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Chairman: Mr. JAROSZEK (Poland)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.15 p.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 34, 35, 37, 38, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 and 116  
(continued)

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those delegations that wish to speak in explanation of their votes on draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.15, which was adopted at this morning's meeting.

Mr. MULYE (India): My delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.15 dealing with the urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban. However, I should like to clarify that, with reference to preambular paragraph 4 of that draft resolution, our vote is without prejudice to and does not in any way change our well-known position concerning the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

Mr. SCHLAICH (Federal Republic of Germany): As it has constantly reaffirmed in the past, the Federal Republic of Germany is likewise in favour of the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests, the accession of all States to the partial test ban treaty and an early conclusion of a comprehensive and adequately verified prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. The realization of these objectives would mark a significant contribution to curbing the nuclear arms race and safeguarding the policy of non-proliferation. If, nevertheless, we have abstained in the vote on the draft resolution before us, it is because we do not consider its wording to be sufficiently balanced, and also because a basic issue is missing from its substantive parts. Concerning this basic issue, though mentioned in New Zealand's introductory remarks, we fail to see any reference in the text of the resolution itself to the need for an arrangement concerning peaceful nuclear explosions being reached simultaneously with the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty in order to prevent that peaceful nuclear explosions may serve as a pretext to promote the development of nuclear weapons.

Furthermore, we would have welcomed the reference to the Ad Hoc Group of Seismic Experts working under the auspices of the Conference of the Committee on

(Mr. Schlaich, Federal Republic  
of Germany)

Disarmament. According to our information the reference to this Group was contained in the original draft of resolution A/C.1/31/L.15.

In addition, considering this year's draft resolutions concerning the conclusion of a CTB in general, we want to express our opinion that we find it neither appropriate nor convenient to demand that a comprehensive test ban agreement should come into force only after all nuclear-weapon States have acceded to it. We continue, furthermore, to view the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament as the most suitable forum to discuss the comprehensive test ban agreement.

Mr. THOMPSON (United States of America): The draft resolution approved by the Committee this morning concerning the question of a comprehensive test ban closely resembles in most respects the resolution on this subject adopted by the General Assembly last year. The major concerns that led the United States to abstain on that resolution continue to be relevant to the present draft and my delegation has, therefore, abstained from the vote.

The CHAIRMAN: Since no other delegation wishes to speak in explanation of its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.15, I declare concluded the consideration of agenda item 37 concerning the urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and the conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban.

We shall now proceed to a vote on draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.16 relating to item 47 of the agenda: "Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests". The draft resolution was introduced by the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 23 November. The financial implications are set forth in document A/C.1/31/L.27. I shall now give the floor to delegations wishing to explain their votes before the voting.

Mr. OXLEY (Australia): The Australian delegation will abstain on draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.16: Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon test. Since Australia is, in fact, a co-sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.15 on the companion item: Urgent need for the cessation of nuclear and thermo-nuclear tests and the conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban, our motives in adopting quite different positions on what might otherwise appear to be quite similar items may not be clear to some delegations and I shall therefore explain them briefly.

The Australian Government is firmly committed to the cessation of nuclear weapon tests in all environments out of recognition of the contribution adoption of such a measure may make to the nuclear arms race. But the differences between the two approaches embodied in each of the two resolutions are quite fundamental. In my delegation's view they centre on the following points.

Draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.15 calls for all nuclear-weapon States to suspend testing by agreement as an interim step towards the conclusion of a formal

(Mr. Oxley, Australia)

agreement. Draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.16 does not recognize the desirability of a suspension of testing before the commencement of negotiations. My delegation recognizes that negotiations of a comprehensive test ban agreement are likely to be protracted and believes that nuclear-weapon States should testify to their support for any such an arrangement by ceasing testing before, or at the time, any negotiations commence. Draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.15 calls for negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty within the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. Draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.16 does not recognize the value of using this negotiating forum which, despite its imperfections, the Australian Government considers should remain the primary international forum for negotiation of arms control and disarmament measures.

Draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.15 recognizes that some nuclear-weapon States have already shown a willingness to reach agreement on limited restrictions on nuclear-weapon tests and have already accepted the obligation through adherence to the Partial Test Ban Agreement and other international agreements (of which the Australian Government considers the Non-Proliferation Treaty to be the important one) to end nuclear-weapon testing. Draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.15 emphasizes that such an obligation exists, but draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.16 only envisages negotiations of a comprehensive test ban agreement if all nuclear-weapon States participate in those negotiations. It ignores the fact that obligations to cease testing have already been assumed and it depends for its implementation on the co-operation of those nuclear-weapon States that have not even demonstrated the willingness to impose partial restrictions on nuclear testing. The approach underlying draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.15 suggested that early negotiation of a comprehensive test ban agreement is feasible. The approach underlying draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.16 does not.

Up until this General Assembly a major point of contention between the two principal nuclear-weapon States about negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty was the issue of the means by which a CTB might be verified. My delegation welcomes the announcements made at this Assembly that the Soviet Union is prepared to be more flexible on this issue. We note particularly that the Soviet Union has now modified paragraph 3 of article 2 of the Soviet draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear tests to allow some provision for

(Mr. Oxley, Australia)

on-site inspection. It is not for my delegation to judge whether or not the proposals made will satisfy the concerns that had been expressed about the need for adequate provision for verification. We note, however, that the proposals are essentially voluntary.

It is not usually the case to have an arrangement whereby a State, against whom a complaint may be lodged for alleged breach of an arms control measure, should have the residual power to decide itself whether or not any such complaint should be investigated. The essence of verification procedures is that they should be confidence-building measures, particularly when potential adherents regard agreements as central to national defence interests. But, presumably, the Soviet Union regards this proposal as a starting point for negotiations, since it has said its draft treaty should be negotiated by a group of nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States.

However, the Australian Government does not consider that the issue of verification is a major obstacle to early negotiation of a comprehensive test ban treaty. It considers the major obstacle now to be the stipulation implied in the approach in draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.16 that a CTB should not be negotiated unless all nuclear-weapon States participate in those negotiations.

That two nuclear-weapon States are not signatories either to the partial test ban treaty or to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty is well known. That this is the case is deeply regretted by the Australian Government. However, the two major nuclear-weapon States are the ones who make the most sophisticated contribution to the vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons and who have given a valuable lead to other nuclear-weapon States by agreeing to partial measures to restrict nuclear weapons testings. Negotiation by them of a comprehensive test ban treaty would represent a major contribution to restricting the nuclear arms race and it is a matter of deep regret that one of them now chooses to establish a precondition which will defer negotiations for an indefinite period.

(Mr. Oxley, Australia)

We are all aware that the negotiations proposed in General Assembly resolution 3478 (XXX), the precursor of draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.16, did not get off the ground because none of the other nuclear-weapon States were prepared to join the Soviet Union in the negotiations envisaged in that resolution.

The Australian Government does not disregard the supreme importance of the ultimate goal of the universal cessation of testing, but it has welcomed the acceptance in the past by the leading nuclear-weapon States of the special responsibility of setting an example on this question. My delegation is extremely disappointed that one of those States continues to seek the support of the General Assembly for an approach which, in the opinion of my Government, is contrary to the spirit of that responsibility and takes us farther away from, rather than nearer to, the early negotiation of an agreement on the cessation of nuclear-weapon testing.

Mr. CRAIG (Ireland): The Irish delegation has taken careful note of the revised text of the draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests submitted by the Soviet Union in document A/C.1/31/9 and, in particular, of the new paragraph 3 of article II regarding the possible on-site inspection of seismic events. My delegation hopes that this latter proposal may enable progress to be made in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) towards the negotiation without delay of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

However, it will be evident from the general approach adopted by my delegation in relation to a comprehensive test ban that this does not resolve the essential problems which my delegation has with the Soviet draft treaty and the approach suggested in draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.16. Let me note, firstly, that the draft treaty does not address what my Permanent Representative described last year as the important issue of peaceful nuclear explosions and the crucial problem of making sure that these explosions do not in fact contribute to the refining of existing nuclear weapons or the acquisition of nuclear explosive capacity by additional States. Fundamentally, as my Permanent Representative stated in this year's debate:

"We continue to believe that the responsibility for intensified efforts to reach agreement on a comprehensive test ban (CTB) rests with the two super-Powers.... As a means towards that end, a suspension of testing by nuclear-weapon States by agreement, subject to review after a specified period, could



(Mr. Craig, Ireland)

be a major influence in creating a suitable climate for a CTB treaty. And while we see the obvious desirability of all nuclear Powers becoming Parties to that treaty, my Government does not regard the participation of all nuclear States as a necessary pre-condition for the entry into force of a CTB treaty." (A/C.1/31/PV.34, p. 61)

The Irish delegation's approach is reflected in draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.15 which has just been adopted by this Committee and which my delegation co-sponsored. For the reasons I have outlined, my delegation will abstain in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.16, as we cannot endorse the approach suggested in paragraph 1 of the draft resolution and in article VI, paragraph 3 of the draft treaty.

Mr. NIKOLOV (Bulgaria) (interpretation from Russian): At this stage of our debate we are called upon to take a decision on the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet Union in document A/C.1/31/L.16. The delegation of Bulgaria wishes to state briefly the reasons why we fully support it. We share the opinion that the halting of the arms race must be the priority objective in disarmament efforts. The solution of this problem in the field of international security requires, first, the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests by all States. There is no need to emphasize the urgent need for an agreement on this. We believe that under present circumstances, when the question of verifying the total cessation of nuclear-weapon tests would not entail technical difficulties, the conclusion of the agreement sought depends only on a political decision by all the nuclear-weapon States.

As we know, on a bilateral level, the Soviet Union and the United States have already concluded an agreement limiting the scope of underground nuclear-weapon tests by establishing a threshold. This is certainly a positive measure with which we are very pleased. But everybody realizes that, on the whole and by its very nature, the problem of the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests cannot be resolved except by means of an international treaty to which all nuclear Powers would be parties. Our position in this case is based on the conviction that the desired solution to the nuclear disarmament problem, given the political realities of the world we live in today, is impossible without the co-operation of all States,

(Mr. Nikolov, Bulgaria)

and in particular of all the nuclear Powers. Efforts to promote nuclear disarmament will become truly meaningful only when all the nuclear Powers participate. The commitments entered into by Member States under the Charter entail a duty to participate in this undertaking with a will to succeed.

This is why the delegation of Bulgaria unreservedly subscribes to the considerations which prompted the Soviet draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.16. We consider it necessary, as provided for in that document, that the General Assembly should again call upon all nuclear-weapon States, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3478 (XXX), to proceed as soon as possible with negotiations on the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, with the participation of non-nuclear-weapon States. The delegation of Bulgaria, being convinced that it is in the interests of world peace and security to undertake such action without delay, will vote in favour of the Soviet draft resolution. This also explains why the delegation of Bulgaria abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.15.

Mr. JAY (Canada): Canada has consistently joined in the repeated appeals of this Assembly to the nuclear-weapon States to halt their nuclear-weapon testing and to enter into an effective comprehensive test ban agreement. Thus my delegation has just joined in voting for draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.15 which, among other things, declared the profound concern of the Assembly that substantive negotiations towards a CTB agreement have not begun and urged the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to give the highest priority to the conclusion of such an agreement. However, my delegation will abstain on resolution A/C.1/31/L.16 for the following reasons: first, the resolution does not recognize the valuable role of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament in seeking to achieve a CTB; secondly, the draft resolution requires the mandatory participation of all five nuclear-weapon States in the negotiations it envisages; thirdly, the draft resolution recalls resolution 3478 (XXX) of 11 December 1975, a resolution on which the Canadian delegation and 14 others abstained.

It will be recalled that resolution 3478 (XXX) contained, as an annex, a draft treaty submitted by the delegation of the Soviet Union on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. That draft treaty provided for solely national technical means of verification, did not contain adequate provisions for ensuring that nuclear explosions carried out for peaceful purposes on the territories of nuclear-weapon States would not confer weapon-related benefits, and stipulated that it would not enter into force until it had been ratified by all of the nuclear-weapon States. All of these deficiencies have not been removed from the revised draft treaty tabled by the delegation of the Soviet Union in document A/C.1/31/9 of 22 November of this year, although we are encouraged by the indication in the revised version of the Soviet draft treaty that the Soviet Union is now prepared to envisage something more than solely national technical means of verification. This question must be fully explored in the CCD in the coming year to determine whether the problems of adequately verifying a CTB are in fact closer to solution. We note that, while the revised Soviet draft treaty provides for verification by challenge and for possible on-site inspection, a nuclear-weapon State that had been challenged would not be obliged to accept on-site inspection.

In further explanation of its abstention on draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.16, my delegation wishes to reiterate its failure to understand why, as is explicit

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in the Soviet draft treaty and implicit in draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.16, that a formal and interim underground test ban is impossible unless all five nuclear-weapon States participate from the outset. In its general statement to this Committee on 5 November, my delegation posed this question, which so far has gone completely unanswered: what insurmountable obstacles prevent at least the two super-Powers, and as many other nuclear-weapon States as possible, from entering into a formal agreement to end their nuclear-weapon testing for a defined trial period? When the two super-Powers already have nuclear weapons arsenals of such enormous magnitude and when their own capacity for destruction so greatly exceeds that of any other nuclear-weapon State, how can it be argued with any credibility that an interim testing halt by the two of them would threaten their security unless all of the remaining nuclear-weapon States immediately follow suit?

In the Canadian view, such an interim agreement should be open to all States but not necessarily require the adherence of all five nuclear-weapon States in order for it to enter into force. It should contain measures to ensure that its terms are fully honoured and that nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes did not confer weapons-related benefits, and should be reviewed at the end of its trial period to determine whether it might be further extended or be transformed into a permanent agreement including all nuclear-weapon States. My delegation appeals once again to the two super-Powers to give the most serious consideration to the possibility of concluding such an agreement. We cannot see how an agreement of that kind would impair their security.

Mr. OGISO (Japan): I wish to explain the vote of my delegation on draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.16. My delegation appreciates the effort made by the co-sponsors of the draft resolution to improve the draft, in particular with regard to paragraph 4 of the preambular paragraph and the revised draft treaty accompanying the letter dated 22 November 1976 from the First Deputy Foreign Minister of the USSR, Mr. Kuznetsov (A/C.1/31/9). However, in view of the position of my delegation that the negotiation on the conclusion of the CTB treaty should be started and continued without waiting for the participation of all nuclear-weapon States, my delegation cannot accept the proposal in paragraph 1 of the operative part of the draft resolution, nor can it accept the provisions of article 4 of the draft convention. Therefore, my delegation will abstain from voting on draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.16.

The CHAIRMAN: Since no other delegation wishes to speak in explanation of its vote before the voting, the Committee will now proceed to vote on draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.16 relating to item 47 of the agenda, "Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests". A roll-call vote has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll call.

Indonesia, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Libyan Arab Republic, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bulgaria, Burundi, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Central African Republic, Chad, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, German Democratic Republic, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Hungary, India.

Against: Albania, China.

Abstaining: Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malawi, Malta, Mauritania, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Paraguay, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Zambia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Chile, Denmark, France, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Iceland.

The draft resolution (A/C.1/31/L.16) was adopted by 82 votes to 2, with 37 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on delegations wishing to explain their vote after the vote.

Mr. di BERNARDO (Italy): As we already stated here at the 24th meeting of this Committee, held on 5 November 1976, Italy considers the achievement at the earliest possible date of an agreement on a comprehensive test ban (CTB) to be of crucial importance for further progress in the area of disarmament and for the fulfilment of the objectives of the Charter of the United Nations as well as for the full and balanced implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

(Mr. di Bernardo, Italy)

We have considered with due attention the two draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/31/L.15 and A/C.1/31/L.16. The good intentions of the Soviet Union to co-operate towards an understanding concerning on-site inspections of nuclear tests represent a development worthy of close attention. We maintain, however, that in this essential area -- which constitutes the keystone of any international agreement on a CTB -- it is necessary for the best articulated and most precise agreements to be achieved. Such agreements should be so conceived as to strengthen international confidence and to leave no room for doubt concerning the balanced implementation of all the provisions of the NPT in the interests of all countries. We maintain that the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) is the most appropriate body for the negotiation of a CTB; it is the body which gives the surest guarantee for the formulation of an agreed text which could command general approval. On the other hand, we feel that, in any agreement concerning the cessation of nuclear tests, as well as the progressive elimination of all nuclear weapons, one must take into account the need not to impede the development of the peaceful utilization of nuclear energy, including procurement of the potential benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions in conformity with article V of the NPT. The most effective way to prevent the danger of nuclear proliferation, as well as to justify support for the Treaty by its signatories and to attract further adherence to it, consists in fact in the concrete reaffirmation of the right of all States to the benefits of the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes -- this right being stressed as much in the context of the NPT as outside of it. Of course, the necessary safeguards must be provided to prevent the peaceful uses of nuclear energy -- this energy which is the property of all peoples and the essential means for their economic development -- from being abused and covertly used for acquiring a military capacity.

While noting with great interest the new developments cited already and fully sharing the need for a new and decisive effort in the direction of a general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests, we feel that the draft resolution introduced by the New Zealand delegation should have taken into account the elements I have described above -- thereby requiring further improvements such as, for example, the inclusion of a specific reference to the Ad Hoc Committee of seismic experts working under the auspices of the CCD -- in order to be more balanced and harmonious. On the

(Mr. di Bernardo, Italy)

other hand, the draft resolution submitted by the USSR, while presenting new and positive elements, would have required, inter alia, more congruous and precise wording as regards the essential matter of verification and international controls. For these reasons, the Italian delegation abstained in the vote on both draft resolutions.

Mr. van DUYSSE (Belgium) (interpretation from French): We have just taken a decision on two draft resolutions concerning the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. My delegation abstained in the vote on these two texts.

Nevertheless, we would not wish our abstention to be interpreted as a lack of appreciation for the efforts made by the sponsors of these texts. The aim of draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.15, for example, is the subject of increasing concern and urgency, and we would sincerely have wished that our agreement in principle could have been expressed in a different vote. Unfortunately, this draft resolution also contains elements to which we cannot subscribe. As in 1975, it contains a reference which we consider to be inappropriate. We also regret that no mention is made of the work -- which we consider to be promising -- of the group of experts on seismology which met for the first time at Geneva.

As part of the exchange of views we had on draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.16, the representative of the Soviet Union was good enough to make extremely interesting comments on the revised draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear tests and, in particular, on the question of verification. My delegation intends to study the ideas expressed at that time most carefully. However, in the draft resolution itself we unfortunately did not find any reflection of the special and sui generis responsibilities which, in our view, are incumbent upon the great nuclear Powers. This among other factors accounts for our abstention.

Mr. REINIUS (Sweden): The Swedish Government continues to attach the highest importance to the cessation of all nuclear-weapon tests and to the conclusion of a treaty on a comprehensive test ban. In our opinion, however, the negotiation of a complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests should remain an item of the highest priority of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and



(Mr. Reinius, Sweden)

should not be transferred to a forum outside the CCD. None the less, a year ago we declared our readiness to take part in such negotiations as are again called for in operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.16, provided that at least four nuclear-weapon Powers declared their willingness to take part. We remain doubtful that it will be possible to have negotiations involving all the nuclear-weapon Powers, but we are still prepared to take part under the conditions mentioned -- that is, with the participation of at least four nuclear-weapon Powers. Our position regarding this item on our agenda thus remains unchanged. That is why, as last year, we were not able to support draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.16 and therefore abstained in the vote.

Mr. KHAN (Pakistan): The Pakistan delegation voted for the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.16. However, I wish to state that this draft resolution does not fully reflect our point of view on the question of a comprehensive test ban. Some of our reservations on the draft treaty proposed by the Soviet Union were stated by our delegation in this Committee last year. We feel that agreement among all nuclear Powers concerning a comprehensive test ban is not an essential prerequisite for progress towards such a ban. We agree with the view expressed by many delegations here, including those of Canada and Sweden, that the lead in this respect should be taken by the two super-Powers, perhaps through a unilateral interim halt to nuclear testing. This would encourage the lesser Powers to follow their example.

Mr. ALLEN (United Kingdom): My delegation abstained on resolution 3478 (XXX), which was adopted by the General Assembly at its thirtieth session. It was with reluctance that we decided to abstain this year on draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.16. As is well known, my Government is wholly committed to the goal of achieving a comprehensive test ban. The draft resolution is directly linked to resolution 3478 and to the Soviet draft treaty annexed to that resolution. We are not convinced that the draft treaty provides the answers to the problems which must be solved before a comprehensive test ban can be concluded. My Government has of course noted the new paragraph 3 in article 2 of the draft treaty. This paragraph makes proposals about possible arrangements for on-site inspection in the case of doubtful seismic events. My Government is not convinced that all suspected nuclear explosions could be adequately investigated under the proposed procedure, but it will wish the proposal to be further examined with the seriousness which this subject deserves.

As I said last year, the draft treaty does not deal adequately with the question of peaceful nuclear explosions. We note the statement of the distinguished representative of the Soviet Union made in this Committee on 1 November that:

"... the Treaty of 1976 between the USSR and the United States on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes established a system for the conducting of such explosions which totally eliminates the possibility of using them for purposes of improving nuclear weapons." (A/C.1/31/PV.20, pp. 13-15)

However, we believe that for a comprehensive test ban different procedures would be needed in order to ensure that peaceful nuclear explosions did not yield weapons-related benefits. For these reasons my delegation has abstained, despite its sympathy with the broad intentions of the draft resolution. Operative paragraph 1 of A/C.1/31/L.16 calls upon nuclear-weapon States to proceed as soon as possible to negotiations on the conclusion of a treaty. My Government is prepared to do this as soon as a basis for negotiation can be established which takes account of the points I have just made.

Mr. HARMON (Liberia): In order to be consistent we apologize for not being here, but we would like to record a vote in favour of the resolution.

The CHAIRMAN: The statement of the representative of Liberia will be duly recorded in the verbatim record of this Committee.

Mr. MOONYANE (Lesotho): Consistent with our voting last year on resolution 3478 (XXX), I should like the records to show that we would have voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.16 if we had been here.

The CHAIRMAN: The statement of the representative of Lesotho will also be recorded in the verbatim record.

Mr. THOMPSON (United States): The United States remains committed to the pursuit of an adequately verified comprehensive test ban agreement. Our abstention on the draft resolution introduced by the Soviet Union in document A/C.1/31/L.16 reflects our continuing reservations concerning several issues that it raises, which we explained in some detail in the General Assembly last year. These reservations, involving such questions as the proper forum for negotiations, participation in a comprehensive test ban and the need for resolving the problem of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes in the context of a comprehensive test ban still pertain with regard to the present draft resolution. At the same time we have noted the introduction by the Soviet Union of a revised draft treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests and especially the new paragraph dealing with a possible system of on-site inspection. We believe this paragraph merits further consideration.

The CHAIRMAN: The consideration of agenda item 47, "Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests", is concluded.

The Committee will now proceed to the vote on the last resolution, contained in document A/C.1/31/L.6, relating to agenda item 46, "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia". The draft has no financial implications; the Committee may recall that the draft was introduced by the representative of Pakistan on 24 November. I shall now give the floor to those delegations who wish to explain their vote before the voting.

Mr. MISHRA (India): My delegation would like to explain briefly its position on the draft resolution concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

We can be brief now, because at the twenty-ninth and thirtieth sessions of the General Assembly the position of India was explained in great detail. The most fundamental objection to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.6 is that it seeks to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone in an area which is not appropriate for the purpose. South Asia is a subregion, being an integral part of the Asian and Pacific regions. The South Asian countries are surrounded by nuclear-weapon States or countries belonging to their alliances. Thus, this subregion cannot be treated in isolation for the purpose of creating a nuclear-weapon-free zone. The presence of nuclear weapons in the region as a whole, the alliances with nuclear-weapon States and the existence of foreign military bases have to be taken into account in the examination of any proposal for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Asia and the Pacific.

(Mr. Mishra, India)

Thus, the idea of treating South Asia in isolation is inappropriate. The General Assembly itself recognized the point in its resolution 3265 A (XXIX) by making it clear that the initiative for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the appropriate region of Asia should come from the States of the region concerned, taking into account its special features and geographical extent.

Another basic objection to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.6 is that it once again seeks to endorse, in principle, the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. As I have said this subregion is inappropriate for the purpose, but even for an appropriate region, the initiative for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone should come from States within the region concerned and participation must be voluntary. This is a basic principle unanimously accepted by the ad hoc group of qualified governmental experts charged with the task of preparing the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects. While accepting this principle the General Assembly decided in its resolution 3476 A (XXX) to "give due consideration to any proposal for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in an appropriate region of Asia, after" -- and I repeat, after -- "it has been developed and matured among the interested States within the region concerned".

Further, the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/31/L.6 seeks once again to involve the Secretary-General of the United Nations in promoting the efforts for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. On this same question the Secretary-General reported to the General Assembly last year that "Differences exist in the approach to the question of the declaration and establishment of a nuclear-free zone in South Asia." As is well known to delegates, these differences continue to exist. Thus, to involve the Secretary-General in it again seems to us to be a waste of his time and effort. From what I have said, it should be clear that my delegation is opposed to the adoption of draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.6 and therefore we shall vote against it. India is of the firm view that it could not join the proposed nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and regrets its inability to participate in any effort to establish such a zone.

Mr. ENDREFFY (Hungary): My delegation has already had the opportunity to state its views on the major issues covered in the general debate on items regarding disarmament. Now, I would like to touch upon one concrete question, draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.6 submitted under item 46 entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia".

First of all, I would like to make a general remark. As it can be seen from the reply my Government gave to the Secretary-General in accordance with General Assembly resolution 3472 A (XXX), we attach great importance to the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones; we follow with great interest and study carefully all the relevant initiatives and suggestions. We are aware of the fact that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones is both complex and complicated and that conditions and procedures for the creation of such zones differ from region to region. Consequently, it is impossible to set out rules of universal validity.

There are, however, certain generally accepted principles with which every initiative and suggestion aimed at establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones must be in harmony. For example, any nuclear-weapon-free zone, as its name suggests, must be entirely free of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and the initiative for establishing such a zone should come from the States of the region concerned. This is only natural since it would not be realistic to think that any outside Power or the General Assembly of the United Nations, could substitute for the will or readiness of the States concerned regarding the establishment of such a zone. In the concrete case we cannot disregard the fact that the South Asian zone would not be a separate and distinct continental zone which, therefore, cannot be treated in isolation from other parts of Asia.

These factors no doubt complicate the establishment of a South Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone and contribute to the divergent views of the States concerned regarding the concept of such a zone. The gaps between the divergent views, as we just heard, could not be bridged and there is still no agreement among the States concerned on the advisability of the creation of the zone. A new General Assembly resolution will be no substitution for such an agreement which is a sine qua non for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. We are not even convinced that a new resolution would stimulate efforts to bridge the existing gaps.

(Mr. Endreffy, Hungary)

For all these reasons, my delegation is unable to support draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.6 and will abstain from voting. On the other hand, we shall support initiatives regarding the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones where the scope of the zone is not arbitrary, where it is well defined and which, besides corresponding to certain generally accepted principles, rests on the agreement of the States concerned.

Mr. TSHERING (Bhutan): I asked to be allowed to speak in order to explain the position of my delegation briefly, on the draft resolution now under consideration by this Committee. The problem of the nuclear-weapon-free zone has been under consideration by the General Assembly for several years. Last year, we welcomed the report of the group of governmental experts on the comprehensive study on the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects. This year we have the benefit of the special report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the report of the Secretary-General which contains the views of 36 Member States. All these reports confirm our belief that it is a complex matter, that the views on it are varied and that it deserves careful consideration.

(Mr. Tshering, Bhutan)

My delegation has explained its position on the subject in this Committee at the thirty-first session of the General Assembly. We have always supported in this Committee the resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone, particularly when all the members directly concerned have, through prior consultation, agreed to do so. We believe that such zones should be established with clear understanding, taking into account all the relevant factors which would reflect a general consensus of the States directly concerned. Indeed, it should also be the result of a free agreement among the concerned members without outside interference. Unfortunately, so far there has been no consultation or agreement among the Member States of the South Asian region, of which my country is a member. We all appreciate that the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone is important to all the Member States, but suitable conditions must exist, which differ from region to region. Thus, we are convinced that it is a complex matter, and unless there has been consultation and agreement among the members directly concerned, it will not be realistic and practical to establish a nuclear-weapon-free zone. In view of this, my delegation will vote against the draft resolution now under consideration by the Committee.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now proceed to vote on draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.6 relating to agenda item 46, "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia". A roll-call vote has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll call.

Lebanon, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour: Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Zaire, Afghanistan, Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi,



Canada, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Democratic Yemen, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Iceland, Iran, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait.

Against: Bhutan, India.

Abstaining: Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Norway, Poland, Singapore, Sweden, Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Yugoslavia, Zambia, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Burma, Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, Cuba, Cyprus, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, Fiji, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Hungary, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Lao People's Democratic Republic.

The draft resolution (A/C.1/31/L.6) was adopted by 85 votes to 2, with 42 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on representatives who wish to explain their votes after the voting.

Mr. JAY (Canada): My delegation has voted for draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.6 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia, as we have done on earlier occasions on the same question at the twenty-ninth and thirtieth sessions. We wish to reiterate our view that the value of any specific nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangement will depend, among other things, on whether or not it has or is likely to have the support of most countries of the area concerned, including the major military Powers of the region, on a clear definition of the geographic area covered, on assurances that the arrangement would not confer additional military advantage on any State or any group of States, and on the provisions made for ensuring that all component countries comply with the commitments involved and foreswear the independent acquisition of nuclear explosive capability.

Such arrangements must also be fully consistent with generally recognized principles of international law. My delegation wishes to emphasize that this explanation of vote applies not only to draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.6 but also to the position it has taken or will take on other draft resolutions before this Committee on the possibility of establishing nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangements.

Mr. MISTRAL (France) (interpretation from French): My delegation has just abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.6. I should like to make it clear that this abstention should not be construed as meaning that the French Government is unfavourable towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. Quite the contrary.

We should like to stress that we are considering with sympathy the attempts which have been made towards this end. However, it has seemed to us that, so far, a fundamental element which is necessary in our view for the creation of a denuclearized zone in South Asia is missing, namely the agreement -- which is to us essential -- of the countries which are to become part of the zone in question. One of the States -- one of the most important States in South Asia, India -- has just indicated through its representative its disagreement with the formulae put forward in the draft resolution presented by Pakistan.

(Mr. Mistral, France)

Last year, we said in this Committee that in such a case the French Government considered that the necessary conditions did not exist which would enable it to take a stand in favour of the creation of such a denuclearized zone. We have not changed our opinion and that is why, in accordance with this position of principle, we abstained in the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.6.

Mr. REINIUS (Sweden): The Swedish Government has often expressed its support for regional initiatives aiming at disarmament, including nuclear-weapon-free zones. An active co-operation between all States of the region must, however, be the basis for such regional commitments. When the States have been able to agree and a nuclear-weapon-free zone has been clearly defined, it would be appropriate for the General Assembly to confirm the establishment of the zone. The Swedish Government would welcome the presentation at a later stage of a draft resolution supported by all States of the region. At the present time, however, the Swedish delegation is not in a position to support draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.6 and therefore abstained in the voting.

Mr. MIHAJLOVIC (Yugoslavia): I should like to explain my delegation's vote on draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.6 concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

The Yugoslav Government is, in principle, in favour of the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in various regions of the world. It has expressed its satisfaction at and support for the creation of the first such zone in Latin America, established under the Tlatelolco Treaty, and it also views favourably the efforts which are being made for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in Africa, the Middle East and South Asia, respectively. We believe that if all the necessary conditions for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones are created, such zones can represent an important step in strengthening mutual confidence among States belonging to such a region. Furthermore, they could contribute towards limiting the arms race and creating favourable political conditions in the various regions of the world.

However, the basis for any such regional measures must be the active

(Mihajlovic, Yugoslavia)

co-operation and agreement of all countries in the region itself. Without previous agreement, in principle, concrete initiatives on specific steps to be taken for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone can hardly be realized.

Regrettably, no such agreement seems to exist at present. My delegation, therefore, abstained in the vote on this resolution.

Mr. PIBULSONGGRAM (Thailand): The affirmative vote that the Thai delegation cast for draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.6 is a reflection of our genuine commitment to the concept of the establishment of the nuclear-weapon-free zone. We firmly believe that the realization of this concept would be a positive step towards the reduction of the nuclear arms race and contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. However, we also fully recognize that for these concepts to become reality a concerted effort of all countries in the area concerned is a necessity.

The Thai delegation also wishes to say that this position is also shared by the delegation of the Philippines.

The CHAIRMAN: We have thus concluded the consideration of agenda item 46: "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia". We shall now proceed to vote on draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.19 pertaining to agenda item 44, "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East". The draft resolution has no financial implications. The Committee will recall that it was introduced in the Committee on 20 November by the representative of Iran.

I shall call now on delegations wishing to explain their votes before the voting.

Mr. ELIAV (Israel): My delegation has studied with interest draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.19 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. The Government of Israel wishes to reiterate its support in principle for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East. The "Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects", issued as a special report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, document A/10027/Add.1, has however demonstrated the very wide disagreement that exists concerning the practical meaning and implications of the idea of a nuclear-weapon-free zone. It has confirmed that what might have appeared at first sight to be a clearly defined concept in fact contains a great many highly controversial elements. My Government therefore remains convinced that in the words of its note of 14 September 1976 on this issue to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,

"... in accordance with general international practice, the Government of Israel feels justified in its call for negotiations between all the States of the region as an indispensable requirement for the establishment of such a zone in the Middle East. Israel is firmly of the view that such negotiations should lead to the conclusion of a formal, contractual, multilateral convention between all the States of the region, on the lines of such notable precedents as the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America, through the Treaty of Tlatelolco, and the proposals for similar agreements in the areas of South Asia and the South Pacific. This indeed was Israel's position as set out in its note of 22 September 1975 to the Secretary-General, document S/11778/Add.3 of 25 September 1975."

As the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel, Mr. Yigal Allon, declared in his statement during the general debate to the General Assembly on 30 September 1975 concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East: "Israel ... will be ready to enter into negotiations with all States concerned in order to attain this objective" (A/PV.2368). However, no progress has been made since the last session of the General Assembly in the direction of such negotiations, and the Arab countries continue to refuse to take part in any such consultation with Israel.

The Government of Israel has noted with regret that the following declaration

(Mr. Eliav, Israel)

was made by the Syrian Arab Republic upon the ratification of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons:

"The acceptance of this Treaty by the Syrian Arab Republic shall in no way signify recognition of Israel or entail entry into relations with Israel thereunder."

This declaration is incompatible with the aims and spirit of the Treaty and constitutes a grave obstacle to the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.

The fact that the Egyptian Government regards the bare principle of negotiation as one to be rejected a priori, and insists on a unilateral declaration as the only means of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone which it is prepared to contemplate, casts grave doubt on the sincerity on its support for a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region, as does the constant refusal of the Egyptian Government to withdraw its reservation concerning Israel in relation to the Moscow Test Ban Treaty of 1963. You must be aware that it is only for this reason that the proposal now before the Committee on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East does not call for the consultations which are the sole way to realize it. The omission in fact contradicts the proclaimed aim of the present draft. For the reason stated, we cannot support it and we will have to abstain in the vote.

Mr. KHAULY (Qatar): As we are setting out to vote on the draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.19 entitled "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East", the delegation of the State of Qatar would like to clarify to this Committee the reasons compelling it to vote in favour of its adoption. Mindful as we are of the explosive situation in the Middle East, of the ruinous arms race sweeping across the region and the fact that our area has not seen any stability for the last 30 years, my delegation deems it imperative to insulate the region against the introduction of nuclear weapons which would most certainly endanger its own users as much as those it is used against and would threaten the rest of the world with a nuclear confrontation between the super-Powers.

(Mr. Khauly, Qatar)

The need for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East is further intensified by the fact that a new generation of nuclear mini-weapons and low yield nuclear weapons which use reactor grade plutonium is being introduced into the arsenals of the United States troops in Europe and some Western European nations. The Zionist State has shown in the past that there are very few, if any, military secrets in Western Europe it could not avail itself of, as demonstrated by the theft of the plans of the Swiss Dassault Fighter Jet and of the French missile boats at Cherbourg.

The danger is that if Israel ever gets hold of nuclear mini-weapons, such as nuclear shells of 155 mm and 8 inch howitzers and artillery rockets, my delegation has little hope of seeing it refrain from using those nuclear mini-weapons in wars and skirmishes and assaults on its neighbours, as they were never before reluctant to make use of napalm and phosphorus and incendiary bombs that are deemed too inhuman and inflict unnecessary suffering among both military and civilian population. The State of Israel has so far been the only Middle Eastern country to refuse adamantly to adhere to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and is exerting at Dimona enormous efforts and resources to acquire nuclear capability which not even their friend Congressman Ribicoff and 10 other United States Congressmen could visit to check on the possibility of non-civilian usage of that facility. The delegation of the State of Qatar, therefore, welcomes the draft resolution presented by Egypt, Iran and Kuwait with the hope that it would prevent a ruinous nuclear arms race in the area and reduce the threat of a nuclear confrontation between the super-Powers emanating from the presence of nuclear weapons in such an explosive area of the world.

Mr. HAMZA (Democratic Yemen) (interpretation from Arabic): My delegation will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.19; our support of this resolution is in keeping with our position with regard to the importance of creating nuclear-weapon-free zones in various parts of the world. The countries which can declare the creation of such a zone will only be serving the cause of peace and security in the world. However, we think that it is extremely difficult to implement resolutions of the General Assembly with regard to item 44 of the agenda. The nature of the situation in the Middle East is familiar to us and my country fully appreciates the political situation in the Middle East; we have no need to repeat our position on the subject. Therefore, while welcoming the content of this draft resolution, we would like to reaffirm that our position in no way prejudices our understanding of the nature of the political situation in the area. We think that the violation of the security of small peoples together with the arms race and the existence of foreign military bases makes it impossible to implement the declaration of the Middle East as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. Furthermore, military alliances in the area with nuclear countries cast doubt on the possibility of bringing about this objective.

Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): Pakistan has expressed its support for the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones in various regions of the world as the most favourable way in which to advance the objective of non-proliferation in the present circumstances. It is natural, therefore, that we have consistently lent our full support to the objective of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East as envisaged in draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.19. The importance of denuclearization in the Middle East region cannot be minimized. This region has witnessed four wars in the past three decades as the result of the expansionist aggressive policies of one country in that region. That country is also reportedly in the process of developing a nuclear-weapon capability. The proliferation of nuclear weapons would create a situation in the Middle East that would threaten global peace and security. A conflict with nuclear arms in that region will, in our view, drag in the two super-Powers and trigger a global nuclear holocaust.



(Mr. Shahi, Pakistan)

In this perspective, it is the duty of the General Assembly to encourage and promote the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. The majority of the parties concerned have stated that acceptance of the non-proliferation treaty is an essential condition for the denuclearization of the region. This prerequisite, we hope, will be fulfilled by all the parties concerned. The refusal of one of the parties to accept the objectives and conditions for the creation of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East should not be allowed when the international community and the United Nations strongly and vigorously endorse these objectives. The Pakistan delegation will therefore be happy to support the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.19.

The CHAIRMAN: I have no more speakers wishing to explain their votes before the voting; consequently we shall now proceed to a vote on draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.19. A separate vote has been requested on operative paragraphs 2 and 3. We shall, then, vote first on those two paragraphs taken together, in accordance with the request conveyed to me.

Paragraphs 2 and 3 of the draft resolution (A/C.1/31/L.19) were adopted by 107 votes to none, with 11 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now proceed to a vote on the draft resolution as a whole.

The draft resolution, as a whole, was adopted by 121 votes to none, with 2 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on representatives who wish to explain their votes after the vote.

Mr. MULYE (India): My delegation supported and voted in favour of resolution A/C.1/31/L.19. However, in the separate vote on operative paragraphs 2 and 3, my delegation abstained because operative paragraphs 2 and 3 are not consistent with our well-known position on issues to which these paragraphs refer.

Mr. BLACK (United States of America): My delegation's vote in favour of the draft resolution we have just adopted reflects continuing United States support for the objective of establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East under conditions that would assure its effectiveness. As we have stated in the past, we are prepared to lend our co-operation to efforts to achieve this objective. However, while support the draft resolution in general, and the over-all concept of a Middle East nuclear-weapon-free zone, we continue to question the approach of asking States to undertake commitments to establish a zone in the region in advance of actual negotiations. Moreover, our support for any nuclear-weapon-free zone arrangement will be contingent upon its compatibility with criteria that the United States has frequently articulated in the past. In essence, these criteria are that the initiative for the creation of the zone should come from the States in the region concerned; that all States whose participation is considered important should participate in the zone; that the zone arrangement should include adequate provisions for verification of compliance; that the establishment of a zone should not disturb existing security arrangements to the detriment of regional or international security, and that the zone arrangement should effectively prohibit its parties from developing any nuclear explosive device.

The CHAIRMAN: As no other delegation wishes to speak at this stage, the Committee has thus concluded its consideration of item 44 of the agenda, "Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East".

I shall now call on delegations wishing to make short statements after conclusion of the consideration of the draft resolution that we have just voted upon.

Mr. GAUCI (Malta): I should like to express a certain amount of regret that pressure of other business has prevented me from following the discussions in this Committee with the attention that they merit. I shall be very brief. My purpose today is to join other delegations that have expressed concern at the lack of substantive progress on disarmament questions, and also to state publicly that we are joining other countries as co-sponsors of resolution A/C.1/31/L.7/Rev.1. This is the only resolution which we will co-sponsor because we see in this a sincere attempt to generate a new momentum for progress. We hope almost against hope, in the light of thousands of disappointments, that real progress will be achieved. One essential factor, without which the prospects of success would be even less promising, is that the Secretariat should be able to serve the Preparatory Committee and the special session in the most efficient manner with up-to-date material. The Secretariat should also be able to help small delegations with research and reference materials so as to enable these delegations in particular, which would otherwise be severely handicapped, to make their best contribution to the success of the special session. I should like to inquire, therefore, whether the Secretariat would feel able to provide this and other essential services within the existing staff complement. This information does not seem to me to come out sufficiently clearly from document A/C.1/31/L.23 of 23 November, and while I have the floor I should like to explain that our favourable vote on resolution A/C.1/L.15 and its operative paragraphs does not distinguish between countries carrying out nuclear weapons tests; it applies to the need for a comprehensive test ban in general.

My delegation also voted in favour of resolutions A/C.1/31/L.6 and A/C.1/31/L.19 as a matter of principle. On the other hand, it seemed to me that resolution A/C.1/31/L.16 seemed to be somewhat selective and conditional in its approach, and for this reason my delegation had to abstain.

Mr. MARIN BOSCH (Mexico) (interpretation from Spanish): Since several delegates referred to questions of nuclear tests for peaceful purposes during the debate on the draft resolution on items 37 and 47 on the agenda for the General Assembly, the delegation of Mexico wishes to place on record its interpretation of preambular paragraph 5 of draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.15 which was adopted this morning by the Committee. The text of that preambular paragraph is the following:

(Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico)

"Noting the information contained in document A/31/125 concerning agreements concluded by two nuclear-weapon States limiting the scope of underground nuclear weapon tests and making provision in this connexion for the control and supervision of peaceful nuclear explosions including, in certain cases, arrangements for on-site verification,".

In this connexion, I should like to recall the relevant paragraphs of resolution 3484 A (XXX), entitled "General and complete disarmament", adopted by the General Assembly on 12 December 1975. It is in the light of these paragraphs that the delegation of Mexico interprets that fifth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.15. In the resolution I have mentioned, the seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth preambular paragraphs read as follows:

"Noting that non-nuclear-weapon States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons have the right to obtain the potential benefits from any applications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, under appropriate international observation and through appropriate international procedures, pursuant to a special international agreement, through an appropriate international body with adequate representation of non-nuclear-weapon States, as contemplated in article V of the Treaty,

"Noting further that the potential benefits from any applications of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes could be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States not parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons by way of nuclear explosion services provided by nuclear-weapon States, as defined by the Treaty, and conducted under the appropriate international observation and appropriate international procedures called for in article V of the Treaty and in accordance with other applicable international obligations,

"Recalling once again the statements made at the 1577th meeting of the First Committee, on 31 May 1968, by the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America concerning the provisions of article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons which relate to the conclusion of a special international agreement on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes,

(Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico)

"Convinced of the need for the special international agreement or agreements contemplated in article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in respect of the peaceful application of nuclear explosions,"

The operative section of the same resolution reads in part as follows:

"3. Notes the conclusions of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons with respect to article V of the Treaty, contained in the Final Declaration of the Conference, adopted by consensus on 30 May 1975;

"4. Notes also that the final documentation of the Conference included a draft resolution submitted by eight States which attended the Conference, which urged the Depositary Governments of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons to initiate immediate consultations with all of the other States parties to the Treaty in order to reach agreement on the most appropriate place and date for holding a meeting of the parties in order to conclude the special basic international agreement contemplated in article V of the Treaty;

"5. Notes in this connexion that, according to information provided by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in response to the invitation addressed to them in General Assembly resolution 3261 D (XXIX), no consultations have yet taken place for the conclusion of the special basic international agreement on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes as envisaged in article V of that Treaty;"

The last paragraph which I should like to quote is operative paragraph 6. It reads as follows:

(Mr. Marin Bosch, Mexico)

"6. Invites the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America to provide information on such consultations as they may have entered into or may intend to enter into for the conclusion of the special basic international agreement on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes, as envisaged in article V of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, to the General Assembly at its thirty-first session through the Secretary-General;"

The interpretation of the delegation of Mexico of the fifth preambular paragraph of draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.15 which we adopted this morning should be viewed in the light of what I have just said. Furthermore, we can in no way interpret this paragraph as considering that the United States and the USSR have complied with the appeal of the General Assembly in the resolution I mentioned earlier.

Mr. BADAWI (Egypt) (interpretation from Arabic): My delegation voted in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.15 on the urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban. There is no doubt that this position of Egypt is entirely in keeping with our policy designed to bring about a cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament, as well as general and complete disarmament. However, in this regard, it should be stressed that our support for this resolution does not mean that we have changed our position with regard to non-nuclear countries as far as the implementation of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and article VI of the Treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions is concerned. We think that the draft resolution adopted should contain a reaffirmation of the principle embodied in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

Mr. RAJAKOSKI (Finland): The Finnish Government has again this year decided to co-sponsor the two draft resolutions adopted by this Committee today concerning the banning of the nuclear-weapon tests. These were presented respectively by the delegations of the USSR and others (draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.16) and by the delegation of Australia and others (draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.15).

The reasons for our consistent position are briefly as follows: both draft resolutions seek the same end -- the discontinuance of all nuclear-weapon tests for all time. This indeed is a goal which the international community has been seeking for the last 18 years. While the aim of both draft resolutions is the same, as I said, the methods by which they seek to achieve this aim are different but not contradictory. In the view of the Finnish delegation, every method of achieving a complete test ban should be attempted, none should be left unexplored.

In this respect the draft resolution presented in the name of the delegation of Australia and others, deals on the valuable work already done by the CCD. The work obviously must go on and we would have liked this fact to be more clearly reflected in that draft.

The resolution presented by the Soviet Union and others places the main responsibility for negotiations on a test ban on those States in whose power it ultimately lies to put an end to the tests, namely, the nuclear-weapon States. Thus the proposal of the Soviet Union is also responsive to the earlier resolutions of the General Assembly reminding the nuclear-weapon States of their special responsibility to initiate proposals for a comprehensive test ban treaty. These are in brief summary the reasons for which the Finnish delegation has again this year decided to co-sponsor the two resolutions on the banning of all nuclear-weapon tests. We have noted with satisfaction that both resolutions have been approved by the overwhelming majority of this Committee this morning.

Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): I should like to make a few brief concluding remarks on the adoption of Pakistan's resolution on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia.

(Mr. Shahi, Pakistan)

First of all, I would like to extend the sincere appreciation and thanks of my Government to all those delegations who voted affirmatively on the Pakistan draft resolution. My Government is indeed gratified, but the concern of Pakistan for the spread of nuclear weapons is shared by the overwhelming majority of the Members of the United Nations. We take particular satisfaction over the fact that two thirds of the countries of South Asia voted affirmatively and this gives us encouragement to pursue our efforts towards the prevention of proliferation of nuclear-weapons in the South Asian region.

I have listened with very great attention to the observations made by the distinguished representative of India. Let me assure him that Pakistan has an open mind in regard to the considerations that he urged in his statement before the vote. In particular, we shall bear in mind the views of his delegation on the extension of the area of the South Asian nuclear-weapon-free zone to include other regions and other countries. We shall also be willing to give our best attention to the question of military alliances, whether multilateral or bilateral, the existence of bases, and we are quite prepared to enter into a discussion in the course of consultations, bilateral as well as multilateral, on the question of the liquidation of such alliances and the removal of foreign military bases from the countries where they are now said to exist.

My delegation is fully conscious of the need for wider and fuller consultations than have taken place bilaterally between Pakistan and three of the countries of South Asia. We shall look forward to continuing exchanges of views with all of them.

The main considerations behind the initiative taken by Pakistan towards the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia is the renunciation by all the countries of South Asia of the nuclear weapons option. Despite the statement by the distinguished representative of India, before the vote on the Pakistan draft resolution, Pakistan will not construe what he said as derogating from the Government of India's commitment to the countries of South Asia and to the world, not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons.



(Mr. Shahi, Pakistan)

Finally a number of representatives who spoke today put forward other considerations as the reason for their abstentions on our draft resolution. Among them it was pointed out that no outside Power, including the General Assembly, can promote the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone unless the countries of the region concerned themselves came forward with a proposal for its establishment. It seems to my delegation that these objections have been misconceived. What the Pakistan resolution has called for is the reaffirmation of the endorsement in principle of the concept of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. We think that the adoption of this resolution was entirely within the competence of the General Assembly, indeed, it was the duty of the Assembly to vote affirmatively on this resolution which is aimed against the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Pakistan delegation was not calling for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone for South Asia here and now. All we have asked the General Assembly is to bless the efforts that are being made to take the countries of South Asia towards that goal for the future peace, stability and well-being of the hundreds of millions of people of our region.

The CHAIRMAN: Does the distinguished representative of India wish to speak in exercise of his right of reply? I call on him.

Mr. MISHRA (India): First of all I should like to thank the distinguished Foreign Secretary of Pakistan for having taken note of the statement which I made before the vote was taken on draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.6. I should like to make two brief comments on the statement which he has just made.

First, so far as India's declaration in regard to the non-manufacture of nuclear weapons is concerned, it has no connexion with the question of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. That is a declaration which has been made all these years, every year, and earlier this month I had the honour to repeat that declaration in my general statement on disarmament items.

Second, I should like to reiterate that, whereas bilateral consultations between Pakistan and India on any subject are not ruled out at any time -- after all the Shimla Agreement provides a very good framework for discussion of any subject which might be considered feasible by both parties -- nevertheless consultations or negotiations on the basis of the draft resolution passed today by this Committee or the two resolutions passed in the preceding two years are not possible.

As we have said very often, the endorsement of a particular proposal by the international community before it has been discussed in the region concerned is putting the cart before the horse. We should like to say, with all respect due to the distinguished Foreign Secretary of Pakistan, that this position is very well known to not only his delegation but to all concerned in this Committee.

Finally, I should like to note that the number of abstentions and negative votes on the resolution is a very clear indication of the deep divisions which exist on this question.

The CHAIRMAN: Before adjourning the meeting, I should like to remind the Committee of the decisions taken at our 41st meeting on 23 November, namely, to set as a deadline for submitting draft resolutions Tuesday, 30 November, at 6 p.m., and as a deadline for introducing draft resolutions Wednesday, 1 December, also at 6 p.m. Thus, our Thursday and Friday meetings will be devoted exclusively to taking decisions on draft resolutions that have not yet been dealt with. Tomorrow, we shall have only one meeting of the Committee in the morning, in order to give delegations

(The Chairman)

enough time in the afternoon to finish their consultations and negotiations before submitting draft resolutions that have not yet been submitted. On Wednesday we shall have two meetings, in a conference room provided with mechanical means of voting. The meetings will be devoted to the introduction of the draft resolutions that have not yet been introduced and, also, I intend to put before the Committee for decisions the following draft resolutions on Wednesday, either in the morning or in the afternoon, or perhaps at both meetings:

draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.8, relating to agenda item 43 concerning a "Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects";

draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.10/Rev.1, relating to agenda item 48 concerning "Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons";

draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.18 relating to agenda item 38 on "Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3467 (XXX) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco)".

Furthermore, the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/31/L.20, relating to agenda item 49, "General and complete disarmament" and dealing specifically with the question of international transfer of conventional arms; and draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.21, relating to agenda item 34, "Reduction of military budgets";

And, time permitting we might also take decisions on Wednesday on draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.7/Rev.1 which was introduced this morning as well as on revised draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.11 pertaining to the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

I am giving this information to representatives so that they may be able to get their instructions in time.

The meeting rose at 5.50 p.m.