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Chairman: Mr. JAROSZEK (Poland)

CONTENTS

- Reduction of military budgets: report of the Secretary-General /34/
- Incendiary and other specific conventional weapons which may be the subject of prohibitions or restrictions of use for humanitarian reasons: report of the Secretary-General /35/
- Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /36/
- Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /37/
- Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3467 (XXX) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) /38/
- Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean /39/
- World Disarmament Conference: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference /40/
- Effective measures to implement the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade /41/
- Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa /42/
- Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects: report of the Secretary-General /43/
- Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East /44/
- Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /45/
- Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia /46/
- Conclusion of a treaty on the complete and general prohibition of nuclear weapon tests /47/

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ENGLISH

Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /48/

General and complete disarmament /49/

- (a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament;
- (b) Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency;
- (c) Report of the Secretary-General

Strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament /50/

Implementation of the conclusions of the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons /116/

The meeting was called to order at 10.50 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50
AND 116 (continued)

Mr. TEMPLETON (New Zealand): Mr. Chairman, since I am speaking for the first time at a comparatively late stage in the proceedings of this Committee I am able to congratulate you not only on your election to the chairmanship but, from observation, on your smooth and effective conduct of our work.

For the first time that I can recall in the 30 years since it first met in 1946, this Committee is not called on this year to consider a major political situation or dispute.

This is not because such situations and disputes do not exist, but because of a growing tendency, on which perhaps this is not the appropriate occasion to comment, to insist on raising such matters directly in the plenary. As a consequence, this Committee certainly has more time to devote to the important multilateral issues on its agenda; and we must acknowledge that, within the scope of the present item, the Committee has a responsibility of awesome dimensions, one that could determine the future of humanity.

The United Nations Charter confers an inescapable duty on this Organization to promote disarmament. If our annual debate in this Committee achieves no other objective, it does serve to prick our consciences and to remind us that we have so far failed in the performance of this duty. Frustrations and disappointment have been the keynote of many of the speeches we have heard in this year's debate. They are sentiments that my delegation shares to the full.

This year, even more than in the past, we are faced with an almost bewildering array of proposals and draft resolutions under no less than 18 item headings. The disarmament debate, ranging over all aspects of these complex and, in many cases, technical issues, has become more and more the preserve of professionals. For those of us who are not members of the CCD, and who do not have the opportunity to follow these questions on a year-round basis, it becomes almost impossible to examine all the various proposals in depth and formulate an independent judgement of their value. It is not surprising that some give up

(Mr. Templeton, New Zealand)

altogether and that we have quite a few empty seats during the debate on this vitally important topic. But the complexity of the issues, in my delegation's view, in no way justifies us in abdicating our responsibility to participate actively in the debate and in the formulation of resolutions. What I propose to do is to concentrate on a few issues which New Zealand considers especially significant. On the issues which I appear to neglect, I may recall that, in some cases, New Zealand's views have been clearly stated in the past, and that in all cases we have the opportunity to put ourselves on record when the time comes to vote.

I shall begin with a subject to which my delegation attaches special importance, and on which the Assembly has, unnecessarily in our view, inscribed two separate items: I refer to the need for a comprehensive test ban treaty. For years past, my country has publicly expressed its concern at the continuance and proliferation of nuclear weapons testing. During the four sessions at which I have been participating in these debates, my delegation has been active in promoting resolutions calling for testing to be suspended and for the conclusion of a treaty to ban all forms of testing for the future. It is inevitable, therefore, that what I have to say this year will be largely repetitive.

Yet I am emboldened to address this subject once more by the comments in earlier speeches by delegations which are traditionally among the most active in the field of disarmament and whose views command great respect.

A central theme in these statements has been concern at a tendency for attention to be diverted away from genuine disarmament problems to peripheral issues. There is, in these statements, implicit or explicit, a strong thread of criticism of the CCD for allowing itself to be so diverted, despite repeated injunctions from this Assembly to give the highest priority to certain tasks, notably the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty. To avoid the charge that any comments I may make on this issue are uninformed, I confine myself to selecting a few quotations from statements by members of the CCD itself.

(Mr. Templeton, New Zealand)

Earlier in this debate Mr. Ogisu, of Japan, said:

"In this connexion we are particularly concerned by the tendency during the recent deliberations of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva to give priority to the discussion of such peripheral issues as a ban on what are vaguely termed weapons of mass destruction rather than the most important issue, nuclear disarmament. It should be recognized that such a tendency is bound to raise questions about a possible lack of political will on the part of the nuclear-weapon States and that this may undermine the very basis of the nuclear disarmament efforts which have thus far been made under the aegis of the United Nations" (A/C.1/31/PV.21, p. 36).

Then later he said:

"The fact that a variety of nuclear tests are being conducted while these efforts for a comprehensive test ban are being made inevitably arouses a deep feeling of dissatisfaction and helplessness in my delegation. We deplore the fact that in 1976 -- not to mention what happened earlier -- underground nuclear tests have been conducted by France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States. We deplore also the fact that an atmospheric nuclear test recently was conducted by the People's Republic of China" (ibid., p. 42).

And I noticed from the newspaper this morning that another such test is reported to have been conducted.

Also in this debate the representative of Sweden, Mrs. Thorsson, referred to "the key element in a real disarmament process and, therefore, the element which occupies the place of highest priority in the work of the General Assembly and the CCD -- namely, the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban (CTB) treaty. Besides being a most significant step towards real nuclear disarmament," she said, "a CTB treaty is necessary to ensure the credibility of the non-proliferation régime" (A/C.1/31/PV.25, pp. 59-60).

Mrs. Thorsson went on later in her speech:

"My delegation is convinced that a global monitoring system for the verification of compliance with a CTB, largely based on existing resources, can provide adequate deterrence for States parties to the treaty not to

(Mr. Templeton, New Zealand)

carry out clandestine testing ... The fact that the expert group will need some time to fulfil its duties on the technical aspects of a monitoring system does not change our view that political negotiations on a CTB should start without delay. Such negotiations are in fact long overdue,"

(Ibid., p. 61).

The representative of Canada, Mr. Jay, said:

"Despite the appeals made year after year for almost three decades in resolutions of this Assembly, progress in recent years towards a ban on all nuclear weapons testing has been almost imperceptible. The partial Test Ban Treaty of 1963 has not yet been signed by two nuclear-weapon States, and one of them is still engaging in atmospheric testing.

"Although the CCD continues to grapple with the question of nuclear testing, it is difficult to accept that more resolute efforts have not been made by the nuclear-weapon States themselves to overcome the obstacles to a nuclear test ban ... What insurmountable obstacles prevent at least the two super-Powers, and as many other nuclear-weapon States as possible, from entering into a formal interim agreement to end their nuclear weapons testing for a defined trial period?" (A/C.1/31/PV.24, p. 41)

Finally, in this series of quotations, the Foreign Minister of Mexico spoke out even more critically, noting that the CCD had displayed "flagrant lethargy" on this matter, despite the very strong language in which the Assembly had condemned all nuclear weapons tests in six separate resolutions.

We are all aware that one of the reasons why the CCD has not got down to serious work on the drafting of a CTB is the divergence of views that has arisen on the question of verification. The different approaches may be categorized roughly as follows:

First, that adequate verification requires on-site inspection;

Second, that national technical resources are quite equal to the task, so that on-site inspection is unnecessary;

Third, that the problem of verification is not a sufficiently valid reason for delaying the conclusion of a CTB;

Fourth, that national verification capabilities are likely to prove sufficient to detect all but very low-yield explosions, and that the risk of undetected tests in that category must be weighed against the greater risk involved in the continuance of nuclear testing programmes without restriction.

(Mr. Templeton, New Zealand)

Of these four approaches, the last -- the fourth -- is the one which perhaps comes closest to reflecting our own viewpoint. We have no wish to downgrade the importance of the verification issue, but we believe that it is capable of early solution, and that it provides no pretext for the CCD to put off consideration of a draft treaty year after year.

We are pleased to note two potentially encouraging new developments. In the first place, the CCD has established a group of seismological experts to consider the possibility of international co-operation to detect and identify seismic events. As explained by the representative of Sweden, the work of this group could provide the basis for a global monitoring system for the verification of compliance with a CTB treaty. We hope that the group will work with a due sense of urgency and produce some agreed conclusions at an early date. We do not, however, consider, that the political task of negotiating a treaty should await the completion of its work.

Secondly, we have noted an apparent modification of the position of the Soviet Union, which in the past has considered on-site inspection to be unnecessary. At our meeting on 10 November, Mr. Issraelyan said:

"The Soviet Union is prepared to participate in attempts to find a generally acceptable agreement on a compromise basis whereby the adoption of decisions regarding on-site verification of relevant conditions would be on a voluntary basis, while at the same time all parties to the treaty would be certain that these obligations were being fulfilled" (A/C.1/31/PV.27, p. 32).

My delegation will study the reactions of the other nuclear-weapon States to this concept with the greatest interest. We would also hope, in the course of the debate, for some further clarification of the Soviet position, which does seem to us a little enigmatic, at least in the English translation. What precisely are the obligations to which Mr. Issraelyan refers? Does his reference to a "voluntary basis" mean that each party would be free to accept on-site inspection or reject it in each individual case and, if so, how can the other parties be certain that obligations are being fulfilled in a situation where on-site inspection is rejected? It is the earnest hope of my delegation that this question will be clarified in a way which will enable a significant step forward to be taken.

(Mr. Templeton, New Zealand)

My delegation considers, in any event, that there is no justification for delaying the negotiation of a CTB treaty beyond 1977. Nor do we consider it essential that all nuclear-weapon States participate in the negotiations. We believe that the successful preparation of a draft treaty would, in itself, almost guarantee the success of a special session of the General Assembly on disarmament questions. My delegation is therefore consulting with others with a view to submitting a draft resolution on a CTB treaty to the Committee, and we hope to be in a position to introduce such a text in the very near future.

One of the substantial benefits which would flow from the entry into force of a CTB treaty would be a powerful deterrent to the proliferation, both vertical and horizontal, of nuclear weapons. The danger of widespread horizontal proliferation has never been more acute. It is, to say the least, regrettable that narrow commercial considerations have in some instances been allowed to override those of international security. The capacity to make nuclear weapons is no longer the prerogative of a relatively small number of countries. Many of the countries which can easily develop this capacity, moreover, have not ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

New Zealand views this situation with grave apprehension. It is a welcome development that the major nuclear exporters now seem prepared to face up to their responsibilities in this respect. We note that renewed efforts are being undertaken to improve existing safeguards and to strengthen control over the fuel cycles of recipient countries. All these are questions requiring urgent attention.

Perhaps the most urgent step of all, however, is to secure the ratification of the NPT by all countries which could develop a nuclear capability. In this connexion, we regard the ratification of the Treaty earlier this year by Japan as a very significant step. New Zealand pays tribute to the determination of the Japanese Government to put aside all hesitation and permanently to renounce the doubtful privilege of membership in the nuclear club. In doing so, it has joined with several other States which had a real choice to make in setting an example which, we hope, still others in the same category will soon follow.

Efforts to reach agreement on tighter safeguards, surveillance and even possible sanctions can, in our view, best be carried out within the framework which already exists. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is carrying out some vital studies concerning the applications of safeguards and a possible international

(Mr. Templeton, New Zealand)

régime for peaceful nuclear explosions (PNE). This valuable work deserves the support of the international community. We hope that the IAEA will continue to be the central mechanism for devising and supervising a safeguards system.

(Mr. Templeton, New Zealand)

There is a related question concerning nuclear explosions for non-military purposes. There is no internationally agreed procedure to govern the conduct of nuclear tests of this kind. The virtually undisputed conclusion of a group of CCD experts meeting in 1975 was that important information for the development of nuclear weapons can be derived from the conduct of so-called peaceful nuclear explosions.

New Zealand has yet to be convinced that the benefits -- if indeed there are any -- to be derived from such experiments are likely to outweigh the political and environmental problems they create. If it can be demonstrated that there are such benefits, it is our position that PNEs should be conducted under strict international supervision.

We note that the implications of a possible international régime to govern a PNE service, should one be provided, are at present being examined by an ad hoc advisory group with the IAEA. New Zealand supports this effort.

The Assembly has before it this year one draft treaty prepared by the CCD, on what has come to be known as ENMOD. This should be a matter for congratulations. We regret, however, that the congratulations must be somewhat muted because of the controversy which continues to surround this exercise.

The prohibition of military or hostile uses of environmental modification techniques is not in itself a disarmament measure. It would be my delegation's hope and belief that even in time of war civilized nations would not resort to techniques which carry the risk of uncontrollable and irreversible disaster to the environment in which we live, and which are as likely to cause harm to innocent civilian populations outside the zone of war, as to the intended enemy. We would hope that considerations of broad self-interest would lead to a self-denying ordinance among States with the capacity to manipulate the environment, whether or not there is a treaty. Nevertheless, we see value in a treaty formulation of international law on this subject, which would be of value not only in war but in time of ostensible peace.

We therefore welcome in principle the draft treaty prepared by the CCD, while regretting that the Commission was unable to recommend it unanimously and that there remain certain doubts about the effect of the words "having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects" in article I of the draft. My delegation is bound to say that it shares those doubts.

(Mr. Templeton, New Zealand)

We therefore have some sympathy with those who have suggested the desirability of further consideration of the draft treaty by the CCD in the light of comments made during this debate. At the same time, it would emphatically not be our view that the CCD should devote a major part of its 1977 sessions to this issue, and thus delay still further the detailed consideration of a comprehensive test ban treaty, and the further consideration of the question of chemical weapons.

If I may return for a moment to article I of the draft, my delegation would, at a minimum, like a clearer explanation than we have had so far of the reasons why an unqualified prohibition is not possible or acceptable.

Finally, I would also like to record my delegation's view that it is entirely competent and proper for the Assembly to review the form and substance of draft treaties which are presented to it for approval by expert bodies, such as the CCD. It is entirely open to it to accept, reject or amend such texts, or to refer them back to the drafting body for further consideration. It may be politically expedient for it to refrain from doing so, especially where technical matters are involved or where the number of directly interested parties involved is limited. I do not reject the possibility that the present case may have such special features.

I would say, however, that if the Assembly is not regarded as a competent body to approve treaties related to disarmament or cognate topics, and intended to be open to all States to become parties, the only alternative seems to me to be a full-scale plenipotentiary conference.

If there is a theme in my statement which I should recapitulate in my concluding remarks, it is the equal measure of concern which all States share in the objective of reducing the burden of armaments, and their corresponding equal duty to participate actively in the preparation and adoption of disarmament measures. Those Powers which have used their advanced technologies to produce especially destructive armaments and, in particular, nuclear weapons, do of course have a heavy burden of responsibility to promote, and not to obstruct, negotiations in regard to both nuclear and conventional disarmament. But this does not in the least absolve smaller countries, such as mine, from their duty to take their full part in the negotiating process. To permit us to do this, there is a need for greater awareness, both among governments and on the part of world public opinion,

(Mr. Templeton, New Zealand)

as to what is actually happening in regard to disarmament. We require more comprehensive and up-to-date information on both technical developments and the progress of current negotiations in the various forums. SIPRI, of course, performs a most valuable role on an unofficial basis. But there is also need, in our view, for greater activity by the United Nations itself. That is one reason why New Zealand has constantly supported the Swedish initiative to intensify the activities of the United Nations, and especially of the Secretariat, in this field. We hope that this can be done in an economical and efficient manner with special care to make the most effective use of available resources.

We also hope that, as a result of the early implementation of the Ad Hoc Committee's recommendations, we will see an improvement in the United Nations disarmament machinery, and, in particular, a more efficient working relationship between the CCD and the General Assembly. In addition, we strongly support the proposals in the report which are designed to make it easier for this Committee to deal with the complex issues before it.

For these reasons, we have been glad to co-sponsor draft resolution L.11.

New Zealand attaches all the more importance to the implementation of the Ad Hoc Committee's proposals at a time when plans are being introduced for a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

My delegation welcomes the proposal for a special session, as offering an opportunity for all States -- not merely a selected few -- to concentrate their attention on disarmament issues and make a renewed effort to break out of the stagnation in which, on the basic disarmament issues, we find ourselves at present. But if the special session is to justify our decision to convene it, there must be very active and constructive preparatory work to ensure that it has before it well-thought out and widely supported proposals on central, rather than peripheral, disarmament issues. My delegation is not without hope that, given careful preparation of this kind, 1978 may yet prove to be an annus mirabilis in the disarmament calendar.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of New Zealand for his kind words addressed to me personally.

Mr. HOLLAI (Hungary): My delegation has already addressed itself to most of the disarmament questions now on the agenda of our Committee. This time I should like to give some thought to the world disarmament conference, which is currently emerging in a new context for us.

The endeavour to convene a world disarmament conference is a long-standing issue before the forums of the United Nations. The idea of such a conference has received a wide response from Member States ever since it was raised. This is only natural, since in the course of years quite a number of delegations have been seeking ways to make the disarmament negotiations more substantial and more meaningful.

A world disarmament conference should, in our view, be one that would transcend in relevance all the present forums for disarmament and would, at the same time, provide further impetus for the disarmament talks now under way. A leitmotiv of the negotiations at any disarmament forum is the call to ensure the participation of all States Members of the United Nations and even of countries outside the United Nations family in the discussion of disarmament issues and in the study and consideration of documents dealing with the problems of disarmament. The world disarmament conference would be a universal forum with the participation of all States. The popularity of the idea of holding such a conference is accounted for, not least, by the possibility it would offer to meet this rightful claim in a satisfactory manner. This by itself underlines the exceptional importance of the conference, particularly if we consider the relevance of disarmament issues and the opportunity for dealing with questions of concern to the peace of all countries. The democratic character of a world conference lies precisely in the possibility for all States to participate in it on an equal footing.

The pronouncements made so far in connexion with a world disarmament conference have proved beyond doubt that the holding of such a conference is supported by the overwhelming majority of the States Members of our Organization. The countries opposed to the conference are few in number but, regrettably enough, they happen to be nuclear Powers. Those present are familiar with the views of the conference's opponents, so my delegation does not intend to deal with them now. I simply wish to note that those few countries refrain from putting forward alternative proposals or suggesting any other approach conducive to progress in disarmament questions.

(Mr. Hollai, Hungary)

The primary objective of a world disarmament conference is to provide an opportunity for the problems of disarmament to be discussed in a comprehensive and thorough manner and to offer a possibility for all States to make their voice heard on questions that, by their very nature, are of profound concern to us all and have a vital bearing on our future.

The Hungarian People's Republic has officially stated its position on the calling of a world disarmament conference on several occasions. The last time it did so was in May 1975 in response to General Assembly resolution 3260 (XXIX) which invited all States to communicate to the Secretary-General their comments on the main objectives of a world disarmament conference. As a reminder, I should like to quote only one paragraph of that statement:

"The convening of the world disarmament conference would create a very important international forum which, as yet, is still missing from the system of independent but inevitably interacting bilateral and multilateral organs effectively dealing with various aspects of disarmament. Consequently, it also means that the world disarmament conference would not substitute for, but properly complement, the activities already going on in the present bilateral, regional and other international bodies."

In its statement on the strengthening of international security, the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic has pointed out that:

"The Hungarian Government holds the view that the negotiations on disarmament would be given a new stimulus by the convening of the world disarmament conference. Therefore, together with the majority of the States Members of the United Nations, it urges that preparations for the conference should be started as soon as possible. At the same time, the Hungarian People's Republic, as a member of the Geneva Committee on Disarmament, makes efforts to help this important forum of discussion fulfil its mission, facilitate the elaboration of effective measures promoting the cause of disarmament."

The Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe signed in Helsinki particularly sums up the achievements of the policy of détente.

(Mr. Hollai, Hungary)

Proceeding from a common interest in peace and security, it reaffirms the basic principles governing inter-State relations and imparts further impetus to political détente.

The further development and strengthening of political détente call for concrete results in the field of disarmament.

We are of the view that the present climate of international politics makes it possible for disarmament issues to be dealt with at a world disarmament conference in a manner that may result only in benefit to all peoples.

At the same time, the Hungarian delegation receives with understanding proposals which seek to remove the cause of disarmament negotiations from the impasse created by the opponents of convening a world disarmament conference. In this connexion, the idea has also arisen of holding a special session of the General Assembly devoted exclusively to the consideration of disarmament problems.

Our agreement with this approach does not mean, however, that we consider a special session to be the only possibility. Nor does this position of ours imply playing down the role of a special session. The search for the solution of the complex disarmament issues requires continuous and persistent efforts by the international community. My delegation therefore wishes to emphasize that the holding of a special session of the General Assembly may represent a useful step towards disarmament, but that it is not a substitute for a world disarmament conference.

The Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries held at Colombo last August also took a virtually similar stand when it stated: "The Conference reiterated the urgent need to adopt effective measures leading to the convening of a world disarmament conference." It was spelled out in a resolution of the Colombo Conference that the question of convening a world disarmament conference should be included in the agenda of a special session of the General Assembly.

The support given by the great majority of the international community to the cause of a world disarmament conference is proof of the need for continued and increased efforts to have the conference convened. Its topicality cannot be questioned because of the unwillingness of a few Powers to participate in its

(Mr. Hollai, Hungary)

preparation and deliberations. The opposition of a few Powers must not cause us to lose, once and for all, a possibility so wide in scope as that which would be offered by a world disarmament conference. We must seize every opportunity and use every possible way to see a world disarmament conference held as early as possible in order that it may effectively advance the cause of real disarmament.

We have no doubt that the logical way to serve this widely supported cause is to draw upon the useful experience of the Ad Hoc Committee for the successful preparation of the world disarmament conference. It is advisable that the Ad Hoc Committee should continue its work -- all the more so since this seems to be the natural and only way of ensuring that the world disarmament conference takes place at the earliest possible date.

In summing up, I should like to reiterate the Hungarian delegation's warm support for the convening of a world disarmament conference as the broadest forum for discussing the questions of disarmament. At the same time, however, my delegation is not opposed to the holding of a special session of the General Assembly to consider disarmament issues.

Mr. SAAD (Sudan): I intend to be very brief, and since this is the first time my delegation addresses this Committee, it gives me great pleasure to extend to you, Mr. Chairman, our sincere congratulations for your election to steer the deliberations of our Committee. We are confident that the diverse capabilities you command will enable you to guide us in the most exemplary manner in carrying out the tasks before us. It also gives me great pleasure to extend to the other officers of the Committee our warm congratulations on their election.

The disarmament negotiations, which started many years ago, have achieved very little progress when we think of the desire of the peoples of the world, manifested in many fora, to reduce the dangers of arms and armament. In this matter the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, as a member of the international community, shared in the worries and disappointment expressed by almost all the delegations which took the floor before us. One cannot believe that man's ingenuity falls short of breaking through the barriers hindering that progress. However, and bearing in mind that the Disarmament Decade is approaching its last quarter, the Sudan adds its voice to those raised here demanding an urgent positive move towards disarmament in general, and the control of nuclear weapons in particular. We believe that there are many sound options open to us if we are really keen to spare the world the horrible effects of modern weaponry.

One such option is the belief that the stockpiles of arms we actually have now are more than enough to destroy all forms of life on earth. So it is only sane to demand an immediate stop to all kinds of expenditures for designing new means of life obliteration. We in the developing countries regard with great concern the waste of know-how and funds consecrated to innovations in the means of destruction and testing of their efficiency. Three hundred billion dollars per annum spent on armaments, while millions of people are starving, diseased, and illiterate, is a disgrace to this community. Our countries need these expenditures to probe untapped resources essential for development and for closing the ever-widening gap characterizing the standards of living of the rich North and poor South. Technical break-throughs and foreign aid are now regarded as two major prerequisites to development.

Thus, it is no wonder that the General Assembly took up this matter at its twenty-ninth and thirtieth sessions and by its resolutions 3254 (XXIX) and 3463 (XXX) requested an in-depth analysis and examination in concrete

(Mr. Saad, Sudan)

terms of the definition and valuation of military expenditures and resources. The report of the Group of Experts on the Reduction of Military Budgets contained in document A/31/222 is before us. Like other reports on sensitive issues like this one, experts almost always face the technical problems of identification, verification, valuation etc. We believe that, because of the dire poverty and urgent need of mankind, sensitivities and mistrust should be put aside, and that our prime concern should be to achieve cuts in military budgets so that the funds saved could be channelled into development programmes.

Other than the reduction in military budgets, which is a major contribution to the limitation of the arms race and the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, there is the desire for the establishment of nuclear-weapon-free zones. General Assembly resolutions 3263 (XXIX) and 3474 (XXX) of 9 December 1974 and 11 December 1975 respectively, commended and recognized the need for establishing a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. My country's proximity to this region needs no elaboration. The explosive nature and complex problems of the region need no elaboration either. Most apparent is the fact that the presence of any form of nuclear weapon in that area will surely constitute a continuous threat to world peace.

The threat to world peace is further aggravated when we take into consideration that all the countries in the Middle East region, with the exception of Israel, have adhered in some way or another to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. All those countries except Israel have responded positively to the Secretary-General's request emanating from the General Assembly's resolution 3263 (XXIX) commending the idea of the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East. My delegation's view in such a situation is that it exposes the peace-loving countries of the region to the possibilities of nuclear blackmail and adds to the complexities already prevalent.

We hold similar views on the preservation of Africa as a nuclear-weapon-free zone. We view with great concern the attempts of certain Western Powers to create a nuclear country out of South Africa. This concern was explicitly expressed by the African heads of State in Mauritius last July. We cannot tolerate the

(Mr. Saad, Sudan)

subjugation of our brethren in southern Africa, indeed all Africa, to nuclear threat and the inhumane domination that follows. We appeal to those who are contributing to South Africa's nuclear strength to reconsider their actions in the light of the danger the continent will be exposed to.

This is not a refusal of nuclear technology per se. It is the fear that this technology might become used as a means of blackmail and usurpation that arouses our concern. As long as the IAEA safeguards are not strictly complied with, and as long as adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty is not universal our fears and concern remain unabated.

Another issue before us is the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace. The non-aligned movement and African Summits this year made it crystal clear that this is the desire of the peoples of the region. We would like to draw the attention of the world community to the fact that the present burgeoning rivalries over the control of that area are endangering the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of the States in it. Consequently, the implementation of the declaration should be given its deserved importance and be recognized by all of us assembled here; namely, the Indian Ocean should be an area free from all kinds of nuclear weapons, military bases and be outside the power politics struggle.

Disarmament has proved to be a thorny matter and of intricate complexities that calls for a world disarmament conference. In this concern, my delegation deems it expedient to convene a special session of the General Assembly consecrated to questions of disarmament. It would be conducive to the success of the special session if preparations for it start as early as possible. We believe that so far the desire for disarmament has become a global demand. Also there are already enough technical studies and convergent views and consensus that need the political will of the human race, as represented in the General Assembly, to bring about and promulgate the international agreements on disarmament we are craving for.

Finally as regards the efforts exerted to reach an agreement on the prohibition of the production and use of chemical and biological weapons, as well as the destruction of their stockpiles, my delegation commends such efforts and calls for their intensification till a complete eradication of the use and manufacture of such weapons is achieved.

Mr. CHERKAoui (Morocco) (interpretation from French): The problems of disarmament discussed in our Organization since its creation exemplify in their complexity, the political realities of our time. The First Committee unfortunately reverts to this debate each year without tangible progress, thus revealing the fragility of détente based on a precarious balance and acutely posing the problem of the ability of our Organization to find solutions in an area on which depend the very survival of mankind, its development in peace and security. Disarmament has indeed become a problem of concern to the peoples of the entire world who, increasingly disturbed, witness the infernal arms race as well as the massive build-up of increasingly sophisticated weapons and a prosperous trade of conventional arms. As our Secretary-General has written in his report on the work of the Organization, each year \$300 billion are devoted to arms expenditures and since the Second World War military expenditures have exceeded \$6,000 billion.

The Moroccan delegation, in the course of this general debate, wishes to centre its considerations around a few general comments, reserving its right to speak at a later stage on given items on our agenda. Several speakers in this debate have expressed their disappointment at the slow progress of the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament and the scanty results obtained. Some even question its *raison d'être*. This body reflects, indeed, the complexity of the international situation characterized by divisions between blocs and economic and technical inequalities among States. Its ineffectiveness derives from the absence of political will of the two super-Powers, which are its co-Chairmen, to enter into specific commitments for the purpose of achieving general and complete disarmament. But we believe that the CCD, despite its inadequacies, has the merit of existing, and that it is an appropriate forum for multilateral debates on disarmament.

We should, therefore, engage in a global analysis of the institutional arrangements for disarmament in order to render these more effective. In this context, the reactivation of the CCD through a modification of its structures and procedures linking it more closely to the General Assembly seems to us essential.

The Moroccan delegation, which welcomed the adoption of resolution 3484 B on the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the area of disarmament, supports the recommendations of the Special Committee created to this end and would wish our Organization to continue to deal with the means to improve the working machinery so as to make progress towards a positive solution to the problems of disarmament.

(Mr. Cherkaoui, Morocco)

In 1976, if we draw a mid-term balance-sheet of disarmament, a number of treaties concerning various aspects of disarmament have been concluded and have prompted legitimate hopes within the international community. Of particular note are the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof, the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, the Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes concluded on 28 May 1976 between the United States and the USSR.

All these instruments constitute undeniable progress which is capable of strengthening détente and reducing the threat of war, particularly nuclear war. Moreover, and for the first time in years, the CCD has been able to draw up a draft Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques. The useful work accomplished in this area by the CCD is noteworthy and we venture to hope that despite the gaps and the inadequacies for which the draft Convention has been criticized, our Committee will take note of the positive work accomplished by the CCD and that there will be a majority in favour of the adoption of this Convention.

Despite these efforts, vast problems still remain which make us aware of the tasks that lie ahead of us. For instance, no specific results have been achieved as regards the complete prohibition of nuclear tests. Morocco remains convinced that nuclear disarmament should remain the priority objective of all negotiations on disarmament. All nuclear Powers should, therefore, proceed to put an end to all nuclear tests, which is the only means capable of paving the way for the prohibition of these weapons, their reduction and finally their total elimination. To us, the problem of cessation of nuclear tests remains linked to the political will of nuclear States. The arguments advanced concerning the technical difficulties involved in appropriate verification can no longer be advanced in view of the technical progress accomplished in the area of seismic protection.

Another difficulty involved in the work on disarmament lies in the implementation of the Treaty on Non-Proliferation. The Moroccan delegation believes that the effectiveness of the Treaty can only be achieved through universal adherence thereto and through new safeguards accorded to non-nuclear-weapon Member

(Mr. Cherkaoui, Morocco)

States. Moreover, the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons is particularly important in our view. Morocco is convinced that only a total prohibition of all forms of chemical weapons and the stockpiling of such weapons would constitute a true disarmament measure.

Our delegation is pleased at the valuable work accomplished by the delegation of the United Kingdom, which has submitted a draft convention on the global prohibition of the development, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. This initiative represents definite progress and we hope that the draft convention will move our deliberations forward in this area towards positive results.

(Mr. Cherkaoui, Morocco)

The arms race and world military expenditures continue at a frantic pace and run counter to the purpose of establishing a new international economic order. Morocco is convinced that disarmament is inexorably linked to development. The reduction of military budgets of States, and especially of nuclear-weapon States, remains the fundamental imperative. It is urgent to retain progress in this area and to leave the permanent members of the Security Council to set the figure of 10 per cent requested by our Organization. These resources could be allocated to the development of numerous poor countries and to preservation of international peace and security.

One of the positive points in the last few years lies in the increasing awareness of small and medium-sized States of all problems related to international disarmament and security. In fact public opinion is becoming increasingly aware of the need to be informed of the dangers represented by the arms race, as well as the continued perfecting of nuclear weapons. This view would exert increasing influence on, and bring its full weight to bear in, an area which still remains a closed world of debates reserved to the initiated few.

Thus at the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries in Colombo, the convening of a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament has been requested. This request, which has our full support now states the priority which non-aligned States accord to disarmament. The Moroccan delegation believes that this session, which should be well prepared, would enable our Organization to find new ways to help break the deadlock regarding problems of disarmament and, particularly, to devise a veritable disarmament strategy.

In this same context, the convening of a world disarmament conference, on which our Organization has not yet been able to agree, has this year been solemnly supported by the Colombo Conference. My country continues to express its wish that such a conference be convened. Only a meeting at that level, benefiting from the participation of all nuclear States, would enable us to contemplate all the aspects of the disarmament problem and to give the work of our Organization in this area the necessary impetus. If the principle of the convening of the conference is supported by all, we could contemplate the creation of a preparatory

(Mr. Cherkaoui, Morocco)

committee with participation based on equitable geopolitical distribution. Moreover, we should do our best to create a propitious international climate for the effective development of this work.

In the opinion of the Moroccan delegation, only a general and complete disarmament under strict international control should be the constant objective of our Organization. Indeed, our Organization has tended thus far to devote too much effort and time to partial measures. The complexity of the enterprise should not discourage us. We should proceed to tackle the fundamental problems of disarmament which can alone ensure the security and the development of all States.

Mr. IKLE (United States of America): We welcome this opportunity to address the First Committee again. We consider this the ideal forum in which to present a fuller up-to-date explanation of the United States' most recent policy and proposals on nuclear energy and put forward a related arms control proposal.

Throughout the nuclear age, the United States has launched many efforts to control the destructive potential of the atom and yet keep the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy in mankind's service. Some 30 years ago, when only the United States possessed the atom bomb, we made a proposal to the United Nations that envisaged placing all nuclear resources throughout the world under the ownership and control of an independent international authority. Perhaps that proposal called for too great a willingness of other nations to place their trust in international co-operation.

Less than a decade later, in 1954, the United States undertook a second major initiative -- the "Atoms for Peace" programme -- to assist other countries in acquiring nuclear technology for peaceful uses. And we invited other nations to join with us in building an international agency to facilitate co-operation in peaceful uses of the atom and to safeguard nuclear technology from diversion to destructive ends. The fruit of this initiative can be seen in the broad acceptance and usefulness of the International Atomic Energy Agency and its unprecedented safeguards system.

(Mr. Ikle, United States)

But in the last two decades, much has been learned about both the promise and the threat of nuclear technology, and the thin dividing line between them. It became clear that further and far-reaching measures were needed. Otherwise, in region after region, new nuclear threats and rivalries could accompany the world-wide spread of peaceful nuclear technology. This concern is widely shared in the United States and other countries. President Ford's 28 October announcement on United States nuclear energy policy is a response to these concerns and represents a wide spectrum of agreement in my country as to the steps needed.

I believe it is important to emphasize to you certain premises on which this policy is based:

First: Success in stemming the spread of nuclear weapons must be based on sympathetic understanding of the energy needs of all States. States electing to participate in the necessary restraint arrangements must, therefore, be assured that they will be able to benefit fully from the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Second: If the United States asks other nations to exercise restraint in certain aspects of their nuclear power programmes, it must be prepared to show comparable restraint at home.

Third: It is of crucial importance that all nations clearly recognize their common interest in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities to country after country. No single nation or group of nations can ensure an effective non-proliferation effort. As President Ford has said:

"The United States is prepared to work with all other countries ...

Effective non-proliferation measures will require the participation and support of nuclear suppliers and consumers."

The security of many of the non-nuclear nations represented here is perhaps more directly threatened by further proliferation than is the security of countries now possessing nuclear weapons. This is important.

Our new nuclear energy policy sets forth action the United States has decided to take on its own, and proposals the United States will make to other nations. Several of these measures are designed to avert the serious dangers that would result from the existence throughout the world of nationally-owned uranium enrichment plants and plutonium reprocessing plants. These plants can produce the materials that can readily be made into nuclear weapons.

(Mr. Ikle, United States)

In regard to uranium enrichment, we of course recognize that countries which plan for nuclear reactors as an important source of electrical energy need to have an assured and reliable source of nuclear fuel. In foregoing acquisition of sensitive nuclear facilities under national control, it is evident that such countries are entitled to assurances that suitable nuclear fuel will remain available.

It has long been assumed that the energy value remaining in spent reactor fuel would be retrieved by reprocessing recovered fissile material and recycling it back into power reactors. However, as our understanding and information improved, two facts became plain: first, the economic advantages of plutonium recycle are at this time very uncertain; second, and more important, in the absence of adequate safeguard measures, the accumulation of separated plutonium can greatly increase the risk of diversion to nuclear weapons. And this risk would lead to instability among the neighbouring countries of a region.

The United States policy statement of 28 October specifies several actions, domestic and international, aimed at restraining the spread of such plutonium:

The United States has decided to defer commercial reprocessing activities. We no longer regard reprocessing and recycling of plutonium as a necessary and inevitable step in the nuclear fuel cycle. We will pursue them in the future only if there is sound reason to conclude that it is economically justified and that the world community can effectively overcome the associated risks of proliferation. In the meantime, we will expand our capacity to store unprocessed spent fuel, we will fully consider all the implications of reprocessing, and we will also explore alternative means for recovering the energy value from used nuclear fuel without separating plutonium. Several ideas have been advanced for such recovery methods and research will now be undertaken to determine their validity.

(Mr. Ikle, United States)

We are calling on all nations to join us in refraining from the transfer of reprocessing and enrichment technology and facilities for a period of at least three years. We are also asking suppliers and consumers to work together to establish reliable international means for meeting nuclear fuel needs with minimum risk.

We will invite other nations to participate in our new evaluation programme on the values and risks of plutonium reprocessing and recycling, and the alternatives that may be available.

In addition to these actions, the United States' policy calls for better controls on the accumulation of plutonium. It proposes international discussions aimed at secure and safe storage arrangements for civil plutonium and spent reactor fuel under the auspices of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), pending ultimate disposition. We are prepared, when such a storage arrangement is broadly accepted and in operation, to place our own excess civil plutonium and spent fuel under its control. We are also prepared to consider providing a site for international storage of spent fuel and radio-active wastes under IAEA auspices.

Another important element of the United States programme of action is support for strengthening the IAEA safeguards system. We hope that all States will join us in ensuring that the IAEA has the technical resources and staff necessary to meet its growing responsibilities. We are committing more resources to help the Agency improve its safeguards capabilities, and our national laboratories with expertise in safeguards will provide assistance on a continuing basis to the IAEA as the Agency identifies its needs.

Let me now turn to United States nuclear export policies. The United States is adopting new criteria to encourage nations to pursue co-operative and responsible non-proliferation policies. In determining whether to enter into new or expanded nuclear co-operation, we will consider the following factors:

Adherence to the Non-Proliferation Treaty will be a strong positive factor favouring co-operation with a non-nuclear-weapon State;

Non-nuclear-weapon States that have not yet adhered to the Non-Proliferation-Treaty will receive positive recognition if they are prepared to submit to full fuel-cycle safeguards, pending adherence;

(Mr. Ikle, United States)

We will favour recipient nations that are prepared to forego, or postpone for a substantial period, the establishment of national reprocessing or enrichment activities or, in certain cases, are prepared to shape and schedule their reprocessing and enriching facilities to foster non-proliferation needs;

Positive recognition will also be given to nations prepared to participate in an international storage régime, under which spent fuel and any separated plutonium would be placed pending use.

Moreover, we will also encourage other nuclear suppliers to adopt these same criteria as common guidelines. As a fundamental element of our non-proliferation effort, I now reiterate the continuing United States support for the Non-Proliferation Treaty and our position that all nations ought to adhere to it.

My Government believes the international community must take certain concerted actions. It must be made clear that no State can expect to abrogate or violate any non-proliferation agreement with impunity. As President Ford stated on 28 October, the United States will, at a minimum, respond to a violation of any safeguards agreement with the United States by immediately cutting off the supply of nuclear fuel to the violator and ending co-operation. We would also consider further steps against violators -- steps not necessarily confined to ending nuclear co-operation. Moreover, our actions would not be limited only to agreements in which we are directly involved. In case of violation of any safeguards agreement, particularly one involving the IAEA, we will initiate immediate consultations with all interested nations to determine appropriate action. We will invite all concerned Governments to adopt a similar policy.

While the United States believes that the steps I have outlined will inhibit the further spread of nuclear weapons, it recognizes that nuclear energy policy, of course, must also offer the benefits of co-operation and incentives, bearing in mind the importance of nuclear power as an alternative to fossil fuel. The United States will take steps to assure that States which practise responsible non-proliferation policies, and join appropriate international arrangements, will have an adequate and reliable supply of nuclear energy.

The United States is prepared to act, in co-operation with other nations, to assure reliable supplies of nuclear fuel at equitable prices to a country that

(Mr. Ikle, United States)

accepts effective restraints on reprocessing, plutonium disposition, and other sensitive technologies. We will initiate consultations with other nations to develop the means to ensure that suppliers will be able to offer, and consumers will be able to receive, an uninterrupted and economical supply of low-enriched uranium fuel and fuel services.

The United States will offer other equitable arrangements. Where appropriate, this may include providing fresh, low-enriched uranium fuel in return for mutual agreement on the disposition of spent fuel, where this clearly fosters our common non-proliferation objectives.

We will expand co-operative efforts with other countries to develop their indigenous non-nuclear energy resources. We have proposed that an International Energy Institute be established to help other countries match the most economical and readily available sources of energy to their power needs. We will offer technological assistance through this Institute and other appropriate means.

My Government believes that the programme of actions described in the Presidential statement of 28 October -- and summarized very briefly today -- can provide an improved foundation for the use of nuclear energy throughout the world, in ways that meet both non-proliferation objectives and electric power needs. "The task we face", President Ford emphasized in his statement, "calls for an international co-operative venture of unprecedented dimensions." So we ask all nations to join us in this opportunity to work together for the benefit of all.

I must ask you, however, to keep in mind that all these steps cannot change the fact that large amounts of radio-active materials will continue to accumulate until the question of their final utilization or disposition is resolved. I would like to turn now to a further opportunity for arms control.

These rapidly accumulating radio-active materials have the potential for use in radiological weapons -- a hazard distinct from nuclear explosives. Such weapons, if ever developed, could produce pernicious effects -- long-term and short-term -- solely by the radio-activity emitted. Virtually any of the strongly radio-active isotopes might be used to contaminate areas for long periods of time. For example, the amount of plutonium which could be dispersed by a conventional explosive could contaminate a substantial area, with the material retaining its radio-active characteristics for tens of thousands of years. Decontamination, if feasible at all, would be extremely costly.

(Mr. Ikle, United States)

My Government suggests that next year an appropriate forum, such as the CCD, consider an agreement that would prohibit the use of radio-active materials as radiological weapons. Such an agreement would not affect the production of radio-active materials, either as a necessary by-product of power reactors or for other peaceful applications, or affect our call for storage of spent fuel under international auspices.

Such an agreement could complement the Geneva Protocol of 1925, which prohibits the use of poison gas and bacteriological methods of warfare. In addition, a radiological warfare agreement could contain a provision for appropriate measures by the parties to preclude diversion of radio-active materials for use as radiological weapons.

Such a commitment would, of course, be a particularly worth-while undertaking for the major nuclear industrial States. Countries with substantial nuclear energy programmes have accumulated large amounts of waste materials with extensive remaining radio-activity.

Negotiation of a radiological weapons agreement should not, of course, impede work on other multilateral arms control issues. It is our intent that it will not. But feasible arms control steps, such as this, should not go unrealized simply because larger problems have yet to be solved. Such a proposal, if adopted, would address a potentially significant future danger; each arms control agreement that is sound on its own merits can be another positive step toward a safer world.

The measures the United States is here advocating are important to progress in arms control. They will make more durable our peaceful nuclear co-operation by making it safer. They will help prevent the world's search for energy from fostering rivalries for mankind's most destructive weapon.

All this is good, but all this, of course, is not enough. We must move resolutely toward much broader and more far-reaching controls on nuclear weapons. The security of every nation -- of every person -- requires that we do our utmost to limit and reduce the nuclear arsenals and that we work with no less determination toward a more secure international order. The United States pledges its continuing dedication to this goal.

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to inform the Committee that Kenya, Liberia and Italy have become co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.7/Rev.1; that Liberia and Morocco have become co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.11; and, finally, that Bulgaria, Denmark and Ethiopia have become co-sponsors of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.13.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN: I have no more speakers for this morning's meeting, but with the Committee's indulgence I should like to focus the attention of members on the question of the organization of work.

The representative of Sweden recalled that the Committee, at its 20th meeting on 1 November, decided to end the general debate on disarmament questions by 19 November, which is tomorrow, and to devote the rest of its time allocated for disarmament -- that is, two weeks -- to the discussion of draft resolutions.

Up to this moment the following draft resolutions have been submitted to the First Committee on various disarmament items: the draft resolutions in documents A/C.1/31/L.4 and L.5/Rev.1, both relating to agenda item 45 on a convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques; the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.6, relating to item 46 on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia; the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.7/Rev.1, relating to item 49 entitled "General and complete disarmament" and dealing specifically with the proposal for the convening of a special session of the General Assembly on disarmament; the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.8, relating to item 43 on a comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects; the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.9, relating to item 40 on the World Disarmament Conference; the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.10/Rev.1, relating to item 48 on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction

(The Chairman)

and new systems of such weapons; the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.11, relating to item 50 on the strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament; the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.13, relating to item 36 concerning chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons; and the draft resolution relating to item 39, concerning the implementation of the declaration of the Indian Ocean as a zone of peace, which is contained in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean in document A/31/29, and Corr.1.

Thus 10 draft resolutions have been submitted. So far, four of these draft resolutions have formally been introduced in the Committee, namely those in documents A/C.1/31/L.4, L.5, L.9 and L.11. I am, of course, aware that a number of draft resolutions are still being informally discussed, but as we have 18 disarmament items on our agenda I should like to urge those delegations which have not yet submitted or introduced their draft resolutions to consider doing so as soon as they can so that we can proceed with the consideration of the draft resolutions following the conclusion of the general debate.

I would suggest to the Committee that we devote our meetings on Monday, 22 November, and Tuesday, 23 November, to introducing all draft resolutions that have already been submitted by them but not yet formally introduced, as well as to discussing the draft resolutions. Then, later on, as more draft resolutions are submitted we would proceed in a similar manner, that is, by discussing draft resolutions in groups. We could vote on any given draft resolution as soon as the sponsors indicated to me that it was ready to be voted upon. I hope that at least some of the draft resolutions I have mentioned will be ready to be voted on early next week. I intend to consult the Committee on setting a deadline for submitting draft resolutions some time next week.

If I hear no objection I shall take it that the Committee agrees with the suggested plan of work for the next few days.

It was so decided.

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.