



VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 13th MEETING

Chairman: Mr. BOATEN (Ghana)

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Mr. VEJVODA (Czechoslovakia): Mr. Chairman, since this is the first time I have spoken in this Committee, allow me first to congratulate you and your colleagues on your election to lead it in its important work. We are certain that your experience will help us to achieve favourable results from our deliberations.

Our session this year is being held at the time of a complex and often quite difficult restructuring of the relations among States in all fields of international life. The policy of détente, which pursues the aim of bringing about relations of equal and mutually beneficial co-operation among States of all social and economic systems and of securing lasting peace in the world, has brought a number of extraordinarily valuable results.

In Europe, which in the past was the principal arena of two world wars, the Helsinki Conference succeeded two years ago in laying the first foundations of a lasting peace and thus initiating a new stage in international relations, which until recently rested more on force than on an endeavour to search for constructive solutions to common problems. This positive process is exerting a growing influence on world events. The demand is made with ever greater force that détente should extend to all regions and all countries, that it should become the only and irreversible foundation of relations among States. The demand for the relaxation of tensions has been heard also from the rostrum of the current session of the United Nations General Assembly, expressed in a variety of ways according to the specific characteristics of the different regions, in the overwhelming majority of statements made in the general debate.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Although the approach to the policy of international détente is not uniform and may vary in this or another aspect, when we discuss the further fate of détente we always arrive at the common denominator of all efforts for its implementation - the problem of disarmament. It has been said many times - and we must draw practical conclusions from these words - that unless the hectic armaments in the world are halted and effective measures taken in the field of disarmament international détente will inevitably strike certain limits and it will be ever more difficult to preserve at least those positive results that have already been achieved in relations among States. Those limits will of necessity grow narrower in proportion to spiralling armaments, the growing size of military arsenals and the increasing expenditure on means of destruction.

That is why the question of disarmament is without doubt the most timely, the most important and also the most complicated problem of the present time, on the solution of which, without exaggeration, depends the fate of mankind on our planet. Up to now armaments have been halted or limited in only a few fields. It would be incorrect none the less to underestimate the value of those limitations. In questions affecting vital security interests of every State like that of disarmament, nobody can take the position of a gambler playing "va-banque" and demand either everything or nothing. On the contrary, it is necessary to consolidate the achieved results and push for their universality, because that is the only way in current conditions of implementing step by step the idea of general and complete disarmament.

On the other hand, it remains a fact that despite the partial successes achieved we have not succeeded so far in halting the spiralling armaments race. In disarmament negotiations we have so far witnessed considerable discrepancy between words and deeds and between wishes and actual results. While from the United Nations rostrum, including in this Committee, we often hear of good intentions to achieve progress, in practice those words are in many cases negated by stepped-up armaments production. Almost daily we hear of the development of new types of destructive weapons that are beginning to escape the possibility of practical control and entail the danger of a further critical stage in the hectic armaments race, whether the so-called cruise missiles or preparations for the production of the neutron bomb and so on.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Measures of that kind are grossly at variance with the proclaimed endeavours for progress in disarmament and are quite rightly a cause of profound concern and indignation to world public opinion.

Within the United Nations and in other forums the socialist countries have many times convincingly demonstrated their determination to follow the road to disarmament. It is well known that it was socialism which 60 years ago in the Soviet Union initiated a new stage in world history and gave the world one of its basic ideals - the ideal of general and complete disarmament. From that source stems the comprehensiveness and consistency with which the socialist countries are approaching disarmament issues. If from those dozens of proposals submitted in this field in the last decade by the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, including mine, at least the most important ones had been implemented, the world would have long lived in conditions of permanent peace and the armies and instruments of war would now be a part of history. The resources released in that way could then be concentrated on increased assistance to developing countries. As was correctly noted here in the statement by the representative of Ghana, the mutual interdependence of economic development and disarmament measures cannot be overlooked in disarmament negotiations.

One voice was also raised in our debate - a completely isolated voice - that tried to throw doubt not only on our disarmament efforts but also on the entire policy of détente, that is, the endeavour to secure durable peace throughout the world. The speaker whom I have in mind mentioned my country also in an effort to corroborate his contradictory reasoning. It is our desire that disarmament negotiations should reflect nothing but the aspiration to achieve progress and that they be free of attempts at disturbing the atmosphere. There is no way of obscuring the fact that without relaxation of tensions there will be no disarmament, and without disarmament, if only partial at the beginning, it will not be possible to solve all the complicated questions of economic relations and development in the world, as called for with every justification by the developing countries.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

This year the delegation of the Soviet Union submitted another of its peace proposals to the United Nations General Assembly, asking it to consider, as an urgent matter, the item entitled "Deepening and consolidation of international détente and prevention of the danger of nuclear war", and, in that connexion, to adopt new important measures that would provide guidance for the practical activities of States in this vital sphere. Such measures also include the proposal to conclude a world treaty on the non-use of force in international relations, which has already won the support of the majority of the States Members of our Organization. My delegation will return to this question at a later stage of our deliberations.

I would now merely express the conviction of the Czechoslovak Government that it is in the constructive solution of those issues that the potential of the United Nations should be fully developed and that this is the only way for the United Nations to enhance its role and authority as the supreme international body whose highest mission is to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war", as stated in its Charter.

In November of last year, the socialist countries members of the Warsaw Treaty submitted the proposal that the signatories of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe should conclude a treaty whereby they would undertake not to be the first to use nuclear weapons against each other. It is therefore high time for those Governments which have so far been rejecting the proposal by the Warsaw Treaty countries to take more consistently into account the realities and requirements of the present time and to embark on the road of practical negotiations that should be started as soon as possible.

We wish to express the hope that the matter-of-fact spirit of searching for mutually acceptable and equitable solutions will eventually prevail also in the talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe that have been going on in Vienna for four years now. As a direct participant in the Vienna talks, the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic attaches a great deal of importance to their success. Now that it has been confirmed on the basis of concrete data that a military status quo exists in Central Europe, the time has come to proceed from technicalities to the drafting of at least an initial agreement on equal reduction of armed forces and armaments in that highly sensitive region of the world.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

We are attaching extraordinary importance to the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on the limitation of strategic arms. In the course of those negotiations five years ago a limit on strategic armaments was fixed for the first time in history. We trust that the Soviet-United States talks, which are dictated by realism and the awareness that their alternative could be the danger of nuclear confrontation, will successfully continue despite certain accompanying difficulties and that in the foreseeable future they will lead to substantive results in the field of nuclear disarmament. That sort of development would naturally simplify the situation also in all other forums dealing with the question of disarmament.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

The basic positions of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic on disarmament issues are sufficiently known from deliberations within the United Nations and in other bodies, including the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). They have been explained also in the current session of the General Assembly, in the general debate, by the Czechoslovak Minister for Foreign Affairs. It is therefore my intention to mention only some of the main issues that are this year on the agenda of the First Committee.

Although this year has in many respects brought a revitalization of disarmament negotiations, certain warning phenomena have at the same time become more pronounced and deserve our increased attention. Particularly, the situation developing in the question of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is causing concern. If, seven years ago, when the Non-Proliferation Treaty entered into force, it might have seemed that the question had been solved to a considerable degree, it appears now with increasing urgency that as long as this Treaty is not universal the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons continues to be an acute problem of the current time. It is undoubtedly a positive fact that since the beginning of this year the Non-Proliferation Treaty has more than 100 signatories. Even that, however, is not enough and it is necessary that all countries accede to it. The rapid and as yet insufficiently controlled development of nuclear energy and technology, together with the endeavour by some Governments to acquire nuclear weapons of their own, make the question of non-proliferation once again one of the principal issues in the safeguarding of international security and world peace.

We can imagine, for instance, what far-reaching negative consequences would be entailed if the South African racist régime were armed with nuclear weapons. The United Nations General Assembly should therefore once again appeal with emphasis for universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and for the adoption of energetic measures to isolate those who, by their nuclear ambitions, are jeopardizing world peace and the security of nations. A greater and, particularly, more important role in this respect should be played by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), by which we do not in the least want to detract from the positive results achieved by that body. However, its activities pertaining to supervision and to safeguards must be systematically strengthened, not only in words but also in practice.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

Being realistic, we are aware that ensuring the complete universality of the Non-Proliferation Treaty is not a simple matter. That is why we agree that it is necessary to adopt even some emergency measures, such as agreed conditions for the export of nuclear materials and equipment that were adopted last year in the talks of major nuclear suppliers in London. The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is willing to participate in all international measures designed to avert the threat of nuclear proliferation, excepting, of course, those measures that would be of a discriminatory nature or would hamper the peaceful development of nuclear energy and equal international co-operation in that field.

Another important question closely connected with the over-all problem of nuclear disarmament is the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. We can say that after many years an outline of a solution of this question is taking shape. Above all, I should like to highlight the constructive position of the Soviet Union, which expanded its 1975 draft of the Treaty by an important provision relating to the question of verification that says that in case of doubt on-site inspections may be undertaken on a voluntary basis. That provision, together with the international system of the exchange of seismological data, the technical solution of which is being successfully worked out by expert negotiations in the Geneva Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), provide sufficient safeguards for the strict observance of the future Treaty. If a treaty is concluded on this basis, the Czechoslovak Government, whose experts participate in the work of the Geneva Committee, is prepared to link up, on an appropriate scope, its seismographic facilities to the verification system. This year we have welcomed with satisfaction the opening of trilateral talks between the Soviet Union, the United States and Great Britain as a substantial step towards the implementation of resolution 3478 (XXX), adopted by the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly, of which talks we have been informed in the Geneva Committee on Disarmament by representatives of the participating countries. We would wish that the remaining two nuclear Powers also would join these talks as soon as possible.

Let me once more reiterate that the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is prepared at any time to take part in the talks on the conclusion of the treaty in the group of non-nuclear countries established in accordance with resolution 3478 (XXX). The road to agreement is still complicated by the question of nuclear

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explosions for peaceful purposes. I deem it necessary once more to point out the provision of article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, from which it should follow unequivocally, especially for the signatories of the Treaty, that the question of these explosions is to be solved in the over-all context of the non-proliferation régime and as its organic part. This approach has, by the way, asserted itself already in the Treaty on Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, concluded in May of last year between the USSR and the United States of America.

This year a conference of the parties to the Treaty on the denuclearization of the sea-bed and ocean floor was held in Geneva and reviewed the effectiveness and the implementation of the Treaty in the five years of its validity. There is no need to describe here in detail its great importance. The very fact that the Treaty excludes almost two-thirds of the surface of the earth from the nuclear arms race makes it one of the foremost measures taken so far to limit armaments. However, I should like to emphasize that Czechoslovakia fully supports the appeal addressed by that Conference to the Geneva Committee on Disarmament to start immediately talks on further measures pursuing the objective of the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and ocean floor as called for in article V of the Treaty.

One of the issues that ever more urgently require solution is the complete prohibition and liquidation of the stockpiles of chemical weapons, an anachronism which survives from the times of the First World War. As is known, this question has now been on the agenda of the Geneva Committee on Disarmament for many years. As we know from expert negotiations in that Committee, the very liquidation of the amassed stockpiles of chemical weapons is becoming a difficult problem the solution of which will require probably several years of arduous and dangerous work. May I recall that five years ago the group of the socialist countries submitted a draft convention, including the procedures for the verification of its fulfilment, which, as it now appears ever more clearly, corresponds fully to the needs of an effective and definitive solution of this question. The Geneva negotiations in recent years bring us to the conclusion that the question of the scope of prohibition should no longer present an insoluble problem and that it is possible to agree both on the complete prohibition of all chemical weapons and, if need be, at least on an initial ban of the most dangerous means of chemical warfare.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

The expert negotiations this year seem to support the position that the only practicable system of verification must be based on national means of verification taking advantage of all the possibilities of modern technology and complemented by certain international procedures. We appreciated the information given by the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States that intense bilateral talks are continued on the submitting of a joint initiative promised three years ago and that progress is being achieved in those talks. All these factors should in our view be correctly reflected in the decision to be taken by the current session of the United Nations General Assembly.

Increasingly urgent in recent years has become the task of achieving the prohibition of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons, raised for the first time in the United Nations two years ago by the delegation of the Soviet Union. The deliberations in the CCD have already shown with sufficient conviction that modern science and technological progress are fraught with dangerous possibilities for the development of weapons which, though now existing only in scientific hypotheses, could soon become a frightful reality. An eloquent example of such development is the so-called neutron bomb that has called forth resolute opposition from world public opinion.

This year the Soviet Union submitted a revised draft agreement on the prohibition of similar types of weapons. The draft offers a more exact definition of the commitments to be undertaken by States parties to the agreement. It provides a flexible system of expanding the agreement whenever this may be necessary, while leaving sufficient scope for its applicability.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

I should like to express the firm belief of my Government that the draft responds fully to the urgent needs of the present time and offers us the best opportunity of ridding the world of the fear of as yet unknown horrors of military destruction and effectively preventing further stages of hectic armament which at a later date may be impossible to halt.

We have noted with satisfaction the reports that the Soviet Union and the United States have been conducting successful talks on the prohibition of one category of new types of weapons of mass destruction: namely, radiological weapons, the military application of which is already on the horizon. It is all the more necessary to continue to exert efforts for the complete prohibition of all new types of such weapons and for the conclusion of a corresponding international agreement. In May this year we scored a success in the signing of the new and significant Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. I should like to express appreciation of the important role in disarmament negotiations which has been played for 15 years now by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, of which my country has been member from the beginning. In the course of its existence the Committee has provided an irreplaceable forum in the search for common means of halting ongoing armament. Even in complicated conditions the Committee has achieved a number of outstanding results that have at least partially reduced the level of military arsenals and contributed significantly to the improvement of the international climate and to the fact that the world is succeeding in turning away from a policy of a position of force to the policy of international détente and co-operation. That is the decisive reason for our attaching permanent significance to the activities of that Committee. Especially in the recent years the Committee's work has shown an upward trend and the intensity of negotiations is being stepped up virtually with every new session. Although of course we cannot expect now or in the future that the complicated problems of disarmament will be solved in the Committee easily and without difficulties, we must create the best possible conditions for its work and take full advantage of its capability.

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

The Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic is among those which already six years ago initialled the proposal to convene a world conference on disarmament. It is our belief that only a world conference equipped with sufficient powers and due procedures and above all with the unanimous determination of Governments to make radical progress in the field of disarmament could deal in a really effective manner with a broad range of disarmament problems and work out a realistic strategy for general and complete disarmament. It appears, however, that for the time being not all countries are pursuing such far-reaching objectives and there are even those that resist the idea of disarmament or even reject the idea of any disarmament proposals whatsoever. In this situation we have welcomed the proposal to convene a special session of the United Nations General Assembly devoted to disarmament as a proposal which could mean a certain step forward and although not solve at least facilitate the solution of world-wide disarmament problems.

It was with this in mind that we proceeded together with the other socialist countries to submit the drafts of the main documents that should emerge from the special session, namely the declaration and the programme of action. It is a good omen that the forthcoming special session of the United Nations General Assembly is to pay due attention to the preparations for a world conference on disarmament. However, I should like to emphasize that the authority of the Preparatory Committee for the special session and the effectiveness of its work are in our view weakened by its unbalanced composition which does not reflect to a sufficient degree the role played by the different groups of countries in disarmament efforts. The representation of the socialist countries, for instance, is unduly low. In this connexion I must reiterate the request of my Government that Czechoslovakia be allowed to continue to participate in the preparations for the special session as a full member of the Preparatory Committee.

In disarmament negotiations the idea is often correctly stressed that the most important prerequisite for progress is the goodwill of all participating parties. We know from long experience that such goodwill never comes about

(Mr. Vejvoda, Czechoslovakia)

at once but only gradually, from case to case, in complicated and difficult negotiations and that the adoption of even partial measures usually requires a great deal of effort. May I therefore, in concluding my statement, express the hope that this year's deliberations in this Committee will proceed in a spirit of goodwill to search for and find solutions to the burning problems of disarmament. The delegation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, in what we trust will be constructive co-operation with all the other delegations, is determined to do its utmost for the achievement of that goal.

Mr. JANKOWITSCH (Austria): Although it is in contravention of the rules of procedure and your own wishes, Mr. Chairman, I cannot hide my delight at seeing you presiding over this important Committee of the Assembly. I believe that in view of not only the heavy work load but also the delicate nature of the subject-matter before us, the Political Committee of the Assembly could hardly find a more experienced and skilful hand than yours to guide, in the true sense of the word, our deliberations.

In opening our remarks in this year's general debate on this item it might perhaps be appropriate to quote briefly from the dramatic warning contained in the latest report of our Secretary-General on the state of the Organization. In that report the Secretary-General said:

"Since the Second World War there have been some modest achievements, but they have been in the nature of arms limitation rather than disarmament, or regulating competition and proscribing certain particularly undesirable developments rather than on substantially reducing important weapons systems. It is now becoming increasingly clear that such an approach is wholly inadequate to stem the tide of an innovating arms race, where technological ingenuity tends constantly to outstrip the pace of negotiations. We cannot take for granted, as a permanent feature of life, that new military developments must and will always be controllable in a stable balance of mutual or multiple deterrence. If we continue to try only to regulate or to temporize with the arms race, treating the symptoms rather than the underlying causes, we run an increasing risk of temporizing ourselves into oblivion."

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(Mr. Jankowitsch, Austria)

I should therefore like to place my remarks in the framework of these larger considerations. It is almost a commonplace now to say that stocks of nuclear weapons have for some years been sufficient to destroy the world many times over, and yet the number of nuclear warheads has increased fivefold in the past eight years. Awesome as these numbers may be, recent qualitative developments in offensive and defensive strategic weapons and delivery systems seem to be at least as alarming as the mere size of the nuclear arsenals. The continuous qualitative change in the weapons and equipment being produced and deployed has to be seen as the distinguishing characteristic of the present arms race. It is primarily this feature that gives the arms race its momentum and at the same time introduces what appears to us at least to be potentially destabilizing elements.

(Mr. Jankowitsch, Austria)

Furthermore, a growing number of scientists believe that military technology, by its sheer momentum, will inevitably lead to nuclear war. Horrifying as this reasoning may be, it cannot be disputed that tactical and strategic weapons are currently being developed which are suitable for fighting, as well as deterring, a nuclear war. At the same time the arms race of recent years has led to an extremely dangerous blurring of the line between nuclear and conventional weapons.

The comprehensive, not to say universal, character of the technological arms race is also reflected in its proliferation into space. Publicity about satellites and about space activities in general, as well as the related activities of the United Nations, normally focus on their peaceful applications. Because of this, there is little debate in the United Nations about the military uses of outer space which, hand in hand with the unrelenting pace of technological innovation, becomes an extremely worrisome prospect. We might therefore have to consider whether steps will be necessary to supplement the relevant provisions of the 1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in Outer Space with an agreement on a further demilitarization of outer space which should guarantee that outer space will be used for peaceful purposes exclusively. This thought might be fitting in the year in which we celebrate the tenth anniversary of the outer space Treaty.

The last months have also been marked by an intense debate in this Committee and in the general debate of the Assembly on the proliferation consequences of broad access to nuclear technology on a world-wide scale.

In order to secure the survival of mankind and at the same time meet the urgent needs of an increasing number of countries, particularly developing countries, an adequate solution to this problem must be found as soon as possible. Such a solution should acknowledge the dual nature of nuclear technology. It must take care of the legitimate interest of many industrialized and many developing countries to take advantage of the various possibilities offered by peaceful uses of nuclear energy and at the same time ensure that military uses of nuclear energy can be prevented.

Finally, it must be realized that the problems of development and disarmament are related. In this connexion it seems appropriate to refer to some statistical data. Thus, the distinguished and highly respected director of the Stockholm

(Mr. Jankowitsch, Austria)

International Peace Research Institute, Frank Barnaby, speaking only a few days ago at the Madrid meeting of the Bureau of the Socialist International reminded us once again of the enormous magnitude of the resources that are spent for military purposes. According to his estimates, current global military expenditures amount to \$1 million per minute. Or, to use a very telling comparison: world military expenditure is now equivalent to about two-fifths of the total gross domestic product of all third world countries combined. Mr. Barnaby also pointed out that about half of the world's physical and engineering scientists working in the field of research and development are employed on military projects. I can only agree with his conclusion to the effect that there could be a dramatic improvement in living conditions on a global scale if these scientists, or only some of them, were allowed to devote their energies to peaceful rather than military pursuits.

Equally, in a recent paper devoted to questions of disarmament and international security, Willy Brandt, former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize, has used the following precise words in order to sum up and perhaps dramatize a situation which we all face today:

"The arms race creates instability and endangers peace. At a time when every war can lead to the extinction of mankind, efforts towards arms control and disarmament turn into a categorical imperative."

It is in this spirit that my delegation sincerely hopes that recent reports about progress in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), carried out between the Soviet Union and the United States as well as in the trilateral negotiations for a comprehensive test-ban treaty, will prove to be justified. An early conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and a decisive step forward in the SALT negotiations would lay the necessary basis for the successful work of the special session when it will be dealing with the complex question of nuclear proliferation, both vertical and horizontal, not only because of the devastating destructiveness of nuclear weapons, but also because of their high symbolic value on the political balance sheet of the world today.

If, on the eve of the special session - to which we all look forward with so much expectation - we want to offer a realistic assessment which alone can provide us with an adequate framework for discussions and decisions, we must start from the

(Mr. Jankowitsch, Austria)

basic assertion that today the question of nuclear proliferation can no longer be confined to its merely technical aspects.

Because as long as the technical barriers to the acquisition of nuclear weapons were too high for most of the world to scale, and to seriously consider the acquisition of such highly prestigious weapons, an examination of the political aspects of nuclear proliferation seems to be somewhat superfluous. In the last years, however, nuclear technology has become globally accessible. Fissile material, perhaps atomic bombs, today can be produced on a relatively small scale and in great secrecy, as many examples prove. A small reactor - disguised as something else perhaps - components of which could be obtained on the open market without too much cost, could eventually produce enough plutonium to enable its possessor to manufacture his own atomic bombs. Such a reactor and a small chemical reprocessing unit to separate plutonium from the reactor fuel elements can be constructed and run clandestinely. Thus, we cannot afford to close our eyes to the continuous warnings of a number of well-known scholars - coming out of the Pugwash Conference and other meetings of this kind - that what they call the small-reactor route to military nuclear power has become practicable even for countries with relatively modest technological and industrial capabilities.

(Mr. Jankowitsch, Austria)

This does not, of course, mean that the possibility of the diversion of plutonium from a recognized peaceful nuclear-power station to military purposes should be ignored. But, contrary to conventional wisdom and often even to official statements, it does mean that a lack of access to a commercial reprocessing plant need not - and probably would not - prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons to countries which have made the decision to acquire them. Hence it is ultimately the political will not to proliferate that counts more than technical barriers to nuclear proliferation.

If, starting from this assumption, we are now trying to devise a non-proliferation strategy for the sake of a secure future for mankind, we can no longer afford to concentrate merely on the regulation of the technical and commercial aspects of the transfer of nuclear technology. We must at the same time acknowledge the fact that for many countries the option "to go nuclear" becomes more and more an exclusively political choice. We must ask ourselves how this political option to join the "nuclear club" can best be counterbalanced and we have to focus on ways and means to reduce the incentives for and to strengthen the deterrents against States' acquiring nuclear weapons.

What we, for one, would therefore expect from the nuclear-weapon Powers would be not only that they themselves should not start a war which might turn nuclear, but also that they establish the disarmament and arms-control measures that are politically necessary in order to diminish any motivation for an independent development of new nuclear arms potential for anybody. A clear and unequivocal sign on the part of the nuclear Powers that they are finally willing to bring about nuclear disarmament, thus reducing the symbolic importance of nuclear weapons in world politics, could provide one and perhaps the most important incentive for hitherto non-nuclear States to forgo their nuclear option. Furthermore, complementary political measures, such as effective security guarantees for non-nuclear-weapon States in cases where such guarantees seem appropriate, and new mechanisms allowing for the responsible and democratic participation of non-nuclear-weapon States in the management of a regulated and secure transfer of nuclear technology, also seem to be of capital importance.

(Mr. Jankowitsch, Austria)

The Non-Proliferation Treaty, which Austria has always supported, and was one of the first to sign and ratify, together with the International Atomic Energy Agency - whose safeguards system we consider to be of utmost importance and whose constant efforts to accelerate and enlarge, in accordance with article II of its Statute, the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world, we warmly commend - can provide the framework for the kind of action I have just outlined.

In this connexion we must, however, once again recall the three fundamental interacting premises on which the Non-Proliferation Treaty is built: first, the commitment of nuclear-weapons States to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and nuclear disarmament; second, the commitment of non-nuclear-weapon States to foreswear nuclear weapons and to accept safeguards on their nuclear industries; and third, the commitment of all countries - nuclear and non-nuclear-weapon countries alike - which are in the position to do so to co-operate in the peaceful development of nuclear energy.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty thus rests on the mutual rights and obligations of all parties; if and when the nuclear Powers recognize the existing direct and specific link between the obligations of non-nuclear-weapon States and their own commitment to effective nuclear disarmament then, and only then, will the Non-Proliferation Treaty have a chance for further survival, and only then can States that up to now have preferred to remain aloof be convinced to adhere to this Treaty.

It is for these reasons that 14 years after the conclusion of the partial test ban Treaty utmost importance must be attached to an early agreement on a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We welcome, therefore, the ongoing negotiations between the United Kingdom, the United States and the Soviet Union in this matter. A decision by the two leading nuclear Powers to cease underground testing would not only help to curb the arms race by encouraging less reliance on nuclear weapons and increasing the level of confidence between States, but would also weaken the arguments of those who have so far refused to accept any limitations on their testing programmes and enable international opinion to exert more effective pressure for universal adherence to the test ban.

(Mr. Jankowitsch, Austria)

Thus, the Austrian delegation also commends the useful work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament expert seismic group in pooling existing knowledge and creating the foundations for an effective international teleseismic network, which will certainly play an essential role in solving the problem of adequate verification of a complete test-ban treaty. Austria - within its possibilities, of course - is prepared to co-operate in the establishment of such a network if this should be necessary or useful.

In this connexion, the question of peaceful nuclear explosions - which, as we all know, have specific arms-control implications - must also be addressed. It is important to ensure that no prerequisites for nuclear arms proliferation, either vertical or horizontal, will be offered by future procedures in making use of peaceful nuclear explosions. One solution of this problem might lie in a full international régime for peaceful nuclear explosions worked out in accordance with article V of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We note that the report of the International Atomic Energy Agency Ad Hoc Advisory Group on Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes contains an extensive discussion of potential applications of peaceful nuclear explosions. A number of questions, however, remain, not the least being the status of peaceful nuclear explosions in the framework of a complete test-ban treaty. The implications of major earth-moving projects using peaceful nuclear explosions in respect for the partial test-ban Treaty should also be taken into consideration in this connexion.

Like many representatives who have spoken before me, I have devoted a major part of my statement to what we consider to be the highest priority in the disarmament sector. If I now add a few quick comments on questions of non-nuclear disarmament this in no way indicates a lesser degree of concern on our part. First, I would like to stress again the particular importance my country attaches to the question of a prohibition or restriction of the use of incendiary and other excessively injurious weapons. We have always voiced our firm conviction that with regard to these weapons the humanitarian aspect must be considered as overriding all other aspects, and that urgent and decisive action to ban the development, production and use of these weapons is necessary.

(Mr. Jankowitsch, Austria)

We regret the fact, in this connexion, that the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law could not reach an agreement on the complete prohibition of these weapons. We do note, however, that in the course of the work of that Conference and the parallel meetings of Government experts on the use of certain conventional weapons it has been possible to explore in great detail the uses and effects of specific categories of weapons which for humanitarian reasons should be subject to prohibitions and restrictions of use. Furthermore, at least in the case of some of these categories of weapons, we seem to be very close to an emerging consensus with regard to a possible restriction of their use.

(Mr. Jankowitsch, Austria)

The Austrian delegation is therefore pleased that the Geneva Conference, in its resolution 22 (IV) based on a consensus, made concrete proposals for the follow-up of its work. Those proposals contain in particular a recommendation to the effect that a conference of Governments should be convened not later than 1979. The Geneva Conference also suggested the establishment of a Preparatory Committee for that conference.

We shall join the Swedish and other delegations - and we should like again to commend the Swedish delegation for its untiring efforts in this regard - in presenting to this Committee a draft on the subject which will be based on the aforementioned resolution of the Geneva Conference.

In this connexion I should like to indicate that the Austrian Government is prepared to consider the possibility of offering appropriate conference facilities in Vienna as host for one or more meetings of the Preparatory Committee. We hope that that invitation will meet with the approval of all interested delegations.

I should like to speak briefly about the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). This year for the sixth time the General Assembly will request the CCD to continue negotiations on effective and strict measures for the complete prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons. Certainly we know that the problem of adequate verification of a treaty banning chemical weapons is extremely difficult to solve. Nevertheless we would urge the CCD to speed up its work in this field so as to be able to present to the special session a draft treaty on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

The increasing build-up of arsenals of so-called conventional weapons in many parts of the world during past years and the related problem of arms transfers have become another grave and legitimate concern of the international community, in particular because the conventional arms race is now responsible for by far the most considerable portion of the global military expenditures.

(Mr. Jankowitsch, Austria)

In order to find a suitable solution to this problem it seems essential to deal with all its aspects. We recognize that the question of arms transfers which constitute only a very small part of the total process of arms production and acquisition does not lend itself easily to broad and general restraining measures unless such measures are co-ordinated with general progress towards disarmament, involving the arms-producing countries as well. Even so, there is an urgent need to consider - while paying due regard to the security of the States concerned - measures aimed at specific regions to avoid encouraging international conflict and to pre-empt costly and pointless local arms races. There is scope for the exercise of a maximum of self-restraint by countries individually and reciprocally and for collective arrangements on a regional basis for multilateral negotiations to limit regional regulations on types or levels of armaments with measures of disengagement by outside Powers.

Austria has always considered a balanced reduction of military expenditures as a particularly useful approach to disarmament. General agreement on military expenditure concepts, including definition and measurement procedures, as well as on a corresponding international reporting structure, seems to be a prerequisite for the realization of this approach. We therefore welcome the fact that further progress in this field, as reflected in the relevant report of the Secretary-General, has been achieved in the course of the current year.

The Austrian Government is prepared to consider taking part in the testing of the proposed reporting system. We hope that after an adequate testing period it will be possible to refine the reporting system and make it operational on a global scale. We therefore expect that the major military Powers will find it possible to agree in the near future on the effective reduction of their military expenditure and thereby not only enhance international security but also release resources that are urgently required for economic and social progress all over the world.

I would not like to conclude my remarks without paying a special tribute to Assistant Secretary-General Mr. Djornerstedt and all the other members of the United Nations Centre for Disarmament for their dedicated and untiring efforts in assisting us in our work. In particular I warmly welcome their contribution to the preparation for the special session as well as the publication of the first United Nations Disarmament Yearbook which will

(Mr. Jankowitsch, Austria)

guide us through our difficult deliberations. We especially appreciate the analytical approach in the treatment of various disarmament items in the Yearbook, and we should like to encourage the Centre to develop that approach further in the next editions of the yearbook and in the forthcoming editions of the disarmament periodical.

The difficulties and obstacles which block the way to disarmament are, as we all know, enormous; to some they may well seem to be insurmountable. However, if our civilization is to survive there really is no reasonable alternative to disarmament. We cannot believe that man's intelligence should only enable him constantly to invent new means of self-destruction without making him capable of evolving the political and institutional structures necessary to guarantee his survival.

Thus we hope that next year's special session, so ably prepared by the Preparatory Committee under the chairmanship of Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas, will mark the beginning of a new era of our combined efforts towards disarmament. We realize the difficult task that session will have to face, yet every effort must be made to use that opportunity - which will not come again - to devise, with the active co-operation of all, a new and comprehensive approach to the problems of disarmament that would then lead to the adoption of genuine disarmament measures.

Effective progress towards disarmament presupposes the elaboration of an over-all plan, persuasive in concept and workable in application - a "Strategy for Disarmament" as it were. That plan must be based on a thorough assessment of the problems involved. It must reflect the growing awareness of the alarming political, economic and social consequences of the arms race and recognize the existing link between disarmament and our over-all development efforts. It should involve specification of priorities, decision on targets and adoption of programmes. That strategy must be comprehensive enough to ensure a fair and equitable response to the concerns of every country and flexible enough to permit the taking of realistic and concrete steps in the immediate future, in intermediate stages and in the final stage.

The Austrian delegation, which has the honour of serving on the Preparatory Committee for the special session, will continue to do whatever it can together with all other Members of the United Nations to secure a successful outcome for the special session.

Mr. BLOMBERG (Finland): Mr. Chairman, while being responsive to your plea about the brevity of opening remarks, let me just express the appreciation of my delegation at seeing you as Chairman of this Committee. Your skill and experience make you particularly well suited to lead and guide the work of our Committee.

In the face of the ever-spiralling arms race, the impatience and frustration of many at the excruciatingly slow progress towards the goals of disarmament that the United Nations has committed itself to is justified and understandable. Although it has been recognized that disarmament negotiations have become an integral element of international politics and that meaningful results have been achieved in the control of some sectors of arms technology, it is still a reality that a breakthrough in disarmament continues to elude us. The arms control agreements concluded so far have not essentially abated the arms race. It has proved particularly difficult to control the areas where the arms development and build-up are most intense.

Yet it would be unfair to claim that the agreements concluded have been peripheral or insignificant. Efforts to exclude certain categories of weapons and certain environments from the arms race have met with success. The existing multilateral and bilateral disarmament negotiating mechanisms, particularly the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD), have proved their viability. They have also shown that the arms build-up is not a hopeless, uncontrollable, self-perpetuating process.

This partial, piecemeal approach to arms control has revealed one of its basic weaknesses: pressures to accelerate the development of military technology and to deploy new weapons have been transferred to areas not covered by agreements.

The real challenge today is to bring under control the development and deployment of new arms in their entirety. It is, however, encouraging to note that this problem has been recognized and brought under the active consideration in disarmament negotiations, within and outside the CCD.

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

One particular aspect in the recent development of arms technology is the tendency, on the one hand, to modify the destructive qualities of nuclear weapons - an example of this is the neutron bomb - and on the other hand to increase the destruction potential and accuracy of conventional weapons. This development will not, however, blur the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons. Weapons either are nuclear or they are not.

Finland recognizes the urgency of a further limitation of strategic arms. Obviously, it is far more than a bilateral question between the two major Powers, as it has direct links with other disarmament issues, notably with other facets of nuclear disarmament. Specifically, progress in the limitation of strategic arms is essential to efforts to prevent a further spread of nuclear explosives and their manufacturing capability. More generally, it is widely considered that the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) have a direct bearing on the continuation of détente. The international community has, therefore, the right to expect early results in the SALT talks. While the complexity of the questions connected with strategic arms limitation must be recognized, my Government hopes that the remaining difficulties blocking the way to a new SALT agreement will soon be overcome and that the strategic arms race can be stopped and eventually reversed by further agreements.

The remaining difficulties should not stand in the way of the following essentials. First, the continuance of strategic dialogue between the leading nuclear Powers, which the SALT negotiations represent, is in itself a major contribution to the prevention of nuclear war. Secondly, the immediate aim of these talks is the maintenance and enhancement of the stability of the mutual nuclear deterrence. Thirdly, despite the difficulties caused by the structural asymmetries of the nuclear weapon arsenals, the central strategic nuclear balance based on a rough equivalence of forces is not unstable.

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

As an early conclusion of a SALT II agreement is the declared intention of the two negotiating parties, and as that is in their enlightened self-interest and in the interest of the international community as a whole, we continue to be optimistic about the future of SALT. The progress recently reported from those talks is a further reason for our optimism.

To the profound regret of my Government, the many positive results scored in the wake of the process of achieving European security and co-operation have so far failed to include any measures or agreements on the reduction of armed forces and armaments. The Vienna talks on this subject are an important test case for the integral interaction between disarmament and détente. As central Europe is an area of major military concentration, success in the talks would be a milestone in the military relaxation of tension. The confidence-building measures provided for under the Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe are a small but not insignificant step in the right direction. Confidence is a basic ingredient of détente. Indeed, only with political will and confidence in the intentions of the negotiating partners can the Vienna talks yield results.

Finland has strongly emphasized the role of disarmament for the future of détente in Europe at the Belgrade follow-up meeting of the Conference on Security and Co-operation and finds it appropriate that continued attention is being given at the meeting to disarmament measures on the basis of the Final Act. The system of confidence-building measures has already proved meaningful and it could be further developed.

Finland welcomed the unanimous decision by this Assembly last year to convene a special session devoted to disarmament. To our mind, this decision reflected a growing awareness of the fact that the pursuit of disarmament needs a new impetus from the international community as a whole. The preponderance of disarmament issues is further evidenced by the obvious intensity of current arms control negotiations.

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

My Government has noted with satisfaction the progress made at the preparations for the special session on disarmament. Work continues on the remaining substantive issues. As a country that is not a member of the Preparatory Committee for the special session, we have especially welcomed the opportunity for all Member States to participate in and contribute to its preparations. In focusing world attention on disarmament issues in their totality, the task of the special session should, to our mind, be to clear the way for the necessary political decisions by setting out the principles and shaping the programme of action for genuine disarmament. If major progress in the various disarmament negotiations under way could be reported to the special session, its chances of success would be greatly enhanced.

If we fail to stop the massive, ever-accelerating diversion of the world's resources to the arms race, not only do we undermine the security of nations but we also frustrate aspirations for a more equitable, economic world order. At its sixth special session, the General Assembly succeeded in agreeing on the outline of a new international economic order. My Government believes that disarmament and development should be viewed in closer relationship with each other than hitherto. One of the results of the forthcoming eighth special session could be a deepened understanding and appreciation of the links between these two vital issues. In this perspective the Nordic countries have proposed that a further in-depth study in this field be undertaken.

During the past two years, the work of the CCD has been marked by a distinct new sense of purpose. Although the Committee has produced no new draft agreements in the course of this year, work has progressed in two key fields, a comprehensive treaty on the prohibition of nuclear tests and a convention on the prohibition of chemical weapons.

A promising advance has been made towards the solution of the central issues underlying a comprehensive test ban, the priority item of the CCD. Some recent statements are further evidence of this development. Questions

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of the verification and control of a comprehensive test ban seems to be virtually solved. Nor does the question of pursuing universal compliance any longer constitute an obstacle. As opinions vary, to some extent, on the economic benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions, the scope of a comprehensive test ban in this regard has not been defined yet. Given the urgency of a comprehensive test ban - a goal that has continued to elude the international community for the last 14 years - it would be tragic indeed if the subsidiary question of peaceful nuclear explosions should be permitted to frustrate the completion of a treaty. We hope that the General Assembly at its present session will recognize and encourage these negotiations.

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

The prohibition of chemical weapons, linked with the Biological Convention of 1971, would be the first major step in the actual reduction of arms. Problems pertaining to the scope and verification of a projected convention have been particularly intricate. Finland welcomes the recent indications that a comprehensive agreement is now being pursued. The bilateral work of the Soviet Union and the United States towards a joint basic text for the consideration of the CCD shows that they give particular weight to this item.

Progress on a comprehensive test ban and a chemical warfare convention would most markedly contribute to a successful outcome of the special session on disarmament.

Although Finland is not a member of the CCD, both a comprehensive test ban and a chemical weapons convention are priority items in our own disarmament activities. Finland has continued to participate in and contribute to the work of the CCD Ad Hoc Expert Group on Seismological Detection. We have also taken measures to increase our preparedness to participate in international co-operation in working out a system of seismological control of nuclear explosions. Since 1971, Finland has carried out a research project with the purpose of creating a national capacity for chemical weapons control. The project has been so designed that the capacity to be created could be put to international use. The results so far obtained in the Finnish project are incorporated in a manual that Finland submitted to members of the CCD in August of this year.

As positive entries to the past year's arms control balances, I would like to recall the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques and the Review Conference of the Sea-Bed Treaty.

The newest arms control agreement, the Convention I have just mentioned was opened for signature in May. Finland was among the first signatories and hopes for the widest possible adherence to the Convention.

In the assessment of my Government, the recently held Review Conference of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-bed and the Ocean Floor and in

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the Subsoil Thereof was held in a constructive, businesslike atmosphere. As a noteworthy outcome of the Conference, the Parties to the Treaty reaffirmed their intention to continue negotiations concerning the prevention of the arms race on the sea-bed and took practical steps to this effect.

The holding of the review conference of another multilateral arms control treaty is, inter alia, an interesting example of the development of the institutional framework within which the international community manages arms control and disarmament matters. The kingpin of this system is the CCD, which has a responsibility for action as the main multilateral negotiating forum for producing arms control agreements. The system further involves the Security Council as an organ to ensure compliance with the treaties, and the institution of regular review conferences to keep the treaties constantly up to date. In the opinion of my delegation, these institutional arrangements have considerable intrinsic value which, we believe, is not always fully appreciated.

An issue that, in our view, merits more attention than it has been given so far, is the international transfer of conventional arms. In the widest sense, this issue encompasses not only the actual transfer of arms and armaments, but also the movements of military know-how and facilities directly or indirectly related to military production. Successful efforts to regulate international trade in arms are hardly conceivable without a proper analysis of the inherent transnational characteristics of military production and trade.

The question of the control of conventional arms should be tackled with many strategies; one of them could be regional. Arms control agreements are not feasible without a proper balance of the rights and obligations of each party. This and other strategies should be sought through a dialogue between the recipients and suppliers of arms in a given area.

My Government fully shares the view that the process commenced by the Diplomatic Conference on the Reaffirmation and Development of International Humanitarian Law should be continued and deepened. We support the resolution adopted at the last session of the Diplomatic

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

Conference for convening a United Nations conference to reach agreements on the prohibition and restriction of specific conventional weapons. We stand ready to participate in the preparations for the proposed conference.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones remains a viable approach to the enhancing, on a regional basis, of the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, while also contributing to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and thus being a world-wide security measure. The establishment of such zones is the subject of several items before this Committee at the present session of the General Assembly. Against the background of recent developments, particularly in southern Africa, efforts to exclude nuclear weapons on a regional basis have gained added momentum. This concern was aptly expressed by Ambassador Olu Adeniji of Nigeria in his statement before this Committee last Tuesday. As the sponsor of last year's General Assembly resolution 31/70 on the subject of the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects, my Government hopes that these and future proposals can fully draw on that study.

I wish to take this opportunity to congratulate the authors of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America, the so-called Tlatelolco Treaty on the tenth anniversary this year of its signing on 14 February. The Treaty has been an obvious success and has proved the viability of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone.

Let me now turn to the subject of nuclear non-proliferation. It is a subject that has received a great deal of world attention during the past year. The question of peaceful uses of nuclear energy has reached a stage which calls for both fundamental choice and determined action. In the view of the Government of Finland, the United Nations General Assembly is a forum that can, and should, contribute to the unification of international efforts for the non-proliferation of nuclear explosives.

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the cornerstone of these efforts. The reason for the disappointments that have been encountered in the efforts to contain the spread of nuclear weapons, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Finland, Mr. Paavo Väyrynen, stated in the General Assembly a month ago, does not lie in the alleged weaknesses of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He continued:

"Rather the reason is in the failure of the international community to use the Treaty as an effective instrument against the dangers of proliferation. The prospect of nuclear explosives in South Africa is a telling reminder of the danger of nuclear proliferation". (A/32/FV.10, p. 4-5)

According to current estimates of existing and potential energy sources in the world, the role of nuclear technology in energy production will markedly increase in the near future. This fact is creating a rapidly rising demand in an increased number of countries for nuclear technology, facilities and material. Among the suppliers, the growth of the potential market is leading to increased commercial competition. As the acquisition of peaceful nuclear technology may contribute, regardless of the intentions of the recipient, to the capability of manufacturing nuclear explosives, the spread of peaceful technologies brings about, in the absence of effective restraints, a risk of nuclear proliferation. The spread of technologies relating to particularly sensitive parts of the nuclear-fuel cycle, that is, enrichment, reprocessing and plutonium-based fast breeder reactors, adds a qualitatively new dimension to this risk.

The prospects of a plutonium economy have given rise to new demands on the international safeguards systems administered by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Originally, these systems were not designed to meet such demands. If one assumes that there will be an increased adoption of plutonium fuel cycles, existing international safeguards may become inadequate in maintaining the confidence that the Non-Proliferation Treaty requires. There are at least two approaches to checking this development, one by improving the entire system of safeguards, and the other by developing fuel cycles that would be more resistant to proliferation than those involving plutonium. Both ways must be vigorously explored. Therefore, my Government

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

endorses the goals of the nuclear-fuel-cycle evaluation programme that was recently launched by a conference in Washington, D.C. It is equally important to recognize the value of and to express support for the work of the International Atomic Energy Agency that is under way in this broad area.

During the past year, two new States, Panama and Switzerland, have ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty, thus bringing the number of parties to the Treaty to over a hundred. As the Treaty has now entered its seventh year of operation, it is appropriate to analyse the various factors that prevent maximum adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. What has failed with regard to the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty so that a number of countries continue to regard non-adherence to the Treaty to be in their considered interests? An answer could expediently be sought within the United Nations, where different views and interests pertaining to this question are represented.

We consider it essential for the success of the goals of the Non-Proliferation Treaty that countries presently non-signatories to it should not enjoy nuclear co-operation and trade under less stringent control requirements than those stipulated in the Non-Proliferation Treaty. If States that have not pledged themselves to refrain from using peaceful nuclear facilities for military purposes can benefit from international nuclear co-operation, the foundation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty will be eroded. Not acceding to the Treaty can be made less attractive if the terms applied in international co-operation and trade in the nuclear field are designed to comply effectively with the interests of non-proliferation.

Among those not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, of particular concern are those countries - and, according to the IAEA, there are at least five of them - that have nuclear facilities that are not under IAEA safeguards. This is where the laboriously constructed system of non-proliferation leaks most markedly. The number of countries with nuclear programmes that are not completely covered by international safeguards will inevitably grow with an increasing international nuclear trade if the export conditions applied do not provide for effective restraints. The requirement of Non-Proliferation Treaty membership or other effective non-proliferation restraints, such as

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full scope control on the part of the recipient country, is imperative for the success of non-proliferation efforts. Regrettably, the main nuclear exporters have so far failed to reach agreement on responsible export policies. We would regard such an agreement as a necessary step towards the objectives of non-proliferation.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty is sometimes viewed as in itself hampering peaceful uses of nuclear energy. This view is incorrect. Rather, restraints on the use of nuclear energy stem from the fear of proliferation of nuclear explosives. Adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is the best means of eliminating this fear.

My Government is convinced that non-proliferation and a wider use of nuclear energy are not irreconcilable aims. The interests of non-proliferation should not be seen or used as a means to hamper the exploitation of nuclear energy in countries that accept effective non-proliferation restraints. All countries consider it vital to the implementation and operation of their national energy programmes that an adequate supply of nuclear fuels and equipment is ensured. Therefore, it is important that efforts be made in common in an appropriate context between suppliers and recipients to reach mutually satisfactory arrangements ensuring such a supply. This should be done with the particular needs of the developing countries in mind and in recognition of the important role of the IAEA. As a result of such common efforts, trust and confidence in the practicability of the nuclear energy regime of the Non-Proliferation Treaty could be restored.

Last year, the General Assembly adopted a resolution (31/189 D) on the strengthening of the safeguards of the IAEA. The resolution called for support to and the development of the IAEA safeguards system and requested the Agency to give special attention to its work in this area. As the initiator of that resolution last year, Finland considers it important that the General Assembly should also express its views at its present session concerning the progress and continuation of this work. The delegation of Finland has therefore submitted a draft resolution (A/C.1/32/L.3) to be considered under item 51 on this subject. This action should be seen as a practical measure to assist us and other delegations to formulate the draft resolution so as to reflect accurately the views of the Committee. It is, therefore, to be seen as a first draft, short of finalization.

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

My delegation is prepared, in consultation with other delegations, to improve the text. Before concluding let me briefly sketch the outlines of the draft resolution as it stands now.

In designing the draft resolution we have tried to set a balance, first between considerations of horizontal and vertical proliferation, and secondly between the rights and restraints associated with the uses of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. We have been guided by the conviction that both balancing considerations are essential in order to reach the widest possible consensus on the strengthening of the non-proliferation régime at this session of the General Assembly.

The principal content of the draft resolution can be summarized in the following three points.

First, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and the adoption of measures leading to nuclear disarmament would be an important contribution to non-proliferation, and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons expressly commits the nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty to vigorously pursuing these goals. Efforts to these ends are under way and should be encouraged. Also, measures to strengthen the security of non-nuclear-weapon States should be adopted.

Secondly, the draft resolution recognizes the right of States that accept effective non-proliferation restraints to enjoy fully the benefits of nuclear energy. Further efforts to promote the exercise of this right should be made, in particular with the needs of the developing countries in mind. For this purpose the draft resolution recognizes the value of the International Atomic Energy Agency, technical assistance programmes and proposes that they be essentially increased.

Thirdly, my delegation considers that it would be in the interest of the non-proliferation régime for the Member States, by means of this resolution, to make a solemn declaration that they would not convert civil nuclear materials or facilities for any military purpose. Such a declaration would constitute the affirmation of this principle by the most prestigious and representative international body. In our view, furthermore, this declaration should be coupled with a call for the universal adoption of a common system of full-scope safeguards for all nuclear materials and facilities in non-nuclear-weapon States.

(Mr. Blomberg, Finland)

At an appropriate stage of the work of this Committee my delegation will introduce the draft resolution A/C.1/32/L.3 in greater detail.

Mr. PETRIĆ (Yugoslavia); May I first of all congratulate you warmly on behalf of my delegation on your election to the very responsible post of Chairman of this Committee. Please be assured of our readiness to co-operate with you fully in the accomplishment of the important tasks with which the Committee is faced during the current session of the Assembly. May I also address my sincere felicitations to the Ambassadors of Hungary and Finland, Mr. Imre Hollai and Mr. Ilkka Pastinen, on their election as Vice-Chairmen of the Committee, as well as to Mr. Francisco Correa, our Rapporteur, and the members of the secretariat.

The disarmament items on our agenda rank among the most important and acute problems in contemporary international relations. They affect most directly the security of every State and thereby in the final analysis peace and security in the world. The absence of progress in the field of disarmament and the simultaneous intensification of the arms race weigh most heavily on international relations, which makes it incumbent upon the United Nations to exert the utmost efforts in order to reverse such trends. On the other hand, the questions we are dealing with here are also most closely linked with the prospects and ways of solving the ever more complex and urgent problems of further economic and social development in the world. The undertaking of genuine disarmament measures and the releasing of the immense and constantly growing human, material and natural potentials that are now being absorbed by the arms race are of the greatest importance in ensuring the accelerated economic and social progress of the international community as a whole - hence the constantly growing interest of its members in solving problems of disarmament, and their insistence on the necessity for taking resolute steps to that end; hence also their deep concern over the state of and negative trends in development with which we have been confronted in this field for many years.

(Mr. Petrić, Yugoslavia)

During the year that separates us from the last session of the General Assembly of the United Nations various negotiations of a bilateral, trilateral and multilateral character concerning a broad range of questions relating to disarmament and limitation of the arms race have taken place.

The beginning of new negotiations and the continuation of earlier negotiations on specific problems involved in halting the arms race and in disarmament are undoubtedly a positive fact. We consider as encouraging the assurances given by some of the participants in these negotiations to the effect that intensive and substantive negotiations are involved. We would like to express the hope that these negotiations will soon yield concrete results. When referring to these negotiations we cannot but draw attention to some events which to our mind are of special importance.

Since its establishment the United Nations has been exerting efforts to deal with problems of disarmament and limitation of the arms race, particularly in the nuclear sphere. During the recent past many proposals have been submitted in that sense and a number of negotiations have taken place both within the United Nations and outside its framework. And yet, in spite of all such efforts, the results achieved are rather modest owing to the political context in which these talks have been mainly conducted. Now we are confident that conditions are becoming ripe for setting in motion, with the full and active involvement of the United Nations, the process of disarmament, and simultaneously halting the arms race.

The development of military techniques as a whole, particularly with regard to the use of nuclear energy for military purposes, has, in the meantime pursued its independent road, following its own logic and needs. A whole series of new weapons, nuclear and conventional, has been developed. Intensive efforts are being exerted incessantly to develop ever more effective and destructive systems, which objectively makes less and less sense as this cannot bring any expected advantage to any side. There is today practically no weapon that has not undergone many changes and improvements in the post-war period.

(Mr. Petrić, Yugoslavia)

Contemporary conventional weapons, by their effects, often bear very little resemblance to those used in the last war. The arms race, both nuclear and conventional, whose rate is still dictated by the leading military Powers, is continuing at an alarming speed in all environments: on land, on sea and in the air. What causes particular concern in this respect is the fact that the arms race, as a means and a function of bloc rivalry, is assuming ever more dangerous proportions and encompasses ever wider geographical regions.

It is obvious that military technology is advancing much more rapidly than the rate of negotiations in the field of disarmament and limitation of armaments. It is becoming, therefore, ever more evident that as long as our negotiations and the results achieved lag behind in relation to the use of scientific and technological discoveries for military purposes, we shall not be in a position to overcome the present state of affairs and check the negative impact of the arms race on over-all international relations. In other words, our present procrastination in taking, as a matter of the greatest urgency, resolute steps towards disarmament will cause the arms race to continue to increase even more rapidly. We have in the past already drawn attention to this fact, as have other non-aligned countries.

It is difficult not to mention, on this occasion also, that all the negotiations on problems of disarmament and limitation of armaments now in course are being conducted outside the United Nations. The bypassing of the United Nations with regard to direct negotiations on these questions over a number of years has had negative consequences.

Since its founding, the United Nations has been the unique forum for the promotion of the broadest co-operation on the basis of equality and consideration of all problems of international relations in which its Members are interested. Disarmament and the limitation of armaments obviously belong to this group of problems. Hence, it is unacceptable that the United Nations should be practically excluded from negotiations in this crucially important area of international relations. It is even less understandable that the world Organization is not continually informed of the course of negotiations conducted by some of its Members within different frameworks and of the progress achieved at these negotiations.

(Mr. Petrić, Yugoslavia)

The United Nations could make a valuable contribution to the consideration and solution of disarmament problems, without hampering thereby other efforts made in this field outside its framework. The United Nations could play a very important role in elaborating negotiating principles, drawing up programmes of measures and actions, promoting and linking the present negotiating mechanisms, and intensifying its own activity by having, among other things, the Political Committee become a body dealing exclusively with problems of disarmament and international security, by reviewing the progress achieved as well as providing the necessary impetus for further negotiations, as my Government has already suggested in its reply to the Secretary-General's questionnaire relating to the convening of the special session.

The solving of the disarmament problem in the world in which we live, in the conditions of ever greater interdependence and interrelation of vital interests of States, calls for the adoption of new approaches. It makes it imperative to overcome many old habits and concepts, as it is obvious that no satisfactory solutions can be reached on the basis of old methods. The responsibility of the leading military Powers in providing a fresh incentive for negotiations is particularly great, in view of the fact that, objectively, they can and should contribute, to the greatest extent, towards arresting the present negative processes inherent in the arms race and towards opening up new avenues conducive to agreement on measures of genuine disarmament on a broad, equitable and democratic basis.

This year's debate on disarmament problems and international security is marked by specific characteristics. It is taking place immediately after the completion of the first stage of implementation of the General Assembly's decision to convene a special session devoted to disarmament. We have to appraise, among other things, the efforts that have been exerted in this field, adopt appropriate conclusions and lay down guidelines for further work. On the other hand, our debate precedes the holding of the special session. This makes it incumbent on us to concentrate our attention on key disarmament issues.

(Mr. Petrić, Yugoslavia)

The Preparatory Committee has held three sessions so far. It has completed an important part of its work and submitted proposals for our consideration. I wish to emphasize that my delegation appreciates the constructive and workmanlike approach that characterized the Committee's sessions, the spirit of understanding that prevailed, and the readiness of its members to co-operate most actively in the search for generally acceptable solutions.

During its activity so far, the Preparatory Committee has fulfilled only one part of its mandate. In the meantime, until the special session, the Committee will have to complete the remaining part of its responsible task. In this connexion, I have in mind, in the first place, the draft declaration and programme of action that it should prepare. We view with optimism the continuation of the work of the Preparatory Committee, convinced as we are that it will prove once again that it is capable of completing the task that we have entrusted to it.

Eighteen items concerned with various problems of disarmament and limitation of armaments are on the agenda of our Committee. On the whole, all these are well known questions with which we have been confronted for many years. Among them, the cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament continue to attract particular attention.

As in earlier years, we are, unfortunately, again compelled to note that no progress has been achieved in this field in the past period. The negotiations between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of strategic weapons have not yet been completed. The trilateral negotiations between the USSR, the United States and the United Kingdom on a comprehensive ban of nuclear-weapon tests are still going on.

It has often been stated that the conclusion of such a treaty would be one of the important steps in the efforts to halt the nuclear arms race and to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Petrić, Yugoslavia)

We agree in principle with that view. However, at the same time, it has to be stressed that the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons constitutes only a first step in the right direction - a step to be followed immediately by other measures. In this connexion, we have in mind, in the first place, the taking of such measures for the limitation of armaments and disarmament as the prohibition of the use of fissionable materials for military purposes and for the development, sophistication and deployment of technical nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

Without putting an end to the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons, it is not realistic to expect that a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapons tests, in the same way as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, will present an effective barrier to the further proliferation of nuclear weapons. The purport of these two Treaties is not that they should preserve the present situation and division into nuclear and non-nuclear-weapons States, but primarily that they should create more favourable conditions and make it easier for the present nuclear Powers to undertake measures leading to their own nuclear disarmament.

The establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones and zones of peace in various parts of the world may also prove to be a useful means of preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and prohibiting their use.

We still believe that for establishing such zones the following two preconditions have to be fulfilled: the consent of all countries of a given region, and the obligation of military nuclear Powers to respect strictly the status of those zones.

I should like to reiterate our firm belief in the necessity of implementing the United Nations Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. We continue to attach great attention to the initiative to establish a zone of peace and co-operation in the Mediterranean, as well as to the other proposals concerning the creation of similar zones in various parts of the world. This would be one of the ways to reduce military tension in the regions where it is particularly acute, to remove the risks inherent in the presence of alien military bases in foreign territories, and to create conditions for the dismantling of such bases, thus rendering possible the development of broad peaceful co-operation among countries belonging to a given region.

(Mr. Petric, Yugoslavia)

No progress has been made in the field of banning chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction either. However, we continue to believe profoundly in the necessity of banning all chemical weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. We shall continue to insist on the comprehensive prohibition of the use, manufacture and stock-piling of chemical weapons, as well as on the destruction of existing stock-piles, convinced as we are that this is the only way to a lasting solution.

We expect that the negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States which are now under way will soon make it possible to tackle the task of drawing up international treaties on the prohibition of chemical and radiological weapons. Confidence-building measures can greatly contribute to the relaxation of tension in the world, especially in regions where military concentrations and antagonisms arising therefrom are particularly manifest.

The Helsinki Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe has ushered in the process of co-operation among European States in that sense. We believe that the current Belgrade meetings will mark a forward step towards expanding co-operation among European States with regard to the strengthening of security. In this respect, the neutral and non-aligned European States have submitted concrete proposals.

Questions involving the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes are gaining in urgency and are attracting the attention of both the developed and the developing countries. This is understandable, because what are involved are problems concerned simultaneously with the prevention of further expansion of the military nuclear capability of States and with the unhampered use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, which implies free access to nuclear technology and its introduction into the energy systems of non-nuclear-States, particularly developing ones.

Consistent in its support for the prevention of the proliferation of nuclear weapons, Yugoslavia has always endeavoured to resist attempts to prevent or to restrict, under the guise of preventing a further proliferation of nuclear weapons, the sovereign right of every State to have access to nuclear technology, by means of transfer or otherwise, and to use nuclear energy for purposes of economic and social development. All restrictions along these lines due to

(Mr. Petrić, Yugoslavia)

discriminatory actions or to the monopolistic position of some countries or groups of countries are in contradiction with the generally-accepted principle concerning the right of every State to unhampered economic and social development.

As has already been emphasized in the statement made in this Assembly on 30 September by the Yugoslav Vice-Premier, Mr. Minic, we believe that it is high time to find an internationally agreed solution ensuring the free transfer of nuclear technology and its use for the accelerated development of non-nuclear, predominantly developing, countries under an appropriate system of international control, applied without discrimination.

Finally, I wish to note with concern that, in spite of its efforts, the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has not been able to inform us of any important progress with regard to questions which were on the agenda of its session this year. It is indispensable to complete, as early as possible, the bilateral negotiations on chemical and radiological weapons, as well as the bilateral negotiations on a comprehensive ban on nuclear-weapons tests, which would enable the Committee to begin to work intensively on the completion of preparations for the elaboration of appropriate international treaties - we would hope before the opening of the special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament in May of next year. My delegation will deal with some specific problems of disarmament in the course of the further work of this Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: The next speaker is Ambassador Hoveyda of Iran, who will introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference.

Mr. HOVEYDA (Iran): It is indeed an honour and a great pleasure to address the First Committee when such an accomplished diplomat and great friend is in the Chair.

As stated by the Chairman, I am here to introduce the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference contained in document A/32/28.

I am pleased to be able to inform the Committee that, despite the many complexities involved, the Ad Hoc Committee has been able to submit to the General Assembly a consensus report in conformity with its mandate. Before turning to the content of this year's report, allow me to dwell briefly on some procedural aspects of the Committee's work.

In undertaking its task, the Committee was guided by the mandate entrusted to it in resolution 31/190 of 21 December 1976. By that resolution the General Assembly requested the Ad Hoc Committee to maintain close contact with the representatives of the States possessing nuclear weapons in order to remain currently informed of their respective attitudes, as well as to consider any relevant comments and observations which might be made to the Committee and, for this purpose, to meet briefly and submit a report to the General Assembly at its thirty-second session, in accordance with its established procedure. The composition of the Committee remained unchanged and, as in previous years, of the five nuclear Powers - which now enjoy the same rights as the designated Committee members - France, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom participated in the work of the Committee, while China and the United States maintained contact with it through its Chairman.

Turning now to the body of the Ad Hoc Committee's report, I would observe that there are three chapters, the first being a short introductory one. It is perhaps pertinent at this juncture to point out that the size of the report this year is a reflection merely of the limited nature of the Committee's mandate as spelled out in resolution 31/190. Its size places no value judgement on the importance of the subject-matter which it covers.

(Mr. Hoveyda, Iran)

It will be seen from Chapter II, which deals with the work of the Committee, that pursuant to its mandate the Ad Hoc Committee held one meeting on 4 April 1977, and that after a general debate and an exchange of views it decided, inter alia, that the remainder of the session should be held in September 1977. The Committee also agreed that the Working Group, established in 1974 as an open-ended body, should undertake the task of preparing a draft report for the Ad Hoc Committee's consideration. The Committee resumed its work on 12 September and held two meetings devoted to a general debate in the course of which statements were made by a number of countries.

The Working Group resumed its work on 13 September and held a number of formal and informal meetings until 16 September, under the very able chairmanship of the Rapporteur of the Committee, Mr. Ignacio Lopez-Chicheri of Spain. On this occasion I should like to acknowledge gratefully the important contribution made by Mr. Lopez-Chicheri and his colleagues in the Working Group.

It will be noted in Chapter II that, in compliance with its mandate, the Committee, through its Chairman, also maintained close contacts with the representatives of States possessing nuclear weapons in order to be currently informed of their respective attitudes. Information regarding those contacts which, in the opinion of the Ad Hoc Committee in the prevailing circumstances of its work, are a unique feature of the Committee was provided by the Chairman to the members of the Committee on 25 August 1977 and are included in the present report. The result of those contacts was to make it amply clear to the Committee that on important aspects the position of the five nuclear Powers concerning the holding of a world disarmament conference remained unchanged.

In the final chapter, which contains the conclusion of the report, the Ad Hoc Committee notes that in considering the advisability of the continuation of its work under an appropriate mandate, in the light of the contents of the present and previous reports, the General Assembly may wish to bear in mind the recommendation made to it by the Preparatory Committee for the Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted to Disarmament.

(Mr. Hoveyda, Iran)

Representatives will recall that, in paragraph 18 of its report in documents A/32/41 and Corr.1, the Preparatory Committee, inter alia, recommended that the General Assembly at its current session request the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference to submit a special report to the special session on the state of its work and deliberations.

Needless to say, the conclusion arrived at by the Committee, as well as other parts of the report, are the result of protracted and intricate negotiations and the product of a delicate compromise. The objective nature of the report is a clear testimony to the efforts made by all concerned to ensure a constructive solution to the difficulties involved and a successful outcome to our joint endeavours. And in commending this report to the Committee's attention, I am hopeful that the same spirit of co-operation will prevail as the General Assembly engages in the task of charting a course for our future work.

The meeting rose at 1 p.m.