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VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 19th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. BOATEN (Ghana)

CONTENTS

AGENDA ITEM 33: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE ARMAMENTS RACE AND ITS EXTREMELY HARMFUL EFFECTS ON WORLD PEACE AND SECURITY: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 34: IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 3473 (XXX) CONCERNING THE SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL I OF THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA (TREATY OF TLATELOLCO): REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 38: INCENDIARY AND OTHER SPECIFIC CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS WHICH MAY BE THE SUBJECT OF PROHIBITIONS OR RESTRICTIONS OF USE FOR HUMANITARIAN REASONS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 39: CHEMICAL AND BACTERIOLOGICAL (BIOLOGICAL) WEAPONS: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 40: URGENT NEED FOR CESSATION OF NUCLEAR AND THERMONUCLEAR TESTS AND CONCLUSION OF A TREATY DESIGNED TO ACHIEVE A COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 41: IMPLEMENTATION OF GENERAL ASSEMBLY RESOLUTION 31/67 CONCERNING THE SIGNATURE AND RATIFICATION OF ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL II OF THE TREATY FOR THE PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN LATIN AMERICA (TREATY OF TLATELOLCO) (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 42: EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO IMPLEMENT THE PURPOSES AND OBJECTIVES OF THE DISARMAMENT DECADE (continued):

- (a) REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT;
- (b) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

AGENDA ITEM 43: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION ON THE DENUCLEARIZATION OF AFRICA (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 44: ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE IN THE REGION OF THE MIDDLE EAST (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 45: ESTABLISHMENT OF A NUCLEAR-WEAPON-FREE ZONE IN SOUTH ASIA: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued)

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ENGLISH

AGENDA ITEM 46: PROHIBITION OF THE DEVELOPMENT AND MANUFACTURE OF NEW TYPES OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND NEW SYSTEMS OF SUCH WEAPONS: REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 47: REDUCTION OF MILITARY BUDGETS: REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 48: IMPLEMENTATION OF THE DECLARATION OF THE INDIAN OCEAN AS A ZONE OF PEACE: REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE INDIAN OCEAN (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 49: CONCLUSION OF A TREATY ON THE COMPLETE AND GENERAL PROHIBITION OF NUCLEAR-WEAPON TESTS (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 51: GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT (continued):

- (a) REPORT OF THE CONFERENCE OF THE COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT;
- (b) REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY;
- (c) REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

AGENDA ITEM 52: SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT: REPORT OF THE PREPARATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE SPECIAL SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DEVOTED TO DISARMAMENT (continued)

AGENDA ITEM 53: WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE: REPORT OF THE AD HOC COMMITTEE ON THE WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE (continued)

The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 33, 34, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45,
46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52 and 53 (continued)

Mr. DIEZ (Chile) (interpretation from Spanish): In our previous statement on disarmament items we maintained that nuclear disarmament was urgent as an essential first step towards general and complete disarmament under international supervision. We also said that the benefits from the peaceful development of nuclear energy were an essential contribution to the progress and welfare of the international community.

At this time Chile deems it desirable to offer its views and suggestions on two closely interrelated items: the arms race and reduction of military budgets. We should also like to comment on one of the items which has aroused most attention in the present debate, namely the eighth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. We shall endeavour to analyse some of the causes of the arms race and the consequences deriving from it. We shall conclude by expressing our views on the need to define an over-all disarmament strategy which will make it possible to establish a global plan of action to be followed in order to achieve the objectives which will lead us to the strengthening of world peace.

What, in our opinion, are the main causes of the stockpiling of arms by States which, if kept up, would make any disarmament initiative unattainable? We believe that in the first place one of the elements which characterizes present international relations, unfortunately but obviously, is an atmosphere of distrust which leads States to maintain a more or less strong military force depending on their objectives and capabilities for use as a strategic backstop in imposing their foreign policy decisions.

Détente has been effective so far in preventing tensions in Europe which might have led us to a nuclear conflict. This policy, to be sure of success in the future, should be extended to the military field and should include all States desiring to live in peace. Man has not succeeded in dispelling the danger of war. There are political and ideological reasons which are a permanent source of international frictions.

(Mr. Diez, Chile)

The possibility of a conflict is what causes the arms race and in most cases prevents a just balance from being struck between the development which all mankind urgently needs and security. The security imperatives of various nations, as a consequence of their own foreign policy, have confirmed different types of national security structures which, to a greater or lesser extent, have an influence on the arms race.

We shall in the first place refer to the model of national security of those countries which like ours, seek simply to maintain their territorial integrity and secure respect for their national sovereignty. These countries do not have to sacrifice their economic and social development in order to strengthen their security. They merely seek to maintain the armed forces strictly needed for their internal and external integrity. The arms they acquire are those essential to ensuring the effectiveness of these forces. Moreover, these forces not only discharge their professional duties but, in addition, perform civil functions and thus are part of the country's economic, social and cultural development.

(Mr. Diez, Chile)

Their task is one of education. They prepare skilled labour for civilian employment, give different types of technical instruction, form units of forest protectors, and they cover the supply of the most isolated populations and carry out many other tasks for the benefit of the community.

But there are other countries which have active political objectives whether direct or indirect, which imply territorial conquest, expansionism or hegemony, and so are bound to sacrifice their economic development or that of other peoples with which they can co-operate, so as to organize a superior military power to support their political decisions. It is these countries which add to the arms race because they furthermore compel their probable adversaries to maintain as a minimum a balance of forces to act as a deterrent to their claims.

Lately, a new factor, which contributes to the arms race in some parts of the world, has been added to the existing factors: that is, violence and international terrorism, which threaten the stability of Governments of developing countries and disturb public order.

Our own Minister for Foreign Affairs, speaking in the plenary Assembly at the present session, described the situation as follows:

"In referring to subversive terrorism, we do not mean isolated or unrelated acts of violence, which have existed throughout history.

The terrorism which is of concern to us is that which has the political and ideological aim of planned subversion of the democratic order throughout the world." (A/32/PV.21, p. 42)

States threatened by this phenomenon are forced to strengthen their international security and to try to maintain in their countries a normal development of civilian life. To this end, security forces must be given the necessary elements to fight this type of action. Apart from these reasons, the great military industries of some industrialized countries are established not only to satisfy their own military needs but also to enable them to transfer weapons to other States for purely financial ends, without international control, contributing to the arms build-up and sometimes encouraging or trying to encourage local conflicts.

(Mr. Diez, Chile)

As can be seen, the objective of disarmament is a major objective, but great obstacles must be overcome. Many interests will be harmed and very diverse criteria must be combined. Unless we overcome these obstacles, the arms race will continue permanently to threaten world peace and security and the social development of mankind.

The Secretary-General, with the advice of a distinguished group of expert consultants, has presented a new report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and military expenditures. In his valuable report it is shown that the diversion of vast amounts of resources of every kind for military purposes has continued without registering any decline and, on the contrary, increased from year to year.

This is due to the accelerated sophistication of weapons and to the unbridled aspiration of a large number of States to have more powerful and more modern military forces. Lastly, it is due to the threat of war in various regions of the world, with the obvious danger that this can be extended and generalized. Thus, there is a world-wide waste of technology, financial resources, human potential and raw materials employed for security purposes. This delays the economic development of all States, but fundamentally that of the poorest, which are frustrated in their efforts to eradicate the extreme poverty in their countries and improve their food, health, education and housing standards, which have sunk to critical levels in many parts of the world.

For all Governments it is a priority moral task to halt the arms race, and so make it possible to reduce military budgets in order to make more effective the international co-operation and solidarity without the support of which it would be impossible to seek adequate solutions to the many problems which cause anguish among men in our times.

The resources used to produce and acquire sophisticated nuclear and conventional weapons are far larger than social expenditures for the most urgent needs in most States, to the detriment of vital services such as health and education.

(Mr. Diez, Chile)

The report I mentioned gives us clear and undeniable examples of the disproportion between military and social expenditures, a disproportion which seems to us to be alarming. Thus, for example, medical research throughout the world uses the equivalent of only one fifth of the resources devoted to research and development of new means of battle. The Trident Submarine with nuclear missiles costs three times the sum of money used by the World Health Organization for its total programme for the elimination of malaria throughout the world. Such examples, which are so obvious, should be sufficient to lead us to negotiate more speedily effective treaties to halt the arms race.

Regrettably, the advances achieved in the last years in reducing military expenditures throughout the world have been fruitless and we see no possibilities of immediate success or the hope of arriving at satisfactory solutions. Lately, military expenditures on a world-wide scale have increased again at a truly exaggerated rate. Parallel with this, extreme poverty in some regions of the world has led to very grave situations.

Some United Nations resolutions on reduction of military expenditures date back more than two decades. On 17 November 1950, the General Assembly, under resolution 380 (V), appealed to States to reduce to the minimum the human and economic resources devoted to armaments and to strive to develop resources for general well-being.

All these urgent appeals, which are repeated yearly by means of new resolutions, have gone unheeded. On the contrary, military expenditures of the various countries are ever greater, and without further ado the possibilities for economic and social development are sacrificed to the detriment of mankind.

The importance of disarmament resides in consequences which not only would lessen the possibility of armed conflicts, but also would promote the prosperity of nations. Disarmament of the poorer countries would release comparatively insignificant funds to strengthen the world economy, and in some cases would expose them very directly to the risks of losing

inalienable rights, such as the rights to sovereignty and territorial integrity. On the contrary, disarmament of powerful rich countries would release significant resources, which would strengthen the world economy and would expose them only remotely to any threat to their sovereignty or to their territorial integrity. This would be possible through a policy of balanced disarmament and détente fully complied with and enforced.

(Mr. Diez, Chile)

Accordingly, to be really beneficial disarmament must be started by the great Powers which must transfer to the poorer countries all resources thus released.

With a general improvement in the world economic situation and emphasis on overcoming under-development in the third world, the resulting social and economic conditions would improve détente and disarmament might then be progressively broadened as a result of that policy.

So far, after so many years, we have not even succeeded in preparing adequate procedures for information on military budgets. Despite efforts made by the Group of Experts, only a few countries have bothered to send their comments on the format of the instrument to be used to measure military expenditures. As long as there is no competent international organ authorized to control weapons, supervise compliance with treaties and analyse budgets, any attempt to obtain military data, including the quantity or installation of weapons must fail because of the secrecy with which countries naturally surround those subjects.

The major military Powers account for three quarters of the world's military budgets. If the recommendations of resolution 3093 B (XXVIII) of 7 December 1973, had been implemented for only a single year, some \$30 billion would have become available as a source of assistance for the social and economic advancement of the countries of the third world. Unfortunately, not even the Powers most in favour of that initiative have taken a single step along the lines indicated in that resolution.

We must recognize that our ability to make those provisions a reality is virtually nil. As long as the world continues with this unbridled arms race intended to maintain a balance between the military Powers, a balance essential to world peace, our ideals of progress and welfare of the international community will continue to be an unattainable dream.

In the light of the above considerations, it becomes essential fully to assess all the aspects of the arms race in the world, in order gradually to achieve general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

(Mr. Diez, Chile)

With two thirds of the Disarmament Decade already behind us, little progress on these matters has been made. Some important multilateral and bilateral agreements have been reached, it is true, but progress has been slower than the pace of the arms race itself. Accordingly, our delegation believes that a complete disarmament programme must be started without delay or excuses and that its substance must include the following subjects, which I shall enunciate without comments because they have been debated on many occasions.

A legally binding instrument establishing an international organ under United Nations control, with authority to ascertain the present actual arms situation in each country, must be negotiated. Unless such data can be obtained, any evaluation would be useless and we shall never be able to adopt effective disarmament measures acceptable to all and reliable.

Machinery must be set up to make available, on request, accurate information required by States and world public opinion. This would make a valuable contribution to disarmament measures. Various political movements and organizations as well as non-governmental and religious organizations must be involved in this in order to elicit their support in halting the arms race.

Through appropriate multilateral agreements machinery must be established to regulate the transfer of arms and to promote the channeling of the powerful world military industry into peaceful pursuits beneficial to the progress of all.

Appropriate targets must be set for reducing military budgets and establishing levels of assistance to developing countries with the funds thus released.

An essential and priority stage of disarmament must be the cessation, reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons, including the immediate cessation of all nuclear tests.

There must be a disarmament agreement on conventional weapons, including the urgent elimination of weapons of mass destruction and of environmental warfare.

(Mr. Diez, Chile)

Finally, we must set the stage for general and complete disarmament and the establishment of an international peace-keeping force under United Nations control which will safeguard the security of all nations.

That is our great task. The theory is clear and for it to be viable we must apply all our common sense and believe in the truth of our affirmations, above all, the major military Powers of the world must be firmly resolved to achieve it by taking the steps necessary to prevent a continuation of the arms race. Consequently, the world requires political will on the part of the great Powers to achieve what we yearn for.

We, the small countries, may be responsible for preventing local conflicts, but it is up to the great Powers to prevent a world conflagration. Hence, disarmament is something they must achieve.

Disarmament is therefore the first step in creating a better world. The first decisive step in achieving it will, we hope, be the special session to be held next year which we consider valuable in itself and which my Government unconditionally supports.

We believe that, although our statements may appear to serve no purpose and we meet together simply to repeat the same things from year to year, we are shaping world public opinion, later to be reflected in the communications media. This has a decisive impact in the contemporary world and on government decisions. Thus, even the verbiage of the United Nations is, on this item as on many other items in the past, contributing to bringing the world nearer an effective solution. We must therefore not be discouraged from dealing with nor must we view possible results from the standpoint of our own short life span. We must realize that we are in an Organization which in the history of mankind, after thousands of years, has to its credit successes never achieved before. We must also adopt a universalistic approach when dealing with an item with which we have had so little success, as in the case of disarmament.

The contribution of the non-aligned countries towards efforts to consolidate international peace by eliminating the dangers of war has been strikingly demonstrated in the initiative to convene a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. This idea, which goes back to

(Mr. Diez, Chile)

the 1961 meeting in Cairo, is proof of the pacifist spirit which inspired the founders of that group and of their genuine desire to be independent of bloc policies or spheres of influence.

Last year - and we all recall it well - the General Assembly made that initiative a reality by adopting by consensus resolution 31/189 B, which in its operative paragraph 1 decided to convene a special session of the General Assembly to be held in May-June 1978. The large number of States which joined in sponsoring that resolution, as well as the statements made by a large majority of representatives in favour of it, are eloquent proof that the international community is anxious to take steps to find new means of achieving general and complete disarmament, which is our ultimate goal.

During the year the process of preparation for the Conference was started by a Committee set up under the terms of the same resolution.

At an earlier meeting, the report on the work of the Preparatory Committee was presented with singular brilliance by its Chairman, Mr. Ortiz de Rozas of the sister Republic of Argentina.

(Mr. Diez, Chile)

With Latin American pride we wish to place on record our gratitude for his excellent work, and we wish him every success in his future activities as Chairman of the Committee.

On considering document A/31/41, which contains the report, we note the fruitful work done in the relatively short time available to that Committee. The fact that the major obstacles of organization and procedure have already been surmounted, and the fact that we already have a draft agenda, warrant our hope that we shall have a fruitful special session. We trust that in the two sessions of the Committee scheduled for the beginning of next year, when matters related to the substance of the disarmament problem will be discussed, the same goodwill and spirit of compromise will continue to prevail among all the participants including the militarily most important Powers.

Like other delegations, we are convinced that the success of the special session will depend on adequate preparation, and hence the importance of the work entrusted to the Preparatory Committee.

From the outset my country has supported the idea of holding a special session, because it is our profound conviction that it is vital if we are to find a way out of the present deadlock in disarmament negotiations. We believe that the United Nations still has reserves which can be used to solve the urgent problem of halting the arms race and removing the nuclear danger, and that we have to comply with our obligation to consider the general principles of co-operation for the maintenance of international peace and security, including principles governing disarmament and arms regulation, as indicated in Article 11 of the Charter.

The special session of next year represents for the United Nations an opportunity and a challenge; an opportunity, because we shall have far-reaching negotiations, and a challenge because, if we fail, trust will have been lost in the competence of this forum to manage disarmament matters. As for the main actors, that is to say we the States Members, we should attend with a genuine desire to negotiate in good faith.

(Mr. Diez, Chile)

In this connexion, we consider as appropriate the recommendation of the Preparatory Committee on the level of participation of those attending, that is to say, that it should be the highest level. It is important that formal and informal contacts be directly established among those who have a high degree of responsibility in their respective countries in these delicate matters. Likewise, a high political level might give rise to a dynamic debate in which suggestions will be made for concrete negotiating subjects and measures of self-control in disarmament.

We expect to have a plan of action for disarmament which, besides containing a description of the present situation, will lay the basis for a mechanism which will lead us to the attainment of the aspiration for general and complete disarmament.

Before concluding, allow me to utter a very personal hope. The irrationality of the situation I have described, which means that mankind can be annihilated by use of only a part of the existing stockpiles, is a paradox that will, we hope, lead us to eliminate the threat to the work of the Creator. Because of our vocation, we must seek to build a better world through the use of our higher faculties.

Mr. NUSEIBEH (Jordan): Mr. Chairman, as this is my first statement before this most important Committee, it is my privilege to extend to you my most sincere congratulations on your election to your high office. It is also my duty to extend my best wishes to the other officers of the Committee and to wish them success in the performance of their difficult task.

The question of disarmament is inseparable from the paramount issue of peace and war, which in our present-day world is no less than the survival of the human race and its habitat as we know them. It is, therefore, only the foolhardy who glosses over the questions relating to disarmament with complacent resignation, indifference and, worst of all, with wilful derogation of their uppermost priority, by subjugating them to any higher priorities, motivations or objectives.

(Mr. Nuseibeh, Jordan)

There are many reasons for these ambivalent, varying and manifestly contradictory attitudes. Foremost amongst them is a sense of over-confidence, amounting to conceit, on the part of policy-makers and statesmen, with all due respect to them, that they are more calculating, more discerning, more rational and more moral than their predecessors of generations past. If we scan recorded history, recent and past, which is our only concrete guide apart from hypothetical analysis, we find that external and internal wars have scourged almost every generation, every region, every segment of the human race. In this present century alone, great leaders have dragged their people and others beyond into two devastating global wars; and in between, into scores of more limited but terribly destructive wars. Were those earlier decision-makers of lesser minds and stature than contemporary leaderships? The answer is no.

Another reason for the complacency and ambivalence is the false belief that, in the post-nuclear era, wars have become so terminal, so futile, and with no bounty to collect, that even contemplating them as an option is unthinkable. Thus, confidence has been vested in what are variously termed "the balance of fear, massive retaliation and other conceptual frameworks." The flaw here is that insufficient allowance is made for intrinsic, and perhaps difficult to alter instincts, passions and inbuilt weaknesses in human nature. Human nature and the pugnacious instinct which it comprises in varying degrees might conceivably alter in the long run. But in the long run we shall all be dead; and this time perhaps the whole human race. There are nations which have succeeded in subduing their violent instincts and have undergone a mutation of consciousness towards the more friendly and gregarious instincts within themselves and towards others. But such nations are generally not the rule.

A third reason is an innate fear that unless a nation is ahead in military preparedness - either ahead, or at least in a position of equivalence with a would-be adversary - it must continue the unabating discovery of new weapons systems, or it will go under. Here again, rational thinking should teach us that in fact there is nothing to fear more than fear itself. For the ultimate security is the security of the grave, and the instinctive human impulse generally chooses existence over non-existence.

(Mr. Nuseibeh, Jordan)

I cannot imagine any nation relishing the thought of decimating hundreds of millions of people and making this planet unfit for habitation unless in a state of mental and emotional derangement, miscalculation of the other side's intentions, or pathological fear which psychologists are more qualified to treat than ourselves.

A further compounding factor in any discussion or action in the field of disarmament is the "devil theory" which prevailed in the 1930s in the aftermath of the first global war. It, in effect, placed a considerable blame for that catastrophe upon the profit-seeking manufacturers of armaments and munitions, even though it wrought death and destruction upon uncounted millions and innumerable countries.

(Mr. Nuseibeh, Jordan)

Although we should not exaggerate the reality of this theory, we cannot dismiss it either, as we watch in helpless consternation today the expenditure of close to \$300 billion on wasteful armaments, thus considerably impeding the prospects of creating the new economic order about which we all talk, but do little indeed to bring about.

As the Secretary-General has stated in his report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race, if between the years 1970 and 1975 half the allocations for armaments in the world had been diverted to non-military production, the increased production in the civilian sector would have increased by \$200 billion over what it was. The \$200 billion figure exceeds the total gross national product of south-east Asia and central Africa.

We all realize the close interrelationship in the industrialized countries between employment and arms production, and in research where almost 25 per cent of the scientists and close to 40 per cent of research expenditures are allocated for military purposes.

But this can be rectified by changing the basic objectives and priorities, gradually but purposefully, at the highest echelons of decision-making, and primarily by the super-Powers, which have it within their power to alter the fundamental orientation of the kind of world that we wish to live in and the means to achieve it.

Any resolutions or aspirations that nations of lesser capabilities may initiate or endorse would not amount to much more than moral persuasion. They would be real indicators of what the vast masses of humanity aspire to, but the ultimate responsibility for the fate of the world and its continuance in peace and prosperity is squarely on the shoulders of the super-Powers, where it really rests, and the consequences of their ultimate decisions will be borne equally by all of us without exception.

What I have said may sound like sermonizing, and to some, guided by inertia or otherwise, it may seem divested of the realities of present-day life. So be it. But I still maintain that what I have said is the truth and the hard reality of life, not necessarily as it exists today but as it should exist if we are to learn at all from the catastrophes of preceding generations and the far worse catastrophes that inevitably lie in store for this generation and for future generations.

(Mr. Nuseibeh, Jordan)

It is with this in mind that I wish to commend heartily President Carter's address before the General Assembly on 4 October 1977 in which he gave pride of place to the questions of disarmament, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and other related issues of international peace and security. It is our earnest hope that these exhilarating expressions will find their way into practical implementation.

It is also with this in mind that my Government supports the draft resolution on agenda item 127 (A/C.1/32/L.2) dated 4 October 1977 submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics under the title "Deepening and consolidation of international détente and prevention of the danger of nuclear war".

Détente and the prevention of the danger of nuclear war are closely and inseparably interrelated. There is widespread misapprehension of what détente means in the minds of many and, surprisingly, even amongst the knowledgeable and articulate. Détente, as we understand it, does not necessarily mean conformism, or even a confluence of views on all or even most of the issues that confront our turbulent world. It simply means unity in diversity, a tolerance of the other side's ideologies, systems and beliefs, and, in the final analysis, a renunciation of the use of war as an extension of diplomacy by other means, as diplomacy and war were defined by von Clausewitz. But détente cannot be sustained indefinitely if certain people allow individual or isolated incidents and disagreements to undermine the spirit of détente and thus create situations where hostility replaces friendliness and co-operation and eventually becomes the order of the day. This would be a relapse to the cold war era and an invitation to an even more heated arms race.

My delegation welcomes the modest progress that has so far been achieved in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and looks forward to further and more imaginative steps towards not only the renunciation on a reciprocal basis of the development of even more destructive weapon systems but also the prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests, the reduction of nuclear weapons and, eventually and ideally, general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.

(Mr. Nuseibeh, Jordan)

My delegation welcomes, in particular, operative paragraph 2 of the Soviet draft resolution which states:

"The nuclear-weapon States, in view of their special responsibility as permanent members of the Security Council, should always exercise restraint in their mutual relations, show a willingness to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means, and do all in their power to prevent conflicts and situations which could exacerbate international tension". (A/C.1/32/L.2)

I have underscored this last point because we all realize full well that acts of aggression, especially on a sub-global scale, cannot, unfortunately, be obliterated by conventions, resolutions and pious hopes. There must therefore be a method for the resolution of such acts by effective means short of war.

This must have been, and indeed was, the rationale behind the creation of the Security Council as the ultimate guardian of world peace and security and the means of bringing about the removal of acts of aggression and threats to peace. But there has been an on-going erosion of the will and prestige of the Council as the law enforcement arm under the Charter and custodian of an orderly international situation. If this erosion were allowed to persist, for whatever reason, the aggrieved parties would then, in despair, be left with no avenue of rectification except that of struggling for the redemption of their usurped rights.

It goes without saying that the Security Council, with the overwhelming support of the General Assembly and assuming that it acts in unity, particularly among its permanent members, and with all the instrument of implementation as set out in Chapter VII of the Charter, has it within its power and jurisdiction to enforce any resolution or solution against any recalcitrant State. The reason why there is so much disenchantment with the United Nations amongst the victims of blatant aggression is precisely that they know that the Security Council can act, and act irresistibly, but has allowed itself, for lack of will, not to act, thus reducing its status to that of yet another debating society.

(Mr. Nuseibeh, Jordan)

Thus the Security Council and the manner in which it fulfils its sacred trust have a great deal to do with international peace and security, the non-use of force in the settlement of disputes and regional wars, which in many instances threaten to escalate to worldwide dimensions. Here again, the Security Council can only discharge its responsibilities in an atmosphere of détente. Its absence would simply paralyse the Council as it has on many occasions in the past.

President Carter, in his speech to the United Nations, which was almost universally acclaimed, laid great emphasis upon the consequences of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the years ahead. My delegation could not agree more with his assessment and does not doubt his profound goodwill, but I feel it my duty to speak candidly and without mincing words about this very grave issue.

The General Assembly has endorsed the declaration of the African Heads of State pertaining to a nuclear-free zone. South Africa seems to ignore that declaration. Jordan has endorsed the establishment of a non-nuclear zone in South Asia and Latin America, in accordance with General Assembly resolutions. We also support all efforts being made concerning the proposed declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace.

Likewise Jordan has signed the international Treaty pertaining to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, as have indeed all the other Arab States. We supported the General Assembly resolution concerning a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East. Israel abstained on the resolution and has not acceded to the international nuclear non-proliferation Treaty. Since 1975 Jordan has also been a signatory to the Treaty banning the development and stockpiling of other lethal weapons in the bacteriological and biological fields.

The question now arises, as I am sure members will agree, how can a zone, any zone, be a nuclear-free zone if that is not agreed by all the parties in the zone, particularly in areas of actual or potential conflict? Does it not make of all such agreements a farce amounting to deception? No nation in the world views with acquiescence a situation in which its entire survival is exposed to such mortal and irretrievable destruction. I raised this very issue before this Committee last year. The reply of the Israeli representative was that the matter should be the subject of agreements and negotiations between the parties.

(Mr. Nuseibeh, Jordan)

I maintain that such grave issues are not the concern solely of the parties in any region but should be the concern of the international community in its entirety. When President Carter talked about proliferation his approach was international and not regional, as it surely must be.

When in 1963 I signed in Moscow on behalf of my Government the first partial test-ban Treaty, my Government acted without negotiating with anybody, and that was the case with other international instruments on the subject. The motivation was our recognition of our duty to ensure the welfare and survival of humanity, even though, I can assure the Committee, my Government had inside and reliable knowledge connected with nuclear activities in Daimona as far back as 1964-65. Indeed, we had legitimately requested the then Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, to order an investigation, and the results corroborated the information which we had gathered.

At present the mass media and intelligence sources tell us that Israel, by plutonium hijacking, regular visits by experts from advanced countries and other means, possesses somewhere between 15 and 150 nuclear bombs. I cannot vouch for the accuracy of the figures and most probably they are somewhat on the inflated side, but just in case they are accurate may I propose that instead of wasting their time negotiating with us it would be more appropriate for Israel to join the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and commit itself to a reduction of its massive nuclear arsenal.

If my suggestion sounds as if it were made in jest, the problem is an extremely grave one all the same. All those countries which possess no nuclear deterrents and are asked, and rightly, not to participate in proliferation are entitled to seek and publicly obtain unequivocal assurances from the super-Powers that under no circumstances will they allow such a holocaust to happen to their people and serve a prior warning to this effect.

If this is not done, then it is merely a matter of time and money before every nation in jeopardy finds it is compelled to hedge to protect itself. What then will become of the grandiose plan for non-proliferation within the next decade or two? I regret to state that the answer can only be frightening and tragic.

(Mr. Nuseibeh, Jordan)

I wish to acknowledge the exemplary work of the Preparatory Committee for the special session of the General Assembly during the coming spring to work out an over-all strategy for dealing with the question of general disarmament. I am not suggesting that this will prove an over-all panacea in this connexion but at least it will be a timely starting point for the achievement of the ultimate objective.

I wish to conclude my statement in the general debate by quoting the late Professor Einstein - or perhaps misquoting, because I do not remember his exact words. As I recall it, someone asked the distinguished scientist and sage in Princeton what type of arms he thought would be deployed in a third world war. His prompt reply was: "I cannot answer your question about the third world war, but I can answer it on the fourth world war - it will be axes, shovels and rockstone."

Mrs. THORSSON (Sweden): Mr. Chairman, the Swedish delegation, speaking for the first time in this Committee, would like to assure you of its great satisfaction at seeing you in the Chair. As far as our work for disarmament is concerned, this thirty-second session of the General Assembly, taking place half a year before the special session devoted to disarmament, is of particular importance. We are confident that with your ability and experience you will be able to conduct our work at this session to a successful end. We also direct our congratulations and felicitations to all the other officers of the Committee.

It is my convinced opinion that there is not very much of that precious commodity, time, available to us for achieving the necessary results in our disarmament negotiations. These results are urgently needed in order to show to the peoples of the world that we are serious, that we have the necessary political will, that we are intent on finally achieving something and that we are contributing whatever qualities we may possess to efforts to that end.

The main reason for this feeling of immense urgency is, in my view, the great speed at which military technology is moving far ahead of any progress that we may be able to make in arms control and arms limitation. The unrestrained

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

development of military research and development is, in the view of the Swedish Government, one of the main roots of our present deeply felt and well founded concern at the slow pace so far of progress in international disarmament talks. We shall have to bridge the gap between the speed of research and development advance and that of reaching arms limitation agreements, if prospects of human survival are to have a fair chance of success.

The special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be convened in a little more than half a year from now, is expected by a rapidly growing number of people around the world to provide an opportunity for new approaches to this task, which must not be lost.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

Since we last met in this Committee, estimates are that some \$400 billion will have flown into armaments; 400,000 man years will have been spent in search of new ways and means for destroying mankind - methods that would be more efficient than the forty-fold death which could already today be awaiting each one of us.

We know that the United States and the Soviet Union are estimated to account for 70 per cent of all military outlays. The most alarming feature in their role in world armaments is their intense pursuit of military research and development activities, ensuring a continual qualitative upgrading of the arsenals - a so-called vertical arms race of unabated force. Even now, the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two Powers are of enormous proportions. I need hardly quote the well-known figures: some 12,000 or more independently targetable strategic nuclear warheads, tens of thousands of tactical nuclear weapons.

And yet, in spite of this, some 95 to 30 billion dollars in public funds are allocated yearly to military research and development purposes. To remind us of the full dimension of this issue, a few other figures must be recalled, however. Some 95 per cent of all present research and development resources of the world are located in the industrialized countries. At least 40 per cent of the most qualified scientific and technological manpower devotes its skills and energy to bringing the military machines to further perfection. Of that manpower the United States of America and the Soviet Union account for the major part.

The so-called vertical arms race involves successive technological breakthroughs and continuing technological developments, leading to the need for new doctrines and strategies in the defence system of the power blocs. The political momentum behind this qualitative development is the equally strong desire on both sides to maintain a strategic balance. But considerations of security policy are only part of the forces driving the race of technology. Other factors may be even stronger. Over time, an apparently self-propelling force of great momentum has developed.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

The arms race has now reached a point where the mere suspicion of a new technological exploitation by a potential enemy stimulates in the opposite party renewed scientific efforts aiming at catching up with, and surpassing, even imaginative technological feats. New technological systems are initiated unilaterally, as new trumps in the game of negotiation. Once they are initiated, it proves often impossible to avoid their being developed, beyond the requirements of negotiation, into a full new weapons system.

Let me broaden the perspective for a moment. We live in a world where new weapons tend to search for new tasks and where new weapons lead to development of new counter-weapons. In the strategic debate it is often contended that this development is necessary, unlimited, uncontrollable and legitimate. But this is definitely not the case. A grave warning against this crudely simplified view has to be constantly voiced. Such a view breeds general scepticism and becomes easily a self-fulfilling prophecy. Should it be allowed to dominate it would also be necessary in our view to question the value of declarations of intent which are strewn on the road of disarmament. If the gospel of inevitability were allowed to prevail in the thinking of Governments in crucial periods of decision, the real value of the few agreements of disarmament which we have seen achieved so far would have to be examined closely again. But in fact the thesis of inevitability is neither legitimate nor bound by destiny.

Let me formulate a question directed against the attitude of scepticism and surrender to which I have just referred. What tells us that each new weapon consolidates the military balance between the leading Powers? What tells us that each new counter-weapon provides improved security to these Powers and to the rest of the world? Is not in fact the answer rather this: far too easily each development of a new weapon, or a new weapon system, and each military build-up within a certain region lead away from a situation which the parties formerly may have perceived as a tolerable balance. Therefore I ask again, who charts the direction in waters where accurate navigation is impossible? Often the immediate impact of each new development

in the arms race cannot be foreseen. But in the light of accelerating weapons technology the following end result can be foreseen. Each new balance of forces which is established on a higher level of armaments presents new risks, creates new apprehensions and provokes unforeseeable reactions in the long-range defence planning of one or the other protagonist in the continuing arms race.

Our own position in these matters is clear. In our view these risks face us constantly and are constantly increasing. There is no reason to be astonished that smaller countries, with limited military resources, ask themselves these questions and bring them out into the international debate to the greatest of their ability and with all the force that they can muster. Their own security is concerned. This is so, irrespective of the motives and driving forces behind the arms race, irrespective of the forms in which the leading military Powers pursue their own security in the shadow of the balance of terror.

Let me also add that the security of smaller countries is directly concerned even if their information is incomplete regarding weapon systems which they cannot develop themselves, which they do not want to have and which they do not desire to see developed close to their own frontiers. Besides, I need only mention the SALT I treaty regarding anti-ballistic missile systems in order to exemplify the awareness of the United States and the Soviet Union regarding the risk inherent in new weapon systems.

We all still live in the era of the balance of terror. That is an undeniable fact. But that is no reason to desist from expressing deep concern at the development of new weapons or from pursuing energetically the work of disarmament. On the contrary it is the awareness of the risks linked to the balance of terror which explains the international interest that apprehensions be expressed and that they be brought to influence the development as far as possible.

The roles are different in the era of the balance of terror. We do not escape that fact either. But again that is why it is important to keep one thing in mind. It is certainly not the scope of a country's military resources which finally decides its stand as regards the global dangers or regional manifestations of the arms race. This point is valid in the case of Europe where we are aware of the highest concentration in the world of conventional forces and arsenals of nuclear weapons. This point is valid also for any other region of the world where arms sustain tension or where tensions sustain the build-up of armaments. Naturally, however, all countries gain experience from the problems specific to their own region. In Sweden the perspective of a continuous further development of the already enormous military resources of the blocs cannot fail to raise serious concerns, whether the build-up is one of strategic nuclear weapons, tactical nuclear weapons or conventional forces.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

Let me emphasize that these concerns do not only refer to the qualitative side of the arms race. The competition between new weapons and new counter-weapons is only one side of the question. There is also an important quantitative aspect. This is the filling out, by quantity, of what is perceived as deficiencies in performance of all weapons or weapons systems. According to a common line of thinking, considerations of the total military balance require at a given moment certain new measures of qualitative build-up. Another argument - recognizable from more than one disarmament negotiation - claims that consideration for this total military balance makes it impossible to even out a numerical superiority of forces which one side may dispose of locally. Such arguments may easily be understood to have some sort of universal validity if they are never contradicted. Silence and acceptance in this context strengthen those factors which tend to prolong political tension and work against a deepening of co-operation between different countries.

Deterrence is an ambivalent word which can be used with different meanings. If deterrence, in the specific strategic meaning of the concept, is to be fully effective it requires a built-in measure of risks and uncertainties, it is often said.

But the post-war international debate and the treaties on crisis control and prevention of nuclear wars, concluded between the leading military Powers, have clearly shown that this thesis does not exhaust the discussion. Nuclear weapons may also become so manageable that they unleash a conflict instead of helping to deter it. Especially if the permanence of considerable forces within a region constitutes a breeding ground for political tension and lingering suspicion. This is also deeply felt by a broad world opinion. This is a political fact which has left its imprint on the post-war debate concerning nuclear weapons and relations of forces, including lately the debate on the neutron bomb.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

The reason for the deep preoccupation of public opinion is natural. People outside the territories of the super-Powers shrink back at the prospect that their own territory could become the target area of a military conflict between the super-Powers. This reaction is natural, not only, but certainly not least, for people living in the densely populated countries of Europe. This instinctive reaction of the human mind can never be pushed aside by the argument that it is the strategic realities alone which count: that only they should weigh in the balance of decision-making. Let me underline again that public opinion is a political reality. An active public opinion is also a precondition in the long run for a deepened dialogue between countries with different economic and social systems, as well as a starting point for intensified efforts in the field of arms control. For as far as the fears and hopes of ordinary men and women are concerned the neutron weapon remains a weapon which kills people but leaves buildings untouched.

For most people it also seems obvious and at the same time terrifying that the pursuit of security - a concept which often eludes exact analysis - pushes the leading military Powers to a continuous development of all those weapons which science permits.

Another reality to keep in mind is of course that the access of other countries to information about the results of technological weapon developments is highly different depending on which side is concerned and on the role of secrecy in the social and economic systems of different countries.

Not least for countries which, as in the case of Sweden, have long since refrained from the possession of nuclear weapons, it is natural to study closely the nuclear doctrines of the super-Powers. All nuclear weapons are totally unacceptable for us in the disarmament perspective which we apply. This applies to small weapons with reduced collateral damage. Naturally it applies equally to larger and stronger tactical nuclear warheads. Our position is not changed by the way in which the prevailing doctrines are being expressed. In one case the doctrine may

be to use one or a few warheads only in a situation where deterrence has failed; in another case, to use a number of large warheads over densely populated countries in Europe regardless of how a fateful nuclear conflict starts.

For countries outside the military alliances the ultimate intentions in their planning for the use of nuclear weapons is naturally unknown. But they are informed enough to know that the disarmament perspective is and must be global when it concerns nuclear weapons. Naturally, each country also draws its lessons from its own immediate neighbourhood and follows developments in that area closely. Therefore, the neutron weapon, which is only the latest example of the development of technologically advanced weapons in the competition between the two super-Powers after the Second World War, is unacceptable to us, and so are all other nuclear weapons.

Therefore, we underline - and we shall continue to do so as forcefully as we can - the special responsibility of the super-Powers, to limit the nuclear arms race through concrete measures. Thereby, they can actively help to reduce the risks of further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

The security of each and every nation may be directly influenced by the way in which the leading military Powers choose to guarantee their own safety on the global as well as the regional level. When these Powers, the super-Powers, recall the principle of undiminished security for themselves, the result must not be diminished security for smaller countries. This is a reality which should not be hidden.

It is an important rule to distinguish between the means by which a goal is reached and the goal itself. But the means chosen may influence the goal. Smaller countries cannot always share the views of the super-Powers on the ways in which to proceed in order to solve the fateful problems of the arms race and to exploit fully the real possibilities of disarmament.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

After these remarks on principle, remarks to which the Swedish Government attaches considerable importance, let me pass to some thoughts on current disarmament issues.

The multilateral disarmament efforts have, as I said earlier, been given a forceful stimulus by the decision to convene a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, giving the United Nations an opportunity of taking effective action with respect to one of the most complex and difficult problems it has to face. I should like to emphasize by repetition that this opportunity must not be lost, as has been the case at several critical moments in the past. When preparing ourselves for the special session we must keep in mind the considerable risk for a loss of credibility of present multilateral disarmament negotiations which a failure of the session would entail. Such an awareness will no doubt serve to guide the preparations in such a way as to ensure a successful outcome of the session.

The Swedish Government, for its part, notes with satisfaction the progress of the preparatory work so far, and appreciates the spirit of co-operation which has characterized the three sessions of the Preparatory Committee which have taken place until now. This augurs well for the next, and much more difficult, stage of substantive negotiations which will start at the fourth session of the Committee in January. We will try to make an as active and useful contribution as possible in this work.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

Certain fundamental concepts stand out, in our view, when attempting to visualize the structure and content of the final texts to be adopted by the session. I am thinking above all of the urgent need to deal effectively with the problems represented by the nuclear arms race. The dangers inherent in the rapid conventional arms build-up in many regions of the world must also be recognized and a serious international discussion started now on how to find ways to resolve the underlying problems in order to prevent them from becoming still more serious. Finally, a constructive approach must be taken to the long-debated issue of how to relate efforts in the field of disarmament to the enormous needs of economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries.

The nuclear-weapon States, and particularly the two leading Powers, carry an undeniable and tremendous responsibility for the initiation of the global process of disarmament which has eluded us for so many years. The possession, by those two States, of nuclear weapons sufficient to destroy the human race, its civilization and physical environment is evidence enough of the particular responsibility which the international community undoubtedly will wish to see recognized in an appropriate way at the special session.

Real progress in the current Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union which would show in a sufficiently clear way the determination of those two States to strive energetically towards nuclear disarmament would contribute substantially to the atmosphere at the session. We firmly believe that collective security can be reached at successively lower levels of armament. We hope that spirit will prevail in those complex and difficult negotiations. The prestige that is now customarily attached to the possession of nuclear weapons will then also fortunately diminish.

The Swedish Government welcomes the fact that at long last substantive negotiations have started with regard to the comprehensive nuclear test ban, since for years it has been one of the two high-priority items on the agenda of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). A comprehensive test ban is a necessary step on the way to nuclear disarmament. The current trilateral talks between the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom should, as soon as possible, be transformed into concrete multilateral

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

negotiations in the CCD with the aim of presenting to the special session a draft treaty capable of winning broad support.

The Swedish delegation in the CCD, in view of its long-standing involvement in the comprehensive test-ban issue, put forward a draft comprehensive test-ban treaty during the spring session of the CCD. The purpose of our initiative was to stimulate discussion on the matter and to identify certain ideas which could contribute to a solution of central problems. We were pleased to receive many comments on our text, and we hope that the debate in the CCD which followed has served a useful purpose in clarifying and, I hope, indicating realistic solutions to the outstanding issues of negotiations. In this context, the rapid progress in the work of the CCD seismic expert group is also a source of satisfaction to us. A global network of monitoring stations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty now seems to be within reach.

Nuclear disarmament should be seen also as a key in the critical battle against proliferation of nuclear weapons to additional States. If today, nine years after its conclusion, the best available instrument of non-proliferation - the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) - is still not universally adhered to and its viability is called into question, it is to a considerable extent due to the fact that the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty are still reluctant to accept what we, the non-nuclear-weapon States, see as the full consequences of their accession to it.

Those nuclear-weapon States must give concrete evidence that they take seriously their treaty obligations and solemn pledges to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures of disarmament to be taken at an early date. I have already said that the two leading nuclear Powers must start a process of gradual eradication of nuclear weapons; otherwise there will be no balance in the fulfilment of the obligations undertaken in the Treaty by nuclear-weapon States, on the one hand, and non-nuclear-weapon States, on the other.

In this connexion, I wish to take up the matter of security guarantees to non-nuclear-weapon States. We have stated many times that, in our view, Security Council resolution 255 (1968) cannot be regarded as a realistic answer to requests for security guarantees. My Government favours a general

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

pledge by the nuclear-weapon States parties to the non-proliferation Treaty not to use nuclear weapons and not to threaten to use them against non-nuclear-weapon States which are parties to that Treaty and not members of a military alliance possessing nuclear weapons. That is what we call a negative guarantee. We must also act in other ways to further the idea of non-proliferation.

I wish to recall the strong Swedish hope that all States accept comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on their nuclear energy activities - and I would like to emphasize "all States". Thus, it is a matter of national policy that permission for nuclear exports to non-nuclear-weapon States can be considered by the Swedish Government only if they have ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty or have otherwise accepted IAEA safeguards that are at least equally comprehensive. As a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we have accepted to apply the same rule with regard to our own nuclear imports.

Behind that policy lies the conviction that nuclear arms proliferation would endanger the national security of all States, developed and developing, nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States alike. Against that background it is, in the Swedish view, clearly in the interest of all States to make their active contribution to international efforts aimed at minimizing those risks.

The future of nuclear power as a source of energy is surrounded by important uncertainties. In Sweden fundamental reassessment of the role of nuclear power is now in progress.

In any decisions between various technical alternatives in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, non-proliferation considerations, environmental concerns and safety aspects are elements which must all be taken into account. Sweden supports the initiative for an international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation. Sweden actively participated in the international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation organizing conference in Washington last month and intends to make its contribution to this evaluation. In this context we also wish to stress the impact of the development of new energy sources as alternatives to nuclear power. A wider choice of solutions to national energy problems would be advantageous also from a non-proliferation point of view.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

Before turning to the problems of the conventional weapons, I wish to stress the importance we attach to the ongoing bilateral dialogue between the United States and the Soviet Union with regard to the prohibition of the production, development and stockpiling of chemical weapons. This is, as we all know, the second of the two high priority items of the CCD. We hope that this dialogue soon will be transformed into multilateral negotiations in the CCD with the aim of registering substantial progress towards an international agreement at the special session.

The importance of the subject has prompted me to dwell at length on the problems represented by nuclear weapons. At the same time, we cannot close our eyes to the conventional arms race, which consumes approximately 80 per cent of the resources now devoted to military purposes in the world.

The pace of the conventional arms build-up in many parts of the world has been greatly increased by the rapid advancement of military technology and extensive international arms transfers, involving ever more sophisticated weapons. Apart from the increasing risks for armed conflict which are inherent in this situation, it is most alarming that enormous resources in this way are drawn from the efforts for economic and social progress in the world. All States, and in particular the arms producing countries, must shoulder their responsibility to halt this dangerous trend. The special session should seriously consider this issue and decide on specific measures to deal with it.

Let me now take up the matter of linking disarmament efforts with economic and social progress. The problem at hand is truly enormous. The magnitude of the total world military expenditures estimated according to various sources at between 350 and 400 billion dollars annually, cannot be grasped by the human mind. What is clear is that even fractions of the sums involved could meet the basic needs of the poorest peoples of the world.

The non-aligned summit meeting in Colombo in August 1976 addressed itself to this glaring discrepancy in the use of scarce resources when it declared, inter alia, that the arms race is inconsistent with efforts aimed at achieving the new international economic order.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

The relationship between disarmament and development has indeed been considered by the General Assembly many times. As a result of General Assembly resolutions, several studies have been undertaken by the United Nations in this field. Regrettably, this work has so far not led to any tangible results. The calls by the General Assembly for a reallocation of resources released through disarmament to economic and social development purposes, particularly in the developing countries, have yet to be acted upon. The special session offers a most welcome opportunity to review this subject in its totality and pave the way for increased efforts to achieve concrete reallocation measures.

In order to develop a basis for decisions on such measures, it is clear that a further in-depth analysis of the relationship between disarmament and development is necessary. This realization motivated the delegations of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden to put forward in the Preparatory Committee for the special session a working paper entitled "Disarmament and Development: Proposals for a United Nations Study" (A/AC.187/80). The Preparatory Committee has recommended that the General Assembly initiate the proposed study and that the terms of reference and other aspects of the study be determined by the special session itself.

My delegation is currently participating in informal discussions on the text of a draft resolution in this matter, aiming at providing the special session with the best possible basis for taking its final decision on the initiation of the proposed study. I will not go into the details of the thinking of the sponsors of the draft resolution, which will be developed by my colleague from Norway at a later stage of our deliberations. Suffice it to say that the study should be clearly oriented towards providing a ground-work for political action in a given situation of disarmament. The study should further be started as soon as possible after the special session and be concluded within two to three years.

I have discussed some of the substantive matters which will come before the special session. I will now take up rather briefly a few other matters, primarily of an organizational nature, to which we attach particular importance.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

The favourable development set in motion through the review of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament in 1976 should be allowed to continue. The newly established United Nations Centre for Disarmament should be given adequate resources to be able to fulfil its increasing responsibilities. Particular attention should be given to the valuable contributions which the centre can make with regard to studies and information activities in the field of disarmament. The first United Nations Disarmament Yearbook is an excellent example in this connexion. I should further like to take the opportunity of mentioning that my delegation is pursuing informal consultations on the text of a draft resolution on the publication of a disarmament periodical, which would present in highly readable form current facts and developments in the field of disarmament. This idea was accepted in principle by the Ad Hoc Committee to which I referred recently.

It is obvious that the special session must pay special attention to the institutional mechanism needed to promote disarmament efforts at the multilateral level. It seems clear to us that two different types of organs would be required, that is, a negotiating body with limited membership and a forum at the highest political level comprising all Members of the United Nations. The actual situation today corresponds roughly to this general concept. This does not mean that there would be no room for improvements; on the contrary, several measures can be contemplated in this context.

The CCD should in our view be more closely linked to the United Nations. A first step has been made by the decision to circulate widely to delegations in New York the relevant documents of that body. Further, the possibilities for Member States of the United Nations to follow and, in a manner which does not detract from the interests of efficiency, also to influence the work of the CCD should be increased.

Certain changes can also be made in the organization and procedures of the CCD itself. This is of course mainly a matter for the CCD itself to consider. I can by way of example mention here that the Swedish delegation to the CCD has pursued the idea of substituting the present co-chairmanship institution with a formula which would be more in keeping with the present times.

(Mrs. Thorsson, Sweden)

It is evident that the follow-up of the decisions and recommendations of the special session will be crucial. We have proposed that a second special session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament should be convened after a period of 3 to 5 years. We believe that such a decision would be very helpful in securing a continuous attention, at the highest possible political level to the need for concrete action. If this approach is accepted, it seems natural that the declaration to be adopted by the special session next year would formulate broad general principles to guide the work of the international community in the field of disarmament, whilst the foreseen programme of action would be geared to specific steps that could be taken before the second special session.

I have finally arrived at my concluding words. Let it truly be said: we stand on the threshold of what can be shown to be a new era of meaningful talks on disarmament, in a world which yearns not for more military force but for decency, compassion and common sense in relationships between peoples and nations. We must not lose this opportunity. Let us move forward, with determination, towards the goal that is now in sight.

Mr. RAMPHUL (Mauritius): The 1970s have been proclaimed as the Disarmament Decade. Two-thirds through that decade, it is already possible to begin to take stock. This period has been characterized by a consolidation of détente among the main protagonists in the arms race and by the adoption of a number of partial agreements - bilateral and multilateral - on the limitation of armaments. The Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe was of particular importance for the consolidation of détente. But these results have been far from sufficient to turn or even to stem the tide of the arms race. It is already apparent that the Disarmament Decade is not likely to produce the results hoped for, and that in planning for the next decade the reasons for that failure will have to be considered carefully, for there can be no relaxation of effort. Genuine and substantial disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, and especially of those countries whose military arsenals and military budgets are the most massive, remains a task of the greatest urgency. All countries and Governments share responsibility for taking effective action to halt and reverse the arms race so that genuine security can be achieved and one of the main hindrances to social and economic progress can be removed.

Several years ago, in the face of the lack of meaningful progress in disarmament negotiations and of the ever spiralling arms race, I expressed the view that it might be useful to address some basic questions regarding the arms race and disarmament in order to overcome the deadlock in which disarmament negotiations found themselves. That conviction of my delegation has been strengthened by the conclusions of the recently published report of the Secretary-General on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and of military expenditures.

The forces behind an ever-expanding arms race and the intense development and exploitation of technology for military purposes cannot be accounted for simply in terms of action-reaction processes or of the apprehension created in each country by the military programmes of others. As the arms race expands in the direction of ever greater reliance on advance technology and draws into its orbit ever new sectors of society, a number of new mechanisms set in which tend to perpetuate the race, if not to accelerate it. The sheer logic of technological innovation, the fact that one cannot afford to leave

(Mr. Ramphul, Mauritius)

any avenue unexplored, and the industrial imperative and other long-term implications have already been mentioned in this Committee over the years. A number of other factors have been proposed in explanation of the blind momentum and the vast scale that characterize the present arms race. In addition to a variety of more or less explicit political and military motivations applicable to individual cases, a number of domestic factors may be involved. Their importance obviously depends on the precise circumstances. In some instances, the armed forces have been expanding mainly in response to internal strains and have served to uphold the social order in the face of mounting opposition or profound divisions in society. Another factor is the inertia inherent in institutions once they are established and consolidated and in the coalitions of interests which may develop among the armed forces, industry, sectors of the scientific and technological professions and political and administrative apparatuses. We recall that President Eisenhower spoke about the military-industrial complex.

A thorough understanding of these different processes that sustain the arms race and determine its orientation is, of course, an essential prerequisite if political action is to turn the tide. Each of them directly points to forces that may impede progress towards disarmament. So far, however, these different processes are, on the whole, poorly understood. One important reason is that the same factors and combinations of factors are not at work everywhere. There are evidently great differences between the countries are technologically ahead in the arms race and the countries which are gradually being drawn along, between countries with different socio-economic systems, and so forth. If effective progress towards disarmament is to be achieved, it would clearly be insufficient to regard the arms race as merely an action-reaction phenomenon, and disarmament as simply a question of political will at the highest decision-making levels. The arms race is not only becoming more dangerous, it is also becoming more complex and more firmly entrenched. It is sustained by a variety of forces acting together, and it must be expected that to remove one of them is not sufficient to reverse its course. In fact, it may be assumed that it is not one or several factors but precisely their multiplicity that confers upon the arms race its great inertia and has rendered

(Mr. Ramphul, Mauritius)

it so intractable from the point of view of disarmament, with any limited successes in one field tending to be offset very quickly by developments in other sectors of the arms race.

Against this background, I invite anew the attention of the members of this Committee to this fundamental question, and I formally propose that the Secretary-General undertake, with the assistance of qualified experts appointed by him, a study of the arms race and of the factors that sustain it, with a view to enabling this and other bodies to approach the issue with a greater chance of success.

Progress towards disarmament will require systematic co-ordination and planning, with the participation of all States. On the one hand, this points to the need for more effective measures, at the international level, for information, research and evaluation on questions of disarmament so as to enable all Member States - not only the largest or the most advanced - to obtain effective insight and to take initiatives in questions of disarmament. On the other hand, the United Nations - and, first of all, its plenary organ, the General Assembly, whose task it is to harmonize the efforts of States in the attainment of their common goals - should be able to fulfil its role of over-all guidance in the field of disarmament more effectively than it has been able to do in the past.

These and some other issues were discussed last year under the item entitled, "Strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament". Now, I am pleased to note that, pursuant to the decision adopted last year, the first issue of the Disarmament Yearbook has been published by the United Nations Centre for Disarmament. I take the opportunity to express our gratitude to my friend, Dr. Rolf Bjomnerstedt, Assistant Secretary-General, and to his staff in the Centre for the efforts they have made to produce an extremely useful publication in such a short time. It is my hope that future issues will be more analytical and will contain more information on developments in the disarmament field. The Secretary-General and the Centre for Disarmament should play a more active role in mobilizing peoples in support of disarmament, in expounding openly the dangers of the continuation of the arms race, and in

(Mr. Ramphul, Mauritius)

dispelling the illusion that lasting peace and security can coexist with huge accumulations of the means of destruction. We want to assure the Secretary-General of our appreciation of his activity and to pledge our continuous support.

Here, Mr. Chairman, I should like formally to propose that you, Sir, as Chairman of the Political and Security Committee, invite Dr. Bjornerstedt, head of the Centre for Disarmament, to come before this Committee so that he may have an opportunity to express his views on what should be the future work of the Centre with respect to publications and studies on disarmament. I hope that members of the Committee will agree with me that such views will be most helpful to those participating in the consideration of disarmament items.

(Mr. Ramphul, Mauritius)

The special session of the General Assembly which is to meet next year should become a turning point in our search for disarmament and thereby move us closer to attaining the broad objectives for which the United Nations was created. It is generally considered that the primary factor in the world-wide arms race is the arms race among the major military Powers, which is due chiefly to their virtual monopoly in the development of advanced military technology, their overwhelmingly large share of world production and world exports of advanced weaponry and the global character of their political and military interests. This indicates that the largest and most advanced Powers bear a very special responsibility for putting an end to the arms race, and in the first place the nuclear arms race.

While fully recognizing the important role and responsibilities of the great Powers with respect to disarmament, peace and security, the small and medium-sized States, the developing countries and the non-aligned States should also participate and contribute to bringing about disarmament. The interest in disarmament is universal and the issue should be dealt with accordingly. That is why we consider that the special session should be adequately prepared for with the active participation of all States. Mauritius has made a modest contribution of its own to the preparations for the special session, inter alia by submitting a working paper containing elements to be included in the proposed declaration on disarmament, which was circulated as an official document under the symbol A/AC.187/60. That working paper represents our basic views and I shall refrain from repeating them here.

Instead I should like to refer to a problem of particular interest to Africa. For some time African States have expressed grave concern over what they perceive as the ominous implications for the peace and security of their region, and of the whole world, of developments in South Africa's multi-billion-dollar nuclear programme. For instance, at its thirty-first session the General Assembly adopted an African-initiated resolution expressing concern that the further development of South Africa's military and nuclear-weapon potential would frustrate efforts to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa and elsewhere as an effective means of preventing nuclear-weapon proliferation, both horizontal and vertical, and of contributing to the elimination

(Mr. Ramphul, Mauritius)

of the danger of a nuclear holocaust. The Assembly also appealed to all States not to deliver to South Africa or place at its disposal any equipment or fissionable material or technology that would enable South Africa to acquire nuclear-weapon capability. South Africa has not yet acceded to the non-proliferation Treaty.

Recently the attention of the international community has again been drawn nuclear developments in South Africa. On 8 August 1977, in a statement carried by Tass, the Soviet press agency, the Soviet Union stated that according to its information South Africa was preparing to test a nuclear device in the near future as a step towards developing a nuclear-weapon arsenal. The Soviet Union held that such a development would produce the most serious and far-reaching consequences for international peace and security and indicated that it was ready for its part and together with other States "to contribute in every way possible" to preventing the dangers of nuclear-weapon proliferation and the threat of nuclear war posed by the South African developments.

Several countries, including France, the Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, formally requested clarification from the South African Government concerning the charges raised by the Soviet Union. On 21 August the South African Foreign Minister, Mr. Botha, stated that the Soviet reports were "unfounded". This was reported in The New York Times of 22 August. However, one day after the statement, on 22 August, the French Government stated that it had received new information that South Africa was preparing to set off an atomic test explosion, an action which, according to French Foreign Minister Mr. Louis de Guiringaud, would have "grave consequences" for French-South African relations. That was reported in The New York Times of 23 August.

In an opening statement at a press conference on 23 August President Carter said that South Africa had informed the United States that it did not intend to conduct any nuclear tests "now or in the future". That was reported in The New York Times of 24 August. While expressing appreciation of the no-nuclear-test "commitment" by South Africa, the American President added, however, that the United States would "continue to monitor the situation closely". On the same day, the South African Prime Minister, Mr. Vorster, for the first time publicly denied that South Africa was planning to develop nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Ramphul, Mauritius)

In a statement reportedly issued by the Foreign Minister in Bonn on 25 August, the Federal Republic of Germany pointed out that it had noted a speech by Prime Minister Vorster expressing the possibility of his régime's signing the non-proliferation Treaty. The Federal Republic of Germany added that it would continue discussions with South Africa aimed at attaining the goal of the latter's accession to the non-proliferation Treaty.

A number of South African officials have themselves over the years fuelled international anxieties over their régime's nuclear programme and intentions. For example, in July 1970 Prime Minister Vorster announced that South Africa had successfully developed a "unique" uranium-enrichment process which was reported in the press as one similar to, if not the actual, "jet-nozzle" aerodynamic enrichment process originally invented by a West German nuclear scientist, Professor E. W. Becker. That was reported in The Times of London on 23 August 1973. Four years later, in July 1974, Dr. Louw Alberts, Vice-Chairman of the South African Atomic Energy Board, stated that South Africa's nuclear programme was more advanced than that of India, and that South Africa was capable of producing a nuclear bomb. That was reported in The Times of London on 18 July 1974.

South Africa reportedly has a pilot uranium-enrichment plant which could be used to produce nuclear weapons and which it has refused to place under international safeguards, allegedly to protect the "secret" process the plant uses. An unnamed official American source has observed that the pilot facility could have accumulated enough material for an experimental nuclear explosion. That was reported in The New York Times of 23 August. Other experts feel that the pilot plant could produce enough plutonium for a bomb within three years, while one British observer feels that South Africa may already have produced an atomic weapon. That was reported in The Washington Post of 16 February 1977.

Although South Africa has now publicly declared that it does not intend to test a nuclear device of any kind now or in the future this does not mean that the country will stop or curtail its nuclear programmes. In this connexion it is not inconceivable that South Africa will continue to resist appeals that it should join the non-proliferation Treaty régime. Moreover, there is nothing to stop the apartheid régime from declaring such commitments null and void in

(Mr. Ramphul, Mauritius)

the future should a new set of white leaders there conclude that a nuclear option would be the only guarantee of the security of their régime and of its policy of apartheid.

In this connexion it is significant to note the statement on 30 August 1977 by Mr. Owen Horwood, the South African Finance Minister, that:

"... if we [the South African régime] did at any time wish to do other things with our nuclear potential we will do so according to our own decisions and our own judgement."

That was reported in The New York Times of 31 August 1977. This statement appears to contradict the unequivocal denials of a week earlier by Prime Minister Vorster and Foreign Minister Botha that South Africa had nuclear-weapon development ambitions or intentions, and enhances the view that the no-nuclear-weapon "commitment" expressed recently by the South African authorities is not permanent and could be annulled by any future régime.

Recent reports published in The New York Times of 29 August 1977 said that American reconnaissance photography had reportedly established that South Africa had built a testing structure and other facilities required for an atomic test in the Kalahari Desert.

In view of these developments this Assembly should take a firm stand to put an end to the nuclear-weapon ambitions of the apartheid régime.

Mr. DATCU (Romania) (interpretation from French): One of the most important tasks of this Committee and, more generally speaking, of this session, is to make it possible to take stock of the position of Member States with regard to the preparation, proceedings and results of the first special session devoted to disarmament to be held in a few months' time.

It is this question that I should like to refer to today and it is a particular pleasure for me to do so because this is something which my country has constantly supported and hoped for over the years.

The discussion, for the first time, of a separate item, the special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, is in itself something of great significance in the life of the United Nations.

In turning to this subject, we think we should begin with an objective analysis of the way in which the United Nations has hitherto discharged its historic task of calling a halt to the arms race and bringing about disarmament. The question has been discussed at length for over three decades, many proposals and initiatives have been considered and many resolutions adopted. However, no genuine measure of disarmament with practical effects on a reduction of military arsenals has, so far, been undertaken. We might as well say that the resolutions, appeals and exhortations have remained dead letters, and that the United Nations has not performed its task and has not discharged its direct functions in negotiations relating to military disengagement and disarmament.

It is clear that the major problems of disarmament have been gradually removed from the authority of the United Nations and that the Disarmament Commission, conceived as a major body of the United Nations for the discussion of disarmament questions, with the participation of all States, has hardly functioned, while negotiations have been undertaken within a limited framework outside the United Nations. Moreover, disarmament problems and, above all, problems of nuclear disarmament, have not yet been the subject of determined or decisive measures on the part of Governments to ensure a reduction and elimination of arms and to protect mankind from the danger of another war.

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

This less than satisfactory state of affairs, and the continuing deadlock in negotiations on disarmament have led to a steady growth and escalation of the arms race, the spearhead of which is the nuclear arms race. The development, diversification and continual uninterrupted accumulation of nuclear and conventional arsenals, the destructive capacity of which is mind-boggling, gives the impression of a force beyond the control of human reason.

The disturbing picture presented by armaments and disarmament negotiations 32 years since the creation of the United Nations, can lead to only one conclusion. It is that the strategy, the specific measures taken, the approach to problems, the rules and procedures which have been resorted to, have not in spite of the efforts made, proved their effectiveness and have not yielded the results demanded by the peoples of the world.

Dealing with disarmament problems from a peripheral approach, by measures which resemble control of armaments rather than disarmament proper, has proved to be an inadequate method incapable of slowing down the ever-increasing escalation of armaments. We do not intend now to dwell on the causes, real or imaginary, underlying this situation, nor to the arguments adduced in explanation.

We believe that beyond theoretical debates, which go back scores of years and which were only interrupted by the greatest conflagration in history, we must now recognize the need to effect a drastic switch in disarmament negotiations. We must, in a constructive spirit, consider new ideas and methods, and objectively the machinery of negotiation.

Within the framework of what must necessarily be an innovative process, the United Nations should play a special and ever-growing role. In order to rise to the level of its primary responsibility which is that of safeguarding peace and security, and to justify the trust and hopes placed in it by the peoples of the world, the United Nations should decisively increase its own role in the field of disarmament and exercise its paramount authority in negotiating, adopting and controlling the implementation of disarmament measures.

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

The withdrawal of disarmament problems from the authority of the United Nations has served neither to promote successful negotiations, nor to enhance the prestige of the United Nations in the world. It is high time to place disarmament negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations, in accordance with the need to democratize international life and to ensure the participation, on an equal footing, of all States in the process of solving international problems. Negotiation on these problems must take place in open forums, in the sight and knowledge of world public opinion, in order to reflect the major changes which have occurred in international relations and to strengthen the trust of the peoples of the world in the United Nations. We are justified, therefore, in claiming that the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is destined to play a historic role in this regard.

As was stressed by the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu:

"We believe the special session of the United Nations to be devoted to disarmament in 1978 should pave the way to the adoption of concrete measures and on disarmament, above all, on nuclear disarmament."

In our view, the special session should take place at the highest level so as to give a powerful boost to disarmament negotiations and to make effective progress towards the solution of a problem which is long overdue.

The session must be an autonomous forum, empowered to take decisions of crucial importance to world peace and security, to discuss and adopt the principles, decisions and measures needed to open up a new era of negotiations, an era of genuine disarmament under strict and effective international control.

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

Having always actively supported the adoption of the decision to convene a special session of the General Assembly of the United Nations devoted to disarmament, the Romanian delegation has maintained from the very outset that its success depends to a very high degree on appropriate and scrupulous preparation. A particularly important role in this respect should be played by the Preparatory Committee for the special session, whose first report on its work is before our Committee.

The report of the Ad Hoc Committee is an encouraging document and makes it clear that the work that has so far been done by this body has demonstrated perceptible progress, the most important aspect of which seems to us to be the concerted work on the agenda for the forthcoming session. At the same time, we should like to stress the constructive working atmosphere which prevailed in the course of the Committee's work.

In spite of the accomplishments of the Committee, we do feel that in view of the short time which remains before the special session sustained effort is necessary on the part of all to accelerate the preparatory work. I think it is appropriate to recall here that the most important part of the Committee's work - that is, the preparation of the documents which the special session will have to adopt - should begin immediately, and the results of the session will themselves depend largely on the way in which we perform this task.

Now, in the well-known present disarmament situation, we can hardly permit the special session to be anything other than successful. In its anxiety to make a constructive contribution to the preparation for the special session, the Romanian delegation submitted in the Preparatory Committee, in the form of working proposals, draft documents which we believe it will be desirable and necessary to have adopted by the special session, namely: the declaration of the special session containing the principles of disarmament negotiations and their goals and priorities; tactics and strategy for guiding the process of all negotiations on disarmament; the programme of action, staggered in terms of time, containing concrete measures to be taken within

(Mr. Datcu, Romania)

the realm of nuclear and conventional disarmament, to strengthen confidence and co-operation among States; and, finally, decisions and recommendations on negotiating machinery, with a view to establishing flexible and viable structures, enjoying the necessary authority and functioning according to democratic rules and working procedures.

Those are the points which my delegation wanted to make at this stage of our debate on the subject of the special session of the United Nations devoted to disarmament.

While repeating the sincere wish of Romania to contribute, now and in the future too, in so far as lies within our power, to the successful preparation and outcome of the special session, I should like to stress once again the need for us all to redouble our efforts to see to it that that session adopts clear, precise and binding documents which can set disarmament negotiations on the road to effectiveness.

The meeting rose at 12.55 p.m.