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Chairman: Mr. PASTINEN (Finland)

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ENGLISH

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Mr. FEIN (Netherlands): In my intervention of today I shall confine my remarks to matters related to nuclear proliferation, both horizontal and vertical, that is, the further spreading of nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and the on-going nuclear arms race, on the other. I intend to address myself to other important items on our agenda on another occasion.

In a debate on nuclear weapons, on their reduction and eventual elimination, one cannot lose sight of the link between the problems of horizontal and vertical proliferation. At present, with only five nuclear-weapon States, the problem of nuclear disarmament is already extremely difficult. This problem would become insurmountable if more States were to develop a nuclear-weapon capability and acquire nuclear arsenals. All efforts to reduce and finally abolish the existing nuclear weaponry will become meaningless if more States acquire nuclear weapons. All efforts of the past decades to arrive at reductions of nuclear arsenals will have been in vain.

In the Final Document of the special session on disarmament the world community acknowledged the special responsibility of nuclear-weapon States to achieve nuclear disarmament. But there is also a responsibility towards this goal for all other nations; all nations, whether nuclear-weapon States or not, should forgo the military nuclear option. It is to be feared that not all non-nuclear-weapon States will permanently refrain from acquiring their own nuclear weapons if the present nuclear-weapon States do not adopt measures leading to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament. Action and determination on both sides are necessary for solving the problem of proliferation: action by the nuclear Powers to reduce their arsenals, in a continuous and determined effort to achieve nuclear disarmament, and self-restraint by the non-nuclear Powers in the acquisition of a nuclear capability.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

We must realize that one can only expect, and indeed insist, that other States exercise self-restraint with regard to their nuclear programmes, so as to avoid the dangers of horizontal proliferation, if nuclear-weapon States faithfully carry out their obligations as spelled out, inter alia, in article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Mr. Government shares the widespread concern about the nuclear arms race. We are witnessing rapid changes in nuclear armaments and the emergence of new technologies and weapon systems, which seriously complicate present negotiations to curb the nuclear arms race. I refer in particular to the SALT II negotiations, the results of which are long overdue.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

We consider the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) between the United States and the Soviet Union as a cornerstone of the East-West relationship with increasingly far-reaching implications for the whole world community. We recognize the complexities of these negotiations and the continuing difficulties that, up to now, have prevented the two parties from reaching agreement.

These difficulties are to be attributed at least partially to emerging new technologies and new weapon systems which affect the premises of the present SALT negotiations. The qualitative arms race with its own dynamics threatens to destroy the practical value of quantitative restrictions. A SALT II agreement, as it appears to be emerging, will represent important progress. Not only will a SALT II agreement be a further step towards halting the nuclear-arms race, but its greatest importance will be that it will also provide a framework for wider and more comprehensive restrictions and substantial net reductions in the present nuclear arsenals. This framework will enable the negotiating parties to deal also with the qualitative aspects of nuclear armaments and to cope with the many complex problems that endanger the maintenance of international peace and security in the coming decade.

An indispensable complement to SALT is the early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty banning all nuclear explosions in all environments for all time. As my Government has already stated on previous occasions, we regret that the general expectation that such a treaty was within reach has not been fulfilled. We most sincerely hope that the tripartite negotiations between the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom will bear fruit in the near future. We urgently call on those Powers to submit a draft treaty to the Committee on Disarmament before it meets in the beginning of next year. In our view, it should be a priority task for that Committee to finalize the negotiations on this draft so as to make it a viable multilateral treaty that will attract the widest possible international adherence.

Though both SALT and a comprehensive test ban are being negotiated by nuclear-weapon States, the whole world community is vitally concerned with their effects and with their wider political dimensions in so far as they contribute to strengthening the present régime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

SALT provides a road towards nuclear disarmament, starting with the halting and reversal of the nuclear-arms race of the two major nuclear-weapon States. As is laid down in the Final Document of the special session devoted to disarmament, the ultimate goal is the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this planet. A comprehensive test ban will serve the same purpose by blocking the road to further nuclear-weapons development.

In addition, an effective comprehensive test ban also implies that the nuclear-weapon States show the same restraint as non-nuclear-weapon States. SALT and a comprehensive test ban offer the perspective of removing the fundamental inequality between nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States.

While pointing to the link between horizontal and vertical proliferation, I do not want to overstress its significance. In particular, I do not want to suggest that those States that at present have not acquired nuclear weapons could derive a moral right to do so in the future from the absence of nuclear disarmament or even the lack of swift progress in this field. It is our conviction that the nuclear-arms race has already gone too far also in terms of the number of participants. The existence of five nuclear-weapon States cannot be regarded as any excuse whatsoever for other States to acquire a nuclear explosive capability or explicitly to keep open the nuclear option. Nor can we subscribe to the proposition that in the absence of nuclear disarmament at least a prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons should be the minimum prerequisite for halting the further spread of nuclear weapons. Such a prohibition cannot but be unrealistic and illusory as long as nuclear weapons, regrettably, determine the over-all balance of power in the world.

On the other hand, the non-nuclear-weapon States have a right to insist on appropriate assurances by nuclear-weapon States that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. Here, indeed, the non-nuclear-weapon States do have a moral right. For this reason the Netherlands delegation has, during the two preceding regular session of the General Assembly, voted in favour of resolutions on the subject of so-called negative nuclear security guarantees, notwithstanding our reservations with regard to some important elements of those texts. We noted with satisfaction that at the special session devoted to disarmament major progress could be made in this field: all nuclear-weapon Powers are now on

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

record, spelling out the kind of restraints each of them is willing to impose on its possible use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. In view of the fact that since the conclusion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty it had appeared quite impossible to move forward, it is now fully justifiable to speak of "major progress".

Of course, we recognize that the present situation is not an ideal one. We understand the misgivings of certain non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly those which are not allied with a nuclear Power, as to the lack of more or less uniform language in the declarations I referred to. Much has already been said in this room on the desirability of calling upon the Committee on Disarmament to give consideration to the conclusion of an international convention on negative security guarantees with a single and binding formula.

To our mind, however, the time has not yet come, and may not come in the near future, to start upon such a course of action. The differences in the unilateral declarations as they stand now are plainly due to the different strategic interests and obligations of the nuclear-weapon States involved - differences that are not likely to disappear in negotiations in Geneva. Although we could go along with a recommendation to the Committee on Disarmament to consider the question of negative security guarantees and to examine its full implications, one concrete step that could, in our view, be made now is to consolidate the progress made so far. Perhaps it might be useful to request the Security Council to take formal note of the pledges given by the nuclear Powers.

While we do regard negative security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States as an indispensable element of a strategy to fight proliferation, we do not see why such guarantees should not be met by a commitment of those non-nuclear-weapon States to forgo the nuclear option. A comprehensive approach towards solving the problem of non-proliferation requires constraints in different fields on all parties concerned, both nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon States.

This holds true not only when matters of security are at stake, but also when we come to discuss international co-operation in the peaceful application of nuclear energy, the difference being that we are now talking in terms of suppliers

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

and recipients of nuclear materials, equipment and technology. It is a cause for grave concern to us that a rift of misunderstanding has grown between the two sides. Time and again the Netherlands delegation, here and elsewhere, has underlined the necessity for a new consensus in the field of peaceful nuclear energy. Such a consensus should be built on the two pillars of access on a non-discriminatory basis and self-restraint by all concerned, as was quite rightly pointed out by Dr. Eklund at the last General Conference of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). We recognize the difficulty of striking a balance between freedom of access and self-restraint, or, in other words, of finding our way between the extremes of unchecked dissemination of nuclear technology on the one hand and unilateral restrictions on the other. There should be freedom to apply and develop nuclear energy for economic and social development, but we should also avoid nuclear anarchy stemming from freedom without restraint. In return, restraint should be freely accepted, otherwise it would quickly lose its strength.



(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

We would strongly hope that the present phase of insufficient understanding between supplier and recipient countries is only a transitory situation and that a new international consensus will be achieved in the near future, a consensus on conditions under which peaceful uses of nuclear energy can proceed without undue hindrance.

We look to the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) as an international evaluation exercise, the results of which might well be instrumental in bringing about a much needed universally accepted code of conduct in this regard. It will not be easy since different nations have different interests. But given patience and the political will to arrive at a more stable situation, the cause is by no means hopeless. A non-proliferation policy that effectively contributes towards making this world a safer and more prosperous place to live in is a goal worth fighting for. It is in the interest of all of us, whether powerful or not, whether rich in energy supplies or deficient. We must be prepared to consider making sacrifices in terms of unrestricted freedom of access to all stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. It is our considered opinion that the unrestricted application of nuclear energy in all its forms is by itself a proliferation hazard. Besides, it is quite often also uneconomical if pursued on a small scale. If after having considered all the pros and cons of engaging in the sensitive activities of the fuel cycle, it is deemed unavoidable to do so, then at least this should be done on a multinational or regional basis. The excellent IAEA study on regional nuclear fuel cycle centres is a helpful incentive towards establishing such regional centres. Regional co-operation by countries in the sensitive phases of the fuel cycle can actually diminish the potential for horizontal proliferation and should, consequently, be actively pursued. The alleged disadvantages of such a course, in terms of autarchy or sovereignty or energy independence, are clearly balanced by the gains in mutual trust, in the reduction of proliferation dangers, and in international nuclear co-operation for economic and social advancement.

Let me sketch in a few sentences the position the Netherlands has taken with regard to nuclear co-operation and exports. We consider the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Treaty of Tlatelolco, when effectively applied, as corner-stones for nuclear co-operation. When necessary,

(Mr. Fein, Netherlands)

those treaties can be usefully complemented by other international arrangements, such as the guidelines of the nuclear suppliers' group aimed at the prevention of nuclear proliferation. A responsible nuclear-export policy should imply the worldwide application of safeguards on a non-discriminatory basis. We support continuing efforts to refine and strengthen the safeguards system of the IAEA. In this context I want to mention as a very promising example the IAEA study on international plutonium management. And finally, we support the INFCE exercises which I already mentioned.

In 1980, the parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty will meet again in Geneva on the occasion of the second review conference of this Treaty. The first preparatory committee for this review conference will probably take place next year. By 1980 we may expect that INFCE will have finalized its work. In the next few years there will be a number of opportunities to try to reach the new international consensus I mentioned. For its part, the Netherlands stands ready to participate in this common search for a new international consensus on how effective measures can and should be taken to minimize the danger of proliferation without jeopardizing access to much needed energy suppliers.

Allow me to conclude my intervention by stating my conviction that all these problems to which I referred are interconnected: the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), a comprehensive test ban, security guarantees, and the use of nuclear energy for civil purposes are all parts of a comprehensive approach to the problems of proliferation, aiming both at the elimination of nuclear weapons as well as at channeling the peaceful use of nuclear energy to the best interests of mankind.

Mr. LAIGLESIA (Spain) (interpretation from Spanish): In connexion with the discussion of agenda item 125, we have dealt with many of the items that appear on the agenda for this Assembly separately, as it were, and which we must now consider again in greater detail, in some cases. With respect to other aspects, and in accordance with the work of our Committee, we have chosen to deal with them only in the course of this debate in respect of the major part of the items assigned to it.

(Mr. Laiglesia, Spain)

As I had occasion to state in my intervention on agenda item 125, we attach considerable importance to all those measures which relate to the limitation and control of conventional weapons. We took part in the first meeting of the Preparatory Conference for the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects. I should like now to reiterate our strong support for the Conference to be held on the subject in 1979. It is the view of the Spanish delegation that the results of that international gathering may well be positive and effectively help to prevent the arms race from continuing in a field that, for various reasons, is of great concern to the international community as a whole. We believe that the measures to be adopted by that Conference should be, on the one hand, as specific as possible; and on the other hand, that the criteria which in the future will determine the status of this type of weapon should be laid down with great precision.

As for the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new weapons of mass destruction, an item in respect of which two resolutions were adopted at the last General Assembly, we also believe that we must be realistic and avoid recommending measures the effectiveness of which is always relative. This does not mean that we shall not endeavour to bring to the attention of countries the need to prevent technological progress, which is the fundamental characteristic of our time, from contributing to the creation of new weapons of mass destruction. In this connexion, the course proposed in the Convention on the prohibition of biological weapons and the negotiations presently under way on chemical weapons, appear to us to be the right course to follow and we are, therefore, ready to give it our most enthusiastic support.

The work aimed at undertaking a study of the reduction of military budgets is, in my delegation's view, of the highest importance because through the evolution of military expenditures we shall be able to judge in due time the results of our own endeavours in favour of the cause of disarmament.

(Mr. Laiglesia, Spain)

To conclude our comments on the items on our agenda devoted to conventional disarmament, I should like now to emphasize the importance of the question of the traffic in non-nuclear weapons, something that, in our view, the deliberating and negotiating bodies which strive to achieve positive results in this field have not dealt with sufficiently.

(Mr. Laiglesia, Spain)

We take this opportunity to welcome the talks on the question being held between the two countries which export the bulk of the weapons sold on the international market, and especially the announcement that those talks will soon be continued in Mexico City. That work, we hope, will lead to specific measures which, bearing in mind the security needs of States, will put an end to such trade, since they undoubtedly serve to exacerbate existing tensions.

We also trust that, within the context of the 1974 Ayacucho Declaration, the States parties thereto will take effective measures to ensure progress in this area. Similarly, we believe that it is necessary to devise formulas which will prevent the clandestine transfer of weapons. To this end we believe it is desirable to undertake detailed studies which subsequently may make it possible to adopt the measures called for.

In regard to the items on our agenda dealing with nuclear disarmament, we wish to stress the importance of those relating to the two Protocols annexed to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, since that international instrument is one of the greatest achievements in the field of disarmament, and we express the hope that it will soon be improved upon.

We believe that the initiative of the Iberian-American countries is an example that other regions of the world should follow on the understanding that initiatives of that kind are incumbent exclusively on the countries located in those particular regions. In this context we believe that the carrying out of the comprehensive study referred to in General Assembly resolution 32/87 D will be very useful.

We shall not dwell on questions that are directly connected with the results of the tenth special session. However, we feel that here we should make a reference to the work of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference in which the Spanish delegation has participated actively and with great interest. In accordance with paragraph 122 of the Final Document adopted by the special session, the mandate of the Committee has now acquired greater significance.

(Mr. Laiglesia, Spain)

The Spanish delegation has taken note of a number of proposals put forward by various countries. In this connexion we should like to mention the proposals submitted by the Government of France concerning the creation of an International Institute for Disarmament Research which in our view could well supplement the very interesting work that is done by the United Nations Centre for Disarmament.

We are convinced that the widest possible knowledge and a detailed analysis of those factors which affect tensions that arise in international life is useful at all times. We therefore support those initiatives.

Similarly, in our view the studies on the creation of an international disarmament fund for development and an international satellite control body would be of great value and assistance in achieving progress in the field of disarmament.

We have also followed with keen interest the initiatives of several delegations, and I should like here to refer in particular to the initiative of the Federal Republic of Germany, in connexion with the very important item relating to measures that may be adopted to contribute towards the promotion of confidence among States.

Lastly, I should like to emphasize the need for us not to lose sight at any time of the most important, although the most difficult, objective in our work. I am referring to the elaboration of a comprehensive disarmament programme conducive to general and complete disarmament under effective international control which, as stated in paragraph 109 of the Final Document of the special session, may become

"a reality in a world in which international peace and security prevail and in which the New International Economic Order is strengthened and consolidated". (A/RES/S-10/2)

To this end we hope that the Committee on Disarmament will pay the closest attention to this question and that at both the forthcoming meeting of the Disarmament Commission and at the thirty-fourth session of the General Assembly it may be possible for all Member States to consider the progress achieved in this area. Although the primary function in connexion with this

Mr. Laiglesia, Spain)

question devolves on the Committee on Disarmament, we believe that, because of its importance, all countries should contribute ideas which reflect those problems affecting them more directly in the field of disarmament. In fact, we believe that the diversity of causes which lead to international conflicts, depending on whatever region in which they occur, is the greatest difficulty standing in the way of a comprehensive disarmament programme. Despite the fact that so far results in the field of disarmament cannot be said to be spectacular, we believe that it is an attainable objective rather than an illusion as so many people seem to think. The technological explosion which threatens the future of mankind must be channeled and oriented towards peace and the well-being of peoples rather than have it contribute to the annihilation of our civilization.

Mr. VUNIBOBO (Fiji): Some years ago, in a spirit of both hope and promise, the United Nations declared the period 1970-1980 to be the "Disarmament Decade". As the Decade nears its end, it is appropriate to look back and take stock. I will confine my remarks to the well-recognized and urgent need for a comprehensive ban on all nuclear testing, and related regional disarmament matters.

There is no doubt that an overwhelming majority of Member States regard the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty as a matter of priority. Although the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban is not the answer to all disarmament because it would not lead to any reduction in the volume of existing nuclear weapons, it is however a key element in preventing horizontal and more especially vertical proliferation. Furthermore, adherence to the comprehensive test ban could prevent the risk of serious and dangerous pollution to man and his environment.

Although the goal of achieving the permanent prohibition of all nuclear-weapon test explosions had been proclaimed in the preamble of the 1963 Treaty banning nuclear-weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water, as well as in the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, efforts to achieve a treaty for the permanent prohibition of all nuclear test explosions continue without significant results.

Much optimism was generated by the decision of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom to join in trilateral negotiations to achieve a comprehensive test ban treaty. As a result, hope was expressed that a multilateral comprehensive agreement of unlimited duration banning all nuclear explosions and providing for effective verification could result. That hope persists, while the trilateral negotiations continue. Although we are deeply aware of the complexities and intricacies in drafting such a treaty, we regret that the international community has not been shown the degree of progress achieved in the trilateral negotiations.

There is no doubt that the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban will not be easy and that it is some time away. Furthermore, we would have to allow time for its ratification and coming into force. Meanwhile, nuclear explosions continue to take place. At this stage, my delegation believes strongly that the negotiations must be conducted in good faith and in an atmosphere



(Mr. Vunibobo, Fiji)

of trust and confidence, not only among the negotiators but also among those who are awaiting the progress and results of those negotiations. Furthermore, the conduct of negotiations on such an important agreement for all mankind must not in any way be prejudiced by the actions of those outside the negotiations. Commitment to confidence-building measures is very important and could significantly contribute to preparing for progress in disarmament. If we do not encourage policies and measures designed to enhance confidence among States, the inevitable result can lead only to frustration and, worse still, confrontation. This, we believe, calls for the status quo to be preserved. In this regard, my delegation does not see any alternative to an interim voluntary cessation of all testing in all environments until at least the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban, if not the coming into force of a comprehensive test ban treaty. Accordingly, we welcomed the statement delivered on 2 November 1977 in Moscow by President Leonid Brezhnev, who announced that the USSR was prepared to accept the suspension of all underground nuclear tests for a definite period of time. We welcomed that proposal as an important step towards the comprehensive test ban.

My delegation firmly believes that an interim cessation of all testing in all environments until the coming into force of a comprehensive test ban, or at least the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, is a logical corollary to the ongoing negotiations to conclude such a treaty. It is our hope that any resolution on the call for an early conclusion of a comprehensive test ban will include a call for an immediate cessation of all nuclear testing. The two issues are interlinked.

Our call for cessation is also in conformity with the spirit of paragraph 51 of the Final Document, although we regret the need to use equivocal terms in the paragraph. It was argued at that time that one must use compromise language because a complete test ban treaty was almost in the offing. We have once again been told by some delegations that we must not now call for a moratorium because the treaty is almost in the offing. To the contrary, it appears to us that the treaty is not within reach. We believe that the nuclear-weapon States are about to reconsider positions on some very important aspects of those negotiations.

(Mr. Vunibobo, Fiji)

However, on a brighter note, the delay in completing the negotiations may have had one good sign. As a result of the special session we have a new Committee on Disarmament - an extended and more representative negotiating body, with a rotating chairmanship. We welcome the decision of the Government of France to take its seat in the Committee and look forward to its contribution there, and more particularly to any comprehensive test ban proposals put to the Committee - as it is to be hoped they will be in the very near future. It is our hope that China will also join the Committee. Such developments should enable a wider ratification and adherence to any comprehensive test ban. In our view, it is important for all the permanent members of the Security Council to demonstrate in a very special way their commitment to work for the achievement of the total elimination of all nuclear testing.

Although our concern for immediate cessation of all testing stems from our conviction that such cessation could greatly enhance the status and trust in the present ongoing negotiations on a comprehensive test ban, Fiji has an added reason to call for an immediate halt. I am sure it comes as no surprise that we must once again reiterate that the people of the Pacific have been made victims of nuclear testing by Powers foreign to the region. The last test in the South Pacific was conducted on 24 July 1978 - an unfortunate climax to the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

We have had reports that some of the indigenous people living in the areas in the vicinity of the test sites in the South Pacific have been taken ill as a result of eating contaminated fish. Although those reports have been denied there is no independent way of verifying them. What is important is to re-emphasize - if re-emphasis is needed - the real danger to which the people of the South Pacific have been exposed. The continuing plight of the people of Bikini is a stark reminder to us in the Pacific that, despite assurances by all those involved, the people of the Pacific are completely helpless to prevent the use of their region as a place to be used by others to test nuclear devices.

(Mr. Vunibobo, Fiji)

It is my Government's desire to keep the South Pacific free from nuclear and other forms of contamination and conflict. Delegations may recall that the Heads of Government of independent and self-governing States members of the South Pacific Forum emphasized in their Nukualofa communiqué of 3 July 1975 the importance of keeping the South Pacific region free from the risk of nuclear contamination and of involvement in a nuclear conflict. The Heads of Government commended the idea of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific as a means of achieving that aim. That agreement was followed by the adoption by the General Assembly of resolution 3477 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, which deals with the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the South Pacific. Owing to other existing arrangements of some of our neighbours, the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone has not yet matured. We hope that consultations with our neighbours will continue in the context of the South Pacific Forum and result in an appropriate arrangement in which we hope member States of the South Pacific would agree and undertake not to manufacture or acquire possession or control of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

(Mr. Vunibobo, Fiji)

Furthermore, we hope that as a result other States from outside the region, and more particularly nuclear-weapon States, will give the region the undertaking, first, to refrain from testing, manufacturing or developing nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in the South Pacific; secondly, not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices against any State or country within the South Pacific region; and, thirdly, to refrain from transferring possession or control of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices to any State or country within the South Pacific region. Such a regional arrangement, in our view, would be in conformity with the spirit and letter of the Final Document of the tenth special session devoted to disarmament on regional approaches to disarmament. In the interim we hope that those from outside the region will respect our strong concern and deep desire to keep the South Pacific free from nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices.

I have devoted my statement entirely to the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty and related matters because we view these matters with great concern. However, our preoccupation with this issue does not mean that we relegate other nuclear and non-nuclear issues to a place of secondary importance.

The CHAIRMAN: I call on the representative of Nigeria who wishes to introduce a draft resolution.

Mr. KAJAL (Nigeria): On behalf of the delegations of the Bahamas, Barbados, Bolivia, Cuba, Egypt, Ghana, India, Indonesia, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Liberia, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Niger, Philippines, Senegal, Somalia, Swaziland, Sweden, the Syrian Arab Republic, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yugoslavia and Zambia and my own delegation, I wish formally to put before the Committee draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.5, entitled "United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament".

(Mr. Kajal, Nigeria)

Representatives will recall that one of the decisions adopted at the tenth special session was for a programme of fellowships. It is no longer necessary to seek justification for such a programme. The numerous references made to the proposed programme of fellowships when the Committee was considering the item on the implementation of the decisions of the special session are a clear indication of the support delegations give to this programme. Suffice it to say that the medium-sized and small States that make up the majority of the membership of the United Nations would greatly benefit from the fellowships programme. As of now, many delegations do not follow disarmament discussions because of, inter alia, the technical nature of disarmament discussions.

This programme aims at removing this problem. Even though it will not be possible to make experts out of the participants in the programme with a six months' course, my delegation and the other sponsors feel that sufficient interest would be generated in the participants to cause them to follow disarmament discussions more keenly.

The draft resolution itself is a very simple one. In operative paragraph 1 we are asking the Committee to adopt the guidelines prepared by the Secretary-General on the programme of fellowships and circulated as document A/33/305. In operative paragraph 2 we are requesting the Secretary-General to commence the programme of fellowships in the first half of 1979. We make this request because we would like the participants in the programme to observe the new institutions adopted by the special session at work. As the Disarmament Commission decided at its first meeting that its regular session for 1979 would be held from 14 May, we would very much like to see the programme commenced before that date. My delegation believes, therefore, that observation of the work of the Disarmament Commission is an important aspect of the training and that it will be necessary to start that early. At the Disarmament Commission we believe the participants would be able to get a glimpse of what the various positions of groups are. Later on in the year they would then be able to observe the Committee on Disarmament in session. It is therefore my delegation's hope, as well as that of the sponsors, that the draft resolution will be adopted by consensus.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Nigeria who has been good enough to introduce officially to the Committee draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.5, entitled "United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament". The Chair and the Secretariat have taken note of the wish of the sponsors that when the time comes this draft resolution should be accepted by consensus.

Does any other delegation wish to speak on this or any other matter?

Mrs. CASTRO de BARISH (Costa Rica) (interpretation from Spanish): My delegation wishes to become a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.5, entitled "United Nations programme of fellowships on disarmament", which the representative of Nigeria has just introduced. We wish also to sponsor draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.16, which refers to paragraph 125 of the Final Document of the special session, and should be grateful if our delegation's name could be added to the list of sponsors.

The CHAIRMAN: It will be duly noted that the delegation of Costa Rica wishes its name to be added to the list of sponsors of draft resolutions A/C.1/33/L.5 and A/C.1/33/L.16.

Before adjourning the meeting I should like to announce the following other additional sponsors of draft resolutions: A/C.1/33/L.12/Rev.1, Egypt and New Zealand; and A/C.1/33/L.13/Rev.1, Egypt.

The meeting rose at 4 p.m.