



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 20TH MEETING

Chairman: Mr. PASTINEN (Finland)

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OF GUARANTEES OF THE SECURITY OF NON-NUCLEAR STATES

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The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m.

## AGENDA ITEM 128

CONCLUSION OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE STRENGTHENING OF GUARANTEES OF THE SECURITY OF NON-NUCLEAR STATES (A/33/24; A/C.1/33/L.6)

The CHAIRMAN: As representatives will recall, the inclusion in the agenda of this item was requested in a letter from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the Secretary-General. The request pointed out that this item should be included as an important and urgent question in the agenda of the thirty-third session of the General Assembly. Today we are beginning the discussion of this item and altogether 10 meetings have been reserved for this purpose. I would ask representatives who wish to speak on this subject to put their names on the list.

Mr. TROYANOVSKY (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): This year there was a special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations on disarmament and there is also a discussion of the problem of disarmament at this session of the General Assembly. This is fresh testimony to the unabating concern of States at the continuance of the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race. It is obvious that the increase in nuclear weapons, the stockpiles of which have increased more than threefold in the past 10 years, increases the risk of their use, which would have catastrophic consequences for mankind.

(Mr. Troyanovsky, USSR)

The danger is aggravated by the fact that the matter is not confined solely to the quantitative increase of the nuclear potential; at the same time new systems of nuclear weapons are being created which are ever more refined, sophisticated and destructive.

What can be done to combat these trends and what ways and means should be used?

In this connexion the Soviet Union has put forward a broad programme of measures designed to exploit every possible opportunity in the struggle for the cessation of the arms race and for disarmament. The essence of this programme and its concrete content were outlined by the Soviet Union at the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and also in the statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union and member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, A. A. Gromyko, at this session of the General Assembly, on 26 September. The Soviet delegation also availed itself of the opportunity to explain the fundamental content of the measures proposed by the Soviet Union and to give the necessary clarifications in its statement here in the First Committee on 18 October.

Of course, as the delegation of the USSR explained in detail in its statement on 18 October, the most effective way to achieve that end would be by reaching agreement on the cessation of the manufacture of all types of nuclear weapons and the gradual reduction of stockpiles of them up to and including their total elimination. The Soviet Union will work consistently for such an agreement.

However, the task of making progress in these and other key areas of nuclear arms limitation and disarmament should not, in our view, be allowed to obscure the need for or preclude other, albeit less radical, measures that in the final analysis would serve the same purposes of lessening the danger of an outbreak of nuclear conflict and limiting of the sphere of the possible use of nuclear weapons. Everyone would benefit from such steps for they would

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strengthen the foundations of peace and bring about a better general climate, which is by no means unimportant for the successful carrying out of more fundamental measures of disarmament.

One such step could be the conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States.

What was the motive of the Soviet Union in putting forward this proposal at this session? First of all, we took into account the fact that non-nuclear States have for years expressed a strong interest in obtaining guarantees of their security against a nuclear attack.

At one point, when the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was still in the preparatory stages, the Soviet Union, desirous of accommodating the wishes of non-nuclear States, expressed itself in favour of granting them such guarantees. In his message to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in February 1966, A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, said:

"To facilitate agreement on the conclusion of the treaty, the Soviet Government declares its readiness to include in the draft treaty an article on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons against the non-nuclear States parties to the treaty which do not have nuclear weapons on their territories."

It will be recalled that it was intended that the purpose of ensuring the security of non-nuclear States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons be served by Security Council resolution 255 (1968) and the guarantees by the three nuclear Powers to such States that are embodied therein.

Nevertheless, the non-nuclear States continued to urge that further guarantees be accorded by the nuclear States. Thus, for example, at the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and at the thirty-first and thirty-second sessions of the General Assembly many non-nuclear States repeatedly stressed the need for the nuclear Powers to assume the obligation not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States. That problem was

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also raised at the sixth and seventh Conferences of the Foreign Ministers of Islamic States.

The question of the strengthening of security guarantees for non-nuclear States received a great deal of attention both during the preparation for and in the course of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The Final Document of the special session contains a number of provisions calling for the strengthening of the security of non-nuclear States; for example:

"... while noting the declarations made by nuclear-weapon States, effective arrangements, as appropriate, to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons could strengthen the security of those States and international peace and security." (resolution 10/2, para. 32)

The appeal to the nuclear-weapon States to take steps to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them is also contained in paragraph 59 of the Final Document of the special session which urges the nuclear-weapon States:

"... to pursue efforts to conclude, as appropriate, effective arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons." (Ibid., para. 59)

The Soviet Union takes a favourable view of the desire of non-nuclear States to obtain from the nuclear-weapon States international legal guarantees of the non-use of nuclear weapons against them. It proceeds from the understanding that the States that renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and do not permit their deployment on their territories are contributing substantially to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and thus to reducing and eventually eliminating the threat of the outbreak of nuclear war. Those countries are entitled to have the necessary guarantees to the effect that nuclear weapons will not be used against them.

At present, it appears desirable and possible to take further steps to strengthen the security of a large number of non-nuclear States in accordance with their wishes to that effect.

(Mr. Troyanovsky, USSR)

At the special session the Soviet Union declared that it would never use nuclear weapons against those States which renounced the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and did not have them on their territories. As the document "On practical ways to end the arms race" stressed:

"We are ready to conclude special agreements to that effect with any such non-nuclear State. We call upon all other nuclear Powers to follow our example and assume similar obligations." (A/S-10/AC.1/4, para. 2)

That document was submitted to the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament by Mr. A. A. Gromyko, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

The discussion of this question at the special session provided us with additional material for proposing to the General Assembly that a further step should be taken in response to the appeals addressed by the special session to the nuclear States. We noted, for example, that in his address to the special session on 2 June the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Callaghan, made the following statement:

"We recognize ... that States which have renounced nuclear weapons are entitled to look for some more specific assurance that nuclear weapons will not be used against them. ...

I place on record now that the United Kingdom will be prepared itself to take part with other nuclear Powers in firm, far-reaching and permanent assurances to the non-nuclear States." (A/S-10/PV.14, pp. 35, 36)

We understand that statement as declaring the United Kingdom's willingness to seek a formula of guarantees for the security of non-nuclear States which would be agreed upon by the nuclear States. The United States, France and the People's Republic of China have also made statements on this issue. While those statements on guarantees varied in content, it can be said that, as a matter of principle, all the nuclear-weapon States have concurred in the necessity of providing non-nuclear States with guarantees of security. In other words we see, on the one hand, a strong and express interest on the part of the non-nuclear States in receiving security guarantees from the nuclear States

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and, on the other hand, the consent given as a matter of principle by the nuclear States to granting them such guarantees. Thus there actually exists both a necessity and a possibility for the granting of guarantees. That is why the Soviet Union has proposed the inclusion in the agenda of this session, as an important and urgent matter, of the item entitled "Conclusion of an international convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States", the consideration of which has begun today in this Committee.

We believe that the objective of strengthening the security of non-nuclear States could best be served by the conclusion of an international convention, the parties to which would be, on the one hand, the nuclear States prepared to grant appropriate guarantees of security to non-nuclear States and, on the other hand, the non-nuclear States concerned, which would renounce the production and acquisition of nuclear weapons and have no nuclear weapons on their territory.

We are prepared also to enter into special bilateral agreements on security guarantees. However, we believe that the most comprehensive and effective solution to the problem of protecting non-nuclear States from the use of nuclear weapons against them would be for the nuclear States to assume obligations with regard to the agreed guarantees embodied in an international agreement.

In the process of negotiating the text of a multilateral convention, the States Parties would inevitably have to carry out the necessary and important work of finding a solution to the problem generally acceptable to both the nuclear and the non-nuclear States. Meanwhile, there would be a case for accommodating to the utmost the wishes of non-nuclear States themselves, which under our proposal should participate in the negotiating of the convention.

As to unilateral declarations, they do not of course impose upon States obligations, in terms of their legal validity, which those States would be assuming by entering into an international agreement.

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The Soviet delegation would like to comment on certain provisions of the draft convention proposed by the Soviet Union.

The first key article of the draft is based on the premise that the obligation of the nuclear States with respect to non-nuclear States must be made as clear as possible. As has already been said, the Soviet Union has stated that it would never use nuclear weapons against those States which renounced the production and acquisition of such weapons and did not have them on their territories. That clear-cut approach appears from the first article of the draft.

In essence our proposal is similar to the formula contained in the resolution on the same subject adopted on the initiative of Pakistan at the thirty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly. Both that resolution and our own proposal call upon nuclear-weapon States to assume the uniform obligation not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States. The difference lies only in the category of non-nuclear States in respect of which the afore-mentioned obligation should be assumed. The resolution of the thirty-first session refers to non-nuclear weapon States "not parties to the nuclear security arrangements of some nuclear-weapon Powers".

Frankly, we see no valid arguments in favour of the claim that any non-nuclear State which, even though it does not have nuclear weapons of any other States on its territory, still maintains relations with a nuclear Power as its ally should be deleted from the category of non-nuclear States receiving the guarantees. When we hear proposals of that kind we begin to wonder whether this is not the result of force of habit - the habit of thinking in terms of bloc policies - and whether that habit is not actually relegating to the background the real objective of seeking to narrow down as much as possible the potential sphere of the use of nuclear weapons and, consequently, to reduce the very danger of a nuclear war.



(Mr. Troyanovsky, USSR)

Therefore, our proposal has been worded in broader terms. It provides for participation in the convention of those non-nuclear States that are bound by undertakings of alliance to nuclear States but have no nuclear weapons on their territory. At the same time, our proposal takes into account another fact of life, namely, that no one can count on a lack of response on the part of a nuclear Power in the case of a war if that Power were to fall victim to a nuclear strike launched from the territory of a non-nuclear State where nuclear weapons are stationed or if it faces the threat of such an attack.

The merit of the formula we are proposing consists also in that it is intended to discourage States from acquiring nuclear weapons, thus contributing to the consolidation of the régime of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

We believe it possible, as emerges from article II of the draft convention, to extend the obligation not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States also to their armed forces and installations under their jurisdiction and control, and this would make the obligations even wider in scope.

Article III of the draft convention also contains what we think is a most expedient solution of the question of its observance by consultations held when appropriate, between the States parties with a view to clarifying the actual circumstances of the matter. Article IV of the Soviet draft convention provides for the procedure of seceding from the convention, by giving three months' notice. Article VI contains a provision concerning its entry into force. However, at present it does not predetermine all the provisions to this effect, and the question is left open subject to further discussion among the States concerned.

Many delegations have already expressed, in general terms, their attitude towards our proposal in the course of the general debate and while discussing the first item on the agenda in the First Committee. We are very satisfied with the support in principle it has elicited. We appreciate highly the support of our initiative by fraternal socialist States. We have also taken note of the statements made by many other countries, in particular the delegations of Afghanistan, Argentina, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Finland, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Iraq, Algeria, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Zaire, Kuwait, Madagascar, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates and others which have shown their interest in and taken a business-like attitude to the Soviet initiative, understanding as they do that it stems from the wishes of the non-nuclear States themselves and is dictated by the desire further to consolidate peace.

(Mr. Troyanovsky, USSR)

In the course of the discussion of the question, many interesting suggestions and comments were made which deserve careful and comprehensive consideration by participants in future negotiations. We construe such reaction on the part of many States as an intention to undertake a thorough examination of the opportunities contained in the Soviet initiative and to translate them into reality.

At the same time, some delegations expressed scepticism with regard to our proposal. The Australian delegation, for example, stated in the First Committee that our proposal, "known in advance to be unacceptable to an important group of States" (14th meeting, p. 27), cannot serve as a basis for the implementation of measures designed to strengthen security guarantees.

Such an assertion is beyond our comprehension. We are convinced - and we have just illustrated this point - that there exist quite real preconditions for a positive solution of the question of the strengthening of guarantees for the security of non-nuclear States.

If a particular proposal were to be viewed as "unacceptable in advance" because of differences in the positions of States, then no international agreements could ever be worked out at all. However, international practice shows that the contrary is true; on the basis of proposals and positions, which, more often than not at the initial stage, are different from one another, it becomes possible, step by step, not without difficulty, to arrive finally at a common decision.

In practical terms - and this is the main thrust of the draft resolution which the Soviet delegation is formally submitting today on the question under consideration-- it would appear necessary, after the proposal about the conclusion of the convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States has been discussed at the session, to refer this question to the Committee on Disarmament with a view to enabling it to embark upon its consideration in practical terms.

The Committee on Disarmament, as a multilateral negotiating body in the field of nuclear disarmament, is in a position to do most effectively the necessary work in negotiating the text of the document, which would have the effect of strengthening the security of non-nuclear States.

(Mr. Troyanovsky, USSR)

The draft resolution we have prepared also provides that the General Assembly, together with the draft convention on the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States, would take note of the suggestions and proposals made during the discussion of this question and would request the Secretary-General to transmit to the Committee on Disarmament all documents relating to the discussion by the General Assembly at its thirty-third session of the agenda item that we are discussing today. This should be done in order to enable the Committee on Disarmament to discuss the question with due regard for the views and proposals put forward by various States on the strengthening of security guarantees.

We are not putting forward any ultimatum-like conditions, but we do propose that we should get down to constructive concrete negotiations with a view to co-ordinating positions, and, as I have already said, we believe that the situation in this regard is conducive to the success of this endeavour.

The Soviet delegation proceeds from the premise that, given the goodwill of States, and primarily of the nuclear States, the initiative of the Soviet Union can relatively soon yield practical results. We wish to express our confidence that most of the other States Members of the United Nations will also be guided by an awareness of the great importance of a speedy and practical solution of the problem relating to the strengthening of guarantees of the security of non-nuclear States.

In conclusion, I should like to appeal to all delegations to take an active part in the discussion of this question. The Soviet delegation, as always, is ready to co-operate constructively and hopes that its co-operation will be reciprocated by other delegations.

The CHAIRMAN: Before adjourning the meeting, I wish to announce that Sweden has become a sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/33/L.5.

The meeting rose at 11.15 a.m.