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Chairman: Mr. JAROSZEK (Poland)

CONTENTS

Reduction of military budgets: report of the Secretary-General /347

Incendiary and other specific conventional weapons which may be the subject of prohibitions or restrictions of use for humanitarian reasons: report of the Secretary-General /35/

Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament $\sqrt{377}$

Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3467 (XXX) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) $\sqrt{387}$

Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean $\sqrt{397}$

World Disarmament Conference: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference /40/

Effective measures to implement the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade /41/

Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa /42/

Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects: report of the Secretary-General /43/

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East /447

Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /45/

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia /46/

Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests /47/

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Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament $\sqrt{487}$

General and complete disarmament /49/

- (a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament;
- (b) Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency;
- (c) Report of the Secretary-General

Strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament $\sqrt{50/}$

Implementation of the conclusions of the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons $\sqrt{116/}$

The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 and 116 (continued)

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee will continue its consideration of the agenda items relating to disarmament. We shall first continue the discussion on the draft resolutions and then proceed to take decisions on the six draft resolutions which I mentioned at our meeting on Friday and which are listed in today's Journal.

Mr. YANGO (Philippines): During our meeting last Friday, the representative of Mexico referred to the tenth anniversary of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). My delegation voices its warm felicitations to this Institute for its valuable contributions to the deliberations of our Committee. Its annual Yearbooks since 1966 have been a source of vital and significant information relating to disarmament and arms control. During the last 10 years, including our session this year, numerous delegations have quoted from the SIPRI Yearbooks to point out the latest developments or statistics in the disarmament field. The SIPRI reports on these events or developments have no doubt helped us greatly in our work in this Committee. In felicitating SIPRI the Philippines expresses the hope that this Institute will continue to pursue its important work in the field of disarmament for many more years to come, and that it will spare no effort in giving us reliable information, data or statistics on disarmament and arms control. The tenth anniversary of SIPRI was highlighted by its publication of a handbook entitled "Armaments and Disarmament in the Nuclear Age". This handbook provides us with the latest information on the perils of the nuclear age and therefore on nuclear arms control and disarmament. The information contained in this handbook is very relevant to our discussions this morning, when we take up the draft resolution on the urgent need for the cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and the conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve the comprehensive test ban in document L.15, the draft resolution concerning the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-

weapon tests in document L.16 and the draft resolutions concerning the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia and in the Middle East in documents L.6 and L.19 respectively.

I wish to recall that last 8 October, an item appeared in The New York Times concerning a report that nuclear war is inescapable. This report was attributed to SIPRI's news publication entitled "Armaments and Disarmament in the Nuclear Age" to which I referred earlier. Chapter II of this publication is entitled "The Nuclear Momentum" and under this chapter a section is called "Nuclear Weapons -- the Ultimate Absurdity", in which it is claimed that in a world with the steady spread of nuclear power, nuclear weapons will be within the reach of many nations before the turn of the century. If this happens it will become impossible to maintain the stability of nuclear deterrents as we know it now, and this would result in the inevitability of nuclear war. In other words, nuclear war is inescapable if horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons continues to increase. It is reported that about 35 countries will have the capability to make atomic weapons by 1985 if they choose to do so. Under the circumstances, some nations will have relatively many bombs and some will have relatively few. Some will possess sophisticated bombs with high accuracy and some will have crude bombs. In such a situation, there arises the increased possibility of false alarms and of nuclear accidents of all kinds, in which case neither the technical nor the political basis of the current bipolar stability will exist. All these assertions and assessments appear very plausible to my delegation. But why should these 35 countries, or even only some of them, entertain the idea of possessing nuclear weapons by 1985? The answer seems simple enough when we pause to consider that national security is of utmost priority to every country. When that national security is threatened, all and every means will be availed of to maintain and preserve it. It is precisely national security which has impelled the two nuclear super-Powers to enter into all sorts of negotiations, arrangements or understandings that could bring about a stable nuclear balance of power and, on the basis of the concept of mutually assured destruction, maintain their security. The vast majority of non-nuclear countries pin their hopes on the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) for their national security in a nuclear age, but

subsequent events to the NPT have dashed these hopes. Vertical proliferation of nuclear weapons continues unabated. The technology and the sophistication and qualitative improvements of nuclear weapons advances every day. Between the two nuclear super-Powers, it is estimated that a nuclear test conducted underground occurs every 10 days since the partial test ban treaty of 1963. On the other hand, the strategic arms limitation talks between them moves ever so slowly and at this stage is practically stalled.

It is a sorry state of affairs that one year after the Review Conference of the NPT, and six years after its entry into force, the nuclear weapon States have failed to negotiate to halt the nuclear arms race and achieve nuclear disarmament. The balance of responsibilities between the nuclear-weapon States and the non-nuclear-weapon States under the Treaty has not been realized so far. As a result, the credibility and viability of the Non-Proliferation Treaty has been greatly eroded. It is no wonder, therefore, that one begins to hear ominous predictions that in the next decade more countries will acquire nuclear weapons, thus creating an alarming instability in the nuclear age, which, inescapably or inevitably, could result in a nuclear war.

It is also reported by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) that scientists in both East and West are now striving for a lead in nuclear technology that would make a preemptive atomic strike tempting to either the United States or the Soviet Union, a fact which further aggravates the situation and greatly increases the chances for an all-out nuclear confrontation. This only goes to show that the so-called balance of terror, underlying the concept of mutually assured destruction in which the two super-Powers now operate, although described as stable, is, in fact, unstable, if either of them makes an effort to acquire a preempted nuclear capability against the other.

I am positive that we are all aware of the highly destructive power of a nuclear weapon, but mankind has a short memory, or we have become immune to shock, because despite the horror of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and only 30 years after that awesome and horrendous destruction, we are now all privy to the tremendous progress achieved in the design of nuclear bombs in man's unending search for more and greater efficiency in the formula known as yield-to-weight ratio of the bomb.

We are also aware of the competitive achievements of the super-Powers in their production of delivery systems over vast distances, so accurate that 50 per cent of nuclear warheads aimed at the target could be delivered within a radius of 250 metres of the said pinpointed target. This efficiency is attributed to the single nuclear warhead of the ICBM and even of the MIRV's but the MARV's and cruise missiles are said to have a 100 per cent efficiency in hitting their determined targets. As we consider the impact of the devastation made by the atomic bombs over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the destruction and the havoc that will be wrought by

the present generation of nuclear warheads will certainly defy all calculation and imagination. The Hiroshima bomb, whose yield was about 15,000 tons of TNT, pales into insignificance when compared to present day nuclear warheads with estimated yields of 1 megaton or 1 million tons of TNT.

The destructive effect of such a nuclear weapon generating temperatures of 1 million degrees centigrade in the immediate vicinity of the explosion and of a shock wave in which pressures reach about 7,000 atmospheres per square inch can demolish all houses in an area 50 square kilometres around its point of impact. It is therefore clear that the destruction to property and life caused by such a weapon will be immense no matter where it lands in a populous city. The blast effects of the weapon would undoubtedly be fatal to people, but by far the most lethal effect of a nuclear explosion is thermal radiation. The weapon can destroy both buildings and human beings by direct and indirect thermal effects which extend to great distances from the point of explosion. It is said that the heat released by a 1-megaton nuclear explosion, for example, will cause paper to ignite 14 kilometres away.

I have repeated these figures relating to the highly destructive effects of a nuclear weapon because I strongly believe they need to be repeated over and over to make us realize the true seriousness of the matter. It seems that there are political and military leaders who tend to believe that a nuclear war may be acceptable or tolerable, even between the super-Powers, as long as such nuclear confrontation is partial or limited. I can only hope that these military and political leaders realize that given the nuclear weapons of today and the new qualitative situation it has created, the risk of escalation in a future war is very great indeed. It is said that the resulting damage to life and property caused by a nuclear explosion is so great that it could elicit a response ruled more by emotion than by reason, thus producing a reaction and counter-reaction effect that ultimately could bring about an all-out nuclear exchange.

With the nuclear weapon we cannot and should not take the risk in assuming that some political and military leader may be right. Over-all, the present nuclear situation is an explosive one that should not be sanctioned or tolerated much longer. The Non-Proliferation Treaty as it was conceived is a step in the right direction. Its clear objective is to prevent a nuclear war. If its prohibitions in halting the

nuclear arms race and in achieving nuclear disarmament were to become realities, the present impossible nuclear situation should be reversed.

In the view of my delegation, there is no alternative to nuclear disarmament if we are to be spared from a nuclear war. Being realistic, we also believe that the disarmament process should be a gradual one, but at the same time it should satisfy the concern of the non-nuclear-weapon countries for their national security. These countries have asked for security guarantees from the nuclear-weapon States, and it is only fair that their views on the matter should be taken into account. The very least that the nuclear-weapon States can do is to undertake not to attack or threaten to attack the nuclear-weapon States with nuclear weapons, especially if the latter have agreed to give up their options of acquiring nuclear weapons.

In order to restore credibility to the Non-Proliferation Treaty before the next Review Conference is scheduled in 1980, the nuclear-weapon States must have to come up with some concrete proposals in the light of the security guarantees sought by the non-nuclear-weapon States. At the same time, the problem of nuclear disarmament must be set upon with greater vigour. The strategic arms limitation talks are acknowledged as an intermediate step to nuclear disarmament. Greater progress must be achieved in these talks, and they had better be soon. Even the super-Powers themselves are aware of how imperative and essential it is for these talks to be pursued expeditiously, especially since after the arms limitation talks they still have the obligation to undergo the more difficult phase of negotiations on nuclear disarmament under the NPT.

Concomitant with these steps there should be continuing efforts to arrive at the comprehensive test-ban agreement. The report of the CCD this year gives rise to some optimism that the solution to the ticklish problem of verification may be near at hand, considering the latest turn of events with respect to verification of underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes.

My delegation has long held the view that national means of detection, supplemented by international co-operation in seismic information, is now sufficient for verification of underground nuclear explosions. A Partial Test Ban Treaty was achieved because of the force of public opinion against the increasing contamination by radiation of the environment. If public opinion proved effective in concluding that Treaty, we do not see why the same public opinion cannot prevail in the realization of a comprehensive test ban agreement. It is unquestionable that this agreement is essential, not only in halting the nuclear arms race but also, and more so, in preventing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons.

Another step that needs to be taken is the establishment of effective international safeguards for the transfer of nuclear materials, technology and facilities for peaceful purposes from nuclear to non-nuclear States. Greater attention is now being paid to this matter by industrialized countries exporting nuclear technology and materials. Without the safeguards, the proliferation of nuclear weapons may be inevitable. Because of the energy crisis, more and more countries are turning to atomic energy to meet their power needs. However, it must be noted that these countries, in shifting to atomic energy, acquire in the process materials used in the production of nuclear weapons — hence the need for effective safeguards as envisioned in the Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The steps to be undertaken by both the nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon countries will be difficult ones in relation to the exercise of their national rights and powers under the concept of sovereignty. It means sacrifices for everybody concerned because such steps would, as a matter of course, encroach on the rights of States to independence and autonomy in the conduct of their relations with other peoples and States. But these steps, no matter how exacting, appear to be the only way to establish good faith and co-operation and achieve mutual trust. It is our firm belief that otherwise, mankind will assuredly drift into an inevitable nuclear war with all its attendant consequences.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to announce that Finland has become a co-sponsor of the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/31/L.15 and L.16.

Mr. BART-WILLIAMS (Sierra Leone): I should like to offer very brief comments to explain my delegation's stand on a few important items dealt with in resolutions before this Committee.

My Government fully subscribed to the resolution adopted at the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Colombo, declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace. It is our belief that all the States in this area, as indeed in other regions of the world, have a collective right to enjoy peace without being molested by military presence and great-Power rivalry which help to increase tension and the threat of war. We also believe that efforts by the littoral and hinterland States to remove these undesirable elements and thereby reduce tension in that area deserve commendation and that all other States with interests in the Indian Ocean should co-operate fully in providing acceptable solutions to the problems of the region.

My delegation would like to join many others in urging these States concerned, particularly the super-Powers and other maritime nations, to give the necessary co-operation to implement the United Nations General Assembly resolutions so that the Ad Hoc Committee and the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean can continue their consultations and formulate a programme of action which would lead to the convening of a Conference on the Indian Ocean. My delegation will therefore support the recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee as attached to its report in document A/31/29.

On this same rote, my delegation would like to emphasize that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones in other regions of the world is also urgent and desirable. We are convinced that this will not only contribute to the peace and security of the States in these zones, but will also complement our efforts on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and take us a big step towards our objective of general and complete disarmament.

My delegation will therefore give its support to the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.6 introduced by Pakistan on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia. We also expect to support another draft resolution, soon to be introduced under agenda item 42, on the denuclearization of Africa.

In keeping with another declaration of the Fifth Conference of Non-Aligned Countries at Colombo, my delegation is pleased to join the co-sponsors of the draft

(Mr. Bart-Williams, Sierra Leone)

resolution submitted in document A/C.1/31/L.7/Rev.1 calling for a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament, to be held in New York in May/June 1978. We are convinced that this date should afford sufficient time for substantial progress to be made by the Preparatory Committee, provided of course this Committee is given the necessary co-operation by all States. This date should also afford adequate time for further efforts and more substantial progress to be made on all aspects of general and complete disarmament. In any case, the General Assembly, at its thirty-second regular session, will have an opportunity to review progress and assess the situation in good time for the ensuing special session. Those genuinely and earnestly pursuing the cause of disarmament should give their full support to this draft resolution.

All our disarmament efforts and objectives will be severely handicapped without the capable assistance and guidance of the United Nations Secretariat. rate of progress expected to be made in disarmament should be measured in proportion to the organization and resources of that part of the Secretariat which co-ordinates all aspects of disarmament matters and which is also expected to cope with more and more detailed and complicated assignments. It is also true that a strengthened Secretariat should be able to provide for States requiring assistance or guidance and also to adequately inform Governments and public opinion on all disarmament issues. The Ad Hoc Committee's agreed proposals should therefore go a long way to complement both the United Nations Secretariat and the efforts of all States on disarmament questions. Indeed, it will no doubt facilitate the work of our Committee. Furthermore, the total estimated annual cost of \$227,800 submitted in document A/C.1/31/L.23 by the Secretary-General should be considered as a small price to pay for the peace and security we all seek. Recruitment of suitably qualified staff should commence as soon as possible by the Secretariat in the usual way. It is on these bases that my delegation joins other co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.11 on the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament.

My delegation stated during the general debate in this Committee that it would support the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.5/Rev.1 dealing with the draft convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. This support is without prejudice to any further

A/C.1/31/PV.44 14-15

(Mr. Bart-Williams, Sierra Leone)

improvement or amendment to be made to the articles of the draft convention or the draft resolution itself prior to the voting in this Committee. We, however, still believe that the convention is not as comprehensive as we would have liked -- a fact proved by the lack of over-all consensus among members of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD). The main area of concern is that, because of a possible loophole of interpretation, particularly in article I, the draft does not go far enough to eliminate the apparent dangers of environmental warfare. My delegation, however, is convinced that there are adequate safeguards in the draft and its annexes to ensure strict adherence to the provisions of the convention under the watchful eye of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). To send the draft convention back to the CCD would serve no further useful purpose but would rather, frustrate the work of the Committee and delay progress on other important and urgent matters it should deal with. Besides, there is no indication that the CCD can make any further improvement in the draft. We rather believe that the future Review Conference should be able, in due course, to close any possible loopholes in the convention by recommending any necessary amendment or additional protocol. For now, we should not underestimate the progress that the present draft has made towards general and complete disarmament.

Mr. SENEVIRATNE (Sri Lanka): Thank you Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman it is my pleasure to introduce draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.7/Rev.1 on the subject of convening a special session of the General Assembly to deal with disarmament. I introduce it on behalf of the following co-sponsors:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bhutan, Botswana, Brazil, Burundi, Canada, Congo, Cyprus, Egypt, Ethiopia, the Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Guinea, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Peru, Philippines, Romania, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sudan, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Republic of Cameroon, Upper Volta, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, and, of course, my own country, Sri Lanka.

The convening of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament is in the schedule of the Fifth Conference of Non-Aligned Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries who met in Colombo this year. The co-sponsors of this resolution believe that disarmament not only is one of the essential objectives of the United Nations, but that it would also provide vast resources that are desperately needed for the economic development of many areas of the world. These hopes are contained in the preambular paragraph of the resolution. In operative paragraph 2, reference is made to the establishment of a Preparatory Committee for the special session. The figure of 35 has been mentioned in the draft resolution as the number of States that will comprise this Preparatory Committee. Consultations with various delegations have indicated that the Committee will have to be enlarged and the figure therefore altered. The President of the General Assembly is currently engaged in consultations concerning the formation of this body and it is expected that a final figure will shortly be available for insertion in operative paragraph 2 of the resolution.

It is the expectation of the co-sponsors that the special session shall be concerned with substantial matters covering the whole field of disarmament and that it may, through its deliberations and petitions, bring about positive and practical results that will materially further progress in this field. The number of co-sponsors of this draft resolution is indicative of the support it

(Mr. Seneviratne, Sri Lanka)

has received from all quarters and it is therefore the hope of my delegation that this resolution may be accepted unanimously in this Committee. After I read the co-sponsors' list I learned that Ecuador and Malta were joining the list of co-sponsors; I therefore introduce this resolution and thank you very much Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Sri Lanka for his statement, in the course of which he introduced the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.7/Rev.1. I should like to inform the Committee that Cuba also has become a co-sponsor of that draft resolution. I should also like to announce that Cameroon has become a co-sponsor of the draft resolutions contained in document A/C.1/31/L.14, L.15 and L.20 and also of the amendment in document A/C.1/31/L.24.

The Syrian Arab Republic has become a co-sponsor of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.10/Rev.1 and Hungary has become a co-sponsor of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.16.

Mr. ANDREESCU (Romania): In my statement I wish to refer to the five resolutions regarding the creation of zones of peace and co-operation free of nuclear weapons.

In view of the gigantic proportions reached by the nuclear arms race, the danger represented by the accumulation of these weapons for the peace and security of all peoples, for the very existence of human civilization, it is essential, in efforts for disarmament, to give absolute priority to nuclear disarmament.

Resolute action should be taken to stop the production of nuclear weapons, eliminate existing stocks and ban nuclear weaponry.

Taking into account the complexity of the problems involved in the implementation of these nuclear disarmament measures, at world level, Romania is devoting special attention to the creation of denuclearized zones, aimed at freeing large geographical regions, or even continents, from the nuclear threat.

The gradual extension of these zones could, in our conception, lead towards the mankind of "tomorrow", a mankind free from the nightmare of the nuclear weapons.

The agreements for the creation of such zones should offer equal assurance of security for all countries on the basis of the solemn undertaking of the States which possess nuclear weapons to respect the status of the denuclearized zone.

Of course, such agreements should not limit in any way the free use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, but, on the contrary, should stimulate the development of research in this field and the application of advances in nuclear physics for the socio-economic development of all States.

Starting from this position of principle, Romania has consistently supported the efforts aimed at the creation of denuclearized zones in various regions. As a European country, concerned with the security of this continent, my country has put forward the idea of making the Balkans a zone of peace and co-operation, free of nuclear weapons.

The relatively large number of resolutions before the First Committee referring to the creation of denuclearized zones reflects the wide interest in this idea shared by the Member States of our Organization. The fact that the initiative has been taken in most cases by the small- and medium-sized States, and especially

(Mr. Andreescu, Romania)

by the developing countries, demonstrates once again the role of these States and their contribution in the search for the best solutions for the problems confronting mankind.

Starting from the position of principle set out above, Romania has from the very beginning supported the initiative of Finland regarding the comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects. We consider that this study could be a useful instrument for States wishing to participate in denuclearized zones. We express our hope that the draft resolution will receive broad support in our Committee and will be adopted by consensus.

Draft resolutions A/C.1/31/L.6 and A/C.1/31/L.19, as well as that contained in document A/31/29, are also important initiatives for the creation of zones of peace and co-operation or denuclearized zones in the Middle East, Southern Asia and the Indian Ocean.

In our view, the initiation of consultations among the interested parties, with the direct support of the United Nations, could lead to the fulfilment of the desire of the peoples in the respective zones to live in a climate of peace free of the nuclear threat.

That is why Romania will vote for the adoption of these draft resolutions.

In Romania's conception, one of the essential elements of the establishment of denuclearized zones is the assurance for the Member States of the respective zone that the nuclear weapon States will never, under any circumstances, use or threaten to use these weapons against the countries of the denuclearized zone. Consequently, Romania will cast its vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.10 regarding the Additional Protocol II of the Tlatelolco Treaty.

Romania has also constantly supported the efforts of the African countries to stay outside the nuclear arms race. It is ready to support any initiative of the African countries regarding the protection of the African continent from nuclear danger.

In conclusion, I assure the Committee that Romania wishes to continue to make an active contribution to the efforts aimed at establishing denuclearized zones in various parts of the world, in order to achieve the final goal of creating a world free of the nuclear threat.

Mr. HULINSKY (Czechoslovakia) (interpretation from Russian): The need to find an effective solution of the problem of disarmament, and above all nuclear disarmament, is becoming increasingly urgent inasmuch as nuclear arsenals are growing and the technology of nuclear weapon production is being perfected; and as a result of the vertiginous development of nuclear energy technology we are witnessing here and there the emergence of new dangers of the proliferation of nuclear weapons to new parts of the world. The results achieved so far in respect of limiting nuclear weapons, the most important of which are the Treaty Banning Nuclear-Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and under Water of 1963 and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1970, are still being weakened by the fact that in spite of the repeated appeals of the General Assembly, a number of countries, including certain nuclear countries, are not parties to those Treaties. The comprehensive strengthening and universalization of these Treaties and indeed, of other international instruments limiting nuclear armaments and reducing the danger of the outbreak of thermonuclear war, is one of the prerequisites for the achievement of progress in the right direction.

The socialist countries, including Czechoslovakia, have been the initiators of the search for new ways and means of creating an atmosphere of mutual trust and co-operation of States in the field of disarmament, in order to ensure swifter progress and the removal of obstacles which still impede disarmament talks. And, incidentally, excellent confirmation of this has been the course and results of the Conference in Bucharest of senior representatives of States Parties to the Warsaw Treaty, which has just ended. It is our belief that if not all countries are yet ready to hold talks on the question of complete disarmament, we must try to achieve at least partial measures and create conditions for proceeding to a general reduction of the level of armaments and disarmament.

One of the problems -- the solution to which will have an important bearing on the halting of the arms race -- is, without any doubt, the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests by all States in all environments. This is something which has to be undertaken without further delay and as soon as possible.

The Czechoslovak delegation supports the draft resolution on this subject submitted by the Soviet Union, along with other countries, in document A/C.1/31/L.16, and requests to be listed as one of its co-sponsors. In our view,

A/C.1/31/PV.44 24-25

(Mr. Hulinsky, Czechoslovakia)

this draft is a positive new effort aimed at beginning talks on the concrete preparation of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclearweapon tests with the participation of all nuclear States and a group of non-nuclear countries, which is the subject of the appeal in General Assembly resolution 3478 (XXX). Czechoslovakia, together with a number of non-nuclear countries, has already expressed its willingness to take part in such talks. The revised text of the draft treaty submitted by the Soviet Union in document A/C.1/31/9, contains in article 2 the basis for a compromise solution to the complex issue of on-site inspection where legitimate doubts arise with regard to the nature of a seismic event occurring in the territory of any party to the treaty. The list of means for ensuring scrupulous observance by all parties of the obligations assumed under the treaty has in this way been extended by one further means. It is reasonable to hope, therefore, that this draft resolution will make it possible for those countries, primarily nuclear countries, whose position in matters of verification has hitherto impeded progress, to take part in the talks.

(Mr. Hulinsky, Czechoslovakia)

Obstacles should not be created in the talks on complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests by invoking the question of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Perceptible progress in this regard is constituted by the Treaty between the USSR and the United States on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes concluded this year and also the progress achieved in this field by the IAEA shows the lack of grounds for apprehension about the negative effects of such explosions in regard to a treaty on the total prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests. It would be a mistake to complicate talks on this Treaty by issues the solution of which in all respects fall squarely within the field of competence of IAEA.

The Czechoslovak delegation has attentively studied draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.15 on item 37 of the agenda submitted on behalf of its co-sponsors by the delegation of New Zealand. This draft in our view does not provide for feasible measures for concluding a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests and does not sufficiently reflect the necessity for consensus on the part of all nuclear Powers without exception on this question. The work of the Geneva Committee on Disarmament is at the present time also being directed towards the consideration of technical matters of control: this was mentioned here, for example, by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in his statement on 9 November. In the existing situation where this work is not yet based upon the consent of all nuclear Powers, it can, in spite of its positive content, have only a limited and preliminary character. Referring the question of complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapons tests to one more forum might at the same time weaken efforts designed to achieve consensus among nuclear States which is called for by resolution 3478 (XXX).

For these reasons my delegation will abstain in the voting on draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.15.

The CHAIRMAN: The Committee notes that Czechoslovakia has become a co-sponsor of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.16. I should like to inform the Committee that the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic also has become a co-sponsor of that draft resolution. I wish to announce also that Bangladesh has become a co-sponsor of the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/31/L.7/Rev.l and A/C.1/31/L.14.

Mr. PASTINEN (Finland): I have asked for the floor this morning in order to formally introduce the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.8 which pertains to agenda item 43 and bears a title of "Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects". This draft resolution has my delegation and my Government as its only sponsor. This is indeed what has happened with two previous resolutions on the same item at the previous General Assemblies. Before making a presentation of the substance of the resolution I would like to make one remark, and that is an apology to some delegations who have expressed, if I may say so, entirely justified expressions of wonderment about the fact that the draft resolution which bears the number L.8 was for such a long time a "phantom resolution". This fact is partly explained by an asterisk which says that the original draft was received on 9 November 1976. Why it was not circulated earlier is explained by the fact that, as often happens at the United Nations, some Government had important views to present to us on the matter and it is a consistent practice of the Finnish delegation to give every Government and every delegation the latitude to present their own views to us and to give all possible accommodation to such views. I now come to the substance of the resolution and I am going to be very brief.

I should like to draw the attention of the members of the Committee to operative paragraph 3. This is a matter of the principle behind the original Finnish idea of a study, the procedure for that study and the underlying conviction which we still maintain; and I think that it would be of benefit if I read that operative paragraph for the verbatim record so that it shows the main political thrust which we have had in mind about the study. I am therefore now quoting from the draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.8, operative paragraph 3:

"Reiterates its conviction that the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones can contribute to the security of members of such zones, to the prevention of proliferation of nuclear weapons and to the goals of general and complete disarmament."

I need not comment on that except to say that this was one of the broad consensuses reached by the Ad Hoc Committee. It also produces in exact terms the sense of the General Assembly's last year's resolution on the same subject which had a similar preambular paragraph.

(Mr. Pastinen, Finland)

We think, however, at this point when the study has been completed, and Governments have expressed their views on it, that it is only proper that the Assembly now reiterate this conviction in the form which we suggest. So much for operative paragraph 3.

The other comment pertains to operative paragraph 6. That I believe I do not have to read for the record. I shall only give a few explanatory notes. It is suggested that the comprehensive study and the Secretary-General's remarks be conveyed to the Governments concerned, which of course is natural; but, secondly, that they be conveyed to interested international organizations, and we think that there are a number of these. One of them is of course the International Atomic Energy Agency which has already given considerable help in this study. The second one is the only administrative agency administering the only nuclear-weapon-free zone in existence in inhabited areas of the world, namely, Organización para la prescripción de armas nucleares en América Latina (OPANAL), the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America.

(Mr. Pastinen, Finland)

The third organization to which this is addressed is the Committee on Disarmament. We note that there have been a few delegations that have expressed some misgivings on this particular point. We feel however that this procedure is justified, first because the study was undertaken -- if not by the CCD itself, nevertheless under the auspices of the CCD. Secondly, because the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones is included in the provisional agenda of the CCD, which dates from 15 August 1968 and is on that agenda in explicit terms. Hence our mention of the three instances to which this comprehensive study and the Secretary-General's report should be addressed. But we have been very careful to draft a final clause to this operative paragraph asking these three instances to take the study and the Secretary-General's report, and here I quote: "... for the further consideration and measures that they may deem appropriate within their respective fields of competence". I end my statement by saying that so far as my delegation is concerned, we feel no reason for any votes to be taken on this resolution, our earlier resolutions having been accepted by this Committee by consensus. At any rate, after the explanations I have provided today, we should be most grateful if this Committee would again, for the third time, act by consensus on this draft resolution.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of Finland for his statement, in the course of which he introduced the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.8.

Mr. OXLEY (Australia): I have asked for the floor to make a brief statement setting out the position of the Australian Government on the item on the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. The Australian delegation will support the draft resolution, which we shall vote on later in the day, on the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. This resolution was prepared by consensus by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean, of which Australia is a member.

The Australian delegation considers the establishment of a zone of peace in the Indian Ocean a long-term goal for the enhancement of regional security. However, we are all aware that it will be extremely difficult to advance this goal

(Mr. Oxley, Australia)

without the co-operation of the great Powers. The Australian Government believes that the shared objective of reduced tension and greater security within the region, which a conference on the Indian Ocean should strive for, can only be achieved if the agreement and co-operation of the great Powers and major maritime users, as well as that of the littoral and hinterland States, is assured. The Australian Government will continue to play a constructive role in an endeavour to ensure that the Indian Ocean Conference would be successful and have as its goal realistic objectives. The Australian Government does not wish to see the balance of power in the Indian Ocean tipped in favour of one major Power. Such a development could lead to a competative escalation of great Power rivalry. The Australian Government considers that a balance of military forces between the major Powers should be achieved at the lowest practicable level and that balance and stability are essential prerequisites for future restraint in Indian Ocean deployments.

My delegation welcomes the statements made so far by major Powers indicating an awareness of the influence of their actions on the Indian Ocean region and demonstrating willingness, in varying degrees, to consider measures which would be conducive to the eventual achievement of conditions in the Indian Ocean consistent with the principles contained in the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now proceed to take decisions on a number of draft resolutions before us.

I call on the representative of Finland.

Mr. PASTINEN (Finland): Could I raise a point of order at this point? We seek a clarification which happens to be of some importance to my delegation.

For various reasons, over which I have no control, I have been unable to be in this Committee from the start of the meeting this morning. My problem refers to agenda item 37 -- which is concerned with the urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusions of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban, and to agenda item 47 entitled "Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests" in respect of which there is a draft resolution circulated under number A/C.1/31/L.16.

A/C.1/31/PV.44 33-35

(Mr. Pastinen, Finland)

I have instructed my delegation to inform you this morning that my delegation would be a co-sponsor of both resolution A/C.1/31/L.15, under agenda item 37, and resolution A/C.1/31/L.16, under agenda item 47. If my recollection of the procedures of the Committee are correct, since I am a co-sponsor I can no longer explain my vote on those items. Are the explanations of votes the only one you are going to allow or will you still allow a debate on the consideration of these matters?

The CHAIRMAN: As I suggested to the Committee some time ago -- and the Committee accepted my suggestion -- we were going to discuss various draft resolutions and then proceed to a vote or to taking a decision on draft resolutions in groups. My understanding, therefore, was that when we start the voting procedure on a particular draft the discussion will be restricted to explanations of vote before or after a vote or a decision is taken and therefore we shall not start again a general discussion of that particular draft resolution. Representatives may recall that a number of delegations addressed themselves to various drafts during the general debate, then again during the discussion that we have been having since last Monday, 22 November. I think that gave the delegations ample opportunity to explain their positions, if they thought it necessary, on each particular draft. Then, of course, I am trying to inform the Committee well in advance when, on what date, particular drafts will be put for decision by the Committee. Therefore, I do intend now to proceed to a vote or decision, as the case may be, on individual draft resolutions, and we have decided to take up six drafts today and not to reopen general discussion on those drafts. Any delegation, except a sponsor, can explain his vote, either before or after a decision is taken. Perhaps it would not be out of place to read to the Committee rule 128 concerning the conduct during voting, which states:

"After the Chairman has announced the beginning of voting, no representative shall interrupt the voting except on a point of order in connexion with the actual conduct of the voting. The Chairman may permit members to explain their vote, either before or after the voting, except when the vote is taken by secret ballot. The Chairman may limit the time to be allowed for such explanations. The Chairman shall not permit the proposer of a proposal or of an amendment to explain his vote on his own proposal or amendment."

I hope that answers the point of clarification raised by the representative of

I call on the representative of Finland.

Finland.

Mr. PASTINEN (Finland): You have been kind enough to give me a very clear picture of the situation. The only difficulty is that, as far as my delegation is concerned, I cannot draw an exact conclusion from that. My delegation has received only this morning instructions to become a sponsor of both

of these draft resolutions. Until this morning, my delegation was not co-sponsor to either of those two draft resolutions. That would have given my delegation ample opportunity to explain its positive votes on both but since we have now become a sponsor, that possibility no longer exists. So the conclusion I am unable to draw from your very correct procedure is, whether I shall be able to speak on agenda items 37 and 47, since you cannot call on me for an explanation of vote under the rule of procedure.

The CHAIRMAN: I think I made myself absolutely clear and I can well understand the problem of the representative of Finland but he had the floor some 10 or 15 minutes ago and I cannot understand why he did not take this opportunity to address himself to those two draft resolutions, as he could have done.

With the permission of the Committee, then, we shall proceed to take a decision on the draft resolution relating to agenda item 39, "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace". The draft resolution is contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean on page 5. The administrative and financial implications of the draft resolution are given in document A/C.1/31/L.22. I should also like to draw the attention of the Committee to a corrigendum concerning document A/31/29, which does not, however, change the text of the draft resolution we are about to vote on. It introduces, if I am not mistaken, some small amendments to the report itself, not to the draft resolution.

I call on the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to explain his vote before the vote.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): The Soviet delegation would like to express its views by way of explanation of vote on the draft resolution on the Indian Ocean in document A/31/29. The position of the Soviet Union on the question of declaring the Indian Ocean a zone of peace is based on a position of principle designed to support proposals which would genuinely facilitate the strengthening of international peace and security and reduce international tension.

This position, as is well known, has been repeatedly set forth at sessions of

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

the United Nations General Assembly. It is once again formulated in the memorandum of the Soviet Union on the question of the cessation of the arms race and disarmament, submitted to this session of the General Assembly.

The Soviet Union is sympathetic towards the proposal on converting the Indian Ocean to a zone of peace and is ready to participate with all interested States on an equal footing, in seeking a favourable solution for this problem.

Of course, no detriment should thereby be caused to national interests or the security of any of the parties. In resolving this matter there should be no artificial setting apart of any group of countries, which would enjoy special rights with regard to the preparation and establishment of a régime in the Indian Ocean.

Clearly, the key issue is the fact that there should be no foreign bases in the area of the Indian Ocean, that those bases which do now exist should be eliminated, and that no new bases should be established.

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

In so far as concerns the Soviet Union, as the Soviet Union has repeatedly stated, it has not had and does not have any intention of establishing military bases in the Indian Ocean. Therefore it considers unfounded any attempt to attach to it any responsibility for tension in that area.

In resolving the problem of foreign military bases in the way I have mentioned, the Soviet Union would be ready, together with other States, to seek ways of reducing on a mutual basis the military activities of non-coastal States in the Indian Ocean and the areas immediately adjacent to it. Of course, such measures should fully take into account the universally acknowledged norms of international law with regard to freedom of navigation on the high seas, the need for putting into ports of coastal States, and freedom of scientific research.

For the Soviet Union this is a matter of great importance, since the Indian Ocean is practically the only maritime route open the whole year round linking the European part of the Soviet Union with the Soviet Far East.

In the light of these considerations, the Soviet Union would be ready to consider the question of its attitude to the convening of an international conference for the discussion of practical measures to convert the Indian Ocean into a peace zone.

Guided by what I have said, we have held consultations with the co-sponsors of the draft resolution. We set forth in detail our views and expressed our readiness to support the draft resolution if the co-sponsors showed some flexibility and accommodated our wishes.

For our part, we have displayed flexibility with regard to the draft resolution. Unfortunately, the views of the Soviet delegation have not been duly taken into account and the Soviet delegation will consequently be constrained to abstain in the voting on draft resolution A/31/29.

The CHAIRMAN: We shall now proceed to take a vote on the draft resolution in document A/31/29, relating to item 39 of the agenda.

The draft resolution was adopted by 97 votes to none, with 27 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those representatives who have indicated their wish to explain their votes after the vote.

Mr. JAY (Canada): Canada remains strongly sympathetic to the idea of creating demilitarized or denuclearized zones where these are feasible and would promote stability. We appreciate the efforts of certain States to initiate consultations on the possibility of establishing the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace and hope that such consultations will be fruitful.

As we have observed in previous years, however, the concept of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace implies obligations for States outside the zone, including the maritime users of the Indian Ocean. This concept has been defined in the General Assembly only in resolution 2832 (XXVI) at its twenty-sixth session, on which Canada abstained, because it had reservations about the definition of the obligation implied in the resolution.

Canada continues to have those reservations and as a result, my delegation abstained on the present resolution.

Mr. MARTIN (United States of America): The United States fully shares the desires of the nations of the Indian Ocean area for peace and tranquillity and their wish not to be subjected to military pressure by outside Powers. We have long appreciated these objectives. Our actions in the Indian Ocean have always been consistent with our support of the independence and sovereignty of the States of the region. It is our long-standing view that stability in the area serves not only the aspirations of the regional States, but also United States interest and the broader objectives of world peace. We thus are always prepared to do what we can to advance the cause of peace and stability in the Indian Ocean, and we hope that a similar commitment will be reflected in the actions of other outside Powers.

The United States deploys only modest forces in the Indian Ocean, reflecting its concern and the concern of other States that the lines of communication vital to world economic prosperity and stability not be subjected to pressure by anyone. We are as anxious as the littoral and hinterland States to avoid manifestations of great Power rivalry in the area and to lower, rather than raise, the tensions therein. In this regard, it should be emphasized that United States naval deployment in the Indian Ocean is not increasing. We will continue to follow a policy of restraint in our military activities in the area, and we look to others to do likewise.

The present resolution is directed towards our shared goal of assuring peace and stability in the Indian Ocean region. In the view of my Government, however, it raises some of the same problems as did its predecessors, and some new ones:

First, by its preambular reference to the original Indian Ocean Peace Zone resolution of 1971, this resolution can be interpreted as acknowledging that littoral States of the region have the right to establish a legal régime for the high seas in that region.

Second, it opts too readily and uncritically for a multilateral conference as the best way of addressing Indian Ocean arms limitation. In our view, practical steps to prevent a competitive expansion of military strength in the Indian Ocean area should be based on restraint by the States in the region and restraint by the great Powers.

Third, in the Colombo Resolution of Non-aligned Countries, referred to in the preamble of this resolution, the United States facility on Diego Garcia is singled

(Mr. Martin, United States)

out for attention while only veiled references are made to the military activities of other Powers that are external to the Indian Ocean. We cannot accept that comparable activities by different States are to be judged according to different standards. We do not believe that this is the intent of the States of the Indian Ocean region that have prepared the present resolution, because such an approach makes it difficult to deal with these important security questions in a serious, balanced and objective manner.

For these reasons, the United States has abstained in the vote on this resolution.

The United States has been candid and open in making public the extent and nature of our military activities in the Indian Ocean. We would urge other nations to be equally candid in discussing their own activities. To maintain peace and tranquillity in the Indian Ocean there must be restraint and openness on the part of all States concerned. This can be promoted only if those seeking the stated objectives of the Indian Ocean peace zone initiative pursue a balanced approach.

The United States is committed to the goals of peace, stability and security for the States of the Indian Ocean region and for international shipping in the Indian Ocean. We are always prepared to consider positively any realistic and constructive proposal to advance these objectives.

Mr. CHRYSANTHOPOULOS (Greece): My delegation wishes to clarify that it voted in favour of the draft resolution relative to the implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace because of the constant and persistent support of Greece for all causes of peace and justice. However, my delegation, representing a major seafaring nation, wishes to reiterate in this connexion the permanent interest of Greece in assuring the maintenance of the freedom of navigation on high seas, which should be upheld and in no way curtailed by such a declaration when drafted in its final form.

Mr. PASTINEN (Finland): Just as last year, the Finnish delegation has voted for this draft resolution for two overriding reasons. First, we consider that the aim of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace is closely aligned with the aim which we are seeking by trying to do whatever we can to promote

(Mr. Pastinen, Finland)

the concept of nuclear-weapon-free zones. That aim is to strengthen the peace and security on a regional basis. Secondly, we have taken careful note of the resolution adopted at the Fifth Conference of the Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries on this subject. As I have had occasion to point out before, as a small, neutral country, Finland, which stands non-aligned in its relation to military alliances, had the status of an invited guest at that particular conference.

The CHAIRMAN: I have no more speakers in explanation of vote after the vote on that particular resolution. If there is no other delegation wishing to explain its vote, I shall declare concluded the consideration of agenda item 39, "Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace".

We shall now proceed to take a decision on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.14, which is sponsored by 15 delegations and was introduced by the representative of Nigeria on 24 November. I am informed by the Secretariat that the draft carries no financial implications. The sponsors have expressed the wish that the draft resolution be adopted by consensus. May I take it that the Committee agrees with this proposal?

As I hear no objection, I declare the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.14 pertaining to agenda item 41, "Effective measures to implement the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade" to be adopted by consensus.

The draft resolution was adopted.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now call on those delegations that wish to explain their positions in this connexion.

Mr. OXLEY (Australia): The Australian Government was happy to participate in the adoption by consensus of the resolution on effective measures to implement the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade. My delegation, however, should like to make a brief comment amplifying the Australian Government's position on the question of a link between disarmament and development.

The Australian Government supports the principle of reductions and expenditure for armaments and for military purposes and measures to obtain cessation of the arms race, particularly of nuclear armaments. For example, we shall support resolution L.20 on the question of the international transfer of conventional arms, and we are co-sponsor of resolution L.15 on the urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban.

The Australian Government is also firmly committed to the principle of expansion of the resources available for development assistance. In this respect, Australia has planned increased expenditure on development assistance this financial year, compared with development assistance of the previous financial year, despite the fact that the Australian Government has had to impose rigid financial restraints on government expenditure in most sectors in view of the difficult economic conditions currently prevailing in Australia. However, the Australian Government remains unconvinced that it is either beneficial or necessary to allow levels of expenditure on development assistance to be automatically governed by levels of expenditure for military purposes.

Mr. VAN DER ZEE (Netherlands): Speaking on behalf of the nine States members of the European communities, I would like to make some observations on draft resolution L.14, just adopted by this Committee by consensus.

First, I would like to stress that the individual position of each member State of the European community concerning the aspects mentioned in preambular paragraph 3 is not affected by this vote.

(Mr. Van Der Zee, Netherlands)

Secondly, I would like to make a few comments with respect to the link between disarmament and development so emphatically stressed in this draft resolution. Obviously, resources spent for research, development and stockpiling of armaments cannot at the same time be spent on other things such as economic and social development. The consequences of this situation are being studied by the Secretary-General, with the assistance of qualified constultant experts appointed by him in conformity with resolution 3462 (XXX). No one will deny that progress in the field of arms control and especially disarmament could release vast intellectual, technological and economic resources that can be used for the solution of other problems including those of the developing countries. In this sense, a link between disarmament and development can be made. However, we have misgivings that the link might be interpreted in a distorted manner, as a pretext by States for arguing that lack of progress in disarmament prevents them from contributing as much to development as they would otherwise be able to afford.

I would like to underline that our nine countries attach the greatest importance to both disarmament and development: in our view each field has its own characteristics, needs and momentum that have to be taken into account. We believe that in order to reach progress in the field of development we need not expressly wait for progress in the field of disarmament. Pending the conclusion of future agreements on disarmament, which could set free new additional resources, we should in the meantime give high priority to the supply of financial means and other forms of co-operation in order to help reduce the gap between developed and developing countries.

Mr. BLACK (United States): My delegation has joined in the consensus adoption of the resolution on the Disarmament Decade introduced last week by the representative of Nigeria. We have done so despite reservations concerning a number of elements in the draft and some of its language. In particular, we continue to question the assertion made in the resolution of a direct link between disarmament and development. As we have stated repeatedly in the past, progress toward each of these goals depends upon the solution of distinct types of problems that are relevant to each. Among other elements of the resolution which we question is the

language of the second operative paragraph. While my delegation, like all others represented here, would welcome greater progress in the field of disarmament, we believe the steps that have already been taken during the first half of the Disarmament Decade are far from meagre. We therefore regret that the resolution before us does not acknowledge the achievements of recent years in a more positive spirit.

Mr. LI CHIH-HUNG (China) (interpretation from Chinese): Had draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.14, which we have just adopted, been put to a vote, the Chinese delegation would not have participated.

Mr. JAY (Canada): My delegation was pleased to participate in the consensus and indeed if draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.14 had been put to a vote, we would have voted in favour of it. However, I share some of the misgivings already expressed about the directness of the so-called link between disarmament and development. But more particularly, I would like to address this explanation to paragraph 7 of the resolution. In accordance with that paragraph, Canada is fully prepared to participate in an effort among CCD members to examine once again the possibility of agreement on a comprehensive programme dealing with all aspects of the problem of the cessation of the arms race and general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. However, my delegation wishes to stress its view, a view reflected in resolutions already adopted or likely to be adopted by the First Committee this year, that the main priorities for the CCD in the coming year must clearly be concerted efforts to achieve agreement on a treaty to ban all nuclear weapons testing and a treaty on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling, as well as the destruction, of chemical weapons.

My delegation is firmly of the view that discussion of a comprehensive programme should not divert the CCD from focusing its primary attention on these two questions, above all others.

The CHAIRMAN: No other delegation wishes to take the floor in explanation of its position. Therefore, with the adoption by consensus of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.14 we have concluded our consideration of item 41 of the agenda, "Effective measures to implement the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade".

We shall now proceed to take a decision on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.15 pertaining to agenda item 37, "Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban". The draft carries no financial implications. It is sponsored by 18 delegations and was introduced by the representative of New Zealand on 24 November. I shall now call on those delegations wishing to explain their vote before the vote.

Mr. MEERBURG (Netherlands): As last year, the Netherlands delegation wishes to dissociate itself from the wording of operative paragraph 1 of draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.15. In our view, progress towards a comprehensive test ban will not be enhanced by combinations of actions by those States on which co-operation for such progress really depends.

My delegation is disappointed that in the draft no mention is made of the group of seismic experts established by the CCD. In our view it would have been worth while to recognize the importance of international co-operation in verifying arms control measures, in particular, with respect to a nuclear test ban.

My delegation regrets that also in other aspects verification issues do not get enough attention in the draft resolution. For example, the draft could have mentioned the problem how to conduct peaceful nuclear explosions under a comprehensive weapons test ban. This is in our view still an unsolved problem. I noted however with interest that the distinguished delegate of New Zealand in his introduction of draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.15 recognized the PNE issue clearly.

Notwithstanding these and some other misgivings, my delegation will vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.15 to express our deep concern about the ongoing arms race in general and nuclear-weapons tests in particular. I recognize that some slight movements on the test-ban issue are discernible. I may refer to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and perhaps, more interesting, the Agreement on

(Mr. Meerburg, Netherlands)

Peaceful Nuclear Explosions, signed but not ratified by the Soviet Union and the United States.

My delegation also noted with interest the acceptance by the Soviet Union of a kind of on-site verification by challenge of nuclear tests. We look forward therefore to fruitful discussions in the CCD next year, with the hope that substantial progress can now be made towards a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

Since draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.16 relating to agenda item 47 does not recognize the special responsibility of the two greatest Powers with respect to a comprehensive test ban, my delegation will abstain from voting on that draft.

Mr. ISSRAELYAN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (interpretation from Russian): In connexion with the vote on draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.15, the Soviet delegation would like to make the following statement.

The Soviet Union has always favoured the cessation, everywhere and by all, of nuclear-weapons tests, including underground tests. In order to curb the nuclear arms race we must above all call a halt to all nuclear-weapons tests. As we know, certain results have been achieved in this area. The Moscow Treaty of 1963 was concluded; in 1974 there was the conclusion of the treaty between the USSR and the United States on the limitation of underground nuclear-weapon tests which prohibited the carrying out of underground explosions above a certain threshold; and, in the light of the great importance of nuclear explosions for industrial purposes, the Treaty between the USSR and the United States of 1976 on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes established a procedure for the carrying out of such explosions which fully eliminates the possibility of their being used for purposes of perfecting nuclear weapons.

Accordingly, a real basis has been laid down for the final solution to the problem of prohibiting all nuclear-weapon tests. The time has now come for a solution to this problem and the Soviet Union once again proposes the conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. Such a draft treaty has already been submitted to the United Nations, and the General Assembly has expressed itself in favour of the holding of concrete talks in order to achieve agreement on complete and general prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests. These talks have not yet started, but as we know this is not the fault of the

A/C.1/31/PV.44 58--60

(Mr. Issraelyan, USSR)

Soviet Union. The Soviet Union is still ready, with the participation of other nuclear Powers, to come to an agreement once and for all to put an end to tests. The new proposals of the USSR on this question, which are contained in the revised text of the treaty and which relate to the possibility of carrying out on-site inspection on a voluntary basis, will, we are convinced, promote the attainment ultimately of such an agreement. In a spirit of goodwill the Soviet Union is ready to take part in the search for a universally acceptable understanding on a compromise basis which would make it possible to observe the framework of voluntariness in the adoption of a decision on on-site verification, under appropriate circumstances, and which, at the same time, would assure all parties to the treaty that the obligations assumed under the treaty are being complied with by all.

The Soviet Union, accordingly, is making constant efforts to bring about a radical solution to the problem of nuclear tests. It is precisely for this reason that the Soviet delegation is unable to agree to draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.15, which attempts to include the USSR among those responsible for continuing nuclear-weapons tests, and place it on the same footing with those who are refusing to take part in talks or to seek a radical solution to the question and are still continuing tests -- indeed, large-scale tests in the atmosphere -- thus doing serious harm to the environment. We cannot agree that the USSR bears responsibility for the lack of progress in talks on a comprehensive test ban.

In the light of what I have stated, the Soviet delegation will be unable to support draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.15 and will abstain in the vote.

Mr. OGISO (Japan): Japan has consistently taken the position of being opposed to any nuclear tests conducted by any State. In accordance with that position, the spokesman of the Foreign Ministry of Japan issued a statement on the occasion of recent Chinese nuclear tests which read in part as follows:

"Whenever a nuclear test has been carried out by any country, including China, Japan has always lodged the strongest protest and called for the cessation of all such tests. On learning that China had carried out another nuclear test, Japan, which hopes most ardently for the attainment of a peace which does not depend on military power, deeply regretted the Chinese action and is protesting most strongly. It is greatly to be regretted that, at a time when pollution of the atmosphere and the seas is a matter for great concern all over the world, nuclear tests should be destroying the environment and, for this reason too, the Japanese Government is calling on the Government of the People's Republic of China to cease all nuclear tests immediately."

It is in the same spirit as expressed in the above statement that my delegation will support the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.15. One minor reservation which my delegation wishes to express at this stage is that no reference is made in the above draft resolution to the work of the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts on seismic events within CCD. However, basically, my delegation fully supports the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.15.

Mr. KHAN (Pakistan): I take this opportunity to explain the Pakistan delegation's attitude towards the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.15. We feel that a halt to nuclear testing is an important step towards general and complete disarmament. We are therefore in accord with the basic intentions of the draft resolution. However, we are convinced that a condemnation of nuclear testing at this stage would be directed against some of the nuclear Powers, not those who have been conducting such tests for over two decades. A condemnation is not the best way to encourage progress towards the objective of a total ban on nuclear testing. My delegation will therefore abstain in the vote on operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution and my delegation requests that a separate vote be taken on this particular paragraph.

The CHAIRMAN: The Chair notes the representative of Pakistan's request for a separate vote on operative paragraph 1.

Mr. RIOS (Panama) (interpretation from Spanish): The delegation of Panama wishes to address itself to resolution A/C.1/31/L.15 on the urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban. Panama sees no reason whatsoever for nuclear tests to continue. These explosions have reached such a degree of danger that we would venture to describe them as truly irresponsible and feel that they should be totally and finally ended. Each of these explosions creates an imbalance, not only in the atmosphere but also under ground; who knows whether these irresponsible practices, if continued, may not even lead those nuclear Powers to destroy our unfortunate planet and wipe it out in an apocalyptic *atastrophe. For these reasons, my delegation will whole-heartedly support any resolution designed totally to prohibit such nuclear tests.

The CHAIRMAN: The representatives will now proceed to vote on the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.15. A separate roll-call vote has been requested on operative paragraph 1, which reads as follows: "Condemns all nuclear weapon tests, in whatever environment they may be conducted".

We shall proceed to a vote on this particular paragraph first.

A vote was taken by roll call.

Somalia, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour:

Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab
Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia,
United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, Upper
Volta, Venezuela, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina,
Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia,
Brazil, Burundi, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus,
Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji,
Finland, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Iceland, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan,
Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan

A/C.1/31/PV.44 63-65

Arab Republic, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore.

Against: United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Albania, China, France.

Abstaining: Spain, Turkey, Uganda, Ukrainian SSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Yemen, Zambia, Algeria, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Canada, Congo, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Democratic Yemen, German Democratic Republic, Germany, Federal Republic of, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Mauritania, Mongolia, Netherlands, Oman, Pakistan, Poland, Portugal, Romania.

Paragraph 1 of the draft resolution (A/C.1/31/L.15) was adopted by 82 votes to 5, with 38 abstentions.

The CHAIRMAN: I shall now put to the vote the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.15, as a whole. A roll-call vote has been requested.

A vote was taken by roll call.

Peru, having been drawn by lot by the President, was called upon to vote first.

In favour:

Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Cameroon, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela, Yemen, Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burma, Burundi, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Democratic Yemen, Denmark, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guyana, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libyan Arab Republic, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay.

Against:

Albania, China.

Abstaining:

Poland, Ukrainian SSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,
United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Zambia,
Algeria, Belgium, Benin, Bulgaria, Byelorussian SSR, Cuba,
Czechoslovakia, France, German Democratic Republic, Germany,
Federal Republic of, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg,
Mauritania, Mongolia.

The draft resolution (A/C.1/31/L.15), as a whole, was adopted by 101 votes to 2, with 23 abstentions.

A/C.1/31/PV.44 67

The CHAIRMAN: I have a number of delegations that wish to speak in explanation of the vote after the vote, but I suggest that we adjourn now and hear those delegations at our afternoon meeting.

The meeting rose at 1.10 p.m.