



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 38TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. PASTINEN (Finland)

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The CHAIRMAN. Before calling on the first speaker I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to two new draft resolutions which have been circulated this morning. The first one bears the symbol A/C.1/33/L.19 and concerns the report of the Disarmament Commission. The second one, A/C.1/33/L.20, which stands in the name of the delegation of Liberia concerns a new philosophy on disarmament.

His Excellency Mr. Samarendra Kundu, Minister of State for External Affairs of the Government of India, is the first speaker this morning and, on behalf of the First Committee, I should like to extend a warm welcome to him.

Mr. KUNDU (India): Thank you for your kind words of welcome, Mr. Chairman.

I had the opportunity to participate in the deliberations of the First Committee at the thirty-second session of the General Assembly and to make a statement on the subject of disarmament. I am glad that, once again, I am able to take part in the discussion in the First Committee this year, when the Committee is conducting its work under the revised mandate entrusted to it by the General Assembly.

As you know, Mr. Chairman, my Government attaches great importance to the question of disarmament. Mankind is living today under the threat of complete annihilation by nuclear weapons that are stockpiled by five States and have an estimated total explosive power of more than 15 tons of TNT for every man, woman and child on this globe. What is even more discouraging is the fact that the nuclear arms race, far from abating, is being escalated at a furious pace by the nuclear-weapon Powers. As the Secretary-General's report on the work of the Organization submitted to the current session of the General Assembly correctly points out, technological advances in the arms race tend constantly to outstrip the pace of negotiations on arms control. In spite of the obvious danger the major Powers continue to base their security on the massive accumulation of nuclear weapons, on doctrines of strategic deterrence and on counter-force strategy.

One of the important events that took place during the current year was the holding of the special session devoted to disarmament. That special session was convened to fulfil some of the most abiding hopes and aspirations of mankind, namely, the adoption of concrete measures to halt and reverse the nuclear arms race. Those hopes have not been fulfilled, and even our minimal expectations from the last regular General Assembly session have not been realized. Nevertheless, the fact that the special session helped to add to the awareness about disarmament is no mean achievement. The task with which we are confronted at present is to decide what concrete measures we are going to take to follow up the decisions and the commitments made at the special session. In my view, the special session has passed on to the members of this Assembly two important commitments that should be fulfilled. They are, first, the issuance of an urgent call to bring about a moratorium on the further testing of nuclear weapons by all nuclear-weapon States, and secondly, the initiation of the consideration of the question of concluding a convention on the non-use of

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nuclear weapons. It would be something of an achievement for us if we could reach a positive conclusion on those two important matters.

As I myself had the privilege of stating in this Committee last year, doctrines of nuclear deterrence have in fact been exploited by interested groups in the countries concerned to escalate the arms race to continually higher levels. If the arsenals of major nuclear-weapon States 20 years ago were adequate at that time as deterrents, then there was absolutely no reason for the stockpiles to be increased beyond that point to the present mind-boggling levels. Another danger underlying doctrines of strategic deterrence is that they may undermine the international campaign against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. By refusing to diminish and eliminate their nuclear stockpiles, the nuclear-weapon States are in fact encouraging the belief that in order to deter possible attacks against them, it is useful for nations to possess nuclear weapons. It would be unacceptable, at least to my Government, to be told that nuclear weapons are safe only in the hands of the five present nuclear-weapon States, since we cannot accept the obvious implication that some States are more responsible than others. The nuclear-weapon States would carry conviction among others in regard to the dangers of nuclear-weapon proliferation if they were to adopt decisive and substantial measures on nuclear disarmament.

We are of course aware that the major nuclear-weapon Powers have been conducting negotiations to control the qualitative and quantitative aspects of their strategic nuclear-weapon arsenals. These negotiations led in 1972 to the conclusion of what is known as the first agreement of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, to which I shall refer hereafter as SALT I. We understand that the United States and the Soviet Union are currently negotiating a further agreement called SALT II. My delegation would certainly welcome any measure that would effectively control the nuclear arms race. We shall reserve our judgement about SALT II until such time as all the details have been made public. At this point we have to note that the SALT I agreement, far from resulting in a reduction of nuclear weapons, established ceilings which permitted the two sides to expand their nuclear arsenals. Given the rapid technological advances and the development of multiple warheads on nuclear missiles, we wonder whether the SALT II agreement, while technically reducing the ceiling on the number of launchers, might actually lead to an increase in the number of nuclear warheads. We also note with deep concern

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the fact that the SALT negotiations do not cover the huge arsenals of nuclear weapons deployed by both military alliances on the continent of Europe. These arsenals by themselves are sufficient to destroy life in large areas of the globe. One cannot therefore look upon the strategic arms limitation negotiations as necessarily connected with or leading to nuclear disarmament. Even while negotiations on limiting strategic nuclear weapons and their delivery systems are in progress, both the major nuclear-weapon Powers are developing new and more horrendous nuclear weapons, such as backfire bombers, the Cruise missile, the neutron bomb, SS-20 missiles, MX missiles, as well as new theories of deployment.

The recently concluded special session on disarmament was held at a crucial period of the world's history. Mankind had a chance to halt and reverse the calamitous arms race at a time when technological innovations were placing the goal of nuclear disarmament beyond its reach. In this context it must be emphasized that, however encouraging the current negotiations may be among the major nuclear-weapon Powers, in order to achieve genuine nuclear disarmament there is no alternative to implementing the measures recommended in paragraph 50 of the Final Document of the special session.

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I should like to express my delegation's views on some of the items now under consideration in this Committee. It is hardly necessary for me to reiterate the importance my delegation attaches to the urgent conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. In order to attract universal adherence, the comprehensive test-ban treaty must be genuinely non-discriminatory in terms of the obligations to be assumed by nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States. Furthermore, if it is to be truly meaningful and effective it is essential that all the nuclear-weapon Powers become parties to it. My delegation is disturbed by reports to the effect that the comprehensive test-ban treaty currently under negotiation by the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom might provide for exemption of what are called laboratory tests. We shall of course wait for the definition of laboratory tests in the draft treaty as and when it is submitted to the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. Any attempt to provide loop-holes would seriously undermine the credibility of the treaty.

My delegation, along with a number of other delegations, has submitted a draft resolution calling for a moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons pending the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

This Committee has discussed certain proposals regarding a possible convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. We should like to reiterate our position that we find such an approach rather limited since the concept does not offer genuine security to non-nuclear-weapon States, which would remain vulnerable to the global effect of the atomic radiation and the disastrous environmental changes which would accrue from the use of nuclear weapons in other parts of the world. It is for this reason that my delegation, along with a number of others, has put forward a draft proposal regarding a convention on the non-use of nuclear weapons under any circumstances. If such a proposal were accepted by all the nuclear-weapon States, not only would the world obtain a greater sense of security but the process of nuclear disarmament would be greatly accelerated.

This Committee is also considering various proposals regarding the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in certain regions and subregions of the world.

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As the Prime Minister of my country, Shri Morarji Desai, said in his statement at the special session on disarmament on 9 June:

"It" -- the problem of disarmament -- "can only be solved in a total manner keeping in view the whole of the globe and not the regions into which, presumably as a matter of political convenience or strategy, some countries seek to compartmentalize the world. It is idle to talk of regional nuclear-free zones if there are still zones which could continue to be endangered by nuclear weapons. Those which have such weapons lose nothing if some distant area is declared non-nuclear. The nations without nuclear capacity which imagine that their inclusion in such zones affords them security are suffering from a delusion. We are convinced that there cannot be a limited approach to the question of freedom from nuclear threats and dangers, but that the whole world should be declared a nuclear-free zone." (A/S-10/PV.24, p. 12)

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in particular areas of the world where nuclear weapons do not in any case exist is rather a strange approach to the problem. Surely it would be far more relevant to the cause of disarmament to create such zones in areas where nuclear weapons already exist, such as in central Europe. The creation of such zones in areas which are already free of nuclear weapons cannot properly be described as a disarmament measure.

Another subject to which my delegation attaches particular importance is the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean. The three rounds of talks between the United States and the Soviet Union on the Indian Ocean have not led to any perceptible movement towards the goal of implementing the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. It is ironical that the littoral countries, which are the parties directly concerned, have not been involved in these talks so far. We understand that the talks will be resumed shortly and we trust that they will lead to a speedy elimination of big-Power rivalry and military presence from the Indian Ocean.

The Committee will no doubt also consider the problem of other weapons of mass destruction. My delegation strongly supports the urgent conclusion of a convention effectively prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles. The General Assembly has been adopting resolutions on this subject for at least the past

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10 years. Most of those have been consensus resolutions. This is an item which should be accorded high priority by the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva. In this context we wish to express our regret at recent reports of the development of new types of chemical-weapon munitions.

We are equally in favour of the prohibition of the development of other types of weapons of mass destruction, including radiological weapons. We look forward to the day when scientific and technological research will be devoted solely to peaceful purposes in order to promote the welfare of man rather than to devise new and more novel ways of killing him.

We have repeatedly stressed the integral link between disarmament and development. It is indeed unfortunate that, while we speak and deliberate about disarmament, the expenditure on the mad armaments race rises and the gap between the developed and the developing countries widens. This is a disturbing phenomenon and an unfortunate paradox. Unless this paradox is resolved for the betterment of a large segment of humanity there cannot be real and lasting international peace and harmony. We are baffled when we learn that the staggering sum of about \$400 billion is being spent every year on armaments. At the same time, although almost a decade has passed since the international community adopted the official development assistance target of 0.7 per cent of the gross national product, that target has not been reached by many countries as yet. It is a matter of great disappointment that the projected concessional aid-flows from the developed countries to the developing countries are likely, I understand, to raise the ratio of official development assistance to gross national product of donor countries by a very nominal margin, that is, from 0.36 per cent in 1975 to only 0.39 per cent in 1985.

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It is sad to note that the 0.7 per cent target will not be achieved even by 1985. In fact, the official development assistance ratio by then, it is estimated, will be even lower than the 1960 figure. This position reveals an unfortunate state of affairs obtaining in the world in spite of the fact that we are committed to the Declaration on the Establishment of the New International Economic Order in which we say that we

"... shall correct inequalities and redress existing injustices, make it possible to eliminate the widening gap between the developed and the developing countries and ensure steadily accelerating economic and social development and peace and justice for present and future generations ..."

(resolution 3201 (S-VI))

Therefore, the time has come when we should seriously consider how to accept the challenge to attack global poverty, and at the same time, pierce the thick veil of distrust and fear which impedes the realization of a meaningful programme of disarmament.

The approach of my delegation in dealing with the items on disarmament is inspired by our genuine conviction that we are racing against time, particularly with regard to nuclear disarmament. We sincerely hope that we do not have to wait for the explosion of a nuclear device, accidentally or in some other manner, in a populated part of the world, to compel us to face the grim reality of nuclear arms and their disastrous consequences.

Mr. KOMATINA (Yugoslavia): The Yugoslav delegation has already had the opportunity to express its views on the implementation of the decisions of the General Assembly at its tenth special session. My delegation will explain later its position on a number of concrete issues which are on our agenda.

At this time I would like to draw attention to those aspects of the problem which, although forming a component part of the wider context of disarmament and security, are closely linked with the immediate tasks before us.

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There is no doubt that disarmament negotiations are lagging behind the arms race, which has become a permanent and universal phenomenon. The non-aligned countries have provided the broadest platform for new approaches and efforts. They have launched organized and extremely varied activity aimed at ushering in a new phase of efforts to set in motion a genuine process of disarmament. The special session created a momentum unprecedented in the history of international relations.

We know, of course, that general and complete disarmament will be a long and complex process. There is no doubt that such a sensitive matter affecting the most vital interests of every State and society calls for the investment of both time and effort in order to achieve concrete results. In spite of everything, however, this reality should not be interpreted statically. We live in times when no one is ready to reconcile himself to the existing state of affairs in times when massive and highly organized efforts are being made to achieve a universal relaxation of tensions, to establish the New International Economic Order and to eliminate all relations based on domination. The endeavours to launch the process of disarmament on the broadest basis and through universal action are also a component part of these developments.

Although the time has been too short for all the positive effects of the special session of the General Assembly to be felt, we are already faced with attempts to write off the special session, as it were. There are several signs indicating that some factors are behaving as if the special session had not even taken place.

Expenditure on armaments is growing, while the qualitative and quantitative arms race is, in fact, increasing and gathering speed. Disarmament negotiations are slowing down, while in some areas a state of complete stagnation has set in. The measures announced and often promised during the special session of the General Assembly have not materialized, or have been postponed, and it is not yet clear whether they will be taken, or when.

It is not possible to reconcile ourselves to such a situation. The momentum achieved at the special session must be maintained. In other words, it is imperative to ensure continuity, intensity and universality of action. By this we mean that there is an absolute need to ensure continuity and accelerate the pace of the process of negotiations; to revive and put into operation all the mechanisms

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that ensure the central role of the United Nations to take into account all initiatives and, in particular, the priorities on which agreement was reached at the special session of the General Assembly and, finally, to secure the participation of all States in this process. There exists, in our view, a solid basis for adopting new approaches to disarmament problems. In the general debate disarmament was singled out as one of the highest priorities. The record number of draft resolutions submitted testifies to the readiness of Member States to work actively for the implementation of the decisions of the special session. This, of course, depends on the political will and resolve primarily of those countries and structures that bear the greatest responsibility for the arms race.

The ever more intense efforts to accumulate nuclear arsenals and the stagnation in negotiations to limit them show that mankind is faced today with an increased threat to peace; hence the increased responsibility and obligation to undertake, without delay, effective measures of nuclear disarmament. The agreements or decisions reached so far, although their importance cannot be contested, do not, in fact, constitute measures of disarmament, but are aimed mainly at an agreed regulation of the nuclear balance, giving free rein to the continuance of the nuclear arms race. This is certainly not the right reply to the demand formulated by the international community and reaffirmed at the tenth special session of the General Assembly.

The postponement of SALT II and of other measures aimed at reducing nuclear arsenals in their quantitative, qualitative and territorial dimensions is an extremely discouraging development which is bound to have a negative impact on international relations as a whole. For this reason Yugoslavia attaches very great importance to the early conclusion of a SALT II agreement and agreements on a comprehensive test ban, guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones as a way of creating more propitious conditions for the conclusion of agreements on a genuine reduction of nuclear arsenals, pending their complete elimination.

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I say that because, as long as the nuclear arms race is not halted and no effective measures are taken in order to reduce nuclear armaments and finally to eliminate them, not only will the credibility of some existing agreements be constantly brought into question, but the chances for the conclusion of new agreements will also be considerably reduced. In the first case, for instance, it is the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons that is involved and, in the second case, it is the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones, disarmament negotiations on a regional level, and the like.

It will indeed be very difficult to achieve universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, if no adequate measures for the implementation of its provisions concerning nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes are taken. In such conditions, it is difficult to expect a strengthening of the régime of non-proliferation, which is based essentially on inequality and discrimination. That régime will not be strengthened unless its essential provisions are respected and applied, and are not used for perpetuating the monopoly of a small group of nuclear-weapon States over the transfer and use of nuclear technology and energy for peaceful purposes. In this connexion, I wish to emphasize the importance of an urgent search for solution of the question of the unhindered transfer of nuclear technology and its use for the accelerated development of developing countries. The continuance and even the worsening of discrimination with regard to the use of technology is becoming a lever for maintaining unequal international relations.

The establishment of zones of peace and co-operation and of nuclear-weapon-free zones will become ever more difficult if the arms race, especially the nuclear arms race, is not halted and if nuclear weapons and armed forces are not gradually withdrawn from foreign territories, from seas and oceans. The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones will not produce the expected results if the non-nuclear-weapon States are asked to assume again the obligations they have already assumed under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and other international agreements. Such zones can be established and actually expanded only if effective measures are taken for the

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reduction of existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons, if the areas where those weapons are stationed are narrowed, and if such weapons are prohibited and eliminated. We do not, of course, wish to underestimate the importance and usefulness of the possible establishment of such zones by States of a given region, for which such an agreement provides an additional guarantee for the strengthening of mutual confidence.

In the same way, the granting of negative security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States will have only a limited and, I would say, symbolic value, if it is not accompanied by measures of nuclear disarmament and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. This is even more so as, even in the case of a hypothetical nuclear clash of "local" dimensions, the States having obtained such guarantees would not be protected from the multifarious negative effects of the use of nuclear weapons.

On this occasion also, I wish to emphasize that we attach particular importance to the question of reduction of the armed forces and armaments of military blocs. The General Assembly in the Final Document of the special session quite rightly devoted a separate paragraph to Europe, as the zone of the largest concentration of armed forces in the world today, and drew attention to the necessity of reducing them to a lower level of military potential, with full respect for the security interests and independence of States outside military alliances. Proceeding from this recommendation of the special session, we cannot but express our concern over the fact that the negotiations on a regional reduction of armed forces and armaments that have been going on in Vienna for several years have not yet produced any results and have not gone beyond identifying the subjects of the talks. In this light, we consider that some of the new initiatives regarding regional measures of disarmament aimed at giving concrete form to the recommendations of the Final Document of the special session concerning Europe deserve our attention and support. In this regard, we have in mind that such measures are complementary to the efforts directed towards disarmament on bilateral, regional and global levels. We must, of course, take into account the specific conditions existing in various regions.

At the special session we endorsed the principle of parallel consideration of nuclear and of conventional armaments, emphasizing, at the same time, the priority

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of nuclear disarmament. In this respect, the importance and complexity of conventional armaments have been abundantly elaborated. I intend to deal, this time, with only one aspect of this problem.

The dynamics of the conventional arms race and the strengthening of conventional armed forces have assumed extraordinary proportions. A major part of the burden of this race is borne by the economically less developed and, as a rule, non-aligned countries, which are constantly faced with dangers posed by aggression, colonialism, bloc rivalry and expansionism. In such conditions, an essential premise of conventional disarmament is the elimination of such phenomena and the removal of focal points of crisis.

It is in this context that we view the problem of the removal of military bases and forces from foreign territories and the question of confidence-building measures. The non-aligned countries defined their common stand with regard to this important problem at the tenth special session, and we believe that appropriate attention should be accorded to this problem at the forthcoming disarmament talks. There is no doubt that the first steps with respect to conventional disarmament should be taken by the militarily most significant countries in the world, primarily by the military blocs and their leading Powers.

We attach great importance to the efforts to start meaningful negotiations and to reach agreement on the prohibition of the production of new types of weapons of mass destruction, having in mind that those weapons, by their effects, come near to, and even tend to surpass, nuclear weapons. The prohibition should encompass all weapons of mass destruction, because what is in question is the halting of the qualitative proliferation of armaments. It goes without saying that every new weapon of this type opens a new cycle in the arms race and poses an additional threat to international peace and security.

The prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and their destruction is one of the questions for the final settlement of which, in the form of an agreement, all the preparatory work has already been completed. And yet, no international agreement is in sight. We feel that the new Committee on Disarmament in Geneva should

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undertake as soon as possible, at the very beginning of its work, the elaboration of a draft convention based on existing proposals and that the General Assembly should adopt a resolution to that effect.

We have always supported all initiatives aimed at opening and accelerating the process of disarmament and, in this context, the active involvement of all countries and various bodies dealing with disarmament. Consequently, we continue to believe that the holding of a world disarmament conference would greatly contribute to this end. However, before convening a world disarmament conference, it is indispensable to make adequate preparations and to ensure the participation of all States, particularly of all the nuclear-weapon States.

To conclude: there is no doubt that even initial measures of effective disarmament would promote positive changes in international political relations, while the solution of key international issues and crises would greatly contribute to disarmament. The interconnexion of these two factors is obvious. We believe, therefore, that it is indispensable to exert parallel efforts aimed at solving key political issues and at ensuring progress towards disarmament. Effective measures in either direction can contribute considerably towards promoting détente, security and confidence. In fact, without genuine steps towards disarmament, without effective measures to halt the arms race, all the positive achievements in international relations would be jeopardized. After the tenth special session, the world expects resolute measures, commensurate with the dangers lying in wait for us, to be undertaken. Yugoslavia will, as in the past, continue to lend its support to all measures leading to the achievement of these objectives.

Mr. CRINBERG (Bulgaria): As is rightly pointed out in the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, disarmament has become an imperative and most urgent task facing the international community. Indeed, it is only through disarmament that States and peoples can achieve true and reliable security and humanity can be made free from the danger of war and total annihilation. It is no less clear that only by halting and reversing the arms race will the world be enabled to use the enormous resources that are now being squandered for arms in favour of the economic and social progress of all nations, and particularly of the developing countries.

This great promise and its unthinkable alternative are, of course, the main reasons why the problem of disarmament is of such paramount importance and urgency. At the present time, however, there are some additional weighty factors which militate in favour of speeding up the efforts in this field. We have in mind, specifically, the widening gap between the military technological revolution and man's ability to cope with its consequences. Of late we have been witnessing a very disturbing fact in this respect. As has been observed by many speakers, technological developments have been clearly outstripping the pace of disarmament negotiations. If the international community fails to take remedial measures the existing gap is bound to grow bigger and bigger.

Disarmament negotiations have not yet solved the pressing problems associated with existing weaponry and above all nuclear weapons. Yet States must already face the fact that new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction are about to emerge. The appearance of some of these weapons may result in an erosion of stability, thereby making it more difficult to keep crisis situations under control. Many of the new weapon systems tend to blur the distinction between conventional and non-conventional means of warfare and to lower the nuclear threshold, thus making more likely the escalation of any future conflict into a nuclear war.

Last but not least, a very important characteristic of most of the new weapons is their reduced size and increased mobility. This makes more difficult their detection by acceptable means of verification and this is certain negatively to affect future negotiations on arms limitations and

(Mr. Grinberg, Bulgaria)

disarmament. In fact, a point may be reached beyond which no arms limitation agreements based on reciprocal control will be feasible.

The plans for the production and deployment of the neutron bomb have heightened in a dramatic way awareness of the fact that these threats are of something not far removed, but of something just around the corner.

It is our belief that if States are to cope with these new developments a sense of great urgency is needed. The conduct of disarmament negotiations should reflect the importance of the time factor, and efforts to resolve outstanding issues should be greatly intensified. We share the belief that the present situation in the world fully justifies accelerating the pace of disarmament negotiations. What are needed are, basically, political decisions and political will.

In our previous statements we have pointed out that we fully subscribe to the order of priorities established in the Final Document and particularly to the importance which is attached to the early attainment of the goals set in the nuclear arms field. Yet, in view of the time factor, we have no right to ignore the pressing need for action aimed at preventing the dangerous consequences of what is usually called the qualitative arms race.

With this in view my country has stressed on many occasions the timeliness of the Soviet proposal to ban the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. This initiative has already brought one concrete dividend in that it has triggered the bilateral talks on the prohibition of the radiological weapon. It is our sincere hope, too, that reason and common sense will prevail and the United States will abandon for good its plans for the production and deployment of the neutron bomb. But without prejudice to this type of effort geared to individual new weapons, the need is clearly felt for bolder and more imaginative action based on the comprehensive approach. Some countries maintain that this approach is not suitable. We believe, however, that the successful work on the conclusion of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, the so-called ENMCD Convention, has demonstrated its feasibility.

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We are conscious of the differences in the character and scope of the prohibition in the two cases, but even if we make allowance for this, the fact remains that the ENMOD Convention banned the use of a whole category of potential new means of destruction warfare by using the method of defining in general terms the scope of the prohibition and setting out an illustrative non-exhaustive list of such means as are covered by the Convention. In our view this experience can facilitate the work on the comprehensive prohibition of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. It is our hope, therefore, that the decisions of the special and the current sessions will give a new impetus to the efforts towards speeding up the negotiations in this important area.

Time is pressing also with regard to the efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Without doubt the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the centerpiece of the system of measures in this area. That is why we are looking forward to working with all interested parties for the success of the 1980 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference, for the strengthening of that Treaty and its full universalization. The fight against the dissemination of nuclear weapons, however, has proved complex and difficult. In view of this we have consistently supported all additional measures which have been adopted or proposed so far in this field, such as the strengthening of the International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards system, the guidelines adopted by the exporting countries in London, the establishment of denuclearized zones and zones of peace and so on.

In the course of the current session further significant possibilities have emerged with the submission of the two Soviet proposals relating to the security of non-nuclear-weapon States and the non-stationing of nuclear arms on the territories of States where there are no such weapons at present. We believe that the realization of these initiatives would further consolidate the whole system of non-proliferation measures. This acquires additional relevance now in view of the forthcoming Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference.

(Mr. Grinberg, Bulgaria)

One of the questions that recently has attracted increased attention is that of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. Many dozens of countries and hundreds of millions of people have a vital stake in the realization of this idea. That is why the Soviet-United States talks on the limitation and subsequent reduction of military activities in the area of the Indian Ocean were met with approval and hope in all the interested countries. It is to be regretted, therefore, that those talks, which had already made considerable progress, were unilaterally suspended by the United States.

We believe that the linking of disarmament problems to other unrelated issues is a policy that can only delay, or maybe even render impossible, the achievement of progress in this area. With this in view, we join in the urgent appeal of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean for the early resumption of the bilateral talks.

As mentioned by other speakers, in 1980 there will be yet another review conference - the one envisaged in article XII of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction. As a party to the Convention we shall do our best to contribute to the success of the conference and the strengthening and universalization of this first measure of real disarmament in modern history.

In this context, I should also like to refer briefly to the problem of chemical weapons, which is contractually and otherwise connected with the biological weapons Convention. Having been among the sponsors of the first draft convention on the comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons, submitted as early as 1972 by the socialist countries, we have additional reasons to be strongly interested in the successful solution of this problem.

We are aware of the complexities of the question. Yet by now it has been the subject of probably the longest and most thorough examination in the history of disarmament negotiations. Besides, those weapons do not form part of what are referred to as forces of deterrence and their use is prohibited by the Protocol of 1925. Therefore it seems to us that there should be no difficulties that cannot be easily surmounted provided there is the political will to arrive

(Mr. Grinberg, Bulgaria)

at a solution. This encourages us to hope that the current talks on this subject between the USSR and the United States will be successfully completed before long and that the Committee on Disarmament will be enabled to undertake the concrete elaboration of a draft convention.

In its previous statements my delegation has already had the opportunity of putting forward its views on many basic issues that are under consideration now, such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, the nuclear-test-ban talks, the Soviet proposal to end completely the further quantitative and qualitative build-up of arms and armed forces, the reduction of military budgets, the convening of a world disarmament conference and many others. It is not my intention to revert now to these issues, though I should like to reserve the right of my delegation to make an additional statement on some of them if the need should arise at a later stage.

In the months and years to come, the United Nations and the bodies dealing with disarmament will have to achieve substantial progress in all areas if they want to be responsive to the strivings of people all over the world towards détente and peaceful coexistence, towards a world without arms and without wars. On 24 October, when we marked in this hall the first Disarmament Week - and let me in passing pay a tribute to our Mongolian friends for their useful initiative in this respect - the theme that ran through all statements was: now is the time for efforts to turn the promise of the special session into reality.

Together with the other socialist countries, we are committed to everything within our power to contribute to the attainment of this objective.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to announce that the delegation of the United Republic of Cameroon has indicated its desire to become a sponsor of draft resolutions A/C.1/33/L.5, A/C.1/33/L.10 and A/C.1/33/L.12/Rev.1.

The meeting rose at 11.40 p.m.