacteriological and toxic weapons. The current negotiations on a treaty for a total and effective ban on the production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and the destruction thereof can lead to constructive results. We must also have international treaties regarding all other weapons and means of mass destruction. The prohibition of the production of weapons and decreasing military allocations as well as armed forces will allow the international community to allocate part of the funds currently used for military purposes to economic and social development, particularly for the benefit of the developing countries.

Current treaties and conventions, as well as negotiations, both bilateral and multilateral, can with difficulty be described as steps toward total disarmament. As far as we are concerned, they are only a codification or regulation of the arms race amid each party's terror and fear of the other. Within these negotiations comprising different trends and ideas, the time has come for the international community to discuss disarmament and the dialogue concerning it at an international conference to be held for that purpose in order to allow all the developing and small States to play a greater role in that field and in application of the principle of world-wide participation.

While we give all disarmament items the importance and attention they deserve, at the current moment my delegation has only dealt with the items that are of direct interest to my country and to our Arab area, hoping that the international community will assume the responsibility which has been placed upon it for eliminating and eradicating the conditions which have made the Middle East and Africa and other areas pockets of tension and the scene for the presentation and consumption of the production by arms merchants of different types of weapons, disregarding mankind and its values.

Mr. ARANGO (Colombia) (interpretation from Spanish): The avoidance of war and the maintenance and preservation of peace are at the very root of the United Nations and are its raison d'etre. Achievement of this objective would be total success but inability to create organizations and to adopt procedures rendering war impossible would be total failure. This First Committee bears a major responsibility because it deals with these important items.

At a time when concern for the meagre achievements of the talks on nuclear disarmament and the increase in the manufacture and trade of conventional weapons is great, and the United Nations is reorganizing the Disarmament Commission, my delegation wishes to stand firmly on its profoundly pacifist thesis and to remind all peoples of the world that while it is true that the major nuclear Powers are not reaching agreement to halt their dangerous arms race, other peoples can indeed create denuclearized zones which, as they expand, will at least formally reduce the possible utilization of such weapons against defenceless, densely populated areas, thus opening the way to a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons.

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America - the Treaty of Tlatelolco - has been the only positive achievement among all peoples of the world in trying to avoid nuclear war. It is only logical for the peoples of Latin America to have been the first to take this step as an example to the world. The Latin American peoples have shown their commitment to peace. They have shown this, for example, by having resolved almost all of their territorial border problems among States of the region through negotiations and not by force of arms.

Conclusion of this Treaty and of its Additional Protocols I and II has not been an easy task. The idea of creating nuclear-free zones has been bandied about in the General Assembly since 1956. Ever since then we have heard talk about the creation of denuclearized zones in various regions of the world such as the Balkans, the Nordic countries, the Mediterranean, Asia, the Middle East, Central Europe and Africa. The latter two have been extensively studied and considered. Latin America, of course, has also been under discussion since then. It is only just to note the interest of Poland in the establishment of a

(Mr. Arango, Colombia)

nuclear-free zone in central Europe; of Romania in the denuclearization of the Balkans; of Ireland as shown in its proposal of 1959 to expand this principle by regions; of Egypt and Iran to attain this objective in the Middle East; and of Pakistan for South Asia; and finally, that of all African peoples most of whom have committed themselves to making Africa a nuclear-free region as proclaimed in resolution 3471 (XXX) adopted by the General Assembly in 1975. Our delegation hopes that very soon Africa will have its denuclearization treaty, because there is no reason whatsoever why the African Governments and peoples could not add to their political victories and achievements of the last two decades one more successful action, that of declaring their continent a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

The adoption in 1962 by the Assembly of resolution 1762 (XVII), which condemns all nuclear testing, greatly opened the way to the establishment of zones free of nuclear activity, which served as the basis for a joint statement issued, on 29 April 1963, by five Latin American Presidents, led by the President of Mexico, in which they proposed the denuclearization treaty to other Governments of the region. By 14 February 1967, the plenipotentiary representatives of 14 nations had signed it in Tlatelolco, and on 18 October 1968 Barbados, the newest country in the region, signed the Treaty, thus bringing the number of signatory States to 22.

At the twenty-second session of the General Assembly resolution 2286 (XXII) was adopted which welcomed the Treaty and urged States to become signatories to the agreement and to Protocols I and II to sign and ratify the document.

In a relatively brief span of time - 10 or 12 years of talks - the first and only real step was taken in man's struggle to free himself from the fear and tragedy of a nuclear threat. This is the meaning of the Treaty of Tlatelolco we are now discussing. This major agreement among countries in the Latin American continent and the Caribbean area is a step which makes it possible to achieve Bolivar's dream in the near future: the unity of South America. The Latin American peoples must go from unity in strategy for avoiding war and maintaining peace to economic unity which is so needed to achieve development, and to political unity which is desired in order to strengthen our position in the world.

(Mr. Arango, Colombia)

My delegation ventures to invite Cuba and Guyana to sign the Treaty of Tlatelolco, thus obtaining unanimity among all States of the region, and Argentina, which is a signatory State, to ratify it. With regard to the countries signatories of Protocols I and II dealing respectively with the application of the Treaty in areas within its purview and which provides for the commitment of nuclear Powers not to use their weapons in the region, my delegation would be pleased to see the United States of America ratify, Additional Protocol I as soon as possible, bearing in mind that the situation of the Panama Canal has fundamentally changed after the welcome agreement between the Panamanian Government and the United States as to the future of that transoceanic waterway.

(Mr. Arango, Colombia)

In like manner, my delegation urges the Government of France to sign Additional Protocol I, and we are pleased to note the good intentions in this regard expressed by the President of that nation on 25 May 1978.

Lastly, we invite the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to ratify its adherence to Additional Protocol II, so that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America would be duly guaranteed by all the nuclear Powers of the world.

We also wish to announce that we shall co-sponsor the draft resolutions on these items, namely, items 36 and 39 of our agenda, which are to be submitted by the delegation of our brother country, Mexico.

We also make a special appeal that in other regions of the world where talks have been initiated to bring about nuclear-weapon-free zones, those talks should continue and reach speedy agreement. We hope that the next major step will be taken in this connexion by Africa and that Southern Asia, the South Pacific and the Middle East will soon attain this vital objective.

My delegation, at the explicit recommendation of our Government, wishes to express Colombia's interest in promoting the establishment of zones of peace in regions or subregions which include countries of similar characteristics in terms of internal and external security. The nations of those zones of peace should agree among themselves upon norms of arms control and of military co-operation in situations in which their security, individual or collective, may be threatened by nations, groups of nations or factors alien to the established zones.

A level of conventional weaponry should be fixed to guarantee the appropriate exercise of the sovereignty of the nations. That would freeze the number of conventional weapons for the region. It would be a first stage in the control of the manufacture of and trade in conventional weapons which are so harmful to mankind. In keeping with these ideas, we are co-sponsoring, with Sweden, the draft resolution in document A/C.1/33/L.18, which would be included as an agenda item at the thirty-fourth session of the United Nations General Assembly entitled 'Reduction of military budgets'.

(Mr. Arango, Colombia)

We cannot conclude this statement without referring to the most important element in our struggle to maintain peace, namely, the disarmament of the spirit. We must dislodge from the mind of man the idea that war can truly lead to a settlement of conflicts. In this regard, only education for peace can bring mankind to a new era of progress and solidarity among all peoples. This concern with education for peace was clearly expressed by Colombia when it sent as its spokesman to the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament its Minister of Education, who at that time was Mr. Rafael Rivas, now the Chairman of our delegation. He stated:

"... in the final analysis, peace and human solidarity can spring only from the mind of man, and the loftiest objective of education is to ensure the reign of those ideals on earth." (A/S-10/PV.12, p. 22)

Spurred on by these ideas, we have enthusiastically welcomed the draft resolution submitted by the Polish delegation on education for peace.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): I call on the representative of New Zealand, who wishes to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.7.

Mr. FRANCIS (New Zealand): I should like to say a few words in introducing the draft resolution in document A/C.1/33/L.7. I do so on behalf of the delegations of Australia, Austria, Canada, Colombia, Congo, Denmark, Ecuador, Ghana, Ireland, Japan, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, the Netherlands, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, Singapore, Sweden and Venezuela, which have joined New Zealand in co-sponsoring this draft.

My delegation has already expressed in this Committee New Zealand's view of the importance and urgency of concluding a comprehensive test ban treaty. In this statement, therefore, I can be comparatively, and perhaps mercifully, brief.

(Mr. Francis, New Zealand)

Last year New Zealand was one of the sponsors of a draft resolution adopted in the plenary Assembly by a vote of 126 in favour to 2 against, with 1 abstention. Our chief concern then - and it arose out of our strong belief in the value of a comprehensive test ban as an important means of preventing both horizontal and vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons - was to lend the Assembly's encouragement and support to the negotiating nuclear weapon States and to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) by producing a text that was as non-controversial as possible. The reasons for doing so were all the more compelling because we expected that the negotiations then in progress would soon be completed. We were glad that a single draft resolution on the question of nuclear testing proved possible and we were delighted that it commanded such wide support.

This year we face a situation which is different and yet in some respects much the same. It is the same in that the negotiations are still in progress. We are no nearer now - publicly at least - to the conclusion of a draft treaty than we were this time last year. It is different in that 12 months have gone by. In those 12 months nuclear testing has continued both in the atmosphere and underground. The promise of resolution 32/78, adopted so overwhelmingly, has not been fulfilled. A comprehensive test-ban treaty is still not in sight. It is therefore scarcely surprising that the mood of the great majority of delegations in this Committee on this issue is one of disillusionment and disappointment. Nor is it surprising that delegations, their patience at an end, should wish to see this Assembly call for more precise, definite and immediate action. New Zealand understands, and indeed shares, the strong feeling behind such a call.

But it is our view, as it is I believe the view of all the co-sponsors of this draft resolution, that our principal purpose is to secure a comprehensive test ban treaty. That purpose, this year at least, will best be served by a resolution which acts as a spur to the speedy conclusion of the negotiations now in progress. That purpose will be advanced not by a resolution from which the negotiating nuclear-weapon States can easily dissociate themselves, but by one to which the overwhelming majority of the Assembly, including those three nuclear weapon States, are obliged to subscribe. It is our belief that draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.7 meets this need.

(Mr. Francis, New Zealand)

Its key paragraphs are operative paragraphs 5 and 6, which establish the time frame for the conclusion of the trilateral negotiations, consideration by the multilateral negotiating body and submission of a draft treaty to a resumed session of this thirty-third General Assembly. In this connexion, I would ask delegations to note an amendment to operative paragraph 5. With the concurrence of the co-sponsors, the final words of operative paragraph 5, "the end of 1978" have been deleted and replaced by the phrase "the beginning of its 1979 session". The paragraph as a whole therefore now reads:

"Urges those three States to expedite their negotiations with a view to bringing them to a positive conclusion as a matter of urgency and to use their utmost endeavours to transmit the results for full consideration by the multilateral negotiating body before the beginning of its 1979 session."

The Secretariat has been informed of this change and a revision will be issued shortly.

Operative paragraph 6 requires the multilateral negotiating body to take up the agreed text, with the aim of submitting a draft treaty to a resumed thirty-third General Assembly. The language of this operative paragraph does not, in our view, limit in any way the discretion of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament - or the Committee on Disarmament, as the case may be. Clearly it may recommend to the Assembly any modifications that it may deem advisable, as a result of the full consideration envisaged in operative paragraph 5, to the agreed text resulting from the negotiations of the three nuclear-weapon States. Nor indeed does it limit the right of the multilateral negotiating body to consider the issue of a comprehensive test-ban treaty in the absence of an agreed text from the trilateral States. But once a draft has been negotiated in Geneva by the negotiating body, it is, under the terms of draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.7, to be submitted to a resumed session of the thirty-third General Assembly. The timing of this resumed session cannot now be determined. It is our view, however, that Assembly discussion

(Mr. Francis, New Zealand)

of a draft treaty should not wait until the thirty-fourth General Assembly. It is of such preeminent importance as to warrant the financial expenditure involved in reconvening the present Assembly. Possibly that resumed session could coincide with the meeting here of the Disarmament Commission in May/June next year.

Draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.7 should be seen as complementing, not contradicting, the call in draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.3 for a moratorium on nuclear testing. That draft resolution relates to a separate issue, important in its own right, and is co-sponsored by a number of the sponsors of draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.7. But it spans a different time frame -- the period before a comprehensive test ban treaty -- and should be seen, as it is seen by us and its sponsors, in that light. The two draft resolutions, in fact, reinforce each other.

Delegations will also be aware that there is another draft resolution before us in A/C.1/33/L.11, which has a reference to a comprehensive test ban treaty and has a substantial number of non-aligned co-sponsors. That text deals with a number of subjects. It refers to a comprehensive test ban treaty only briefly. Draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.7, the text that I am now introducing, is a fuller draft, stronger in some respects, covering in more detail the stages leading to a treaty. Again, however, there is no inconsistency between the two drafts. I have no doubt, therefore, that the co-sponsors of that draft resolution will lend their support to draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.7.

This draft resolution should not be misconstrued by the negotiating nuclear-weapon States. It is an unequivocal and pressing call upon them to show the necessary political courage and will to overcome the remaining difficulties and to reach agreement without any further delay. As such, it is my delegation's hope that this draft resolution, which I now have the honour to submit on behalf of all its sponsors, will be adopted by an overwhelming vote.

The CHAIRMAN (interpretation from French): I want to make a few announcements. Sri Lanka has become a co-sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.2. Romania has become a co-sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.19; Cuba and Peru of draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.3 and Peru also of draft resolutions A/C.1/33/L.9, L.13/Rev.1 and L.17. Zambia has become a co-sponsor of draft resolutions A/C.1/33/L.14 and L.17.

I now call on the representative of Nicaragua who wishes to speak in exercise of his right of reply.

Mr. MONTIEL ARGUELLO (Nicaragua) (interpretation from Spanish): I consider it unfortunate that the representative of Venezuela has taken advantage of our debate on disarmament to attack the Government of Nicaragua by saying that it violates human rights and that it retains power through its massive purchases of weapons.

I do not wish to tax the patience of representatives, but I must reject those charges.

Recently the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights visited Nicaragua at the invitation of my Government, and I must advise the representative of Venezuela to wait for the report of that Commission, which is chaired precisely by a Venezuelan diplomat. Otherwise he will be prejudicing the outcome and being over-passionate.

As to the purchases of weapons, it is not true that the Government of Nicaragua remains in power on that basis. It is in power because of the backing of the majority of the Nicaraguan people. It was a small minority which attempted to take power by force and with the assistance of foreign countries. Because they were a minority they naturally resorted to violence rather than run for election, the normal procedure in a democratic country.

The meeting rose at 12.40 p.m.