



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 14th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. BOATEN (Ghana)

later: Mr. PASTINEN (Finland)  
(Vice-Chairman)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

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Mr. UPADHYAY (Nepal): Every nation, as every individual, has been endowed by the Creator with certain essential attributes that make it survive, develop, and grow. It is essential for a nation to choose its own path of development. No nation owes its survival to any other and no nation can develop without its own initiative. So, when we talk of the relationship between disarmament and development, we do not do so to arouse compassion towards the developing countries. In fact, we are guided by two factors: first, the impact of colonialism as a factor that contributed to the state of underdevelopment cannot be ignored; and, second, the interdependence of the modern world and the need for global co-operation to tackle these problems cannot be overlooked.

However, when we say that the imperialist-colonial exploitation of countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America resulted in the stunted growth of these countries, we are not asking for any compensation, but we do believe that the developed countries are in duty bound to co-operate in the restoration of the economic health of these countries. Although we are still in an age in which nation-States predominate, it is true that the problems faced by these States have acquired a new dimension. We are paving the way for the emergence of a single world order, though not at present a world government, and the law of social development remains a guide to these efforts. As the emergence of a nation-State superseded the so-called self-sufficient village or community economy, so the growth of a world order will have to be based upon interdependence and co-operation among the nations of the world. The realization that mankind as a whole can either prosper or perish together has given rise to the modern phenomena of aid, assistance or co-operation from one nation to the other.

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When we talk of peace, we cannot isolate the question of progress. So when we talk of disarmament, we cannot but think in terms of development. In fact, although in a different context, the connexion between disarmament and development was seen as far back as twenty centuries ago. As it says in the Bible (Isaiah 2, 4):

"They shall beat their swords into ploughshares and their spears into pruning hooks. Nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more."

The Secretary-General of the United Nations in his report on the Economic and Social Consequences of the Arms Race and its Extremely Harmful Effects on World Peace and Security observes:

"The arms race represents a waste of resources, a diversion of the economy away from its humanitarian purposes, a hindrance to national development efforts and a threat to democratic processes. But its most important feature is that in effect it undermines national, regional and international security". (A/32/88, p. 59)

We are in the second Development Decade and also in the Disarmament Decade. We are debating how to establish a new economic order yet the performance in all these fields is grossly disappointing. The present level of development assistance falls far short of the targets. During the first half of the Second Development Decade, official development assistance from the developed countries amounted to 0.32 per cent of their combined gross national product. Transfer to development assistance of funds equivalent to a mere 5 per cent of their current military expenditure would have been sufficient to meet the target of 0.7 per cent.

The theme of diversion to peaceful purposes of the resources now in military use is not new to the General Assembly. One can at least go back to 1950 when the General Assembly called upon nations to agree to reduce military expenditures and divert them for "the general welfare, with due regard to the needs of the under-developed areas of the world". (General Assembly resolution 300 (V)).

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But 20 years later, in 1970, the military budgets of the aid donors were approximately 30 times greater than the official development assistance they provided to the developing countries. For the last few years, we have been discussing again the need for reduction of military budget, although this obligation has been confined to all States permanent members of the Security Council. It is a matter of relief that we have passed the stage of scepticism that was initially expressed when the item was introduced in 1973. There seems to be an agreement in principle. The only problem that remained was to develop a satisfactory instrument for the effective reporting of military expenditures by States. The validity of the concept of reporting instrument, as contained in the 1976 report on reduction of military budgets, has received sufficient credibility with an awareness of the need to further develop the reporting instrument in order to ensure attention to the suggestions for modification and reservations made by some States. My delegation welcomes the report on reduction of military budgets and supports the continuation of the efforts of the Group of Experts.

However, we feel it is our obligation to inform the General Assembly that, although my delegation supported the item from the beginning during the thirtieth session of the General Assembly, we had cautioned that unless this move is coupled with the desire to freeze the level of military spending, the so-called reduction of 10 per cent might become ineffective by an over-all increase in the military budget. When we proposed a freeze we did so with the desire to check the growth in military expenditure so that a cut in expenditure during a year would not be followed by an increase of 20 per cent in the subsequent year and thus weaken the thrust of the proposal. A freeze on the level of military expenditure would mean that there would be a limit beyond which expenses could not be increased. Since then, our position has been vindicated. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) estimate in 1973, the world military expenditure was \$207.4 billion. Being aware of the difficulty of calling an immediate halt to the manufacture and production of weapons, we put forward the proposal as a means of ensuring a reduction in

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the level of armaments. The rising cost of materials needed for armament and the rising cost of research and development of more sophisticated weapons should have had the effect of slowing down the arms race. If we are to increase the manifold attempts to curb the arms race, the question of freeze must receive the proper attention of the General Assembly and of its special session on disarmament.

Difficult as it is, the problem of disarmament, because of its multifarious nature, needs manifold tackling. Disarmament is a "must" for peace and security, but peace cannot be guaranteed only with the reduction of armaments. We will not have peace unless tension is reduced by all possible means. We must realize that war has become too dangerous a game to play, and we must create an alternative to war as an instrument for the settlement of disputes between nations. We have to look for such an alternative, as any other problem in the establishment of peace is multi-faceted. The role of the United Nations has to be increased, along with the establishment of institutions for peace on a regional and subregional basis. In this context, the question of the creation of zones of peace assumes great significance. It is important for all nations of the world, but for the small Powers and the powerless ones, it is imperative.

A world free from tension between nations is our goal. A region or subregion free from tension will greatly contribute to the achievement of such a goal. But no region or subregion can become free from tension by dint of understanding among the nations of the region and subregion alone. Any such effort on a regional or subregional basis must receive the full support of the extraregional Powers, so that tension is not inflicted upon them because of the whims or so-called interests of extraregional Powers.

Similarly, no single nation can chart a course of peace for itself unless the peripheral nations guarantee that its wishes to chart a course of peace will be respected. We have before us the examples of the declaration of Latin America and the Indian Ocean as zones of peace. In order to create a zone of peace, at least the acquiescence of extra-zonal Powers becomes most essential. Most of the small developing countries are engaged in the maximum use of all the

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resources at their disposal for their socio-economic development. They cannot afford the luxury of being engaged in the acquisition of arms.

At least in this respect, I believe, the plight of all developing small nations is the same. Under the leadership of our sovereign, His Majesty King Birendra, we in Nepal are engaged in a constant endeavour to achieve the goals of economic development and social justice with a view to fulfilling the needs and aspirations of the common man.

His Majesty has expressed that

"to realize these goals, an atmosphere of peace is vital. We have, therefore, unreservedly advocated the establishment of peace, both within and outside the country, and have followed a policy of peace and friendship with all nations of the world irrespective of their social and political systems".

For such countries as mine which bear friendship for all and enmity towards none, which neither wish to disrupt peace in any way nor to become the victim of the effects of tension between nations, which want to live in peace and let others live in peace, the question of freedom from tension is of supreme importance. We are always in favour of promoting understanding between nations, and even more so with our neighbours. We believe that the promotion of understanding and the elimination of tension between nations in a region or subregion will make a positive contribution to world peace.

The question of the creation of zones of peace in different parts of the world will be a positive step in the direction of lessening of tension and de-escalation of the arms race. The desire of a country or a number of countries should be considered in the light of that background.

(Mr. Upadhyay, Nepal)

The creation of a zone of peace in any area, however small and limited, creates a definite advantage for the peripheral nations as well. It not only enlarges the scope of peace and security within a country or countries thus declared a zone of peace, but also extends it to adjoining nations, which for certain reasons are not able to join the zone, because it relieves them from tension at least in those areas of their country that border on the country in the zone of peace. It reduces their tension to the extent that they may feel secure in that part of their country and are relieved of the burden of preparation and deployment, thereby reducing to some extent the waste of resources. The creation of zones of peace can therefore be considered a positive step towards the lessening of tension. The creation of a zone of peace even in a limited area will have to involve more than one nation in order to contribute towards the zone, and thus provides a subregional character.

Having been convinced of the efficacy of the creation of such zones of peace in lessening tension, we stated during the last session that:

"... it will not be out of place here to examine the question of the urge of nations to declare certain areas as zones of peace. Such proposals for the creation of zones of peace, we believe, have been motivated by a desire to contribute to the relaxation of international tension. They are also in keeping with the objectives of the United Nations, in particular the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all States and abstention from the threat or use of force.

"... A feeling of insecurity leads to armament which, in turn, leads to a feeling of further insecurity. The circle is so vicious that any proposal, however modest it may be, should be given due support by the international community, since it has the effect of relaxing tension and should be welcomed as a step contributing to the goal of disarmament - nuclear or conventional.

"In fact, this process of declaration of zones of peace should be regarded as a process of horizontal reduction of armaments. ... It reduces the areas of possible conflict and also removes the need for rivalry and influence. The creation of such zones will greatly contribute to reducing tension". (A/C.1/31/EV.33, pp. 25 and 26)

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Thus, the proposal to create zones of peace is very closely linked to disarmament and development. It contributes positively to the relaxation of tension in an area, making the acquisition or production of arms unnecessary, and it provides an incentive to reduce military expenditure, thus allowing the transfer to development purposes of resources used in order to possess and to manufacture arms. It reduces the harmful effects of armament on world peace and security, gradually expands the area of peace, and enhances amity and understanding among nations, thus strengthening the purposes and ideals of the United Nations.

Mr. FLORIN (German Democratic Republic) (interpretation from Russian):

At the present time, the focus of our discussion in the First Committee is on questions associated with the arms race and the implementation of genuine disarmament measures. Our debate has clearly reflected the growing concern of States and peoples to attain perceptible progress in those areas. This is only too understandable, because, after all, the issue is the most important problem of contemporary international politics. Making peace more reliable, taking effective steps to bring about disarmament and making détente an irreversible process are matters in which all peoples have a vital interest. We should therefore spare no effort to come to an agreement as soon as possible on measures concerning the qualitative and quantitative limitation of the arms race and disarmament.

As was stated by Erich Honecker, the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany and the Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic, on 3 October this year on the occasion of the visit by a party and State delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic to the German Democratic Republic, our country believes

"that it is essential to halt, first of all, the arms race, and to take concrete steps to limit armaments and to bring about disarmament. All those who have sincere intentions will consider the recent Soviet-United States statement on the limitation of strategic armaments as an encouraging sign. It would appear that, with a realistic approach, progress is possible on the most complex international problems.

(Mr. Florin, German Democratic Republic)

"Every gain made in détente is to the advantage of the peoples of the world, and this is something that we take to be an unswerving principle. It is precisely in this sense that we support all the proposals of the USSR submitted at this session of the General Assembly, proposals which constitute an important further initiative for ensuring peace".

The delegation of the German Democratic Republic is convinced that the Political Committee at the thirty-second session can do a great deal to promote the practical implementation of the numerous initiatives to limit armaments, to bring about disarmament, and to achieve appropriate binding and effective international agreements. Conditions are becoming ever more favourable to resist the desires of the opponents of détente and those circles connected with the military-industrial complex whose goal is to hinder the attainment of agreement on a limitation of the arms race and on initiating real disarmament.

This kind of action leads to an escalation of the arms race, and is in flagrant contradiction to the aspirations of the peoples of the world who wish to consolidate the process of détente.

No one would deny that in the circumstances of the nuclear age such a policy increases the danger that possible military conflicts will flare up into full-scale nuclear war with nefarious consequences for mankind. It is becoming ever clearer that if we do not succeed in taking effective measures towards military détente, slackening the arms race and ultimately bringing it to a halt, it will become increasingly difficult to deepen the positive trends in international life and make them an irreversible factor in international relations. We must take urgent and far-reaching measures to halt the arms race and to bring about disarmament. This is, of course, the key issue in continuing the process of détente. We are gratified by the growing understanding of the fact that effective disarmament measures require the active participation of all States. There is no alternative. After all, in the face of the danger to mankind flowing from the arms race, can we allow certain States with substantial military potential to persist in their refusal to assume specific obligations in the field of disarmament, and enable them systematically to make achievement of progress even more difficult?

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(Mr. Florin, German Democratic Republic)

No one can or has the right to sit by idly, waiting or, by invoking the particular responsibility of certain great Powers with substantial military potential, simply to let events take their course. In order to achieve concrete results in the field of disarmament, we must unite the efforts of all States and mobilize the peace-loving forces of the whole world.

(Mr. Florin, German  
Democratic Republic)

We cannot fail to remark, on the eve of the sixtieth anniversary of the great October Socialist Revolution, on the tireless efforts of the Soviet Union which, by its new initiatives, is showing the way consistently and with great flexibility to comprehensive disarmament measures up to and including general and complete disarmament. This purpose is served also by the proposal recently made by the Soviet Union to prevent the danger of nuclear war, a proposal which if it were to be adopted would undoubtedly improve the political climate for radical agreements in the field of disarmament.

Thanks to the active efforts of peace-loving forces throughout the world, real conditions have now been created for the prevention of world nuclear war and the taking of radical disarmament measures. We are surprised that in the light of this situation the representative of a great Power abused the opportunity afforded by this debate once again to preach the inevitability of world war and to spread crude slander against the policy of a State which for 60 years, the 60 years of its existence, has earned universal respect as a consistent champion of peace and disarmament. We are convinced that the united efforts of States and the peoples of the world will overcome those forces which are making frenzied efforts to knock together an anti-communist bloc under the flag of anti-hegemonism, namely, a kind of new edition of the so-called anti-Comintern pact, forces which for their own narrow selfish interests want to incite hostility between States.

The German Democratic Republic wishes to confirm its view that in order to prevent a world military conflict highest priority should go to the limitation of the arms race in the field of weapons of mass destruction, banning this type of weapon, primarily nuclear weapons. In so far as concerns the States parties to the Warsaw Treaty, they have undertaken a number of initiatives in order to create an appropriate international climate. These initiatives include the proposal of States parties to the Warsaw Treaty to other participants in the Helsinki Conference to conclude a treaty which would provide for the obligation not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other. We hope that the negative reaction of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) States will not be their last word.

(Mr. Florin, German  
Democratic Republic)

I should like to welcome the efforts which are under way at the present time in various bodies to obtain agreement on a comprehensive ban on any form of nuclear-weapons tests, including underground tests. In this connexion I should like to stress particularly the trilateral talks between the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom in Geneva and also the talks which are going on on these matters in the Geneva disarmament Committee. A total and comprehensive prohibition of nuclear tests would bar the way to the qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons. It would be an effective contribution to the cessation of the arms race in this area and also to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

A pre-condition for a fundamental solution to this problem, however, is the participation of all nuclear Powers in such an agreement. This would place equal obligations on all States and would be entirely in keeping with the security interests of all States which could, on an equal footing, enjoy the material and political advantages flowing from such a prohibition. This end still continues to be best served by the proposal of the USSR to begin talks on a complete and general prohibition of nuclear tests with the participation of all nuclear States and 25-30 non-nuclear States, approved by an overwhelming majority of Members of the United Nations in General Assembly resolutions 3478 (XXX) and 31/89.

It is gratifying to note that already 26 socialist and non-aligned States, and also the Soviet Union as a nuclear Power, have expressed their readiness to take part in such talks. Since this body, because of the negative attitude of certain nuclear States, has so far been unable to begin its work, the thirty-second session of the General Assembly should issue an urgent appeal, particularly to all nuclear States, immediately to participate in implementing this proposal. My delegation views the readiness of the USSR to come to an agreement with the United States and the United Kingdom, not to carry out underground tests of nuclear weapons for a given period of time - this was stated by the Foreign Minister of the USSR in a plenary meeting of the thirty-second session of the General Assembly - as evidence of the intensive efforts of the Soviet Union to achieve a prohibition of all nuclear-weapons tests.

(Mr. Florin, German  
Democratic Republic)

Such a moratorium could constitute a certain stage on the road towards the prohibition of all nuclear-weapons tests. We should make effective use of this moratorium so that all nuclear States could assume treaty obligations with regard to the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests and we continue to believe that it is the primary task of the United Nations and of its bodies to promote this end.

My delegation further believes that it is necessary and possible in connexion with the agreement on the prohibition of all nuclear-weapons tests also to regulate the problem of peaceful nuclear explosions. Agreements in the field of disarmament should in no way be allowed to impede or make impossible the harnessing of the latest advances of science and technology for solving important economic problems. Therefore, article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty provides that the benefits flowing from the peaceful use of nuclear explosions should be made accessible to non-nuclear States. In accordance with this, the German Democratic Republic is also taking part in the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in working out rules of conduct governing nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes on the territory of non-nuclear States by using the services of nuclear explosions of nuclear States.

(Mr. Florin, German Democratic Republic)

The treaty signed on 28 May 1976 between the Soviet Union and the United States on underground peaceful explosions confirms the fact that given the necessary political will this problem can be resolved too. But we cannot possibly permit this question to become a pretext for procrastinating or hindering the attainment of agreement on a comprehensive prohibition of all nuclear-weapons tests.

My delegation attaches great significance to the further strengthening of the régime governing the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Measures to prevent the expansion of the number of nuclear States have become extremely topical and timely. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by other States would erect new obstacles to nuclear disarmament. For example, a serious threat to peace and security in Africa would arise if the South African racist régime were to obtain the possibility of acquiring nuclear weapons. Therefore, all countries which so far continue, in flagrant violation of the relevant resolutions of the United Nations, to co-operate with the apartheid régime in the nuclear field bear particular responsibility. We firmly favour the total implementation of resolution 3411 G (XXX) which recommends that the Security Council call upon the States concerned to ban the delivery to or placing at the disposal of South Africa of nuclear material, equipment and technology which the racist régime could use to manufacture nuclear weapons.

One of the most important requirements within the context of efforts to bring about disarmament should be that science and technology are harnessed for peaceful purposes. The treaty which the Soviet Union proposed two years ago banning the development and manufacture of new forms of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons would do a very great deal to help to bar the way to the proliferation and spread of the arms race into other areas. Such a preventive agreement, furthermore, would decisively prevent the undermining of existing agreements limiting armaments and promoting disarmament, and would thus help to consolidate those treaties. The urgency of this requirement has been stressed by the development of new forms of weapons such as, for example, the neutron bomb. The President of the World Federation of Scientific Workers, Professor Dr. Eric Berhaupt described the danger of this kind of weapon in an article for Horizont, a foreign policy magazine, using the following words:

(Mr. Florin, German Democratic Republic)

"It" - that is to say, the neutron bomb - "is a weapon exclusively for an aggressor who intends to seize towns and industrial centres of another country which remain undestroyed."

The German Democratic Republic, which is a relatively small European State situated at the interface between the two systems, has a particular interest in prohibiting this dangerous weapon, and we cannot be indifferent to the fact that certain imperialist circles seriously intend to locate this new cruel weapon of mass destruction in the NATO States, which include a State that is a neighbour of the German Democratic Republic. That would not only threaten the physical existence of our people but would cast a shadow on all the progress which has been made in recent years as a result of the sustained efforts which have been made to ensure peace and security in Europe.

Therefore, we firmly favour the continuation of talks on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, including the neutron bomb, and we welcome the growth of a mass movement in the most varied States which support this demand.

But it would be wrong to suppose that by using the threat of the neutron bomb it would be possible to blackmail the socialist States and force them to make concessions in certain fields. Those attempts will meet the same fate as did the attempts on the part of certain circles to influence the Potsdam Conference in 1945 using as a basis the successful carrying out of the first nuclear test. Nor should we forget that the beginning of production of such a weapon would lead to a further escalation of the arms race, because the other side would be forced to take appropriate retaliatory measures.

The draft treaty on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new forms of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons presented by the Soviet Union on 9 August 1977 to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva opens up new prospects for mutual understanding. It takes into account the views of a number of States and constitutes a good basis for the continuation of talks in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

(Mr. Florin, German Democratic Republic)

Therefore, the thirty-second session of the Assembly should call upon the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to continue its efforts and give priority to producing an agreement on a prohibition which will be binding in international law on the development and manufacture of new forms of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons.

As a result of bilateral talks between the Soviet Union and the United States and also talks in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament it has been possible to make some progress in preparing an agreement on the prohibition of chemical weapons, and we are gratified at the fact that the demand for a comprehensive prohibition of chemical weapons made by the socialist States as far back as 1972 is winning growing support.

(Mr. Florin, German Democratic Republic)

In our view, the complex problem of control could be swiftly resolved if all parties were to demonstrate the necessary political will. The proposals submitted in this regard by the USSR to the Geneva Committee on Disarmament show that national means of control are fully consistent with the purpose of the treaty, namely, that of effectively ensuring observance of the prohibition of chemical weapons. Furthermore, if national means of control are supplemented by certain international procedures, something on which the Soviet Union has presented concrete proposals in the CCD, then nothing could prevent a speedy agreement on the text of a treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The forthcoming special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament opens up favourable prospects for progress in the disarmament field. The report of the Preparatory Committee already before us reflects the serious wish of States to avail themselves of the session in order to consider matters connected with disarmament and to determine the major areas for further action. However, the participation of all nuclear States in the special session is of course, of great significance.

In this connexion I should like to recall the readiness of the Soviet Union "at any time to sit down at the negotiating table with all other nuclear Powers to consider comprehensively the whole problem of nuclear disarmament in all its scope and jointly to work out concrete ways and means of resolving it in practice".

That comes from the memorandum of the USSR on questions relating to the cessation of the arms race and disarmament.

If all States, as they are called upon to do by the draft resolution on the prevention of the danger of nuclear war submitted by the USSR, were to refrain from any action likely to make international talks more difficult - talks which are being held in order to produce agreements on limiting the arms race and eliminating the danger of nuclear war - this could only serve the goal of achieving further progress.

Accordingly, if all States Members of the United Nations were to give decisive support to this draft resolution, they would by so doing be making a valuable contribution to the preparation and the successful holding of a special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament.

(Mr. Florin, German Democratic Republic)

In the course of the debate we have repeatedly heard the phrase "arms control" used as if this were the primary task. In order to dispel misunderstanding I should like to stress in this regard that it is not arms control which should be the principal content of our thinking processes but, rather, the need to come to an agreement on effective measures to limit the arms race and to bring about disarmament. This, in our view, should be the fundamental task of the United Nations, and of the forthcoming special session of the General Assembly on disarmament.

We expect the special session to be held in a constructive and creative atmosphere and decisions to be taken by consensus, thus preparing the ground for effective disarmament measures. Like all other States of the socialist community, the German Democratic Republic has an interest in the greatest possible success of the special session of the General Assembly, but success depends largely on preparation for that session. In this regard we note with great regret that the Eastern European socialist States are not properly represented in the Preparatory Committee. Two States with many years of experience in the field of disarmament and which have for many years actively participated in the work of the Geneva Disarmament Committee have so far not had an opportunity to co-operate on an equal footing in the Preparatory Committee. We hope that in the course of this session a decision will be taken on this point in keeping with the active role of the socialist States in the fight for disarmament.

My delegation wishes to express its agreement in principle with the report of the Preparatory Committee. This specifically refers to the items on the agenda, site and period of the session. We must now pay greater attention to preparation for the special session in terms of the substance of the problems. The seven socialist States in the Preparatory Committee have presented their views with regard to a final document of the session and this contains the fundamental principles for disarmament talks as well as major areas for further action in the disarmament field. They take into account the need for limiting the arms race both as regards weapons of mass destruction and conventional weapons and, finally, for making a start on destruction of these weapons. At the same time, they provide for measures for regional

(Mr. Florin, German Democratic Republic)

military détente and also for the establishment of peace zones and nuclear-free zones. Accordingly, favourable conditions exist for comprehensive preparation of the substance of the forthcoming special session.

In this regard my delegation wishes once again to draw attention to the need for the special session to make a decisive contribution to an improvement of conditions for the convening of a world disarmament conference. This would be in keeping with the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Member States. Such a conference could take some fundamental decisions on disarmament questions as well as measures to implement specific agreements on disarmament. On this basis my delegation supports the proposal that the Special Committee for the World Disarmament Conference should present a report on all aspects of the convening of a world disarmament conference.

(Mr. Florin, German Democratic Republic)

At the present time, States already have available to them a broad network of bilateral, regional and world-wide bodies for holding talks on matters pertaining to the cessation of the arms race and disarmament. My delegation attaches great importance to the role and work of the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

In the course of its work over a period of fifteen years, the CCD has produced some important agreements limiting armaments and for disarmament; it has also accumulated some valuable experience. By no means the least important reason for its success is the composition of the CCD, which to a large extent reflects existing international reality. If it has hitherto been unable to achieve far-reaching success, it is by no means because of its composition or procedures. It is mainly because of the lack of political will on the part of certain States which continue to resist comprehensive disarmament measures.

The German Democratic Republic is in favour of enhancing the role of the CCD and it is convinced that if this happens, the Committee can play a decisive role in the preparations for future disarmament agreements.

In conclusion, may I be permitted to point out that my delegation believes that the debate in the First Committee will facilitate the attainment of appreciable progress in the consideration of the items on the agenda. The delegation of the German Democratic Republic is determined to make its own contribution to this cause.

Mr. OGISO (Japan): Before going into the substance of my remarks, Mr. Chairman, I should like to take this opportunity to congratulate the Chairman of this Committee, on his election to this important post. I should also like to congratulate the two Vice-Chairmen, and the Rapporteur, on their election as officers of this Committee.

In 1969 the General Assembly, at its twenty-fourth session, declared the decade of the 1970s the Disarmament Decade. Last year, the thirty-first session of the General Assembly decided to convene the first special session in the history of the United Nations devoted to disarmament. Those decisions demonstrate the

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earnest desire of the international community to strengthen international peace and security, and are additional reasons why tangible results should be achieved in the field of disarmament. Until now, a number of disarmament treaties have been brought into being through negotiations in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and among the nuclear-weapon States, including the partial test ban Treaty, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the Treaty banning biological and toxic weapons, the sea-bed Treaty, and several agreements within the framework of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) negotiations. However, that does not necessarily mean that those achievements were entirely satisfactory, particularly when we realize the urgency of the measures that are required for the attainment of general and complete disarmament.

Now that the special session is less than seven months away, my delegation wishes to state here the views of the Government of Japan, focusing on the greatest, the most urgent and the truly fundamental questions in the field of disarmament. They are nuclear disarmament, conventional arms control and disarmament.

I believe that no one can deny that the highest priority in the field of disarmament must be given to the question of nuclear disarmament. In spite of the continuous efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament at the United Nations and in other international forums on disarmament, nuclear disarmament is still far from attainment, while the nuclear arms race continues to increase in terms of both quality and quantity.

Today the question of nuclear disarmament is closely related to one of the urgent concerns of the international community, namely, how to prevent the danger of nuclear weapons proliferation while securing the use of atomic energy to help to meet the increasing demand for energy. The supreme task is how to pursue these two imperatives in harmony with each other. My delegation believes that the most practical way to further international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons is to take as a starting point the Non-Proliferation Treaty régime, the most important existing international legal framework and the basic instrument for halting nuclear proliferation.

We wish to call attention to the fact that nearly 100 non-nuclear-weapon States have voluntarily given up the option of manufacturing or acquiring nuclear

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weapons by becoming parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and have thus contributed to the cause of nuclear non-proliferation. Therefore we need to make the Non-Proliferation Treaty universal and effective by further supplementing and reinforcing this Treaty. My delegation wishes to emphasize again, firstly, that negotiations for nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States should make real progress and, secondly, that the inalienable right of the non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty with respect to the peaceful uses of atomic energy should be substantiated. Summing up, nuclear disarmament, that is, the prevention of vertical proliferation, is also urgently needed to reinforce the framework of non-proliferation. Therefore, if there is no progress in preventing vertical proliferation, or if it becomes clear that none is in prospect, justification for seeking the prevention of horizontal proliferation will be greatly reduced, and eventually the Non-Proliferation Treaty régime itself will be weakened.

In concrete terms, my delegation believes that rapid progress should be made with respect to the following measures. First, with regard to SALT, the United States and the Soviet Union have for five years continued their negotiations in the second round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, but they did not succeed in reaching final agreement by the deadline of 3 October 1977. We cannot refrain from saying that we are disappointed with this result.

However, we would like to note that on 3 October, when SALT I expired both the United States and the Soviet Union issued statements pledging that, while making further efforts to reach agreements on SALT II, they would respect the SALT I agreement on a reciprocal basis.

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On 4 October, speaking in the United Nations General Assembly, President Carter stated:

"The United States is willing to go as far as possible, consistent with our security interests, in limiting and reducing our nuclear weapons. On a reciprocal basis, we are willing now to reduce them by 10 per cent, 20 per cent or even 50 per cent. Then we will work for further reductions to a world truly free of nuclear weapons." (A/32/PV.18, p. 6)

We welcome that statement. However, we request emphatically that, in view of their special responsibilities, the top leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union bring the second round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) into being at an early date, and beyond that, endeavour to take concrete steps towards the substantial reduction of nuclear weapons.

I turn now to the question of the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban (CTB) treaty. The conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear test-ban treaty is essential as the first step towards nuclear disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States. The main problems to be solved in attaining the CTB treaty are as follows: first, adherence of all the nuclear-weapon States to a CTB treaty from the time of its entry into force; secondly, regulation of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (PNE); and thirdly, verification - particularly acceptance of on-site inspections.

With respect to the first problem, namely, the participation of all the nuclear-weapon States, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, made the following statement at the start of the current session of the General Assembly:

"Today we are taking one more step forward: under an arrangement with the United States and the United Kingdom we have consented to suspend underground nuclear-weapon tests for a certain period of time even before the other nuclear Powers accede to the future treaty."

(A/32/PV.81, p. 73-75)

If a moratorium on underground nuclear-weapon tests is accepted by the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union, that will be an important first step towards the achievement of a CTB treaty, and my delegation would welcome it.

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However, this is far from indicating in any way that China and France may continue to stay outside the CTB régime, and my delegation wishes to reiterate its strong appeal to them to participate in the CTB treaty negotiations as soon as possible and become parties to the treaty.

In this connexion, as was reported on 25 August this year, President Giscard d'Estaing made the following statement:

(continued in French)

"Arms limitation is, after all, a topical question. The excessive accumulation of weapons in the world requires urgent and resolute action. France will make its contribution to such action."

(spoke in English)

My delegation wishes to interpret that statement as indicating a positive attitude by France towards multilateral disarmament negotiations, including CTB treaty negotiations.

With regard to peaceful nuclear explosions, it has been said that certain discrepancies of views in the current consultations between the United States, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on this matter have delayed the opening of CTB negotiations. At the present stage of technology, nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes cannot be distinguished from those for military purposes, and hence it is clear that unless PNE is placed under strict international control, PNE will inevitably develop into loop-holes in the CTB régime. My delegation does not reject entirely the theoretical possibility of the useful role which PNE can play, for example in large-scale civil engineering projects such as canal construction. But when we compare such hypothetical economic benefits with the benefits for mankind as a whole from the prevention of nuclear proliferation, my delegation considers it most reasonable that no PNE should be conducted unless agreement is reached on an international supervision and control system which will ensure that no weapons-testing can be carried out under the guise of PNE. In this connexion, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, referred to the prohibition of underground nuclear tests, but we believe that the prohibition of underground nuclear tests will be meaningless unless the suspension of PNE is agreed upon.

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With respect to the verification problem, my delegation wishes to call attention to the fact that the Ad Hoc Experts Group on Seismic Events of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) has been quite active and its work has made steady progress, while, at the same time, the CCD has not been able to start negotiations for a CTB treaty. It is to be noted that the Group is studying the feasibility of setting up an international seismic data exchange system to detect and identify seismic events. In this connexion, since the greater the number of stations participating in the system, the more effective it will be, my delegation strongly appeals to the countries represented here that desire to do so - including those that are not members of the CCD - to participate in the proposed system.

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We wish to call attention to the fact that Japan has proposed to the CCD that the Expert Group continue to function and that it try out this data exchange system, stage by stage, on an experimental basis. Clearly, this work of detection and identification will continue to be an important part of the verification procedures of a comprehensive test ban, the basic principle of which should be on-site inspections. In the light of the increasing tendency to develop the system of verification for arms control and disarmament treaties, as shown in the deliberations on the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, we are convinced that this system can avoid the political disputes involved with verification problems and will help assure compliance with the Treaty obligations if a consultative committee of experts of the parties, including those of non-nuclear-weapon States, is set up within the framework of a comprehensive test ban treaty and if on-site inspections can be carried out through such a consultation system upon the findings in cases giving rise to certain doubts.

In accordance with the developments I have mentioned my delegation strongly urges that political decisions be made on two points that remain to be settled - namely, verification and peaceful explosions - and that negotiations be initiated at the CCD as soon as possible to formulate a comprehensive test ban treaty with effective international controls.

Finally, the fact that a variety of nuclear tests are being conducted while these efforts at a comprehensive test ban are being made inevitably arouses a deep feeling of dissatisfaction and helplessness in my delegation. We deplore the fact that, without even mentioning what happened earlier, the United States, the Soviet Union and France have continued underground nuclear tests since the last session of the General Assembly. We deplore also the fact that an atmospheric nuclear test was recently conducted by the People's Republic of China. Consistent with our opposition to any nuclear test by any State, Japan reiterates its appeal for the immediate cessation of all nuclear tests.

Concerning the question of a cut-off in the production of fissionable materials for weapons purposes, it has also been suggested that such a cut-off would be another step towards nuclear disarmament. President Eisenhower of the United States first proposed the idea in 1956, and since then the United States

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has strongly favoured a cut-off and has made a variety of proposals to this end in statements in the United Nations General Assembly and the CCD. I should like to call to mind in particular the statement made in 1969 by the representative of the United States of America, Mr. Fisher, at the spring session of the CCD, in which he proposed the essential elements of a cut-off agreement, and also his statement in the First Committee at the present session of the General Assembly which showed that the United States still has a cut-off in mind as one of the next subjects for negotiation. In the light of the positive statement by President Carter on the reduction of nuclear weapons, to which I referred earlier, as well as the statement in the First Committee on 17 October by the Soviet representative, Ambassador Troyanovsky, supporting the reduction of nuclear weapons, I strongly urge that the United States, the Soviet Union and the other nuclear-weapons States commence talks aimed at a cut-off of the production of nuclear fissionable materials for weapons purposes, to be accompanied by the transfer of stockpiles of weapons-grade materials to peaceful purposes as concrete steps to restrain the increase in the quantity of nuclear weapons.

There has been a tendency in recent disarmament negotiations to deal mainly with preventive measures such as the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and the prohibition of radiological weapons. Certainly we do not intend to ignore the significance of these preventive measures, but we doubt the wisdom of having the CCD, following the environmental modification Convention, continue to take up and devote its time to such disarmament questions, which are peripheral and unclear even with regard to the scope of the prohibition and present difficulties of verification that are easy to foresee.

We cannot fail to observe that the achievements in disarmament negotiations in the 32 years since the Second World War are meagre in comparison with the tremendous number of problems still to be solved. We are convinced that the time has come to give priority to more basic, central and urgent disarmament questions and to deal with them directly. In so doing we shall be giving a fresh impetus to genuine disarmament. Is this not the fundamental reason for holding the special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament?

What, then, are the urgent disarmament questions that we should tackle? They are, first, the early realization of a comprehensive nuclear test ban and, second, the conclusion of a treaty banning chemical weapons, on which deliberations have

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been continuing for more than 10 years. The CCD, which has substantial achievements to its credit as a negotiating body and is now functioning effectively, should not accept the criticism that it has been dealing solely with peripheral questions. What is important for us is to have the CCD start negotiations immediately on such important disarmament questions.

In addition to those items, the control and reduction of conventional arms, stockpiles of which are reaching tremendous totals, and in particular the control of the arms trade, should be undertaken as another crucial problem touching the core of the arms race. With the special session on disarmament approaching, I should like to state as clearly as possible the views the Government of Japan holds on this problem.\*

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\* Mr. Pastinen (Finland), Vice-Chairman, took the Chair.

(Mr. Ogiso, Japan)

I want to emphasize first of all that to take up the question of conventional arms control and disarmament does not at all mean diverting our attention from the question of nuclear disarmament. Japan has experienced the ravages of nuclear weapons - it is well known that there are now in the world tens of thousands of nuclear weapons, each with a yield equal to 50 of the Hiroshima-type bombs - and hence we have taken every opportunity to insist that nuclear disarmament is the most urgent and important task of our time and that the nuclear-weapon States have grave responsibilities for furthering nuclear disarmament. We will never cease to do so.

Furthermore, we have been making practical contributions to the realization of effective measures of nuclear disarmament, utilizing the technical knowledge and experience acquired in seeking a comprehensive test ban, as I have mentioned before. Since we are conscious of the fact that progress in nuclear disarmament depends on the political will of the nuclear-weapon States, we doubt that the non-nuclear-weapon States can release themselves from their responsibilities for the over-all progress of disarmament simply by calling for the need for nuclear disarmament. While the nuclear-weapon States have incomparably larger responsibilities in both nuclear and non-nuclear disarmament, we, the non-nuclear-weapon States, should on our part do our utmost to accelerate progress on disarmament in the non-nuclear area.

There can be no genuine disarmament without the control and reduction of conventional weapons, which account for four-fifths of the total military expenditures of the world. It is made clear in the Expert Group's report on the economic and social consequences of the armaments race (A/32/88) how resources that are urgently needed for economic and social progress have been wasted on the arms race in conventional weapons, and how this wastage has proved an obstacle to the economic and social development of a number of countries, particularly the developing countries. This report, which is the product of two years of work, and was recently presented to the Secretary-General, has just been distributed to this Committee. The final chapter of the report makes the following recommendation:

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"It should be borne in mind that the bulk of the world's military expenditures is being devoted to the accumulation of conventional arms. The build-up of conventional arms in many parts of the world in recent years has generated increasing concern. Without denying the overriding importance of nuclear disarmament, which is undoubtedly the most urgent task of our time, nor the inalienable right of every sovereign State of self-defence, it should be stressed that maybe the time has come to study this problem thoroughly and to seek feasible ways to formulate international agreements on the transfer of weapons." (A/32/88, para. 183)

The recent qualitative improvement in conventional weapons has increased both their destructive power and strategic capability, has blurred the distinction between nuclear weapons and conventional weapons, and in the end has produced weapons which fall into the so-called grey area. We need to tackle the question of conventional arms control and disarmament parallel with that of nuclear disarmament, and we believe that if we do so, the over-all picture of general and complete disarmament will emerge.

Why has such an important question hardly been pursued in the United Nations? It is because conventional arms control and disarmament, and especially their international transfer, are delicate and difficult questions, directly related to the actual security needs of a great number of countries. However, we cannot circumvent these questions simply because they are delicate. As the representative of Nepal pointed out in his statement in this Committee on 19 October:

"In the last 32 years, since the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, not a single person has lost his life through the use of a nuclear weapon.

But in the same period" a great number "of people have died in" ...

"wars and battles by means of conventional weapons". (A/C.1/32/PV.8, p. 12)

Therefore, if we leave the matter unsolved, it cannot but be said that we are against the purpose of the early achievement of general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Ogiso, Japan)

The truth of this comment is clearly reflected in the fact that at least 32 of the 58 countries which have communicated to the Secretary-General their views on the special session touched upon the importance of this question, and that Sri Lanka, Mexico, Romania, the Northern European countries, and the Eastern European countries emphasized its importance in their proposals for a political declaration and an action programme.

The present situation, in which large amounts of sophisticated weapons are transferred and accumulated, is critical because of the danger of the outbreak of serious conflicts and the further danger that they may even escalate into a nuclear holocaust. We wish to emphasize that the time has come to tackle squarely the question of international transfers of conventional weapons, and we must face the realities involved in this question.

As a result of the production and transfer of conventional weapons, huge stockpiles of these arms exist in the world and arms exports by the United States and the Soviet Union to the rest of the world, particularly to the developing countries, have reached surprisingly large amounts.

As for the European region, negotiations for mutual and balanced force reductions are under way. Although the progress has not been great, it is of no small significance that representatives from both sides of Europe, including service officers, have gathered and sat at the same conference table, exchanged information on their military power, and continued their negotiations. However, as for the rest of the world, weapons have been rapidly acquired without regional consultations. The warning in the Secretary-General's annual report of 1976 that:

"The arms build-up in many particularly sensitive areas of the world has continued," (A/31/1/Add.1, p. 11)

referred to this situation. If weapons continue to flow into areas of potential armed conflict, while efforts are being made for the peaceful settlement of existing disputes, we have to say that any political settlement that may be

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reached will be on a precarious basis, not on a solid foundation. It is vitally necessary that, together with efforts for political settlements, the control of arms transfers which may be the means and source of conflicts should be worked out to improve the chances for a peaceful settlement of regional conflicts.

What I have mentioned here is not at all a new observation. It is a dark side of international politics that few have dared to touch upon.

What I want to say, in essence, is that we should no longer avoid looking at this disquieting reality, but should bravely throw a powerful light on it. Japan constitutes an exceptional case among advanced industrial States, since it exports practically no weapons, and I, as a representative of that State, say without hesitation that the international community must face this issue with courage. It is quite encouraging to us that since the Foreign Ministers of Singapore, Belgium, the Philippines and other countries took up this question at the last session of the General Assembly, a great many countries have expressed their positive views on it.

(Mr. Ogiso, Japan)

In his statement on 19 May this year, President Carter made it clear that the United States will follow a policy of self-restraint in limiting its weapons exports, and I welcome this as a positive response to the appeal for self-restraint which a number of countries, including my own, made in the General Assembly last year.

There is growing consensus that control of the transfer of conventional arms is an urgent and difficult question and that resolute measures should be taken to put restraints on such transfers into effect as soon as possible.

However, we wish to make it very clear that we are not seeking any radical measures at this moment, since this question is a very delicate matter, being closely related to global as well as regional security, to the freezing or reduction of mutual arms levels, and to the peaceful settlement of international disputes. We cannot therefore solve this question simply by cutting ourselves off from all these other matters. The international community should approach the issue carefully, for it requires, above all, just and impartial treatment.

In the General Assembly last year, my country appealed to every Government to communicate its views, and further requested a factual study of the present situation, as the first steps towards deliberations on this question and the formulation of a draft resolution. We made this appeal because we wished to avoid prejudging a decision on how this question should be handled. We believed that measures to solve it should be found in co-operation with other countries, and in such a sound and fair way that they would be acceptable to all.

We do not have any specific remedy for restraining the current flow of international transfers of conventional weapons, but in the light of suggestions made by many countries since the General Assembly met last year, we believe it possible for the General Assembly to handle the question on a global basis. And as Belgium suggested in the "Aide-Memoire on the Regional Aspects of Arms Control and Disarmament" which it submitted to the General Assembly last year, it may also be useful for us to examine the question of arms transfers as a part of regional conventional arms control and disarmament.

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In any case, the acquisition of weapons is allied with the sovereignty and security needs of every nation and hence we cannot impose any restrictive measure, even for those areas where a conflict seems likely to break out. In considering a regional arrangement, we should observe the fundamental rule that the initial steps should come from the regions concerned, which will lead to mutual consultations among the countries in the region on the level of armed forces and imports of weapons.

The reasons why we took an initiative on this question, appealing to the main arms suppliers to exercise self-restraint, was because we hoped to encourage emergence of such initiatives from the countries concerned in the respective regions. For example, I would cite the case of the Ayacucho Declaration by eight countries of Latin America, a continent of peace, with low armed forces levels.

There is the further example of the statement by the Egyptian Foreign Minister, Mr. Ismail Fahmy, in the General Assembly on 28 September, in which he stated that, as one of the items that have to be agreed upon for ensuring real peace in the Middle East:

"It is necessary to regulate conventional armaments, since a race in this field is likely to increase tension, thus increasing the possibilities of the situation exploding in the future." (A/32/PV.10, p. 53)

Possibly the ideal solution would be for such an initiative to come from the countries in a given region, and that this would lead to a detailed control of the region's international arms trade. If such an initiative were taken by arms importers in a region, my country, as a non-exporter of arms, would be in a position to appeal to the main arms exporters to respect and co-operate with this initiative in order that it may attain its goal and that progress may be made on arms control in the region concerned.

In the deliberations in the General Assembly last year, and at the three sessions of the Preparatory Committee for the special session devoted to disarmament, and also in the views and suggestions made by many countries regarding the special session, an increasing number of countries have pointed out the importance of this question and have demonstrated their positive attitude in seeking a solution. This has led my delegation to entertain great hopes for the outcome.

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We are convinced that these countries, while recognizing the complexity of the question, have come to the conclusion that unless conventional arms control and disarmament are undertaken, general and complete disarmament will not be achieved. We believe that they recognize also that without conventional arms control and disarmament, it will be difficult to attain the ideal of channelling these resources, now being wasted on military spending, to the aid of the developing countries.

My delegation hopes that in this session of the General Assembly or in the special session next year, a number of countries will offer positive views on the search for concrete measures and that agreement will be reached with regard to the procedures for a thorough examination of this question, without hindering the progress of negotiations for nuclear disarmament.

We sincerely desire that, in accordance with the procedures I have described, the first step will be taken towards finding a solution for this highly important question.

Mr. JAY (Canada): Mr. Chairman, may I first of all add my voice to the others that have quite rightly congratulated the Committee for having selected so distinguished a bureau to guide its work. Under the leadership of our able Chairman, and with your collaboration and the invaluable support of our friends in the Secretariat, I am confident we shall fulfil our duty to contribute to the solution of many grave issues of concern to all Members of the United Nations. Certainly, the Canadian delegation will loyally work with you to that end.

In his address to the General Assembly on 26 September, the Secretary of State for External Affairs of Canada stated:

"... no problem is of greater concern to [the United Nations] than disarmament, but, equally, no subject has more frustrated our efforts and disappointed our peoples." (A/32/PV.6, p. 32)

I would recall also that in the debate in the First Committee last year I expressed a sense of impatience, frustration and profound disappointment at the continuing failure of the international community to face up more concretely and rapidly to the awesome problems that confront us in the field of disarmament. Disappointing as achievements have been up to now, when we come to examine the current situation we do find that there are grounds for greater optimism in at least three crucial areas. In these areas efforts have been accelerated and intensified, with the result that opportunities for major progress may - may - at last be in sight.

These developments do not, of course, give grounds for any complacency. The task of nurturing these possibilities to the stage of fruition is bound to take time. This fact does not diminish, but heightens, our sense of urgency. As a result of the persistent efforts of the international community to enhance international security through arms limitation and disarmament measures we now are on the threshold of important developments. The success of this enterprise will depend on the intensity of the effort - particularly by all militarily significant States - in the next few years.

First and foremost, in terms of the proliferation of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of the super-Powers, the ongoing efforts of the United States and the Soviet Union to reach agreement on a series of further measures to curb, and

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then to reverse, the strategic arms race are of crucial importance. It is the strongly held view of Canada that these bilateral negotiations between the two major nuclear Powers must, as their ultimate objective, endeavour to attack the problem in qualitative as well as quantitative terms - that is, seek to curb the technological arms race, as well as to limit and reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons.

A short while ago, the United States and the Soviet Union announced separately their intention to continue to be governed by the provisions of the now-expired SALT I Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement, in order to preserve a measure of stability while negotiations continued for the long-delayed follow-on agreement, SALT II, which should be a significant first step in the actual reduction of nuclear arsenals. It is particularly important that the negotiations on SALT II, and on certain interim supplementary restraints, are now being pursued with renewed vigour.

No one who is aware of the serious problems involved in such negotiations, relating to matters of vital security interest, can question the complexity of the difficulties which must be overcome in order to achieve worth-while measures of restraint with regard to strategic weapons. None the less, if the momentum of the negotiations so painstakingly achieved in past years is not to be lost and the prospects of success diminished, Canada strongly believes that new, bold steps forward at the earliest possible date are desirable - even essential. At this juncture, it would be appropriate for the Assembly to leave the two negotiating Powers in no doubt about the profound hope of the international community that these talks will soon result in the conclusion of SALT II, and permit progress to the third stage of SALT, which should lead to further and substantial reductions in strategic weapons.

The other side of the same coin is the pressing need to improve the international non-proliferation system, to strengthen safeguards administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), to implement the Non-Proliferation Treaty more effectively and to re-examine the risks inherent in various nuclear cycles and processes. This task is all the more important because the world must increasingly come to terms with a growing energy shortage, and many countries are looking to nuclear energy as an alternative to conventional

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sources. In this field Canada has had long experience as a producer and a supplier of both uranium and proven nuclear technology. We recognize the contribution we can make as an exporter to the energy-poor countries, both industrialized and developing. At the same time, we attach the highest importance to developing the most effective international system of safeguards possible in order to try to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and the capability to produce them.

This policy stems from concerns which go beyond commercial considerations. We have made clear that we are prepared to sacrifice potential gains rather than accept less than satisfactory controls. Canada has rejected the nuclear weapons option long ago, and our policy on safeguards is the logical extension of our concern, and indeed our sense of responsibility, regarding non-proliferation. Accordingly, in the case of its exports of nuclear materials, equipment and technology to other non-nuclear weapon States, Canada requires that such countries should either adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or otherwise make a binding non-proliferation commitment and accept IAEA-administered safeguards on their entire nuclear programme - the so-called "full-scope safeguards".\*

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\* The Chairman returned to the Chair.

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In seeking from others agreement to such controls and safeguards we are asking for undertakings which Canada has already and willingly accepted. We welcome the fact that a number of other suppliers have adopted a similar policy. It is our hope that this condition will become a basic international requirement facilitating international co-operation in the strictly peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Canada also welcomes the international nuclear fuel cycle evaluation project which is about to get under way on a broad international basis. We appreciate that there are legitimate differences of opinion on the question of the desirability of different means of utilizing nuclear resources and technology, but we hope that this international study will give careful thought to alternative fuel cycles that avoid the use of plutonium and improve safeguards. In our view the international nuclear fuel cycle study project warrants the full support of the international community. The plain fact is that, although countries such as Canada have been prepared to adopt rigorous measures at the national level, the international non-proliferation system can be implemented effectively only through a broad collective approach involving nuclear weapon and non-nuclear weapon, industrialized and developing, exporting and importing nations - all of which share a common interest in avoiding the dangers inherent in nuclear proliferation.

As in the case of both the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and international efforts to strengthen the non-proliferation system, there is also some basis for optimism with regard to the long-sought goal of a comprehensive test ban. Year after year in this Assembly the immense majority of Member States have insisted on the importance of achieving such a treaty. Certainly, we can feel particularly encouraged that serious formal negotiations have indeed begun involving all three of the nuclear-weapon States upon which the onus rests, as original parties to the partial test ban Treaty of 1963, to undertake such negotiations.

The views of Canada on this question have been repeated time and again. We have expressed the view that in this area it was incumbent upon the two major nuclear Powers to set an example by agreeing to end their nuclear tests

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for a determined period of adequate duration, even if other nuclear-weapon Powers did not immediately join such an agreement. The recent announcement by Foreign Minister Gromyko at this session that the Soviet Union was now prepared to envisage stopping tests, along with the United States and the United Kingdom, represents a welcome development in the Soviet position, particularly in so far as it means that, as we have long advocated, progress on a definitive cessation of tests need not await participation by all nuclear-weapon States.

There are clearly difficult hurdles to be surmounted involving problems such as verification, the scope of the agreement and the conditions for its entry into force. The pursuit of solutions to those problems will require time. In the seismological working group of the Geneva Conference on disarmament, Canada and other countries have already invested a great deal of technical effort concerning the contribution international co-operation in the exchange of seismological data can make to easing the verification problem. Canada welcomes the fact that the principle of such a data exchange seems to be accepted by the participants in the negotiations. Moreover, we have already stated in the Geneva Conference that, in view of the lack of any convincing way of ensuring that so-called peaceful nuclear explosions do not provide weapons-related benefits, a comprehensive test ban should prohibit all nuclear explosions. Surely the utility of peaceful nuclear explosions is sufficiently doubtful that such uses of nuclear explosive energy should not be allowed to impede the achievement of an objective to which this Assembly has already assigned the highest priority.

We trust that this essential trilateral stage of the negotiations will be carried out successfully within a reasonable period so that the Geneva Conference on disarmament will be able to begin the multilateral phase of negotiation of a treaty. We believe that such a treaty should be adhered to on the broadest possible basis in order to address the proliferation problem in both its vertical and its horizontal aspects.

(Mr. Jay, Canada)

With regard to efforts to achieve a convention on the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, to which this Assembly has also assigned a very high priority, we note that this year there are much better prospects than existed last year. Negotiations are being pursued actively between the United States and the Soviet Union. We are encouraged by the fact that the two major military Powers have recognized their special responsibility for taking the initiative of working out the key elements of a chemical-weapon treaty. As is the case with the efforts to achieve the basic elements of a chemical test ban, there remains much ground to be covered in these negotiations; but perhaps it would be realistic to expect that the bilateral negotiations may be successfully completed in time for the Geneva Conference on disarmament to begin its work on the multilateral treaty before the special session of this Assembly devoted to disarmament meets next year.

I turn now to the question of the reduction of military budgets and an adequate reporting system. This is an area where efforts can probably best be pursued in a broad multilateral forum, because such reductions should be implemented universally. My country appreciates the extremely valuable work which has been carried out by the Secretary-General's study group and supports their recommendations. The viability of reductions in military budgets as a means of progress towards real disarmament on an assured basis rests upon the development of a satisfactory means for reporting and comparing military expenditures. It also clearly requires a much greater degree of openness on the part of States in making useful information available. This is, in our view, an avenue which should be pursued vigorously with the objective of devising a valid reporting system and adequate verification techniques to make military budget reductions a truly effective approach to disarmament.

(Mr. Jay, Canada)

While reviewing, as I have been doing, the list of more promising opportunities for progress that we now have before us, I would place particular importance on the special session devoted to disarmament, which is to be convened next May. Provided that it pursues its deliberations in a truly collective and co-operative spirit, a spirit which I am happy to note has prevailed throughout the sessions of its Preparatory Committee so far, largely because of the skilful and sensitive guidance of Ambassador Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, the special session could and should provide an opportunity to reach a meeting of minds in identifying further avenues for progress in concrete arms limitation and towards more comprehensive measures of real disarmament.

Of course, such a broadly based forum cannot itself undertake the negotiation of specific measures and treaties. These will require intensive efforts in the appropriate negotiating bodies, including particularly the Geneva disarmament Conference, which we now have good grounds to believe may be about to enter upon a period of renewed activity and importance. The special session could also provide us with an opportunity for a broad reassessment of the problems and the opportunities and of the interrelationship between disarmament, international peace and security, and economic development.

My country joined in the initiative for the special session; we are pledged to play our full part in it and to contribute to making its deliberations as fruitful as possible.

To round out my survey of developments in the past year I might mention also both the signature by more than 30 Governments of the environmental modification Treaty and the successful completion of the Review Conference of the parties to the sea-bed Treaty. These treaties are, we all know, limited agreements which deal with only hypothetical areas of arms control. While they are peripheral to the central issue disarmament, they are worthy of our support as desirable ancillary measures. Nevertheless, we should not allow the negotiation of such agreements to detract our attention from the need for other measures that will tackle the more

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urgent problems. Indeed, the scope for further collateral measures of this kind seems very limited. We now have the opportunity to negotiate much more significant measures such as a comprehensive test ban and a chemical weapons convention.

The Geneva Conference has also given careful consideration in the past two years to the best means of preventing any development and deployment of so-called "new weapons of mass destruction", that is, categories of weapons that might conceivably be developed in the future having effects analogous to the mass destruction weapons with which we are all too familiar. Those deliberations have, in our view, tended to clarify the very serious problems of trying to address this matter on what I might call a broad generic basis. I think it would be fair to say that we have been left in a state of considerable confusion as to just what hypothetical, futuristic weapons such a treaty would be supposed to deal with. Any attempt to base a comprehensive treaty on such a concept gives rise to serious problems of knowing what could be actually prohibited and how to verify compliance with such prohibitions. We note that the Soviet Union has presented a revised draft, and some elements of obscurity which many States found in the original draft have been somewhat diminished. Nevertheless, the view of my Government, following the intensive study that has been given to this problem in the Geneva disarmament Conference, is that there are very serious practical difficulties standing in the way of making the Soviet proposal effective as an arms control treaty - and I emphasize the word "treaty". In sum, we believe the soundest way to proceed is to consider specific agreements to prohibit on a case-by-case basis particular new categories of mass destruction weapons when such specific weapons can be identified.

At the same time, we fully recognize the hypothetical element of risk which a future development of such new categories of mass destruction weapons might pose. We are therefore prepared to support a resolution that would call upon States to abstain from the development of new categories of mass destruction weapons and would request the Geneva Conference to consider specific international agreements.

(Mr. Jay, Canada)

Without in any way diminishing the importance Canada attaches to these areas involving mass destruction weapons, it is our conviction that the international community must begin to address the problem of conventional weapons, and the production and transfer of such weapons, which has been ignored for so long. In our view, the special session should take the lead in identifying avenues to be explored in this particular area. The problem of conventional arms, and the escalating transfers of such weapons including the most sophisticated, is crucial to hopes for the achievement of comprehensive disarmament or at least getting closer to it.

In conclusion, I have tried to identify some of the most important opportunities which at last seem to be unfolding before us, particularly in the areas of strategic arms limitations, a comprehensive test ban and a chemical weapons treaty. Because it relates inter alia to fundamental questions of the perceptions of nations of their security interests, arms control and disarmament is a difficult uphill task and the past has been fraught with frustration. There are, however, grave and pressing dangers inherent in a failure to make real progress. Moreover, other more constructive demands on the resources of all of us make clear that our efforts must be pursued with renewed determination.

It is right that we make every effort to consider as analytically and objectively as possible the issues I have described. Emotion will not help us to understand properly the intricacies and the magnitude of the challenge of disarmament or to devise effective means to deal with them. Yet we must never lose sight of the underlying supreme task - to ensure the security of us all by reducing, and ultimately eliminating, the risk of war. Dare we hope that this year, perhaps more than in many previous years, we are on the verge of significant progress in this vital direction?

The meeting rose at 5.35 p.m.