



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 31ST MEETING

Chairman: Mr. PASTINEN (Finland)

CONTENTS

AGENDA ITEM 35: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE FIRST REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE SECOND CONFERENCE (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 36: IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 32/76 CONCERNING THE SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I OF THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA (TREATY OF TLATELOLCO) (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 37: CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 38: IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 32/78: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 39: IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 32/79 CONCERNING THE SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II OF THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA (TREATY OF TLATELOLCO) (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 40: EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT THE PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE DISARMAMENT DECADE: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 41: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF AFRICA (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 42: ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE IN THE REGION OF THE MIDDLE EAST (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 43: ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE IN SOUTH ASIA: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued)

/...

* This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be incorporated in a copy of the record and should be sent *within one week of the date of publication* to the Chief, Official Records Editing Section, room A-3550.

Corrections will be issued shortly after the end of the session, in a separate fascicle for each Committee.

Distr. GENERAL

A/C.1/33/PV.31
9 November 1978

ENGLISH

AGENDA ITEM 44: PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND MANUFACTURE OF NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND NEW SYSTEMS OF SUCH WEAPONS: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 45: REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 46: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A ZONE OF PEACE: REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE INDIAN OCEAN (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 47: GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT (continued):

- (a) REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT;
- (b) REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY;
- (c) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

AGENDA ITEM 48: WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE: REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 49: UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS OF USE OF CERTAIN CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE DEEMED TO BE EXCESSIVELY INJURIOUS OR TO HAVE INDISCRIMINATE EFFECTS: REPORT OF THE PREPARATORY CONFERENCE (continued)

The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48 AND 49
(continued)

Mr. KLESTIL (Austria):

"Mankind today is confronted with an unprecedented threat of self-extinction arising from the massive and competitive accumulation of the most destructive weapons ever produced."

"The increase in weapons, ... far from helping to strengthen international security, on the contrary weakens it".

"... the competition for qualitative refinement of weapons of all kinds to which scientific resources and technological advances are diverted, incalculable threats to peace." (A/RES/S-10/2, p. 5)

It was with these and similar impressive and at the same time precise words that the special session of the General Assembly characterized the enormous dangers which the current arms race entails. As an expression of the consensus of all participants in the special session, these sentences reflect the immense anxiety of the entire community of States, in view of the madness of the arms race. These sentences are a clear testimony of our common conviction that we have no choice other than to strive for genuine disarmament with all the means which are at our disposal.

The problems and complexities involved are enormous. The arms race, in the nuclear and in the conventional fields, has reached such proportions and has developed such a dynamic of its own that each and every small step towards a mere limitation of armaments is by far offset by much greater advances in arms technology. Thus the longer effective and concrete measures of genuine disarmament remain delayed, the harder it will become to control these developments.

Today the essential questions in the field of disarmament are posed by the continuous qualitative refinements in the weapons that are being produced and deployed. We have to realize that this misguided technological ingenuity has a definite tendency to outstrip the pace of negotiations which still focus primarily on the quantitative aspects of the arms race. These developments are responsible for the growing momentum of the arms race, while at the same time introducing potentially destabilizing elements which work against an already precarious balance of deterrence.

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

The arms race of recent years, through the development of smaller nuclear weapons with ever increasing accuracy and the development of multimission weapons, has led to blurring of the distinction between strategic and non-strategic weapon systems with unforeseeable consequences for a possible escalation of conflicts which otherwise might remain of a restricted nature. Furthermore, this trend poses considerable difficulties for the verification of disarmament agreements.

The arms control and disarmament efforts as currently pursued between East and West seem to be incapable of coping with the qualitative arms competition. Therefore, ways and means will have to be found to make these negotiations more responsive to the constant technological improvements in weaponry as well as to the growing interdependence between global and regional, nuclear and conventional components of the East-West military relationship.

The Final Document of the special session did not fail to acknowledge the challenge resulting from the qualitative aspects of the arms race. Thus paragraph 39 of this document calls for negotiations on the cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments and the development of new means of warfare so that ultimately scientific and technological achievements may be used solely for peaceful purposes. We are fully aware of the intricate problems encountered in any attempt to address the question of possible restrictions in military research and development. However, these problems will have to be faced and overcome through arduous negotiations, because otherwise all disarmament efforts will ultimately lose their usefulness.

The proliferation of the arms race into space is a further disturbing phenomenon. Developments in the relevant programmes of both of the two major space Powers seem to be moving toward a new phase in space militarization characterized by the emplacement of weapon systems in space around the earth. In particular, efforts to develop a capability to interfere with observation satellites or other space systems could prove to be very destabilizing in peacetime and could open up a whole new area of space warfare which until now only existed in science fiction and which could entail unforeseeable security effects. Within the United Nations there has, until now, been surprisingly

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

little debate about the military uses of space which, together with the unrelenting pace of technological innovation, becomes a most worrisome prospect. We therefore note with some satisfaction that the Final Document contains a first reflection of this problem within the United Nations framework. Paragraph 80 of the document calls for appropriate international negotiations in accordance with the spirit of the Outer Space Treaty in order to prevent an arms race in outer space. We sincerely hope that the relevant contacts which have been started by the two space Powers concerned will yield positive results. Given the direct implication of these efforts for international peace and security as a whole, we hope that the negotiating partners will see fit to provide useful information on the progress achieved so far.

Before entering into a more detailed discussion on some of the particular disarmament issues which we find on our agenda, I should like to restate a number of considerations of a more general nature which, in our opinion, apply to all disarmament efforts.

Disarmament measures in individual sectors must be based on a global and comprehensive concept which aspires ultimately - even though this is clearly a long-range objective - to general and complete disarmament. At the same time we do not fail to support a pragmatic approach giving priority to those measures which are not only meaningful but which also hold out prospects for realization in the short term. Such partial measures should, however, be evaluated within the framework of their possible contribution to more far-reaching disarmament objectives.

In military planning different armament systems are closely interrelated. Disarmament efforts in all their phases must take this fact into account. This holds true in particular for the interdependence of conventional and nuclear armaments. For this reason, it would hardly appear possible to pursue disarmament objectives relating to only one category of armaments.

Disarmament must be considered in relation to the existing balance of power. It must not jeopardize national and international security by giving one country, or group of countries, advantages or military benefits over others.

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

Given the enormous proportion of the current arms race, disarmament measures, in order to have any meaning at all, will have to be concrete and must have a significant impact on the military balance sheet.

Disarmament measures must include appropriate procedures for verification to give adequate assurances concerning compliance with the terms of a given disarmament treaty. The question of verification is the crux of most, if not all, disarmament efforts and therefore deserves further and in-depth study.

The primary responsibility for disarmament rests with the great Powers and especially with the two major nuclear-weapon States. We cannot expect genuine progress towards disarmament on the global or even on the regional level unless these Powers are ready to take important and concrete steps.

By far the most important and urgent issue on our agenda is the question of nuclear disarmament. For Austria, as for many if not all other countries, the existence of vast stockpiles of nuclear weapons is the chief cause of concern. It hardly seems compatible with the spirit of international co-operation to build stockpiles of nuclear weapons sufficient to kill all mankind several times over. Not even the most extensive interpretation of a country's subjective needs for security can furnish adequate justification for the maintenance of such stockpiles.

We certainly welcome recent announcements about the progress achieved in the context of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) negotiations, and we join those who have expressed the hope that before the end of this year a SALT II treaty will be agreed upon by the two leading nuclear-weapon States. However, it is apparent that this treaty will do no more than regulate an ongoing nuclear competition between the Soviet Union and the United States. We therefore urge the negotiating partners to immediately follow up such a SALT II treaty with further negotiations leading towards the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons and fissionable material for weapons purposes, as well as towards a progressive and balanced reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery, in accordance with paragraph 50 of the Final Document. We sincerely hope that such negotiations, to which the two leading nuclear Powers are committed by the clear terms of the Final Document, will be carried out in good faith and with the necessary political will in order to produce significant progress in the near future. Such progress should then enable the other nuclear-weapon States to join in the negotiating process, thus bringing us closer to global nuclear disarmament.

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

The special session has reaffirmed the urgent need for a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty which would make a significant contribution to the aims of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We are glad to note that in the course of the trilateral negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty many previous difficulties such as the question of on-site inspection or the inclusion of peaceful nuclear explosions within the framework of the treaty seem to have been resolved.

Fifteen years have now passed since the conclusion of the partial test-ban treaty in 1963. Thus we can only register our deep-felt disappointment that in spite of the many urgent appeals addressed to the negotiating partners by the General Assembly it has not yet been possible to conclude the negotiations and submit the draft treaty for full consideration to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. We are, furthermore, concerned about reports that seem to indicate the emergence of certain tendencies to limit the scope of the treaty. A comprehensive test ban will prove to be useful only if it is of a truly comprehensive nature. Only then can its international acceptability be ensured.

The Austrian delegation has over the past years again and again underlined the fact that the question of horizontal nuclear proliferation is in the first instance a political one and therefore needs first and foremost a political answer.

In recent years nuclear technology has become globally accessible. Today fissionable material for atomic weapon purposes could be produced by many countries. Hence it is ultimately the political will not to proliferate that counts more than technical barriers to nuclear proliferation. The decision of any country to create an independent nuclear arms capacity would not only introduce additional dangers for regional and international security. Such a decision would also have unpredictable consequences in terms of new regional nuclear arms races. Austria is convinced that effective prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons is in the interest of all States. It should, therefore, be pursued with great determination. We are equally convinced that a country's decision not to produce or acquire nuclear weapons constitutes a renunciation of a sovereign right in the interest of the international community

/...

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

and that today's nuclear-weapon States would have to provide an adequate response in the form of similar self-restraint. Hence early and concrete steps for nuclear disarmament are of the greatest importance and urgency.

In this connexion, let me once again recall that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is based on mutual rights and obligations of all contracting parties. Only if the nuclear Powers recognize the interrelations between their own obligations and those of the non-nuclear-weapon States will the Treaty have a chance of survival. Only under these conditions will it be possible to persuade those countries that have so far preferred to remain aloof to accede to the non-proliferation Treaty.

Austria was one of the first to sign and ratify the Non-Proliferation Treaty and subsequently to conclude a safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). IAEA's activities in the field of safeguards are of great importance. We have always given the Agency our full support and shall continue to do so in the future.

Nevertheless, let me repeat that a political consensus will have to be found to solve the problem of nuclear proliferation. The following must be the main elements of such a consensus: general agreement on the dangers of any form of proliferation, both vertical and horizontal; the elaboration of generally acceptable, non-discriminatory safeguards; an unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to engage in nuclear disarmament; and recognition of the legitimate interests of many industrialized and developing countries to take advantage of the various possibilities offered by the peaceful use of nuclear energy.

Non-nuclear-weapon States have every right to obtain guarantees from the nuclear Powers that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. Therefore we appreciate the fact that the nuclear Powers have decided to give assurances against the threat or use of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States which have themselves renounced the acquisition of nuclear weapons. We also welcome efforts to further develop and broaden the scope of such assurances. These efforts, however, cannot serve as a substitute for nuclear disarmament.

For a great number of years the General Assembly has continuously referred the question of a complete and effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as a high-priority item. The special session

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

has again defined this subject as one of the most urgent disarmament measures. Therefore the apparent lack of any tangible result on this question is a matter of deep concern and disappointment. Seven years after the conclusion of the negotiations on the biological weapons Convention the negotiations on chemical weapons still remain within the domain of the United States and the Soviet Union, and multilateral negotiations on the complete elimination of chemical weapons have not even started. Furthermore, the two negotiating partners do not seem to be ready to provide substantive information on the status of their bilateral negotiations. In our view, this situation cannot be allowed to continue. The prohibition of chemical weapons is a matter of utmost concern to all nations. Many countries have a direct interest in these negotiations. Therefore we would urge that such negotiations in a multilateral framework should start immediately.

The Final Document calls for negotiations on the limitation and gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons, which should be resolutely pursued together with negotiations on nuclear disarmament measures.

In view of the massive concentration of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, which is quite certainly out of proportion to real security requirements, it is one of the chief objectives of Austria's security policy to support a reduction of this potential in such a way that a genuine balance of forces can be achieved at a lower level. It is for these reasons that we are following with great interest the Vienna negotiations on the mutual reduction of armed forces and armaments as well as associated measures in Europe.

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

We hope that the new proposals that have been advanced in the context of these negotiations within the past year will soon break the deadlock so that the first concrete results will be possible in the near future.

On a more general level, the increasing build-up of arsenals of conventional weapons in many parts of the world during recent years and the related problem of arms transfers have become of grave and legitimate concern to the international community. Effective measures to curb this particular aspect of the arms race will be most likely to succeed at the regional level. We therefore welcome the increasing interest in this approach as well as the relevant concrete steps that, as far as the region of Latin America is concerned, have been initiated by the Governments of Mexico and Venezuela.

In order to find suitable solutions to this problem, it seems essential to deal with all its aspects. We recognize that the question of arms transfers does not lend itself easily to broad and general restraining measures, unless such measures are co-ordinated with general progress towards disarmament.

Austria attaches particular importance to the question of the prohibition or restriction of the use of those conventional weapons that cause unnecessary suffering or have indiscriminate effects. We therefore actively support the preparatory work for the 1979 conference. This positive attitude towards the conference and the contribution we are prepared to make in order to promote its success are based on the understanding that it is among the duties of a permanently neutral country to ensure - without overlooking relevant military and economic aspects - that humanitarian considerations prevail as far as possible in the conduct of armed conflicts.

We regret that at the first meeting of the preparatory conference only a limited discussion on the substantive issues took place. However, even this limited discussion has proved that, at least in the case of some categories of weapons, sufficient common ground for rules of restriction and prohibition will be found. We hope that the next meeting of the preparatory conference will further broaden this basis for an agreement. As far as the question of decision-making, which took up so much valuable time at the September meeting, is concerned we would appeal to all interested parties to agree on a flexible consensus rule based on the model of the special session.

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

Before concluding my remarks, I should like to pay a special tribute to Assistant Secretary-General, Mr. Bjornerstedt, and all the other members of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament for their untiring efforts in assisting us in our work. In particular I warmly welcome their contribution to the special session as well as the publication of the second United Nations Disarmament Yearbook. We especially appreciate the analytical approach in the treatment of various disarmament items in the yearbook.

We all know the tremendous difficulties and formidable obstacles that block the way to disarmament. They may very well lead us to despair. However, we cannot afford such defeatism. As we see it, disarmament is necessary for at least three fundamental reasons, namely, to lend credibility to the principle of the renunciation of force pledged by all Members of this Organization, and thus to increase mutual confidence; to lead us towards a safer world, which will no longer be characterized by a more than precarious balance of terror, and thus ultimately to ensure human survival; and to release resources necessary for a more rapid economic development, and thus to pave the way towards a more equitable international order and a better world for all.

Disarmament must therefore be seen as part and parcel of an over-all policy of peace and security based on the principle of the renunciation of force, mutual confidence and economic development.

Mr. BUKETI BUKAYI MATULOMBELE (Zaire) (interpretation from French):

Mr. Chairman, in response to your recommendation, my delegation will refrain from congratulating you on your unanimous election to the chairmanship of the Committee. Nevertheless, I should like to assure you of the whole-hearted co-operation of my delegation.

My delegation has chosen to speak only at this stage of our debate, and there are many reasons for this approach. First, just four months after the tenth special session devoted to disarmament it is premature to examine exhaustively the application of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly. Also, the views expressed by several competent speakers in the matter, including in particular the representatives of Argentina and Mexico, have met with the agreement of the delegation of my country. Comments on the Final Document are, of course, necessary, but what is more important,

(Mr. Buketi Bukayi Matulombele, Zaire)

in the view of my delegation, is to study the ways and means that we will make available to the new machinery to achieve the objectives we have set for ourselves in the Programme of Action. It is within this context that particular stress should be laid on the attributes of each organ to avoid conflicts of competence and overlapping. Everyone has expressed deep satisfaction at the fact that the first session devoted to the serious problem of disarmament was held in spite of the fact that the results did not measure up to the hopes that had been placed in those meetings. Hence, the need to organize a second session devoted to disarmament. The Disarmament Commission, in a realistic spirit, should buckle down primarily to working on a global disarmament programme according to a precise time-table the various stages of which will be negotiated by the Committee on Disarmament.

Disarmament, as several delegations have stressed, is not an end in itself. As we understand it, in the terms of Article 1 of the Charter, disarmament is the taking of

"... effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace ..."

Disarmament is a means to help the international community to combine its efforts to maintain international peace and security.

The ultimate aim of disarmament is, therefore, international peace and security. That is why the delegation of Zaire supports the Soviet proposal to conclude an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States.

On 6 October last, the head of my delegation had this to say on this subject:

"The draft convention submitted by the Soviet Union with regard to the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon countries is an excellent initiative and represents a first step, but the most adequate solution would consist in simply prohibiting nuclear weapons as such." (A/33/PV.25, p. 66)

To the extent that all nuclear States accede to this convention, a climate of confidence will be restored among the non-nuclear States. In our Committee, a resolution should be adopted enjoining the Committee on Disarmament to embark on the necessary negotiations to bring this about. It is only at the stage of negotiating a draft convention that my delegation will make known its view on certain clauses of the convention.

JVM/4

A/C.1/33/PV.31
19-20

(Mr. Buketi Eukayi Matulombe, Zaire)

After this cursory survey of the first two items on our agenda, I should like now to submit the views of my delegation on all matters related to general and complete disarmament. The tenth special session drew up a programme of action following an order of priority laid down in paragraph 45 of the Final Document.

(Mr. Buketi Bukayi Matulombele, Zaire)

My delegation believes that nuclear weapons are the priority of priorities in negotiations. Here primary responsibility belongs to the nuclear Powers. A treaty among those Powers relating to the cessation of all nuclear tests is, in the view of my delegation, of primary and vital importance. That treaty not only would constitute a first step towards halting the unbridled arms race, but also would be tangible proof of the political will of nuclear States to abandon their considerations of the balance of terror based upon their destructive capacity, and of their earnest desire to restore a climate of mutual confidence based upon the ideals of good-neighbourliness and co-operation. Also, the banning of the manufacture of arms of mass destruction, including chemical weapons, would strengthen the tendency on the part of most of the members of the international community to build their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence.

My delegation wishes to congratulate those Powers which have declared that they have renounced the manufacture and stockpiling of certain chemical weapons. The most ardent wish of non-nuclear States which do not possess chemical weapons is to see the total disappearance of all of those weapons in accordance with the wishes expressed in resolution 32/77 of the General Assembly.

Zaire has duly ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty. My country believes that that Treaty is important inasmuch as it constitutes a means of limiting in space the presence of these doomsday weapons. The attitude of the States parties to it should not be allowed to encourage the hegemonistic leanings of certain nuclear Powers, but should be considered as expressing the will of all peace-loving and freedom-loving States to give up these weapons which threaten the very survival of mankind. These considerations are in accordance with the purport of the statement made at the tenth special session by the head of the French delegation when he spoke of the need

"... to prevent, wherever possible, the introduction of nuclear weapons, to reduce in stages the level of nuclear strategic weapons while maintaining balanced deterrence, and to begin a regional debate on the level of security and the limitation of arms sales." (A/S-10/PV.3, p. 26)

(Mr. Buketi Bukayi Matulombe, Zaire)

My delegation believes that it is possible to eliminate the threat of the introduction of nuclear weapons in Africa, Asia, South Asia and Latin America. With regard to Africa, Zaire, like all other members of the Organization of African Unity, wishes to reaffirm its firm determination to abide by the statements of the Heads of States and Governments which they made on the denuclearization of the African continent in accordance with the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, particularly resolutions 1652 (XVI), 2033 (XX), 3261 E (XXIX), 3471 (XXX), 31/69 and 32/81.

Within this context we shall always oppose most firmly any assistance to help South Africa become a nuclear Power. It would be a crime against mankind to make available the secret of nuclear weapons to a State which has had nothing but scorn for human rights and which continues to defy our Organization. The recent developments in the Namibian question are eloquent testimony of this. The possession by South Africa of nuclear technology not only would constitute a threat to peace but would jeopardize the future of the whole African continent. Racism and its elevation to the status of a political system, namely, apartheid, should at no time find any justification within the international community whatever are the reasons invoked for it.

Human dignity counts more than any material considerations. Africa, although it is considered a denuclearized zone, also should be declared a zone of peace in order to meet the legitimate aspirations of the people of that continent.

What is true for Africa is true also for South Asia and Latin America. With regard to Latin America, the Treaty of Tlatelolco is the framework and the expression of this will which inspires the signatories of this Treaty to live in peace. Nuclear Powers have been invited to respect the will of the peoples of that part of the world. Ten years have elapsed since the adoption of resolution 2286 (XXII) of 1967. My country is convinced that all nuclear States will live up to the requirements of that resolution.

(Mr. Buketi Bukayi Matulombele, Zaire)

As to south Asia, Zaire wishes to encourage the countries in that part of the world to persevere in their efforts to attain the noble objective of making south Asia a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The many resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on this subject are a mark of approval of the international community for this initiative. The same considerations also apply to the Indian Ocean, which has been declared a zone of peace.

The report of the Special Committee also includes certain other aspects of concern which have been hindering the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean. The delegation of my country will give its support to the draft resolution submitted by the Special Committee in its report - the draft resolution which provides, inter alia, for the holding in July 1979 of a meeting of the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean as a preliminary stage before the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean.

Gradual disarmament in the nuclear field will certainly strengthen international security. That is why my country believes that the implementation of a nuclear disarmament agreement should be accompanied by adequate control measures. The French proposal to create in this connexion an international satellite control agency would be a great contribution in this area. My delegation is ready to give its whole-hearted support to putting this project into effect.

The fear of the nuclear weapon has often been allowed to eclipse the danger and quite considerable importance of conventional weapons. Although conventional weapons have not actually been used since the end of the Second World War, the world has not actually been spared fratricidal wars where so much use has been made of conventional weapons to the point that trade in them represents three quarters of all armed expenditures. We cannot talk of disarmament without abolishing the very idea of war. Therefore, we must do everything in our power to eliminate all sources of tension in order to create new conditions for existence based upon mutual confidence.

The forthcoming United Nations Conference on Prohibition or Restriction of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects will be a major step forward towards conventional disarmament, because the many wars and sources of tension which I have mentioned before are often kept going by this kind of weapon.

(Mr. Buketi Bukayi Matulombele, Zaire)

My delegation should like to take this opportunity to congratulate Mr. Adeniji of Nigeria, Chairman of the preparatory conference, for his tireless efforts to ensure that the 1979 conference will be successful, as we all expect.

The process of genuine disarmament would release considerable resources which the international community could well and profitably use for the purpose of development. The waste of resources swallowed up in the arms race is a disservice to the cause of mankind. The reduction in military budgets and the total halting of all nuclear-weapons testing are essential elements in the work on a disarmament programme in the service of development.

Headed by a competent personality, the group of governmental experts, which has the task of studying relationships between disarmament and development as laid down in paragraph 94 of the Final Document of the tenth special session, will present to us within the time allowed, I am sure, an exhaustive study justifying the real advantages for the whole of the international community of disarmament for the benefit of development.

Approximately two years from the end of the disarmament decade it is high time for concrete measures to be taken to meet fully the requirement of resolution 2602 E (XXIV) of 1969. The Zaire delegation now declares that it is ready to take part in any concerted action which would strengthen the effort of the United Nations to bring about these objectives.

Among other tasks our Committee has the task of proposing to the General Assembly the date of the next special session on disarmament and of expressing its views on the forthcoming world disarmament conference. A number of proposals have been made on this subject since 16 October. In the view of my delegation it is indispensable for a period of three to four years to elapse after the last special session in order to enable us to evaluate the ground that we have covered and to allow sufficient time for the new machinery which has been established to become operational. One or two years after the holding of the second special session on disarmament we could convene a world disarmament conference, which would then have a good chance of being successful.

(Mr. Buketi Bukayi Matulombele, Zaire)

I should like to reaffirm that the objectives of disarmament are international peace and security and not sterile quarrels among Members of our Organization. It is in that spirit that my delegation declares its readiness to give its support to any draft resolution aiming at that goal. The tenth special session on disarmament has outlined for us the framework, the priorities and the machinery. Let us add to that the political will, and let us move ahead without procrastination or undue haste: success is within our grasp.

My delegation would like to conclude this statement by appealing urgently to the nuclear Powers, which have a particular responsibility, to supply the remedy for this hitherto incurable disease of our time, over-armament, in order to ensure the survival of mankind. Because, as a thinker put it: "He who dies for the progress of knowledge or the curing of diseases is someone who serves life as he dies."

Mr. DOMOKOS (Hungary): Events of the past few years give clear evidence that the solution of major international problems makes it inevitable to create and strengthen an atmosphere in which understanding of the position and acceptance of the rightful interests of the other side are coupled with a willingness for active co-operation. This is also instrumental in the generation of political will which we all believe is the determining factor of disarmament. Unfortunately, the process of détente has experienced a slow-down owing to the increasing activity and influence of extremist forces of imperialism interested in military production and bent on an expansionist policy. For this reason disarmament talks have also entered a phase in which the solution of problems has become particularly difficult and time-consuming, with progress being made at a slow pace.

Therefore, today when calls are made for an acceleration of disarmament talks and for the earliest and fullest possible realization of the Programme of Action adopted by the special session on disarmament, renewed efforts must concurrently be deployed to neutralize the forces opposing peaceful coexistence and to increase co-operation. At the same time, one is equally justified in

(Mr. Domokos, Hungary)

saying that achieving solutions to the pressing international problems - first of all a successful conclusion of the ongoing disarmament talks - would have a beneficial effect on the process of détente. The general debate at this session of the General Assembly has clearly reflected a growing awareness of that interrelationship.

The ultimate goal pursued in disarmament efforts continues to be general and complete disarmament; that must not be overlooked for even a moment. However, since armament is going on in several areas its discontinuance has likewise become a complex task which could only be solved step by step, through parallel efforts in different forums and in several phases. The Final Document of the special session, particularly its section III, reflects that situation correctly.

Allow me to proceed now to state the views and position of the Hungarian delegation on the current problems of disarmament and on the most urgent tasks in this field.

None of the ongoing disarmament talks is followed with as much attention, anxiety and hope as are the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on the limitation of strategic armaments. It is no exaggeration to say that the conclusion of a new SALT agreement between the two big Powers is a key issue of present-day international politics. It could initiate a new period on the world political scene, could mark a turning-point in disarmament and could give a new momentum to improvement in the international atmosphere in which many-sided co-operation would be accorded incontestable priority over military competition. Yet, given the highly complex and global nature of that problem, we must face the reality that we cannot move closer to the desired objective except by a phased approach. None the less, the high importance of the issue and the potential promising effect of its eventual solution increase our expectations that the bilateral talks now in progress will be successfully concluded in the near future. We hope that the recent rounds of high-level talks, while we are still awaiting the final solution, have placed the signing of the SALT II agreement within our reach. Hopeful accounts by the participants of a rapprochement between their respective positions are a source of optimism for us.

(Mr. Domokos, Hungary)

It is not accidental that the complete prohibition of nuclear explosions should have priority today among the difficult problems of nuclear disarmament. Nuclear-weapon tests are conclusive proof of the continuing nuclear arms race and they constitute the precondition for stockpiling nuclear weapons, keeping them in combat readiness and developing new types of such weapons, which are still the most dangerous kind of weapons of mass destruction. On the other hand, general and complete cessation of nuclear-weapon tests would essentially limit the scope of the nuclear arms race, reduce the danger of proliferation and create a favourable precondition for arriving at further stages in nuclear disarmament. That is why we have attached, and continue to attach, great importance to an early ban on nuclear-weapon explosions in all environments; and it is why we have held and continue to hold that it is necessary for the nuclear Powers to make every effort to work out as early as possible an international treaty on the complete prohibition of such explosions.

Similarly, we are urging all nuclear Powers to join in the nuclear disarmament efforts and to accede to the agreement expected to result from the ongoing tripartite negotiations. It is our firm belief that only universal participation in disarmament efforts can give us guarantees of approaching general and complete disarmament without the risk of reversal. Any disarmament in which only a group of the militarily significant States takes part, while others continue and even step up their armament, cannot hope to last.

(Mr. Domokos, Hungary)

Such a practice is likely to slow down disarmament talks, to make new disarmament accords impossible and even to jeopardize existing ones. That holds true of disarmament as a whole and nuclear disarmament cannot be an exception. Mindful of the importance of these problems we have always supported the tripartite negotiations and we wish to see their early and successful conclusion.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is still the main instrument and guarantee for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons. The system of safeguards should keep in step with changes in the economic development and potential of countries and with the general increase in the levels of technological capabilities, while reckoning with the nuclear ambitions of certain countries in the military field. Therefore my Government places great significance on efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation régime and to bring the NPT closer to universality.

The cessation of nuclear-weapon explosions and the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime are prior conditions for restraints on armaments. On this plane they should enjoy incontestable priority, yet they cannot by themselves ensure full elimination of the nuclear arms race and achieve disarmament. Further measures are needed to attain these goals.

At the tenth special session of the United Nations General Assembly, devoted to disarmament the socialist countries made consistent efforts to ensure that, pursuant to the Soviet proposal of 26 May (A/S-10/AC.1/4), the General Assembly decided to discuss a programme of action which would provide for the cessation, within a specified limited period, of the production of all types of nuclear weapons, gradually reducing their stockpiles until they have been completely destroyed. We consider it a pressing task to take the first concrete measures aimed at implementing these provisions of the Final Document of the special session.

While the aim has been set of removing the danger of nuclear war and of reversing the nuclear arms race, one has to face another growing danger posed by the attempt of certain militarist circles of imperialism to open a new stage of nuclear armament by creating new types of nuclear weapons in the hope of securing military supremacy and an advantageous position at disarmament talks.

(Mr. Domokos, Hungary)

Several dangerous consequences of a deployment of the neutron bomb are amply summarized by the annual report of the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in the light of the Committee's debate on the subject. I do not wish to repeat them.

Contradictions in official positions on the neutron bomb and recent preparations for its deployment are also clear proof that the creators of any weapon find it hard to renounce its deployment even if the hazards are extremely great and the anticipated gains doubtful. It is self-deceit to believe that the neutron bomb could be used with any hope of unilateral advantage either in the military field or at the negotiating table. An eventual decision on its production would diminish hopes for reversing nuclear armaments, would jeopardize the effectiveness of measures - taken or contemplated - to strengthen the non-proliferation régime, and would increase the ambitions of certain near-nuclear countries to acquire this kind of nuclear weapon which allegedly could be used without the risk of a nuclear counter-strike in a war fought with conventional weapons. The advocates of the neutron bomb should also be mindful of this danger when they seek to lower the nuclear threshold.

Those are the reasons why Hungarian public opinion and the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic have repeatedly condemned plans to deploy this cruel weapon and continue to demand its complete prohibition. The only reasonable option, in our opinion, is to conclude an international treaty banning the neutron bomb. In the CCD the socialist countries, including the Hungarian People's Republic, have submitted a draft treaty to facilitate the solution of this pressing issue.

The question of the prohibition of the production and stockpiling of chemical weapons has long been on the agenda of sessions of the United Nations General Assembly and the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. So far the negotiations have not resulted in a final accord despite General Assembly resolutions which for years have been calling for the elaboration of an international convention. We welcome the progress reported by the negotiating partners on various occasions and express our hope that further advances will soon result in a draft convention. The urgent necessity of such a convention

(Mr. Domokos, Hungary)

is justified by the appearance of successive generations of increasingly dangerous chemical weapons developed by intensive research during past decades. For instance, a comparison of the destructive effect of nerve agents with that of nuclear weapons is well advised.

A recently published statement by the Commander-in-Chief of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Forces that NATO might consider a sharp upgrading in its offensive chemical capacity gives us cause for concern. The strong demand for the prohibition of this type of weapon is further justified by these and similar plans.

The continuing arms race is not confined to a build-up of known armaments but includes a drive in developing new types of weapons and achieving technological superiority. There is a growing awareness that this process may lead to the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction, with the added implication that even if agreements were reached on nuclear and chemical disarmament, the arms race could spread to other areas unless an international treaty is signed to prevent the birth of new generations of weapons of mass destruction. That led the General Assembly, at the initiative of socialist countries, to adopt resolutions urging international talks aimed at working out an agreement or agreements to prevent the development of new types and new systems of weapons of mass destruction. Unfortunatley, resolution 32/84, adopted by the General Assembly at its session last year, lent itself to different interpretations, on account of which some Western countries have further reduced their contribution, so that the past year did not produce any meaningful progress.

(Mr. Domokos, Hungary)

The view of my delegation remains, that a comprehensive approach is the most effective way to achieve the goal, including the conclusion of specific agreements on particular new types of weapons of mass destruction. It was in that spirit that at the summer session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) the Hungarian delegation submitted a working document on infrasonic weapons to promote a further study of the question, with a view to elaborating a preventive international treaty.

For a more effective consideration of the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction, it would be advisable for the General Assembly during this year's session to urge more vigorously the acceleration of negotiations and to call on all participants to show a constructive attitude.

At the same time, we are please to note that the talks that have been conducted on the prohibition of the radiological weapon, a potential weapon of mass destruction, have resulted in agreement on several provisions of a future draft international treaty. Such a treaty would be a useful addition to the series of treaties putting a complete ban on nuclear weapons.

The emphasis on the priority to be accorded to the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction does not run counter to our opinion that in the process towards general and complete disarmament increased importance should be attached to the limitation of conventional armaments, not only because the larger part of the world's military expenditures is absorbed by conventional armaments and armed forces, but also because technological competition, which is no less intense in this field than it is in the nuclear area, tends to produce more sophisticated conventional weapons with a destructive power that is often close to that of nuclear weapons. We believe, therefore, that disarmament efforts should also encompass that area, and give appropriate attention to the problems involved, thus creating in advance conditions for the implementation of appropriate measures. At the same time, we reaffirm our position that in dealing with the limitation of conventional weapons we must not lose sight of the right of States to defend their security and to effective self-defence against aggression, or of the legitimate struggle for independence by peoples under colonial oppression and by national liberation movements.

(Mr. Domokos, Hungary)

Regional disarmament measures may have special significance, sometimes beyond regional boundaries, in reducing political tension and military confrontation. We feel that in this context we can rightly accord first place to the Vienna talks on the mutual reduction of armaments and armed forces in central Europe. It is our belief that the conclusion of an agreement would create a firm basis for the elaboration of further restrictive measures and could in the longer run help to extend the talks to areas not covered by the current negotiations. We hope that by giving due consideration to the proposals made by the socialist countries last June the Western negotiating partners will in the end act in a similarly constructive spirit, thus speeding up the talks and opening up the possibilities of reaching an agreement based on the principle of equal security.

I should like to conclude my statement by addressing the complex problems of disarmament and of development. In the light of the pressing economic problems and development goals it is understandable that the focus of attention should be increasingly on disarmament, not only for political and military reasons but also on economic grounds, since disarmament holds out the prospect of radical change and perhaps of a solution. The Hungarian delegation has from the outset favoured study of this subject. However, from the experience of the special session of the General Assembly, I find it necessary to stress that at the present stage attention should be focused on disarmament itself, because nothing less than the realization of that objective can be expected to provide the material basis for more ambitious development goals. Undoubtedly there is an established case for examining the possible relationships between the two domains. That has led us to send our representative to the Group of Experts, and he played an active role in the discharge of its mandate.

The process of reducing military confrontation is an exceptionally difficult and complex one, particularly today when the improvement of the political atmosphere is often disturbed by the activities of militarist and reactionary circles. The nations and the international community, however, give ever stronger proof of their recognition of the magnitude of the dangers of the arms race, as well as of their increasingly active search for possibilities to meet their interests. We hope that realism and perseverance will lead to success in that field as well.

The CHAIRMAN: As indicated at the meeting yesterday, about two-thirds of the draft resolutions that have been distributed in this Committee have not yet been officially introduced.

Is there any delegation at this point that is willing or able to introduce a draft resolution? I do not see any.

I call on the representative of Saudi Arabia, who wishes to speak on a point of order.

Mr. BAROODY (Saudi Arabia): I should like to speak on a point of order. So that there may be no misunderstanding, I do not wish to put forward a draft resolution at this time; I have no resolution ready to present, but I should like to commiserate with you, Mr. Chairman. I am not flattering you when I say that I think you are one of the most efficient Chairmen we have had in the First Committee. However, with all your prodding, we are accomplishing very little. The general debate is becoming repetitive, in the sense that nothing new has been adduced which was not mentioned at the tenth special session on disarmament. Perhaps I may refer to an Arabic proverb: "There is benefit to be derived from repetition". However, I believe that we are all familiar, or at least we are supposed to have become familiar, with the substance of the matter.

(Mr. Baroody, Saudi Arabia)

I looked at the agenda just now and found we have 15 items to which we are addressing ourselves in a general debate which I believe has been exhausted. And as you have rightly said, Mr. Chairman, it is difficult to understand what deters those who have draft resolutions from presenting them.

In view of this, perhaps I may make a suggestion about the procedure of our work. It is that those who have draft resolutions might get together in the hope that they can merge some of them and co-ordinate others, because many of them overlap. If one reads the preambles one finds sentences repeated almost word for word. Everyone has his own style of language, but the substance is the same. Why not show the leaders who are in the seats of power that we here in the United Nations can get together and co-ordinate things? I do not think we need permission from those in the seats of power to merge preambles or operative paragraphs that touch on the same subject. It is a question of style. Instead of being the style of, say, Arabia, Romania or the Soviet Union, it would be the United Nations style. This is an innovative idea. We may break new ground for something in the future more constructive than being repetitive and dealing in platitudes, so that you then have to come and prod us.

I can come here and speak like my three colleagues who have spoken this morning. I must say I was deeply impressed by their contributions, especially by the statement we heard from our Austrian colleague. I also had the chance to read what he said, and his conclusions are marvellous, but what can we get out of them? He talks about lending credibility to the renunciation of force. Are we lending credibility? What shall we do to lend credibility? The representative of Austria spoke about leading us towards a safer world which will no longer be characterized by a more than precarious balance of terror and thus ultimately to ensure human survival. This is succinct and to the point. Every one of us has said it in different language, but here it is very clear. Then, of course, there is the third point - to release resources for more rapid economic development. We have said this and have been saying it for many years, and more so during the tenth special session. And we are repeating now.

(Mr. Baroody, Saudi Arabia)

I had occasion this morning to go through again the draft resolution submitted by our colleague from Pakistan. It is not very dissimilar from the Russian text. I believe they overlap. The Committee will remember that the Russian text calls for the transmittal of the draft resolution, with its annex, to the Committee on Disarmament to see how the non-nuclear powers can be safeguarded against the use of nuclear weapons. As a mere suggestion, why cannot our colleague from Pakistan and our colleague from the Soviet Union get together and produce one text instead of each of them having friends or clients. I am glad that the representative of Pakistan did not approach me; he knows me by this time. I do not very lightly lend the name of the country I represent to any draft resolution, and that is why I try to work solo, so to speak. I am just hinting. I would not have taken up the time of the Committee had there been any speakers. That is why I raised the point of order. Far be it from me to abuse the time of the Committee.

Why should not others who have draft resolutions get together and work out a common text? Perhaps I am too optimistic in my approach to this subject, or a little too ambitious in presuming that representatives could co-ordinate or merge their different draft resolutions. Instead of having three or four separate draft resolutions, perhaps we may be able to have one; instead of 10, perhaps we may be able to have three. If there are things that cannot be merged so as to fit into one draft resolution, perhaps we should take two or three draft resolutions and examine them. Let us take the simile of intersecting circles; in other words, there is agreement on the intersection, the overlapping, and the other points could be worked out.

Mr. Chairman, every morning you come and prod us to do some work, but we are repeating the same thing over and over again with no palpable results. Of course the people who are behind us in the seats of power have to be consulted sometimes, but we should depart from that. Let them trust us a little more. We work as comrades -- and I do not mean that in the communist sense but "camarade" in French, lest anyone thinks I am changing my ideology. I mean it in the sense of colleagues and friends. I get along very well with many of my colleagues from the Soviet Union, although I do not subscribe to their ideology. Likewise, when I was

fighting the mighty French and British Empires one of my best friends who opposed me was Sir Samuel Hoare -- not the Sir Samuel Hoare of Mr. Chamberlain's day, but the one who passed away a couple of years ago. He was a wonderful friend. He was one of my adversaries whom I always tried to fight with more vehemence than I would any other person, because he was very capable. But we got on very well together. Take for example, Marcel Bouquin who was an opponent of mine on self-determination in the Third Committee for years. He was one of my best friends. Why do we not come to that level of friendship? Then, if our hands are tied, we can probably clear certain things with our respective Governments if and when informally we get to some area of agreement.

I want to be frank. Look at what is happening with these Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). For how many years have they been going on now? We read in the paper that the Soviet Union and the United States of America are getting closer together, but then there are differences. Are we going to do the same thing? Mr. Gromyko and Mr. Vance can afford it. They shuttle between Moscow and Washington and they talk, and sometimes they are led to believe that things are getting closer, but all of a sudden we see the rift is there. Shall we duplicate what is going on in the SALT negotiations? In the meantime there are worse weapons than strategic arms; at least we are given to understand that there are neutron bombs, and God knows what the Russians have. They do not tell us. But the Americans tell us they could develop a neutron bomb.

(Mr. Baroody, Saudi Arabia)

As I said before, buildings are perhaps more precious than human lives.

This is ludicrous.

I would beg your forgiveness, Sir, and that of my colleagues here if I have been a little too frank. But I think we should try to arrive at a new approach in dealing with our problems, especially of disarmament.

I want to tell you one thing that I have done, but I did not succeed. At one time our Chinese and Soviet friends threw so much mud at each other that we thought some of the mud might hit us, because when you throw mud it splatters. I tried to talk to my good friend Yakov Malik and my good friend Mr. Huang Hua as persons not as representatives. I said, "if you neighbours do unto each other what you are doing and you have the same ideology, what can you expect from us?" I got nowhere. I think there are still troops on the border there.

But we cannot go on like this. Should we remain false witnesses to something that is not being accomplished? For heaven's sake, Sir, I am sure you can do something other than just to prod us. Talk confidentially to some of the proponents of those resolutions. If you want anyone to be put on the spot, ask me. I will put them on the spot. They will not hang me. I am sure the people around this table are very kind. I don't think their intelligence services will harm me because I am not dangerous, nor are you, Sir. You belong to one of the countries that would like to see peace established in the world, as would every American, every Soviet citizen, every Chinese citizen, every Frenchman and every Englishman. I am citing those countries which have atomic bombs and other atomic weapons. For heaven's sake, you who possess atomic weapons, be frank with your own Governments. Tell them to change their tune. If they do not change their tune or their method you can set an example by coming to us and exchanging views, instead of having each one wait for the other to submit a resolution and see how the wind blows before he makes his views known.

We are tired of this. We are accomplishing nothing. For heaven's sake, Sir, let us be a little more practical, a little more pragmatic. Thank you for allowing me to speak on this point of order which may have been protracted. But I do not see how I could make myself clear without using enough time to express my views.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Saudi Arabia for his statement and particularly on my own behalf for his kind sentiments of commiseration, as well as his promise to put himself on the spot in my stead. I appreciate that very much. On behalf of the Committee, I see that the Committee has listened with great care to the words of wisdom and experience from the representative of Saudi Arabia.

Before adjourning this meeting I should like to announce the following additional sponsors of draft resolutions: A/C.1/33/L.5, Ivory Coast; A/C.1/33/L.10, Swaziland; A/C.1/33/L.12, Ghana; A/C.1/33/L.13, Ghana; and A/C.1/33/L.14, Ghana and the Philippines.

The meeting rose at 12.05 p.m.