

United Nations
**GENERAL
ASSEMBLY**

THIRTY-FIRST SESSION

Official Records *



FIRST COMMITTEE
21st meeting
held on
Tuesday, 2 November 1976
at 10.30 a.m.
New York

VERBATIM RECORD OF THE 21ST MEETING

Chairman: Mr. JAROSZEK (Poland)

CONTENTS

Reduction of military budgets: report of the Secretary-General /34/

Incendiary and other specific conventional weapons which may be the subject of prohibitions of restrictions of use for humanitarian reasons: report of the Secretary-General /35/

Chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /36/

Urgent need for cessation of nuclear and thermonuclear tests and conclusion of a treaty designed to achieve a comprehensive test ban: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /37/

Implementation of General Assembly resolution 3467 (XXX) concerning the signature and ratification of Additional Protocol II of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) /38/

Implementation of the Declaration of the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean /39/

World Disarmament Conference: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the World Disarmament Conference /40/

Effective measures to implement the purposes and objectives of the Disarmament Decade /41/

Implementation of the Declaration on the Denuclearization of Africa /42/

Comprehensive study of the question of nuclear-weapon-free zones in all its aspects: report of the Secretary-General /43/

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region of the Middle East /44/

Convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /45/

Establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in South Asia /46/

Prohibition of the development and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons: report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament /48/

/...

* This record is subject to correction. Corrections should be incorporated in a copy of the record and should be sent *within one week of the date of publication* to the Chief, Official Records Editing Section, room LX-2332.

Corrections will be issued shortly after the end of the session, in a separate fascicle for each Committee.

Distr. GENERAL
A/C.1/31/PV.21
3 November 1976
ENGLISH

General and complete disarmament /49/:

- (a) Report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament;
- (b) Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency;
- (c) Report of the Secretary-General

Strengthening of the role of the United Nations in the field of disarmament: report of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament /50/

Implementation of the conclusions of the first Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons /116/

The meeting was called to order at 10.45 a.m.

AGENDA ITEMS 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47,
48, 49, 50 AND 116 (continued)

The CHAIRMAN: I should like to suggest to the Committee that we close the list of speakers in the general debate this Friday, 5 November, at 5 p.m. The general debate itself, as we decided yesterday, will finish on 19 November.

If I hear no objection, I shall take it that the Committee agrees with my suggestion regarding the closure of the list of speakers.

It was so decided.

Mr. UPADHYAY (Nepal): After the world had gone through the horrors and suffering of the most devastating tragedy experienced by mankind, the United Nations was founded "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war". It is incumbent upon the Members of this Organization to fulfil the objectives of Article 2 of the Charter, and the only way to avoid another holocaust, which might mean the annihilation of mankind, is to achieve general and complete disarmament. Today the membership of the United Nations is close to universality. Nations, big or small, have a stake in the future of the Organization, which is the only hope of mankind's emancipation from want and fear. We cannot achieve the goal of freedom from want unless we achieve the goal of freedom from fear. Unfortunately, the growth and expansion of the Organization has not resulted in the growth of mutual understanding and co-operation in the search for ways and means to conquer fear.

Nepal is a small and least-developed country. We cannot afford to divert our meagre resources in order to counter fear by means of militarization. Our foremost priority is and shall remain freedom

(Mr. Upadhyay, Nepal)

from want. However, we cannot ignore the reality that the arms race and its consequences have their fallout on us too. The adherence to peace of Nepal, as a non-aligned country, and its interest in disarmament are genuine. The formation of military blocs as a result of the cold war and the polarization of the world led to the vicious circle of further militarization and arms race. The wider acceptance of the philosophy of non-alignment has thoroughly shaken the traditional concept of polarization. We believe that one of the ways to conquer fear is to follow a non-aligned policy. But it is indeed sad to note that in spite of a tremendous increase in the membership of the non-aligned movement, the arms race continues unabated, in full swing. The so-called mistrust among nations has not been lessening. Nations' fears have multiplied their arms and nations' arms have multiplied their fears.

Small nations like mine have a genuine interest in relaxation of tensions because the limitation imposed on us by size has made us aware that we are the ones who become ultimately the victims of such tension. The fallouts of tensions between the bigger Powers affect us, whether we like it or not. The flames generated by such tension heat the atmosphere not only in places where they originate but also in those areas and countries that have in no way contributed to such tensions. So our desire is not to be victimized by an event which we did not help to create in any manner whatsoever; nor do we wish to get involved in the tensions caused by misunderstandings or rivalries of others.

My small country, fully aware of the limitation on its contribution towards the effort of achieving the goal of a world free from want and free from fear, has pledged to take an active part in the items under discussion now.

My Sovereign, His Majesty King Birendra, has said:

"... We are wholly committed to an orderly and uninterrupted economic development for our people. Being a small landlocked country, we hardly can afford to waste our resources on presumptions. On the contrary, exigencies demand that we continue to intensify our efforts at economic development."

(Mr. Upadhyay, Nepal)

His Majesty has clearly laid down our priority. The priority, therefore, remains the achievement of the goal of freedom from want. I do not have to re-emphasize how dependent freedom from want is on freedom from fear.

There is no doubt that our feeling is shared by many and that the Members of this Organization have been seized of the issue from the beginning. The annals of the United Nations are full of such evidence.

(Mr. Upadhyay, Nepal)

Ever since the founding of this world Organization more than three decades ago one of the main issues preoccupying the world body has been the control and regulation of armaments. The complex issue of disarmament has been discussed and debated at great length in various forums and organs of this body over a number of years. If a collection of all the speeches, statements, reports and studies, as well as treaties and resolutions, on questions relating to disarmament were to be put together today it would run into thousands upon thousands of pages. Since peace and security are so closely interlinked with the question of disarmament, the United Nations has rightly engaged in a continuous search for universal and meaningful disarmament.

Almost every year this Committee spends more time on discussing disarmament items than any other agenda item. This year there are 18 items on the agenda on disarmament matters. In 1972 there were only seven. I do not know if the increase in the number of agenda items might itself lead to increased efforts towards successful disarmament. However, we shall participate with hope. About a quarter of a century ago, during a debate on disarmament, one representative said satirically, "We must have more arms in order to get an agreement on disarmament". If there is any truth in that statement we should be closer to an agreement on disarmament today than at any other time, for the simple reason that today there are more arms in the world's arsenals than ever before.

Each year the General Assembly adopts several resolutions relating to disarmament. If one were only to look into the amount of time and energy and money the United Nations spends each year in dealing with the disarmament items, and at the volume of documentation it produces in this regard, it would indeed make an impressive record. But what is the end result of all these efforts? Has there been real progress towards disarmament? Has the world become a more secure place to live in? I can safely answer those questions in the negative, and I hope representatives will agree with me.

It has been estimated that the world total of regular armed forces increased from 18.6 million in 1960 to 21.9 million in 1974. The world military expenditure, which, according to the SIPRI Yearbook, totalled \$US 126.66 billion in 1954, has been estimated to have reached \$US 300 billion at present. About four hundred thousand scientists and technicians are estimated to have been engaged in research and development for military purposes, which costs between \$25 billion and \$30 billion annually. According to SIPRI Yearbook estimates,

(Mr. Upadhyay, Nepal)

the over-all number of all categories of delivery vehicles except strategic bombers of the two super Powers has increased considerably in the last ten years. Thus the number of strategic submarines increased from a total of 50 in 1967 to 95 by 1 July 1976. The number of submarine-launched ballistic missiles increased from a total of 683 to 1,372 during the same period. Also during the same period -- 1967 to 1976 -- the total number of intercontinental ballistic missiles increased from 1,774 to 2,561. In 1967 the number of independently targetable nuclear warheads on missiles stood at a total of 2,457, but by 1976 that number had increased to a total of 11,987. The smallest of these is three times more powerful than the bomb that was dropped on Hiroshima and took more than 100,000 lives. I should like to illustrate the awesome capabilities of some of the modern weapons by quoting from a study entitled World Military and Social Expenditures 1976 conducted by Mrs. Ruth Sivard:

"A single bomber can today carry a warload equivalent to 10 million tons of TNT, almost twice the tonnage released by all combatants in World War II. The nuclear stockpiles of the two super-Powers alone contain the equivalent in destructive power of 1,300,000 Hiroshima-size bombs.

"... The conventional arsenal now includes such weapons as supersonic bombers that travel 1,100 miles per hour at cruising altitude, chemical fireballs of near nuclear strength, cluster bombs containing 600 bomblets each, ultra-rapid fire guns, smart bombs guided by TV and laser beams and fully manoeuvrable unmanned aircraft controlled from the ground."

In the midst of such facts and figures, how can anybody believe that any progress at all is being achieved in the field of disarmament? I for one could not be tempted to live under the cover of a make-believe world which tries to portray progress in the field of disarmament. It is even dangerous inasmuch as such a notion might induce a sense of complacency in us and divert our attention from our efforts in pursuit of the goal of disarmament.

One of the most frequent arguments advanced in favour of continuous armament is the need to achieve or to maintain parity. Such parity, so the argument goes, is essential in order to maintain a balance of power by way of a balance of terror. But it is now common knowledge that the present nuclear stockpiles have upwards of 15 tons of explosives for each and every man, woman and child in the world. The nuclear arsenals of the two super-Powers are enough to destroy each other and the rest of the world many times over. This tremendous over-kill

(Mr. Upadhyay, Nepal)

capacity is maintained and developed at an astronomical cost. There can be no viable justification for further developing and increasing these stockpiles. The nuclear stockpiles of each of the super-Powers are sufficient to create a disincentive in the mind of the other super-Power concerning launching the first strike. Each side very well knows that it is impossible to get away with an offensive strike, however devastating it may be, without itself suffering equal or greater devastation.

We hear so much about détente these days, but, after all, what real meaning does it have if it does not lead to an increasing sense of security and confidence and thereby enhance the prospects of genuine disarmament? It is time for the world to expect and to see military détente born of the prevailing atmosphere of political détente. If military détente does not appear on the horizon, then there is reason even to question the genuineness and sincerity of the prevailing mood of détente.

Necessity is said to be the mother of invention, but judging by the present trends in armaments invention seems to be the mother of necessity. The colossal amount of manpower and money engaged in research and development for military purposes results in greater and better technological refinement. New products of improved technology are constantly and mindlessly absorbed in the arms system. Most of these improvements and refinements are neither fully warranted by facts nor justified by circumstances. In most cases the whims and caprices of the strategists, who seem to take a childlike delight in constantly acquiring newer toys, seem to regulate and control the direction of such research and development.

(Mr. Upadhyay, Nepal)

A comparatively new dimension of the problem of disarmament has been increasingly visible in recent years. It is most discomfoting for my delegation to note that the developing countries are arming themselves at a faster rate than most of the developed countries themselves. The annual military spending of the developing countries increased from \$15 billion in 1960 to more than \$39 billion in 1974. Whereas the average annual increment in world-wide military expenditure has been estimated at 2.6 per cent, in the case of third world countries the average annual increase has been 10.3 per cent, and, in the case of the Middle East countries 16.7 per cent. To put it in another perspective, in 1957 developing countries, including those in the Middle East, spent only 3.7 per cent of the total world expenditure in arms. But their military expenditure in 1975, constituted as much as 18.4 per cent of the world total. The total strength of the armed forces of the developing countries, which was 8.7 million in 1960, increased to 12.3 million in 1974, while the developed countries actually reduced their armed forces from 9.9 million to 9.6 million during that same period. While war or regional conflicts might have triggered such a big arms build-up in some areas, in most cases there does not seem to be enough justification for the huge expenditure on armaments. In many cases, the acquisition of arms is made more for psychological reasons, and in some cases the acquisition of the most sophisticated weapons has been made more for reasons of prestige than for practical considerations. Here I would like to quote His Majesty King Birendra, who in a recent statement observed:

"... the enthusiasm for general and complete disarmament has, in point of fact, flagged. There is, on the contrary, a definite tendency among nuclear-weapon Powers and also among middle-Powers, even within the fold of the non-aligned movement, to seek security, superiority and prestige in sophisticated arms build-up."

Closely interlinked with and contributing significantly to the problem of arms build-up is the question of arms trade. The volume of world trade in armaments has been rising every year, and currently totals more than \$20 billion annually. The most significant and costly arms procurements have been made by some of the OPEC countries recently. With huge amounts of money derived from oil revenues, there seems to have been a great temptation for these

(Mr. Upadhyay, Nepal)

countries to acquire very sophisticated weapons systems. Since most of the modern and sophisticated weapons are available from two or more sources of supply, there is also keen competition among suppliers of arms to outbid and outdo one another. This has only helped to increase the flow of arms from developed to developing countries, resulting in a reverse flow of money from those countries to the developed countries ... money which could have been better used for more productive and urgent purposes.

Because of the sheer magnitude and volume of their trade, as well as the type of merchandise they produce and deliver, the military-industrial complex has a very powerful lobby and holds formidable power and influence in most of the main arms-producing countries. It is in their interests to produce and sell as many of their products as possible. Whatever control Governments prefer to have on the production and delivery of armaments is at best minimal and entirely unrelated to the goal of disarmament. It seems that, in many instances, Governments of these main arms-producing nations find the narrow interests of the arms industries commensurate with their own national interests.

Moreover, it is not difficult to understand that Governments and arms industries have, in most cases, a common interest and thus seem to act in concert and unison in the matter of arms deliveries. The more a country is able to sell its arms abroad, the more that helps to improve its balance of payments and keep its huge arms industry thriving. At the same time, it helps the country to gain more political and military influence in the countries which make such purchases, since the latter become more and more dependent on the former for spare parts, replacement and maintenance of the weapons. Recent acquisitions of very sophisticated weapons by some of the developing countries have even necessitated the deployment of a large army of technicians and experts from the supplier country to train their men in the use of those weapons.

From the standpoint of the arms supplying countries, all this seems to be in perfect accord with their own interests. But what about the countries which by making such acquisitions not only squander vast amounts of money but at the same time become more and more dependent on the

(Mr. Upadhyay, Nepal)

supplier countries? Such countries should have second thoughts and take a second look at the whole state of affairs which they have created for themselves. Do they really have the need for all that they have acquired or plan to acquire? It may very well be the case that they are merely being exploited by the arms suppliers and falling victims to the games that the suppliers are playing by whetting their appetite for more and more arms. Should they not consider whether they can actually digest them as well?

I have made some general observations and remarks regarding the situation in the field of disarmament. The gloomy and disheartening picture that I have portrayed above will also emerge if we take up the individual agenda items that this Committee has been assigned this year.

The item on the reduction by 10 per cent of the military budgets of States permanent members of the Security Council and utilization of part of the funds thus saved for assistance to developing countries was introduced in this Committee during the twenty-eighth session of the General Assembly, in 1973. After the adoption of a resolution in this connexion, and expert group has studied the problem and submitted a report. But the chances of any actual reductions in military budgets in pursuance of the resolution are almost non-existent, owing to the attitude of most of the countries that are supposed to take the initiative in this regard.

The objectives of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty remain far from being accomplished, mainly because of non-adherence to it by some nuclear and many other near-nuclear States. In spite of some of its inherent weaknesses, it is the only Treaty designed to prohibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons. It is sad to note that the prohibitions enumerated in the Treaty are not only being circumvented but even openly violated by many countries, thus rendering it, in effect, almost ineffective and useless. A recent report of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) states that in nine years as many as 35 countries will have developed the capacity to become nuclear Powers, and this state of affairs will inevitably lead to nuclear war. Should we not learn our lesson before it is too late?

(Mr. Upadhyay, Nepal)

It is generally agreed that a most important step towards the halting of the nuclear arms race would be the signing of a comprehensive test ban treaty. Yet such a treaty is nowhere in sight because of the various, and in some cases openly hostile, attitudes towards such a treaty. This issue has been further complicated because of the question of peaceful nuclear explosions. While every country has a right to engage in peaceful nuclear explosions, that right should be allowed to be neither an excuse nor a temptation to develop nuclear weapons. In the opinion of my delegation, a bolder initiative and a more forward-looking policy should be forthcoming in this regard from the two super-Powers themselves. The Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) should, in the meantime, continue its valuable work towards finding a widely acceptable framework for such a treaty.

In the field of the prohibition of chemical weapons, too, little progress seems to be in sight. My delegation is aware of the difficulties that we confront in this regard because of the complexity of the issue. However, there should no longer be unnecessary delay in arriving at a satisfactory solution of the problem. Japan has introduced in the CCD a very useful working paper on the prohibition of the use of chemical agents in warfare. That working paper should merit thorough and careful consideration in the further deliberations of the CCD.

It has been five years since the General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace. That Declaration reflected the genuine and sincere desire of a number of littoral and hinterland States of the Indian Ocean to keep that area free from super-Power rivalry and consequently from the heavy arms build-up and installations in the area. It is, however, disheartening to note that the stationing and strengthening of arms bases and other military installations continue at an unabated rate in total disregard of the Declaration adopted by the General Assembly. The Ad Hoc Committee on the Indian Ocean has done some very useful work with regard to the convening of a conference of the littoral and hinterland States. That conference should be held without undue delay in order to work out an effective method for the implementation of the Declaration.

Likewise, during the last few years, various proposals have been introduced in the General Assembly with a view to the establishment of nuclear-free zones in different regions of the world. Such proposals have been
motiv

(Mr. Upadhyay, Nepal)

motivated by a genuine desire to establish zones free from the threat or use of nuclear weapons. A careful and thorough study of all aspects of such proposals should be made in a positive and constructive manner so as to facilitate the establishment of such zones rather than to thwart such an attempt.

Another important and useful proposal that has long been before the United Nations is that regarding the holding of a world disarmament conference. In spite of general support for such a conference from a majority of the countries in this Organization, no agreement has so far been reached in this connexion because of the very strong views and positions held by some of the major countries. Some countries oppose a world disarmament conference on the grounds that it would become a mere propaganda forum and serve no useful purpose as a negotiating body for effective disarmament measures. Such countries tend to place more emphasis on the usefulness and effectiveness of bilateral negotiations such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). In spite of the limitations of SALT I, my delegation does not minimize the importance of these bilateral agreements and hopes that SALT II will be agreed upon before the term of SALT I expires in October next year. However, a world disarmament conference should not be viewed as an obstacle or alternative to SALT. It should more appropriately be regarded as a more comprehensive and a complementary effort towards disarmament. The complex and myriad problems of disarmament should be discussed and tackled on a global basis with universal participation. Regarding the doubts raised about a world disarmament conference being turned into a propaganda forum, my delegation thinks it better not to make such assumptions. Seriousness of purpose should prevail in the minds of the participants in the conference. If such a sense of purpose pervaded the Conference, any would-be propagandist would have to think twice before embarking upon propagandistic tactics.

My delegation has always supported the idea of a world disarmament conference. We have no reason to deviate from our position at this stage. In the meantime, however, my delegation will go along whole-heartedly with the proposal for holding a special session of the General Assembly on disarmament, as was called for at the Fifth summit Conference of the Non-Aligned Countries held in Colombo recently.

(Mr. Upadhyay, Nepal)

Those are some of the views that my delegation holds with regard to the question of disarmament in general. My delegation will speak again to comment upon the specific issues of disarmament at appropriate occasions during the discussion of those items in this Committee.

Mr. NEAGU (Romania): The achievement of general disarmament and, first of all, of nuclear disarmament now holds a central place among the major problems confronting the contemporary world, inasmuch as the solution of all the other problems is closely connected with the solution of the disarmament problem. It can be said without exaggeration that the present arms race, and above all the nuclear arms race, constitutes the greatest single peril facing humanity, a peril that threatens its very survival. The huge nuclear arsenals now existing in the world have surpassed all super-saturation levels, the destructive power accumulated being capable of destroying the whole world several times over. The stockpiles of nuclear bombs and the payloads so far accumulated are equivalent to 15 tons of explosive for each inhabitant of the planet.

It should be clearly stated that it is by no means certain that the existing arsenals will not be used in the future. On the contrary, this danger is all the more conceivable as attempts are being made to justify the arms race by the so-called theory of the balance of power, which is nothing but an invitation to line up at ever higher levels a chain reaction in the accumulation of increasingly sophisticated armaments, pre-eminently nuclear.

In the entire course of history, such a policy has always inevitably led to war, each period of equilibrium being, in fact, a pre-war period.

Under the present circumstances, however, mankind cannot tolerate a new conflagration. It is therefore imperative that all available means and forces be mobilized in order to reveal the real implications of the balance of power, to stop this course of events and divert it towards disarmament.

At the same time, one cannot overlook the fact that the arms race provides the material support for the policy of force and diktat.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

The arms race places a heavy burden on the peoples of the world, seriously hindering the efforts aimed at development. It prevents the granting of adequate international assistance to the countries which have endured colonialist and imperialist exploitation to enable them to build a new economy and social life, to turn to account their human and material resources and to benefit fully from the achievements of contemporary science and technology.

It is absolutely irrational and inhuman to waste each year \$300 billion on armaments whilst 70 per cent of the world's population is affected by economic underdevelopment. These aspects of the question should be a matter of greater concern to States in formulating their policies and to the United Nations as well. In this context, I should like to express the satisfaction of the Romanian delegation, which, I am convinced, is shared by many other delegations in this Assembly, with the diligent manner in which the Secretary-General, Mr. Waldheim, has constituted a group of eminent consultant experts to study and report on the economic and social consequences of the arms race and military expenditures and their extremely harmful effects on international peace and security. This study will undoubtedly constitute one of the most important reference works in this field, and we express the hope that it will be widely publicized.

I did not wish to call the attention of our Committee to this state of affairs because it might be unknown: in their authoritative statements, Heads of State or Government and Foreign Ministers have presented in the general debate at this session much more significant data and much more alarming conclusions. My purpose is only to stress the fact that, in spite of rather general concern over the harmful effects of the arms race, the problems of disarmament, particularly nuclear disarmament, have not yet been the subject of resolute and decisive measures by Governments. Although the international treaties and conventions concluded so far have contributed in some degree to building a climate of understanding, they have not proved to be sufficient to slow down the arms race, much less to stimulate disarmament. They have had little or no effect on the ever spiralling arms race, in particular the nuclear arms race.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

The measures meant to prevent the acquisition of new weapons have, in fact, led to the maintenance of existing weapons.

In these circumstances, as stated by the President of the Socialist Republic of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu,

"... it would be an unforgivable mistake to give the peoples the illusion that they can live quietly and safely while more and more new stockpiles of destructive weapons are accumulated at an extremely rapid pace in the world. We must openly show the reality of the situation to the peoples and take action through resolute measures for stopping the arms race before it is too late".

My delegation wishes to stress the need to begin the preparation of a programme of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control. The preparation of such a programme constitutes not only an objective requirement but also an obligation deriving from the decision on the Disarmament Decade by the United Nations in resolution 2602 E (XXIV).

In this context, we welcome the decision taken on 2 September 1976 by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) at Geneva on the proposal of Nigeria to discuss at its session in 1977, as required by resolution 2602 E (XXIV), the problem of a comprehensive disarmament programme covering all the aspects of the halting of the arms race and of general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international supervision. In our view, it is necessary for the CCD to take into consideration during the preparation of such a programme all the proposals already made by different States on this matter.

Romania has consistently fought for the adoption of a comprehensive disarmament programme designed to get the negotiations out of their present position of stalemate and to lead to the adoption of concrete and practical measures to stop the arms race and achieve disarmament. On the basis of this position of principle, Romania submitted to the thirtieth session of the United Nations General Assembly a document entitled "The position of Romania on the problems of disarmament, and particularly nuclear disarmament, and the establishment of lasting world peace" which was circulated in document A/C.1/1066 of 30 October 1975.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

Romania considers that steps aimed at disarmament should be taken with three basic aims, as follows:

first, to strengthen mutual confidence among States, the adoption of partial measures of disarmament and military disengagement, such as the discontinuance of military manoeuvres, and particularly multinational manoeuvres near frontiers or in the territory of other States, and of troop concentrations and shows of force directed against other States; the conclusion of arrangements or agreements to prevent attacks due to accidents, errors in calculation or lack of communication; and the undertaking of a joint commitment concerning the banning of all forms of war propaganda, animosity and hatred among nations;

secondly, to reduce military tension among States, the adoption of a group of measures including: the banning of the introduction of new nuclear weapons into the territory of other States and the withdrawal of nuclear weapons previously introduced; the withdrawal of foreign troops, armaments and other military devices within national frontiers and the demobilization of the troops withdrawn; the dismantling of military bases on foreign soil; the creation of zones free from nuclear weapons, with all their specific components; the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction; and the dismantling of opposed military blocs;

thirdly, to halt the arms race and bring about disarmament, the adoption of a further set of measures: the freezing and gradual reduction of military budgets, starting with the budget of the large and heavily armed countries; the banning of the design and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; the cessation of the development, testing and production of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery; the cessation of the production of fissionable materials for military purposes; the use of existing such materials for peaceful purposes and the transfer of a portion of such materials to be used, by all States, within the context of broad international co-operation; the reduction and complete liquidation of all existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons and means of their delivery; the total banning of nuclear weapons; the gradual reduction of troops and armaments forming part of the equipment of national forces; and the negotiation and conclusion of a treaty on general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

Under the programme aimed at achieving general and complete disarmament the highest priority, as we have repeatedly stressed, should be assigned to nuclear disarmament. The implementation of all those measures should be carried out under strict and effective control with the participation of both States possessing nuclear weapons and those not possessing such weapons.

As long as the nuclear arms race continues, other countries will take steps to produce nuclear weapons; there is no way of stopping that. The danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons can be removed only by outlawing and halting the production of such weapons and by proceeding to destroy them.

In this context the Romanian delegation wishes to draw attention to the fact that now, along with the intensification of the nuclear arms race, action is being taken aimed at preventing the peaceful use of nuclear energy by countries which, having signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, have renounced the acquisition of those weapons. That action demonstrates an unawareness of the provisions of the Treaty, which, in its article IV, states:

"Parties to the Treaty in a position to do so shall also co-operate in contributing alone or together with other States or international organizations to the further development of the applications of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, especially in the territories of non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the Treaty..." (General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), annex)

Measures and actions taken by a limited group of States to restrain and hinder the peaceful uses of atomic energy could undermine the very substance of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It must be clear to everyone that the future of that Treaty is indissolubly linked with the observance of the provision that non-nuclear-weapon States should have access, without discrimination, to the widest possible exchanges of equipment, materials and scientific and technical information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The future of the Treaty depends to no small extent on the fulfilment of the obligation

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

undertaken by the nuclear-weapon States to encourage and facilitate access to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy by non-nuclear States.

In my Government's opinion, any approach that fails to take those considerations into account, any limitation, restriction or infringement of the right to the peaceful use of atomic energy, will have the effect of leading States to reconsider their position on that Treaty.

Besides measures to outlaw and destroy nuclear weapons, Romania considers that the time has come to ban and destroy all weapons of mass destruction and to ban the design and manufacture of new types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons. Resolute measures should be taken, by means of appropriate international instruments to which all States should be parties, to ban the use and halt the production of, eliminate from military arsenals and outlaw all weapons of mass destruction in existence or in the design stage. States must also undertake, under strict and effective international control, not to engage in the future in any research activity connected with the discovery and development of such weapons.

The banning of new weapons and systems of mass destruction must be closely linked to firm measures for the cessation of nuclear weapon production, the liquidation of existing stockpiles and the complete and definitive prohibition of nuclear weapons, and, pending the attainment of that goal, to an undertaking by nuclear States not to use or threaten other States with the use of nuclear weapons. Only thus can the dangers inherent in the existence of weapons of mass destruction -- nuclear, chemical, bacteriological, biological, ecological or of whatever other type -- be removed from the life of peoples.

It is obvious that as far as disarmament is concerned a general approach to the problem cannot and should not preclude actions on the regional level which can exert a positive influence on the international climate. On the contrary, measures aimed at improving good-neighbourly relations and disarmament at the regional level should be a constant preoccupation of Governments.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

As a European country, Romania considers that energetic measures are required for the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territory of the European States that do not possess such weapons, the dismantling of military bases and the withdrawal of foreign troops from the territory of European States within national frontiers. At the same time sustained efforts will be necessary by all European States to bring about reduction in national armed forces, armaments and military expenditure. Likewise, it is more than ever necessary that the European States make every effort to bring about the simultaneous liquidation of both the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Warsaw Pact as an essential prerequisite for the development of confidence and the building up of security on the European continent and throughout the world.

Romania considers that a comprehensive programme of military disengagement and disarmament should be worked out and implemented, with the participation of all European States, on both a continent-wide scale and in the various areas of the continent. Within the framework of the measures adopted at the regional level a pre-eminent place should be given to the creation of nuclear-free zones of peace and co-operation in various parts of the world. Proposals for the creation of such zones reflect the particular interest taken by the States in instituting them. Romania reiterates on this occasion too its proposal concerning the transformation of the Balkans into a nuclear-free zone of good-neighbourly relations, co-operation and peace, having no military bases or foreign troops. Of course, the agreements on the establishment of such zones should not limit in any way the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

It is axiomatically true that in order to be actually implemented a disarmament programme containing concrete measures has to be negotiated with the participation of all States on terms of full equality. This requires increased joint efforts to provide a democratic framework for negotiations on disarmament in keeping with the requirements of the new international order.

According to the Charter, the United Nations is invested with general responsibilities and competence in the field of disarmament. In this connexion, it must be admitted frankly that the United Nations is far from having carried out the task entrusted to it in this field and that, if progress is to be made, it should exercise direct authority in the negotiation, conclusion and supervision of disarmament measures. Romania considers that the United Nations General Assembly should fully exercise its powers with respect to this problem and make it one of its fundamental preoccupations. In line with this position, Romania endorsed during the previous session the adoption of resolution 3484 B (XXX) of 12 December 1975, proposed by Sweden and concerning the setting up of an ad hoc committee to examine the part played by the United Nations in the field of disarmament. In our view, the results so far obtained by that Committee are only a modest beginning which has to be continued perseveringly in order to reach agreement on measures conducive to the results expected by all of us. The recommendations contained in the report represent the outcome of a long process of negotiations and constitute a balanced compromise. For this reason, we suggest their approval by this Committee as they stand.

We fully support immediate action to strengthen the disarmament unit of the Secretariat.

Under the circumstances, we think that the best way to start off a vigorous movement in that direction would be to convene a special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament problems. The General Assembly offers an adequate framework for the equal participation of all States in the discussion and negotiation of measures that could help to solve this crucial problem. This would provide the opportunity for comprehensive debates on the armaments situation and the principles that should govern disarmament, and for recommendations that might serve as a basis for disarmament negotiations. It is our firm belief that

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

such action would result in the intensification of efforts by all States to achieve disarmament and in the concentration of those efforts on the most important and urgent problems in the field. Romania is ready and keen to take a most active part in the preparation for a special session in order fully to contribute to the success of that most important event in disarmament negotiation.

The broad process of reappraising the negotiation mechanisms in the field of disarmament was also reflected at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva. We should like to express our satisfaction at the decision adopted by the CCD, on the initiative of the Romanian delegation, concerning some procedural aspects of its activity. The decision to resume the debate on the procedures of the Committee next year stems from an increased awareness of the necessity of adopting additional measures for the democratization of that body.

We really hope that the next meetings will be conducive to the achievement of agreement within the Committee on measures that would lead to effective negotiations on the essential problems of disarmament, particularly of nuclear disarmament, to the democratization of the working procedures and to the participation of all States in disarmament negotiations on terms of full equality.

We fully share and strongly support the opinion expressed by the Secretary-General in his report on the work of the Organization that:

"... it is time that world public opinion became far more actively involved in the struggle for disarmament, which may well be a struggle for nothing less than human survival". (A/31/1/Add.1, p. 11)

This requires, however, the sustained provision to the public on a broad range of information on the current status of armaments and its consequences, and on the steps to be taken to stop the arms race. In our view, the United Nations is the most appropriate organization for the supply of correct and impartial information in this field, thus contributing to the mobilization of the broadest masses in favour of achieving real progress towards general agreement.

(Mr. Neagu, Romania)

Those are the basic considerations that the Romanian delegation intended to present before this Committee on the occasion of the present general debate on disarmament.

In the light of this position based on well-known principles, my delegation is ready to bring its contribution to the work of this Committee on disarmament. I should like to assure you, Mr. Chairman, of our sincere desire to co-operate with all the delegations to bring to a successful conclusion our common endeavours in this debate.

Mr. OGISO (Japan): This year I must emphasize once again to this Committee that, in the field of disarmament, nuclear disarmament is the all-important question and the one that most urgently requires a solution. Since the end of the Second World War the question of nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament has been of vital concern and has been thoroughly discussed in the United Nations and other centres of negotiation. Despite these efforts, however, the threat posed by nuclear weapons has not been reduced by one iota. On the contrary, stockpiles in the arsenals of the nuclear-weapon States have shown an enormous increase in both quality and quantity. This alarming contradiction requires sober and serious reflection on what is causing it. In other words, we must retrace our steps and re-examine such basic issues as: first, whether the nuclear-weapon States have in fact the political will to promote, or accept, real nuclear disarmament; secondly, the consequences of the absence of some nuclear-weapon States from the negotiations on nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament; and thirdly, the manner in which the question of nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament is being negotiated. This re-examination should determine whether any or all of these issues are in fact responsible for the contradiction to which I have drawn attention.

(Mr. Ogiso, Japan)

The first question I have mentioned, whether the nuclear-weapon States, the super-Powers in particular, have the political will for real nuclear disarmament, has been raised on a number of occasions in various international bodies. If there is no such will on the part of nuclear-weapon States, the efforts which we are making are meaningless.

(Mr. Ogiso, Japan)

In this connexion we are particularly concerned by the tendency during the recent deliberations of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in Geneva to give priority to the discussion of such peripheral issues as a ban on what are vaguely termed weapons of mass destruction rather than the most important issue, nuclear disarmament. It should be recognized that such a tendency is bound to raise questions about a possible lack of political will on the part of the nuclear-weapon States and that this may undermine the very basis of the nuclear disarmament efforts which have thus far been made under the aegis of the United Nations.

As regards the second issue, I should like to take the opportunity offered by this meeting to reiterate vigorously my delegation's many requests to France and the People's Republic of China, which are not participating in the current negotiations on nuclear disarmament, to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and assume the obligations incumbent upon other nuclear-weapon States, under article VI of the Treaty, to pursue in good faith the negotiations on nuclear disarmament, and also to join in the work of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. As regards the latter questions, I would point out that the moves which are now under consideration to convene a special session of the United Nations General Assembly on disarmament arise from the recognition that for the purpose of promoting disarmament, and nuclear disarmament in particular, the participation of all nuclear-weapon States is desirable. Consequently, my country is ready to support the calling of a special session of the General Assembly for this purpose, in the expectation that all nuclear-weapon States would attend. At the same time, I wish to emphasize that before holding such a special session there must be sufficient preparatory work, utilizing the knowledge and experience of the States members of CCD. Moreover, such a special session should not, in my opinion, interfere with the concrete negotiations being conducted in such existing disarmament bodies as the CCD.

The third issue I have mentioned, which is related to the issue which I have just touched upon, is the manner in which the question of nuclear arms control and nuclear disarmament is now being negotiated. Specifically, this

(Mr. Ogiso, Japan)

arises from the fact that two different approaches to nuclear disarmament are being tried by the international community, one calling for the prohibition of vertical proliferation and the other for the prohibition of horizontal proliferation. Surely, simultaneous progress in the achievement of both goals should be the aim.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty is of course outstanding among international efforts to prevent the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. The prevention of vertical proliferation would reduce the number of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of States. As regards the prevention of horizontal proliferation, we note that many States having potential nuclear-weapon capabilities have acceded to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in recent years. International co-operation is being provided, notably by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), in steps to check horizontal proliferation. For our part, Japan ratified the Non-Proliferation Treaty in June this year. Japan's sole reason for doing so was the fact that my country whole-heartedly supports and has full confidence in the determination of the international community to prevent vertical proliferation parallel with the prevention of horizontal proliferation and eventually to remove nuclear weapons from the earth. As I have indicated, the prevention of horizontal proliferation presupposes progress in the prevention of vertical proliferation. If there is no progress in preventing vertical proliferation, or it becomes clear that none is in prospect, the justification for seeking the prevention of horizontal proliferation will be greatly reduced. In his statement in the general debate the Foreign Minister of Japan, Mr. Kosaka, pointed this out when he referred to the ratification by my country of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He stated:

"The Treaty accords special status to the 'nuclear-Weapon States', allowing them to possess nuclear weapons, while all other States, including the potential nuclear-weapon States, are prohibited from possessing such weapons. It is the firm conviction of my Government that this inequality should be neither consolidated nor perpetuated. It should be rectified, not through the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which could lead to the annihilation of mankind, but rather through the abolition by the nuclear-weapon States of all nuclear weapons." (A/31/PV.6, p. 61)

(Mr. Ogiso, Japan)

The Minister for Foreign Affairs added:

"Failure on the part of the nuclear-weapon States, which have a special responsibility in disarmament, to achieve meaningful disarmament -- particularly the reduction of nuclear armaments and a comprehensive nuclear test ban -- will inevitably lead to the erosion of the non-proliferation Treaty." (ibid.)

Accordingly, if we are to be confident that the efforts we have thus far made mainly for the prevention of horizontal proliferation have been on the right track, tangible results have to be obtained as quickly as possible in the prevention of vertical proliferation and specifically in the limitation and reduction of the nuclear armaments of the nuclear-weapon States and concerning a comprehensive test ban.

In specific terms, I would first call upon the United States and the Soviet Union to bear in mind the fact that the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I) agreement will expire in October 1977 and to reach agreement on SALT II as soon as possible and then to strive to reduce nuclear weapons and missiles.

Next there is the question of a comprehensive test ban. As a result of intensive discussions on this subject last year, in which the experts participated, the CCD decided to establish an Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts to Consider International Co-operative Measures to Detect and Identify Seismic Events which would be instructed to conduct experimental exercises involving a specific global network, among other things. We welcome this progress and believe that it will create a good prospect for solving the technical difficulties involved. It is our hope that as many experts as possible from the widest possible geographical area will participate in the Group's work, so that these efforts may in time contribute to the achievement of a comprehensive test ban.

(Mr. Ogiso, Japan)

Parallel with that study, we should spare no efforts to make a phased approach directed towards the gradual achievement of a test ban. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty, concluded between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1974, and the accompanying Treaty on Underground Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, signed last May, are examples of such a phased approach, and we value them accordingly.

Further steps on that line can be taken by expanding the Threshold Test Ban Treaty into a multilateral treaty, and by simultaneously reducing the threshold of 150 kilotons provided for in the Treaty, with a view to reaching eventually a comprehensive test ban. That approach was suggested by my delegation in detail in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament (CCD) in the spring of this year. With regard to reducing the threshold, we must emphasize in particular that it can be lowered quite considerably from the 150 kilotons provided in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty. Thus far, during the discussions at the expert meetings on the detection and identification of underground testing by seismological means, a variety of figures have been given by the experts of Canada, Sweden and the United Kingdom regarding the limit of the yield of explosions down to which verification is possible. The figures given vary, and further discussions therefore will be necessary for agreement on the threshold level above which identification is possible. Our judgement is that it is possible to reduce the threshold considerably below 150 kilotons. To be sure, that would not mean that all tests over a given yield could be detected and identified, but they could be detected and identified with a certain degree of probability. In any case, if tests can be detected and identified with a high probability, it can be said that the network used has a reasonable chance of detecting violations. In that connexion we have noted with interest a section of the memorandum on the ending of the arms race and disarmament submitted to this session of the General Assembly by the Soviet Union. That section reads as follows:

(Mr. Ogiso, Japan)

"The Soviet Union is convinced that no particular difficulties should arise in elaborating such a compromise basis for an agreement as would ensure a voluntary framework for taking decisions relating to on-site ascertaining of relevant circumstances and, at the same time, impart confidence to all parties to the treaty that the obligations are complied with. The Soviet Union stands ready to participate in a search for a universally acceptable understanding on this basis". (A/31/232, p. 7)

As for on-site inspections, we note that the Treaty between the United States and the Soviet Union on underground explosions for peaceful purposes provides for on-site inspections on a reciprocal basis in certain circumstances. We should like to welcome this provision if it is indeed a first step towards the settlement of their long-standing disagreement on on-site inspection. The threshold could no doubt be reduced drastically from 150 kilotons if on-site inspections were allowed even in a limited manner. We might even be able to achieve a comprehensive test ban at one stroke and without fixing any threshold, depending upon the provisions of the agreement on on-site inspection. We do not consider that that approach would in any way cut across the work being done in the Ad Hoc Group of Scientific Experts. On the contrary, we believe that the results obtained by the Group could be used in the approach which we are suggesting.

The fact that a variety of nuclear tests are being conducted while these efforts for a comprehensive test ban are being made inevitably arouses a deep feeling of dissatisfaction and helplessness in my delegation. We deplore the fact that in 1976 -- not to mention what happened earlier -- underground nuclear tests have been conducted by France, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the United States. We deplore also the fact that an atmospheric nuclear test recently was conducted by the People's Republic of China. Basing itself on our opposition to any nuclear test by any State, Japan reiterates its appeal for the immediate cessation of all nuclear tests.

(Mr. Ogiso, Japan)

While I have so far emphasized the views of my delegation on the question of nuclear disarmament, I do not wish to underestimate in any way the importance of other, non-nuclear disarmament measures. Of these, I shall speak first on banning chemical weapons, with regard to which the General Assembly adopted last year resolution 3465 (XXX) as a matter of high priority.

The question of banning chemical weapons is an item which the General Assembly for years has requested the CCD to treat as a matter of high priority. In the spring of 1974 my country submitted to the CCD a draft convention (CCD/420) on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction, using a phased approach, with a view to having it serve as a basis for discussion. In addition, my country has submitted a number of working papers and has thus actively participated in the international effort to draft a convention banning chemical weapons. At the CCD this year an informal meeting was held with the participation of experts, and towards the end a draft convention was submitted by the United Kingdom. As a result of the discussions at both formal and informal meetings, crucial points have been highlighted fairly clearly, and the outline of a text is gradually emerging.

In the definition of the scope of the chemical warfare agents which should be banned initially, the prevailing view was that we can use general-purpose criteria and supplement them with toxic criteria. As for verification, while on-site inspections undoubtedly are required for such specific purposes as the destruction of stockpiles, it is becoming widely recognized that national means of verification can be supplemented in a not unreasonably obtrusive manner.

(Mr. Ogiso, Japan)

A joint initiative of the United States and the Soviet Union on this matter has been expected since 1974, and we note that consultations took place between the two countries in Geneva in August of this year. We strongly hope that this joint proposal will be made soon and that the deliberations at next year's session of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament will provide the basis for substantial progress.

Next among the non-nuclear disarmament measures is the question of banning military or other hostile use of environmental modification techniques. My delegation notes with satisfaction that the draft convention on environmental modification techniques --- or the ENMOD draft convention, as it is often called -- has been submitted to the General Assembly at this session after intensive discussions in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament. The course of the discussions is shown in annex I of the report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the General Assembly, so I shall refrain from repeating here the position of my delegation except on a few basic issues.

As for article II, the examples listed in the original draft convention should have been retained in the form of an annex, forming an integral part of the convention, in order to avoid any possibility of future disputes concerning interpretation and to ensure correct application of the convention. For the same reason, the list of illustrative examples should have been as complete as possible. On the other hand, as a result of suggestions by many countries, including mine, a paragraph on the convening of a consultative committee of experts for the purpose of consultation and co-operation in solving problems in relation to the objectives and application of the convention has been included in article V, while the details of that committee are given in an annex and the provisions on review conferences have been placed in article VIII. These provisions would considerably reduce the difficulties involved in the application of the convention. While not all the views of my delegation have been incorporated in the draft convention, we recognize that it has emerged as a compromise formula incorporating the views of delegations to the maximum extent possible. My delegation hopes that at this session the General Assembly will commend the draft convention.

(Mr. Ogiso, Japan)

I now proceed to the question of banning weapons of mass destruction, on which two informal meetings, with the participation of experts, were held at the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament this year. As a result of those discussions it has become clear that the suggested definitions are wide-ranging and diverse and have given rise to fears of duplicating the bans on corresponding matters contained in existing disarmament agreements. Also, the suggested convention is intended to ban extremely hypothetical weapons. Consequently, though my delegation is in sympathy with the idea of banning weapons of mass destruction, it finds it hard to see the reason why the question of weapons of mass destruction should be given priority in terms of urgency and be discussed in preference to nuclear disarmament and the ban on chemical weapons. Therefore my delegation strongly urges that the discussion on the banning of weapons of mass destruction should in no way interfere with the discussion of such important issues as nuclear disarmament, including a comprehensive test ban and the banning of chemical weapons.

As the last item among non-nuclear measures I should like to discuss the importance of arms control and production in the case of conventional weapons. In his statement in the general debate of this session of the General Assembly, the Foreign Minister of my country, Mr. Kosaka, pointed out that in some areas of the world there has been a significant build-up of arms through the rapid importation of conventional weapons and that this trend may further intensify existing conflicts or lead to new disputes. He continued:

"My Government forbids the export of weapons to areas of conflict. I feel that the time has come to seek feasible ways to formulate international agreements on the transfer of weapons, in order to avoid encouraging international conflict. In the meantime, I should like to urge all countries concerned to take reciprocally prompt measures of self-restraint and to give serious consideration to all the implications of this matter." (A/31/PV.6, p.62)

As a step in that direction I would suggest that this Committee consider taking steps to study the current state of arms transfers with a view to encouraging the exercise of self-restraint by the States concerned in the exportation and acquisition of conventional arms on either a regional or a global basis. I wish to add that my delegation is ready to study carefully any other constructive propositions concerning this problem and to consult with States interested in it.

(Mr. Ogiso, Japan)

I have stated the views of my delegation on the question of arms control and disarmament, which are now being discussed in this Committee. In concluding I wish to reiterate my readiness to co-operate with you, Mr. Chairman, and with the representatives so that our discussions may lead to significant results. At the same time I request all nuclear-weapons States to initiate tangible disarmament measures as soon as possible by taking a wider view of the problem as a whole.

Mr. ORTIZ DE ROZAS (Argentina) (interpretation from Spanish): Fifteen years ago, when the General Assembly endorsed the creation of the organ now called the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament, in its resolution 1722 (XVI) the Assembly recommended that with the greatest urgency negotiations be undertaken to conclude an agreement on general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Despite the undeniable importance of this matter and the repeated appeals in which the United Nations has constantly stressed the need to carry out such efforts, regrettably we have to state that nothing has been done to achieve that objective, which, as far as Argentina and the majority of countries here represented are concerned, remains the permanent focus that gives its true importance and direction to our work.

(Mr. Ortiz de Rozas, Argentina)

Suffice it to read the pertinent section of the latest report of the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to the General Assembly (A/31/27) to see how scrupulously accurate my statement is. Time and again, in this Committee and in Geneva, we have stressed the fact that if we do not give due attention to that basic aspect of the disarmament deliberations the few isolated non-armaments measures that have been adopted in the last few years will become meaningless.

We have also stressed just as frequently that if we are resolutely to advance towards that final goal the first effective step must be that of nuclear disarmament in order to do away with the greatest threat which, with increasing danger, is still weighing on mankind. The situation in this field is still far from satisfactory. The multilateral negotiations so often urged by the General Assembly are non-existent, and bilateral negotiations, the object of which has so far been to maintain the nuclear balance, rather than to promote effective disarmament, are at a standstill.

We are obviously fully aware of the fact that the great Powers differ in their strategic concepts and in their own respective views on how best to protect their security. But, at the same time, we are obliged to recall that in our day and age the security of the world is far too closely linked to theirs for the rest of the international community to ignore the constant growth of the nuclear arsenals.

It is within this context that the views expressed by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of my country during the general debate acquire particular significance. He said:

"The United Nations has exerted tremendous efforts, by all the means at its command, to check the pace of the competitive armaments race among the great Powers. Hence it is the latter which must assume the essential responsibility of devoting greater efforts to achieve agreement on effective disarmament measures, giving priority to nuclear weapons." (A/31/PV.18, pp. 73-75 and 76)

(Mr. Ortiz de Rozas, Argentina)

We believe that that priority could not be altered without paying the far too high cost of diverting the attention of nations towards collateral matters. Both here and in the CCD, we have been made aware of the concern of those who see in the international trade in conventional weapons one of the greatest threats to peace. We might share that concern were we sure that it was directed towards an agreement to halt the production, development and dissemination of conventional weapons by the few countries that possess a significant military industry. But we do not share it at all if the intention is to indicate to the developing countries what level of military equipment is adequate to meet their defence needs.

The danger of a generalized war does not lie in the reduced military capacity of medium-sized or small States but basically in the quantity, diversity and destructive capacity of the weapons in the hands of the super-Powers.

In this connexion, it is very difficult to understand the special attention given by some of the great industrialized Powers to the way in which developing countries control and utilize nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. This perplexity becomes obvious when we note that between 1945 and 1975 those possessing nuclear weapons carried out 1,044 explosions of all types, when we see that they still have not shown sufficient political will to agree on the cessation of all types of weapons testing, and when they continue daily accumulating and stockpiling them without the world's having so far seen either the disappearance of a single nuclear warhead or the conclusion of a single measure of effective disarmament.

The Argentine Government believes that there is a link between vertical and horizontal nuclear proliferation so close that in some cases it could almost be considered a cause-and-effect relationship. The possibility that fears about horizontal proliferation might be confirmed is directly proportional to the persistent refusal of the nuclear-weapon States to reduce the number of such weapons and ultimately eliminate them from their arsenals.

(Mr. Ortiz de Rozas, Argentina)

I do not believe it would be appropriate here to state how many and how important would be the present and future benefits of the peaceful uses of atomic energy. However, I do believe it essential to stress the need to make a very clear distinction, conceptually and practically, as regards research which leads to the manufacture of nuclear weapons. To permit confusion between these two fields would be tantamount to granting the monopoly of nuclear technology to a few Powers and to condemning the developing countries, as was the case in previous centuries, to remain in a constant state of scientific dependency. Furthermore, to permit discriminatory criteria devised to benefit a minority to acquire a universal nature would be tantamount to tacit acceptance that the world is divided, as some would contend, into responsible and irresponsible nations, into suppliers of wisdom and minors incapable of governing their own actions.

May I now deal with an issue in which Argentina has been very actively involved both in the General Assembly and in the CCD in Geneva. I refer to item 45, which deals with a draft convention on the prohibition of military or any other hostile use of environmental modification techniques.

The Argentine delegation sponsored resolutions 3264 (XXIX) and 3475 (XXX). We did so in the conviction that we were encouraging the opening and development of meaningful multilateral negotiations on a subject which, although only collateral to the priority objectives of the international community, nevertheless was of significant importance for the future of mankind and might well pave the way for the consideration of other items with the participation of a greater number of countries, and thus contribute to making the disarmament negotiations less restrictive than they are at present.

(Mr. Ortiz de Rozas, Argentina)

Let us now see whether our hopes were well-founded. The resolution adopted by consensus at the thirtieth session of the General Assembly requested the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament:

"to continue negotiations, bearing in mind existing proposals and suggestions, as well as relevant discussion by the General Assembly, with a view to reaching early agreement ... on the text of a convention on the prohibition of military or other hostile use of environmental modification techniques, and to submit a special report on the results achieved for consideration by the Assembly at its thirty-first session." (General Assembly resolution 3475 (XXX))

That matter is now before us today in part III and annex I of the report of the CCD, to the content of which I shall now refer.

(Mr. Ortiz de Rozas, Argentina)

The first paragraph tells us that at the beginning of the 1976 session the delegations of the Soviet Union and the United States, as sponsors of the identical draft texts for a convention on environmental war, urged the Committee to reach an agreement in the course of the current year's session. The details of the negotiations appear in precise form in the next 115 paragraphs. May I point out, incidentally, that one third of that lengthy text is devoted to the discussion of article I of a draft convention of ten articles.

The fact that the bulk of the discussion concerned article I was not an accident. It is in that article that the scope of the agreement is defined; it is there that it is established whether the prohibition should be complete or partial; it is that article which defines the principal obligations of the States parties and the consequent requirements for the verification of the adequate implementation of the future treaty.

However, despite the time spent on the negotiation of that article and its undeniable importance, its wording is still identical with that of the original draft and does not include any proposal or suggestion out of the many that were put forward by other delegations. It still stipulates a partial prohibition, allowing the use of ecological or environmental war techniques that do not have "widespread, long-lasting or severe effects" and defining those terms in a very imprecise and ambiguous way.

The refusal to modify this provision was the main obstacle to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament's reaching an agreement, as requested by the General Assembly.

In fact, annex I of the report is very clear when it states that the Working Group of the CCD on the prohibition of environmental war "considered modifications proposed by various delegations to the identical texts of the draft conventions" and that there "was agreement on many of the modifications but no agreement on others". And then it adds that "The comments of some delegations on this text, as well as dissenting views or reservations, are given in paragraphs 6 to 19". (A/31/27, p. 86)

In short, we are confronted with a document that is the result of an intense and prolonged negotiating process, perhaps one of the most arduous and productive of those held by the Committee in Geneva, a process of the harmonizing of

(Mr. Ortiz de Rozas, Argentina)

positions that called for the efforts and goodwill of all delegations and which gave positive results in the majority of cases on a draft which today is significantly better than its original version.

Unfortunately, this work was not crowned with success so far as the precepts constituting the nucleus of the draft treaty itself are concerned.

We may return to this subject later, but the Argentine delegation does consider that the General Assembly should urge the CCD to continue to show the spirit of co-operation and understanding evinced during 1976 so that by the end of next year we shall be able to have an agreed document that will warrant the general support of the Members of the United Nations and can effectively safeguard mankind from the dangers of environmental war.

I could not leave reference to the CCD without stressing two points that we believe to be most promising. The first is the active deliberation of the Committee on the question of the prohibition of chemical weapons. On this subject I should like to express our appreciation to the delegation of the United Kingdom for the initiative it took in August 1976 in submitting a draft convention on the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical weapons and on their destruction. We have no doubt that that draft constitutes an adequate basis for the furtherance of negotiations in this respect.

The second is the exchange of opinions on the prohibition of the development and manufacture of new weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons held during the last part of the Committee's deliberations. Without in any way implying that this constitutes a value judgement on any of the proposals made, we believe that that discussion, although preliminary in character, opens up the possibility of preventing the arms race from assuming even more complex and more threatening dimensions than it already has.

Argentina has been one of the most active advocates of the efforts regarding the convening of a world disarmament conference. We have joined in sponsoring the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly on this subject in the last few years and we have constantly participated in the labours of the Ad Hoc Committee

(Mr. Ortiz de Rozas, Argentina)

which, as we can bear witness, have been intensive. However, in this field also the lack of agreement among the nuclear-weapon States has made any progress impossible. That elusive agreement which we believe to be indispensable for the conference to be able to carry out effective work seems still too distant. This is stated in the report of the Ad Hoc Committee which, in this aspect, is almost an exact repetition of the report submitted in 1975.

Therefore, this might be the right moment to take time for reflection and to pause in our work so as to be better able in the future to appreciate and to put in the right perspective all nuances of the difficulties with which we are confronted when discussing the question of the world disarmament conference.

The compelling certitude that there can be no lasting and secure peace without effective disarmament and that both concepts are closely linked to the needs of development must lead us to redouble our dedication, so that the General Assembly, the most representative organ of the United Nations, may re-examine the entire question of disarmament and democratically lay down the guidelines called for.

I refer to the idea of convening an eighth special session of the General Assembly, devoted to disarmament. This idea has already received the support of a majority of States representing all geographical areas of the world and, above all, the very significant support of the Heads of State or Government of the non-aligned nations recently convened in Colombo.

The Argentine Republic firmly supports this proposal and we believe it timely to make a few comments on it.

First, we believe that that special session should not be defined as or considered to be an alternative to or a substitute for or in any way exclusive of any other initiative undertaken in disarmament bodies. At the same time, we consider that it should not be characterized as preparation for any other international undertaking in that field with the exception of any that the Assembly in that special session may decide on in the exercise of its competence.

(Mr. Ortiz de Rozas, Argentina)

Secondly, we believe that the fact that the Assembly was convened should not be taken as passing a prior judgement on the effectiveness or existence of any negotiating body or machinery. Here again, it would be a responsibility of the eight special session to pronounce itself on these matters if it deemed that appropriate.

Thirdly, the preparation of all matters relative to the convening of that session must be very careful and adequately planned so as to ensure that it is representative and effective and that at the same time the equality of States in the decision-making process is guaranteed.

We are convinced that such a special session, as was the case with the sixth and seventh special sessions devoted to the problems of development and economic co-operation, would break the paralysing routine with which disarmament matters are discussed, encouraging new approaches that would awaken greater interest in the subjects themselves and stress the need to widen and deepen the negotiations in this field. By the same token, it might well galvanize public opinion in many countries, which quite justifiably has shown a certain indifference, if not scepticism, at the present state of affairs.

There can be no doubt that problems as delicate as these, closely linked as they are to the security of peoples and the sovereignty of nations, cannot suddenly be resolved simply by recommendations of the General Assembly; but the majority feeling in the United Nations unequivocally expressed may well lay the ground work for clear guide lines and directions to be drawn up that will deal in a balanced manner with the responsibilities and obligations on all of us to curb the arms race and give impetus to true disarmament measures. Furthermore, the special session might contribute to establishing a more logical and up-to-date ordering of the items which in the course of years have accumulated in the agenda before us.

(Mr. Ortiz de Rozas, Argentina)

The Argentine delegation considers that in order that the preparations for such an important meeting may be completed this Committee should authorize the Secretariat to take all necessary financial measures, which should include securing the specialists the staff at present lacks. I believe that if we take steps along these lines we shall cover much of the road which will lead to meaningful results at such a meeting.

I should not like to conclude this statement without reiterating the Argentine delegation's appreciation of the constant and constructive efforts of the delegation of Sweden to ensure that the Ad Hoc Committee on the Review of the Role of the United Nations in the Field of Disarmament successfully concludes its work. The report of the Ad Hoc Committee contains a series of agreed proposals which, generally speaking, have earned our support. Among these special mention should be made of those intended to strengthen the activities of the Secretariat and allow it fully to carry out its new functions. We are sure that they will improve the already effective and excellent work that the Disarmament Affairs Division has been carrying out for the past few years.

Lord GORONWY-ROBERTS (United Kingdom): I should like to begin today by expressing my great pleasure at taking part in the work of this thirty-first session of the United Nations General Assembly. This is the first occasion on which I have had the opportunity to address the First Committee. I am particularly glad that it should be under the distinguished chairmanship of Mr. Jaroszek, whose wide experience of arms control and disarmament negotiations will be invaluable to our work here.

In 1946 the General Assembly adopted a resolution recognizing the central role of disarmament in relation to peace and security. During the 30 years of United Nations history disarmament has been discussed in the Security Council, at every session of the General Assembly and in many other bodies. Our common purpose is general and complete disarmament under effective international control, although by general consent we have worked for a series of intermediate steps designed to reduce the level of armaments and to increase international confidence.

The United Kingdom has been active in all multilateral negotiations and has, I think, contributed to progress in many areas. My Government is determined to continue to contribute everything it can to international efforts to achieve realistic and practical measures of arms control and disarmament. If we in the international community can really reduce the danger of war in coming years, then perhaps we can leave a heritage for our children in which we can all take some pride.

Instead of trying to cover the whole disarmament field today, I intend to concentrate on three specific topics of great importance to the international community. They are: nuclear weapons, chemical weapons and world military expenditure. But it would be wrong to ignore other measures to be discussed here. In particular, we have before us two valuable results of hard work and constructive negotiation by representatives of many States. One is the draft treaty banning the use of environmental modification techniques in war and the other the report on the role of the United Nations in disarmament. We hope that both of these will command the widest possible support.

We also have before us a proposal of interest to every Member of the United Nations: the holding of a special session of the Assembly devoted

(Lord Goronwy Roberts, United Kingdom)

to disarmament. We believe that such a session, if properly prepared, could improve the prospects for multilateral disarmament negotiations. If the proposal is adopted we shall look forward to taking part in the preparations for the special session.

Coming to my first theme, nuclear weapons, the resolutions adopted by the General Assembly in past years show that there is overwhelming support for measures to prevent the proliferation of nuclear explosive devices and to stop the nuclear arms race. These were the main objectives of the most important arms control measure since the Second World War: the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.

The Non-Proliferation Treaty places obligations both on States which have nuclear weapons and on those which do not have them. The Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, springing from article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, are of course concerned with the strategic nuclear weapons of the United States and the Soviet Union. We wish the two Governments success in these crucial talks. Meanwhile it is essential that there should be no further spread of nuclear explosive devices. My Government has been much encouraged by recent ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, especially that of Japan, the 100th nation to ratify and one with an extensive and advanced civil nuclear industry. Support for this Treaty remains the best way to build up the necessary confidence between nations, so as to avert a spread of nuclear weapons which could have appalling consequences for the whole world.

(Lord Goronwy-Roberts, United Kingdom)

There are various ways in which the non-proliferation régime can be strengthened, without impairing the vigorous development of civil nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Since the last session of the Assembly and in the spirit of the Final Declaration of the Review Conference on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the international community has taken important steps in the field of nuclear arms control.

First, a great deal of attention has rightly been given to the call by the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference for the strengthening of common export requirements related to safeguards and for according them the widest possible measure of acceptance by all suppliers and recipients. The British Government, like others with advanced nuclear industries, has been working to ensure that we have a fully responsible nuclear export policy. We believe that our policy, announced by Mr. James Callaghan on 31 March, will meet the two essential requirements: first, sheer inadvertence or the pressures of commercial competition must not lead to the spread of the capability of making nuclear explosive devices; and, second, the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy should be available to all States. This most important question was the subject of a very comprehensive and farsighted statement by the President of the United States on 28 October which my Government and, I am sure, many others will be considering with great care and attention.

Second, and right in line with the call for strengthening international safeguards, has been the preparation by the International Atomic Energy Agency of arrangements to enable States not party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty to accept Agency safeguards on all their civil nuclear facilities. It is increasingly important that the development of one country's civil nuclear power industry should not be interpreted by others, especially neighbouring countries, as a threat to their national security. General acceptance of comprehensive safeguards will foster international confidence that the spread of nuclear weapons is indeed being limited. My Government gives firm support to International Atomic Energy Agency activities in this field and will continue to do all it can to ensure that the application of safeguards is simplified and made still more efficient. The United Kingdom, for its part,

(Lord Goronwy-Roberts, United Kingdom)

has voluntarily submitted to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards those parts of the British nuclear industry which support our civil nuclear programme. The agreement on this was signed in Vienna on 6 September. We hope that this and the similar United States voluntary offer will encourage other nuclear-weapon States to do likewise. We urge all non-nuclear-weapon States which have not yet done so to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty or, failing that, at the least to accept comprehensive International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards on all their civil nuclear activities, that is to say, safeguards on the full fuel cycle.

The third significant development in the field of nuclear arms control has been the association of many States with the International Atomic Energy Agency's Advisory Group studying peaceful nuclear explosions. That Group is preparing essential material on the technical and economic aspects of peaceful nuclear explosions, on the crucial issues of health and safety, on the important legal considerations which must be taken into account in drafting any international framework for the regulation of peaceful nuclear explosions. The Group is performing a most useful task, and it is right that the International Atomic Energy Agency continue to examine this question thoroughly.

The fourth step has been the bilateral Treaty governing Peaceful Nuclear Explosions recently concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States, limiting peaceful nuclear explosions to 150 kilotons, with important provisions for on-site inspection. This complements the threshold test-ban Treaty signed by those two countries in 1974. But, in offering our congratulations to the two Governments on the progress they have achieved, I recognize that those who have undertaken not to develop nuclear weapons naturally want such limitation agreements to be regarded as stages towards the goal of a comprehensive test ban treaty; and I entirely agree that we should press on with vigour towards that goal.

Consequently, we regard as important the fifth step, which was the decision by the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament to establish a group of governmental experts to study international co-operation in detecting and identifying seismic events. We are grateful to the Government of

(Lord Goronwy-Roberts, United Kingdom)

Sweden for its considerable work in making this proposal and developing it. Obviously seismic monitoring will form a most important element of the verification machinery of any comprehensive test ban treaty. We regard the work of that Group as a useful way of exploring what form this machinery might take and how it might be established. We look forward to sharing with other experts in the Group our own experience in the field of remote seismic monitoring, and we hope the Group will be joined by experts from every part of the world. I would remind the Committee that membership of that Group is open to all States.

In working for a comprehensive test ban we should concentrate on finding solutions to the two outstanding problems: verification and peaceful nuclear explosions. We must face the fact that, whatever improvements are made in seismological techniques, there will remain a threshold below which detection and identification of an explosion cannot be assured, and that leaves scope for evasion. In this context we are most interested in that passage of the memorandum of the Soviet Union which suggests that a compromise is possible on the basis of -- and here I quote the official translation:

"... a voluntary framework for taking decisions relating to on-site ascertaining of relevant circumstances".

Yesterday Mr. Kuznetsov repeated that point in his speech, and we look forward to further exploration and elaboration of these ideas. There is also the problem of ensuring that peaceful nuclear explosions do not provide the opportunity for clandestine benefits in relation to nuclear weapons. There is continued need for study and research into seismic methods of detection and identification of underground events, and for further examination of the role of peaceful nuclear explosions in the context of a comprehensive test ban treaty.

I now turn to my second main theme, the prohibition of chemical weapons. They are weapons of terrible potential and we ignore them at our peril. Their use during the First World War inspired the humanitarian concern which led to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. That banned the first use in war of chemical and biological weapons against other States party, and it has been largely observed to this day.

(Lord Goronwy-Roberts, United Kingdom)

Chemical weapons were not used during the Second World War, but several of the belligerents accumulated stocks. In one case these included agents many times more toxic than the chemical weapons used in the First World War. Since 1945, the British defence effort in this field has been devoted to protective measures -- and even they will only be necessary as long as we have to reckon with the possession of chemical weapons by other States.

Several nations have presented useful technical papers to the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on chemical weapons, and many of these have concentrated on the definition of agents which should be banned. My Government believes that there is in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament now a basis for general agreement on how to define those agents to be banned under any chemical weapons treaty.

(Lord Goronwy-Roberts, United Kingdom)

Our objective now should be to secure a comprehensive and verifiable prohibition of the production, stockpiling and use of chemical weapons. The United Kingdom on 12 August submitted a draft convention which tries to bring together the good work done since the conclusion of the biological weapons Convention in 1972 and incorporates many features from earlier East European and Japanese drafts. We hope it will give further impetus to the negotiations, with a view to real progress in 1977.

The United Kingdom draft convention, while comprehensive in its coverage, is phased in application. In the first stage, signatories would provide information on their stocks of chemical weapon agents and production facilities, and would stop further production. In the second phase, which would take place when an agreed minimum number of States had ratified the convention, the undertaking provisionally accepted on signature would become permanent and verification provisions to ensure that the convention was being observed by parties would come into force. These would include the setting up of a consultative committee to arrange for verification, inspection and the exchange of information. In the third stage existing stockpiles of chemical weapon agents would be destroyed or converted to peaceful use. We believe that the provisions in our draft represent the minimum level of verification which a chemical weapon agreement of this type would require. Shortly after we had submitted this draft convention, the United States and the Soviet Union resumed their bilateral discussions on chemical weapons initiated in 1974. We hope this, too, will contribute to progress in 1977.

At this point I might remind the Committee that in 1972 the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament successfully concluded a Convention on biological weapons to which 69 nations are now party. I urge those States which are not yet parties to adhere to the Convention and thus increase its effectiveness.

I now turn to my third main topic: world military expenditure. There is growing international concern at the high level of global military spending which includes an increase in the transfer of conventional weapons.

Many nations still consider that their security is threatened by others. That is why nations seek to deter aggression by providing themselves with the

(Lord Goronwy-Roberts, United Kingdom)

means of defence. And that in turn has led to a rising demand for more and better armaments. It is only too clear that weapons have become more complex and more expensive. In this respect there is a strong though unpredictable connexion between work in pure and in applied science; for example, the theoretical work of eminent physicists led to the conception of the atomic bomb. We do well to remember that conventional weapons are in daily use in conflicts throughout the world. Moreover, competitive acquisition of weapons can become a source of international tension and increase the risk of outright conflict. The economic consequences of diverting scarce resources from other uses should also not be neglected. These briefly are the effects of what is often called 'the arms race'.

The total value of global arms transfers, in constant 1973 dollar terms, increased by 60 per cent between 1965 and 1974. In that period, the level of arms imports by developed countries remained relatively constant at about \$2 billion each year. By contrast, arms imports by developing countries doubled to reach over \$6 billion. The rapid surge in arms deliveries to South-East Asia and the Middle East has accounted for virtually the whole of this increase, and as the Secretary-General pointed out in the introduction to his report on the work of the Organization: "The arms build-up in many particularly sensitive areas of the world has continued." (A/31/1/Add.1, p.11) The growth in quantity has been accompanied by a demand for even more advanced weapons systems.

This is another case where we must be realistic as well as idealistic. For many years to come nations will see external threats, and seek to arm themselves to deter aggression. Some can rely, at least partly, on the weapons of more powerful allies. But many, notably the non-aligned countries, are not in that position. If we are to tackle this problem we must begin from an awareness of the relationship between local and regional tensions and the acquisition of armaments.

The Director of the United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency suggested in the Conference of the Committee on Disarmament on 29 July this year certain principles which might govern the supply and the acquisition of arms. We believe they deserve very serious consideration by arms exporters and importers alike; and many countries, including Britain, are both.

(Lord Goronwy-Roberts, United Kingdom)

Some would argue that the first move lies with the arms suppliers, and there may indeed be scope for all of significant quantities of arms suppliers to agree to certain limits on the types of arms they are prepared to export. We believe that arms importers should be associated with any such arrangements, and this may prove to be most practicable on a regional basis.

Certain Latin American States made an encouraging start in this direction in the Declaration of Ayacucho, which asserts the principle of collective restraint. In Europe, the negotiations in Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions provide an opportunity to bring greater stability to an area where forces are heavily concentrated and where the consequences of conflict would be disastrous for all. We should like to see further groups of countries examining the possibilities of regional arms limitation, and suppliers playing their part also.

The rise in conventional arms transfers is only one aspect of growing military expenditure in many parts of the world. The Secretary-General's Group of Experts on Military Budgets has now reported to the Assembly on how the military budgets of the various countries might be fairly compared. This work will now have to be tested in practice, and I hope that with the necessary measure of international co-operation it will prove to be a sound basis for progress towards international agreement on reducing military expenditure throughout the world.

(Lord Goronwy-Roberts, United Kingdom)

Nations continue to believe that they need weapons for self-defence and that, indeed, their possession acts as a deterrent and keeps the peace. But it is an uneasy peace in many parts of the world and we should feel much safer -- and consume less of our scarce resources -- if it depended upon a far lower level of armaments. This, in my view, is what should be a product of real détente, a determination to take practical measures to reduce the burden of military expenditure. It should be our aim to move from deterrence based on massive armaments to a position of mutual trust and a lower level of armaments which would in time eliminate threats to the security of us all.

To sum up, my Government attaches the highest priority to international efforts to prevent the further spread of nuclear weapons, including the strengthening of International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. We consider that there is now a good opportunity for progress towards the prohibition of chemical weapons and the destruction of existing stockpiles. We wish to see a reduction of global military spending and the halting of the vast build-up of conventional weapons throughout the world.

It is my belief that, given the political will to work together for these objectives, we can achieve progress in the limitation and control of arms by the end of the Disarmament Decade.

The CHAIRMAN: I thank the representative of the United Kingdom, for his kind words addressed to me personally.

The meeting rose at 1.15 p.m.