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Chairman: Mr. JAROSZEK (Poland)

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## The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50 AND 116 (continued)

<u>Mr. CANALES</u> (Chile) (interpretation from Spanish): There can be no doubt that we have now reached the most critical stage in the discussion of the items of the First Committee and the General Assembly when we deal with disarmament. If some day, as we all hope, we were to come to agreement that led to general and complete disarmament, then we might have achieved the most essential target for the future of mankind, since the spectre of war would have been once and for all banished, and that itself would allow us to be certain that States could live together in peace and that all our efforts could be bent to development and the welfare of the international community.

And yet, more than 30 years of efforts to obtain such hoped-for objectives have thus far been futile and sterile, and daily the arms race goes on increasing at a staggering rate, basically at the level of the great Powers. Year after year we indulge in wide discussions on the same basic subjects. Draft resolution after draft resolution is adopted, each one singularly similar to its predecessors, and the specialized disarmament bodies are given new mandates, and yet no true progress is achieved towards the final solutions. There seems to be a lack of effective multilateral negotiations on disarmament, and the bilateral agreements that are arrived at only maintain a relative arms balance which momentarily avoids the dangers of a world conflagration.

These facts prove to us that we must devise new ideas and new approaches to achieve more ambitious goals of disarmament. Otherwise we will never be able to consider as a stable reality what we term international peace and security.

My delegation takes part in this debate, discussing those subjects which are most closely related with one another, in order to limit the length of our statement and make known the views of the Republic of Chile on those matters which we deem of the utmost importance. Chile is a country that has more than once shown its vocation for peace. It is also a country that aspires to

increasingly constructive coexistence in the region. As far as our own security is concerned, our only desire is to possess a military potential enabling us to maintain the domestic order necessary to ensure the welfare of our citizens and to guarantee effectively the territorial integrity of the country. This policy of defence is our greatest moral justification for giving our sincere support to any measure that will lead to regional disarmament and, with all the more reason, for desiring general disarmament that will reduce the threat of a world conflict inevitably involving all countries, even though some might wish to be kept out of the conflict.

On this matter we reaffirm the position of my country that was defined by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Vice-Admiral Patricio Carvajal, during the thirtieth session of the General Assembly, when he said.

In the spirit of brotherhood and peaceful coexistence that inspires its international behaviour, Chile invited early in September this year, the other five countries of the Andean Group to conduct a joint study on the best way to achieve a limitation on military expenditure and to use the funds thus saved for the economic and social development of our peoples" ( $\underline{A/PV.2376}$ , p. 107).

The Santiago meeting, as a continuation of the one held in Lima, saw significant progress in this field.

The United Nations is called upon to play an important role in the maintenance of peace and international security. The efforts made to this end have, to a certain extent, lessened the dangers of a world conflagration and a number of hotbeds of international tension have been cooled down. However, the efforts to stem the arms race have been fruitless and this in itself is a standing threat to the peaceful purposes of the Organization and keep alive a constant concern and fear in world public opinion, which at times is shown in severe criticisms levelled against the efficiency of the international organizations themselves.

If we examine the results of a year's work in the sphere of disarmament, I think we can acknowledge that progress has been meagre in relation to the magnitude of the tasks before us and also in relation to the speed of development of new techniques of war.

The reports presented by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) and the <u>ad hoc</u> committees set up to study the convening of a world disarmament conference and the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament are evidence that a very serious effort has been made by all their members to fulfil their tasks. In practice, however, the results do not entirely meet our expectations because of the lack of consensus on individual items of disarmament.

We believe that it is time for us to seek new means of speeding up our work, but without disregarding the established organs concerned with the study and implementation of tasks already assigned, or that may be assigned in the future. We should not postpone the project of meeting as a world forum for the specific and exhaustive discussion of disarmament. We agree with the view that an eighth special session of the General Assembly in 1978 could achieve this purpose. That would give us sufficient time for preparation, and we should be able to count on the participation of all Member States, particularly those with the greatest military potential. We should also be able to establish the most adequate means of pursuing our future work more effectively, with a view to achieving genuine disarmament.

One of the items to which my delegation attaches the highest importance and priority is nuclear disarmament, since without it we shall never be able to reach agreement on general and complete disarmament, and since the development of nuclear weapons has brought mankind to the very verge of extermination.

Today there are six nuclear Powers, and it is believed that, by the fortieth anniversary of the first nuclear explosion, 35 countries will be members of this club of terror unless we very speedily arrive at a definitive agreement on nuclear disarmament.

Until a few decades ago war was restricted to the achievement of the strategic objective of destroying the armed forces of the foe. Now the development of science and technology has changed strategic concepts, and the objective is to destroy A/C.1/31/PV.35 7

### (Mr. Canales, Chile)

the ability of the entire country of the enemy to continue war. Hostilities are not confined to the field of battle, but are preferably directed against the civilian population and infrastructure of the enemy country, in order to shatter its domestic front and reduce it to subjection.

If we wish to defend the world population from future wars, we must abolish the weapons of mass destruction. Hence the importance of the work of this Committee, and hence our desire to assemble in a world disarmament conference at which we should all be made fully aware of the dangers of the nuclear era and be able to warn the world of the dangers of the arms race.

Both vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation have continued unrestrained. The nuclear Powers continue to increase their nuclear stockpiles in an alarming fashion, although exact data may not be available on the matter, since these are subjects concerning which countries maintain the strictest secrecy.

The old aphorism, "if you want peace, prepare for war", retains all its force. It is an armed peace, where the danger of disaster acts as the only deterrent. But this is a highly dangerous situation, because many factors can suddenly shatter this frail balance and lead us to conflicts with catastrophic consequences. Hence only the elimination of weapons of mass destruction will avert the danger of a war of extermination.

In order to prevent nuclear proliferation, whether vertical or horizontal, it is most important to arrive at a treaty providing for the general prohibition of all tests. But no agreement is arrived at because very differing criteria are brought into play. On this specific matter I should like to make clear the position of Chile.

Since the nuclear Powers are the sole Powers responsible for the continuation of these tests, it is they that must resolve the problems that stand in the way of achieving the goal. So long as these tests continue, this type of weapons will continue to be improved, the solution we seek will be more difficult to arrive at, and each day the difference in the military potential of countries will become greater. It is true that the countries that started later in this mad race will have their aspirations of achieving an adequate level of nuclear potential frustrated. However, the developing countries contend that such agreements would not stand in the way of their aspirations of carrying out peaceful nuclear tests, so as to acquire a technology which, properly used, would be of great benefit to all States.

We feel that one of the factors that most hinders the achievement of a final agreement is verification and supervision. We have followed with great interest the studies that are being made with a view to establishing a world-wide network to check seismic events. This would obviously show up any clandestine nuclear tests, although there might be zones that could elude such supervision.

It is thus very important to study the structure of the international organ of control that would govern all disarmament activities, since that would guarantee greater trust among States. Obviously, all military questions are classified as top secret. Hence the establishment of the quantity of weapons, their strategic distribution and their quality, as a basis for bilateral or multilateral negotiations, cannot be left solely to the good faith of the States themselves, but must be carried out by an organ exercising strict control, and having full powers.

Therefore, we hope that there will be a prohibition of all nuclear tests in all environments, whether in outer space, in the air, under water or underground. The partial test ban treaty concluded in 1963 is important, but it is incomplete. We attach great importance to the bilateral agreements between the great Powers in the last five years, but we are discouraged at the lack of tangible evidence, even though we are assured that progress has been made.

Another matter related to the same subject, and in which we are interested, is that of denuclearized zones. We sincerely believe that this is an effective step towards halting horizontal nuclear proliferation and preserving extensive areas of the planet from the effects of a nuclear war. However, if these initiatives are to be effective, there must be a guarantee that all the great nuclear Powers will become parties to these agreements and stop looking for subterfuges and pretexts to evade such commitments. We shall always wonder whether, if there are strategic objectives of a world character in these areas, such as canals or international straits for navigation, or essential strategic raw materials for the pursuit of war, we shall always wonder, I say, whether these areas will be respected in the course of military operations.

With regard to the weapons of mass destruction we reaffirm our view that they must be outlawed --- both those that already exist and those that are being planned, tested or developed. We seek the effective prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of all types of chemical and bacteriological weapons and their elimination from the arsenals of all States. We regret the fact that as yet the joint initiative on an international agreement to prohibit the most dangerous and lethal means of chemical warfare that the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed to consider in 1974 has not been concluded and that none of the draft Conventions presented by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has as yet been fully supported.

Environmental warfare, the study of which was added to the agenda of our Committee in 1974, is a matter of grave concern to us. Environmental modification techniques used for hostile purposes may have very widespread serious and lasting effects. The capacity to generate clouds and fog, the generation and direction of storms, creation of artificial snow and rain, disorganization of the ionosphere, modification of the ozone belt and the triggering of earthquakes, tidal waves and volcanic eruptions can all be developed in such a way as to cause greater danger than those caused by other forms of warfare. Thus, we believe that a convention on the prohibition of environmental warfare should include a ban on the use of all the techniques described and not merely subject them to a commitment to refrain from using for military or other hostile purposes techniques that have widespread, long-lasting or serious effects as a means of causing destruction, damge and injury. Therefore, we agree with a number of delegations that feel it indispensable that that limitation in article 1 of the draft convention presented to us should be deleted; and to do so we believe that the draft treaty should be referred back to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament.

Once again my delegation reiterates that our Government is an open advocate of the policy of general and complete disarmament under effective international control. For this disarmament to be truly effective and for all its obligations to be scrupulously complied with, it is essential that these measures be applied in their entirety. The way to obtain general and complete disarmament must comprise the approval of partial and progressive measures and, at the same time, of others of a collateral nature such as the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Non-Proliferation Treaty and so many others well known to all of us. Regional agreements

are also important when they deal with the limitation of armaments. The bilateral conventions agreed to between the United States and the Soviet Union within the SALT negotiations are equally important.

So if all States are aware of the need and determined to achieve disarmament, why is it that the United Nations after 30 years of hard work along these lines has as yet been unable to achieve that goal and only very restricted progress has been made as far as true disarmament is concerned. We believe this subject will one day have to be discussed. The causes of the arms race lie in the need of States to ensure the strengthening of their security to permit their over-all development in peace and calm. It is the danger of a war-like confrontation that forces the setting up of adequate military potential. Therefore it is the causes of war that have to be eradicated to provide security without the backing of military matériel. Is it possible in the world of today to lessen these tensions? We will first have to combat ideological penetration, expansionist ambitions, economic predominance and many other factors that give rise to antagonism and rivalry. Once this has been done, we will ensure a reduction of military budgets. Then science and technology will work solely for peace so that development will prevail over security and disarmament will be achieved in an atmosphere of confidence and sincerity.

<u>Mr. MISHRA</u> (India): To begin with, Sir, may I join my sincere congratulations to those already extended by my delegation to you on your election as Chairman and to the other officers of the Committee on their election.

Once again we have gathered here to express our views on the multifaceted issue of disarmament. There are before us 18 items relating to disarmament. They range from individual concerns to regional preoccupations, and some vitally affect all of humanity. None of these items is new. Nor have the views of the Indian delegation undergone change on any of them. For decades we have stated our position on the items here in the First Committee as also in the CCD. There is thus no need for me today to go into details.

What I should like to do, with your permission, is to address myself to fundamentals. It is clear to all -- even to those who over the years have espoused

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## (Mr. Mishra, India)

this idea or that proposal, this convention or that treaty -- that the international community can claim only meagre results in the field of disarmament since the founding of the United Nations Organization. One could say that in truth there has been no disarmament in the 31 years of this Organization. Even the convention dealing with biological weapons has not been adhered to by all those who are capable of producing such weapons. The truth is that today this world of ours abounds in weapons as it has never before. And the quantity is matched by quality. What is more, it needs fewer persons than the fingers of one hand to unleash total and, perhaps, irrevocable destruction. In truth, just one is enough to do it. Humanity has never before faced such a situation. And without a radical change in our thinking there will not be -- there cannot be -- a change in this situation. The situation is radical. Old-fashioned ideas cannot cope with it.

## (Mr. Mishra, India)

One of the old-fashioned ideas is that, if the security of a few is guaranteed, the world will be a safe place to live in. And how is this security brought about? Not by disarmament but by a balance of terror. They are terrified of each other. So every opportunity is used to tilt the balance. Since each is doing the same, the balance turns into a see-saw. To put it another way, we live on a roller-coaster with the pit of the stomach the most conscious part of our body. Security in terror is not possible. One day the mind will be unable to cope with the terror and something will give. Where in such a situation is the safety for the rest of us?

Another old-fashioned idea is that some are more responsible than others; that so long as nuclear weapons remain in the hands of a select few the world is safe. In this very Committee one representative was heard to say 10 to 12 years ago that there was nothing wrong in the five permanent members of the Security Council possessing nuclear weapons. After all, it was argued, they have special responsibility under the Charter of the United Nations to maintain peace and security in the world. The only grace in that statement was that it was not made by a permanent member. The speaker represented one of the allies! Most delegations then, as now, had no doubts about the evil character of nuclear weapons. Certainly my delegation has always held this view. We are against the proliferation of nuclear weapons, vertical or horizontal. We are for their total elimination. They are evil whether in the hands of a few or of many. We do not accept, we will never accept, that some of us are more responsible than others. Any thought to the contrary can only be the legacy of colonialism and imperialism, a product of the zealous missionary activity to civilize others undertaken in centuries past.

But such a thought persists. Over the last few years increasing attention has been paid to the overwhelming majority of nations which do not possess nuclear weapons rather than to those few which do possess them. So much so that a "club" of exporters of nuclear material and equipment has been formed to bring to heel those who refuse to follow the discriminatory policies dictated by a few and sanctioned by none. In parallel, efforts are being made to impose safeguards through international agencies, again without sanction. Do the members of this "club" discuss ways and means of eliminating the stockpiles of nuclear weapons or

## (<u>Mr. Mishra, India</u>)

even of preventing vertical proliferation? If they dared to, the "club" would dissolve in an instant.

The result is that the nuclear technology so desperately needed by most developing nations for peaceful purposes cannot be used independently, much less developed, by the newly-independent and developing countries. Political sovereignty and independence are sought to be nullified through the withholding of the latest technology and, of course, development assistance. It should not be a matter of surprise if nations resist an approach which is far from curbing the nuclear-weapon States and which, in fact, creates a monopoly of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. Strange as it might seem, such an approach is deemed to prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. But it will never succeed in serving the purpose ascribed to it. What is one-sided, lacking in a balance of obligations, will remain so, no matter what the label given to it. And it will become more and more burdensome to the developing nations, regardless of whether or not they subscribe to this or that treaty. Even some of those which became parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons are under suspicion. It will remain so because the bases of this approach are retention of power in the hands of a few, monopoly of nuclear technology and monopoly of commerce in nuclear material and equipment. All this in the name of preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons!

I am reminded of the story of a monk who prayed and meditated beneath a tree by the side of a road. Anyone travelling the road was admonished by the monk to give up his evil ways. Years passed in this way and the monk died fully expecting to go to heaven. But it happened otherwise! He could not understand the situation and chided the dark messenger for bringing him to the wrong place. The messenger told him calmly, "This is the correct place for you. All these years you thought you were praying and meditating. But in reality your mind was constantly occupied with the evil ways of others. You are here by right!"

As in the field of nuclear disarmament so in relation to disarmament in the field of conventional weapons, the same discriminatory approach is rearing its head. Lest there be misunderstanding, it is not my purpose that the developing countries should waste their scarce resources in unnecessarily arming themselves. Indeed, no group of nations is more conscious of the need to husband its resources

### (<u>Mr. Mishra, India</u>)

and to devote them to productive goals. We plead for general and complete disarmament in order that we could do so. But now suggestions have been made that the "transfer" of arms from one country to another or from one group of countries to another should be subjected to selective control. Once again the targets of the suggested controls are the newly-independent and developing countries. Arms would be "transferred" to them in accordance with policies suited to the so-called global interests of supplier States. Let there be no doubt that the suggested controls are politically motivated. As in the nuclear field so here, they are designed to retain power in the hands of a few. There is no suggestion, none at all, that the nations which have a monopoly of arms manufacture should stop the development and production of more and more sophisticated weapons. So, a small group of countries will have more and more powerful means to control the vast majority of nations. We have all talked of the ever-widening economic gap between the industrialized developed States on the one hand and the newly-independent developing States on the other. Most of us have not yet paid attention to this other ever-widening gap. This is not disarmament, not even arms limitation. This is control of many by a few. Again, some are thought to be more responsible than others!

## (Mr. Mishra, India)

Thus, we are trying to cope with a radical situation through old-fashioned ideas. Whatsoever is based on such ideas is doomed to failure. It is repeatedly said that lack of progress in disarmament is due to a lack of political will to disarm. True enough. But the political will of the vast majority cannot be aroused by the dictates of a few. Maintenance of peace and security by means of a balance of terror among a few and the defencelessness of the vast majority are not a sound basis for disarmament, much 1955 for peace. No wonder, therefore, that the recent Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries incorporated this passage in its Political Declaration:

"The Conference emphasized the necessity to strengthen international peace and security and ratified their firm decision to reinforce solidarity and mutual assistance among the Non-Aligned Countries in order to confront more effectively threats, pressures, aggressions and other political or economic actions directed against them by imperialism".

In the same declaration the Conference reiterated the urgent need to adopt effective measures leading to the convening of a world disarmament conference and recommended that in the meantime the United Nations General Assembly hold a special session with this agenda: a review of the problem of disarmament; the promotion and elaboration of a programme of priorities and recommendations in the field of disarmament; and, finally, the question of convening a world disarmament conference.

At the Special Session and, hopefully, soon thereafter at the world disarmament conference, we must re-examine our ideas and recast our approach in relation to disarmament negotiations and agreements. To succeed the new approach must be based on:

1. The primary and urgent necessity of the elimination of nuclear weapons and their means of delivery. It is obvious that action in this regard can be taken only by those who possess the weapons. No amount of restrictions on non-nuclear-weapon 3tates will remedy the situation.

2. Science and technology should be handmaids of economic development of all, not only a few. They must be available to all on a non-discriminatory basis.

3. The necessity of stopping the further development and sophistication of conventional weapons by the industrialized developed States as a first step towards halting the race in such weapons.

(Mr. Mishra, India)

4. The end of practices whereby a few industrialized developed States remain heavily armed on the pretext of assuring their own security but impose defencelessness upon the newly independent and developing States.

We live in a world which is interdependent as never before. There are no isolated phenomena. The security of a few cannot guarantee the security of all. Until we construct policies which do assure the security of all, disarmament will not move from the forum of debate to the field of actuality.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of India for his kind words addressed to me personally and to the other officers of the Committee.

<u>Mr. DUMAS</u> (Trinidad and Tobago): If during the deliberations of the First Committee on this item my delegation has learned one thing, it is this, that the deepening of the frustrations expressed are in direct proportion to the heightening of the responsibility that we all of us bear. Frustration and collective responsibility: the two sides of the ironic coin that for the last two weeks and a half has been spinning like a tormented spirit through the sinuosities of our debate.

But if there is collective responsibility, it is none the less true that the responsibility of two of our number is greater because of the looming power of the armaments they possess. We in the third world believe this (even if we do not necessarily care for it), and we have the recently expressed view of at least one of these two Powers to support us. Speaking in the General Assembly on 30 September 1976, the United States Secretary of State said:

"Accordingly, the great nuclear Powers have particular responsibilities for restraint and vision. They are in a position to know the full extent of the catastrophie which could overwhelm mankind. They must take care not to fuel disputes. If they conduct their rivalries by traditional methods, if they turn local conflicts into aspects of a global competition, sooner or later their competition will get out of control."

Have the two super-Powers in fact approached this increased responsibility with the expected maturity of attitude? Indeed, their behaviour has not been without honour -- there have for example been the 1963 partial nuclear test ban treaty; the 1972 anti-ballistic missile treaty; the 1974 treaty on underground nuclear weapons tests. These agreements, given ideological differences and concomitant suspicions, have certainly not been achieved without much travail and compromise.

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#### (Mr. Dumas, Trinidad and Tobago)

But there are still too many contradictions in the behaviour of the two super-Powers and these contradictions give rise to suspicions in others.

The two super-Powers tell us, for instance, that they wish to see a strengthening of the role of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the effectiveness of its control enhanced; but at the same time we see a news item in <u>The New York Times</u> of 24 October 1976 to the effect that the Director General of the Agency has complained that officially the Agency learns only from the newspapers what the London club of nuclear suppliers, the formation of which the two super-Powers themselves hastened, is doing. And in his statement to the General Assembly on 9 November 1976 the Director General states that:

"According to reports, the progress made in the London talks is heartening ... The IAEA is not directly involved in the current intensive discussions on nuclear export policy matters ..."

a remark the clear implication of which is that the IAEA is being bypassed, even if it is briefed subsequently, by the very Powers that invite many of us to give it our unflagging allegiance.

The two super-Powers also tell us that we should reduce armed forces and conventional armaments; but at the same time we read that one super-Power has been selling supersonic fighter/bombers to a Latin American country and that the other, in order to meet what it says is a threat in central Europe from the first super-Power, has decided to send a large number of modern jet combat aircraft to Europe and to equip the latest version of its fighter/bombers with a nuclear capability --- all this, of course, in the context of current talks between the same two super-Powers on mutual and balanced force reductions in central Europe.

They tell us further that they are in favour of the principle of nuclearweapon-free zones (both, for example, pay tribute to Tlatelolco and Ayacucho); but one of them stresses that arrangements in such zones "should not seek to impose restrictions on the exercise by other States of rights recognized under international law -- particularly freedom of navigation on the high seas, in international air space, and in straits used for international navigation and the right of innocent passage through territorial seas -- and should not affect the existing rights of its parties under international law to grant or deny transit privileges, including port calls and overflight, to other States", which immediately prompts the other super-Power to state that agreements on nuclearweapon-free zones must provide, among other things, for an undertaking by States members of the zone "not to allow the transport of nuclear weapons and nuclear explosive devices and their transit through the territory of the nuclear-weaponfree zone, including entry of vessels carrying nuclear weapons into the ports of the zone".

They tell us, and we must be duly grateful, that they have entered into a treaty with each other which has as one of its principal aims the prohibition of individual underground nuclear explosions having a yield exceeding 150 kilotons; but we should be more impressed by such apparent restraint if we did not note Article III (3) of the same treaty which reads:

"The question of carrying out any individual explosion having a yield exceeding the yield specified in paragraph 2 (a) of this article" -- i.e., 150 kilotons -- "will be considered by the Parties at an appropriate time to be agreed."

And in a draft convention which they have submitted to us they say that they are opposed to "military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques having widespread, long-lasting or severe effects as the means of destruction, damage or injury". They assure us that under the definitions that they have given of the words "widespread", "long-lasting" and "severe" there can be no problem at all for the rest of us. But perhaps we can take a closer look at these definitions.

The word "widespread" is defined in the understanding given on page 91 of document A/31/27 as "encompassing an area on the scale of several hundred square kilometres". Let us assume that the word "several" means not less than three. Can we then state that a small entity, a Caribbean island, say, which may or may not be a State Member of the United Nations but which, like so many Caribbean islands, is less than three hundred square kilometres in area, will be covered by the definition in the understanding if it is struck by an artificially created tidal wave? We can go on. The word "long-lasting" is defined as meaning "lasting for a period of months, or approximately a season". What precisely is "a season"? If we are considering the matter from the point of view from Europe and North America, it probably means one of the four seasons of spring, summer, autumn and winter, each lasting approximately three months. But there are many of us who are, as we might say, climatologically under-developed and do not have four seasons, but only two: dry and wet, each lasting approximately six months. What if clouds are seeded in such a way as to create continuous torrential rainfall for five months over the territory of a State judged unfriendly, if not hostile? And then, if the tidal wave has eliminated the small island or the torrential rainfall cruelly damaged the economy of the larger State, the question of severity -- the third element that attracts our concern --- will have become irrelevant, because the elimination or the cruel damage will have been carried out entirely within the terms of the draft convention. It can therefore be understood why, quite apart from any other consideration, Trinidad and Tobago has managed without difficulty to restrain any enthusiasm it might otherwise have felt for the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/31/L.5/Rev.1, which seeks to commend the draft convention favourably to us. And I say nothing for the moment about the procedure followed in the attempt to secure the General Assembly's approval of the draft convention.

But it is not only the super-Powers that are guilty of contradictions and/or shortcomings. On 5 October 1976 the representative of France told the General Assembly that France, although it had not signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, had "decided that all nuclear exports would be subject to the control of the IAEA". Yet on 11 October 1976, six days later, the French Government's High Council for

Foreign Nuclear Policy, which is headed by the President of France, announced among other things that France would continue to retain control of its nuclear export policy -- there was no mention of the IAEA in the announcement. Which is not surprising when one considers that, according to the <u>Guardian Weekly</u> of 17 October 1976, "The French arms industry ... employs 270,000 people ... Arms exports alone provide work directly for 75,000 people (and in 1975) export orders totalled Frs. 20,000 million, or double what they were in 1973."

And the United Kingdom has proposed a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. It is an initiative the principle of which my delegation appreciates and would appreciate even more highly if it were not confronted by article XII, paragraph 2 of the draft convention which reads:

"This Convention shall be implemented in a manner designed to avoid hampering the economic or technological development of States Parties to the Convention or international co-operation in the field of peaceful chemical activities."

The Committee will at once understand the scope that such a formulation leaves for potential mischief, and article I of the draft convention, which speaks of "lethal chemical agents and other toxic chemical agents (of a nature and intended primarily to cause long-term physiological harm to human beings)" does not inspire the fullest confidence either. What of short- and long-term damage to the environment? What of short-term physiological and long-term anatomical harm to human beings? In this context I should like to commend to the Committee's attention a 1975 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) publication entitled "Delayed Toxic Effects of Chemical Warfare Agents" and to remind the Committee that as recently as 13 October, just over one month ago, we heard of the experience of a Mr. Donald Lee, a chemist employed by the Ministry of Agriculture of the United Kingdom, who, having carried out laboratory tests on a herbicide component of a so-called defoliant that the United States Air Force used in Viet Nam, suffered some bizarre after-effects: excessive oiliness of the skin; a skin disease called chloracne; continual stomach upsets; loss of weight; oppressive headaches; thinning of hair on his head while long coarse black hairs began growing on his shoulders, back, eyebrows and hands, etc. Mr. Lee's two assistants also suffered.

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# (Mr. Dumas, Trinidad and Tobago)

And even a neutral country like Switzerland is not immune from error. While Swiss Government rules appear formally to prohibit all export or transit of war material, especially arms exports, to areas of armed conflict or where such conflict may break out or where other dangerous tensions may exist, there are, it seems, no restrictions on the sale of production licences abroad, nor does the list of war material cover machinery suitable for the production of weapons. To quote the SIPRI publication, <u>The Arms Trade with the Third World</u>, "it appears ... that the restrictiveness of Swiss policy has sometimes been weakened by considerations dictated by commercial trading interest". But it is not only the super-Powers and other industrialized countries that are at fault. Regrettably, there is the third world itself, and here I specifically exclude expenditure on arms to achieve national liberation.

Reference has already been made in the course of this debate to the publication, <u>World Military and Social Expenditures, 1976</u>. Among other things, we see in that publication that the United States and the USSR together account for 60 per cent of the world's military expenditure and for 75 per cent of the world's arms trade; that they have more military force than all other nations combined and that world military expenditure averages \$12,330 per soldier, at a time when public expenditure for education averages \$219 per school-age child; but we also see that the Governments of developing countries in total devote as much public revenue to military programmes as to education and health care combined.

We see from the 1976 SIPRI <u>Yearbook</u> that in 1975 the third world imported major arms to the value of \$4.843 billion (the figure is at constant 1973 prices), of which the countries of the Middle East accounted for \$2.696 billion. And where do the weapons come from? The chief exporters in 1975 were the United States (\$1.769 billion), the USSR (\$1.652 billion), the United Kingdom (\$503 million), France (\$477 million) and the Federal Republic of Germany (\$118 million). Where the average annual value of arms imports by the third world for the period 1969-1973 was \$2.527 billion, arms imports by industrialized countries in 1973 were worth \$2.567 billion, only \$40 million more. And in the period 1974-1975, the average annual value of third world arms imports soared to \$4.387 billion -- and I say nothing of arms transactions by private dealers.

But a closer look at the relationship between third world expenditure on arms and expenditure on what one would normally consider the vital aspects of social development reveals even more startling information.

According to available statistics, there are developing countries that rank high in arms expenditure but low in attention to social progress. It may be that these and other third world countries have excellent reasons for what seems to be a disproportionately and depressingly high expenditure on arms; it may be that, even if they are not front-line countries in the sense accepted these days, they nevertheless consider themselves perpetually threatened by a neighbour or by neighbours. But the over-all picture is none the less astonishing.

If that were all, it would be too much, but it is worse than that. I quote from the 1975 report of the United Nations Secretary-General on the question of reduction of military budgets:

"The cost of servicing external debt in developing countries has been growing fast. The reverse flow of interest and capital repayments has been offsetting an increasing proportion of the gross inflow of public and private financial resources. If we take figures for 81 developing countries, debt service was equal to 40 per cent of the gross inflow from developed countries in 1965; by 1971 the figure was 52 per cent. It has been calculated that if flows of aid continue along present lines, by 1981, 65 per cent of the gross inflow will be offset by debt servicing. The rising cost of debt means that net transfers -- that is, the gross inflow minus capital amortization and interest payments -- have been going up very slowly. Indeed, in real terms, net transfers to these 81 countries hardly rose at all from 1965 to 1971" (<u>A/9770, para. 68, p. 25</u>). And again:

"We do not know the exact proportion of official development assistance which is tied (that is, tied to purchases from the donor country). We know, however, that 80 per cent of official development assistance in Development Assistance Committee (DAC) countries is bilateral -- although this percentage has fallen a little in recent years -- and there are reasons to assume that virtually all of this bilateral aid is tied" (A/9770, para. 70, p. 26).

And it gets even worse, According to the same report of the Secretary-General, the bilateral grant and grant-like percentage element of official development assistance from the DAC countries to developing countries declined between 1962 and 1972. In 1962, official development assistance was \$5.438 billion, of which bilateral grants and grant-like flows were \$4.020 billion, or nearly 74 per cent. By contrast, in 1972 official development assistance was \$8.654 billion, of which bilateral grants and grant-like flows were \$4.360 billion, or only a little over 50 per cent.

The 1976 annual report of the World Bank cites a provisional figure for 1975 of \$37.46 billion as representing official and private disbursements from DAC countries to developing countries and multilateral institutions. Of this figure, \$16.27 billion are given as official disbursements and \$21.19 billion as private.

Let us for the moment leave aside the private aspect, since we know what that almost certainly means -- the usual outflow of profits from the developing country to the developed, repatriation of capital, duty-free importation of plant and machinery, exploitation by transnationals, etc. Let us take only the official disbursement amount, i.e. \$16.27 billion, and compare it with the figure given by SIPRI for 1975 arms imports by the third world (from all sources, but to a dominant extent from the very countries which are members of the DAC). Let us bear in mind that the third world is importing increasingly sophisticated weaponry and that arms imports are tied to other costly additional import factors such as training, technical support, maintenance and repair facilities and construction projects. Can we then fail to come irresistibly to the conclusion -- especially when we remember that the grant element of official disbursements is diminishing, that virtually all the disbursements are tied and that the cost of debt servicing is rising by leaps and bounds -- that the third world is rapidly reaching the point where it may in this area be subsidizing the more industrialized countries of both the east and the west, and that indeed it may have reached that point already?

If this is so, then we in the third world will be perpetuating the very colonial connexion which we say we want to break, and I am not sure that we shall be able seriously to say -- indeed, I am not sure that we can seriously say it now -- that all this was due to the machinations of colonialism. At a time when we are speaking about self-reliance and greater co-operation among ourselves, are we not placing ourselves more firmly in a situation of dependence on the very entities from whose sway we insist we wish to free ourselves?

It seems to my delegation that if we are to tackle the problem of disarmament in a more purposeful fashion we must first look at some basic facts and then try to examine those facts in the context of arriving at a coherent solution. We appear to be spending too much time dealing with effects rather than causes, and here I should like to quote the words of the distinguished representative of Spain when he addressed this Committee on 4 November last. He said then:

"If the arms race is undesirable, and this appears to be denied by no one in his right mind, and if, according to the logic that we inherited from the Greek philosophers, effect follows the cause, then my delegation does not understand how anyone can combat an effect while at the same time trying to conceal the causes that produced it." (A/C.1/31/PV.23, p. 27)

It seems to my delegation that we should be asking ourselves a series of questions in addition to the ones that we have been in the process of posing. If, for instance, there have been 119 wars between 1945 and 1975 involving the territory of 69 countries and the armed forces of 81, why has this been so? If the development of a fighter/bomber plane may cost about \$US 675 million when it has cost the World Health Organization about \$US 83 million in the almost completely successful attempt to eradicate smallpox from the world, why is this so? If, in the United States of America, the Soviet Union and elsewhere, about 400,000 scientists and engineers -- perhaps about 40 per cent of the world's most qualified in their fields -- are devoting themselves to defence research and development, why is this so? If there were more than 170 nuclear power reactors under construction on 31 December 1975 and more than 350 projected by 1980: and if by 1985, less than 10 years from now, about 35 countries may be in a position to produce nuclear explosives as by-products of peaceful nuclear programmes, what does this mean? Is it true that the benefits of peaceful nuclear explosions are questionable? If so, what new steps do we take? Will the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two super-Powers soon double to a total of about 17,000 nuclear warheads on missiles alone? What is the significance of the first-use doctrine? Do the reasons suggested for United States arms sales abroad -- creation of jobs within the United States, creation of jobs abroad for American citizens, pressures from the military/industrial combine, assistance to the balance-of-payments position

and offsetting of the oil import bill, provision of opportunities to influence future foreign leaders, etc. -- do these reasons have validity? To what extent are things similar or the same on the other bank of the ideological divide? Assuming them to be valid, what can we do about these or other factors? If some countries of the third world are purchasing arms at a rate that a reasonable person may consider abnormal, to what extent are these countries' leaders inspired by prestige-building or by territorial ambitions often based on spurious historical claims?

And then one sees the remarkable statistics in the 1976 SIPRI <u>Yearbook</u> on the impact of disarmament on the demand for raw materials. Assuming disarmament (or zero military expenditure) in the industrialized countries and a reallocation of military expenditure to peaceful uses, we are told that there will be a net demand change for bauxite of -4.60, for copper of -2.35, for nickel of -1.68, for tin of -1.69. For crude petroleum the net demand change will be +1.63. Are we to assume from these figures that some of the developing countries of the third world may have and economic interest in seeing a perpetuation of the arms race and in continued nuclear proliferation?

If it takes place -- and my delegation has every confidence that it will -the special session of the General Assembly to be devoted to disarmament must examine these and other factors more closely. It may well be that a reduction in armaments is likely to bring in its wake a reduction of tension and danger, but it is surely not incorrect to tackle at the same time, and more vigorously, the causes of the acquisition of these growing mountains of armaments. It is nice and proper to hope that States will disarm (or, more accurately, significantly and continuously reduce or restrain the quantity and quality of their armaments) and devote part of their savings to the economic development of poorer countries and indeed to their own economic development, but how relevant to reality is this? After all our appeals over the years -- and I can recall making one myself in another Committee of the General Assembly in 1963, 13 years ago -- what is the position? According to SIPRI, world military expenditure in 1963, the year of the partial nuclear test ban treaty, was \$164.1 billion; in 1975 the expenditure was \$213.8 billion at constant 1970 prices or an estimated \$280 billion at current prices. If we genuinely want a comprehensive test ban and meaningful disarmament,

should we not be considering the matter from a different angle? In this context, we should give more thought to the Swedish proposal for a "stepwise" or "phased" approach to the problem.

In early October, about six weeks ago, SIPRI issued a publication to mark the 10th anniversary of its establishment. The publication is a handbook entitled "Armaments and Disarmament in the Nuclear Age", a collection of articles and studies on the subject. Its estimates of our present and future are not, to put it mildly, optimistic. I quote from one essay:

"If you were to ask the leaders of the nuclear powers why they feel it necessary to possess nuclear weapons, they would answer 'to ensure our national security'. They might also add that nuclear weapons help to stabilize international relations and prevent the outbreak of another general war. And if we review the details of the history of the nuclear arms race, we find that each nuclear power originally initiated its nuclear development programme for what they considered to be essential national security reasons."

One might add, of course, that there are other causes of this frenzy of armaments, but largely in the name of national security we have -- nearly all of us, and two much more so than the rest -- created international insecurity. We have more and more effectively been imprisoning ourselves within the cold steel bars of territorial ambition or of nightmares of grandeur and envy or of ideology and its compliant bedfellow psychological dominance, and terror, their awful progeny. And with the spread of armaments, nuclear and non-nuclear, "the possibility", as the same SIPRI essay puts it, "of 'false alarms' and of nuclear accidents of all kinds will increase greatly. In such a world, stable nuclear 'deterrence' as we have known it will become impossible, and war will become inevitable." And the essay goes on:

"In sum, the situation is becoming increasingly absurd. In each individual case, the nuclear states (current and future) develop and accumulate nuclear weapons in order to enhance their national security. In the past, the net result has been that the consequences of a nuclear war have become much more terrible as time went on, and in the future the probability of a nuclear holocaust occurring will steadily increase. This absurd situation can easily result in what we may call the ultimate absurdity. That is, it may result in a situation such that we will simultaneously eliminate both ourselves and all of our other social and political problems."

And perhaps it would serve us right.

<u>Mr. AZZOUT</u> (Algeria) (interpretation from French): The impressive number of items on disarmament on the agenda of this session of the General Assembly indicates the extent of the concern of the international community regarding the dimensions taken by the arms race. But it is also, above all, an indication of the total lack of progress in the field of disarmament made by this Organization during some 30 years of its existence. And thus the annual debate, which is so often repetitious, on disarmament in this Committee shows quite clearly that there is a very acute awareness among the Member States of the crucial importance of this matter. But it also indicates the frustration and the impatience felt because of the lack of any prospects for a solution in an area which is so vital for collective survival.

At every session the Algerian delegation, like many other delegations, has expressed its deep concern regarding this situation, in which we are at a standstill in our efforts to move towards general and complete disarmament under effective international control. At every session, our delegation has stressed the urgent need to adopt concrete measures in the field of disarmament, especially nuclear disarmament, without overlooking the importance of partial measures to restrict or control armaments which have been adopted so far. We have also tried to show that the slow pace of progress in the field of disarmament was due not so much to technical difficulties as to the absence of political will on the part of the countries which have the greatest responsibility in the constant acceleration of the arms race.

It is hardly necessary to dwell here on the terrifying statistics showing the continuous accumulation of destructive weapons in the arsenals of States and particularly of the super-Powers. Yet, it is necessary to say that we have been for some time now in the second half of the Disarmament Decade and that, unfortunately, we can only deplore the negligible result of the efforts which Governments were asked to undertake in order to achieve general and complete disarmament. Moreover, general and complete disarmament is no longer even considered to be the final objective of international efforts in the field of disarmament. Nuclear disarmament continues to have the highest priority, but only at a theoretical level. Even relatively modest objectives, such as the cessation of the arms race in the nuclear field, have been practically abandoned, while

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## (Mr. Azzout, Algeria)

vertical proliferation and the race to develop more sophisticated systems of nuclear weapons are now quite beyond control.

In short, it is becoming more and more evident that the three objectives which were set by the General Assembly, namely the cessation of the nuclear arms race, nuclear disarmament and the treaty on general and complete disarmament, are now being relegated to second place in the efforts of the international community, in favour of partial measures to restrict or control armaments.

The report which the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament has submitted this year does not indicate any progress on the question of the complete prohibition of nuclear tests or in the field of chemical weapons, although the General Assembly, at its last session, specifically requested that it should give this question the highest priority. Therefore, we can only deplore this situation while we hope, at the same time, that CCD will concentrate its efforts on these items in the future.

The CCD has also communicated to the General Assembly the result of its work on the preparation of a draft convention on the prohibition of the use of environmental modification techniques for military or other hostile purposes. We readily concede that the draft convention was the subject of very difficult negotiations and that it is in fact the result of a compromise. Yet the controversy to which it gave rise both in CCD and in this Committee indicates that it is still far from having obtained a general consensus and that it is the subject of many serious reservations, particularly with regard to the limits of its application.

In view of the present situation it is evident that the system which the United Nations has at its disposal in the field of disarmament has shown itself to be clearly inadequate during the last decade, especially when the purpose is to enable all the peoples of the world to contribute to disarmament or at least to participate in the efforts made in that direction. This is why the non-aligned countries have continuously tried for five years now to bring about the convening of a world conference on disarmament. However, despite the efforts made by the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on the World Disarmament Conference and the dynamic action of its Chairman, Ambassador Hoveyda, it has unfortunately not been possibleto make the slightest progress in this direction.

## (Mr. Azzout, Algeria)

Aware of the situation, the non-aligned countries recommended at the summit Conference in Colombo the convening of a special session of the General Assembly which would be devoted to disarmament. They also recommended that the special session should have as its aim "to review the problem of disarmament and to promote the elaboration of a programme of priorities and measures in this field ... /and/ the convening of the world disarmament conference". We hope that the draft resolution to that effect which was presented by a number of non-aligned States, including Algeria, will receive the unanimous support of the Assembly, which would augur well for the success of the special session.

In that context, the initiative which was taken last year by the Swedish delegation to study the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament seemed to us to be very opportune and we gave it our support; for this reason the Algerian delegation has taken an active part in the work of the Ad Hoc Committee which was then set up. Our Committee has before it the report which was presented by Mrs. Thorsson, to whom we wish to pay a deserved tribute for her untiring efforts in the cause of disarmament. Of course, the recommendations contained in that report are modest, if we compare them to what we expected this Committee to produce, because these are simply procedural recommendations aimed at simplifying the methods of work of the First Committee and the publication of studies, yearbooks and periodicals dealing with disarmament. Yet, certainly they are a good starting point designed to enable the special session of the General Assembly to consider this question in detail and to adopt measures aimed at strengthening the role of the United Nations in this field which is important for peace, security and the development of peoples. It is obvious, in any case, that this can only be achieved by franker and more effective participation by all the Members of this Organization in the discussions on the question of disarmament, which for obvious reasons cannot be left to the discretion of those countries which are the very ones that should disarm.

### (Mr. Azzout, Algeria)

Our Committee has referred to the report which was presented by Mrs. Thorssen to whom we want to pay a deserved tribute for her untiring efforts in the cause of disarmament. Of course, the recommendations contained in that report are modest if we compare them to what we expected this Committee to produce, because these are essentially procedural recommendations which are aimed at simplifying the methods of work of the First Committee and the publication of studies, of yearbooks and of periodical publications dealing with disarmament. Yet, certainly they provde a good starting point which is likely to allow the special session of the General Assembly to consider this question in detail and to adopt measures which could strengthen the role of the United Nations in a field which deals with peace, with the security of the development of peoples. It is obvious in any case that such strengthening of the United Nations can only be achieved by more effective participation by all the Members of this Organization in the discussions and the questions of disarmament which, for evident reasons, cannot be left to the discretion of the very ones who should disarm.

Complete and general disarmament is a difficult undertaking. It requires the political will and active participation of all peoples. The present session of the General Assembly provides an appropriate opportunity to show the inadequacy of present structures of the United Nations in the general area of disarmament. The next special session of the General Assembly should make it possible to set up new machinery and programmes which would be more likely to tackle the fundamental problems of disarmament, of security and of the prosperity of all peoples.

<u>Mr. AL-SHAIKHLY</u> (Iraq) (interpretation from Arabic): Disarmament questions occupy pride of place in the concerns of the United Nations since they deal with the very survival of man today and his future in a world where he is surrounded by the dangers of death. Proliferation of nuclear weapons and chemical and bacteriological warfare and the emergence of weapons that can modify the environment has awakened the desire to put an end to these arms races and has deepened the fear of them.

What makes the situation even more serious is the amount of money spent on armaments both conventional and nuclear. Statistics show that the annual armaments expenditures amount to approximately 300 billion at a time when the majority of the

peoples of the developing nations lack the means of satisfying their most elementary needs and suffer malnutrition, despite the universal desire to create a new and better world order in order to meet the needs and allay the sufferings of the third world as well as to bridge the gap between the developed and the developing nations. It is only appropriate to ask whether the enormous amounts spent on armaments have in fact done anything towards achieving the peace that we all seek for the world today. The experience of the last three decades shows that there has been an increase in the rhythm of the arms race as well as in the tensions that threaten the world with a new war. This situation indicates the outmoded ideologies that led in the past to two world wars still exist today. The oppression of peoples, the expansion of others still continue despite the development of certain basic concepts that govern relations among nations and of an awareness of the dangers inherent in these arms races and, furthermore, despite the fact that the people see what can be derived from co-operation among nations on peaceful grounds. The Political Committee of the Colombo Conference attested to this in stating that peace and security can only be guaranteed by general and complete disarmament, and particularly nuclear disarmament.

It is imperative that significant measures be adopted to achieve these goals; that political declaration recognized that the arms race is in contradiction with the very efforts made to try to create a new economic world order and with the need to marshal all the resources now spent on armaments and channel them into development and welfare in the developing countries.

When we speak of strengthening international peace and security, when we speak of economic and social development, we must inevitably speak of the need to eliminate the reasons that prevent the establishment of world peace and the elimination of the sources of tension. The greatest obstacle we face is the continuation of colonial and racist domination in a number of regions of Asia and Africa. The people of Africa are suffering from the sins of the régimes in Rhodesia and South Africa that continue to safeguard imperialist aims as well as transnational corporations and their interests.

The Arab world is also suffering from Zionist settlement and implantation based on racist ideas that have been condemned by the rest of the world. Since the setting up of zionism in the very heart of the Arab world, our whole region

has been the victim of constant Zionist aggression to liquidate the Palestinian people and shatter the will of the Arab nation to achieve progress and peace. This has created a constant tension that threatens peace and security, not only in the Arab world but all over the world and at all times. If it appears that Zionist aggressive behaviour flows from the very concept and nature of the Zionist movement, it is difficult for us to analyse the role of imperialism within the framework of the organic relations linking zionism, colonialism and imperialism.

Certain great Powers have responsibilities to fulfil in accordance with the terms of the Charter of the United Nations. The Charter laid down the need to implement the principles and purposes contained in it but the irresponsible behaviour and conduct in particular of the United States which is manifested in the supplying of sophisticated weapons for the Zionists to use against the Arab people and to ensure that zionism can continue to occupy the legitimate territory of the Palestinian peoples and occupy the land of a number of Arab States. This attitude and conduct have no justification and the result can only be the increase and the spread of the arms race to that region, preventing the Arab peoples from utilizing the resources which would ensure their development.

The items on the agenda of this Committee and of this Assembly show how the Zionists refuse to bow to the will of the international majority and stand in the way of any progress towards achieving peace, such as the prohibition on the use of incendiary weapons that were used in a number of the aggressions perpetrated against the Arab nation. And thus we also see the stubbornness of the Zionists at the efforts made to conclude an agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and the creation of a nuclear-free zone in the Middle East.

We know the content of the General Assembly resolutions that were supported by the majority of the members of the international community. Most of these resolutions apply not only to the Middle East but to the entire world because of the tension that exists in the region and that flows from the constant aggression against the Arab world on the part of the Zionists, who have refused to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and have defied the resolutions for the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East. All this attests to the fact that zionism's expansionist designs have not been set aside and that it is ready to flout the will of the Arab people to unite. The Zionists still continue to deny the Palestinian people their rights, and the only way they can achieve this is through faits accomplis and by wielding the weapons of terror. The Zionists' intention to start a nuclear arms race in our own region is an extremely perilous move that threatens world peace. The United Nations must be aware of this very serious situation and take strict steps to put an end to the tension and restore the legitimate rights of the peoples of the region.

Despite the obstacles that have been placed in the path of disarmament and the prohibition of nuclear weapons, obstacles created by those who refuse to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, there are other ways that might enable the international community to achieve its goals, and here we are referring to the creation of nuclear-weapon-free zones. Iraq supports the idea of declaring the Middle East to be a nuclear-weapon-free zone. We feel that one way of achieving this goal would be through the adherence of all to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the renunciation of the production, manufacture or acquisition of nuclear weapons.

In referring to nuclear-weapon-free zones, we must raise a closely related matter, namely the creation of zones of peace in the world; here I am talking of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, a Declaration to which we attach the greatest importance. We regret to note that, from the very beginning of our discussion of this matter, no concrete progress seems to have been made along these lines, mainly because of the negative attitude of some of the major maritime Powers regarding the proposals that were submitted by the <u>Ad Hoc</u> Committee on the Indian Ocean, this despite the many appeals that have been made by the Committee to nations to participate in its work and the Committee's assurance that the fact of making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace would in no way curtail the

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rights of the maritime nations to use the Indian Ocean so long as their vessels do not strategically endanger the security of the countries that neighbour the region. The escalation of the United States presence in the Indian Ocean and the entry of dangerous weapons into the Indian Ocean have also threatened the Declaration's implementation. From the very outset, the non-aligned nations have attached great importance to military presences in the Indian Ocean, and at the Lusaka, Algiers and Colombo Conferences this concern was made known. The non-aligned nations unanimously supported the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace, and that Declaration has the growing support of the nations of the world, as is obvious from the many appeals made and the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly, particularly at its thirtieth session.

In December 1975, Iraq was among the first States to support resolution 3468 (XXX) and was one of the first to speak on that question. We advocated the convening of a conference on the Indian Ocean as soon as possible, and the Government of Iraq declared that it was ready to participate in the work of that conference and to provide all necessary facilities to guarantee its success. We have called upon the great Powers and the great maritime Powers that have not supported the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace to respect their obligations and to abide by the will of the international community as expressed in the resolutions of the General Assembly. We have also invited them to co-operate in the implementation of that Declaration; in so doing, we feel that it is owed to the littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to attach greater importance to the Declaration and to realize that the work of that Committee is important enough to warrant their participation in it. May I avail myself of this opportunity to mention that some countries have not fulfilled the requirements of General Assembly resolution 3468 (XXX) and to urge them to reply to the questionnaires that were sent out and make known their positions in the Committee so that negotiations can resume.

There are two other important disarmament matters involving practical ways and means of speeding up efforts to achieve disarmament. I specifically refer to the proposals to hold a special session of the General Assembly on disarmament questions to convene a world disarmament conference.

The Iraqi delegation co-sponsored draft resolution A/C.1/31/L.7, providing for the convening of a special session of the General Assembly in May/June 1978 in accordance with the recommendation of the Colombo Conference. The support given by the non-aligned nations to this idea attests to the importance that we attach to the entire matter of general and complete disarmament and the sincere desire of the non-aligned countries to achieve concrete results in this field.

It is, however, a fact that no concrete results have yet been achieved in the normal work of the United Nations on disarmament, and therefore disarmament matters warrant more careful and comprehensive study. The efforts made thus far have not lived up to our expectations, and I must venture to state that the main reason for the proposal to convene a special session of the General Assembly on disarmament is precisely the fact that no real progress has been achieved thus far in the convening of a world disarmament conference. My delegation feels that this is a matter that should be studied within the framework of the Declaration of the Colombo Conference. We feel that the Colombo Declaration could be a good working basis for the holding of that special session of the General Assembly on disarmament. The agenda of such a special session should include the detailed study of the different aspects of disarmament and the preparation of a list of priorities with provision for their study, and an item should be added to the agenda on the convening of a world disarmament conference.

Allow me now to speak of the second of these questions that I have mentioned, namely the holding of the world disarmament conference. The Iraqi delegation and Government feel that the idea of holding such a conference, which was advocated by the Soviet Union and was approved by the non-aligned countries some time ago, may be an effective way of allowing the United Nations to achieve its goals of establishing international peace and security. This is a matter that has been stated repeatedly in the conferences of the non-aligned countries, and particularly in the latest one in Colombo, namely that it is imperative that concrete and effective measures be approved for the convening of a world disarmament conference. We understand full well the difficulties that may arise but we do feel that those countries which believe in the need for disarmament can well iron out these difficulties which at present impede the convening of such a conference. <u>The CHAIRMAN</u>: Before adjourning the meeting I should like to announce that Sudan has become a co-sponsor of the draft resolution in document A/C.1/31/L.7/Rev.1.

The meeting rose at 12.35 p.m.