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Chairman: Mr. PASTINEN (Finland)

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The meeting was called to order at 10.35 a.m.

AGENDA ITEM 125 (continued)

REVIEW OF THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS AND DECISIONS ADOPTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY AT ITS TENTH SPECIAL SESSION: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (A/33/42, A/33/279, A/33/305, A/33/312, A/33/317; A/C.1/33/L.1-4)

Mr. CANALES (Chile) (interpretation from Spanish): We believe it would be premature to attempt an analysis of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions in resolution S-10/2, devoted to disarmament, recently adopted as the Final Document of the tenth special session of the General Assembly, when only a little more than three months have elapsed since its distribution. There has been an opportunity to implement only paragraph 118, whereby the Disarmament Commission, which a few days ago held a few meetings to deal with organizational matters, was established; and paragraph 124, which established the Advisory Board on Disarmament Studies, which is to hold its first session in mid-November, according to the report of the Secretary-General (A/33/312), since it is still in the process of being constituted.

(Mr. Canales, Chile)

For the time being, we consider that our examination of that document could serve the purpose of reiterating to the members of the bodies constituting the implementation machinery restructured in accordance with part IV of the Final Document, paragraphs 113 to 124, the points of view, or criteria, of each delegation concerning the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted at the tenth special session of the General Assembly in order to channel properly the work of discussion and negotiation, thus making it possible for those bodies to do more fruitful work.

In the general debate at this thirty-third session of the General Assembly, a number of heads of delegations referred to the disarmament policies of their respective countries and expressed conflicting views when referring to the results of the tenth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Some heads of delegation expressed pessimism at the results achieved at that session and stated that they felt the convening of the Assembly had been inopportune and that its results were very meagre, because of the lack of immediate negotiations. Other delegations felt that a laudable effort had been made in preparing and carrying out that event and described it as a decisive step towards future world disarmament. My delegation shares the optimism of those delegations which expressed the view that progress had been achieved in the field of disarmament with the formulation of the Programme of Action based on a world strategy which includes the most important and urgent measures for halting the arms race, a phenomenon without precedent in the history of mankind.

The Final Document sums up the views shared by countries having a nuclear capacity and a powerful military-industrial complex and countries which, in order to maintain armed forces capable of ensuring national security, are compelled to resort to purchasing armaments abroad.

Our country is a peaceful country which aspires only to the maintenance of its territorial integrity and supports any initiative which may gradually lead to general and complete disarmament under strict international control.

(Mr. Canales, Chile)

For that reason we stated from the very outset that we were in favour of holding a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament and we believe that before the convening of a world disarmament conference in the next decade we should hold a further special session of the General Assembly, which would enable us to assess clearly the results achieved in the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the Final Document. We believe that that should be done within a time limit of between three and five years, which would give sufficient time for assessing any progress that might have been achieved.

However, our optimism is somewhat damped by certain events, to which we should like to refer.

Since 1945 and the end of the Second World War the United Nations has done everything in its power to limit armaments but, frankly, the results have been pitiful, since all States without exception endeavour to strengthen their armed forces, to the detriment of their social and economic development. The military level attained by the great Powers endangers the life of mankind. Complete respect for the fundamental principles of the United Nations Charter should in itself serve to preserve international peace and security. Unfortunately, that is not the case. Up to now it has been possible to avoid a world conflict but not to prevent the more than 80 local wars which have broken out since the end of the Second World War. World peace is maintained by the power of dissuasion represented by the powerful nuclear arsenals of the super-Powers, which are capable of bringing about their own destruction, rather than by the effects of a policy of détente. It is our arduous task to alter this state of affairs. Unless we can create a climate of world confidence, we shall never be able to bring about true disarmament.

The hegemonic struggles of the opposing large blocs with their different political, social and economic systems must be quieted by positive acts which restore confidence to all States. That will be achieved only if we reaffirm our conviction that the principles of sovereignty, non-intervention, non-use of force, the peaceful settlement of disputes and

(Mr. Canales, Chile)

other principles, must be respected without exception. Therefore, one of the most urgent, important and delicate tasks of our time is to create a sound basis for setting disarmament on a true and effective course.

I shall refer in detail now to the Final Document adopted by the special session of the General Assembly.

In part II, entitled "Declaration" we find reflected in the various paragraphs the experience acquired by the United Nations in the field of disarmament and criteria laid down which should make it possible to establish a world strategy leading to important conclusions and enable us to establish a broad programme of action on disarmament. My delegation fully supports the views expressed in that section of the document and that is why we went along with the consensus by which the Final Document was adopted. We fully support the following general concepts contained in the document.

For the first time mankind is confronted with the danger of a world war which would bring about its annihilation because of the destructive capacity of the nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction accumulated in the arsenals of the great Powers. That being so, a world war would not be like previous wars by reason of the fact that there were a large number of countries that did not suffer the effects of bombardments and other forms of direct attack. The present reality is that destruction would encompass every corner of the globe and all human beings.

The arms race prevents the fulfilment of some of the purposes of the United Nations Charter, owing essentially to the fact that the enormous military expenditures hamper the social and economic development of peoples and limit international co-operation.

We consider it highly dangerous and harmful to the interests of world peace that peace and security should continue to be based on the enormous power of dissuasion represented by the balance in nuclear weapons, which could bring about the destruction of mankind.

The fundamental objective is still general and complete disarmament under effective international control and we should achieve this by well-defined stages, though simultaneous action should be undertaken within each stage.

(Mr. Canales, Chile)

The most important role in a disarmament strategy and programme is played by the large military Powers, which in themselves could achieve the objectives of disarmament, thus meeting the wishes of the whole of mankind. However, we acknowledge that all States, large and small, must share this task.

We agree with the importance attached in that part of the Final Document to the need to adopt collateral disarmament measures in order to create a climate of confidence and security among States that would prompt them to adopt this kind of measure, without endangering their own security.

Bodies for control and verification of disarmament, to be effective, must be structured; they should guarantee strict compliance with the agreements that may be adopted and should be endowed with the means to exercise control both in space and on earth. Also, their acceptance by the States concerned should be compulsory.

The political will of States is the main factor in the initiation of a disarmament era; it could be speeded up by all the treaties, agreements and conventions that are pending on the prohibition of all kinds of weapons, and for their implementation recourse should be made to bilateral, regional and multilateral negotiations.

The most important part of this document is the Programme of Action which, in our view, contains the essential elements for the determination of time-limits within which the various stages leading to general and complete disarmament should be carried out. In our comments we shall refer only to the fundamental aspects of that Programme.

We agree with the priorities laid down for disarmament negotiations as stated in paragraph 45; these could be carried out simultaneously. Our first priority and most important task is nuclear disarmament. The continuance of qualitative vertical proliferation makes it more difficult each day to limit the nuclear arms race and makes those weapons ever more effective and devastating.

Delays in achieving final agreement to limit, reduce and ultimately eliminate nuclear weapons through the strategic arms limitation talks (SALT) between the super-Powers will give sufficient time to other States to begin horizontal proliferation - something that in the long run will make nuclear disarmament

(Mr. Canales, Chile)

impossible, thus increasing the danger of a nuclear war. The general and complete prohibition of nuclear tests should be achieved without delay, since it would prevent the further perfecting of nuclear technology.

In no circumstances should the inalienable right of peoples to the peaceful use of nuclear energy be violated.

We share the view set out in paragraph 60 that it is essential to promote initiatives to create new denuclearized zones. The Treaty of Tlatelolco is a model of nuclear disarmament. Latin America's example should be followed by Africa, the Middle East, southern Asia and other regions.

We support the prohibition, referred to in paragraph 75 of the document of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons, and paragraph 76, which relates to radiological weapons. Weapons of mass destruction should be given second place among the priorities that we set.

Our delegation notes with gratification that in paragraph 78 it is laid down that the Committee on Disarmament should keep under review the question of an environmental war. We reiterate our view that that kind of military operation should be discarded, because its limited use in combat cannot be controlled and there is the risk of its becoming general, with devastating effects.

Similarly, we believe that, as stated in paragraph 80 of the Final Document and as we have been saying for many years in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, a study should be undertaken in the bodies set up by the tenth special session of the General Assembly of the question of the prohibition of the use of outer space for military purposes. Only thus can we prevent the extension of the arms race into a new dimension which man should exploit only for the progress of mankind.

An all-important measure, once the first stages of the disarmament programme are implemented, should be the elimination of military blocs, which serve only to create tension.

Paragraph 81 mentions the reduction of armed forces which, as stated earlier, is an important aspect of any disarmament programme. We believe that that would come about gradually as a result of progress achieved in other phases of disarmament, and that finally general and complete disarmament would be achieved.

(Mr. Canales, Chile)

Recommendations should be included in the programme for the structuring of forces for peace-keeping operations - in parallel with the reduction of the armed forces in the various States to the minimum level indispensable for their internal security - which should be placed at the disposal of the United Nations so that there would be a military instrument capable of intervening in those regions of the world where there were threats to peace.

We believe in the effectiveness of regional disarmament as a valuable contribution to halting the arms race, as stated in paragraph 83. In this connexion, we believe it timely to recall the statement of the Foreign Minister of Chile in the general debate that ended a short while ago:

"Hence the need for establishing mandatory procedures for the settlement of international disputes. It is the duty of the United Nations to provide them. Possibly these objectives could be achieved through the use of regional organizations ...

"Among these regional systems, the oldest and, in its time, the most dynamic was the inter-American system. Thirty years ago, a covenant concerning the peaceful and mandatory settlement of disputes was signed in Bogota. Chile is a party to that covenant. We believe that its observance by all the countries of the system would provide the security our peoples desire." (A/33/PV.31, p. 48)

We also emphasize the fact that efforts in the field of arms limitation within the regional framework prompted the countries in the Latin American continent, including my country, to subscribe to the Ayacucho Declaration. This interest in limiting weapons in the countries of the region was recognized by the United States of America, among others, especially in the statement of its representative in this debate at our ninth meeting.

(Mr. Canales, Chile)

We attach great importance to control of the transfer of weapons as a means of curbing the arms race. We must resolutely tackle these questions and conquer the natural resistance which will be offered by some interests that may be affected. Our Foreign Minister in this connexion emphasized that:

"The lack of confidence in the ability of the international machinery to prevent conflicts or settle them appropriately and expeditiously has induced many countries to embark upon an arms race which drains their economic resources. Hidden influences, attempting to create a climate of distrust, also prompt them towards an illogical and disproportionate arms build-up, and the merchants of death take advantage of this situation. To deny this would be to shut our eyes to a sad reality." (A/33/PV.31, p. 48)

We applaud the establishment of a programme of fellowships on disarmament which will further the specialized study of disarmament matters in developing Member States. We believe that although it would appear that the number of fellowships is small, this figure could be increased later and as a result the experts so trained could assist delegations dealing with this subject.

My delegation agrees fully with the restructuring of the disarmament machinery as laid down in section IV of the Final Document and hopes that it will make it possible better to organize and speed up our work. We maintain that the General Assembly will continue to be the main deliberating body of the United Nations in the field of disarmament and agree that the First Committee should deal exclusively with questions of disarmament and international security.

The Disarmament Commission, which recently began its work and dealt with organizational matters, and which in the future will function as a deliberating body comprising representatives of all Member States, is to play an important role enabling the First Committee and the General Assembly to deal with disarmament matters, having before them a report which will facilitate their consideration.

The Committee on Disarmament, constituted in accordance with paragraph 120 of the Final Document, will prove a valuable body for multilateral negotiations

(Mr. Canales, Chile)

with limited participation. With the participation of the nuclear Powers, treaties or agreements on matters still outstanding, such as the prohibition of chemical and radiological weapons, and the general and complete prohibition of nuclear tests, will be facilitated.

We express the view that the United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be strengthened in order that it may also provide advice and take action regarding regional disarmament agreements and any of the delicate tasks of verification of disarmament which fall to our Organization.

We believe that the Secretary-General should have an advisory board on disarmament matters as stated in paragraph 124 of the Final Document.

As long as we are unable to control arms and reduce armaments to reasonable limits for the security of each State we shall not achieve a lasting peace. On the other hand, we must accept the hard fact that armed peace, although unstable, can prevent world conflict; but this does not mean that it prevents local wars which destroy developing countries by making their problems of hunger and misery more acute.

The achievement of disarmament is the aspiration of the international community, which wishes to live in peace and security, and the challenge facing that community. To this end, political will is required on the part of leaders and those whom they govern. Unless this is achieved, the present generation of political leaders, especially those in the great military Powers, will, in the eyes of posterity, be responsible for signing the death sentence of mankind.

Mr. ANDERSON (Australia): It is fitting that we begin consideration of disarmament at this session of the General Assembly with a review of the Assembly's tenth special session, the largest meeting of States held to discuss disarmament questions in several decades.

There were several important features of the special session which have already been mentioned by a number of speakers. I shall therefore refer to them very briefly.

Firstly, at that session the Assembly agreed on a broad agenda of issues which was supported by all Members of the United Nations. It is now universally accepted that nuclear disarmament is the issue of highest priority.

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

Secondly, the session's most tangible result was the overhauling of the international machinery to deal with disarmament matters. A new negotiating body will be established. It has a broader base of membership than its predecessor and there is now provision for participation by all nuclear-weapon States. A new Disarmament Commission in which all Member States of the United Nations will participate has been established.

Thirdly, the session also produced some modest progress on substantive issues. Additional States indicated willingness to accept the obligations under the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America in order to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone there. Only the ratification of one more State is now required to bring the terms of the Treaty into effect for all States in that region. Three nuclear-weapon States also provided new and more forthcoming assurances about the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon States.

But these results, of which some were modest and some were substantial, are not the real measure of the significance of the special session. It was significant above all because it generated momentum for greater international discussion and negotiation of arms control and disarmament measures. As a result of decisions at the special session, significantly more time will be spent by the international community on arms control and disarmament matters, in the period between now and the conclusion of the next special session devoted to disarmament, than has been the case ever before.

Australia was one of the new States added to the Committee on Disarmament. I should like to express publicly to the international community my Government's appreciation of its support for the selection of our country. We intend to contribute to efforts to ensure that the Committee on Disarmament negotiates agreement on those measures on which agreement is long overdue and on new issues.

The measure of the special session's success will be whether or not significant progress can be made in capitalizing on this momentum to achieve further arms control and disarmament measures. The responsibility for this rests with all of us. Conversion of this momentum will require a sustained and determined effort by Governments.

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

Australia welcomes the Assembly's decision at the special session to give the highest priority to nuclear disarmament questions. We were disappointed that the nuclear-weapon States concerned had not been able to conclude their discussions about a comprehensive test-ban treaty to permit the completion of such a treaty by the time of the special session. We were also disappointed that the SALT II discussions had not been concluded by the time of the special session. However, we take heart from the reports and assurances that discussions of both these subjects are still proceeding purposefully towards conclusion.

It is of overriding importance that a new agreement placing more restrictions on the size and nature of the strategic weapons systems of the super-Powers, and a treaty prohibiting the conduct of nuclear weapon tests, come into force as soon as possible. Each of these measures has its own intrinsic importance. But their early entry into force is of still greater importance because the way will then be clear for the immediate commencement of negotiation of further measures. Let me elaborate a little on this.

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

The importance of a comprehensive test-ban treaty is twofold: it would restrict the ability of States which already have nuclear weapons to develop and refine new types of weapons; and it would require States which do not have nuclear weapons to undertake not to test weapons. It is sometimes argued that a comprehensive test ban is not now of great importance, because the technology enabling States to design and construct nuclear weapons without testing is freely available. It is true that nuclear explosive devices can be built and placed in arsenals without testing. But the performance of such devices must be extremely uncertain. If this were not the case, nuclear explosions would not be conducted. Scientists and military planners cannot be certain that their designs, whether they are for sophisticated or for crude devices, can achieve the magnitude of destruction planned until they test them.

Our efforts this year should be devoted to achieving the single most powerful unified expression of opinion from this Assembly that the nuclear-weapon States should conclude their discussions and present a draft text to the Committee on Disarmament as soon as possible. The prospect of a comprehensive test-ban treaty is now in sight. Such a treaty would provide for internationally legally binding obligations by all States not to conduct nuclear testing. This is what we want. This session of the General Assembly should be marked by a common effort by all States anxious to secure an end to nuclear testing to join forces to ensure that it adopts the optimum course to secure this result.

My delegation has no substantive difficulty with the idea of a moratorium on testing. We prefer that any moratorium should be associated with an international instrument to prohibit nuclear testing. There was a voluntary moratorium on testing between 1958 and 1961. It failed; and the international community was, of course, unable to object that international treaty obligations were being ignored. Nevertheless, we joined others in urging the idea of a moratorium on the General Assembly each year between 1972 and 1976, and, as necessary, we shall continue to do so.

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

A comprehensive test ban would not, of course, restrain the construction of greater numbers of existing types of weapons. This is an area to which some attention was turned at the special session. A proposal was made there for the opening of negotiations leading to the cessation of the production of nuclear weapons. It was suggested that nuclear and non-nuclear weapon States should discuss how the cessation of production of nuclear weapons might be brought about. However, in the course of the extremely measured and cautious progress which has characterized the SALT negotiations, no proposals to cease production of nuclear weapons have been publicized. It must therefore be doubted that this idea holds out very much promise of tangible proposals emerging in the foreseeable future which might result in effective arms limitation and disarmament measures.

In contrast, the proposal for a convention on the cessation of the production of fissionable material for weapons use, which was reintroduced at the special session, is more feasible and therefore much more attractive. Agreement by nuclear-weapon States to such a measure should provide a concrete illustration of their preparedness to cease the continuing development of new weapons systems. An extremely important by-product would be that verification arrangements for such an agreement should lead nuclear-weapon States to accept safeguards on their entire nuclear industries. This measure therefore should be among the first to be addressed in future negotiations on the limitation of existing nuclear arsenals.

Nobody can underrate the importance of SALT. It is an achievement in itself that the two leading nuclear-weapon States have been able to create a framework in which they are prepared to discuss and negotiate restraints on their respective capacities to develop strategic weapons systems.

The result so far of negotiation within the SALT framework has been the establishment of a foundation upon which future discussions can take place. It is regrettable that the dynamics of the relations between the two most powerful nations on this globe actually required an increase in the total number of nuclear weapons and weapons systems deployed in order to cement this foundation. We have seen reports which offer the prospect in SALT II of agreement to restrict development of some new forms of weapons systems. We hope this is so.

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

Of course there is not much point in attempting to anticipate the results of SALT II. But I must, at this point, applaud the statements made by both sides here that we may see agreement on SALT II announced before the end of the year. This would be a welcome implementation of one of the urgent measures in the special session Final Document. We look forward to being informed through the Secretary-General of the terms of agreement consistent with the spirit of the Assembly's request to this effect in resolution 32/87 G.

We know that ratification and entry into force of a SALT II agreement will not occur immediately. But it is extremely important that discussions on the next phase, SALT III, commence almost straight away after agreement is reached about the SALT II measures. We do not say this simply because it is important to maintain momentum. Efforts to limit strategic arms are engaged in a critical race with efforts to develop technology for new generations of strategic arms systems. We all know that both sides are poised ready to deploy or develop systems which in various combinations have the advantages of greater numbers, heavier payloads and greater accuracy.

The fact that this state of affairs exists reflects one of the sadder realities of international politics. There is obviously not yet a strong enough mutual sense of security to render unthinkable in all quarters the notion that it might after all be possible for one super-Power to defeat the other super-Power in a nuclear war. Sometimes it even seems as if the structure and deployment of nuclear forces are not based on the idea of mutual deterrence.

But the will to pursue the saner course exists. It exists in the highest levels of government of the super-Powers, and our responsibility is to encourage it to prevail. The SALT III phase will be complicated. It must signal the end of qualitative development of new strategic weapons systems. It must require significant reductions in existing arsenals. It must address the question of the so-called grey area nuclear weapons systems. This latter proposition in fact points to the possibility of a fundamental shift in the nature of the SALT framework. These matters must be addressed urgently. What could we look forward to at the end of another decade of development and deployment of still more sophisticated strategic nuclear weapons systems, except the prospect that the already extremely large number of nuclear weapons deployed would be substantially increased?

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

Over two thirds of the Member States of the United Nations have undertaken voluntarily to renounce, through accession to the legal instrument of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), the acquisition and production of nuclear weapons. The number of States electing to join this instrument is increasing. Adherence to it demonstrates two important undertakings by States. The first is the political commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons. The second is preparedness to submit all nuclear facilities to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards.

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

The NPT also places legal obligations upon its nuclear-weapon State depositories to strive for nuclear disarmament. I have addressed the necessity of their doing so already. Realization of the first measures of this process - a comprehensive test ban is one - is long overdue. This point is made pertinently by many States. But it is sometimes put forward as justifying non-nuclear-weapon States in not adhering to the NPT. This argument should not be allowed to obscure an extremely important aspect of the NPT which is frequently overlooked - that is that adherence to the Treaty by one regional State can generate a sense of security for neighbouring States.

Non-proliferation measures and the directly-related question of access by States to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes was one subject over which agreement was reached at the special session with great difficulty. The result was a consensus which did not reflect anybody's first, or even second, position. We should have liked to see more explicitly reflected the fact that the use of nuclear technology for economic and social development carries with it a responsibility to ensure that its benefits are not misused for weapons purposes.

This, of course, is an area which will be the subject of intense consideration within the next few years. But is there any point in deepening further the divisions on these issues here again this year? The sensible course today, we believe, is to direct efforts into more technical channels such as the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) and to ensure that their outcome is productive and constructive.

Considerable attention was devoted at the special session to the question of the circumstances of the use of nuclear weapons. There was pressure to have the nuclear-weapon States declare a prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons and negotiate a treaty to that end.

This proposal is before us again under the item we are now considering. The ultimate elimination of reliance on nuclear weapons for defence is, of course, a goal to which we all aspire. But it is because States do not trust the intentions of other States that some of them rely on nuclear weapons, or on the threat of their use, to underwrite their security. Abolition of nuclear weapons requires abolition of the sources of suspicion. A simple call for a blanket prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons is not a practicable approach, since

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

it ignores why States have felt it necessary to acquire nuclear weapons in the first place.

Assurances by nuclear-weapon States of the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States are valuable and we welcome them. The undertakings not to use nuclear weapons against States which have renounced the nuclear weapons option, given at the special session by the three depositories of the NPT, were a positive development. Non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the NPT have long been entitled to such assurances. Two of the assurances given were realistic inasmuch as they specifically excluded the few non-nuclear-weapon States which consider themselves under threat of nuclear attack and accordingly have elected to place themselves under a protective nuclear umbrella.

We have been presented at this Assembly with a proposal for a convention in which assurances of non-use would be given a binding legal character. We are keenly interested in any measure which contributes to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and enhances the sense of security of States. But we cannot see either of these objectives being met by a convention based on negative security assurances in a particular form given by only one nuclear-weapon State. It does not seem to us to be a constructive approach to suggest that a proposal which is known in advance to be unacceptable to an important group of States should be used as the basis for such a measure: particularly when the proposed measure has a direct bearing on the efficacy of existing non-proliferation arrangements. My delegation urges that the common desire to enhance non-proliferation arrangements requires a co-operative approach which will avoid creating yet another divisive issue in the already highly contentious body of subjects constituting non-proliferation arrangements.

Many other issues were brought before us by the special session. Rather than attempt to elaborate upon all of them, I suggest it would be more useful to underline two themes.

In the context of what attitudes are necessary to ensure progress in strategic arms limitation talks, I referred to the race between the achievement of arms control measures and the implementation of new generations of technology.

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

This phenomenon is not related solely to strategic or to any other sort of nuclear weapons system. We all know that we are on the verge of the introduction into the world's conventional armies of an entirely new generation of weapons, the main characteristic of which is the exploitation of contemporary technology to acquire extraordinary accuracy. Properly applied, technology such as this might lead to reductions in the size of armies and to the enhancement of defensive, as opposed to offensive, postures. But these developments also raise the alarming spectre that the accelerating rate of technological development may render existing defensive inventories obsolete, may precipitate more lethal and more expensive regional arms races, and may overtake the capacities of Governments to build confidence in arms limitation arrangements. In addition to pressing for necessary progress in nuclear arms control and disarmament in the coming years, we should ensure that appropriate attention is devoted to this wider problem of technological advance in conventional weaponry.

The Final Document of the special session underlined the need, if radical progress is to be made in disarmament, for first cutting away distrust and suspicion between countries. Until each State feels secure in its relations with other States it will be difficult, for example, to come fully to grips with the question of excessive international arms transfers. Efforts should be undertaken to erode the mutual suspicions and distrust among States. A realistic and constructive approach would be for States to concentrate on what are variously called confidence-building measures. The Foreign Secretary of the Philippines last week spoke to us with great feeling about this. It is suggestions like his for "initiatives of restraint", as he called them, which can facilitate this essential process.

In conclusion, I should like to mention one administrative piece of business with which we must deal under agenda item 125, namely, to decide on the date for the second special session devoted to disarmament. In 1979 there will be the inaugural meetings of the Committee on Disarmament and the first substantive session of the Disarmament Commission. Both of these bodies need to be given time to find their feet and to make progress with their substantive work. In addition, in 1979 and 1980, we shall have the Conference on inhumane weapons, the NPT review Conference

(Mr. Anderson, Australia)

and the biological weapons review Conference. I suggest that a second special session in early 1982 would give us the time necessary during 1981 to review in preparatory committee meetings the very extensive international activity in this sphere which is now developing.

Mr. BUENO (Brazil): Nearly four months have elapsed since we concluded the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. The initiative for such an endeavour was taken by the group of non-aligned States as an additional effort to bring about the progress that has been long overdue in the field of disarmament.

The special session itself, as we all recall, was preceded by intensive work of preparation of crucial importance for its outcome. Despite all our expectations, we never lost sight of the fact that disarmament is an infinitely complex field in which there is no room for over-optimism, so many were our failures and missed opportunities. The succession of failures and disappointments, together with the arms race and the continuing sophistication and refinement of the deadliest of all weapons, prompted us to assemble in a special session in order to try once more to devise ways of making a breakthrough and perhaps bring about new hope.

The limited progress made in the Preparatory Committee, however, gave rise to a pessimistic feeling that was shared by a great number of delegations. At the opening of the special session a simple glance at the document submitted to the participants sufficed to shatter the hopes of those who still anticipated a unique opportunity to come to grips with some of the crucial aspects of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament. It did not take long for them to realize that, given the impossibility of concluding serious negotiations within five weeks, a face-saving formula would have to be devised in order to produce a document to be adopted, preferably by consensus, thus giving satisfaction to public opinion and the world at large. Such an undertaking, on which the Brazilian delegation voiced its doubts in the Ad Hoc Committee, could, however, only be accomplished at the expense of the substance. This set of factors led the Brazilian delegation to the special session to present specific reservations on paragraphs 83 and 84 of the Final Document and to assure itself of the right to return to the document as a whole. We wish to reaffirm this position at this stage.

(Mr. Bueno, Brazil)

When opening the general debate at the current session of the General Assembly, the Minister for External Relations of Brazil made the following comments on the working procedures of the special session and its Final Document:

"Aware of the need to ensure the co-operation of all States, particularly of the nuclear Powers, we all agreed that the appropriate method of work was to seek solutions by consensus. Nevertheless, we witnessed the blockage even of successively diluted versions of texts that addressed themselves effectively to disarmament. Entire sections dealing with the really urgent problems relating to nuclear weapons were completely suppressed or made ambiguous. The final document of the special session contains serious omissions and confers disproportionate importance upon issues of secondary urgency in the general field of disarmament.

"Since it was not possible to achieve significant progress on the substantive issues of greater priority and urgency during the special session, it is symptomatic that the main practical results of the Assembly on disarmament lie precisely in the procedural area of machinery for future negotiations and deliberations. Willing to continue contributing, in good faith, to all constructive efforts in that area, we supported the decisions on the new negotiating body and on the new Disarmament Commission. Within the limits of its possibilities, Brazil will exert every effort to help those bodies to achieve the results urgently required in the field of disarmament, particularly in the field of nuclear disarmament." (A/33/PV.6, p. 8-10)

It would be difficult to acclaim what was achieved at the special session, or to view its achievements with optimism. The Programme of Action, for which my country and others, especially the non-aligned group, struggled so hard, cannot, in all truth, be said to provide an adequate framework for effective measures conducive to disarmament.

The resistance of the leading Powers to any concrete commitment is reflected in the absence of specific proposals related to the main issues of the Programme of Action. Therefore, what we have left in the field of disarmament negotiations are some organizational rearrangements and uncertainty

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about the existence of the political conditions necessary for the United Nations to play a more effective role.

With these preliminary considerations in mind, I shall now put forward the comments of my delegation on the Final Document before the Committee.

The Introduction fails to reflect the reality of world affairs in the domain of disarmament. It is the result of a not very difficult task of drafting that produced general, non-controversial considerations, assembled in such a style as to fit a formal preamble to any document on the subject.

There is not, in the paragraphs on objectives and priorities, an indisputable and clear-cut definition of nuclear disarmament priorities. The emphasis, on the contrary, is on conventional disarmament, in particular on the limitation of international transfer of conventional weapons, and in certain instances on regional aspects of disarmament. Since disarmament must be promoted on a universal and integrated basis, nuclear-weapon States must recognize the undisputed top priority of nuclear disarmament on the one hand and, on the other, their own superiority in the conventional field. Initiatives for conventional disarmament therefore must necessarily be undertaken on a global footing in the light of concrete measures for nuclear disarmament and effective security assurances.

The set of principles for future disarmament negotiations was also specified in an ambiguous text. It cannot be said that paragraph 27 clearly attributes to the General Assembly the role it should play in the sphere of disarmament. The restrictions in paragraph 28 on the participation of States in multilateral disarmament negotiations on a basis of equality make it unsatisfactory. My delegation has pointed out that the participation of all States is an essential prerequisite if the results of negotiations are to meet the rights and interests of all, and not just of those few countries which share the control of nuclear weapons.

The paragraph on the question of measures of verification lacks specific guidelines for the implementation of the principle to which it relates, which should remain dependent on the objectives, scope and nature of each

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disarmament agreement. Nor are there any concrete commitments to restrict research and development for weapons purposes.

We are less than happy with the way nuclear disarmament is dealt with in the Programme of Action. This was only to be expected, since we could not obtain commitments for immediate negotiations on and urgent implementation of measures conducive to halting the arms race, reversing it and, finally, eliminating nuclear-weapon stockpiles. Nor are there any true commitments to a moratorium on testing or a reduction of stockpiles of nuclear weapons and their delivery systems by means of a programme with a definitive time-table.

One of the most crucial aspects of the disarmament question, the ban on nuclear-weapon testing, was dealt with in equivocal terms in the special session's Final Document because, it was argued, a complete test-ban treaty was almost in the offing, although, as now reported, it does not even seem within reach. The nuclear-weapon States, according to the same reports, are about to reconsider positions on some very important aspects of those negotiations.

(Mr. Bueno, Brazil)

My delegation considers that, pending nuclear disarmament, conditions of security for non-nuclear-weapon States must be based upon concrete and undisputed commitments on the part of the nuclear-weapon States. These States should explicitly and unequivocally respect nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace, and offer concrete guarantees not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against such zones. It is unfortunate that in the Programme of Action the nuclear-weapon States refused to go beyond accepting the idea of considering proposals designed to secure the avoidance of the use of nuclear weapons. In this context, we have doubts on initiatives, such as the Soviet proposal before this Committee, which are not clear as to the circumstances or conditions in which assurances should apply. Those assurances must reflect a decision by the nuclear-weapon States to renounce the use of those weapons or to provide binding commitments not to use or threaten to use them against non-nuclear-weapon States. Security assurances must be legally binding and part of a programme of nuclear disarmament.

The creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world was apparently acknowledged as one of the most effective means of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. We would have liked the Programme of Action to be more definitive as to the need for concrete obligations by the nuclear-weapon States strictly to respect the status of the zones and to refrain from the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against States therein.

My delegation is aware of the fact that the Programme of Action acknowledges the necessity for developing an international consensus on universal and non-discriminatory ways and means of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. This is one of the positive aspects of the Final Document. We hope this will entail the realization by certain States that non-proliferation is not an end in itself and does not justify the imposition of unreasonable restraints on the inalienable right of non-nuclear-weapon States to acquire and develop nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.

(Mr. Bueno, Brazil)

The decisions and recommendations on the machinery for disarmament negotiations imply the intensification of multilateral deliberative and negotiating activities on disarmament matters, and this seems to be another positive result of the special session. My delegation is among those that look forward to a certain democratization and broadening of procedures and opportunities for greater participation by States in the process of disarmament. We have already pointed out the possible drawbacks of the new system, as the Final Document fails to specify that the new negotiating body shall be responsible to the General Assembly and that the particular items for negotiation shall be determined by the latter through consultations.

The most significant modification in the negotiating body was the creation of conditions that have already prompted one nuclear-weapon State to announce its participation. New machinery and processes, however, cannot be effective if not followed by the unequivocal will to put them into operation for positive results. They are only part of what has to be done; the main task is still before us. An efficient negotiating body must not be one that waits for arrangements to be made among its individual members or serves as a mere device for transmitting to the General Assembly agreements reached outside its own framework. It must decide on the priorities for the negotiations on matters falling within its competence, and within a vast area of problems connected with the implementation of a disarmament strategy on the basis of the recommendations of the new deliberative body. The decisions contained in the Final Document of the special session and in other resolutions of the General Assembly provide guidelines for the establishment of its wide and diversified programme of work, which can make it an efficient part of the disarmament machinery.

After a long interruption the United Nations can now count on an open-ended body to deal with the problems of disarmament. We want the United Nations Disarmament Commission to play a decisive role in the process of disarmament. As a deliberative organ the Disarmament Commission has the competence to discuss questions of disarmament and international security, which are of equal concern to all countries. The Commission will therefore consider and make recommendations on various problems in the field of

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disarmament and provide a follow-up for the relevant decisions and recommendations of the special session, in addition to considering the elements of a necessary comprehensive programme for disarmament, as far as possible on the basis of consensus.

A supreme goal of mankind is peace, peace under the rule of law and with economic and social progress for all peoples. The attainment of this goal, however, cannot become a reality as long as in practice the results of our efforts continue to give the impression that disarmament is a dead issue. In spite of its shortcomings the special session strengthened our conviction that only with the political will of those that carry in their hands the fate of this planet may we pave the way for a lasting peace in a world free of nuclear weapons.

In conformity with its position of principle on questions relating to disarmament, Brazil considers it most appropriate for us to try, by means of a renewed negotiating effort, to eliminate the deficiencies of the Final Document of the special session. This task could be entrusted to the First Committee or to the Committee on Disarmament, the latter possibly being the better alternative. Brazil, for its part, is ready to participate in such an endeavour.

Mr. KLESTIL (Austria): Four months have passed since the adoption of the Final Document of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. This Committee is now called upon to review for the first time the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted at that historic session. Thus, I believe, it is only natural that most of those who have already spoken have presented to us their assessment of the achievements of the special session.

There can be no doubt that that special session was of the greatest significance in the struggle for disarmament and arms limitation. It produced, for the first time ever, agreement among all Member States of the United Nations on priorities, objectives and fundamental principles in the field of disarmament. The Final Document acknowledges in very clear terms

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the utmost urgency of genuine disarmament measures and it provides a comprehensive framework for future negotiations. It contains the foundations of an international strategy for disarmament efforts in the years to come. Indeed, one of the most outstanding features of the Final Document is the fact that it addresses the different disarmament issues in their intricate interrelationship, thus providing the basis for a realistic approach to the disarmament question.

However, the special session was not intended to produce specific agreements, and indeed the Final Document does not contain any concrete disarmament measure. Nevertheless, the Document indicates and calls for various steps to be taken in the course of ongoing and future negotiations.

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

Certainly, many delegations that participated actively in the work of the special session may consider that those steps, as they are outlined in the Final Document, are perhaps too modest and not far-reaching enough. My delegation was among those which, while being fully aware of the enormous complexities involved in disarmament negotiations, persistently called for more detailed, more precise and more imaginative steps to be included in the Final Document. We should have liked to see the Final Document reflect an even clearer and stronger commitment on the part of the major Powers, and in particular the two leading nuclear-weapon States, to concrete and measurable steps towards real disarmament. However, these aspirations could not be accommodated in a document that was to be adopted by consensus.

On the other hand, it is precisely on the fact that the Final Document has been approved by all Governments participating in the special session that we now base our anticipations. Thus, we are entitled to expect that the measures outlined in the document will be negotiated and carried out in the nearest future.

With the adoption of the Final Document we have reached a crucial moment in the long history of disarmament efforts. The Austrian delegation sincerely hopes that, on the basis of the Final Document, a new momentum of progress in disarmament in the bilateral, regional and multilateral fields covering nuclear as well as conventional aspects will develop.

Now, only four months after the closure of the special session, we cannot yet pass any final judgement on the question whether these hopes will be fulfilled. There can be no doubt, however, that the coming weeks and months will be of the greatest importance. This applies first of all to the ongoing negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on limitations on their strategic armaments. Here we welcome recent announcements about concrete progress in the negotiating process. We trust that these optimistic assessments will soon be justified by the conclusion of a SALT II agreement, which we hope will clear the way for a new round of these negotiations leading towards a SALT III agreement. We hope that the two leading nuclear-weapon States will then, for the first time, not only endeavour to agree on limitations concerning the constant build-up of their nuclear arsenals but also be ready to include in a SALT III treaty provisions for actual reductions of their nuclear arsenals.

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

At the same time, we feel entitled to expect an early and successful conclusion of the trilateral negotiations on a comprehensive test-ban agreement, which has eluded us for so many years.

The Final Document also calls for vigorous efforts to achieve agreed limitations on and a gradual reduction of armed forces and conventional weapons. We hope, therefore, that the new proposals that have been put forward by all the parties to the negotiations on a reduction of armed forces and armaments, as well as related measures in central Europe, will soon break the apparent deadlock in these negotiations.

This Committee will devote its attention in the coming weeks to an in-depth consideration of all the disarmament items on its agenda. My delegation therefore reserves its right to expand its views on these items in a more detailed manner during the forthcoming general debate. Today, however, I should like to refer briefly to some issues that are of particular relevance in connexion with the implementation of the decisions and recommendations of the special session.

Among the important results of the special session are its decisions on the future structure of the multilateral disarmament machinery. In establishing the Disarmament Commission as a deliberative body with the representation of all United Nations Member States and the Committee on Disarmament as a multilateral negotiating forum of limited size and with a membership that will be reviewed at regular intervals, the special session succeeded in striking the necessary balance between these two main elements in the multilateral machinery for disarmament. The Disarmament Commission, together with the First Committee of the General Assembly, will consider and make recommendations on various problems of disarmament and provide for the necessary follow-up of the decisions adopted at the special session. In particular, the Disarmament Commission will focus its attention on the consideration of the elements of a comprehensive programme of disarmament. On the other hand, the Committee on Disarmament will concentrate on the negotiation of concrete disarmament measures.

It is essential that the deliberative and negotiating elements of the disarmament machinery co-operate with each other so as to ensure the greatest efficiency in their respective deliberations.

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

At its first meeting the Disarmament Commission agreed on the organization of its work in the future. There is no doubt that this General Assembly will adopt the relevant recommendations as contained in the report of the Commission that is now before us and will also adopt the necessary guidelines for the future work of the Commission. Thus, the Commission will be in a position to start its substantive work at its May-June 1979 session. Every effort will then have to be made in order to proceed beyond a mere general exchange of views and restatement of well-known positions. It is our opinion that the Commission will have to focus its work on a selected number of essential topics so as to provide a real possibility of in-depth consideration. Only then will the results of the Commission's proceedings have the desired impact on disarmament efforts in general.

The Committee on Disarmament will convene in Geneva at the beginning of next year. In this connexion, we welcome the possibilities that have been provided for interested States not members of the Committee to contribute to its work. We hope that the negotiating body in its revised structure will be in a position to carry out its heavy responsibilities in accordance with the high expectations of the international community. We are confident that all its members have the firm intention of fulfilling in good faith the mandate with which they have been entrusted. Thus, we hope that the Committee on Disarmament will soon start concrete negotiations on the priority issues that will be on its agenda. To make this possible, however, the major Powers, and in particular the two leading nuclear-weapon States, will have to be prepared to recognize and acknowledge to a greater extent than in the past the vast potential and experience that most of the members of the Committee can bring to the negotiating process. The Committee will not be in a position adequately to fulfil its responsibilities if it remains restricted to the secondary role of only endorsing draft treaties that have already been negotiated in advance. Austria therefore addresses an urgent appeal to those nuclear-weapon States that are currently engaged in negotiations on disarmament treaties for submission to the negotiating body, not only to make every effort to conclude those negotiations as soon as possible but also to make available detailed information concerning the status of the negotiations in order to enable the negotiating body to contribute actively to the negotiating process.

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

The special session has rightly acknowledged the importance of studies to be undertaken by the Secretary-General, with appropriate assistance from governmental experts or consultants, for the promotion of further steps in the field of disarmament.

(Mr. Klestil, Austria)

We hope that increased activity on the part of the Secretariat in this field will indeed facilitate disarmament efforts in the future. In this connexion, I should like to express our appreciation to the Secretariat for the preparation of the relevant report which is before us.

A number of valuable proposals for the carrying out of specific studies were already put forward in the course of the special session. These suggestions, as well as new proposals that may be made, could form the basis for the elaboration of a comprehensive and integrated programme of studies. Such a programme would have to establish priorities and ensure that the studies would be carried out in the most efficient manner. The Austrian delegation considers that the newly constituted advisory board of the Secretary-General should at its first meeting focus its attention on the preparation of such a programme.

Mr. BOEL (Denmark): As this is the first time my delegation has spoken in the First Committee I wish to join my colleagues in congratulating you and the other officers of the Committee on your election.

At the same time, as I look around, I cannot refrain from expressing my pleasure as I recognize so many well-known faces of friends and colleagues. Some of those present in this room are eminent experts in the field of disarmament, who contributed in a decisive manner to the consensus that we succeeded in reaching during the very last stage of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. My delegation hopes that the responsible attitude - the feeling of working together for a common cause that transcends differences between national perspectives - that prevailed during the special session will also mark our deliberations during the current session of the First Committee.

Much has been said about the special session. It certainly reflected a growing concern with the dangers of the continuing arms race and increased international interest in action to stop that race. The fact that all the nuclear Powers participated in the discussions was particularly significant. During the general debate of the special session my Prime Minister referred

(Mr. Boel, Denmark)

to the importance of bringing France and the People's Republic of China into the international negotiating process. My Government warmly welcomes the recent decision of the French Government to take part in the work of the Committee on Disarmament.

Another significant feature of the special session was the active participation of such a large number of small and medium-sized countries. This reflected a growing perception of the arms race as a world problem which involves not only the leading military States - which do of course have special responsibilities - but all nations in the world. Thus, a pattern seems to be developing in which small and medium-sized States are contributing more actively to the international disarmament debate. That is a trend which we should all encourage. It is certainly a fact that the achievement of a number of important arms control objectives hinges upon broad international support.

In general, my delegation feels that we should look on the special session as the starting point of a long-term process which it is to be hoped, will generate continuing pressure for productive negotiations on substance. As a result of the special session we now have reformed and enlarged machinery through which to carry out our work. It is up to all our countries to make use of that machinery in order to translate the recommendations of the Final Document into concrete action.

While the functions of the General Assembly, the First Committee, and the negotiating body in the disarmament process are well-defined, we shall have to think about the precise tasks to be referred to the new deliberative body - the Disarmament Commission - within the broad framework of the terms of reference set out in the Final Document. It is the view of my delegation that the Disarmament Commission can and should play an important role. The concrete tasks and priorities of the Commission will emerge from our discussions in this Committee and the General Assembly. In order to enable the Commission to carry out its work successfully we should avoid asking it to do too much. After all, it will only meet for four weeks a year. It should not become a mere debating society. Rather, it should focus on a few specific issues which have high priority on the international disarmament agenda.

(Mr. Boel, Denmark)

Turning now to substance, I wish to emphasize those recommendations in the Final Document which aim at concrete measures to curb and reverse the arms race - nuclear and conventional. In particular I wish to say that my Government attaches decisive importance to a swift conclusion of a SALT II agreement and of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. The nuclear arms race is a threat to international stability and, ultimately, to human survival. The two super-Powers hold by far the larger part of this destructive potential. They have an inescapable responsibility for bringing the nuclear arms race under control. And after SALT II there should be a third treaty leading to a marked reduction of and qualitative restrictions on strategic arms.

All nations in the world are responsible for checking further proliferation of nuclear weapons. Unless the trend of nuclear proliferation is reversed, as many as 35 countries could have their own nuclear weapons by the end of the century. My country is in favour of proposals stressing the desirability of universal adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, of strengthening the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system and of setting up multinational nuclear fuel cycle centres. At the same time we recognize that this must not affect the right of all nations to follow the energy policy they find appropriate.

Two years from now the Non-Proliferation Treaty will be subjected to a second review. The second Review Conference may turn out to be of critical importance for the future of efforts to contain the proliferation of nuclear capabilities. The present General Assembly will have to decide on the procedure for preparing the Conference. When the time comes for substantive discussion in the Preparatory Committee and later at the Conference, the crux of the matter will be how to reconcile the overriding need to preserve and strengthen the present non-proliferation régime with the legitimate interests of nations which wish to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

(Mr. Boel, Denmark)

What we face here is really an aspect of a more general problem which is highlighted by the speed of technological development - the problem of policy versus technology. In the view of my Government it is extremely important that technological development in the military field be kept under appropriate political control, so as to ensure that policy will not lose the race with technology.

There is a close interrelationship between nuclear and conventional weapons. At present 80 per cent of global military expenditure is used for conventional defence purposes. The destructive power of different types of conventional weapons is increasing. Transfers to many parts of the world of new and more sophisticated types of weapons carry the risk of triggering off costly and dangerous regional arms races. Such is the background of the decision of the special session to include references in the Programme of Action of the Final Document to the need for bilateral, regional and multilateral consultations on various aspects of conventional armaments.

So far little progress has been achieved in this field. My Government endorses the objective of limiting the production and procurement of conventional weapons as well as limiting conventional-arms transfers. In view of the fact that the agenda of the Committee on Disarmament will clearly be very heavy, we might consider the possibility of asking the Disarmament Commission to take up the subject of conventional weapons, including transfers of conventional weapons.

In conclusion, I wish to re-emphasize the commitment of the Danish Government to the cause of arms control and disarmament - underlying which commitment is a belief that international disarmament efforts could, if successful, lead to greater security at a lower level of armaments and military forces - and its fear that lack of progress in disarmament negotiations could in the longer run jeopardize the process of détente. The world badly needs the enormous human and material resources now being spent for destructive purposes if we are to meet the economic and social challenges of our time.

Mr. YANKOV (Bulgaria): The discussion on this item of the agenda which has taken place in the First Committee has been further evidence of the particular importance which the Members of the United Nations attach to problems of disarmament in general and to the follow-up of the special session in particular, for indeed this is the first attempt to undertake a review of the implementation of the recommendations and decisions adopted by the General Assembly at its tenth special session.

It is obvious, of course, that it would be premature to expect at this stage a comprehensive evaluation of the results of the special session, because only a few months have elapsed since the adoption of the Final Document. Nevertheless even a very preliminary assessment leads us to the positive conclusion that the special session served a useful purpose. It enhanced the awareness of the public at large and the concern of Governments regarding the negative impact of the incessant accumulation of deadly means of mass annihilation, and emphasized the urgent need to curb the arms race. It further stimulated and streamlined the efforts of the United Nations in the search for effective measures of real disarmament. The Final Document, adopted by consensus, laid down the basic principles, the final objectives and the immediate goals and set out the priorities for concerted international action in the field of disarmament. At the same time the Final Document contains a number of practical recommendations and decisions concerning the international deliberative and negotiating machinery on disarmament matters.

In assessing the results of the special session we have to take into account the main trends in the development of the over-all political situation in the world and the different approaches to disarmament matters. As pointed out in the Final Document:

"The dynamic development of détente, encompassing all spheres of international relations in all regions of the world, with the participation of all countries, would create conditions conducive to the efforts of States to end the arms race, which has engulfed the world, thus reducing the danger of war. Progress on détente and progress on disarmament mutually complement and strengthen each other." (resolution S-10/2, para. 3)

(Mr. Yankov , Bulgaria)

The contribution which the socialist countries, including my own, have rendered in order to promote the process of international détente and give a new impetus to disarmament negotiations, through numerous initiatives in this field, is well known. Many of the proposals made by the socialist States over the years, including the suggestions on practical measures for ending the arms race submitted by the Soviet Union at the special session, are reflected in the Final Document.

A number of constructive proposals that constituted a constructive and useful contribution to the outcome of the special session, as reflected in the Final Document, were made by the non-aligned countries. As is well known, the very convening of the special session was the result of an initiative taken by the non-aligned countries.

While indicating these positive trends in the development of the international situation and the process of disarmament, we should like at the same time to point out that the aspirations of peoples all over the world to the relaxation of tension and the advancement of disarmament have been challenged by efforts to bring back elements of the cold war and by enormous increases in military expenditures, inevitably leading to the further acceleration of the arms race. There are also forces which, under the cover of radical criticism or negation of partial and collateral measures of disarmament, are in effect trying to conceal and justify their policy of speeding up qualitative and quantitative rearmament.

Such a policy runs counter to both the spirit and the explicit provisions of the Final Document, which calls upon all States:

"In order to create favourable conditions for success in the disarmament process, to refrain from actions which might adversely affect efforts in the field of disarmament ..." (ibid., para. 41)

It is against that background that we can better appreciate the political significance of the special session, which reaffirmed in its Final Document the basic concept that war is no rational alternative for humanity, that lasting peace and security cannot be built on the ever-increasing stockpiles of weaponry or sustained by a precarious balance of deterrence and military superiority.

(Mr. Yankov, Bulgaria)

At the same time it was agreed that effective disarmament requires a realistic approach to legitimate security considerations, based on the principle of undiminished security at the lowest possible level of armaments and military forces.

Needless to say, the Final Document, with its Declaration, Programme of Action and institutional arrangements for disarmament negotiations, should not remain a mere source of reference and quotation. We fully share the view expressed by a significant number of preceding speakers that the main problem confronting us now is how to translate words into deeds, how to find the best ways of implementing the measures envisaged in the Final Document with a view to achieving the ultimate objective of all our endeavours - general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

(Mr. Yankov, Bulgaria)

We have to proceed with the implementation of the immediate and long-term measures of disarmament with determination and perseverance, based on objective analysis of international realities, without yielding to the self-defeating doctrine of all or nothing.

When setting the priorities in disarmament negotiations, the Final Document rightly places special emphasis on the complexity of problems relating to nuclear disarmament as an imperative and most urgent task, since - to use the language of the Final Document -

"Nuclear weapons pose the greatest danger to mankind and to the survival of civilization." (ibid., para. 47)

We also agree that:

"Qualitative and quantitative disarmament measures are both important for halting the arms race. Efforts to that end must include negotiations on the limitation and cessation of the qualitative improvement of armaments, especially weapons of mass destruction and the development of new means of warfare..." (ibid., para. 39)

In this connexion, among the various steps proposed by several States, the Bulgarian delegation attaches particular importance to the wide-ranging programme of measures put forward by the Soviet Union with a view to ending completely any further quantitative and qualitative build-up of arms and armed forces of States with a large military potential.

The main merit of that idea is that it is addressed to the most urgent task - that of curbing the arms race at large, with particular emphasis on halting and reversing the nuclear weapons race. An advantage is also the fact that it is based on the step-by-step approach - a realistic approach. Should a freeze be agreed upon at the present levels of armaments, the road would be wide open for embarking on a programme of measures for their gradual reduction.

For many years now and in the course of the special session, many non-nuclear-weapon States have raised the problem of appropriate and effective assurances to them against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. This legitimate request found its expression in the Final Document which, recognizing the special responsibilities of the nuclear-weapon States, explicitly calls upon

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them "to take steps to assure the non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons". (ibid., para. 59)

In response to those well-founded requests, the Soviet Union has come up with the proposal to adopt an international convention on the strengthening of security guarantees in favour of non-nuclear-weapon States. We reserve the right to express our views on that proposal when the Committee embarks on the consideration of agenda item 128. However, at this juncture we wish to place on record our full support of that timely and useful initiative.

It is not our intention to go into all the important issues covered by the Final Document. Without attempting to establish any kind of precedence, we should like to offer our comments on some of them. Speaking briefly on some aspects of the over-all problem of nuclear arms limitations and disarmament we should like to emphasize the urgent need to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons. This objective could be achieved within a framework of different measures, such as the strengthening of the régime of non-proliferation and the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. In our view, the proposal advanced by the USSR on the non-stationing of nuclear weapons on territories of States where there are no such weapons at present is yet another step forward which could be an integral part of the effort to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The nuclear-weapon States are thus called upon to undertake a no-stationing commitment through an international agreement. We hope that the General Assembly will recommend appropriate practical arrangements for the realization of this initiative.

The Final Document places well-deserved emphasis on the imperative and urgent need to achieve the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing by all States as a significant contribution to the aim of ending the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. We hope that the ongoing talks on this matter will soon be completed and that appropriate agreement will be reached.

It is also very urgent to speed up the negotiations on banning the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass destruction. Undoubtedly, the so-called neutron bomb is one of the weapons of mass destruction. In this connexion, we wish to point out that at the twenty-eighth Pugwash Conference, held last September in Varna, Bulgaria, scientists from all

(Mr. Yankov, Bulgaria)

over the world came out against the mere postponement of the final decision on the matter and urged that "strong efforts should be made to reinforce the decision not to proceed with the production of such weapons".

As one of the sponsors of the draft treaty on the banning of the neutron bomb, which has been submitted to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, we urge the prompt consideration of this problem and its solution, in the interest of international peace and security.

It is not by chance, of course, that the special session has attached special attention to SALT II. The solution of the complex problems involved therein is certain to have an exceptionally beneficial effect on all other disarmament efforts and the international situation at large. Agreements on strategic arms limitations are long overdue, and it is our sincere hope that they will be reached soon.

Similar hopes have been voiced by many delegations regarding the ongoing negotiations on chemical weapons, radiological weapons and other disarmament problems. We fully share those views and expectations.

As participants with a special status in the Vienna negotiations on Mutual Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments in Central Europe, we believe that it is high time those talks came to fruition. The new proposals of the socialist countries of June last, whose constructive character was recognized by the other participating countries, offered the necessary prerequisites for rapid progress, and there are no valid reasons for further delaying the achievement of mutually satisfactory agreement.

(Mr. Yankov, Bulgaria)

The basic objective of disarmament is, essentially, achieving security and lasting peace. But the problem is not one-dimensional and its solution is bound to have a positive impact in many other areas.

The Final Document acknowledges, in paragraphs 16 and 94, the close relationship between expenditure on armaments and economic and social development. It is clear that the implementation of disarmament measures would release huge amounts of financial, material and other resources needed to promote the well-being of all peoples and particularly to improve conditions in the developing world.

A short cut toward achieving the same result would be the reduction of the military budgets of the militarily important States and particularly the nuclear Powers. In view of the difficulties which have been encountered so far in the solution of this problem through the method of percentage reductions, the Soviet proposal for reaching agreement based on reductions in absolute figures deserves serious consideration and could bring about the first tangible results in this field. We hope that the present session will pronounce itself in favour of such a measure and will provide for its early practical implementation.

The Final Document contains a number of recommendations aiming at the mobilization of world public opinion and the promotion of educational work and dissemination of information on fostering the objectives of disarmament.

In this connexion my delegation attaches great importance to the proposal made at the current session by Poland for the adoption of a declaration on the preparation of societies for life in peace. We will deal with the substance of this question when the Committee takes up agenda item 50, but at this stage we consider that it is important to acknowledge the relevance of the Polish initiative to the present discussions. Indeed, it is hardly conceivable that disarmament measures can be furthered in an atmosphere of distrust and animosity. This Assembly's endorsement of the idea that the active promotion of confidence among nations is a necessity at the present juncture of international relations would, no doubt, be in the interest of strengthening international peace and security.

(Mr. Yankov, Bulgaria)

Turning now briefly to the question of machinery, I would like to express our satisfaction with the rapid pace of implementation of the decisions of the special session in this respect.

The First Committee is now devoting all its time to disarmament and related international security matters. There are enough indications that focusing the deliberations of the Committee on these matters is fully justified.

The question of the membership of the Committee on Disarmament has already been settled and all the organizational and procedural conditions for its productive work will be at hand when it starts its session next January. We are particularly gratified to note the decision of France, a permanent member of the Security Council, to take at the negotiating table at Geneva the place which has always rightfully belonged to it. It is our pleasure also to welcome the new members of the Committee - Algeria, Australia, Belgium, Cuba, Indonesia, Kenya, Sri Lanka and Venezuela.

In recent days the first session of the Disarmament Commission took place, and, as we all know, consensus was reached on a number of organizational and procedural matters. Now the way is open for that important body to start on its substantive business next year.

Steps are also under way to set up the advisory board to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, as envisaged in paragraph 124 of the Final Document.

The Final Document has clearly defined the functions of all these bodies. Under its terms of reference the United Nations Disarmament Commission can play a very useful role. Its draft recommendations could facilitate the tasks of the General Assembly. The Disarmament Commission could make an important contribution in the discussions on the comprehensive programme of disarmament and other disarmament issues. But if we want to avoid confusion and maintain the Commission as an efficient and useful tool, we should always keep in mind, first, that it is a deliberative body and cannot serve as a substitute for the Committee on Disarmament, and, secondly, that it is a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly and therefore cannot address its recommendations but to its parent body.

(Mr. Yankov, Bulgaria)

When assessing the positive outcome of the special session with respect to the international machinery in the field of disarmament, we should like to point out the recommendation contained in paragraph 122 of the Final Document on the world disarmament conference, which should be convened at the earliest appropriate time "with universal participation and with adequate preparation". It constitutes a new decisive step which would keep the momentum generated by the special session and would be a further proof that the community of nations is ready to use another efficient option to foster the process of disarmament.

The decisions of the special session are only a beginning. Now it is for all countries to work with determination for their implementation. As is rightly stated in paragraph 41 of the Final Document, in order to achieve this all States should "display a constructive approach to negotiations and the political will to reach agreements". The same aim could also be furthered by enhancing the universality of all the existing disarmament agreements, as envisaged in the Final Document.

The People's Republic of Bulgaria, together with other socialist and peace-loving countries, has pledged its full support to all efforts in the field of disarmament. To use words taken from the congratulatory message addressed to the twenty-eighth Pugwash Conference by the President of the State Council of the People's Republic of Bulgaria, Todor Zhivkov:

"Bulgaria will continue, without reservations, with determination and consistency, to give its share to the common struggle to stop the arms race, to achieve disarmament, to strengthen peace in the world".

Mr. HOVEYDA (Iran): In deference to your request, Mr. Chairman, I shall respectfully not express our congratulations to the officers of the Committee and our pleasure at our seeing you preside over these deliberations.

Though disarmament deliberations in the past, whether in the General Assembly or in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, have produced some agreements and treaties, those have for the most part been partial measures. In fact many of the measures previously agreed upon remain such a far cry from meaningful disarmament that global peace and security have hardly been enhanced. I do not intend to reiterate the forecasts of doom with which we are all too familiar and which we have heard repeatedly in this forum on so many occasions. At least at this stage of our deliberations, I intend us to focus our undivided attention on the positive results of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

I underline the words "positive results" because I do not believe that any State in retrospect can express total satisfaction with the outcome of the special session. This is particularly true in the light of the many expectations that were raised by this session. However, the session did accomplish something in that it focused attention on the various problems of disarmament and carved out a way towards their resolution. The fact that a consensus agreement in the form of the Final Document emerged from this session, in spite of various diverging views, can be correctly considered a real achievement. Furthermore, that the Final Document gives the highest priority to some items and accords to them relevant recommendations, again on the basis of consensus, is particularly gratifying for us.

In this connexion then, we can soon draw certain definitive conclusions, on the basis of the Final Document, as to the course we must pursue and measures we must take towards the goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, since the special session fortunately was able to agree on fairly detailed goals and principles for disarmament negotiations, together with a listing, albeit sometimes imprecise, of measures for implementation. Furthermore, it established new machinery, more representative in nature, to elaborate a comprehensive programme for general and complete disarmament and to

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pursue the implementation of this programme. These are but the generalities of what was adopted at the special session, for, as I mentioned earlier, the Final Document lends credibility to a number of conclusions and advocates irrevocable adherence to them. They are too many for me to enunciate here, but some bear special significance for us and those I will briefly share with the Committee.

While declaring that existing nuclear arsenals and the continuance of the arms race pose a threat to the very survival of mankind and while reaffirming the ultimate goal of general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the Final Document quite correctly states in paragraph 20 that:

"... effective measures of nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear war have the highest priority". (Resolution S-10, para. 20)

The primary responsibility of the major nuclear Powers to initiate meaningful disarmament measures and the right of non-nuclear States to participate in disarmament efforts on an equal footing are also accorded universal endorsement.

Certain other principles have also emerged which have registered forcefully with the international community, as a result of the consensus document. I will enumerate them briefly: general and complete disarmament under effective international control must remain the final objective of all disarmament efforts; the obvious task of not only spearheading the drive towards nuclear as well as conventional disarmament but also achieving those objectives is especially to be shouldered by the nuclear-weapon States, particularly those possessing the largest nuclear arsenals; it is necessary to curb and reverse the nuclear arms race until such time as its total elimination is achieved; the link between disarmament and development must be further established; the United Nations is entrusted with the primary role in disarmament and all States are urged to contribute to the performance of this significant role; the right of smaller States to security guarantees has also gained important recognition; the right of States to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy has been reaffirmed; and lastly, the international community has concurred in the fact that the stockpiling of weapons, especially nuclear weapons, not only does not help to strengthen international security but undermines it.

(Mr. Hoveyda, Iran)

I wish now to touch on certain provisions of the Document dealing with the Programme of Action. Though the Programme is ambiguous in places, it does include reference to the

"... specific measures of disarmament which should be implemented over the next few years, as well as other measures and studies to prepare the way for future negotiations and for progress towards general and complete disarmament". (ibid., para. 44)

This Programme entails what has been termed by some of the preceding speakers as a "short-term programme" and simultaneously a programme that is at the heart of the comprehensive disarmament programme. While such statements have validity and while, undoubtedly, some measures are implementable in the near future, they must be seen within the framework of a comprehensive disarmament programme, for many of the questions they involve fall within the said comprehensive context. The next paragraph of the Document states that:

"Priorities in disarmament negotiations shall be: nuclear weapons; other weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons; conventional weapons, including any which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects; and reduction of armed forces". (ibid., para. 45)

It is important, however, to bear in mind that these priorities need not be interpreted in a rigid manner, since paragraph 45 is qualified by the succeeding paragraph to the effect that:

"Nothing should preclude States from conducting negotiations on all priority items concurrently". (ibid., para. 46)

I refer again to that all-important statement contained in paragraph 48 which quite accurately "hits the nail on the head". It is that:

"In the task of achieving the goals of nuclear disarmament, all the nuclear-weapon States, in particular those among them which possess the most important nuclear arsenals, bear a special responsibility". (ibid., para. 48)

We cannot emphasize this point enough, and we believe that a number of priority tasks in the form of specific nuclear disarmament measures rightly contained in the Programme of Action need to be given urgent attention. Among them I would

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include first the conclusion of a SALT II accord, to be followed by a SALT III agreement between the super-Powers, at the earliest possible date - an event we had expected before or during the special session; and secondly, the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty in the very near future. The bilateral talks on the limitation and reduction of strategic arms are of key importance to the safeguarding of peace in the world as a whole. A test ban treaty would also be of considerable importance for the continuation and strengthening of the existing non-proliferation régime based on the 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty. Unfortunately, though accorded the highest priority, these two items have yet to be realized. Thus they remain an important test of the political will of the nuclear Powers, as many of the preceding speakers have accurately observed.

(Mr. Hoveyda, Iran)

Another aspect of the Programme of Action is contained in paragraphs 60, 61, 62 and 63, which deal with the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones as an important measure of nuclear disarmament and confidence-building in general. A detailed portion of the Final Document has been devoted to this subject and the obligations to be undertaken by the nuclear-weapon-States are at least partially covered. Endorsement of the proposal for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, an item that we shall be reintroducing to the General Assembly again this session, is of particular interest to us.

The establishment of zones of peace in various regions of the world as cited in paragraph 64 is also particularly significant to us. Specifically, provision (b) of the paragraph dealing with the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean is quite relevant to our general region. I need not reiterate that we share the view and hope that the region will become free of big-Power rivalry and that subsequently the situation will become more conducive to its conversion into a real zone of peace.

Existing nuclear weapons and nuclear-weapon systems are dealt with in one important section of the Programme of Action. Other sections deal with new weapons of mass destruction: chemical, bacteriological and conventional. In this regard, we feel that an agreement should be reached as early as possible on the prohibition of the development and production of new types of such weapons. The attainment of a comprehensive agreement prohibiting the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical weapons and their destruction is an urgent task. It is our hope that current negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union on a joint initiative for a treaty prohibiting chemical weapons will soon enable the Committee on Disarmament to prepare a draft treaty for submission to the United Nations.

Progress in conventional arms control and disarmament should not await the elimination of nuclear weapons. Yet, for conventional disarmament to take a global dimension, real progress in the field of nuclear disarmament must first become a reality. Once this occurred, valuable confidence would be bound to be generated globally and certain conventional measures would justifiably follow. As mentioned before, this would obviously not preclude

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limiting conventional weapons and reducing forces within the context of a comprehensive approach.

Along these lines, shortly after the closing of the special session our attention and efforts were directed to the Preparatory Conference for the United Nations Conference on Prohibitions or Restrictions of Use of Certain Conventional Weapons which may be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to have Indiscriminate Effects. We are keeping a keen eye on the proceedings of that Conference, not only for its substantive achievements, but also as a test of the political will of its post-special-session participants.

Although it is understood that the special session was not convened to agree on specific international instruments and tended to be ambivalent in parts of its Final Document, it produced some tangible and working results. At the heart of its achievements was the agreement reached on the machinery for deliberating and negotiating on disarmament. The revamping of the organizational aspects of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), and the establishment of the deliberative Disarmament Commission as a follow-up body to the special session meeting between sessions of the General Assembly, would make disarmament a year-round endeavour and at the same time would provide those countries that were not members of the negotiating Committee an opportunity to contribute to the disarmament process. We welcome these developments, especially those dealing with the broadening of participation in the Committee on Disarmament and the decision to allow the Disarmament Commission to make recommendations on a comprehensive programme of disarmament.

It is our hope that the balance being sought between deliberations and negotiating functions as envisaged by revisions in the machinery will actually lead to the intended streamlining of the work of the First Committee. We feel that the Disarmament Commission, as a subsidiary organ of the General Assembly, must develop its own distinct identity. This can be accomplished to a great extent if the Disarmament Commission refrains as much as possible from duplicating the work and discussions of the First Committee. The reverse of this situation is equally desirable, for we must be careful not

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to overburden the already crowded agenda of the First Committee. While we understand that certain duplication is unavoidable, we feel that we should give special attention to this element of clarity and distinction of roles, as duly reflected in the Final Document. Furthermore, along these same lines we feel that the newly-formed Committee on Disarmament with its expanded membership and revamped organization should strive to fulfil its responsibilities as very adequately established by the Final Document of the special session. We congratulate the new members of the Committee, particularly France for, as is known, the nuclear States bear a special responsibility in disarmament efforts, and it is our hope that China, too, will soon join the ranks of the Committee's members. At the same time, we strongly encourage the Committee on Disarmament to follow the guidelines of the Final Document by encouraging and inviting non-member States to express their views and proposals on various subjects so that more comprehensive understandings and measures may be formulated by that body.

Finally, many hoped that the special session in its Final Document would embody a new international strategy for disarmament. Many still wish to think of the existing document as the embodiment of the strategy itself. For us the formulation of a full-scope strategy was an over-optimistic expectation that could not materialize in the face of the existing intricacies of the problems and the paucity of available time. Nevertheless, the present document reflects a certain degree of achievement in this respect. A relatively coherent set of principles constituting the ingredients for a future doctrine is at hand. The general goals and priorities, again, are fairly clearly reflected in the Final Document. With the agreed improvement of the deliberative and negotiating bodies for disarmament we may have most of the essentials for a workable and sensible international strategy, which ought to evolve through deliberations in the newly revamped disarmament machinery. This, combined with a resounding reiteration of and adherence to disarmament principles, as witnessed by the Final Document, should encourage us in the pursuance and accomplishment of our task.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.