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TABULATED SUMMARY OF MATERIAL
CONTAINED IN THE WRITTEN AND ORAL STATEMENTS
SUBMITTED TO THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PALESTINE
BEFORE THEIR DEPARTURE FROM JERUSALEM

INTRODUCTION

1. This tabulated summary of the material contained in the most important of the written statements and in the oral statements submitted to the Committee before their departure from Jerusalem, is not intended to be exhaustive, but to indicate briefly some of the facts, opinions, and recommendations which were presented in respect of a number of important points.
2. These points have been selected on the basis of the material itself and because they are most frequently dealt with by organizations and individuals who propose solutions for the problem of Palestine. They are as follows:

PART I. FACTS AND OPINIONS

Chapter I. Administration of the Mandate: Relations between the Mandatory Power and the Arab and Jewish Communities.

" II. Present State of Public Security.

" III. National Home (including political aspects of immigration).

" IV. Relations between Arabs and Jews.

/Chapter V.

Chapter V. The Present Economic Situation.

A) The Economic Structure of Palestine

- (1) Population
- (2) The economic separateness of Arab and Jewish economies
- (3) Agriculture
- (4) Industry
- (5) Foreign trade

B) Current Economic Trends

- (1) War-time and Post-War Inflation
- (2) Problems of Reconversion from War to Peace

" VI. Economic Development.

A) Economic Absorptive Capacity

- (1) General
- (2) Physical Resources
- (3) Economic and Sociological Factors

B) Economic Development

" VII. Cultural and Educational Questions.

" VIII. Social Questions and Social Services.

" IX. Religious Factors and Holy Places.

" X. Jewish Refugees (Displaced Persons).

" XI. War Effort.

PART II. SPECIFIC PROPOSALS

3. In the case of every subject dealt with, either in Part I or Part II, the relevant portion of the contents of each statement submitted to the Committee is set out. The statements of the Palestine Government and of the Jewish Agency for Palestine are listed first. The other statements are listed in the alphabetical order of their sponsors. Not all statements are referred to under every subject heading, because some of them may contain material on only some of the subjects.

4. A brief description of each of the statements submitted and a list of the oral hearings are set out respectively as Annexes to this paper.

PART I -- FACTS AND OPINIONS

Chapter I

Administration of the Mandate: Relations between the
Mandatory Power and the Arab and Jewish Communities.

1) GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE

Memorandum on the Administration of
Palestine under the Mandate (Jerusalem
1947).

1) The policy of His Majesty's Government to the end of giving effect to the obligations under the Mandate was outlined in the statement of "British Policy in Palestine" published in June 1922 by Mr. Winston Churchill, then Secretary of State for the Colonies. This statement (pages 17-21 of Cmd. 1700) interpreted the Balfour Declaration in the following terms:-

"Unauthorized statements have been made to the effect that the purpose in view is to create a wholly Jewish Palestine. Phrases have been used such as that Palestine is to become "as Jewish as England is English". His Majesty's Government regard any such expectation as impracticable and have no such aim in view.... They would draw attention to the fact that the terms of the Declaration referred to do not contemplate that Palestine as a whole should be converted into a Jewish National Home, but that such a Home should be founded in Palestine... Further, it is contemplated that the status of all citizens of Palestine in the eyes of the law shall be Palestinian, and it has never been intended that they, or any section of them, should possess any other juridical status....

"When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the

/existence...

existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed; and that this should be formally recognized to rest upon ancient historic connection."

2) It was recognized that further Jewish immigration was necessary to fulfill this aim, but such immigration "could not be so great in volume as to exceed whatever might be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals."

3) It was also the declared intention of His Majesty's Government to foster the establishment of a full measure of self-government in Palestine, though this should be accomplished by gradual stages.

4) The Mandate imposed both general and specific obligations --- the former in respect of the development of Palestine in the interests of the people as a whole -- the latter in respect of facilitating the Jewish National Home. Attention is drawn particularly to Articles 2, 3, 4, 7, 11, 13, 14, 15, 18, 22, and 25 of the Mandate. (See paragraph 3, page 2 of statement).

5) In 1924 the Permanent Mandates Commission pointed out that the "twofold duty" imposed by Mandate resulted in a "conflict of interests" between which a balance had to be held. This task fell to the lot of the Mandatory Power and inevitably affected shaping of the Administration in all its branches. A full reconciliation of these conflicting interests was only possible on the basis of "an understanding between Jews and Arabs".

6) The White Paper of 1939 was promulgated in order to provide a clear definition of policy after Jews and Arabs had failed to agree on a basis of cooperation.

7) The Foreign Secretary summarised the situation as follows to the House of Commons on November 13, 1945:

/"His Majesty's ...

"His Majesty's Government have made every effort to devise some arrangements which would enable Arabs and Jews to live together in peace and to co-operate for the welfare of the country, but all such efforts have been unavailing. Any arrangement acceptable to one party has been rejected as unacceptable to the other. The whole history of Palestine since the Mandate was granted has been one of continued friction between the two races, culminating at intervals in serious disturbances. The fact has to be faced that since the introduction of the Mandate it has been impossible to find common grounds between the Arabs and the Jews. The differences in religion and in language, in cultural and social life, in ways of thought and conduct, are difficult to reconcile. On the other hand, both communities lay claim to Palestine, one on the ground of a millenium of occupation, and the other on the ground of historic association coupled with the undertaking given in the first world war to establish a Jewish home. The task that has to be accomplished now is to find means to reconcile these divergencies."

8) The practical task of administration was to establish a form of government under which the development of a backward population could be harmonised with the rapid assimilation of a large number of immigrants. "It was presumed that in the system of administration established, the co-operation of the two peoples to work towards a common end would be secured. That this expectation has not been realized is attributable to a complex of factors including, but by no means confined to, those springing from politics, with some deriving from the Mandate itself."

9) The differences in sociological and cultural background of Arabs and Jews (especially immigrants) are very marked. Nevertheless they have in common a previous experience of oppression and interest in advance towards self-government in Palestine. However, each wishes to be the governing element. The fear of domination by the other is deep and widespread in both communities and is the most serious obstacle to co-operation.

10) The Arabs of Palestine have never accepted the validity of the Balfour Declaration. Palestine is claimed as a wholly

/Arab country....

Arab country. Behind this is a fear of economic domination of the Jews, followed by a political domination.

11) The Jews, on the other hand, accepted the 1922 statement, and the National Home came into being on a Jewish basis which prevented the assimilation of the Jewish community with the Arab. "This need not in itself have precluded the finding by agreement of at least a temporary modus vivendi if the Arabs had not, during the earlier period, proved so intractable, and if the Jewish economic system had been less exclusive racially. After the Jewish population had been more than doubled by immigration in the years 1932-1936 and when the cruel pressure of events in Europe was having its effect on the community in Palestine, the intransigent immoderation of the Jewish attitude was no less remarkable than that of the Arabs."

12) The Mandate did not apply itself to the principles of bridging the gap between Jew and Arab and thus its operation tended to stimulate separatist tendencies. The Jewish Agency, when it has limited itself to advising and co-operating with the Administration in matters affecting the Jewish Home, has been of substantial assistance to the Administration. "In fact, however, the Jewish Agency has not observed its terms of reference and has thus increased the element of disproportion given to the affairs of Palestine by the signaling of a Jewish agency in a special constitutional position."

13) Attempts to create a local representative legislative body failed because of Arab objections in 1922 and Jewish objections in 1936. In time this task has been rendered more difficult by the fact that the Jewish Agency "represents not only the Jewish community in Palestine", but Zionists throughout the world. Here its influence and resources greatly

/exceed

exceed those of any local body.

14) Disparity between Jews and Arabs has been accentuated by a narrow interpretation of Article 15 which guarantees the right of each community to its own schools and language.

Given the basic differences already pointed out the maintenance of three official languages also tends to rigidity and makes administration cumbersome and costly.

15) When account is taken of these conflicting elements it must be pointed out that a common administrative framework has enabled the mass of people, (apart from intermittent disturbances) to carry on day to day business, to worship freely and to seek recreations without hinderance.

16) Apart from the General Agricultural Council (whose functions have now passed elsewhere) and the Citrus Control and Marketing Boards, co-operation in economic matters has also been disappointing. The main obstacle to such co-operation is generally the demand for "parity" - i.e. equal representation.

17) In these circumstances the Administration, attempting to maintain a balance between the conflicts of interest is subject to condemnation from both parties, neither of which recognizes the extent to which its own unwillingness to co-operate and compromise has influenced the tempo of development.

18) The Jewish achievements have been remarkable but the Jewish community generally fails to appreciate the fact that "underlying the Jewish structure is the Administration's foundation". "In fact, however, the creation of conditions under which the National Home could be built and can continue to flourish is an essential part of the upbuilding and can no more be dissociated from it than the foundations from the house. The creation of these conditions was the work of the Mandatory Administration and the question now for examination is the extent to which this work has been facilitated or otherwise by the manner of construction of the National Home."

/19) The greater...

19) The greater disparity between the groups economically and socially the greater the difficulty of harmonising the conflicting interests. Hence the development of the Arab community was an essential duty of the Administration. Jewish development has undoubtedly materially assisted Arab development. Nevertheless the discrepancy between Arab and Jewish communities "caused by the manner of the growth of the National Home", is one of the most serious problems affecting the well-being of Palestine as a whole, and hence of the National Home.

20) The fact that Jewish development has been made possible by large capital imports from many parts of the world has greatly developed the material resources of the country but it has also tended to increase the disparity between Jewish and Arab economic conditions, since Arabs have no comparable source of capital.

21) The Administration has had to carry out development works in a manner which would benefit the whole population. (See paragraph 24, pp. 10, 11).

22) Jewish capital investment has greatly benefited Arab development but "the plain fact remains that their large capital and recurrent expenditure, their plans for development and their elaborate social structure are intended primarily, almost exclusively, for Jews".

23) The Arab community is not organized towards co-ordinated development. The economic enterprises of Arabs are local, individualistic and often mutually competitive. The major Arab occupation is agriculture and here there has been great achievement in the last 25 years. The Arabs have few industries but they have shown themselves capable of a high standard of skill.

24) "The conception of economic absorptive capacity must be fluid and, let it be said at once, it is a matter on which even expert opinions may honestly differ. Be this as it may, it has

/fallen to the

fallen to the Mandatory to be the arbiter at all stages in the development of Palestine since the occupation on the degree of economic absorptive capacity currently existing. While recognizing that the hostility of the Arabs towards Jewish immigration must have economic importance, the Administration has generally taken no account of political, social and psychological considerations in applying the principle of economic absorptive capacity to Jewish immigration. Recognition has been given to the fact that the National Home depended for its economic development on immigration and that investment in it had to some extent been contingent on the assumption that immigration would be continuous. Nevertheless, it became necessary, in the fulfilment of the dual obligation imposed by the Mandate -- let it be repeated, for the fulfilment of both parts of the obligation imposed by the Mandate -- to restrict immigration and the further acquisition of land by persons other than Palestinian Arabs. Both measures have been bitterly resented and actively opposed by the Jews who have represented that they are contrary to His Majesty's Government's obligations under the Mandate; both have been condemned by the Arabs as too liberal to safeguard the position in Palestine of that community."

25) The White Paper of 1939 explained that political conditions as well as economic absorptive capacity would have to be taken into account in determining immigration policy. Immigration was accordingly restricted to 75,000 for the five year period ending May 1944 and has subsequently been fixed (December 1945) at 1,500 per month.

26) The Administration has continued to adhere to the principles of the White Paper. No progress has been made, however, towards a political reconciliation of the two groups. The tendency of both has been towards a more exclusive

/assertion

assertion of their rights. This disparity has not been lessened but rather increased by the economic prosperity and added financial resources brought by the war.

27) "Community of interests, even more than material resources, is fundamental to any large scale planning. The creation of that community of interests has hitherto been precluded by the predominance of political influences. It may be that at any given time a few more battalions or aeroplanes or tanks would, as has sometimes been represented, have produced a different frame of mind in one or other of the local communities. It may be that it would not, but in any event what frame of mind would it have produced in the other community? It has seemed to the Palestine Government that only through free recognition by both Arabs and Jews of the position, needs and rights of the other community, through free recognition by them of their mutual responsibility and interdependence and by the willingness of each to contribute according to his means and the need of the other, not only in material things but morally, that the well being of the people of Palestine as a whole can be ensured and the National Home established. The courage, imagination and will to compromise required to achieve these ends can not be imposed but must be sought from the two peoples primarily concerned."

2) JEWISH AGENCY

1) "It will be to the everlasting credit of the British people that it was the first in modern times to undertake the restoration of Palestine to the Jewish people". (Mr. Ben Gurion's Statement, 16th meeting of UNSCOP, page 14).

2) Today, the Mandatory admits that it has failed and the

/Administration....

Administration dislikes the Mandate. In the history of the Mandate, there were, however, administrators who tried to carry out their duties faithfully; for instance, Lord Plumer (1926-27) (idem. page 61).

3) The Mandatory Administration have carried out works of which no administration need be ashamed, for example, Haifa Port and many excellent roads. It has afforded relief from the heavy agricultural taxes which oppressed the rural population in Turkish times. It has created the Government health and educational services - which serve only the Arabs. (Mr. Ben Gurion's Statement, 16th Meeting of UNSCOP, p. 74).

4) Yet, the Mandate for Palestine has not been implemented, its primary purpose has not been carried out and was very often obstructed even before the 1939 White Paper. The Mandatory in Palestine failed not because Jews and Arabs did not cooperate, but because the Mandatory refused to cooperate with the Mandate (idem, p. 74).

5) The Government has done almost nothing for the National Home and very little for the inhabitants of the country. (idem, p. 62).

6) The Administration has yielded to Arab obstruction, for instance, in the question of the mayoralty in Jerusalem. There had always been an Arab mayor in Jerusalem. The Jews, being the majority, asked for a change. The result is that for two years Jerusalem has not enjoyed elementary municipal government. Following the rejection by the Arabs of the Administration's scheme of rotation for the mayoralty (Moslem Mayor, Christian Mayor, Jewish Mayor in turn) the Municipal Council was disbanded and a direct British rule instituted in the City Hall. It meant a victory for boycotting tactics (Mr. Shertok, 35th Meeting of UNSCOP, page 2).

/There is now

7) There is now a conflict between the Mandatory Power and the Jewish people, a conflict of two unequal parties. One is a small, weak people, the other a powerful world empire, which is in Palestine only as temporary trustee to carry out an international mandate under specific conditions and with a specific purpose, viz., to give effect to the internationally guaranteed pledges given to the Jewish people in the Balfour Declaration. (Mr. Ben Gurion's Statement, 16th Meeting of UNSCOP, p. 13).

8) The conflict is a result of the policy of the 1939 White Paper. The White Paper is destroying the Mandate, has removed the moral and legal basis of the present regime in Palestine. It is an arbitrary rule based on force alone. It is contrary to the wishes of the population, it causes untold sufferings to the Jewish people and threatens its national existence. It is incompatible with international obligations and good faith. (Mr. Ben Gurion's Statement, 16th Meeting, page 75).

9) As stated by the Jewish Agency on 17 May 1939, the day on which the White Paper was issued, the Jewish people "regard this breach of faith as a surrender to Arab terrorism. It delivers Great Britain's friends into the hands of those who are fighting her. It must widen the breach between Jews and Arabs, and undermine the hope of peace of Palestine. It is a policy in which the Jewish people will not acquiesce. The new regime announced in the White Paper will be devoid of any moral basis and contrary to international law. Such a regime can only be set up and maintained by force." (idem., page 31).

10) It is evident from the statements and policies which have emanated from the present British Government that

/it is not

it is not prepared for a return to the full implementation of the Mandate as interpreted prior to the 1939 White Paper.

The British Government has repeatedly declared the Mandate to be unworkable. As the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League once stated, the Mandate becomes unworkable when the Mandatory Power regards it as such (Political Survey, 1946-1947, para. 84).

12) Moreover, a return to the pre-1939 regime would today be advocated "by few voices in the Jewish camp". The betrayal of the trust in 1939 and the events of the past two years have destroyed confidence in the Mandatory Power and the Palestine Administration. Besides, the Jewish community has outgrown the old tutelage -- the system of restrictions and frustrations which have hampered its growth during the past 25 years. It feels ready for the assumption of national sovereignty. It demands a final settlement (idem., para. 84).

3) AGUDATH ISRAEL ORGANIZATION

(Memorandum submitted to UNSCOP, June 1947).

1) Since the Balfour Declaration relations between the Mandatory Power and the Jewish people had been both cordial and sincere.

2) The policy of the White Paper of 1939 is responsible for the growing tenseness of relations, which has resulted in deplorable incidents. The tension has been aggravated by the persistent refusal of the Mandatory to implement the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry. (Paragraph B, 7).

/1) AMERICAN JEWISH

4) AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

(Statement dated May 31, 1947).

1) The American Jewish Committee indulges "in no harsh invective against the Mandatory Power". During the first 25 years of the British Administration about 500,000 Jews entered Palestine and in the main Great Britain followed a course that was reasonably consistent with her tradition of democracy and her leadership among the nations of Europe in the abolition within its own borders of the civil disabilities of Jews.

2) But the White Paper of 1939 represented a complete reversal of conduct on the part of the Mandatory and constituted a complete violation of its obligations as trustee. The continuation of that White Paper policy is the root cause of the present terror, repression and bloodshed.

5) AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE

(Statement submitted to UNSCOP, June 5, 1947).

1) Clear and sufficient evidence exists that the human and material assets of the mandated territory are in the process of being destroyed by the present guardian of the territory. (page 17).

2) The course on which the Mandatory has embarked carries with it the imminent danger of plunging Palestine into total chaos which might well lead to the final destruction of a people whose fate has now become the concern of the United Nations. (page 17).

6) ANGLO-JEWISH ASSOCIATION

(Memorandum submitted to UNSCOP, 24 June, 1947).

1) It is to the credit of the Mandatory regime that Jews have, in fact, been settled in Palestine in considerable
/numbers...

numbers.

2) Due credit must be given to the British Administration for the creation of an orderly system of Government, the progressive development of the public services and the execution of important public works. Without these, the Jewish effort would have been crippled.

3) What the Jews have achieved in Palestine is however in the main the fruit of Jewish exertions.

7) BNE-HORIN MOVEMENT

(Memorandum to UNSCOP, 28 June, 1947).

1) The Bne-Horin Movement accuses the local administration of anti-Zionist feelings, and maintains that the Mandatory has conceived as its principal duty the protection of the Arabs against "the menace of the alien invasion". The British have pushed "the most chauvinistic and intolerant Arab reactionaries" into prominent positions, while "the moderate Arabs have been discouraged and deprived of any influence."

8) CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF PALESTINE

(Memorandum - 5 July, 1947).

- 1) Palestine is ruled on the lines of a Crown Colony.
- 2) The municipal and local council areas are not governed democratically. The franchise is subject to various qualifications, including rate-paying requirements. In most municipalities, no elections have taken place for the last 12 years.
- 3) The "budget" is dictated by Government without consultation of the population.

/9: THE COUNCIL

9) THE COUNCIL OF THE ASHKENASIC JEWISH COMMUNITY --
JERUSALEM

(Statements to UNSCOP - July 1947).

1) After confirmation of the Mandate in 1922, the Palestine Government began to adopt a negative attitude towards the Ashkenasic Jewish Community Council and recognized the free-thinking Community Councils of the Zionists. The Ashkenasic Council opposes these General Councils because:

a) According to the Torah, a religious community must recognize the Torah in all public affairs and communal arrangements. Such obligatory recognition must be made the basis of the constitution of a Jewish community.

b) According to the Torah, women can not take part in nor can they be elected to Committees of Communities. No man can take part in elections granting franchise to women.

c) No one who is not religious, desecrates the Sabbath and infringes dietary laws may be a member of the Executive Committee of the community or express an opinion on the administration of affairs of religious Jews.

d) Support of free-thinking schools or institutions where Sabbath is desecrated or dietary laws infringed, is prohibited.

e) No observant Jew may become Member of a community that refuses to accept and embody the above-mentioned foundations in the constitution of the community.

10) FIGHTERS FOR THE FREEDOM OF ISRAEL.
(LOHAMEY HERUTH ISRAEL).

(Memorandum to UNSCOP, June 1947).

1. The Fighters for the Freedom of Israel strongly criticize the Mandatory on the count that the administration has not helped to develop the National Home, but has deliberately put up barriers to immigration and to Jewish acquisition of land in order to dodge its obligations under the Mandate, and to prolong British rule in Palestine.

- 2) The Mandatory is accused of inciting the Arab revolt of 1936 (p. 20).
- 3) The Jews accepted the White Paper of 1939 at the time it was promulgated as a necessary concession to the Arabs to keep them from joining the Axis, but the subsequent Land Regulations and the bar of Palestine to Jews escaping the massacre in Europe were blows which the Jews could not accept.
- 4) Many Jews learned in 1939 that the real enemy was not the Arabs but the British. "The dispute between Jews and Arabs was the outcome of British intrigues, for Arabs were not the rulers of this country and neither did they deprive us of our natural rights." (p. 23).

11) IHUD (UNION) ASSOCIATION OF PALESTINE

(Statement by Dr. Magnes before UNSCOP).

- 1) It would appear from the memorandum of Government - but it is not true for example of the administration of a High Commissioner like Sir Arthur Walker who did a great deal of bridge-building between Arabs and Jews - that the Mandate was a sort of umpire in a prize-ring. (Dr. Magnes, 30th Meeting of UNSCOP, page 39).
- 2) I am not criticising the British officials. I regard them as good and able men. What we contend is that there are Jews and Arabs - and many of them - who could fill posts of great authority in the Central Government. This should be done at once. (Dr. Magnes, 30th Meeting of UNSCOP, page 12).

12) IRGUN ZVAI LEUMI

(Memorandum, pages 5-12).

- 1) British Administration in Palestine began with the promised "advancement of the Jewish National Home", developed into the "protection of the defenceless Jewish minority from

/the Arab

the Arab majority", and threatens to end with the "protection of the Arab inhabitants against the aggressive Jewish minority. These declarations of the British mission in Palestine cloak the real purpose of British occupation: to dominate the country and to convert it into a military base for the whole of the Middle East. To this end, the Mandatory wishes either to perpetuate her direct rule or to rule through a puppet government.

2) The achievement of the real object -- British control of the Middle East -- to which the Mandate for Palestine was to contribute, was planned at a series of conferences in Cairo and Jerusalem in March and April, 1921. A secret White Paper was issued. The Irgun calls for the production of that document by the United Kingdom, and, failing that, by the Jewish Agency, which it says possesses a copy. (Page 8).

3) In addition, the severing of Transjordan from Palestine was the result of a deliberate British plan. France renounced her claim to Transjordan, at the insistence of Great Britain, on the grounds that Transjordan was essential for the Jewish National Home and was required for the "forthcoming Zionist Government".

13) LEAGUE FOR PEACE WITH JUSTICE IN PALESTINE

(Memorandum, June 5, 1947).

The Mandate is denounced as an illegal document which disregards the rights of the Arabs in Palestine while protecting those of an "alien population in foreign lands whose right to immigrate into Palestine had never been established."

14) THE NATION ASSOCIATES

(Memorandum, April, 1947).

1) "No sooner had the Mandate for Palestine been granted than the Mandatory Government undertook a series of activities

/which sharply

which sharply limited and contravened its pledges." In particular:

(a) The separation of Transjordan from Palestine reduced the area in which the National Home could be established to 10,400 square miles. The establishment of Transjordan in 1946 as an independent state was the "climax" of British action flouting the terms of the Mandate.

(b) Except for the electrical and potash concessions, little specific action was undertaken by the Mandatory to promote the Jewish National Home. The number of immigrants "fell below the absorptive capacity of the country as created by the Jews themselves". Jewish settlement on the land was not encouraged. Neither were agricultural state lands set aside for the purpose, nor were the agrarian and fiscal systems helpful to Jewish colonization.

(c) By refusing to admit Jews to Palestine during the critical period of Nazi persecution, the British "became responsible for exposing the Jews to the Nazi extermination program". (pp. 23-26).

(d) The development of self-government has been extremely slow, despite the keen interest and desire of the population to develop self-governing institutions. (p. 27).

(e) The British did little for the Arabs, either, particularly towards improving the education system and the agricultural and industrial development of Palestine.

2) The British have followed a policy of "placating and supporting the Arab rulers" and have at the same time

/violated

violated their pledges to the Jews in order to keep British influence strong in Palestine in defence of oil interests and the Suez Canal. (pp. 69-81).

15) VAAD LEUMI

(Memorandum on Local Government in Palestine)

1) The purpose of the Memorandum is to show that the Government of Palestine has not fulfilled its obligation under Article 3 of the Mandate "to encourage, so far as circumstances permit, local autonomy."

Historical

2) When the British occupied Palestine, 22 Arab Municipal Councils existed, possessing in theory broad powers, but in fact almost none. In the rural areas, the Mukhtars, nominees of the Turkish Government, controlled the villages. The Jewish settlements, on the other hand, had democratic local institutions which performed a number of governmental services but had no legal basis.

3) The British Administration brought little change apart from small reforms in the sphere of finance. As regards Municipal Corporations, the Ordinance of 1934 did not substantially increase democratic control and autonomy. As regards Local Councils, the Ordinance of 1921, while intending to bring an appreciable measure of local autonomy, has in practice become more and more restrictive until the hold of the Administration over the Councils is no less absolute than over the Municipalities.

4) Following the strong criticism by the Royal Commission in 1937 that local autonomy was not being developed in rural areas, the Government in 1940 appointed an official Committee, without any public representation, which held secret meetings

/and made

and made a confidential report. The result was the Village Administration Bill of 1943, a measure which does not represent the wishes and desires of the people, and which repeats what the Royal Commission condemned in that it does not relax in any way the hold of the Administration over Local Government.

5) The Royal Commission had likewise criticized municipal government, and recommended that the Government obtain the services of an expert authority to undertake a comprehensive examination of the structure of the Local Government of Palestine with a view to its complete overhaul. Although several amendments were made to the Municipal Corporations Ordinance during and after the War, no change in principle was adopted. The Government did not put the recommendation into effect, but after formally declaring its adoption, delayed its implementation with the clause "as soon as may be practicable."

Self-Government and the Jewish Community

6) According to estimates for the beginning of 1947, 630,000 Jews live in Palestine. The great majority of them - 87% - live in towns, settlements, and villages where municipal councils or local councils are established. There are no village councils in Jewish villages. Although a number of Arab municipal councils are less developed than several Jewish local councils, the Government have not accorded the latter the status of municipal council. Only Tel-Aviv and Petah Tiqva have been raised from the status of local council to municipal council. A table on pages 7 and 8 of the Memorandum gives a complete list of the Jewish local authorities, indicating the population and areas of jurisdiction.

• /7) The number ...

7) The number of Jewish inhabitants in the five mixed towns nearly equals the total number of inhabitants of the two Jewish municipalities. A table on page 8 indicates the distribution of population in the five mixed municipal councils - Jerusalem, Haifa, Jaffa, Tiberias and Safad.

8) From the largest municipality - Tel-Aviv - to the smallest Jewish local council, with very little distinction, "the powers of arbitration action by the central or district Administration in relation to purely local affairs and their powers of control and direction are so extensive and absolute that one is compelled to conclude that no local self-government or autonomy ... exists in Palestine".

Self-governing Local Institutions

9) The Government is bound to observe some constitutional procedures in establishing or altering municipalities, but no such procedures are established in the case of local or village councils. As a result, the arbitrarily fixed areas for newly created local councils have sometimes been contrary to the wishes and interests of the overwhelming majority of the inhabitants.

The Franchise

10) The qualifications of voters and of councillors usually include a rate-paying requirement. Particularly in the case of Arab and mixed municipalities, where the financial requirement is higher than in the Jewish municipalities and local councils, and where the interest in municipal affairs is less, this limitation predetermines the social composition of the councils and results in domination by the Effendi and well-to-do classes. The number of qualified voters in the Arab and mixed municipalities at the first elections held in 1934 under the Municipal Corporations Ordinance was extremely small, and has remained so. The Government has paid little heed to repeated popular demands for broadening of the franchise. A table on

page 10 indicates the proportion between the number of inhabitants and electors in various Arab towns in the elections of 1934 and 1936 respectively. Another table on the next page shows the population and the number of electors in various Jewish local councils.

11) Besides the fact that the financial requirement for voting has so limited the electorate, particularly in the Arab communities, it is also objected to on the ground that it does not correspond with the voting right granted to Jews by the Jewish Community Voting Regulations.

Internal Administration

12) The chief officers of all municipalities, local councils, and village councils are, with a few exceptions, appointed and dismissed by the Administration. While Governmental designation or approval may be justified in mixed municipalities where appointments may have political significance, no such considerations apply to the Arab and Jewish Communities.

13) The Memorandum lists on pages 12 to 14 the powers of the High Commissioner and the District Commissioners respectively in regard to the internal affairs of Municipal Corporations.

Finance

14) Dissatisfaction with what the Vaad Leumi terms the "backward, inadequate, and inequitable system of taxation" and with the "conservative and out-of-date financial policy" of the Government is one of the chief sources of irritation on the part of the Jewish Community. Local taxation is based mainly on the rating of immovable property, which bears little relation to the actual position and capacity of the taxpayer to participate in local expenditure. During the War,

/the introduction

the introduction of a local business tax brought a measure of graduation into the system of local taxation. Municipal corporations are however not free to levy other taxes, although the local councils have been permitted to institute all kinds of rates. This is particularly inequitable in view of the national income tax. Local authorities are not permitted to levy local income tax or to add to the Government income tax a certain limited percentage for their own purposes, nor do they receive any share of Government revenue from the income tax by way of grants-in-aid or subsidies.

15) Strict control over every rate, tax, fee, or charge, and over every expenditure, places local administration at the mercy of the Government. The chief complaint is that the Government does not permit sufficient indebtedness to support development projects, even when the local money market is easy and capital is seeking opportunities for investment.

16) The Memorandum compares the indebtedness of the local administrations in Palestine (only 26% of the yearly expenditure in 1927-28, rising to 38% in 1937-38 and dropping again in 1943-44 to 31.4%) with that of local administrations in the United Kingdom (in 1913-14, 375% of the yearly expenditure, and in 1936-37, 305%). While the Palestine Government has allowed several exceptions by approving large loans for the development of housing for ex-servicemen, there are no signs that it will change its financial policy.

Political Elements in Municipal Affairs

17) The Memorandum cites two cases of what it calls the Palestine Government's support of the Arabs in their extreme and uncompromising attitude on political matters in municipal affairs.

a) The Jewish Quarter of Jaffa.

About 30,000 Jewish residents constitute one-third of the
/population ...

population of Jaffa. The Municipal Council, however, has no Jewish Councillors. Most of the public services and all the social services of this Jewish population are supplied by neighbouring Tel-Aviv and it is its desire to form a part of Tel-Aviv. The Jewish Quarters are distinguished by their needs and character from the rest of the Municipal area of Jaffa. Despite the transfer by the Government of a number of public services for this population to Tel-Aviv, the Memorandum emphasizes that the present arrangements only partly solve the problem, and that the only final solution is to transfer the Jewish Quarters of Jaffa to the jurisdiction of Tel-Aviv.

b) The second case in point is the municipality of Jerusalem. The grievances of the Jewish community in Jerusalem are the Mayoralty, insufficient representation in local administration, and specific complaints against the conduct of municipal affairs such as water supply, taxation, and the administration of public finance.

Conclusion

18) The Memorandum concludes "that the Government has not done enough to encourage and facilitate the development of local government, that the bodies which have been established have not been sufficiently founded on the old established practices and traditions of existing self-governing institutions, and that no adequate measure of autonomy has been granted to the Municipal bodies constituted by law". Excessive control of local affairs by the Government has bred "dissatisfaction with and contempt for any government advice and supervision and is often the cause of evading the strict legal requirements."

19) None of the recommendations of the Royal Commission of 1937 on the subject of local government have been carried into effect during the ten years which have elapsed since

/their pronouncement

their pronouncement.

16) Dr. WEIZMANN

(Testimony before the Committee on 8 July 1947).

- 1) Dr. Weizmann first thanked the Mandatory Power for having inaugurated and carried out the policy which had resulted in a thriving Jewish community in Palestine.
- 2) A point of difference between the Jews and the Administration has always been the question of the speed with which the National Home should be established.
- 3) "Look at the difference which has been created between the Mandate and the White Paper. The Mandate encourages settlement of the land; the White Paper not only discourages it - it stops it. The Mandate encourages intensive colonization; the White Paper discourages it. The White Paper nullifies the Mandate. That is why we have to oppose the White Paper with all the force at our disposal." (p. 18).
- 4) The White Paper is justified by some people on the ground that the National Home is already built up; it is a finished product. This is a meaningless assertion. The National Home is a living organism, and it is only finished when it dies.
- 5) In reply to the frequently expressed assertion that the Mandate is unworkable, or even was unworkable ab initio, Dr. Weizmann contends that the Mandate is not unworkable, but it has been rendered so. "It was rendered unworkable because a great many people who were in charge of working the Mandate had no faith in this policy, had perhaps little sympathy with it, and therefore over-exaggerated the difficulties which were inherent in this policy." (p. 25). The Permanent Mandates Commission never found the Mandate unworkable; it has only
/become so ...

become so since the appearance of the White Paper of 1939.

6) "One of the reasons why the Mandate seemed unworkable was that the policy in the execution of the Mandate was never a firm one; it was always vacillating. Whenever the Arabs made a fuss or a little pogrom the Mandatory Power retreated and the Arabs learned that violence pays." (p. 27).

7) The Chairman questioned Dr. Weizmann as to whether the Mandate might have been rendered unworkable because the rights and position of the other sections of the population of Palestine has been prejudiced. Dr. Weizmann replied that under the disposition of the Mandate, the Arab position, if you speak of the economic, material and monetary position, had become not worse but better. Politically the Arabs have never had a position in Palestine (p. 34-35). The Chairman questioned further whether the Mandatory would have an obligation to carry out the undertaking in the Mandate regardless of the resistance it met. To this, Dr. Weizmann replied that, while it was very difficult for him to say what the Mandatory would think at a given moment, he did think that "the Mandatory should have proceeded with firmness and determination from the very beginning: then it would not have had to use force." The Arabs had been quite friendly when they saw the Jews coming into Palestine. "The moment they saw the vacillation, uncertainty - then they began to utilize this position and certainly make the position of the Mandatory difficult." (p. 35).

ANNEX TO CHAPTER I

The Question of the Validity of the Land
Transfer Regulations of 1940

- 1) S. Horowitz and Co., barristers-at-law, Jerusalem, have transmitted documents relating to the Rosenblatt case in which efforts have been made, and are being pursued, to obtain a judgement declaring that the Land Transfer Regulations are legally invalid, as being ultra vires the Order in Council of 1939 on which they purport to be based and as infringing the provisions of the Mandate.
- 2) Mr. Bernard A. Rosenblatt, an inhabitant of Palestine, a citizen of the U.S.A. and a Jew, desired to purchase 4 1/2 acres of land about 3 miles outside Haifa.
- 3) The consent of the Administration was refused on the ground that "in accordance with Regulation 3 of the Land Transfer Regulations 1940 transfer of land in Zone A save to a Palestinian Arab is prohibited".
- 4) The Local Court refused to grant the necessary order primarily on the ground of the fact that the Municipal Courts cannot question an Order in Council.
- 5) Mr. Rosenblatt appealed to the High Court of Justice, claiming that the Land Transfer Regulations 1940 are ultra vires on certain grounds, including the ground that they are ultra vires Article 15 of the Palestine Mandate prohibiting discrimination between the inhabitants of Palestine.
- 6) The High Court delivered its judgement on 9 June 1947. It ruled inter alia that recourse could not be had to the Municipal Courts, but that diplomatic pressure might be justified. The Order Nisi was discharged. "As the issue
/raised

a question of considerable public interest" there was no order as to costs."

7) Mr. Rosenblatt has been advised by his lawyers, S. Horowitz and Co., Jerusalem, that he may

a) take the matter by way of appeal to the Privy Council in London.

b) Seek the assistance of his Government, which is a party to the Mandate under the 1924 Anglo-American Convention, in his claim for redress in respect of the injury done to him. The U.S. Government could seize the International Court of Justice with jurisdiction on the validity of the Land Transfer Regulations or the 1939 Order in Council by reference to the Mandate. (In 1924 the Greek Government brought the Mavromatis case before the Permanent Court of International Justice).

CHAPTER II
PRESENT STATE OF PUBLIC SECURITY

1) PALESTINE GOVERNMENT

(Supplementary memorandum by the Government,
Chapter IV)

- 1) Of the past years, nearly one-half of the period for which the Mandatory Administration has been in existence, six have been years of local disturbances and five have been years of war.
- 2) It has been necessary to devote to the simple maintenance of law and order a large part of the resources of the country in men and money which could have been usefully employed in meeting the real needs of the population.
- 3) The Arab disturbances of 1936-39 cost 4,000 lives and caused material damage valued at L.P. one million. The Jewish reactions of 1945-47 have cost 270 lives and caused material damage estimated at about one million 1/2.
- 4) The White Paper published in June, 1946, showed the complicity of the Jewish Agency in Jewish terrorism. The Hagana is not a purely "defensive" organisation. Its difference from the dissident Irgun Zvai Leumi and Stern groups was not in any principle, but only in regard to choice of strategic moments to apply force. The arrest of members of the Agency on 29 June 1946 and the arms searches made at that time were due to the part played by the Agency in organising and assisting terrorism. (Chapter V of Supplementary Memorandum of the Government, page 58).
- 5) The Emergency Laws are based on the Palestine (Defense) Order-in-Council 1937. This Order-in-Council enables the High Commissioner in his unfettered discretion to detain persons and to deport them. It authorises him to amend or suspend any existing enactment. Under this Emergency legislation military courts have been established. No appeals lie from their judgments.
- 6) The introduction of the Emergency Regulations in 1937 was welcomed by the Jews, since their immediate purpose was to provide powers for dealing with the Arab disturbances. The case for the Regulations was never questioned by the Jews until, as
/a result...

a result of Jewish lawlessness, the powers conferred by them had to be used against Jews. (Supplementary Memorandum by the Government of Palestine, page 35, para. 9)

2) JEWISH AGENCY

(Political Survey and Mr. Ben Gurion's oral statement)

- 1) After the Arab onslaught (1936-1939) had been successfully resisted by the Jews and liquidated by the military forces, the White Paper of 1939 marked the triumph of Arab aggression and the defeat of Jewish self-restraint. Many Jews were driven to the conclusion that only by imitating Arab tactics was there any chance of securing justice from the Mandatory Government. In the political climate thus engendered, Jewish terrorist groups, which broke away from the organised community and openly defied its national authority, grew in strength. (Political Survey, 1946-47, para. 39).
- 2) During the war, the Jewish national slogan was to cooperate in the war effort as if there was no White Paper, but the practice of the Administration was to enforce the White Paper as if there was no war. The Land Transfers Regulations were promulgated at the very beginning of the war. Sea tragedy after sea tragedy, claiming hundreds of Jewish refugees, demonstrated that there was no mitigation in the ruthless enforcement of the White Paper policy. The news of the progressive extermination of the Jews in Europe produced among the Jews of Palestine a sense of helpless rage. (idem., para. 40)
- 3) The end of the war produced a further deep revulsion of feeling. It revealed the full extent of the European massacres and the utter misery of the survivors. The Yishuv refused to acquiesce in the continuation of the White Paper regime after victory had been won. A "Resistance Movement" sprang up which demonstrated its defiance of the White Paper policy in word and deed. While its members resorted to acts of sabotage, in which they refrained from causing any loss of life, sometimes at a risk to their own lives, the separatist resistance groups indulged in an indiscriminate campaign of destruction and bloodshed which was directed against the Government buildings, British officials and British military and police personnel, but to which Arabs
/and Jews...

and Jews, too, fell victim (idem, para. 41)

4) In the course of time a three-cornered struggle developed in Palestine (organised struggle of the Yishuv against the White Paper regime, which in the main took the form of help to unauthorised immigration; open war between the Government forces and the terrorist organisations; internal struggle within the Yishuv between the organised community and the dissident groups) (idem para. 42)

5) The White Paper policy proved to be superior to all humanitarian considerations, to all the economic needs of the country, to all obligations and requirements of the Mandate. Such a policy could only be carried out by force and the Government embarked on a system of oppression which turned Palestine into a police State. (Mr. Ben Gurion's Statement, 16th Meeting of UNSCOP, Page 44).

6) Apart from peak phases of military activity, the month to month regime in Palestine for years now has been in fact, whether so intended or not, a regime of repeated collective punishment of the entire community. (idem., page 51)

3) CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF PALESTINE
(Memorandum, 5 July 1947 and Oral Hearings)

1) 150,000 policemen and soldiers are stationed in a country of 1,900,000 inhabitants (1 soldier or policeman to less than thirteen civilians); yet, with the increase of "security measures" insecurity has increased.

2) The life and security of Palestine citizens are outlawed. The provocative acts of the Jewish terrorist groups are no justification for the terror perpetrated against peaceful citizens.

4) FIGHTERS FOR THE FREEDOM OF ISRAEL
(Memorandum, June 1947)

1. The memorandum recounts the split of the "Stern Group" from the Irgun Zvai Leumi in 1940 over the question of whether to continue resistance during the war. The organisation justifies that decision on the basis of the subsequent attitude of the Mandatory towards immigration.

2. The Stern Group (Fighters for the Freedom of Israel) grew steadily in numbers and strength. In 1944 the Irgun broke the /truce...

truce it had maintained and joined the resistance. That year for the first time, arrestees, refusing defense before a military tribunal, demanded to be treated as prisoners of war.

3) After the war, disillusioned by the broken pledges of the Labour Government, and determined to abolish the White Paper of 1939, the Jews of Haganah, the Irgun and the Stern Group undertook (from different points of view, but essentially united) a real "Hebrew Resistance Movement". A series of attacks were carried out and the British retorted with two attacks on unarmed civilians (p. 28). The campaign of violence continued, with a short respite during which it became clear that the Mandatory Government did not intend to carry out the recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry.

4. The Irgun Zvai Leumi bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem was the opportunity for the "leaders of the Yishuv", (authorities of the Jewish Agency) to break with the attackers.

5. Occupation troops meanwhile "broke all restraining bonds and began to use their arms on every opportunity".

6. The resistance carried out successive campaigns of attack on military traffic and on the railway system in late 1946. Violence in early 1947 brought the imposition of martial law and the suspension of postal and communication services.

7. Over 100,000 British troops, in addition to 17,000 policemen occupy Palestine. From an international security point of view, the country has become "a military base of British imperialism that endangers world peace". British and American oil interests are to be protected, by force if necessary, against the eventuality of another war. The preparations are directed against the USSR (p. 39-40). The Middle East is a powder keg which may explode at any moment.

8. The British have exhibited the Jewish population of Palestine as "subject to Communist influences" and have intimated to the American members of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry among others, that a Jewish state would be "the Trojan horse of Soviet infiltration into the entire Middle East."

9. The Jews of Palestine are deeply concerned to keep peace in the Middle East, and to that end "fight for the liquidation of British rule in Palestine". (p. 41)

/5) IRGUN...

5) IRGUN ZVAI LEUMI

(Memorandum, June 1947)

- 1) The Irgun charges that the Mandatory has made "persistent attempts to incite Arabs to attacks on Hebrew life and property". (page 20)
- 2) The Emergency Regulations are described as the "rule of oppression" (page 24-27). The Memorandum summarizes the regulations permitting seizure and forfeiture of property, and those restricting freedom of speech, press and movement. It is stated that many of the prisoners taken by the Administration have been tortured to elicit information; many citizens have been killed by British armed formations, individual soldiers and agents. The Irgun protests against the sentences of death pronounced by the Military Court because the Hebrews are soldiers and therefore prisoners of war. The Military is accused of barbarous treatment of prisoners.
- 3) The timidity of the Jewish Agency on the question of resistance is explained in terms of the precariousness of the Agency's position. "After a period of united struggle against the British regime, which was conducted in agreement and understanding by the three Hebrew armed organisations: the Haganah, the Irgun Zvai Leumi and the Fighters of Israel". The seizure of the headquarters of the Jewish Agency and arrest of its officers last year, and threats that it would be dissolved if it did not oppose the solid front presented by the three organisations have made it fear for its existence. The Agency is seeking a "compromise which will permit it to live with the British regime". (page 27 - 29).
- 4) An unsigned letter dated 16 June 1947 addressed to the Committee, and purporting to originate with the Irgun Zvai Leumi, announced that the Irgun was prepared to comply with the General Assembly resolution requesting restraint from violence pending its action on the Palestine problem, on condition that the British Government also comply. "But should the British Government ... continue to drive away by force the members of our people returning to their Homeland, or continue to murder Hebrew prisoners of war, or continue to hold Hebrew citizens in illegal internment, in Eretz Israel or outside its borders, or continue to maintain /the military...

the military regime of oppression which threatens the fundamental rights of the man and the citizen -- then they will be responsible for the breach of the decision of the United Nations Organisation and for the inevitable consequences of such a breach."

5) The decision of the underground is based on the interpretation that the resolution applies to Britain (especially since it is addressed to "all Governments" as well as to "all peoples") as much as to the Hebrew fighting forces in Palestine. The memorandum charges that Britain has already violated the terms of the resolution by (1) the seizure of three immigrant ships and deportation of immigrants attempting to enter Palestine, (2) the perpetuation of the existence and the activity of the illegal Military Courts. Therefore the Committee was requested to intervene with the British Government to prevent such activities against the people of Palestine.

6) JEWISH RESISTANCE MOVEMENT

(Memorandum, ~~originally~~ to originate with the Resistance Movement "somewhere in Palestine", 11 July 1947)

1. The Jewish Resistance Movement, of which the Haganah is the backbone, is a national volunteer army which claims to include "practically every Jewish young man and woman capable of bearing arms". It accepts as its policy that of the Zionist Congress.
2. The Haganah was founded during the Ottoman administration as a watchmen's organisation to defend Jewish settlements and property against Arab attacks, and has served that purpose for many years. Through the last war it was "the only military force in the whole of the Middle East which was unreservedly loyal in the fight against the Axis". (p. 3)
3. Crushing the Haganah can only be accomplished by the complete destruction of the Yishuv. But peace in Palestine depends upon the combined existence of Jewish self-defence, which is "the safeguard for Jewish immigration, the security of the Yishuv and the rights of the Jewish people generally".
4. The British by their policy have encouraged Arab attacks on the Jews.
5. The Haganah claims that the military strength of the Resistance Movement "is adequate to defend Jewish Palestine against any attacks from the Arabs of this country, whether or not they are /assisted...

assisted openly or secretly by the military forces of the neighbouring states".

6. The Resistance Movement "unconditionally rejects terrorism" as "counter to the moral foundations and the very spirit of the Zionist Movement". (p. 4) In service to the Jewish people, the Haganah has exerted every effort to prevent murder, terrorism and provocation. But it will not cooperate with the police in the eradication of terrorism because the Jewish people are engaged in a struggle against the Administration. The Jewish people "cannot cooperate with a Government which dooms us to destruction, drives out and kills immigrants, established a Police State in our country, robs us of our land, and carries out a consistent policy designed to put an end to our work of reconstruction".

7. "The Jewish Resistance Movement denies the raison d'être of the terrorist gangs because they impede our national struggle, because they are a danger to the internal freedom of the Yishuv and because they lead our youth into the paths of evil. We utterly reject the right to existence of such para-military factions because of their reactionary social makeup and because of the criminal folly of their actions".

8. "Terrorism is born of the anti-Zionist policy of the Government. Terrorism persists because immigration and settlement have been crippled and the young people of this country have been driven to disappointment and despair. It is the Government of Palestine which gave rise to terrorism and it continues to nurture it. The Jewish Resistance Movement is combating and will combat the spread of terror, but it must be realised that terror can never be completely stamped out as long as the Government pursues an anti-Zionist policy, as long as the gates of Palestine are barred against our harassed and tortured people, and as long as the youth of Palestine have no constructive channels into which to direct their urge to help their less fortunate brothers and rebuild their country. It will not be difficult for the Yishuv to root out terrorism on its own when the sources on which it feeds dry up, that is, when the Government abandons its present policy." (pp. 5-6)

9. The Jewish Resistance Movement has not and will not recognize the restrictions imposed on immigration and on land purchase. It

/will...

will continue, despite all opposition, to assist immigration and to extend the area of Jewish settlement. Moreover, it will "interrupt the smooth working of the anti-Zionist regime by a series of military operations" whose object is to warn the Government and to demonstrate to the world that the Jewish people will not submit to the liquidation of their Palestine enterprise. (p. 7) The Resistance Movement claims to be strong enough "to resist any anti-Zionist regime in Palestine".

7) VAAD LEUMI

Memorandum on "Features of Emergency Legislation in Palestine"

- 1) While the Yishuv has unequivocally condemned terrorist activities on the part of the dissidents and has even urged the Jews of Palestine to use force to oppose terrorists, it has always maintained that the only means of eradicating violence is the abolition of the White Paper policy and the honest execution of the Mandate. Law and order cannot be restored by the substitution of military rule for a rule of law.
- 2) The source of the Emergency Legislation which forms the basis of the military rule of Palestine is the Palestine (Defence) Order-in-Council 1937, which confers upon the High Commissioner the broadest powers to make Defence Regulations. At the same time the order omits a number of safeguards present in previous legislation: the obligation to respect the provisions of the Mandate, to refrain from discrimination in any way between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion and language, to subject to legislation checks matters specifically dealt with by the Mandate, etc.
- 3) The chief objection to the Emergency Legislation, the Vaad Leumi sets out, is the deprivation of the right to seek the aid of the Courts to protect civil liberties. No document purporting to have been under the Emergency Legislation can be called into question by any Court of Law.
- 4) The Defence Regulations virtually hand over the functions of Government to the British Military Forces, whose commanding officers have the broadest powers over the populace subject to no review by civilian authorities.

/5) The regulations...

- 5) The regulations employ the principle of collective criminal responsibility to a degree which permits the most severe punishments as well as subjection to forfeiture and destruction of property, to be imposed upon innocent persons for a crime submitted by a fellow member of their organisation or community.
- 6) The Regulations moreover authorise the following infringements upon personal liberties: arrest without warrant and detention for what in practice may be indefinite periods; search without warrant of property or person; imposition of curfews; deportation without specification of names, descriptions or reason.
- 7) The only possible appeal against such (indignities) is the Advisory Committee, a group of unnamed persons who meet infrequently and in camera, dependent upon only C.I.D. information, and without real authority to enforce its decisions.
- 8) Membership on the Military Courts requires no legal qualifications, and the result is the Court's inordinate dependence on the Military prosecutor. The defendant is unaware of the evidence and witnesses against him. He has no possible appeal, except to petition the General Officer Commanding to vary the judgment or sentence. Even war criminals in the British Zone in Germany are protected by better safeguards than Palestinians on trial in Military Courts. In addition, the elementary rules for the treatment of prisoners sentenced to death by the Military Courts are not observed.
- 9) The Emergency Regulations provide for censorship of postal communications and publications.
- 10) They grant the government broad powers to requisition property without any regard to those dispossessed.
- 11) The fullest power to restrict personal and property rights, and one which has had the effect not of diminishing terrorist activity but only of disrupting life in Palestine, is that which permits the military to impose martial law, with all the regulations which then apply, upon any area declared to be a controlled area.
- 12) The Yishuv is "rent and torn between the desire to eradicate the cancer (of terrorism) and the impossibility of co-operating with a government which has proclaimed as its declared policy to condemn us to the status of a minority in this country (Testimony before...

before the UNSCOP, July 9, 1947, page 42)

8) DR. WEIZMANN

(Testimony before the Committee on
8 July 1947)

The White Paper had the fatal effect of releasing a flow of
terroristic activities contrary to Jewish ethics and to Jewish
tradition.

NATIONAL HOME (INCLUDING POLITICAL ASPECTS
OF IMMIGRATION)

(I) GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE

(Survey of Palestine, Volume I, Chapter VII; Supplement to the Survey of Palestine, pages 15-25; The Political History of Palestine, pages 30-31).

1) The National Home could never have been established without the direct assistance and support that Britain has given to it, with the expenditure of British resources and British lives. The denial of this fact by spokesmen of the Jewish Agency today, the concealment of the truth and the failure to recognize that there was ever any reason for not granting the most extreme Jewish demands in the face of bitter opposition from the inhabitants of the country must appear as at least a gross self-deception (Supplementary Memorandum by the Government, page 32, paragraph 3).

2) The part played by the Administration in establishing the National Home was essential and considerable. Had it not been for the defence of Palestine undertaken by the Mandatory during the last war, the National Home would have disappeared. That defence, with the responsibilities of feeding and supplying the people of Palestine, was for a long period undertaken by the British Commonwealth alone (Supplementary Memorandum by the Government, page 33).

3) As regards immigration, Jewish immigration until 1938 was conducted solely according to the capacity of the country to absorb new arrivals. In 1939 the government formulated a new policy in the White Paper (Command Paper No. 6019). This affected immigration as follows:

a) Jewish immigration during the next five years was to be at a rate, if economic absorptive capacity permitted, which would bring the Jewish population to one third of the total.

b) For the

b) For the next five years a quota of 10,000 Jewish immigrants per annum would be permitted.

In addition 25,000 refugees would be permitted to enter.

c) The existing machinery would be maintained and the High Commissioner would have ultimate responsibility for determining the limits of economic capacity.

d) After five years no further Jewish immigration was to take place unless the Arabs of Palestine were prepared to acquiesce in it.

e) Illegal immigration would be checked and illegal immigrants would be deducted from the quotas.

4) The war changed the situation by the fact that most of Europe outside Russia came under enemy control. Immigrants from Germany were generally excluded as a security measure. No organised emigration from occupied Europe took place during the war. Certain modifications were made which permitted places to be allotted to 10,300 persons from the Balkans, Italy, Switzerland, Belgium, Aden and Turkey. At the end of 1945 the 75,000 permitted under the White Paper of 1939 had been reached.

5) From December 15, 1945 up to the present time Jewish immigration has been permitted according to a policy of monthly quotas regulating Jewish immigration and Arab and other immigration.

6) The number of Jewish immigrants to be admitted is 1,500 monthly and the number of Arab immigrants was laid down as 100 monthly from 15 December 1945 to 14 September 1946, and subsequently 200 monthly. From 15 December 1945 to 14 March 1947, the following certificates were issued on Jewish immigration account:-

Quota for 15 months	22,500
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/Commitments

Commitments under the White Paper Policy	790	
Legal immigrants	7,721	
Illegal immigrants	<u>13,989</u>	<u>22,500</u>

7) From 15 December 1945 to 14 March 1947, 13,989 Jewish illegal immigrants were deducted from the monthly quotas, and on 1 April 1947, there were 13,330 persons in detention in Palestine and Cyprus awaiting their turn for release under the monthly quotas.

8) There is much that is conjectural in an estimate of the volume of illegal immigration. Since April 1939 illegal immigration is of the order of 30,000 to 35,000, and since 1920, when the first Immigration Ordinance was enacted, it is probably 60,000 to 70,000.

9) In August 1946 His Majesty's Government announced that henceforth immigrants arriving illegally in Palestine would be conveyed to Cyprus or elsewhere and housed in camps until a decision could be taken as to their future. Illegal immigrants are deported from Palestine in exercise of the powers vested in the High Commissioner by Regulation 112 of the Defence (Emergency) Regulations.

(2) JEWISH AGENCY

(The Jewish Case; Political Survey 1946-47; Memorandum on the Position of the Jewish Communities in Oriental Countries).

1) Political Zionism was founded by Theodor Herzl who in 1896, after the first trial of Captain Dreyfus in France, wrote: "The Jewish State: An Attempt at a Modern Solution of the Jewish Question". (The Jewish Case, page 277, paragraph 33).

2) The phrase "Jewish State" was not used by the First Zionist Congress which met in Basle in 1897 under the leadership of Herzl. Its programme read: "Zionism strives to create for the Jewish people a home in Palestine secured by public law."

(Idem, page 279,

(Idem, page 279, paragraph 36).

3) Mr. Balfour's letter conveying to Lord Rothschild, president of the English Zionist Federation, the Declaration approved by the British Cabinet, describes it as "a declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations" (Idem page 282, paragraph 45).

4) The Zionist term "National Home" used in the Balfour Declaration was embodied in the Palestine Mandate. It was realised by the draftsmen of these documents that it was premature at that time to speak of a Jewish State when the Jews still formed a small minority in Palestine. The Mandate could do no more than provide the framework for the gradual evolution, by Jewish effort, of a New Jewish Commonwealth, and its provisions were drafted accordingly. That such was the aim in the minds of those responsible for the Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate was established beyond doubt by the enquiry made by the Palestine Royal Commission in 1937. (Political Survey 1946-47, paragraph 105).

5) Efforts made at various times by minority groups in the Zionist movement to secure an official pronouncement by the Zionist Congress on the final aim of Zionism were consistently discountenanced as likely to hinder rather than help the achievement of that objective (idem, paragraph 106).

6) The situation in this respect underwent a radical change when the British Government in 1937 declared the Palestine Mandate to be unworkable and pronounced in favour of dividing the country into two separate independent States. If the Mandate were to be abolished, it would become incumbent upon Jews also to define their ultimate aim - the re-establishment of the Jewish Commonwealth. When, in 1939, the White Paper had wrecked the mandatory regime, such restatement became inescapable (idem, paragraph 106).

7) In the light of past experience, the resettlement of the bulk of European Jewry in Palestine - the only permanent solution of

the Jewish problem - could not be achieved within the framework of the Crown Colony regime under which Palestine has been governed for the last two decades (idem, paragraph 108).

8) There is little chance of the Jewish National Home and the Jewish people being able effectively to defend their interests and to reach a lasting understanding with the surrounding Arab world unless granted full international status (idem, paragraph 108).

9) The problem of immigration into Palestine cannot be entrusted to some ad hoc authority. It is bound up with the whole machinery of Government, with economic policy, with fiscal policy. It is not merely a question of letting people in. It means shaping the country's economic policy so as to enable it to absorb immigrants.

10) Besides the needs of European Jewry, those of more than 800,000 Jews in Oriental countries other than Palestine, as regards both magnitude and urgency, must be assigned their due place in the consideration of the problem of Jewish immigration into Palestine. (Memorandum on the position of the Jewish Communities in the Oriental Countries, June 1947, page 27).

11) The emigration of Oriental Jews to Palestine has been continuous. A larger proportion of Oriental Jewry migrated to Palestine in the pre-war period than of the Jewish communities in the West. Within the last few decades, Palestine has absorbed about 1/2 of Syrian Jewry and nearly 40% of the Jews of the Yemen. During the war, immigration from Turkey has assumed considerable proportions, and as soon as North Africa was liberated, immigration from these countries was resumed. Jews from Iraq and Iran have used every subterfuge in order to reach Palestine. In Egypt, serious organisation and training work for Palestine among the Jewish youth is in progress.

progress. (idem, page 27).

12) The wish of the young Jews to emigrate to Palestine is explained by the fact that in the Arabic speaking countries of Northern Africa and the Middle East and in the other Moslem countries (Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan) the Jews do not enjoy in practice full equality of civic, political and economic rights and in some of these countries they suffer persecution. The historic position of the Oriental Jew has been one of inferiority, interludes of peace and prosperity alternating with periods of oppression. (idem, pages 1 and 2).

(3) AGUDATH ISRAEL WORLD ORGANIZATION

(Memorandum, June 1947)

- 1) The Jewish people are the People of the Torah, and the Land of Israel, as promised by the Lord of Israel, is destined to become the eternal soil for the realisation of the Torah in its totality, the realisation of the Divine Law and Justice (paragraph A, 1).
- 2) In the Mandate the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine has found that expression of international law which the Balfour Declaration had earlier announced. The call by the Nations to its oldest and most suffering member to rebuild the ancient home has been answered. A stupendous transformation has been wrought in the Holy Land, one that has opened never-believed possibilities for the absorption of thousands of persecuted Jews in all countries (paragraph B, 3).
- 3) The White Paper of 1939 for the first time marks a partly patent and partly hidden intention to liquidate and therefore ultimately to break the perpetual connection of the Jewish people with Palestine (paragraph C, 2).

4) AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR JUDAISM

(Memorandum on Aspects of the Problem of Palestine -
June 4, 1947)

- 1) Point 3 of the Basle Program of the World Zionist Organization (1897) provides for "the strengthening and fostering of Jewish national sentiment and consciousness". This section of the Basle Program, which does not limit the area of the "fostering" of Jewish national consciousness to Jews in Palestine alone, disturbs the sense of exclusive national responsibility of millions of Jews who live in countries other than Palestine, and who want to continue to live in their respective homelands.
- 2) The ambiguous language of the Balfour Declaration has sustained and given further support to this concept of duality of national interests and loyalty. The Balfour Declaration refers to "a national home" in relation to "the Jewish people" as if they are, or could be, a distinctive people in the sense in which other national units are distinctive, with whom political objectives can be negotiated and separate agreements reached. By its very nature, and no doubt inadvertently, the Balfour Declaration sustained the anti-Semitic racialist lie that Jews the world over were a separate, national body.
- 3) To the evils inherent in the Balfour Declaration, the Mandate added a reference to "a historic connection" of the Jewish people with Palestine. Failure to make equivalent reference to the equivalent historic religious connection with Palestine of the Christian or Moslem peoples has served to reattribute national characteristics to Jews of the world and thereby continue the ambiguous quality of that contention.
- 4) The Zionist claim that Jews the world over, as Jews, have special, automatic rights in regard to Palestine not shared by
/those

those who are non-Jews is abhorrent to the organised world of nations. It is only against the background of this philosophy that there can be an understanding of the Zionist contention that "there cannot be such a thing as illegal Jewish immigration to Palestine" or that "the doors of Palestine must be open to all Jews who wish to go there".

(5) AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

(Statement submitted to the UN Committee of Inquiry, 31 May 1947)

- 1) The Balfour Declaration and the Palestine Mandate were issued to meet the pressing need of European Jewry a generation ago. Today that need is infinitely more pressing and the rights established by the Declaration and the Mandate infinitely more necessary.
- 2) History and logic alike lead to the conclusion that Jewish immigration into, and land ownership in, Palestine have not constituted in the past and will not constitute in the future, any infraction of the rights of the Moslem and Christian population of Palestine; on the contrary, they represent an unmixed blessing.
- 3) Great Britain, as mandatory, has asked for advice from the United Nations. It must be advised that the White Paper of 1939 constituted a breach of trust.

(6) ANGLO-JEWISH ASSOCIATION

(Memorandum to UNSCOP dated 24 June 1947)

- 1) The Mandate is closely linked with the Balfour Declaration. Differences have arisen as to the precise construction of various articles of the Mandate, but there can be no doubt as to the direction in which it points.
- 2) There is a moral obligation to ensure that any settlement now proposed shall accord with the spirit of the Mandate and take account of its distinctive purpose.
- 3) Any settlement ought to be such as to ensure the preservation of the values created by the Jews in Palestine, leave them free to develop their own way of life, and guarantee the secure enjoyment of their right of self-expression.
- 4) From a humanitarian standpoint it is of urgent practical importance that Palestine should not remain closed, or barely open, to Jewish immigration. The present monthly quota of 1,500 bears no relation either to the absorptive capacity of Palestine, or to Jewish needs. No settlement can be regarded as satisfactory which does not carry with it an immediate reversal of the restrictive immigration policy now in force.

(7) ENR-NORIN MOVEMENT

(Memorandum, 28 June 1947)

- 1) That the expression "National Home for the Jewish People" employed in the Balfour Declaration and in the Mandate was intended to mean a Jewish State is clear from the letter of the United Kingdom Government covering the Balfour Declaration, and from a number of pronouncements at the time. The letter expressed sympathy with "Jewish Zionist aspirations".
- 2) Quotations from Sir Edward Grey, Lord Robert Cecil, General Smuts, Mr. Winston Churchill, Mr. Ramsey MacDonald, and other leaders indicate that they were thinking in terms of a Jewish state.
- 3) The National Home was intended to include Transjordan, which is an integral part of Palestine, for compelling historical, economic, and strategic reasons. Hence, the present bar of Transjordan to Jews is wrong, and contrary to Article 5 of the Mandate, which provides that "no person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief".
- 4) The declaration of Transjordan as "an independent state" is inconsistent with Article 5 of the Mandate, whose application has never been "postponed" or "withheld" under the terms of Article 25.

(8) CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF COMMUNIST PARTY

(Oral Statement by Mr. Makunis, Secretary of the Communist Party, 29th meeting of UNSCOP, page 31).

The overwhelming majority of the Jews immigrated into Palestine, as well as into other countries, as a result of anti-semitic and fascist persecutions. Without the policy of Imperialism and that of "conquest of the country" of the Jewish Agency the question of immigration would never have acquired its present character.

(9) COUNCIL OF THE ASHKENASIC JEWISH
COMMUNITY - JERUSALEM

(Statements to UNSCOP - July 1947)

1) It was only upon the first appearance of the Zionist Organization as a political entity, created in and by the spirit of reform - to which Orthodox Jewry is so utterly opposed - that the idea of the foundation of a Jewish State in the Holy Land was first advanced.

2) From the time of King Solomon the Holy Land was either united with Transjordan or attached to Syria or Turkey. Western Palestine was never a single and independent entity and certainly a part of that cannot constitute an independent state.

3) Our basic reason for opposing the creation of a Jewish State is that, as the officially recognized representation of the Jewish people does not now recognize the authority of the Holy Law as binding in public affairs, there can be no guarantee that the religious needs and requirements of Orthodox Jewry will be observed.

4) A serious blunder was committed by recognizing first the leaders of Zionism and then the Jewish Agency as official representation of the Jewish population and by handing the keys of immigration to that body, which consists of Zionists and non-Zionists united in their opposition to the application of religion to public life, and who have succeeded in bringing to this country free-thinking people like themselves who blocked the immigration of myriads of Orthodox Jews. Only after prolonged and forceful representations supported by the Government did they agree to issue small numbers of certificates for immigration also to Orthodox Jews.

(10) HASHOMER HATZAIR WORKERS' PARTY

(The Case for a Bi-National Palestine, page 30)

1) The slogan of a Jewish state was introduced comparatively recently into the official program of the World Zionist movement. All Zionist Congresses, right up to and including the Congress convened in Geneva in August 1939, refrained from specific mention of the Jewish State, although they invariably insisted on the right of Jews to come to Palestine up to the full economic absorptive capacity of the country.

2) The change which has taken place during recent years, culminating in the adoption of a "Jewish Commonwealth" program for Palestine, may be attributed, in the opinion of the Hashomer Hatzair Workers' Party, to three essential factors:

- a) The fact that the Royal Commission of 1936 for the first time introduced into an official document the term "Jewish State" - which must greatly appeal to the Jews;
- b) The persistently unconciliatory attitude of the majority of the Arab leaders to all Zionist advances;
- c) The calamity which befell the Jewish people during World War II.

(11) HAPOEL HAMIZRAHI ORGANIZATION IN ERETZ ISRAEL

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE

(Memorandum submitted to UNSCOP on 4 July 1947)

- 1) The realization of our aims is possible only in our Homeland which became ours by the promise of God.
- 2) The confirmation of the Mandate was considered by the Jewish people as an indication that an aroused world conscience would at last permit the Jews to return to their Homeland.
- 3) The Hapoel Hamizrahi considers that the Jewish State in Palestine will rest on the foundations of the Bible and the ethics of the Prophets.
- 4) Immigration into Palestine is a religious commandment and a national duty.

(12) IHUD (UNION) ASSOCIATION OF PALESTINE

(Oral Statement by Dr. Magnes, 30th Meeting of UNSCOP,
page 3).

- 1) Palestine is not just a Jewish land; it is not just an Arab land. Among other things it is a holy land of three great monotheistic religions.
- 2) The Arabs have great national rights. They have been in Palestine for centuries.
- 3) The Jews have great historical rights. The Holy Land has been engraved in their hearts for centuries. Moreover, during the past generation and more, they have acquired a right by their sacrifice and labour in the national home they have built up.
- 4) A compromise is accordingly necessary.

(13) IRGUN ZVAI LEUMI

(Memorandum, pages 35 - 36)

- 1) The Hebrews represent a de jure majority of the population of Palestine, east and west of the Jordan, on the basis of the right of Hebrews all over the world to citizenship in the Homeland. "Our brothers dispersed over various countries... whose right it is to be recognized as citizens of Eretz Israel and to be enabled and assisted to return to their country" together with the Hebrew citizens already in Eretz Israel... "constitute a clear de jure majority of the population, even before the process of repatriation is accomplished". (page 36).
- 2) The official statistics of population are based on the deliberately falsified census of 1931. The "real" population in Palestine (Western Eretz Israel) is between 1,500,000 and 1,700,000. Of these, not less than 650,000 and not more than 750,000 are Jews, less than 200,000 Druzes and Christians, and the rest, Moslems. Hence, "the number of Jews who have to be brought into Eretz Israel in order to establish a de facto majority is considerably less than the British occupiers would have the world believe - and this repatriation could be affected in a matter of months". (page 35).

(14) LEAGUE FOR PEACE WITH JUSTICE IN PALESTINE

(Memorandum, 5 June 1947)

- 1) The Jews are not a "race", a "nation", or a "people". Zionism, a young, essentially political movement which should not be confused with Judaism, was conceived and is today supported by Eastern European, non-Semitic, Yiddish-speaking Jews who bear no relation ethnically or historically to the Jews of Palestine. Zionism is opposed by many Jews (pp. 1-11).
- 2) Zionists want to make Palestine into a Jewish state, not, as they claim, to establish a refuge for a few hundred thousand co-religionists, but really to obtain control of the vast wealth of the Dead Sea. The British Government, "dishonorably and dishonestly" granted the potash concession to Zionists in disregard of an existing Turkish concession (pp. 11-18A).
- 3) The Balfour Declaration is illegal and dishonest. (pp. 29-30).

(15) SEPHARDIC AND ORIENTAL JEWISH COMMUNITIES

(Statements and Memorandum - July 1947)

- 1) Immigration of Oriental Jews to Palestine which had continued in the form of pilgrimages from the 1st century A.D., started chiefly in the 13th century A.D.
- 2) This first "Zionist" movement appeared at times as an organized attempt at reviving a politically independent Hebrew Community in a Jewish Palestine.
- 3) The case of the Oriental Jews does not differ in essence from the problem of the Jews in Europe. It is an urgent and grave problem whose only solution is speedy emigration to Palestine.

(16) DR. WEIZMANN

(Testimony before the Committee on 8 July 1947)

- 1) The Balfour Declaration, like most human deeds, had two motives: the one idealistic and the other utilitarian; it was intended first to make a certain amount of restitution to the Jewish people for their contribution to civilization over the centuries; and second, to gain united support from the Jewish Community in America as well as from the Russian Jewish community (which then included Poland, and was six million strong).
- 2) The persons who framed the Balfour Declaration realized that homelessness was the peculiar quality of the Jews as a people, which accounted for their abnormal position in the world. "The Jews are a people and they lack the props of a people. They are a disembodied ghost."
- 3) Why must the National Home be in Palestine and no other place? Because it was Palestine which was the historic home of the Jews, and you cannot deny your history and begin afresh. There was another attempt at colonization in Argentina - a vast country with virgin soil which had a benevolent government - but it did not become the National Home of the Jewish people.
- 4) The idealistic motive which prompted the Balfour Declaration - the determination to allay the suffering of the Jew by giving him somewhere to go - is a thousand times more valid today than in 1918. For the Jews it is a question of survival; it brooks no delay.
- 5) The statesmen who framed the Balfour Declaration and the men who worked with them all believed that the National Home would result in a Jewish state. Dr. Weizmann quotes a telegram addressed by the British Foreign Office to their Ambassador in Russia and an opinion expressed by Lord Balfour in the Cabinet,

/both

both to the effect that the Declaration envisaged a Jewish state (p. 27).

6) The difficulty arose over the speed with which it was to be accomplished. The Jews needed governmental powers because they had been given the job of developing a National Home, of creating absorptive capacity. On the other hand they could only be given those powers if they brought masses into Palestine and so constituted more or less of a majority of the country (p. 15).

7) Faced with the need for an organization with governmental powers, a sort of Charter Company which could develop the country, the Jews substituted a Jewish Agency. The Agency had "all the difficulties of a government and none of its advantages".

8) Sir Abdur Rahman observed that "The Times" of 1 March 1918 contained a statement of Dr. Weizmann's that "We do not aspire to found a Zionist State. What we want is a country in which all nations and all creeds shall have equal rights and equal tolerance".

9) Dr. Weizmann replied that "We did not want to speak of a state then. We spoke of a National Home. But the characteristic of the thing, whether it is a National Home or whether it is a state, remains the same. We think that in a Jewish State all peoples will live in amity and freedom." (p. 43).

CHAPTER IV
RELATIONS BETWEEN ARABS AND JEWS

1) PALESTINE GOVERNMENT

(Supplementary Memorandum of the Government, pages 56, para. 2 and 34, para. 8)

1) During the eleven years since 1935, when the last attempt to establish a legislature was frustrated, each side has in turn freely resorted to violence and declined to discuss with the other any possible reconciliation of their differences.

2) Since 1935 the entry of every Jew into Palestine has evoked the most bitter protests from the Arabs.

(See also Chapter I part 1, above which contains an analysis of the Government's Memorandum on the Administration of Palestine under the Mandate).

2) JEWISH AGENCY

(Mr. Ben Gurion's statement, 19th meeting of UNSCOP; memorandum on Zionism and the Arab World; memorandum on the position of Jewish Communities in Oriental countries.)

- 1) There is no conflict between Jews and Arabs as far as the Jews are concerned. The Jews do not ask that the Arabs in Palestine should be removed to other countries. If there is a conflict, it is a one-sided conflict. (Mr. Ben Gurion's statement, 19th Meeting of UNSCOP, page 16).
- 2) As regards Arab reactions to the plan of the Jewish Agency for the future of Palestine, there may be different reactions, there are different attitudes (idem, page 24).
- 3) "If there is any certainty in the future, I am certain that, if allowed to come back to our country, we will live in peace and cooperation with the Arabs." (idem, page 49).
- 4) "As soon as there is a Jewish State and we are an independent factor, the Arabs will see reason, because they are sensible . . ." (Mr. Ben Gurion, 19th Meeting of UNSCOP, page 53).
- 5) Apart from cooperation between individuals, between workers, between villages which now exists, "cooperation between Jewish people as a people and Arab people as a people is possible only when we shall have the status which they have - an independent nation - not when they are able to boycott our goods and we are powerless to do anything". (idem, p. 55)
- 6) The only spheres in which Arab-Jewish cooperation can succeed today are those from which are excluded the two main issues of the Palestine problem: Jewish immigration and the political future of the National Home. Once the Haifa Municipality, or the Citrus Board, or harbour workers, or the people of a Jewish and Arab village became involved in a discussion of these two issues, the harmony would collapse. The existing manifestations of Arab-Jewish harmony are no augury for the success of a bi-national government whose members would have to agree on immigration policy and on the objects of the State. In such a situation also the differences in the structure, social outlook, and cultural ideals of the two communities would tighten the deadlock (Memorandum on Zionism and the Arab World, July 1947, page 41).

/7. As regards...

7) As regards the position of Jews in Oriental countries in general, the most serious obstacle to Jewish emancipation has been Moslem hostility. The spirit of Western liberalism - equality of rights for all citizens regardless of race or creed - has never penetrated beyond a small class of educated Moslems. Even among them other trends militate against it. In the struggle against foreign rule, a crude nationalism has emerged, which has to some extent fused with traditional religious fanaticism. The militant strain in the Islamic religion with its emphasis on the holy war, assisted in this process. An example is the Moslem Brotherhood Association, one of the largest organisations in the Moslem world, whose doctrine is a blend of religious and national intolerance. The growth of democratic and parliamentary systems has also been inhibited by the social backwardness of the feudal or semi-feudal regimes. Nazi propaganda found a fertile soil. It checked incipient liberal tendencies and strengthened anti-Jewish feeling.

8) In recent years Zionism has provided an additional slogan for anti-Jewish agitation (Memorandum on the position of the Jewish communities in the Oriental countries, June, 1947, page 4).

3) AGUDATH ISRAEL WORLD ORGANIZATION

(Rabbi Glikman-Porush, 26th meeting of UNSCOP, page 89).

The relations between Jews and Arabs remained excellent even after the Balfour Declaration, which at the time was interpreted by Arab leaders and masses as in fact giving Palestine to the Jews. Right down to the events of 1936, Jews would call on Arab heads and notables, at the offices of the Supreme Moslem Council or at the residence of the Mufti of Jerusalem.

4) CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF PALESTINE

(Memorandum, 5 July 1947 and oral statements)

1) Until the declaration of boycott on Jewish industrial products on the part of the Arab League, followed by the reaction of the "Association for Jewish Products" calling a counter-boycott on Arab agricultural products, economic relations between Jews and Arabs were normal and satisfactory. In 1945, Jewish purchases from Arabs amounted to 2 1/2 million pounds (3 times as much as in 1936). On the other hand Arabs purchased from Jews
/industrial...

industrial products to the amount of 3 million pounds in 1943 (£850,000 in 1935).

2) In spite of all efforts to antagonise the Jewish and Arab workers, cooperation between them is increasing. The Government is the largest employer (about 90,000 workers in the Army, Post, Railways, Public Works and in clerical positions). Antagonism between Jewish and Arab workers is fostered by the fact that the Jewish worker is paid more and that the question of "proportional relationships" in the number of Arab and Jewish workers employed is raised from time to time by the foreman and other Government officials.

3) The Government's policy of division is assisted by the chauvinistic slogans of certain Jewish and Arab forces, such as the policy of "Conquest of Labour" adopted by the leadership of the Histadrut and the actions of Sami Taha (head of the right-wing Arab trade unions) to introduce Arab camp foremen to replace Jews.

4) In May 1947, following a period of minor common strikes in various parts of the country, the three large trade union organizations (Histadrut, Congress of Arab Workers, Arab Workers' Society) for the first time in the history of the working class, organised a warning strike of military camp workers (40,000 Jewish and Arab workers participated).

5) The numerous facts of economic collaboration in common working places, in mixed municipal councils and on various occasions between Jewish and Arab neighbours have emerged beyond the limits of pure economical interests. "They are directed against the desire of the Government to . . . sow division between the two peoples."

6) There have existed and still exist Jewish and Arab circles who desire and are ready to come to a political agreement.

7) On the basis of joint struggle against colonial rule and for complete equal rights between Jews and Arabs, political agreement is possible.

5) CHURCH OF ENGLAND IN JERUSALEM

(Memorandum dated March 1946
submitted to Anglo-American
Committee of Inquiry)

- 1) The "Arab" of Palestine and the "Jew" of Palestine are each of equally mixed stock and either may be of any religion or none. The conflict between the two is mainly one of differing civilizations and different tempos of progress.
- 2) The present educational system can only lead to a wider breach in the next generation. The present divisive policy is inevitable by the terms of the Mandate.

6) FIGHTERS FOR THE FREEDOM OF ISRAEL

1. The British have tried constantly to increase rather than lessen the conflict between Arabs and Jews. (p. 48).
2. The Arab masses are actively supporting the Jewish underground. (p. 49).
3. The Arabs in a Jewish State would be benefited in a number of ways. If, however, they should wish of their own free will to emigrate from Palestine, every assistance will be given in their resettlement. (page 50).

7) HISTADRUT

(Survey of Histadrut Activities, July 1947)

- 1) Cooperation between Jewish and Arab workers is part of the programme of the Histadrut. Jewish labour aims at removing the discrepancy between the standard of living of the Jews and the Arabs (the standard of living of the Arabs has already improved) (Survey of Histadrut activities, page 6).
- 2) The Histadrut's efforts have met with the opposition of the Arab employers and of the politicians and ideologists who represent their interests. From time to time the Palestine Administration has strengthened this opposition. The Histadrut has demanded repeatedly of government, without success, a system of equal minimum wages for Arab and Jew alike (idem, page 6).
- 3) In view of the differences of language, culture, habits and tradition of Jewish and Arab workers, the Histadrut does not consider it expedient to endeavour to bring individual Arab workers into its ranks. It has helped the Arabs to organise in an independent and autonomous labour organisation of their own, conducting its cultural and social welfare affairs, but linked with the

/Histadrut...

Histadrut (idem, page 6). The Arab trade unions formed with the assistance of the Histadrut came to be known as the Palestine Labour League (idem, page 65).

4) The Arab worker has often shown readiness to cooperate with the Jewish worker and has turned to him for help and guidance. Today, with the Arab boycott in force, groups of workers in Jerusalem and Nazareth have approached the Palestine Labour League requesting assistance in the formation of trade union groups in these localities.

5) The attitude of the Palestine Government has not been sympathetic towards the Palestine Labour League. A number of its departments and officials have opposed attempts to promote Jewish-Arab labour cooperation.

6) The Department of Labour, set up in 1942, has encouraged the national Arab organisations which oppose cooperation with the Histadrut. No such encouragement has been extended to the Palestine Labour League.

7) Fluctuation in membership is typical of all Arab workers' organisations, since the Arab tends to regard the trade union as a means to achieve a specific and immediate end. Moreover, members of the Palestine Labour League have to resist pressure by politically-minded employers and by the national Arab unions, who go so far as to use force against them. Today some 2,500 Arab workers have remained members of the League (idem, pages 68 and 69).

8) In the Palestine Labor League the Arab workers come into contact with a number of Jewish comrades - no mean achievement in a country where so much energy is expended on the sowing of discord between the two sectors of the population (idem, page 69).

8) IHUD (UNION) ASSOCIATION OF PALESTINE

(Written statement by the Anglo-American Committee and oral statement of Dr. Magnes before UNSCOP)

1) Jewish-Arab cooperation has never been made the chief objective of major policy, either by the Mandatory Government, by the Jewish Agency or by those representing the Arabs. Sporadic and, at times, serious attempts have been made in this direction; but whenever such attempts encountered difficulties, they were abandoned. After 24 years of the Mandate, there is more political /tension...

tension in the country than ever before. (Written statement to the Anglo-American Committee; page 3).

2) Personal relations between Arabs and Jews are, on the whole, still fair. There is no deep racial animosity and no present religious animosity. In the cities there is a certain amount of economic cooperation, but less than there used to be. There is a large measure of cooperation between villages in the farming districts. But in all these fields cooperation is impeded because of political, "national" animosity. (idem, page 3).

3) There is one condition for the achievement of political cooperation -- that Jewish-Arab cooperation be made the chief objective of major policy, and that this policy be carried through authoritatively, day by day, year by year. (idem, page 4).

4) Cooperation is brought about not through discussion, which is very essential, but can run out into the years and produce nothing practical, but through life itself, including government (Dr. Magnes, 30th Meeting of UNSCOP).

5) "The situation has deteriorated technically, in my view, since the Jewish Agency adopted as its official programme the Jewish State for Palestine" (Dr. Magnes, idem., page 44).

6) The majority of the Jewish population is in favour of a Jewish State. A large part of the inarticulate Jewish population would, however, rejoice if some way of accommodation between Jews and Arabs on the lines of a bi-national State would be found.

(Dr. Magnes, idem, page 53).

7) There is no racial problem between Jews and Arabs, no racial animosity. Though it is easily possible to arouse the religious fanaticism of many Moslems, there are many points of affinity between Judaism and Islam. (Dr. Magnes, idem, page 71).

8) The sensibility as to nationality among the Jews and the Arabs is still on the rise. Many more Jews than Arabs have passed beyond that sensibility. (Dr. Magnes, idem., page 72).

9. IRGUN ZVAI LEUMI

(Memorandum pp. 29 - 33)

1) The British have manipulated Arab-Jewish relations to maintain a pretext for staying in Palestine. To this end, they have attempted "to create an impression of undying hostility on the part of the Arabs, to the reconstitution of the Hebrew Homeland".

/They...

They have imposed on the Arab population "a puppet leadership of feudal notables," and have directed the Hussein family to rule the Arabs in such a way as to achieve British purposes.

2) The British have conceived their role as permanent "arbiter" between two hostile communities. They have prevented the awakening of true democracy. They have made a show of "providing advancement" for the Arabs, though actually they have done little. Whatever they have done has been at Jewish expense.

3) Most Arabs realise that there is little hope of improvement of their standard of living as long as the British rule the country. Most Arabs "do, and are" prepared to, live at peace and in cooperation with the Hebrew population".

4) Examples of Arab-Jewish cooperation are the Municipal Commission in Haifa, the willingness of many Arabs to sell land to Jews.

5) The Arab, in spite of persistent incitement and promises of bribes by British agents -- greatly intensified during recent years with the launching of the Hebrew struggle against British occupation -- has not only refused to be misled into helping the British out by himself attacking us, but lives and works with his Hebrew neighbor in affability and friendliness".

6) The Arabs have even helped Hebrew fighters (page 32 of the Memorandum). Free from British intimidations, the Arabs would express their desire for friendship and cooperation with the Jews.

10) LEAGUE FOR JEWISH-ARAB RAPPROCHEMENT AND CO-OPERATION

(Oral statement at the 32nd Meeting of UNSCOP)

1) The League denies the argument that there exists an unbridgeable gulf between the two obligations undertaken by the Mandatory Government -- the obligation to the Arab community and the obligation to the Jewish people which is rebuilding its national home.

2) The present situation is rather the result of the fact that the Mandatory Government did not see in the common interests of the Jews and Arabs a starting point for its policy.

3) The local point of British policy in Palestine was to use Arab arguments as a pretext for slowing down the development of the Jewish National Home and Jewish arguments as a pretext against the national demands of the Arabs (Mr. Aharon Cohen, 32nd meeting of UNSCOP, page 41).

/4) There...

- 4) There always was a trend in the Mandatory Government to encourage the Arabs to oppose the establishment of the National Home. After the first riots in Palestine in 1920, high Government officials were accused of being guilty in their outbreak - as testified in the protocols of the Shaw Commission in 1930.
- 5) Also during the late years the Government maintained complete indifference to religious and national incitement which culminated in bloody outbreaks, which were allowed to develop. The relations between the two nations were thus poisoned. (Mr. Aharon Cohen, 32nd meeting of UNSCOP, page 41).
- 6) The Government claims in its Memorandum that it made efforts to bring about an understanding between the Jews and the Arabs, but it did not succeed. It would have made a better point if instead of speaking in general terms about efforts, which were frustrated, it had brought at least 5 cases of such attempts during its mandatory rule. (Idem page 41).
- 7) You can speak openly in Palestine about warfare between the two nations and prepare for it, but joint Arab-Jewish activities aiming at understanding and cooperation have to be conducted many times secretly, underground, so to speak (Mr. A. Cohen, 32nd Meeting of UNSCOP, page 46).
- 8) One of the interesting facts in the Palestinian reality is that there exists a gap between the feelings of the wide masses of both peoples and the official proclamations made by their respective leaders.
- 9) The policy of extremism became popular under the assumption that extremism pays. However, wide circles are coming to realize that it leads to destruction (Mr. A. Cohen, idem, page 59)

11) SEPHARDIC AND ORIENTAL JEWISH COMMUNITIES

(Oral Statements and Memorandum - July 1947)

- 1.) The history of Jews in Oriental countries is one long chain of changes, tolerance towards a second class minority -- and then persecution -- and back again once more.
- 2) Attacks against the Jews are not solely a legacy of the Middle Ages, and they occurred not only in the 19th century (Safad - 1838, Damascus - 1840) but even in later years: Hebron - 1929, Algiers - 1934, Baghdad - 1941, Cairo and Tripoli - 1945. Despite Arab attempts to explain them as such, these /modern...

modern massacres are not linked with war against Zionism -- they are based on fanaticism and hatred for the stranger.

3) This hatred for the Jew exists also in Palestine although here it does not have the character of an outbreak of the ruling people against a defenseless "protected" minority. The Jewish Community in Palestine has gathered strength and that is why no such disturbances have taken place recently in Palestine.

4) The allegation of Arab leaders that the hatred of Arabs for the Jews is the result of Jewish mass immigration into Palestine and is directed solely against the Western Jews, and that between the Arabs and the "original" Jews the ancient inhabitants of the country, there are ideal relations -- is without any foundation whatsoever.

5) The growth of World Jewish population is illustrated as follows:

In the year 1700 -- 1,000,000 Oriental Jews and 1,000,000 Jews in Europe and America.

In the year 1939 -- 1,600,000 Oriental Jews (increase of 60%) in a world Jewish population of 15,000,000.

This illustrates the living conditions of Jews in the Orient where the total population increased by a much larger percentage than 60%.

Jews in Oriental countries

1) Yemen. Number of Jews -- 40,000. Jews live under special edict and under discriminatory and oppressive laws, the main purpose of which is to bring the Jew into contempt as a tolerated subject of low caste vis-a-vis the Arab.

2) Iraq. Number of Jews -- 130,000. Theoretically Jews possess complete citizen rights in the State, but in practice they are frozen out of all walks of economic and social life, especially in Government service and business life. Government budgets no funds for Jewish schools, and inspectors interfere with religious and cultural teaching in schools.

3) Syria. Number of Jews -- 10,000 and

Lebanon. Number of Jews -- 6,000.

Conditions similar to those in Iraq. The Zionist movement is illegal and is persecuted. Emigration of Jews to Palestine is forbidden.

4) Algeria and Tunis. Jews are not badly treated (except under the Vichy regime). The hatred towards Jews is on the increase, however, because Jews look upon the French as their protectors and gave them their support. This hatred is also kindled by the fact that since 1870 all Jews have been given full French citizenship whereas not all Moslems benefit from this right.

5) Morocco. A feeling of hostility towards the Jews smoulders in the non-Jewish population. The Jewish community is largely composed of the lower social classes, having left the ghettos only at the beginning of the 20th century, and ardently aspires to emigrate to Palestine.

6) Tripolitania. Jews and Arabs have lived in peace for centuries. Riots broke out in November 1945, however, under the eyes of the British who forbade all contact between local Jews and their brothers in Palestine. The British demanded and obtained from the Jews a complete waiving of compensation rights as a condition of their pacifying the country.

7) Iran. Jews not badly treated. Generation-old fanaticism still exists among the masses, however, despite the sympathy of this country for the Jewish nation and its support of the first return to Zion. Jews remember the time when they were obliged to embrace Islam publicly before the influence of the fanatical priests was broken by the Shah and his government in the past twenty years.

The Iranian government, striving for national unity, does not support the existence of minorities.

The Jews of Iran are poor and are in a very serious economic position which cannot be relieved except by emigration to Palestine.

8) Afghanistan. Anti-Semitism and blind religious fanaticism of the masses are linked with Government discrimination. The Jews are subject to special poll-tax ("jizyah") for non-believers. They are allowed in only two main cities - Kabul and Herat.

9) Turkey. Although the Jews are not discriminated against for being Jews, a systematic general discrimination against all minorities is in force, as a result of which Jews suffer seriously in business and economic life, employment, etc. The Jews allowed
/no part...

no part in social and political life and are not accepted in the Government Party -- until recently the only Party in the State. They are the main target of the capital levy imposed in 1942 (Varlik Vergizi). The Zionist movement is forbidden.

Reasons for anti-Jewish feeling in Oriental countries.

6) The Arabs explain it by the growth of Zionism. Zionism is only one of the causes, and is used by the Arab leaders to promote unity among Arabs. The main cause for anti-semitism, however, lies in various deep social and political forces at work in the Orient as well as in Europe, and the sole remedy is an organized emigration of the Jews.

Other Causes

a) The Arabs are undergoing a process of Westernization which must take place at the expense of the Jew.

b) The Arab nations are busy establishing their own states -- a movement which is tied up with extreme Nationalist groups. On the economic side this trend is manifested by a tendency towards State enterprise and monopoly wherein private enterprise is squeezed. On the political side this trend breeds intolerance towards minorities.

c) The Nazi and Fascist propaganda of recent years has penetrated into the consciousness of many of the Oriental peoples.

d) The countries of the Orient and the Arab States in particular encounter strangers at every step of their national struggle. This breeds a feeling of hatred for the stranger.

e) Behind all of the above lies the traditional and deeprooted religious fanaticism of the masses, which not all governments are in a hurry to combat.

12) DR. WEIZMANN

(Testimony before the Committee on 8 July 1947)

1. As compared with the results of the colonizing activities of other peoples, the impact of the Jews upon the Arabs has not produced very much worse results than have been produced by others in other countries. Even the Government of Palestine, in its Memorandum on the Administration of the Mandate, submitted to this Committee, admits that the Arabs have benefited by the work of the Jews. The Administration, however, blames the Jews for having
/created...

created a disparity between themselves and the local population. But every nation moves on its way of progress with the speed which is the result of its qualities, of its abilities, of its conditions. These cannot be artificially suppressed so as not to create a disparity, even though it might make things easier for the Administration. To the Jews, every slowing down process meant as many dead and so much destruction.

2. To some extent the disparity between the two communities could have been avoided if the Arab population had been ready to cooperate in the same degree to which the Jews were ready to cooperate with them. (p. 16).

3. The White Paper had a fatal effect on relations between Arabs and Jews. "Why should the Arab listen to overtures on the part of the Jew if he knows that with the application of a little violence, as he did in the years 1934 and 1935, and 1936 to 1939, he can get what he wants and more".

4. Dr. Weizmann tells of repeated attempts to "come to terms with the Arabs". (p. 20-22). He denies their claim that they were not informed of the formulation of the Balfour Declaration.

5. In many domains of economic activity - the Citrus Board, the Dead Sea concession and others -- and also in some of the municipal councils, Arabs and Jews are working together successfully. "One of the most important prerequisites for such friendship is to establish a definite, clear and equal status between the Jews and the Arabs." (p. 22)

CHAPTER V

THE PRESENT ECONOMIC SITUATION OF PALESTINE

A. THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF PALESTINE

- (1) Population
- (2) The Economic Separateness of Arab and Jewish Economies
- (3) Agriculture
- (4) Industry
- (5) Foreign Trade

B. CURRENT ECONOMIC TRENDS

- (1) War-time and Post-war Inflation
- (2) Problems of Reconversion from War to Peace

A. THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
OF PALESTINE

(1) Population

1) GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE(Survey of Palestine)

1) Statistics normally distinguish the population by religion into Moslems, Jews, Christians and others. Since, however, a major feature of the economic structure is a fairly sharp division of the economy into two sections, the Arab and the Jewish, differentiation by race is most significant for economic analysis. At the end of 1946, the estimated settled population on this basis was:

Arabs	1,203,000
Jews	608,000
Other	35,000
Total	1,866,000

2) This is not a stationary population. It is growing rapidly. In 1922 the total settled population was 649,068, of whom only 83,790 were Jews, and in 1931, 996,761 of whom 174,606 were Jews. The Jewish population has grown mostly by immigration but also by natural increase, while the Arab population has grown almost entirely by natural increase. The rate of natural increase of the Arab population is high on account of a high fertility rate and falling mortality rates. Fertility is expected to decline in the future and the decline in mortality rates may be expected to continue at a slower pace. The Jewish rate of natural increase appears to be lower than that of the Moslems, but higher than in most European countries. Where no account is taken of immigration, the Arab population may be expected to grow, by natural increase, at a rather higher rate than the Jewish population (Survey of Palestine, Vol. III).

3) Between 1920 and 1946 the number of registered immigrants into Palestine was 414,456 of whom 376,415 were Jews. In 1945, 15,019 immigrants were registered of whom 12,751 were Jews and in 1946 the total number of immigrants was 12,272 of whom 7,851 were Jews. (Supplement to Survey of Palestine)

4) On the assumption that fertility of the population between 1946 to 1960 is the same as that between 1926 to 1944 and the mortality the same as that between 1939 and 1944 the rate of growth of the population of Palestine between now and 1960 has been calculated as follows:

(In thousands)	<u>Moslems</u>		<u>Jews</u>		<u>Others</u>		<u>Total</u>
	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>No.</u>	<u>%</u>	
1945	1,061	60.1	554	31.4	150	8.7	1,765
1960	1,533	64	664	27.7	197	8.2	2,394

5) This is growth by natural increase only and takes no account of immigration. The rate at which immigration would grow by natural increase depends on fertility and mortality rates, age and sex composition, etc. of the immigrants, which are unknown. Assuming age and sex distribution similar to that of the immigrants from 1933 to 1941 and fertility and mortality rates equal to those for the present Jewish population, it is calculated that 100,000 immigrants would have grown by natural increase to 132,200 after twelve years. Thus, if 100,000 immigrants arrived in 1948 the total Jewish population by 1960 would be 796,000--that is, about 50% of the total population. If 1,000,000 immigrants came in 1948 the Jewish population would grow by 1960 to 1,988,000. Thereafter, if rates of increase of the two races remain the same and there is no more immigration, the Arab population would begin to catch up to and shortly overtake the Jewish (Survey of Palestine, Volume III, Section 1).

6) Between

6) Between 1922/21 and again between 1931/44 the Moslem population has increased in almost all districts, but the increases were greater in the towns than in the rural areas, indicating an increased urbanisation of the Arab population. The greatest increases in Moslem population have taken place in Jaffa (20,621 in 1922 to 50,880 in 1944), Gaza (16,722 in 1922 to 33,160 in 1944) and Haifa (9,377 in 1922 to 35,960 in 1944). The greatest increase has taken place in recent years. Nevertheless the Moslem population is still mainly rural, 70% living in villages in 1944 against 76% in 1922. The greatest increases in the Moslem population are in the coastal plain, owing to the more rapid economic development in that area.

7) The Jewish rate of increase has been greater in rural areas than in urban areas. However, the fundamental character of the Jewish community is that of an urban population. More than half of all Jewish inhabitants in 1946 lived in the four large towns of Tel Aviv, Jerusalem, Haifa and Jaffa, as follows:

<u>Jewish population in 1946</u>	
Tel Aviv	182,510
Haifa	74,230
Jaffa	30,820
Jerusalem	99,320
Total	<u>386,880</u>

(Survey of Palestine, Vol. I,
Chapter VI, Supplement to the
Survey, p.10)

2) BNE-HORIN MOVEMENT

2) BNE-HORIN MOVEMENT(Solution of the Palestine Problem)

Although official statistics indicate that the present Hebrew population is 1/3 of the total population, "there are serious reasons to doubt the accuracy of these statistics and to assume that the Hebrew sector already represents 40 to 45% of the total population". In any case the present Arab majority is "merely the result of artificial restrictions". There are "at least two million Hebrews in Europe and in the Moslem world who would have been in Palestine if they had been left to their own free choice".

/(2) The

(2) The Economic Separateness
of Arab and Jewish Economies

1) GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE

(Survey of Palestine, Volume III, pp. 1272
to 1278)

1) The Arab and Jewish communities maintain a high degree of separateness in the economic life and the two groups can be considered as two economies separated only partially, however, on a territorial basis. Only the strictest separation could account for the continued and wide differences in the size of investment in some industries, productivity and labor cost. Otherwise, the force of competition would exert the same leveling influence as between for example Arab and Jewish birth rates.

2) In agriculture there is a clear division between the two communities except in the case of citrus production. The bulk of Arab cereal production is consumed where it is produced. In mixed towns the fruit and vegetable produce of Jewish agriculture is marketed through Jewish wholesalers to Jewish retailers. Arab produce, fruit and vegetables, are in the main marketed by Arabs. There is some overlap in the case of prominent shops in the mixed quarters of Arabs and Jews.

3) As regards industry the bulk of production is in Jewish hands. From the point of view of consumption of manufactured articles, however, the communities are not so clearly separated. During war-time shortages, there has been a considerable growth in the demand for the products of Jewish manufacture on the part of all groups of the population. Net output per head in Jewish undertakings is considerably higher in all branches

/than

than in Arab. This is mainly due to the greater capital equipment in Jewish industry. On the basis of a study of the census of industry in 1942 net output per head in Jewish undertakings was 87% higher than in Arab undertakings. On the other hand, labor costs were 107% higher so that equivalent expenditures on labor yielded more net output in Arab industries than in Jewish. Jewish industry, therefore, may ultimately face not only competition from imported manufacture but also competition from Arab undertakings in Palestine. At present the separateness of the two economies has a clear expression in the fact of these differences in cost structure and in wage rates between the two groups.

2) THE JEWISH AGENCY

(The Jewish Case, page 515)

It cannot be sufficiently emphasized that as far as the Arab population is concerned, the whole of this development (i.e. the ten year plan to absorb one million Jewish immigrants) will occur "in vacuo": Not a single Arab need be displaced, not a single person employed need lose his occupation, not a single square foot of Arab-owned land which is not given up against a very satisfactory remuneration need pass out of Arab hands.

3) IHUD (UNION) ASSOCIATION

(Towards Union in Palestine,
page 77)

There are in Palestine two national economic units which are more or less secluded from each other. But

/for

for a very small number of experts, no Jewish workers are employed in Arab enterprises and very few Arab workers are employed by Jewish undertakings, except in orange groves. The only places where Arab and Jewish workers meet are in government services, the oil refineries, and the Potash Company, but in these concession companies the Jewish labor is mainly skilled and the Arab unskilled. On the whole, the character of the Arab working class is that of a colonial one, whereas the Jews are nearer to European standards. The problems of the Jewish or Arab worker are more or less alien to his comrade from the other community. The majority of Arab and Jewish workers at present still work and live separated.. Standards of life of Jewish workers are on the whole higher than those of Arab workers and different standards of life are accompanied by different habits..

(3) Agriculture

(3) Agriculture

1) THE GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE

(Survey of Palestine; the Jewish Case;
Hearings of Mr. Kaplan)

Agriculture

1) The most striking feature of the Palestine climate is its two alternating seasons of winter rain followed by six months drought. Without irrigation summer cropping is dependent entirely on the amount of soil moisture that can be preserved from the rainy season. Over many areas the rainfall is not sufficient for this form of conservation. Under irrigation the soil will yield intensively almost all the year round. Under natural conditions rotations are essential, as it is not possible to grow a summer crop without a precedent winter fallow.

2) Arab farming is mainly extensive and under natural conditions (i.e. without irrigation). Practically every square yard of land capable of producing a crop under extensive cultivation is in use. Arab farming is devoted to a considerable extent to wheat and barley, of which 70% or more is consumed by the producers.

3) Jewish farming has been greatly developed by irrigation under which mixed farming is being expanded. About 75% of the produce of such farms is sold on the market. (Survey of Palestine, Vol. I, Chapter IX.)

4) The production of the principal types of crops has shown important changes in recent years mainly owing to the development of vegetable production and mixed farming. Output in tons of the chief groups of crops in 1936 and 1945 is as follows:

	1936	1945
Grains and Legumes	181,700 tons	209,755 tons
Vegetables	70,321 "	244,836 "
Plantation crops (excluding citrus)	105,550 "	174,187 "

/5) Grains

5) Grains and legumes are mainly produced by Arabs, only about 10% of the total being produced by Jewish farmers. Arab cultivators also produce a large amount of the total vegetables and fruits. But in the structure of the Jewish agriculture, vegetables and fruits (even excluding citrus) play a large part. (Survey of Palestine, Vol. I, Chapter IX.)

6) Citrus is the principal export product of Palestine and since the Mandate the citrus area has rapidly increased. In 1923, about 30,000 dunums were under citrus and this area more than doubled by 1928. By 1939 about 293,000 dunums were under citrus, and Arab and Jewish holdings were roughly equal. During the war, the area was reduced owing to temporary loss of markets. Exports which were 11 to 15 million cases before the war fell almost completely away between 1940 and 1943. Thereafter they have increased to over 5 million cases in 1945/46 and are estimated at 7 1/2 million cases in 1946/47.

7) The structures of Jewish and Arab agriculture are compared in the following table:

Area under different types of crops and
value of crops produced by Jews and Arabs
in the season 1944-45

	Jewish			Arab		
	Dunums	Tons	Value L P. 000's	Dunums	Tons	Value L P. 000's
Grains	245,191	16,597	497	4,152,438	193,376	4,433
Vegetables	40,207	55,730	1,745	239,733	189,104	5,113
Fodder	119,573	176,525	951	23,970	20,827	157
Fruits (excl. citrus)	37,217	21,398	1,379,620	355,709	73,320	3,139
Olives	7,537	1,182	53,235	592,546	78,287	3,320
Melons	5,675	7,193	89,975	120,304	135,634	969

8) There are marked differences in the structure of Jewish and Arab agriculture. In Jewish agriculture, dairy, poultry, farming and fisheries provide for some two-thirds of the total value of production. In Arab farming, cereal growing is the backbone of production, followed by olives. Dairy farming is of considerable importance but cannot be extended under present conditions as it depends upon natural pasture. The difference in farming structure explains very largely the wide divergencies between the increase in production during the war in intensive and extensive agriculture, respectively. Intensive agriculture, based largely on purchased feed stuffs and dependent on irrigation and fertilizers, lent itself more easily to an expansion of production than indigenous farming which is greatly dependent on climatic factors.

9) Arab farming is directed mainly towards self-supply. On the average only about one-third of the total production of Arab farming is sold on the market. By contrast, the intensive production of Jewish farming is mainly for the market. On the average, 75% of Jewish production is for sale.

Broadly, Jewish and Arab farming are related in the following manner:

a) The production of extensive farming supplies intensive farmers with some advantage (for example, fodder);

b) Arab produce competes to some extent with Jewish produce in the Jewish market;

c) Arab produce to some extent complements supplies from Jewish farmers (The Jewish Case, pp. 540-542).

10) Arab land use has greatly improved during the last 15 years, as a result of direct resources made available by Jewish land purchases and the stimuli of urban markets. According to official figures between 1931 and 1939, the average income of the Arab farmer increased by approximately 30%, apart from the gain in citrus production. By 1945, after correcting for price increases, the income of the Arab farmer was on the average 50% higher than in 1931, due to better and more diversified production. The war price rise also improved the position of the Arab farmer. Output of the Arab farms increased by about 15%, but the amount marketed by about 30%.

Jewish Agriculture

11) Apart from citrus, the increase in the total output (value corrected for price changes) was about 110% between 1931 and 1939. This increase has continued since the war and the present output is about 140% of the 1939 output. Ninety-four new agricultural settlements have been established since the beginning of the war (maps were presented to the Committee showing the growth of Jewish settlements since the First World War). The Jewish agricultural economy is based mainly on protective foods, the prices of which have increased since the beginning of the war by about 360%. Since the war there has been some fall in prices, but a slight rise in cost. Seventy-five percent to eighty percent of the Jewish agricultural production is for the market and depends on imported fodder, the cost of which has greatly increased. The high cost of grain from the Middle East and also the high cost of labor add to the difficulties of readjustment to the post-war conditioning. Immigration would be a means of
/reducing

reducing labor costs and overcoming the shortage of labor.

12) Arab farmers also face difficult readjustment. The price of grain, which is the main Arab crop, has increased by 460%, but the sellers market will eventually disappear and grain prices fall. Before the war, Arab cereal farmers often had to raise additional income by hiring themselves out or by incurring debts. (Hearings: Evidence of E. Kaplan.)

(4) Industry

(4) Industry

1) GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE

(Survey of Palestine and Supplement to Survey)

1) "In the brief interval between the wars industry surmounted the paucity of natural resources and emerged as the dominant contributory to the National Income." This was achieved despite the adverse effects of Article 18 of the Mandate. The protection provided by war conditions after 1940, and the great demand for goods of all sorts for military needs gave a great stimulus to Palestine industry. An index of employment in manufacturing in all communities shows the following trend

<u>1939</u>	<u>1942</u>	<u>1943</u>	<u>1944</u>	<u>1945</u>
100	200	214	209	221

2) This industrial development is also reflected in a change in the structure of imports in which raw materials play a greater, and wholly manufactured goods a lesser, part, as follows:

	<u>1939</u>	<u>1943</u>	<u>1944</u>	<u>1945</u>	<u>1946</u>
1. Food, drink and Tobacco	26	38	40	36	27
2. Raw materials and articles mainly unmanufactured	10	40	38	42	32
3. Articles, wholly or mainly manufactured	64	22	22	22	41

3) There has been no census since 1931, so that a precise statement of occupational distribution is not possible but an estimate has been made of the number of wage earners in different branches of economic activity for the years 1939 and 1942. This shows the increase in manufacturing and in construction. The fall in agriculture (hired labor only) partly reflects the decline in citrus production.

/Number

Number of wage earners in each branch
of industry, 1939 and 1942

	<u>1939</u>	<u>1942</u>
1. Agriculture (hired labor)	35,000	20,000
2. Industry:		
Manufacture	37,200	52,000
Mining	3,000	3,200
Construction	25,000	61,500
Transport and communications..	18,000	20,000
3. Commerce and Finance	21,000	22,000
4. Government, administrative department and municipal services	21,000	31,500
5. Hotels, restaurants and personal services	27,000	31,550
6. War Department civilian employees	1,700	24,600
7. Palestinian soldiers	-	21,200
8. Other services	15,000	17,700
	<u>203,900</u>	<u>305,250</u>

4) Seventy-five to eighty percent of all persons engaged in industry were engaged in Jewish owned enterprises, and of the total number of workers in industry about 90% are Jewish. In the main Jewish workers are employed in Jewish concerns and Arabs in Arab owned industries, though there are some exceptions to this. The most developed Arab industries are milling, tobacco manufacturing, and some branches of the textile and metal trades. A large Arab spinning plant operating 6,200 spindles has come into production. Altogether the capacity of the spinning industry has increased since the end of the war by 20,000 spindles, of which 14,000 are Jewish. Eventually cotton weavers will become practically independent of imported yarn. Cement production, metal trades and the chemical industries are in process of expansion.

/ 5) There

5) There has been a marked shift in the size of industrial establishments towards larger scale undertakings. Enterprises employing fifty or more persons accounted for 50% of the total as against 35% in 1937.

6) The most important branches of Jewish industry in 1937 and 1943, distinguished by the number of employees and capital invested, are:

	<u>1937</u>		<u>1943</u>	
	<u>Number</u> <u>Employees</u>	<u>Capital</u> <u>LP.</u>	<u>Number</u> <u>Employees</u>	<u>Capital</u> <u>LP.</u>
Food	3,676	1,626,780	7,377	3,152,000
Textiles	2,772	656,010	8,434	2,195,000
Metal and Machines	2,872	835,910	2,774	2,067,000
Printing and Paper	2,282	519,450	2,226	866,000
Chemicals	2,002	1,593,500	4,795	3,309,000
Diamonds	-	-	3,571	678,000

2) MANUFACTURERS' ASSOCIATION OF PALESTINE
(Memorandum on Jewish Industry)

1) Between 1925 and 1933 the number of workmen employed in workshops increased from 5,000 to 19,500 and invested capital from LP. 1 1/2 million to LP. 5.35 millions.

2) Industry in Palestine developed on private initiative without any encouragement from the government. Even Arab disturbances did not altogether prevent further development and by 1937 the number of workers had reached 30,000. Capital investment exceeded current demand expectations, but manufacturers assumed

/that

that industrial development would be justified by immigration, and this proved to be the case, for a steady development continued. The authorities were indifferent and the application of Article 18 of the Mandate was at all times a serious obstacle.

3) After 1941 Palestine industry was involved in the production of supplies of great importance to the Allied Forces. There was in consequence a considerable expansion of production of medical preparations, textiles, footwear, household articles and other articles both for military and civil needs.

4) At the end of 1944, with the opening up of the Mediterranean, the official attitude towards Jewish industry again became one of indifference. There was no policy of conversion to peace conditions. However, investment continued and imports of machinery rose from LP. 400,000 to LP. 2,400,000 in 1946. The war-time development of industry was merely an acceleration of a longer term process. Moreover, it should be noted, that Jewish industry is based on high wage standards and high productivity.

5) Exports have developed in quantity and variety and in addition to products of the Dead Sea, artificial teeth and citrus by-products, polished diamonds, clothing, pharmaceutical goods, cosmetics and other products are now exported.

6) Development is impeded by the White Paper immigration policy, by the application of Article 18 of the Mandate, by customs tariffs based purely on fiscal considerations, by the importation of certain essential products from high price areas, and by the application of the sterling-dollar exchange control.

7) The Arab boycott is also a disturbing factor. The government has taken no steps to seek to end it, although it is in violation of international trade agreements.

/(5) Foreign

(5) Foreign Trade

1) GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE
(Survey of Palestine)

Foreign Trade

1) There has been a great increase in the foreign trade of Palestine (both exports and imports) since 1922. The increases in total values during the war over the immediate pre-war years is more than accounted for by the rise in prices, since the actual volume of trade fell during the war. Only in 1945 and, especially 1946, has there been any increase in the volume of trade, imports particularly having jumped in 1946.

Total imports and exports of Palestine
by value 1939, 1945 and 1946

	<u>1939</u>	<u>1945</u>	<u>1946</u>
Imports	14,633	40,691	70,432
Exports	5,468	20,396	24,485
Excess of Imports	9,165	20,295	45,945

2) Palestine depends on foreign trade to secure, by import, food (especially wheat, meat and cattle fodder) raw materials, machinery, and equipment which has been and is essential to its development. The finance of these imports is only partly covered by exports. There remains a considerable balance of imports over exports which are financed by imports of capital which consists mainly of funds coming from world Jewry, capital brought in by immigrants and funds coming to religious institutions. During and since the war there has also been a large military expenditure by the British government.

3) The structure of imports and exports has changed during the war owing partly to temporary causes (especially the decline of citrus exports, which are now rapidly recovering their pre-war importance) and partly to more permanent causes, such as the expansion of local industrial production.

(See table Para. 70 (Supplement to Survey))

See table Para. 80 " " ")

4) In the period 1934/1939 citrus fruits accounted for 77% of the total exports.

5) The percentage of imports from certain countries and regions in 1939, 1945 and 1946 was:

<u>Country of Origin</u>	<u>1939</u>	<u>1945</u>	<u>1946</u>
United Kingdom	16.4	10.4	20.2
British Possessions	5.5	23.1	16.9
United States of America	13.3	11.0	8.2
Middle Eastern countries	17.7	51.9	39.0
Other countries	<u>47.1</u>	<u>3.6</u>	<u>15.7</u>
	100.0	100.0	100.0

6) During the war dependence on Middle East sources of supply was greatly increased.

7) The percentage of exports to certain countries and regions in 1939, 1945 and 1946 was:

<u>Country of Origin</u>	<u>1939</u>	<u>1945</u>	<u>1946</u>
United Kingdom	47.68	14.2	17.9
British Possessions	3.40	6.9	8.4
United States of America	2.85	24.0	20.8
Middle Eastern countries	10.13	48.5	31.4
Other countries	<u>35.94</u>	<u>6.4</u>	<u>21.5</u>
	100.00	100.0	100.0

8) The fall in the United Kingdom share in exports since 1939 is largely explained by the temporary decline

/of

of the citrus trade, but also partly by the growth in importance of manufactured goods in the total of exports. The value of exports from Palestine to Middle East countries, especially Egypt, Syria and Lebanon and Iraq, fell heavily in 1946 compared with 1945.

The Budget

9) The estimated government expenditure through the budget for 1946/47 and 1947/48 is as follows:

	1946/47 (revised) LP. 000's	1947/48 (estimated) LP.000's
Total expenditure	21,915	24,635
Internal security and war services	9,403	10,480
Residue	12,512	14,155

10) War expenditure is now classed as temporary services and consists of special expenditures arising out of war needs, e.g. subsidisation to keep the cost of living down and assistance to the citrus industry.

(Supplement to the Survey of Palestine)

/B. CURRENT

B. CURRENT ECONOMIC TRENDS

- (1) The War-time and Post-war
Inflation

GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE

(Survey of Palestine)

The War-time Inflation

1) In common with most countries Palestine experienced considerable inflation during the war. Inflation in Palestine was greater than in the United States of America or Great Britain but less than in some other Middle East countries. It was due on the side of demand to a large expansion of income and on the side of supply to an inability of output to respond to the increase in demand for consumer goods on account of (1) cutting off of imports; (2) diversion of local production to military needs; (3) limited capacity of agriculture to increase output in a short period. The extent of the inflation is approximately indicated by the cost of living index as follows:

Cost of Living Index of Palestine for
December of each year

Pre-war = 100

<u>1940</u>	<u>1941</u>	<u>1942</u>	<u>1943</u>	<u>1944</u>	<u>1945</u>	<u>1946</u>
131	166	211	230	238	252	275

2) The main causes of the increase in income was the military expenditure of the British Government which is as follows:

Millions of pounds

<u>1940</u>	<u>1941</u>	<u>1942</u>	<u>1943</u>	<u>1944</u>	<u>1945</u>	<u>1946</u>
8.5	20.7	25.4	31.5	25.0	24.3	23.5

3) When the war broke out stocks of commodities in Palestine were fairly high and imports only fell seriously in 1941. By 1943 and 1944 military expenditure

/and

and the pressure of demand on the food supply reached the peak. There was a considerable increase in the output of food and an increase in imports from Middle East countries at high prices, but this was not sufficient to prevent further fairly modest increases in prices. Since the end of the war inflation of prices has continued, although the supply situation has somewhat improved owing to an increase in imports in 1946.

4) Wages were increased both as a result of increase in basic rates and by linking them to cost of living by means of cost of living allowances. Thus, average industrial earnings in all industries increased in the case of Arabs by 200% and in the case of Jews by 258% between 1939 and 1945. Earnings in some agricultural occupations increased by even more than this. In construction trades the increase in earnings for unskilled workers between 1939 and 1945 was in the case of Arabs 405% and in the case of Jews 329%. Thus, on the whole, real wages have not fallen but in some cases risen during the years of the war. (Survey of Palestine, Volume III, Section 15.)

5) An inquiry made before the war indicated that the average Arab producer was considerably burdened by debt, the debt even amounting to as much as the total of his annual cash income. During the war the Arab cultivator achieved a large measure of prosperity owing to the rise in the prices of his products. Also the increased demand for labor at very much higher rates provided a good deal of profitable employment. Consequently, both the income and the standard of living of many Arab producers have increased. An inquiry made in December 1945

/suggests.

suggests that the debt burden of the Arab peasant has been considerably reduced and in some cases wiped out. Also there are now improved credit facilities by which Arabs are able to borrow at lower rates of interest.

/(2) Problems

(2) Problems of Reconversion

1) THE GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE

(Survey of Palestine and Supplementary
Memorandum by the Government)

1) During the war 130,000 people were either in the armed forces, working on military construction, or on production for military orders. Since the end of the war the re-absorption of this labor force has had no significant effect on the labor market. This is mainly accounted for by:

- a. the high volume of demand which has been maintained by the continuance of military expenditure at a level which is about 20% of the total national income.
- b. a continuing shortage of supplies of both industrial and agricultural consumer goods.

2) In consequence prices and the cost of living have remained high. It has been alleged that the high cost of living is mainly due to the importation of food (especially grains) and raw materials from high price Middle East countries. Imports, it is said, could be obtained from other areas at much lower prices. However, essential foodstuffs and certain raw materials of which there is a world shortage are mainly controlled by the International Emergency Fund Council which makes allocations as to quantities and also determines the loading areas. The I.E.F.C. determines which countries shall supply the commodities in short supply. The prices are determined by the exporting countries. On the whole it is believed that Palestine has not been unfairly treated by the I.E.F.C. (See Supplementary Memorandum by the Government of Palestine, pp. 38-39.)

3) Some of the difficulties of the re-adjustment of the Palestine economy to post-war conditions are dealt with in the Survey of Palestine, Vol. III, Section 15. The effect of the war-time inflation has been to raise prices and costs in Palestine more than in the United Kingdom and the United States of America. As a result, the internal purchasing power of the Palestine pound has fallen more than that of the pound sterling, though the rates of foreign exchange have not altered. This will be disadvantageous to Palestine export industries when supplies become more plentiful, unless prices and costs are reduced in Palestine. The government does not contemplate a depreciation of the Palestine pound against the pound sterling and consequently re-adjustment to post-war conditions is visualized as requiring a fall in internal prices. The process of adjustment of relative prices is considered as likely to require a period of three to five years.

4) Some fall in prices may be expected, when world supplies improve, as a result of a fall in the prices of imports of food and raw materials. This will have some influence in reducing costs and improving the competitive position of local industry. It will not, however, overcome all the competitive disadvantages of the high cost structure. Wages in Palestine have risen during the war at least as much as, and some cases more than, the rise in the cost of living. The impediment to the achievement of real competitive capacity deriving from the present wage levels is fully realized by at least the leaders of organized Jewish labor, although the pressure of that section of labor is still exercised in an upward direction.

5) The extent of the inflation of prices of some essential locally produced consumer goods which will be subject to overseas competition when world supplies improve is given in the following table:

Food	% increase in price over 1939
Butter	298
Potatoes	227
Grains	300
Tomatoes	357
Industrial Products	% increase in price over 1939
Primus Stove	421
Cooling Pot	1150
Shoes (men's)	380
Jacket (men's)	422
Linen Cloth	875
Cotton Cloth	1150

6) The inflation of the prices of products using imported raw materials has generally been greater than in the case of foodstuffs. It is stated that the cost of production of such commodities generally approximates to the present demand ceiling price.

7) Palestine has always been economically greatly susceptible to outside influences, both because of her geographical position and of the degree to which she falls short of self-sufficiency in supply. (Survey of Palestine, Vol. III, Section 15.)

2) JEWISH

2) JEWISH AGENCY

(Memorandum on Reconversion in Palestine,
June 1947)

1) Industry in Palestine accounts for 23% of the national income and is more important than in any other Middle East country. During the war 35% of industrial capacity was applied to war production. In 1945 and 1946, 31,000 Jewish immigrants and 26,000 demobilized men were re-absorbed into employment.

2) Considerable investments were required to replace equipment and in 1946 imports of machinery amounted to LP. 2.9 millions.

3) The following is the total of Jewish investments in Palestine in 1946:

	<u>LP. 000'</u>
(a) Urban building	10,000
(b) Agricultural investment-by Jewish National Fund	3,000
(c) Industrial investments	4,350
(d) Transport	<u>1,800</u>
Total	20,500

4) Agricultural land in possession of the Jewish National Fund amounted to 865,000 dunams in September 1946. Recent developments have led to a more intensive use of land by irrigation and the irrigated area of Jewish land has increased from 40,000 dunams in 1939 to 130,000 in 1946. Experiments are being made to develop parts of the Negev by irrigation.

5) A survey of investment projects in the course of execution by Jewish industry in 1946 and 1947 yielded the following results:

/Branch

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Investments in Factory Buildings and Equipment</u>	<u>Number of Ad- ditional Workers</u>
Textiles	LP. 3,200,000	3,700
Food	2,900,000	700
Building Mate- rial	2,600,000	1,100
Metal and Elec- trical Appli- ances	750,000	800
Chemicals	680,000	120
Woodwork	195,000	260
Miscellaneous	670,000	660
T O T A L	10,095,000	7,340

6) There are at present considerable financial resources in Palestine and these are reinforced by imports of Jewish capital from abroad:

Import of Jewish Capital into Palestine

1945	LP. 11,780,000
1946	14,710,000
1947	2,870,000

7) Both agricultural and industrial production have been increased.

8) In 1946 in Jewish Palestine 260,000 were gainfully occupied as against 192,000 in 1939. There were no more than 1,277 unemployed in March 1947.

9) In the Arab economy there has been a similar improvement and the Arab standard of living has improved since 1939. This improvement has so far been maintained during the post-war period.

10) Nevertheless there are dangers in the present situation which may complicate adjustment to post-war conditions. First, is the Arab boycott which has not yet adversely affected production as a whole, because of general shortage and an increase in exports to other areas than the Arab countries. Second, the world

/shortages

Shortages create a sellers' market which may not last.
Third, the political situation creates considerable
difficulties and weakens competitive power.

/CHAPTER VI

CHAPTER VI

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN RELATION TO IMMIGRATION

A. ECONOMIC ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY

- (1) General
- (2) Physical Resources
- (3) Economic and Sociological Factors

B. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

A. ECONOMIC ABSORPTIVE CAPACITY

(1) General

1. Government of Palestine.

(Survey of Palestine, Volume III, Section 2, and Memorandum on the Administration of Palestine under the Mandate, pp.12 and 13).

1) A great many factors determine the limit of economic absorptive capacity - factors too numerous, and in many cases too imprecise, to be measured quantitatively. However, there are three main influences to which most of the others are subordinate. These are: (1) The size of the population receiving the immigrants; (2) The resultant of the forces of attraction in the country of immigration and of repulsion in the countries of emigration - This may be expressed in terms of the total foreign trade (imports + exports) of the country of immigration, since it is largely through foreign trade that the finance to support the immigration is obtained; (3) The local tension created by the influx of immigrants, which can be measured in terms of actual expenditure on police services.

2) The conception of economic absorptive capacity must be fluid and is a matter on which expert opinions may honestly differ. While recognising the hostility of the Arabs towards Jewish immigration, the Administration has generally taken no account of political, social and psychological considerations in applying the principle of economic absorptive capacity. A review of the condition of congestion in Arab and Jewish rural areas carried out in 1936 had indicated serious congestion in almost the whole of the

/Arab area

Arab area, whereas Jewish lands supported fewer families in proportion to the acreage.

2. Jewish Agency.

(The Jewish case and Evidence of Mr. Kaplan, 16th Meeting of UNSCOP).

1) The Statement of British Policy in Palestine, issued in June 1922 stated that Jewish "immigration cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb the new arrivals. It is essential that they (the new arrivals) should not deprive any section of the present population of their employment".

2) The Zionist Organization accepted this principle on the understanding that immigration would proceed to the maximum.

3) Economic absorptive capacity is the resultant of a large number of forces. Material factors are fundamental, but they are not alone determining. Economic absorptive capacity of a country is what its population makes it. Two things should be kept in mind, (1) economic absorptive capacity of a country cannot be expressed in a final and definite figure, (2) economic absorptive capacity is a long-term conception.

4) The Jewish Agency accepts as a limitation the principle that all immigration must be an addition to employment, not a replacement. When the Jewish Agency speaks of economic absorptive capacity, it refers to the number of people who can enter the country and, after a reasonable

/period of

period of transition, sustain themselves without impairing the standard of living of those already there.

5) In the past, the future potentialities of Palestine were presented in terms of agricultural development. The potentialities to-day are expressed also in terms of industrial development. The bulk of immigration will be absorbed by industry. It is argued that such immigrants will meet a minimum of economic resistance on the part of the Arabs. (The Jewish Case, pp. 494).

6) Jewish immigration has created a new absorptive capacity. A sound self-supporting Jewish economic entity has been established and the development process is only at the beginning. Palestine can absorb additional millions of people.

7) Supplies of basic natural resources of land and water are not the limiting factors in the absorption of large numbers. The agricultural population of this country can be easily doubled and may be trebled. The progress of modern agriculture depends upon the expansion of urban markets and we envisage further agricultural development as a part of its general all-round progress. (The Jewish Agency : Evidence of E. Kaplan, Hearings, 16th meeting).

3. Jhud(Union) Association of Palestine

(Written statement to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 1946, page 10, and Dr. Magnes' Evidence before UNSCOP).

As regards absorptive capacity, account must be taken not only of the views of experts, but also of those imponderables, zeal, science, capacity for sacrifice, which have enabled the Jews to extend the economic absorptive capacity of the country beyond anything the experts had considered possible. When Sir

/Herbert Samuel

Herbert Samuel was High Commissioner in 1920-25, it was the accepted view that Palestine, with agriculture as its chief industry, could not hold more than 3,000,000. (There were 805,000 inhabitants at mid-1924, of whom 628,000 were Moslems). But now Lord Samuel, in his recent speech in the House of Lords, mentions the possibility of 4-1/2 million within a generation.

4) League for Peace with Justice in Palestine.

(Memorandum, June 5, 1947, page 26).

The entire Palestine project is only 40% self-supporting, and unless the world continues to pour in hundreds of millions of dollars, the Zionist economic structure must collapse.

(2) Physical Resources

1. Government of Palestine

(Memorandum on the Administration of Palestine under the Mandate, 1947, Supplementary Memorandum, 17 July 1947; Survey of Palestine, Volume I).

1) Both land and water rights were in a state of confusion at the time of the occupation, at the end of the First World War. Survey, settlement and registration have been determined by financial considerations, suspicion as to intention and disturbances. Long range measures have been impeded by uncertainty as to title. "Sir John Hope Simpson, who was appointed in 1930 to investigate on the spot questions of immigration, land settlement and development had reported that, with the existing methods of Arab cultivation, there was no margin of land available for agricultural settlement by new immigrants save such undeveloped land as the various Jewish agencies held in reserve; that free areas of

/State domain ...

State domain - (to which title had been established) were negligible in extent; and that even if Government's title to lands claimed were admitted, it would not be feasible to make these areas available for settlement in view of the impracticability of finding other lands on which to place the Arab cultivators. In consequence of his recommendations, a Development Commissioner was appointed in 1931, but the intention of producing a co-ordinated scheme for increasing agricultural productivity was not realized, to some extent because of failure to co-operate on the part of the local communities, but mainly because the survey coincided with a period of financial stringency. This is not to say that there has not been improvement. The pressure of the natural expansion of the Arab population has had a share in promoting more intensive methods of cultivation in Arab areas and greater care of the land. The main impediment to large scale planning was, however, and remains, uncertainty as to the availability of land, not only for close settlement of an additional agricultural population, but adequately to support the existing population. The position as regards water resources was equally characterised by imprecision. Exploration and experiment has generally given disappointing results and the better disposal of supplies from existing sources is dependent on the determination of "existing rights".

2) The White Paper of 1939 explained that expert commissions had indicated that there was no room in certain areas for further transfer of Arab lands, while in other areas it must be restricted to prevent the development of a considerable landless Arab population. "In fact, a review of the conditions of congestion in Arab and Jewish rural areas carried out in 1938 had indicated serious congestion in almost the whole of the Arab area, whereas Jewish lands supported fewer families /in proportion

in proportion to the acreage. The Land Transfers Regulations, giving effect to the decision to empower the High Commissioner to restrict and regulate transfers of land, were promulgated in 1940." (Memorandum on the Administration of Palestine under the Mandate, p. 13).

3) The approximate area in the plains of Palestine and the west side of the Jordan Valley which might be cultivated if water were available is estimated approximately as 4,200,000 dunams. This excludes the hills and the Bersheba sub-district. Widely divergent estimates have been made of the areas cultivable in the mountains.

4) Nothing has come to light which would cause the Government to take a more favourable view of the possibilities of irrigation than that indicated in paragraph 77 (page 414) of Chapter X of the Survey of Palestine. No assured water supply has yet been discovered either in the investigations made by the Government or in other investigations to make the irrigation of more than 2,000,000 dunams, including 500,000 already irrigated, an economic proposition.

5) In reply to Mr. Kaplan's evidence (Hearing, 17th meeting, p. 77), the Government of Palestine explains that the quantity of water envisaged by Mr. Kaplan as available covers the whole available supply of the Jordan. This ignores the claims of Trans-Jordan. None of the Palestine Government's estimates places the water available for new schemes (whether economic or not) as high as 2 billion cubic metres, quoted by the Jewish Agency. Regarding the limited scheme of the Jewish Agency to irrigate an additional 650,000 dunams, it would be possible to provide the water for this, though not all at economic rates. Such an area, 650,000 dunams,

/might be regarded

might be regarded as the approximate limit of area which could at present be considered as having a potential water supply - that is without resorting to speculative assumptions. (The Government of Palestine's Supplementary Memorandum, July 17, 1947, pp. 45 and 46).

6) The average annual flow in the surface springs, streams and winter torrents of Palestine may be estimated at between 1400 to 1800 millions of cubic metres. The Tennessee River in U.S.A. and the Tigris in Iraq each discharge about 31,000 million cubic metres, while the Nile has three times this amount. The Jordan, the largest stream in Palestine, has less than 3% of the flow of the Tigris and less than 1% that of the Nile. (Survey of Palestine, Vol. I, p. 405).

7) The mineral resources of Palestine are very restricted. Most of the exploitable resources consist of the salts of the Dead Sea. There are no metallic minerals of economic importance, with the exception of manganese, which is not a deposit of major importance. The available deposits of non-metallic minerals are also not considerable. There are large reserves of rock salt at Jebel Usdam at the Southern end of the Dead Sea. Beds of rock phosphate exist in the Jericho region; there is a good supply of excellent building stone and Portland cement is produced from local materials near Haifa. No oil has yet been found in commercial quantities. (Survey of Palestine, Vol. II, Chap. XXV.)

2) The Jewish Agency

(The Jewish Case; Evidence of Mr. Kaplan before UNSCOP)

1) The Land Transfers Regulations, 1940, divided Palestine into three zones :

/Zone A

Zone A, the prohibited zone, about 63% of the total area;
Zone B, the restricted zone, about 32% of the total area;
The "Free Zone", about 5% of the total area and the most congested.

2) Zones A and B comprise land largely uncultivated and described by the government as "uncultivable". Jews own about 50% in the "Free Zone", about 6% in the restricted zone and about 3% in the prohibited zone. (Maps showing the zones and the density of population in relation to them were presented to the Committee). The effect of the restrictions is to limit the development of backward areas.

3) The total area of northern Palestine is 24,600,000 dunams, about one third of which is uninhabited desert. Of the remaining 17,000,000, 9,000,000 are cultivated and 8,000,000 are considered by the government as uncultivable. It is contended that much of this area is cultivable.

4) Moreover, the size of the cultivated area is of less importance than the intensive use of the land. The land area of settlements has been reduced so that a family today can maintain itself on twenty-five dunams of irrigated land in the plains.

5) In 1908, there was not a single modern well in the country and today nearly forty thousand dunams are irrigated. The irrigated area could be increased to eight times the present area. The discovery of water is the greatest discovery ever made in Palestine.

6) The Jewish Agricultural Research Institute has prepared an additional plan to the Hays plan based upon the quantities of water known to exist. The scheme is limited to areas which could be irrigated under the most economic conditions. The area covered is about 2 1/2 million dunams, of which

/ 1 1/2 million

1 1/2 million dunams are in the coastal plain. The remainder of the area consists of the inland plains. These areas require a total of 1.6 billion cubic metres of water per year for irrigation. The plan envisages increasing the families settled in the area from 45,000 to nearly 100,000. The quantity of irrigated land needed to meet the agricultural needs of one million immigrants is about 700,000 dunams and the quantity of water needed is about 450,000,000 cubic metres. (Evidence of E. Kaplan, Hearings 17th meeting).

7) In 1930 Sir John Hone-Simpson estimated the cultivable area of Palestine as 8,044,000 dunams comprising 4,004,000 in the plains, 2,450,000 dunams in the hills and 1,500,000 dunams in the Beersheba Sub-district. On this estimate he came to a negative conclusion regarding the possibilities of future Jewish agricultural settlement.

8) In 1936 the government submitted to the Royal Commission a higher estimate of 8,760,000 dunams. In the opinion of the Jewish Agency, this estimate also is too low. A re-survey of certain village areas in 1943 supports this view. (The Jewish Case, pp. 576 to 580).

9) The term "cultivable" should be applied to all land capable of cultivation after improvements. Much hill land is uncultivable, but it is believed that the cultivated area in the hills could be increased by 50%.

10) In the plans 737,000 dunams are at present uncultivated. By drainage, irrigation and leaching it is considered that over half this area could be cultivated. (The Jewish Case, pp. 568 - 582).

11) The Water Research Board of the Jewish Agency estimates that the net annual amount of water available for irrigation is 2,288,000,000 cubic metres, whereas Mr. Hays

/adopted

adopted an approximate figure of 2 billion cubic metres. According to Mr. Hays, the additional irrigable area is 2.4 million dunams. The Jewish Agency experts consider that this area could be increased to 3 1/4 million dunams. (The Jewish Case, p. 588).

12) The industrial raw materials available in Palestine are as follows :

(1) Dead Sea. Estimated mineral deposits of Dead Sea:

2,000,000,000 tons potassium chloride

1,000,000,000 " magnesium bromide

11,000,000,000 " sodium chloride

22,000,000,000 " magnesium chloride

6,000,000,000 " calcium chloride.

(2) Apart from mineral wealth of the Dead Sea, there are large deposits of phosphates, bituminous limestone and also deposits of manganese, Barvte and felspar. Cement and lime are produced locally.

(3) Vegetable raw materials, especially citrus and oil provide a basis for some local manufacture. The geographical position of Palestine is favorable for its development on the basis of raw materials found elsewhere in the Middle East. (The Jewish Case, pp. 457 to 458).

3. Ihud (Union) Association Palestine

(Statement of Evidence before UNSCOP)

1). There are in Palestine at least 13,150,000 dunams of cultivable land after suitable preparation. 4,500,000 dunams not at present cultivated are suitable for agriculture as follows :

/Negev

Negev	1,500,000 dunams	(including leachable salty land)
In hills	2,000,000 "	(requiring terracing and removing stones)
Coastal Plain	750,000 "	(requiring draining swamps and levelling dunes)
Valleys	250,000 "	

2) Only 500,000 dunams are irrigated at present while total irrigable area is 5,500,000 dunams, as follows :

Negev	2,000,000
Hills	500,000
Coastal Plain	2,250,000
Valleys	850,000

3) "Experience has taught that Palestine which had been considered a barren country has rich resources of water."

4) Winter rain water most of which flows into sea could be tapped by dums and reservoirs.

5) "The cultivable lands of this country could support 4,450,000, instead of the present 826,000". If non-agricultural people increase, in same proportion (from 160,000 at present to 260,000) an additional 750,000 can be absorbed in agriculture and rural activities.

(Based on 25 dunams irrigated land to support family of 5; 50 dunams unirrigated land in level country and 100 dunams in hill country).

6) A large part of uncultivable lands will have to be afforested. This branch of agriculture can also support many thousands of people.

4. General Federation of Jewish Labour (The Histadrut)
(Survey of Histadrut Activities, pages 25 - 28)

The draft ordinance of 10th June 1947 enacting permanent legislation relating to underground water in Palestine, is a serious obstruction to the agricultural development of the country. It is denied by the Histadrut that the underground water resources are threatened by excessive exploitation as the government contends. "According to experts, from a hydrological point of view there is no danger of excessive exploitation of underground water at this stage of the development of Palestine".

(3) Economic and Sociological Factors.

1. Government of Palestine

(Survey of Palestine, Vol. III; Supplementary Memorandum by the Government of Palestine)

1) The future competitive position of Palestine industry turns very considerably on the levels of prices, wages and costs. When the present shortages of goods are overcome, the high levels of prices will confront Palestine industry with a difficult problem. However, the impediment to the achievement of real competitive capacity deriving from the present wage levels is fully realised by the leaders of organized Jewish labour. (Survey of Palestine, Vol. III, Section 15).

2) Foreign competition is relevant to the question of absorptive capacity. On the basis of the 1942 Census of industry, a classification of industries was made according as to whether they were sheltered from competition, partly subject to it, or very sensitive to it. The classification

/would be

would be broadly accepted without dissent, though there would be a difference about particular cases.

3) On this basis, the number of people employed in each class of industry was as follows :

	<u>No. of workers at end of 1944</u>	
	<u>Jewish</u>	<u>Arab</u>
A - Not vulnerable to foreign competition	19,200	3,100
B - Slightly vulnerable	7,100	1,600
C - Open but protected in some measure by local consumption habits	6,900	1,900
D - Completely vulnerable	9,000	2,300
Total :	42,200	8,900

(Survey of Palestine, Vol. III, Section 12).

4) Palestine's economic future will be closely bound up with its trading relations with other Middle East countries. The development of industry in Palestine during the war was bound up with the shortage of transport, and the general shortage of supplies. This provided a considerable protection which, taken in conjunction with war needs, made high costs of production relatively unimportant. Wages have risen considerably and the high cost structure which has developed in Palestine will make competition with other sources of supply difficult when present shortages are overcome.

5) So far as petroleum, diamonds and citrus are concerned, the Middle East market is unimportant, while for other manufactures foreign competition may be expected to increase.

6) Palestine has to contend with :

- (1) Its own high cost structure.
- (2) Increased competition of other foreign suppliers in Middle East Markets.

/ (3). The competition is

- (3) The competition of local manufacturing industries in other Middle East countries.
- (4) The fact that during the war Palestine manufactured on a small scale products manufactured in other countries on a large scale. Generally speaking, large-scale production of these commodities is cheaper.

7) It would be easy to be optimistic on the ground of Palestine's war-time success in industrialization; it would be equally easy to be pessimistic on the ground of Palestine's lack of a wide range of raw materials and the extent to which this increases the country's vulnerability to competition. Geographically, the Middle East is the obvious market for Palestine manufactures. In Palestine itself, consumer demand is inadequate to support extensive industrialization.^x (Survey of Palestine, Vol. I, Chapter XIII).

8) As regards the Arab boycott, the Government has made strong representation from the beginning. Imports from the boycotting countries increased from £ 7.8 in 1945 to £ 8.5 millions in 1946, while exports to these States decreased from £ 3.5 millions to £ 1.2. The increase in imports is explained by the fact that Palestine is far from self-sufficient in foods and has no alternative source of supplies at present. This is likely to prove disadvantageous to the boycotting countries when the sources of supply are available. For these reasons, and having regard to the political causes of the boycott, it has not been considered appropriate to adopt retaliatory measures. (Supplementary Memorandum by the Government of Palestine, p. 42).

^x This, it should be noted, is one of the arguments advanced by the Jewish Agency for increased Jewish immigration.

2. The Jewish Agency

(Memorandum on Reconversion in Palestine, pp. 19/21).

The general progress and the success of the reconversion were affected in Palestine in a period of political difficulties. One of them was the Arab boycott. Exports to Arab countries in 1946 fell heavily as compared with 1945, but the loss of exports to Arab countries was almost compensated by an increase in exports to non-Arab countries. The search for new markets takes time, but the signs are encouraging. Sooner or later Palestine should take steps to protect its commercial interests by retaliation against the Arab States.

B. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

1. Government of Palestine

(Survey of Palestine, Vol. III, p. 1315)

1) Subject to the decisions which may be made following the work of the Committee as to the future of Palestine, this administration has worked out the essential features of a long term development plan. This is for an expenditure of LP. 17.5 millions by the Central administration and LP. 15 millions by the local authorities over a period of ten years.

2) In Volume III, Section 9, of the Survey of Palestine, there is a critical discussion of the Hays report on a scheme for the "Over-all Irrigation and Hydro-electric Development in Palestine". The discussion is long and fairly detailed, but the main burden of it is :

(1) The scheme is, in an engineering sense, only a preliminary report. The project requires careful and detailed study on the proposed sites.

(2) The economic side of the scheme is only briefly /presented

presented. Doubt is expressed regarding the high capital costs per unit of irrigated land.

- (3) There are difficulties of water rights involving agreements with neighbouring States.
- (4) The canals would be very vulnerable to sabotage.
- (5) The estimates of water supply upon which the scheme is based are considered to be open to question, but some parts of the scheme are considered feasible.

(Survey of Palestine, Vol. III, Section 9).

3) It has been frequently alleged by the Jewish Agency that the Government of Palestine has used the tariff purely as a fiscal device and has not been willing to assist industrial development. The Government replied to this argument in a statement in the Supplementary Memorandum to UNSCOP of July 17, 1947. This statement asserts that the tariff has been applied (a) to raise revenue, and (b) to foster and protect industrial development by exempting certain raw materials from duty and by imposing rates of duty on finished goods. Protection has been granted where merited having regard to the interests of consumers.

4) A Standing Committee for Commerce and Industry including representatives of the public was in existence before the war, but it has been in abeyance since 1941 and has not been revived owing to the Jewish Agency's attitude of non-cooperation. (Supplementary Memorandum of the Palestine Government, pp. 37/38).

5) In Vol. III of the Survey of Palestine, a detailed account is given of the tariff protection given to Palestine industry between 1928 and 1938. (Survey of Palestine, Vol. III, Section 11).

2. The Jewish Agency

(The Jewish Case; Hearings, 17th Meeting of UNSCOP).

1) In a Memorandum on the Economic Absorptive Capacity of Palestine published in the Jewish Case and referred to by Mr. E. Kaplan, appearing before the Committee (Hearings, 17th meeting), the Jewish Agency gives the broad outline of a plan for the reception and absorption of one million Jewish immigrants in ten years. The main elements of the plan are as follows :

1.- Within ten years the immigrants would have become permanently absorbed into the economy as self-supporting elements. During the ten years, many of the immigrants will be employed on development works of a temporary nature, but at the end of the period, the economy is visualised as being in equilibrium in the sense that the society will have achieved a stable occupational structure and will be independent of outside assistance - that is current exports of goods and services will be sufficient to pay for current imports.

2.- The main body of immigrants will be absorbed by industry and only the smaller part by agriculture.

3.- Jewish industry will expand so that it will employ approximately three times the present number of workers.

4.- It is assumed that the conditions of Article 18 of the Mandate which limits the extent to which tariff protection can be given to Palestine industry, will be removed.

5.- The prospects for industrial development given by

/Nathan, Creamer

Nathan, Creamer and Gass (Palestine - Problem and Promise) are accepted as expressing a lower limit of the extent of such development. According to this, industrial employment would be distributed somewhat as follows after a ten year period :

	<u>No. of workers</u>
Production for Palestinian market	86,000
Palestinian exports to Middle East	15,000
Palestinian exports overseas	9,000
Production by complementary industries	<u>1,100</u>
Total :	<u>112,000</u>

At the upper limit it is supposed that 180,000 workers may be employed in Jewish industry in Palestine after 10 years and an initial immigration of 1 million.

- 6.- It is assumed that there will be a fall in Palestine prices and costs relative to costs and prices in the United States and Great Britain. The view is expressed that inflation in Palestine is largely caused by the necessity to import high price foods and raw materials from Middle East countries.
- 7.- At the end of ten years, about 10% of the working population, or 70,000, will be employed in the building industry. During the earlier stages of development, the building industry would be rather more expanded than this.
- 8.- There would be a commensurate growth of employment in tertiary occupations to a total of 384,000.
- 9.- The separateness of Arab and Jewish economy is assumed throughout, though it is supposed that increased trade between the two groups would take place.

/10.- It is

10.- It is asserted that land and water supplies will not limit the growth of agriculture associated with this development. Hence the limiting factor in the development of agriculture is said to be potential markets.

11.- The total non-agricultural Jewish population after 10 years is estimated at 1,600,000. On the basis of this and present average rates of consumption of different products the annual amount of produce and the number of farms required to meet this market is calculated.

12.- Citrus production for export is expected to expand to an export of 25 to 30 million cases per annum, of which 15 million will be Jewish. (Pre-war exports were 12 to 15 million cases).

The agricultural population would then be as follows :

29,500 additional mixed farm units at 4 persons per unit	118,000
8,500 mixed farm units already established with actual population	<u>42,500</u>
Total 38,000 mixed farm units	160,500
In citriculture	<u>50,000</u>
Total	210,500

13.- The scheme pre-supposes the repeal of present land laws and the initiation of measures for reclamation of uncultivated land. (The Jewish Case, pp. 404-550).

2) The ten year plan calls for large finances. The Anglo-American experts set the capital cost of establishing 100,000 immigrants at LP 70,000,000. The Jewish Agency thinks this figure rather high. Assuming that prices will fall somewhat from their present level, the capital costs of absorbing 1,000,000 immigrants is estimated at about £ 450 millions. About £ 100 millions may be expected to come from savings in Palestine over the ten year period.

/Immigrants' capital

Immigrants' capital will in this case be a small quantity. Zionist funds abroad may be expected to yield £ 80 millions and sterling balances about £ 70 millions. This leaves £ 200 millions to be obtained from non-Jewish investments, reparations and possibly a loan from the International Bank. (The Jewish Case, pp. 222/27. Hearings, E. Kaplan, 17th meeting).

3. Central Committee of the Communist Party of Palestine.
(Memorandum to UNSCOP)

1) Palestine agriculture is in need of reform and of an immediate improvement of the situation of small farmers and tenants. A first step should be the division of Government lands among landless farmers. A moratorium on debts of poor farmers, the supply of cheap credit facilities and of fertilizers, and the development of a wide irrigation net are also important. Legislation to protect small farmers and tenants against eviction is also urgently needed.

- 2) As regards industry, development is hampered by :
- 1.- restrictions on the import of machinery,
 - 2.- restrictions on the import of raw materials, with a licensing system directed towards the most expensive sources of supply,
 - 3.- the maintenance of a high cost of living by restricting imports from "hard" currency areas, and other import restrictions.^x

^xWith regard to these points, see the answers given by the Government of Palestine in its Supplementary Memorandum of July 17, 1947, pages 38 and 39. This states that import licenses are issued freely except in the case of imports from "hard" currency areas where imports are allowed on the basis of essentiality, and in the case of food and raw materials in short supply, which are controlled mainly by the International Emergency Food Council.

3) The Government does not permit the import of sufficient machinery from the non-sterling areas.

Industrial development calls for :

- 1.- Removal of import control and the abolition of concessions,
- 2.- Permission to import machinery from the free market,
- 3.- Release of the sterling balances and then conversion into dollars,
- 4.- The establishment of a Central Bank.

(Memorandum, pp. 5 to 11).

4. Fighters for the Freedom of Israel.

(Memorandum, June 1947).

The Stern Group accuses the Mandatory of having as the objectives of its economic policy: (1) exploitation of the country in the British interest and (2) interference with the development of the Jewish economic structure which is the foundation for the building of Jewish independence.

a. On the subject of currency, it is complained that the Currency Board does not represent Palestinian interests; that its activities are secret; that its ample reserves are invested not in Palestine securities but in questionable stock of undeveloped British colonies; that the allocation of profits to the Palestine Government should have been greater.

b. The Memorandum protests against the hardships imposed by membership in the sterling block and British control of Palestinian foreign exchange. The sterling balance in London (about LP 140,000,000) is frozen with no possibility of productive investment. Although other countries are in a similar position, their governments,

/unlike that

unlike that of Palestine, possess a measure of independence and have succeeded in conducting negotiations to the end of retiring the balances gradually and systematically. (p. 37).

c. The economic "open door policy" established under Article 18 of the Mandate has been "ruinous" along with the Mandatory's practice of promoting uneconomic imports. (pp. 37-38).

d. The high cost of living has resulted from the Mandatory's practice of guiding the purchase of food-stuffs from "the most expensive sources of supply". (p. 36).

e. The tax burden upon the Jewish citizen is heavy, especially in consideration of the fact that he must pay separately for education and for a number of other services (p. 37)

f. The disproportionate amount devoted to security in the budget of the Government of Palestine is "decisive and persuasive evidence of the oppressive nature of this rule". (p. 38)

g. The issuance of four series of Palestine Bearer Bonds to a total of about LP 5 million has not benefited the people of Palestine, nor has the Government kept its promise that the money realised from the first issue would be loaned to the Tel-Aviv Municipal Council. (pp. 38-39).

h. The oil concessions are evidence of the Mandatory's imperialist exploitation of the people of Palestine. (p. 39)

5. Irgun Zvai Leumi

(Memorandum, June 1947)

1) The Irgun strongly criticises the Mandatory on the following scores :

1. Obstruction to Jewish economic development, and neglect for the first twenty years of the Administration of irrigation, survey, research and development. (p.12)
2. Prevention of expansion of Jewish industry (except temporarily during the war when a source of supply was required for British forces in North Africa). (p. 13)
3. Avoidance of expenditure on constructive public works and on badly needed housing. (p. 13)
4. Exploitation of Jewish industry, and discrimination in grants of industrial concessions. Cites example of free oil concession to British companies which are exempt from taxation. (p. 14)
5. Maintenance of currency system and currency restrictions which prevent economic development and profit the Mandatory. (pp. 14-15)
6. Institution of a system of taxation directed against the economic development of the country; and of a budget the items of which are totally disproportionate, and which is often "inflated" merely to provide justification for an increasingly heavy burden of taxation. (pp. 15-17)
7. Exploitation by individual British citizens and by British companies. (pp. 17-18)
8. Practice of charging off to Palestine sterling balances in London the expenditures for maintaining forces in Palestine. (pp. 18-19)

6. Manufacturers' Association of Palestine

(Memorandum on Jewish Industry in Palestine).

1) The Jewish community has founded at its own expense to assist industrial development in Palestine:

(a) Institutions for vocational training in various crafts.

(b) Industrial and scientific research institutes.

2) For future industrial development, Palestine enjoys a favourable geographical position. It has a reserve of highly skilled technicians, engineers, industrial managers and economists. Moreover, there is the important spiritual factor of the urge to create a national home which provides a great incentive.

3) Palestine is not rich in raw materials, but the Dead Sea products can serve as the basis for a big and important chemical industry. The same is true of oil, whether from Palestine or neighbouring countries. In addition, agricultural products can provide the basis for processing industries.

4) The main requirements for industrial development are:

(a) Large scale immigration

(b) A sympathetic government policy.

(See annexure G of Memorandum of Manufacturers' Association of Palestine for details of industries considered capable of expansion).

CHAPTER VII

CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL QUESTIONS

1) THE GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE

(Survey of Palestine and Supplementary Memorandum by the Government)

Education

A) Arab Education

1. At the present time the number of Arab pupils in the Public School system is 92,000 boys and girls, as against 27,000 in 1932. 57% of Arab boys and 23% of Arab girls between the ages of 5 to 14 are in school attendance.

2. The development is in large measure due to the local Village Councils which have erected a large number of school buildings (there are now 453 rural schools) paid for by local inhabitants. The government maintains these schools, providing staff and equipment. The supply of qualified teachers is very inadequate and the Government Arab College has recently been extended to meet this need. Other colleges are also being erected.

3. Secondary education is growing. In 1946/47 there were 2,420 Arab children in government secondary schools and 2,750 in private schools. Two government schools provide post matriculation courses. Proposals for an Arab University in Palestine are now under consideration.

4. Technical education is still in its infancy and is at present supplied by two government schools. It is intended to develop these two Colleges into senior training institutions and to set up trade schools, and Farm Schools.

B) Jewish Education

5. 93,000 boys and girls were in the Hebrew Public School system in 1946/47, and almost 22,000 in other schools. Total
/expenditure

expenditure in Jewish education is estimated at about LP.2,000,000. Most of this is met by Jewish funds but government grants amounted to £304,000 in 1946/47.

6. There has been a considerable development of school buildings in towns and settlements.

7. The secondary school leaving examination of Va'ad Leumi is being examined with a view to recognition of the examination by United Kingdom Universities.

8. The government has accepted in principle the McNair Report which recommended statutory recognition for the Jewish public school system.

9. The government has decided to establish an Arab Advisory Council on Education covering all aspects of Arab education.

(Supplementary Memorandum by the Government of Palestine pp. 52/55 - Survey of Palestine, Vol. II, Chap. XVI)

2) JEWISH AGENCY

(The Jewish Case and Hearings before UNSCOP, 35th Meeting)

1. The Hebrew School System now comprises hundreds of elementary and scores of secondary schools, Kindergarten, teachers' training colleges, theological seminaries, trade schools, art and music schools and a technical college. The apex is the Hebrew University. Hebrew is the language of instruction throughout, as it is of life in general. (The Jewish Case, page 293, parag.73).

2. There are numerous Hebrew dailies and periodicals of every type and outlook (idem).

3. The Hebrew theatre is very active. Hebrew literature in prose, poetry and science is growing. The Palestine Orchestra, founded in 1935, has raised the country's musical life to a new level. (idem)

4. As the various communities of the Dispersion came to be represented in Palestine by ever-increasing numbers of their own people, the connection between the Jewries abroad and Palestine grew stronger. (idem, page 294, parag. 74)

5. As regards education, it is neither possible nor desirable to establish a system of common schools, in view of the problem
/ of language

of language and the problem of national culture. Some Jewish or some Arab children attend missionary schools, but it would be a national disaster if all Jewish children were educated in such schools. There would be no hope of any independent cultural life of the Jewish people. (Mr. Shertok, 35th meeting of UNSCOP page 27).

6. Hebrew is not taught in Government schools, while Arabic is taught in all Jewish secondary schools and in a large number of elementary schools. (idem page 28).

7. It must be the policy in this country to increase, as far as possible, the number of people bi-lingual in Hebrew and Arabic. (idem p. 28).

3) CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY

(Memorandum and Hearings before UNSCOP)

1. On education the Government spends about 4% of the total budget and another 4% on health and other social services.

2. 70% of the Arab population are illiterate. Among the Arab population in towns, 60% of boys and 45% of girls of schoolage attend school; in villages 40% and 5% respectively. 23,000 Beduin children do not receive any schooling. Out of a total of 300,000 Arab children between the ages of 5 and 14, 68% are not accommodated in schools. They roam in the streets or sweat in hard labour.

3. As regards higher education, about 100 Arab students per annum reach matriculation standard. Every academic year about 50% of the number of Arab applications are refused.

4. Among the Jewish community which spends some £ 900,000 towards its own educational system (the Government contributing only £ 75,000) some 10% of the children (about 10,000) do not receive any school education.

4) CHURCH OF ENGLAND IN JERUSALEM

(Memorandum dated March 1946, submitted to the Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry)

1. The fact that Jewish schools are mainly controlled by the Jewish Community Council and the government schools are left almost wholly Arab, widens the breach between Arab and Jew.

2. Politics have been allowed to permeate the education of the young to a regrettable extent. While the largest part of this
/propaganda

propaganda is carried on in youth organisations and activities outside the schools, these activities are made part of the system. School certificates have been withheld from those refusing to undertake the additional period of "national service".

5) VAAD LEUMI

(Memorandum on the Jewish Community of Palestine and its Social Services)

1. From 1918 until 1932, the Zionist Commission and its successors, the Palestine Zionist Executive and the Jewish Agency for Palestine, were responsible for the organization and administration of education for the Jewish Community. Since 1932 this has been the responsibility of the Vaad Leumi.

2. Eighty percent of the total number of Jewish schools and pupils in Palestine are now connected with the central network of the Vaad Leumi. Students in those schools in the last year numbered 90,000. In the course of 29 years, the number of students in the Jewish national education system has grown from 10,000 to over 90,000, and the annual budget from LP. 74,187 to almost LP. 2,150,000.

3. The school system of the Vaad Leumi comprises kindergartens, elementary schools, secondary schools, and teachers' training colleges. The Hebrew University and the Haifa Technical Institute are independently administered and financed. The various schools are described in some detail. (pp. 14-20).

4. The Vaad Leumi makes the following three demands upon the Government in respect of education:

- a). Recognition of Jewish educational autonomy, and the grant to a representative Jewish institution (The Vaad Leumi) of powers to determine the structure of education in accordance with the decisions of the Elected Assembly, to fix teachers' salaries and to draw up the annual budget for Jewish education.
- b) An adequate grant-in-aid to Jewish education from the Government, to be determined in accordance with one of the following two principles:

(1) One pound for every pound contributed by the Jewish community for elementary education, or

/(2) Payment

(2) Payment for every Jewish school-going child of the same amount paid for every Arab school-going child.

c) A single extraordinary Government grant of LP. 250,000 to compensate for inadequate grants-in-aid in the past and to make good the accumulated deficit of the Jewish educational system.

/CHAPTER VIII

CHAPTER VIII

1) GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE SOCIAL QUESTIONS AND SOCIAL SERVICES

(Survey of Palestine and Supplementary Memorandum,
pages 46-51)

A) Health

1. Before the first world war Palestine was ravaged by epidemic diseases. Most of the improvements brought about among the Jewish population, and practically all prevention work among the Arabs, have been carried out by the government.

2. In 1946 Government spent LP. 934,000 on health, of which LP. 450,000 was for the maintenance of government hospitals. 15% of the funds available were allocated to Jewish institutions.

3. The Department of Health maintains 1,508 hospital beds, 378 at purely Jewish hospitals, 382 at hospitals used by Arabs only and the remainder at mixed institutions.

4. Except for anti-malarial work very little preventive medicine is done by the Jews.

5. The Department of Health has had to advise for the present against a national health insurance scheme for Palestine because of lack of sufficient personnel to carry it out. The Jewish community has been fortunate in being able to undertake good medical work among themselves, but the Department of Health must spread its services over the whole population and must pay greatest attention where there is greatest need.

6. The needs of mental and tuberculosis patients are fully realised by the government but funds have been, and still are, inadequate to provide all the buildings required. Moreover hospital building costs about six times as much as before the war. It is estimated that to build the ideal number of beds would cost up to LP. 20 million.

7. Among the government medical staff, there are 7 Assistant Senior Medical Officers of whom 2 are Jews. There are two specialists and assistant specialists of whom one is a Jew. There are 101 doctors on the present establishment, 31 of whom are Jews.

8. The good results, in regard to health, attained by the
/Arab population

Arab population are almost entirely due to the efforts of the Administration.

9. Typhoid is now reasonably under control, though this was a wide-spread disease before the first world war. The main difficulties are lack of funds and lack of water.

10. Malaria control has been undertaken by the government since the beginning of the Mandate and where possible permanent drainage schemes have been put into effect. Most of the rural work has been planned and supervised by the Department of Health and local communities of both Jews and Arabs have played an important part in this work.

11. Anti-malarial work is broadly as follows:

(1) Major schemes of land reclamation and anti-malarial control.

(2) The clearance and regulation of springs and marshes.

12. Out of 74,900 dunams of marshy land in 1920 more than 50,000 dunams have been drained. Free labour has been made available by Arab village communities to the extent of 20,000 labour days per annum, and about 3,000 labour days by Jewish local councils.

B) Labour

13. Jewish Trade Unionism has existed for more than 30 years and a nucleus of Arab Trade Unionism for 20.

14. The Histadrut (General Federation of Jewish Labour); by far the most important of the Jewish unions, is in fact much more than a Trade Union. Within the Histadrut there is a political labour party (the Mapai), an education organisation, recreation clubs, an elaborate system covering health, invalidity and unemployment insurance, two theaters, an orchestra, numerous cooperative societies, many of them in the form of communal agricultural settlements, banks, other economic institutions, a growing number of factories, some of which are owned by the Histadrut, others partly owned by capitalist partners. Among their most important undertakings are Solel Boneh, the biggest building contractors in Palestine, who employ 10,000 workers and Tnuva, a country-wide agricultural marketing cooperative. Until

/1943 the Histadrut

1943 the Histadrut also conducted a number of employment exchanges which have now been fused with the smaller exchanges of other Jewish labour organisations and are called the General Jewish Labour Exchanges. The fusion was encouraged by the Jewish Agency owing to complaints that employers were forced to take workers exclusively from Histadrut and that members of other labour organisations could not find employment. (The Department of Labour has proposed to create a system of government exchanges in which the General Jewish Exchanges would be incorporated.)

15. The Histadrut in 1945 collected LP. 1,290,000 in fees from members, apart from the profits of their various enterprises. They spent LP. 1,350,000 on their Sick Fund (the Kupat Holim) to which many Jewish employers also contribute, and considerable sums on other insurance funds. At the end of 1945 their total membership was 154,000.

16. During the past 20 years the Histadrut have been carrying on a successful campaign for the improvement of wages and other conditions of employment. Very high wage standards have been created in Jewish industry; there are also paid holidays, paid sick leave, the 47-hour week and leaving indemnities from manufacturers and other employers.

17. At the end of 1942 the Histadrut made an agreement with the Palestine (Jewish) Manufacturers Association, which was approved by a Government Wages Committee. This agreement, which was restricted to industrial and manual workers, and to clerical staff attached to industrial undertakings, awarded to all workers considerable cost of living allowances. A good many Arab employers have also agreed to pay similar cost of living allowances.

18. Arab Trade Unions have grown appreciably during the last five years, but neither numerically nor in organisation can they be compared to the Associations of Jewish Workers. The oldest is the Palestine Arab Workers Society, whose headquarters are in Haifa and whose leader is Sami Effendi Taha. The Society claims a paid-up membership of about 15,000. It runs a number of cooperative societies.

19. An association of nearly equal strength is the Arab
/Workers Congress,

Workers Congress, which is more to the left.

20. While the two main Arab Labour organizations are anti-Zionist, the Palestine Labour League, an Arab union claiming a membership of 4,500, is associated with the Histadrut. According to the Survey of Palestine (Volume II, page 767), "the Histadrut's attempt to form an Arab labour organization under its own direction has, on the whole, worsened than improved" Arab-Jewish labor relations, which are dominated by political considerations. The Palestine Labour League "has now (1945) declined in influence and membership and occasionally the Jewish and Arab unions cooperate on a specific issue such as a dispute in an undertaking where both Arabs and Jews are employed".

21. There are a few mixed (Arab-Jewish) labour organizations whose members may also be individual members of the Arab or Jewish unions. "By far the most important are the First Division Civil Servants Association and the Second Division Civil Servants Association, which have been successfully functioning for some years". (Survey of Palestine, Vol. II, page 767, para. 72).

22. As regards labour legislation, the earliest ordinances, excepting the White Phosphorus Ordinance and the Steam Boilers Ordinance, date from 1927 and 1928, when the Women and Children's Employment Ordinance; the Workmen's Compensation Ordinance; the Fencing of Machinery Ordinance; and the Trades and Industries Regulations Ordinance were enacted. Thanks to the Workmen's Compensation Ordinance, uncompensated accidents became progressively rarer. The Trades and Industries Ordinance was administered by the Health Department and the great majority of the factories conformed to prescribed conditions.

23. In 1942 a Department of Labour was set up, with qualified British staff in key positions: four factory inspectors (one being a woman) and a Trade Union Secretary. Contact was made with Arab and Jewish associations of employers and workers. Factory inspection and the welfare of workers formed an important part of the duties of the inspectors and their Arab and Jewish assistants (including 2 Arab and 2 Jewish women inspectors).

24. Labour Ordinances now in force include new dispensations for the protection of women, young persons and children; an
/amended Workmen's

amended Workmen's Compensation Ordinance; an Ordinance requiring the notification of industrial accidents and occupational diseases; a comprehensive Factories Ordinance covering almost the same ground as the English Act; a Trade Boards Ordinance.

25. During the war, a Trade Disputes Order providing the machinery of conciliation and arbitration made strikes illegal in certain conditions. The order was revoked in June 1946.

26. During the war the wage rates both of Arabs and Jews increased considerably but there are still appreciable differences between the respective wage levels.

27. "There is ample evidence of the accumulation of savings among the working population. However, in the case of white collar workers and government employees, salaries have lagged behind the rise in living costs". (Survey of Palestine, Vol. II, page 745, para. 23)

28. "As regards the attitude of labour organisations to wage problems, there has lately been some indication of the fact that leading labour circles appreciate the undesirable economic effects of inflated wages." (idem., para. 26)

2) JEWISH AGENCY

(The Jewish Case)

1. A feature of the past decade has been the number of Jewish Central European settlers.

2. While Jewish labor immigrants were prominent during the early stage, a growing number of middle-class settlers entered the country from the middle twenties onward, bringing with them considerable capital and wide technical and business experience (The Jewish Case, page 292, para. 67).

3. Jewish organized labour holds an influential position in the economic and political life of the country. Its contribution has been particularly impressive in agriculture (new forms of cooperative effort and collective living). The most important labour organization, the Jewish Labour Federation (Histadrut) runs factories and workshops, building and transport companies, banks and cooperative societies, etc. It runs a country-wide health insurance society with hospitals, etc. (idem., page 293, para. 70).

/ 4. Jewish economy

4. Jewish economy is the economy of a normal society, varying from manual labour to professional and managerial positions (in 1943: 55% employed in physical work; 11% in commerce) (idem., para. 71).

3) CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
OF PALESTINE

(Memorandum, 5 July 1947)

1. 65% of the Arab, and 10.7% of the Jewish population are dependent on agriculture. During the war many poor peasants migrated to towns where it was relatively easy to find employment.

2. The social contrasts in rural areas are very sharp. The wealthy peasant class, existing between the large landowners and the village poor, has increased in numbers and become more firmly established. But the great majority of the peasantry lives under depressed conditions, burdened with debts to usurers and estate owners.

3. Thousands of tenants give away 1/3 or more of their crops in payment for the use of the land (share, cropping).

4. The Department of Survey has not yet completed its work and presented a clear picture of land conditions. (The Memorandum of the Communist party gives on page 6 the results of two partial surveys made in 1936 and 1944 respectively.)

5. As regards social services, only 445 beds in 7 hospitals, centered in the big towns, serve the Arab population. There are also a few beds in private hospitals. The 800 Arab villages have 21 government clinics, 41 sanitary clinics and 38 infant and temporary welfare centers at their disposal.

6. The Jews have 2 beds in hospitals for every 1,000 of the population (in England 8 beds for every 1,000 inhabitants).

7. The few laws for the protection of women and children introduced in 1927 and the amendments of 1944-45 are not enforced. In many industries child labour is still common. Government itself employs children from the age of 10 at extremely low wage rates in road making, building, etc. - especially in Arab districts in southern Palestine.

/ 4) HISTADRUT

4) HISTADRUT

(Survey of Histadrut Activities, July 1947)

1. In Palestine, some 65% of the Arab population lives by agriculture. Industrial and urban pursuits are of minor importance in the Arab economy. The total number of Arab urban workers is about 110,000, of whom 55,000 are employed by the Government and military, and some 10,000 in Jewish enterprises (Survey of Histadrut activities, page 64).

2. Following the example of Jewish labour, ^{employed} Arab workers have made their first attempts at organising themselves in order to improve their social conditions. (idem., page 64).

3. Such attempts have been fought by the Arab employers and the reactionary political leadership. Most of the Arab employers (feudal landlords or urban capitalists) are members of those ruling families who have for many generations dominated Arab society in Palestine. They make full use of nationalist and racial slogans to divert Arab labour from solidarity with the Jewish workers. Their present policy is to support those Arab trade unions which are opposed to co-operation with the Jewish workers (idem., pages 65-66).

4. The most important Jewish organization, the General Federation of Jewish Labour (Histadrut) aims at creating a free, classless Jewish working society. It is affiliated with the World Federation of Trade Unions. Founded in 1920, it represents today an organised working community of 165,000 adult members (some 75% of the total Jewish working population). (idem., page 1)

5. Unable to look to the Government for assistance and lacking adequate labour legislation, the Histadrut succeeded in introducing fair labour conditions for its members (idem., page 5)

6. Through a system of self-taxation, it has created a ramified network of mutual aid and social insurance institutions for the benefit of its members. General Labour Exchanges have also been established. They are administered by the Jewish Agency (idem., page 5).

5) VAAD LEUMI

(Memorandum on the Jewish Community of Palestine
and its Social Services, and Hearings, 24th Meeting
of UNSCOP)

1. The social services of the Jewish Community in Palestine have been administered since 1928 under the Jewish Community Regulations, by the Vaad Leumi (General Council).

2. The Vaad Leumi depends for funds upon a fixed proportion of the local community tax based upon rental, upon Government grants-in-aid, Jewish Agency contributions, and fund-raising campaigns. It has no power to levy direct taxes, although it has frequently petitioned the Government to be granted that right. Moreover, the Vaad Leumi has unsuccessfully urged the Government for years to replace the obsolete system of local taxation based upon rental with a more progressive system based upon income.

3. The powers of the Vaad Leumi are insufficient. Only through the "solidarity and sense of responsibility" of the Yishuv has it been able to perform its duties.

4. Two features characterize the system of the Jewish social services: a large measure of administrative autonomy, and an almost complete financial dependence upon the Jewish Community, with very little Government and other aid. A table on page 11 of the Memorandum illustrates the expenditures for Jewish social services and sources of income for that purpose for the financial year 1945-1946.

5. The Jews faced extremely difficult health conditions when they came to Palestine: malaria and other endemic diseases, and ophthalmic diseases, as well as a general ignorance of sanitation and hygiene. Such organizations as the Health Bureau of Jerusalem, the Pasteur Institute and the Women's Zionist Organization of America, Hadassah, undertook the development of medical services in Palestine. The work of Hadassah is described in detail.

(pp. 26-28)

6. In 1931 the Jewish Community (Vaad Leumi) assumed the responsibility for health and medical services, undertaking "to supervise the health services of the Yishuv, to coordinate the /activities of the

activities of the various Jewish medical institutions, and to maintain relations with the Government Department of Health". Several hospitals were taken over, and voluntary organizations were formed to deal with special problems such as tuberculosis and first aid and ambulance service.

7. The principal health organization - Kupat Holim, the Sick Fund of the General Federation of Jewish Labour in Palestine, administers health insurance and provides medical services. Its membership has grown from 2,000 in 1920 to 129,000 at the end of 1946. Including dependents, it thus provides medical services to over 288,000 persons in over 315 localities.

8. The annual budget of the Sick Fund has increased from LP. 50,000 in 1926 to about LP. 1,900,000 in 1946. Its estimated expenditure for 1947 exceeds LP. 2,250,000. Its income is derived principally from workers' dues and fees (72.2%) and from employers (25.5%). The Government contributes 1.1% (p. 30).

9. Its services are described in some detail. (p. 30-32)

10. The Vaad Leumi complains that the Government has contributed far too little to Jewish health services, and that the Government medical services are used almost exclusively by Arabs. The Government has moreover refused requests for grants to build badly-needed hospitals. (pp. 32-33)

11. In addition, the Government has refused to come to the aid of the workers' health insurance organization either by passing suitable social legislation or by contributing to the maintenance of its services. (pp. 33-34)

12. More than 90% of the total expenditure on Jewish health services is derived from local Jewish sources. (p. 34 for itemized report). More than 90% of all Jewish hospital patients, numbering some 51,283, and more than 95% of the Jewish out-patients, were treated in Jewish institutions. Almost the entire field of preventive medical work is covered by Jewish health services. A report on Jewish anti-malarial work is attached as an Appendix to the Memorandum. The achievement of this work is revealed by the steadily declining mortality rates illustrated on page 35.

/13. In the oral

13. In the oral hearing before the Committee on 9 July 1947, a representative of the Vaad Leumi asserted that although some 90% of the doctors of Palestine are Jews, the Government has no Jews among its top medical officers, and in its second ranks, only 5 Jews as compared with 20 Arabs.

14. "The Government health policy", he stated, "places the Yishuv in a most serious dilemma: either to cut down its essential services, educational, medical and social welfare, or to increase more and more the rates and fees already over-burdening the members of the Jewish community." The Yishuv has endeavoured to follow the latter path, which is "contrary to the social character of these services, and greatly affects the poorer sections of the Community". (pp. 48-49 of Record of 24th Meeting)

15. The Government's policy has been not to help those who help themselves. "Instead of encouraging Arab initiative, Government rather discourages Jewish initiative." As a result the Government has failed in two fields of public health which should have been its main concern: the fight against tuberculosis and the care for mental diseases. (pp. 49-50 of Record of 24th Meeting)

16. The witness referred to a number of statistical reports which elaborate the contentions and facts contained in the Memorandum. (pp. 51-55)

17. When Palestine began to absorb large-scale immigration, it became clear that a social welfare service, maintained and conducted by the organized Jewish community, had to be established for the benefit of those in need of relief and care. Accordingly, in 1931 a Social Welfare Department was established by the Vaad Leumi, and local social service bureaus were started in the towns and larger settlements.

18. The Department's activities include:

- (a) the direction, supervision and financial assistance of local social service bureaus.
- (b) administration of country-wide school feeding and summer camp schemes.

/ (c) supervision

(c) supervision of child placement in foster-families and orphans' homes.

(d) maintenance of two institutions for neglected boys and girls.

(e) maintenance of two convalescent homes.

(f) other social services, including special social cases, distribution of clothing, contacts with social agencies abroad, etc.

19. The local Social Service Bureaus administer direct relief, care for the social needs of new immigrants, maintain child and youth welfare programs, and provide for care for poor patients and convalescents.

20. Similar work by other organizations is described.

(pp. 38-39)

21. The total expenditures on the Jewish welfare services for the financial year 1945-1946 exceeds LP. 1,800,000, of which the Government contributed LP. 120,000.

/CHAPTER IX

CHAPTER IX

Religious Questions and Holy Places

1) GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE

1. The question is dealt with in Chapter XXII of the Survey of Palestine (Volume II).

2. Section 26 of Volume III of the Survey (pages 1357 and following) provides a summary list of the Christian Holy Places which are affected or not affected by the modus vivendi devised in 1852 by the Ottoman Government and commonly known as the Status quo.

2) JEWISH AGENCY

(Political Survey, 1943-47, para. 119)

The Jewish State would devote special attention to safeguarding the rights of Christianity and Islam in Palestine. It would guarantee the complete inviolability of the Christian and Moslem Holy Places and ensure free access to them for all concerned. It would propose the appointment of a special United Nations Commission to supervise all holy shrines. Religious and ecclesiastical establishments of all faiths would be free to administer their property and conduct their activities without hindrance.

3) CATHOLIC NEAR EAST WELFARE ASSOCIATION

(Letter, June 5, 1947)

1. The Christian sanctuaries should be respected, not only with cold juridicism but with local reverence, and they should be continuously and unconditionally accessible not only to local inhabitants but also to the Christians of the entire World.

2. Express and specific guarantees must be imposed by the United Nations in order that the minority of 51,000 Roman Catholics in Palestine should in fact be free from social, civic and economic discrimination. In default of such guarantees a future government of Palestine might for instance conceivably classify Catholic schools as "foreign schools" and make them the object of discriminatory laws.

/ 4) CHURCH OF ENGLAND

4) CHURCH OF ENGLAND IN JERUSALEM

(Memorandum dated March 1946, submitted
to Anglo-American Committee of Enquiry)

Position of religious minorities

1. Under the Turkish regime, non-Muslim subjects, whether Jews or Christians, were recognised as "milletts" or tribes, regarded as tolerated citizens of an inferior grade. Such minorities were under protection of France (Catholics), Russia (Orthodox), Great Britain (Jews and reformed Christians). Today the Anglican Bishop is constantly called upon for assistance by Christians, Jews and Arabs for assistance vis-à-vis the government or their co-religionists.

2. No treaty or constitutional provision can eliminate the social, economic and industrial pressures which make up religious persecution.

3. The place of Christianity in Palestine should be measured by the sanctity of the Land to all the millions of Christendom.

4. Christian sentiment would be profoundly shocked if Galilee and Bethlehem, which have religious meaning chiefly for Christians, were sacrificed to any nationalist or imperialist scheme of industry or commerce.

The Christian Jew

5. The Christian Jew is unable to secure aid or recognition from the Jewish Agency, although we feel that it is the essence of Christianity that a Jew becomes more perfectly a Jew by becoming a Christian.

6. For purposes of immigration the Palestine Government has been forced to rule that a Christian Jew is not a Jew at all.

7. There exists in Palestine a branch of the "Hebrew Christian Alliance", a purely religious non-political organization. They are an isolated class ostracised by other Jews and there are not a few cases of actual persecution. Their number is greater than is known and is increasing. They are perhaps the most unfortunate of religious minorities in Palestine.

/Relevance of the

Relevance of the Bible to the problem

8. The Christian doctrine of the New Testament is that the new spiritual Israel of the Christian Church is the sole heir to the promises, which had been forfeited by old Israel after the flesh, with its descent by human generation.

9. The relevance of the Bible to the problem lies neither in justifying vengeance upon Jews for the Crucifixion, nor in justifying modern political aims by ancient prophecies.

10. Many of the ancient prophecies had a first fulfilment in the return from the Babylonian captivity, and most are balanced by corresponding prophecies of tribulation in the event of Israel's apostasy from God.

5) CHURCH OF ENGLAND AND CHURCH OF SCOTLAND
PRESBYTERY IN JERUSALEM

(Joint Memorandum Dated June 1947 and two Separate Memoranda submitted by the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry and re-submitted to UNSCOP)

1. The Christian population of Palestine is perhaps 140,000 mostly Christian Arabs. Christian Jews are a small minority whose voice is unheard and whose very claim to be still Jews is generally denied by their fellow-Jews.

2. There are some 700,000,000 Christians in the World to whom the whole land is sacred. The Christian case, as the case of the Jews and Moslems, should be considered in the light of World Christendom.

3. Any future constitution will, we assume, include a clause guaranteeing religious liberty to all. The right of conversion, not specifically mentioned in either the existing Mandate or the Palestine Order in Council of 1922, is an essential part of such religious liberty. It is unrealistic to speak of freedom of religion when converts to Christianity, whether from Islam or Judaism, have neither freedom from fear nor often freedom from want.

Joint proposals

4. Axioms which should be basic to any solution of the Palestine problem:

1. The governing principle should be the highest good
/ of Palestine and

of Palestine and of the World, rather than the strategic or economic interests of any power or group of powers.

2. The unique character of Palestine in the world as essentially a Holy Land for Christendom and the meeting place of three great monotheistic religions, should not be undermined.

3. The interest of these three religions should take into account the interests of their adherents throughout the world.

4. Any recovery of peace and stability must ultimately depend on the spiritual factor. Any immediate recommendation must aim at making Palestine the source of creative inspiration for the world as was the case in the past.

5. The solution must be sufficiently positive and constructive to enlist and inspire the cooperation and self-sacrifice of men of all three religions, and should set men free to concentrate on the building up of their educational, cultural, and spiritual life.

6. Some form of positive and constructive co-operation between the communities (Jewish and Arab) is the inescapable conclusion. The religious approach is more consonant with the history and character of the Holy Land. There should be in Palestine one land whose policy is founded upon the study and practice of religion.

Proposals by the Church of Scotland (contained in memorandum submitted to Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry).

5. Certain fundamental rights on which the Church must insist:

1. To assemble for unhindered public worship.
2. To formulate its own creed and determine its condition of membership.
3. To give religious instruction to its youth.
4. To preach the Gospel publicly.
5. To receive in its membership those who desire to join it.
6. To carry on Christian service and missionary activity.
7. To organise local churches.
8. To publish and circulate Christian literature.
9. To buy and hold property and secure support for its work in Palestine and abroad.
10. To have equality of treatment with Islam and Judaism / in the matter

in the matter of taxation, customs dues, and legal procedure (including marriage, inheritance, guardianship and all other questions of personal status).

11. To cooperate and unite with other Churches in Palestine and abroad.

12. Besides the need for having such rights recognised in a constitution, provision must be made for machinery to give effect to them.

13. Provision must be made that the Hebrew-Christians and those Moslems who desire to accept or have accepted the Christian faith be not in any way penalised or discriminated against.

14. It is requested that due provision be made for safeguarding Nazareth and the Sea of Galilee sacred to millions of Christian hearts.

6) CUSTODY OF THE HOLY LAND

(Statement to UNSCOP, July 1947)

1. The question of the Holy Places cannot and must not be fogged by the rivalry of clashing political ambitions.

2. It is not a national problem as to whether political expediency counsels partition, sovereign independence or a bi-national state.

3. It would be somewhat far-fetched to expect a non-Christian Government to exercise a sympathetic regard for Christian Shrines. Should history repeat itself with regard to Christian Shrines within the domain of an unfettered non-Christian Government, Christian reaction might, if difficulties occur, result in serious consequences.

4. Free access to all Christian sanctuaries at all times and the unhampered conduct of religious services are necessary prerequisites to whatever modus vivendi is established.

5. An "Enclave" may protect the Holy Places in Jerusalem and Bethlehem but in order to safeguard all Holy Places a specially deputized Commission should be established to which juridical recourse could be had to avoid friction, danger, or desecration.

6. Should political autonomy be realized solid international guarantees embodying effective protective measures for

/ safeguarding

safeguarding and preserving Christian Shrines is of paramount importance.

7) FRENCH INSTITUTIONS IN THE HOLY LAND

(Memorandum on the "Oeuvres françaises en Terre-Sainte" communicated by the French Consul-General)

1. The Mandate has consecrated the rights and privileges of the religious communities.
2. The Mandatory Power has generally respected the legal status of French institutions established by the Mytilene Agreements of 1904 and the Franco-Turkish Agreement of 18 December 1913.
3. These institutions - mostly Roman Catholic - comprise hospitals, dispensaries, orphanages, schools, seminaries, convents.
4. It is suggested that UNSCOP should recommend the safeguarding of these institutions:

8) GREEK ORTHODOX PATRIARCHATE OF JERUSALEM

(Memorandum submitted in New York by the Greek Archdiocese of North and South America on 6/5/47)

1. The monastic Fraternity of the Holy Sepulchre should retain its rights on the Holy Places.
2. The Fraternity should continue to act as the guardian of the places of pilgrimage of which it is the sole owner.
3. It should continue to administer the proceeds from the Holy Institutions and Benefices (one third of these proceeds being used as heretofore for the clergy, the schools and the poor of the Arab speaking Orthodox Christian community of Palestine).

/CHAPTER X

CHAPTER X

JEWISH REFUGEES

1) Jewish Agency

(The "Jewish Case" and Memorandum on the Problem of displaced and insecure Jews in Europe)

1. It is established that practically all the refugee Jews in Germany, Austria and Italy - 268, 593 - insist on leaving Europe. While not all of the remaining refugee Jews in Europe - some 190,000 - wish to leave their countries of refuge, at least 60% or about 114,000, desire or will be compelled to go. A total Jewish emigration figure from Europe of over 350,000 is thus reached. (Memorandum on the Problem of displaced and insecure Jews of Europe, July 1947, parag. 23).

2. A conservative estimate of non-refugee Jews in all European countries who wish or will be impelled to emigrate from Europe is at least 500,000. (idem, parag. 22).

3. As regards the wish of young Oriental Jews to emigrate to Palestine see Chapter III, section 2 above.

4. The Jewish "displaced persons" in Europe are not an isolated problem, to be solved by ad hoc devices. It can be solved only by territorial concentration in Palestine. Philanthropic attempts to settle Jews elsewhere have failed to elicit a creative response from them.

5. By trial and error, a rich fund of experience has been accumulated which today enables Palestine to offer a permanent home. (The Jewish Case, page 303, parag. 101).

2) AGUDATH ISRAEL WORLD ORGANIZATION

(Memorandum submitted to the Committee,
June 1947)

The gates of the Holy Land must be re-opened to free and unrestricted Jewish immigration. Until the United Nations reaches final decision on the future of Palestine, it is imperative that a door should be opened to the homeless by the grant of a monthly quota of 5,000 immigration certificates.

(paragraph D, 1 and 3)

/ s/ AMERICAN COUNCIL

3) AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR JUDAISM

(Memorandum on Aspects of the Problems of Palestine,
June 4, 1947)

The problem of Jewish Displaced Persons is part of the larger humanitarian problem of Displaced Persons of all faiths in Europe. Their need for resettlement and rehabilitation must be met by concerted world action. The American Council appeals for immediate action by the member States of the United Nations to make possible the admission of Displaced Persons of all faiths in all lands, including Palestine. (Section I).

4) ANGLO-JEWISH ASSOCIATION

Save for Palestine there is no quarter to which the Jewish displaced persons and refugees can look for early and substantial relief.

5) CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF PALESTINE

(Memorandum to the United Nations, February 7, 1947
and Memorandum to UNSCOP, July 5, 1947)

1. Immediate liquidation of displaced persons camps is an absolute necessity.

2. Palestine cannot solve the problem of the large number of Jews displaced by Fascism and war. The resettlement of homeless Jews in their countries of origin, where democratic regimes have been established, should be facilitated by the United Nations.

3. Displaced Jews unwilling to return to their countries of origin should be given immediate opportunities to emigrate to other countries, including Palestine, taking consideration of the wish to join relatives.

4. The question of immigration of displaced Jews into Palestine must be solved by Arab-Jewish agreement within the framework of a general democratic agreement on the Palestine problem and of the international agreement on the future of displaced Jews.

/ 6) IRGUN ZVAI LEUMI

6) IRGUN ZVAI LEUMI

(Memorandum, June 1947)

1. The Irgun bitterly attacks Britain on the grounds that she has "encouraged and participated in the greatest of all crimes in human history: the extermination of the Jewish people in Europe".

2. The memorandum bases the indictment on the fact that many of the Jews who wished to escape Nazi persecution beginning in 1933 were prevented from coming to Palestine, and so were killed. Moreover, the White Paper of 1939 was timed after "the first shrill signal for the extermination of our people".

3. Refusal to allow refugee ships to enter Palestine resulted in several disasters such as the "Struma" and the "Patria". And the deportation of refugees to British colonies (a policy announced in 1940) was a warning to the Jews not even to try to escape Europe.

7) THE NATION ASSOCIATES

1. When the Anglo-American Committee published its report in April 1946, there were 74,000 Jewish displaced persons in Germany. Today, in the American military zones in Germany and Austria and in the British zones in Germany and Italy there is a Jewish displaced persons population of 247,337.

2. On January 1, 1947, the G-5 Division of the United States Forces in the European theatre explained this sharp rise in the Jewish displaced persons population by the fact that the Jewish population of 80,000 in Poland had been increased by 150,000 Jews repatriated from Russia. Of these 230,000 it estimated that some 130,000 had left Poland during the past 16 months. The displaced persons in Germany are mostly Eastern Europeans.

3. The Memorandum provides detailed information concerning Jewish war losses (pp. 1-2) and the status of restitution of Jewish property (p. 3).

4. Anti-Semitism is still strong in Europe.

5. The camp life of the displaced persons is abnormal and shows few signs of improvement. Most of the displaced persons suffer from physical and psychological ills. They are surrounded by a hostile population - their persecutors - who are better

/ housed and

housed and clothed, and who live normal family lives.

6. According to American military reports, in the spring of 1947 some 140,000 Jews in displaced persons camps began movements toward Palestine. On April 7, 1947 both the American Army and War Department officials in Washington made clear that they were powerless to block a mass underground movement of Jews to Palestine from Germany and Austria that spring.

7. The same report emphasized that the displaced persons constituted a potential security problem.

8. If a decision were reached, the Jews could be transported with dispatch. An American military authority reports that 100,000 Jews could be moved to Marseilles or Bari in one month. Another says the camps in Austria could be cleared out in two weeks.

9. An examination of the immigration laws and policies of States, Members of the United Nations, substantiates the finding of the Anglo-American Committee that there is no hope of substantial assistance in finding homes for Jews wishing or impelled to leave Europe. (pp. 9-11)

YEMENITE COMMUNITY

(Memorandum June 1947)

The Yemenite Community, representing an estimated number of 40,000 to 50,000 Jews still in the Yemen, proposes that :

1. A mission should visit Yemen in order to ascertain the position of the Jews there.

2. A mission should visit Aden to examine the plight of the refugees.

3. Yemenite Jews should be granted a proportion of immigration certificates pending final settlement of the Palestine problem.

8) DR. WEIZMANN

(Testimony before Committee on 8 July 1947)

Some people that the Jews should devote their intelligence and experience to building up Europe. But to the Jews that means building up Germany and other countries so as to / enable them

enable them to destroy the Jews again." ...To advise us to turn again to live among the hatreds of the present and the tombstones of the past is asking too much from flesh and blood".

/CHAPTER XI

CHAPTER XI

WAR EFFORT

1) JEWISH AGENCY

(The "Turkish Case")

1. Jewish volunteers for war service totalled 85,000 men and 50,000 women. The privilege of front-line fighting was for a long time denied to Palestinian Jews by the British Government. Nevertheless, under the auspices of the Jewish Agency, large-scale voluntary recruiting was organised for active service within the British Forces (The Jewish Case, page 297, para. 86).

2. Only late in 1944 was the Jewish desire to form a Jewish Brigade group gratified. The latter fought in Italy under the Jewish flag.

3. Altogether, out of some 33,000 Palestinian Jewish volunteers, 26,000 served in the Army, Navy, or Air Force in the Middle East and in Europe.

4. 9,000 Arabs, hailing partly from Transjordan, Syria and the Lebanon, enlisted in Palestine. Long before the end of the war, this total was reduced by at least one-half through desertions and discharges (idem., page 298, para. 88).

5. After certain political prejudices had been overcome, Jewish economy was harnessed to the war machine. Army orders, totalling £36,000,000 were executed by Jewish industry. Services were also performed by Jewish scientific and technical institutions.

2) THE NATION ASSOCIATES

(Memorandum on the Palestine problem and
Documentary Record on the Arab Higher
Committee)

The Memorandum describes the sharp contrast "between the war efforts of the Jewish and Arab communities. Whereas in Palestine 85,800 Jewish men and 50,400 women volunteered for war service, and Jewish industry increased by over 100% to meet war needs, the Arab community was largely indifferent. The Mufti of Jerusalem, popular leader of the Palestine Arabs, "played an active role as an ally of the Axis". (pp.38-54). A second memorandum entitled "The Arab Higher Committee: Its Origins, Personnel and Purposes", was also submitted to the United Nations with the purpose of showing the association of that organization with the Axis.

PART II

Specific Proposals

1) MANDATORY POWER

(Cmd. 7044 and Political History of Palestine under British Administration)

1. While the Mandatory Power, in submitting the problem of Palestine to the United Nations, has recommended no particular solution, the solutions proposed by the Jewish Agency and other organisations refer to the two latest British proposals, either to reject them (Jewish Agency) or to accept one of them, subject to amendment (Ihud). The two latest British proposals are the (July 1946) so-called Morrison plan for provincial autonomy and the so-called Bevin plan for cantonisation (February 1947).

2. The plan for provincial autonomy was outlined in the House of Commons by Mr. Morrison on July 31, 1946. His speech is reproduced on page 3 of Cmd. 7044 and an explanatory map follows page 14. The following is a summary of the plan:

a) Division of the greater part of Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish Province - the latter including almost the entire area on which Jews had already settled, together with a considerable area between and around the settlements. Jerusalem and Bethlehem, together with the Negeb would remain under the direct control of the Central Government.

b) Each province would have an elected legislature and an executive, with a wide range of functions including control over land transfers and the power to limit immigration.

/c) The Central

c) The Central Government would be administered by the British High Commissioner, with a nominated Executive Council. It would have all powers not expressly granted to the provinces, including exclusive authority in questions of defence, foreign relations, customs and excise, and initially in the administration of law and order.

d) In particular, final control over immigration would rest with the Central Government, but it would be exercised on the basis of recommendations made by the Provincial Governments. So long as the economic absorptive capacity of the province was not exceeded, the Central Government would authorise the immigration desired by the Provincial Government. The Jewish province would thus normally be able to admit as many immigrants as its Provincial Government desired.

e) The above plan would be embodied in a trusteeship agreement. In the long run, the way would be left open for development either towards an independent federal State or towards partition. (In the latter case, the boundaries of the Arab and Jewish Provinces could not be modified except by mutual consent.)

3. The plan for cantonisation of February 7, 1947 (Cmd. 7044, page 11) provided for a five year period of British trusteeship, with the object of preparing the country for independence. The following is a summary of the plan.

a) Areas of local administration would be so delimited as to include a substantial majority either of Jews or of Arabs. As the boundaries of such areas would not have the character of State frontiers, it would not necessarily follow that all the Arab or all the Jewish territory need be contiguous.

/b) Each area

- b) Each area of local administration would enjoy a substantial measure of autonomy (legislative, administrative and financial powers, including control over transfers of land, the power to amend the existing Land Transfers Regulations, some share in responsibility for the police - but excluding immigration).
- c) The High Commissioner would retain responsibility for protecting the Jewish minority in Arab areas and the Arab minority in Jewish areas. The rights of these minorities would include: adequate representation in local legislatures; a reasonable proportion of posts in the local administration; freedom of religious practice, in accordance with the status quo, including the maintenance of separate religious courts for matters of personal status; the right to maintain their own educational institutions and to use their own language in their communications with the Administration and the Courts of Law.
- d) The High Commissioner would continue to exercise supreme legislative and executive authority.
- e) He would endeavour to form an Advisory Council, including not only representatives of the Arab and Jewish local administrations, but also of labour and other organised interests. He would be required to give due attention to the views of minorities. (It is probable that voting in the Advisory Council would tend at first to follow communal lines.)
- f) The Jewish members of the Advisory Council would supersede the Jewish Agency as the official channel of communication between the Jewish Community and the High Commissioner.
- g) The High Commissioner would introduce Palestinians /into his

into his Executive Council, and would progressively increase the proportion of Palestinian members in that Council.

h) As "any provisions made for future Jewish immigration must rest upon consideration for the well-being of Palestine as a whole", the trusteeship agreement would provide for the admission of 96,000 immigrants, at a rate of 4,000 monthly, during the first two years of its operation. During the remainder of the period of trusteeship, the rate of entry would be determined, with due regard to the principle of economic absorptive capacity, by the High Commissioner in consultation with his Advisory Council.

In the event of disagreement, the final decision would rest with an arbitration tribunal appointed by the United Nations.

i) At the end of four years, a Constituent Assembly would be elected. If agreement was reached between a majority of the Arab representatives and a majority of the Jewish representatives in the Constituent Assembly, an independent State would be established. In the event of disagreement, the Trusteeship Council would be asked to advise upon future procedure.

4. While both plans provide for a transitional period during which Palestine would be under British trusteeship and would, through the exercise of self-government, prepare itself for independence; the powers granted to the Jewish and Arab provinces in the first plan would be more extensive than those of the areas of local administration in the second. As the "provinces" would in fact control immigration, the Jewish province would increase its Jewish majority within the limits of its absorptive capacity. In the cantonisation plan, on the other hand, after the entry into

Palestine of some 100,000 Jewish immigrants within two years, further immigration would be decided by the Trustee, with the possibility of recourse to arbitration against its decisions.

5. During the period of trusteeship, the first plan, by creating an Arab province and a Jewish province, "leaves the way open for peaceful progress and constitutional development either towards partition or towards federal unity", rather than towards one State, in which the two communities would cooperate.

6. As the second plan is not based on a territorial division into Jewish and Arab provinces (which probably would become Jewish and Arab States after the trusteeship period), it leaves the way open for establishing an "independent State" after the trusteeship period. The second plan (Bevin plan) is accordingly used as a basis - with various modifications - by Ihud, which proposes the creation of an independent bi-national State.

2) JEWISH AGENCY

(Political Survey, 1946-47 and Hearings in UNSCOP)

1. The British Government, having renounced its mandatory trust, it is necessary to substitute therefor a new political structure ensuring the implementation of the Jewish National Home policy. The claim for an international decision in favour of the establishment of Palestine as a Jewish State at the time when the Jews still form but a minority of the population sets an unprecedented problem, but this demand is both just and practicable. (Political Survey, 1946-47, paragraph 110).

2. By a comprehensive immigration scheme to be carried out with the assistance of the United Nations, the numerical position in Palestine could, within a certain period of time, be so changed as to give the Jews a virtual majority. (Political Survey 1946-47, paragraph 110).

/3. In setting

3. In setting up their State the Jews will devise constitutional forms for giving effect to the non-domination principle which the Zionist movement has proclaimed at earlier stages. The individual non-Jewish citizen, and not only the citizen but every inhabitant, will enjoy in full measure the rights which his Jewish fellow is entitled to exercise in the political, civic, religious, and national domains, including the use of his national language in official intercourse and the right to send his children to any school administered by his own community, in which his national traditions are cultivated. Moreover, it will be possible for any national minority group and for any religious group to claim the right to set up a representative body to administer its special concerns (religious establishments, houses of worship, monasteries, religious courts, schools, colleges, hospitals, etc.). The Arab schools will receive financial support from the Government in accordance with their needs. There will also be comprehensive development of local self-government, including regional councils, say for Beduin areas. The Jewish State would, moreover, devote special attention to safeguarding the rights of Christianity and Islam in Palestine. It would propose the appointment of a special United Nations Commission to supervise all holy shrines. (Political Survey, 1946-47, paragraph 113-119).

4. A solution on partition lines, if it is to be at all acceptable, can hardly be regarded as other than a pris aller. The original area of the Balfour Declaration has already been partitioned by the excision of Transjordan, and a further curtailment of the area of the Jewish National Home must involve great sacrifice. Any solution of the Palestine problem which may be proposed will be judged by the Jewish people by reference to whether it ensures large-scale immigration and settlement and leads without delay
/to the establish-
ment

to the establishment of the Jewish State. (Political Survey, 1946-47, paragraph 125)

5. The partition scheme proposed by the Royal Commission in 1937 was considered unacceptable by the majority of the 20th Zionist Congress (1937) mainly for two reasons: that the Negeb and Jewish Jerusalem were excluded from the Jewish State. Everybody, however, admitted that the Holy Places ought to be internationally safeguarded and that the Old City of Jerusalem required a special regime (Mr. Ben Gurion, 16th meeting of UNSCOP, page 25).

6. In rejecting the Bevin scheme, in February 1947, the Executive of the Jewish Agency reiterated its readiness to consider a compromise "scheme for the establishment of a viable Jewish State in an adequate area of Palestine", in the understanding that the Jewish State so established "should have complete control over immigration and development and be represented in the United Nations". (Political Survey 1946-47, Chapter VII and paragraph 124).

7. The reasons why the Jewish Agency rejects all solutions except the setting up of a Jewish State (that is, a State in which the Jews would be the majority) in Palestine or in an adequate area of Palestine are stated in Chapter IX of the Political Survey 1946-47 and summarised in Mr. Ben Gurion's statement (16th meeting of UNSCOP, pages 75 and following).

a) Rejection of British Trusteeship

8. The Jewish Agency rejects a British trusteeship because the Jews have lost faith in the British Administration.

b) Rejection of Joint Trusteeship

9. It rejects a joint trusteeship because there is no reason to assume that considerations of power politics - oil, strategic bases, lines of communication, etc. - would not thwart the admini-

/stration of a

stration of a joint trusteeship in much the same way as the administration of the Mandate has been thwarted. The position might become even worse in that the several trustees might be influenced by divergent interests. (Political Survey, 1946-47,

paragraph. 85)

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c) Rejection of the Bi-national State

10. As regards the proposals for a bi-national State, one may, of course, expect the common economic and social interests of the parallel elements in the two communities to assert themselves more fully and bring about a political re-alignment in the course of time, but there are compelling considerations against the assumption that such re-alignment will develop in the near future on the broader issues involved - especially immigration and development. Apart from the intrinsic causes of conflict, it would be to the continued advantage of Arab politicians to keep alive the present intransigence, and it would be dangerous for any Arab to support a measure helpful to Jewish immigration.

11. The bi-national State presupposes two collective wills acting in unison. The willingness to work together on the part of individuals - who may combine on some minor matters - but on the part of the two national entities which would have to combine on major matters, does not exist in Palestine. There would be either permanent deadlock on the virtual abolition of independence.

12. The question is not whether Jews and Arabs can live together within the framework of one State - but whether they can operate a state machinery by pulling an equal weight in its councils. They will pull apart.

13. The problem is how to make independence an instrument of development and not a stranglehold on development. Equality of veto /would mean a

would mean a Jewish defeat, as an Arab veto would prevent Jewish immigration. (Mr. Shertok, 35th meeting of UNSCOP, page 10).

14. The whole approach which leads to bi-nationalism misses the real point at issue. The starting-point is not how to solve the problem of a country with two peoples, but how to solve the Jewish problem, which is not restricted to present day Palestine.

(d) Rejection of a Federal State

15. As regards federalism, the Jewish Agency would oppose the conception of a federal State, but would favour a federation of independent States (Mr. Shertok, 35th meeting of UNSCOP, page 8).

16. In a federal State, the continuous clash of divergent tendencies would pull the State structure to pieces - unless power was concentrated in the hands of a very powerful umpire. Moreover, the craving of the Jewish people for statehood would remain unsatisfied and would still constitute an international problem. (Idem, page 9).

(e) Preparations for the Establishment of the Jewish State

17. To prepare for the establishment of the Jewish State, the Jewish Agency wants the immediate abolition of the restrictions on immigration and of the Land Regulations of 1940.

18. A plan of development based on Jewish experience and achievements should be considered by UNSCOP and the U.N. to see how it can be carried out and about one million Jews should be re-settled in their country within a few years.

19. The carrying out of the plan of development would be entrusted to the Jewish Agency - in co-operation with the Arabs, if they are willing - and would be supervised by a Committee or any instrument the U.N. might decide upon.

/20. The plan

20. The plan would have two essential features: a large Jewish settlement; a considerable raising of Arab standards - to the same level, if possible, as the Jewish.

21. When in a few years not the whole, but a considerable part of the plan, is carried out, the U.N. will decide there is no more need for supervision and the independent State of Palestine can be established.

22. During the period of transition there will be a dyarchy. The Jewish Agency will undertake the development of the country (irrigation, building, bringing and settling immigrants). Security, relations and all other functions of the Government which have nothing to do with development will be under the supervision of the U.N. which will decide on the form of the administration (Mr. Ben Gurion, 19th meeting of UNSCOP, page 17 and following).

23. As regards security, if the U.N. decides that the Jews have a right to come back to their country, it would be its duty, if necessary, to enforce this right during the transitional period. (Idem, page 26 and page 106).

24. Mr. Ben Gurion has indicated that if the Jewish State comprised only a part of Palestine, there would be no need for a transitional period. As far as defence went, the decision of the U.N. on the one hand, the ability of the Jews to defend themselves on the other, would be sufficient. (Idem, page 109).

/13) AGUDATH

(3) AGUDATH ISRAEL WORLD ORGANIZATION

(Memorandum, June 1947, Hearings of UNSCOP,
26th Meeting)

1. The gates of the land of Israel should be open to all Jews wishing to enter it; a political regime should be established guaranteeing free immigration, the development of the country and its exploitation to the full of its absorptive capacity (Rabbi I. M. Lewin, 26th meeting of UNSCOP, page 76).
2. Control of immigration into, and development of, Palestine should be given into Jewish hands.
3. Agudath Israel claims its rightful place in every body vested with authority in matters affecting Palestine. (Memorandum, paragraphs D1, and E).
4. Every possible safeguard must be imposed to guarantee in perpetuity that the country is established on the basis of religion, of Palestine's traditions and of the rule of Jewish law and belief. (Memorandum, paragraph G).
5. As regards relations with Arabs, in all differences between the two communities, there will have to be political negotiations. If they fail, a supreme authority, the United Nations would have to decide on the basis of justice and right (Rabbi Lewin, 26th meeting of UNSCOP, page 91).

/(4) ALLIANCE

(4) ALLIANCE ISRAELITE UNIVERSELLE

(Memorandum, dated 9 June 1947 transmitted by the
American Friends of the Alliance)

1. Abrogation of the White Paper of 1939, which, being a unilateral declaration of the British Government, may be annulled by them.
2. Immediate entry of 100,000 Displaced Persons, under the control of the Jewish Agency.
3. International trusteeship of United Nations providing for Jewish immigration into and colonisation of Palestine, according to absorptive capacity. The Jewish Agency would be responsible for determining absorptive capacity; it would also be mainly responsible for the integration of the new immigrants in the Jewish Community of Palestine.
4. Equality of rights and basic freedoms for everybody in Palestine.
5. Special provisions for the Holy Places and Holy Shrines of the various religions.
6. International guarantee for the development of Jewish colonisation in quasi-desertic areas, for instance, the Negev and their irrigation according to plans like the Lowdermilk Plan.
7. As regards the final political solution of the problem, a just solution is possible for the whole of Palestine, if relations between the various elements are not troubled by incitation from outside. If a solution for the whole of Palestine is impossible, the Alliance would accept any settlement which would permit mass immigration into and colonisation of Palestine and the free development of the National Home.

(5) AMERICAN COUNCIL FOR JUDAISM

(Memorandum on Aspects of the Problem of Palestine,
4 June 1947)

1. The proposals to establish a "Jewish State" in Palestine or anywhere else are a threat to the peace and security of Palestine and its surrounding area, and are harmful to the Jews in Palestine and to Jews elsewhere throughout the world. A proposal identifying a State with a racial or religious segment of its population - regardless of size - is contrary to democratic concepts. All artificial manipulations of populations and immigration designed to create a majority to substantiate such a State are also undemocratic (Section II).

2. International action must take into account the resettlement of Displaced Persons of all faiths in terms of world-wide humanitarian action; the resolute prevention of the creation of a Jewish State; and action, in behalf of all Jews of the world, to implement the international assurances of guaranteed rights. Such provisions are essential for the solution of immediate problems in Palestine. They are of even greater importance in order not to vitiate a historic process whereby Jews, long a persecuted group, acquired the status of free men and women and recognition of the right to live in equality as citizens of various countries (Sections V and VI).

/(6) AMERICAN JEWISH

(6) AMERICAN JEWISH COMMITTEE

(Written Statement, 31 May 1947)

1. It was the hope of all moderates that the unanimous recommendations of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (including the issue of 100,000 immigration certificates in 1946) would be the basis for a prompt interim solution, good for many years to come.
2. Great Britain insisted that an ultimate political solution for Palestine must be immediately devised as a condition precedent to any decision on immigration.
3. It is not yet too late for Great Britain to recede from that intransigent position.
4. If, however, she insists that immigration on a large scale cannot be permitted until there is an immediate final political solution - and if the United Nations concurs in such insistence - partition along the lines urged last summer by members of the Jewish Agency is the only solution.
5. If, however, UNSCOP decides that it is not necessary or advisable immediately to determine the permanent political status of Palestine, Palestine should be brought under a United Nations Trusteeship (Chapter 12 of the Charter).
6. If Great Britain chooses in that event to ask that she be recognized under article 81 of the Charter as an administering authority, then the Trusteeship Agreement should specifically define "the terms under which the territory will be administered."
7. Great Britain should be requested to submit a Trusteeship Agreement, putting Palestine under direct international supervision and administration, even though she remain as the agent of the United Nations.

/8. The terms /

8. The terms of the Trusteeship Agreement should provide:

(1) 100,000 immigration certificates fully allocated by the end of 1947 to Jews in Displaced Persons camps in Europe.

(2) Facilitation of maximum Jewish immigration and guarantee of the rights of Jews to land purchase.

(3) in the event of a dispute as to the rate of immigration, or the character of land ownership, the Trusteeship Council should be given plenary power to determine such dispute and should in the first instance be given power to prescribe specific rights of Jewish immigration into Palestine.

(4) immediate and general placement of Jews and Arabs in positions of political and economic responsibility, to that end that - subject always to the fulfillment of the purpose of the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate - complete self-government with full equality for all citizens will ultimately be realised.

(5) protection of the sanctity of the Holy Places and the religious interests of Christianity, Islam and Judaism.

(6) obligation for the United Nations, on the request of the administering authority, to furnish means of policing the country, and right, through its appropriate bodies, to do so without such request - the administering authority being in such matters subject to the direction of the appropriate body of the United Nations.

(7) The Trusteeship should continue until the United Nations shall determine that the time has arrived for independence, with the fullest participation by Arabs and Jews, and with complete equality of all citizens guaranteed by a bill of rights.

9. Under such a plan, the criticism made that the present Mandate is unworkable would cease to apply. If the present

/Mandatory

Mandatory prefers not to continue as administering authority or is unwilling to abide by conditions substantially as those outline, the United Nations should itself be the administering authority under Article 81 of the Charter.

/7) AMERICAN-JEWISH

7) AMERICAN JEWISH CONFERENCE

(Written Statement, June 3, 1947)

1. Immediate action: prompt abrogation of the 1939 White Paper.
2. Solution of the problem of Palestine's political future:
reconstitution of Palestine as a free and democratic Jewish
Commonwealth.

/8) ANGLO-JEWISH

8) ANGLO-JEWISH ASSOCIATION

(Memorandum, 24 June 1947)

1. There should be an immediate reversal of the restrictive immigration policy now in force, commencing with the prompt admission to Palestine of at least a considerable proportion of the Jewish displaced persons and refugees in Europe.
2. There is no preferable alternative to partition, but the principle of partition should be applied in a form not necessarily involving the dissolution of all links between the several areas.
3. The Provincial Autonomy Plan (Morrison plan) contained in the White Paper (Cmd. 7044) should be modified as follows:

(1) allocation of powers should be altered in favour of the "provinces".

(2) transfer of powers by stages - the Central Government, after a not very long transitional period, being left with a bare minimum of reserved subjects.

(3) members of the "provincial governments" to be not nominees of the Central Government, but selected by democratic process.

(4) the provinces to have full control over immigration into, and settlement in, their respective areas.

(5) at the end of the transitional period, the "provinces" would choose between (a) a federal system; (b) separation; (c) a Customs Union or such similar intermediate arrangement.

(6) the area for the "Jewish Province" to be reconsidered in the light of the proposals of the Royal Commission of 1937 and substantially enlarged.

/(7) the Negev

- (7) the Negev to be made available to Jewish colonization.
- (8) in the Jerusalem area, the regime should preclude discrimination on grounds of race or religion in the matter of entry into and settlement in the area, the acquisition of land or otherwise.

4. As urged in the White Paper (Cmd. 7044, page 7) "the need for economic development in Palestine should be considered against the background of the Middle East as a whole ". A settlement doing justice to Jewish rights and needs in Palestine should be carried out in conjunction with measures designed to enhance the prosperity of the Arab States and generally to contribute to the peaceful development of the Middle East.

9) BNE-HORIN MOVEMENT

9) BNE-HORIN MOVEMENT

(Memorandum, 28 June 1947)

1.

1. Palestine within its historical boundaries should be proclaimed as the national territory of the Hebrew people and as an independent Hebrew state. Because the Balfour Declaration and the terms of the Mandate were intended to apply to Transjordan as well as to the western position of Palestine, and for other valid economic and strategic reasons, the Hebrew State should include Transjordan.

2. The Holy Places - Christian, Moslem, and Jewish - should be ex-territorialised under the protection and supervision of the United Nations.

3. Until such time as the Hebrew people will govern their own state, Palestine should be provisionally governed under international supervision "through a delegate of UNO, entitled to exercise the right of veto and to refer any questions in dispute to the Permanent Court of International Justice". During the transitional period, forty percent of the members of the provisional Government should be citizens of Arab descent. After a period of five years a democratic system of government should be instituted.

4. All persons of Hebrew descent, wherever they may reside, should be given the opportunity to elect (at any time within a period of five years) to become citizens of the Hebrew State. This right should be secured by the United Nations.

5. All citizens of the Hebrew State should have equal political, civil and religious rights, without regard to race or religion.

6. The Committee should indicate that, if the solution recommended by the Committee and the General Assembly is not accepted by the Mandatory Power, every Member of the United Nations will be

/free to refer

free to refer the question of final determination to the International Court of Justice, and the Hebrew people will also have the right to approach the Court.

/10) CENTRAL COMMITTEE

10) CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY
OF PALESTINE

(Memorandum, 5 July 1947 and Hearings of UNSCOP)

A. Immediate action

The United Nations should demand from the Mandatory Power:

- 1) to give back and extend the civil liberties of which the people is robbed;
- 2) to abolish all Emergency Regulations;
- 3) to abolish capital punishment and refrain from carrying out the death sentences recently passed;
- 4) to abolish the system of banishment of Palestinian inhabitants from the country, irrespective of their nationality and their political views;
- 5) to promulgate laws for the recognition of trade unions.

B. Pre-conditions for any solution

Abrogation of the Mandate and evacuation of the British army and police.

C. The Solutions to be rejected

a) Partition

- 1) The partition of the country would be entirely arbitrary and destroy the economic unity of Palestine.
- 2) In partitioned Palestine there would be no peace, but suspicion and the wish for revenge and territorial extension.
- 3) The following would be the economic consequences of partition (pages 16-17 of the Memorandum of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Palestine):
- 4) Sectional interests only would be served by a partition of the basic national wealth of Palestine

(mineral deposits)

(mineral deposits in the Dead Sea; rock salts at the south end of the Dead Sea; gypsum in the northern part of the Jordan Valley, most of whose output is absorbed by the Nesher Cement Works in the Haifa area; beds of rock phosphate in the Jericho area; sulphur deposits in the Ghaza area; probably mineral oil in southern Palestine).

5) The waters of the Jordan are essential for any development scheme, involving the vital plans of major irrigation throughout Palestine. Partition would increase the number of authorities to be dealt with as regards irrigation and power development. All important reservoir sites would be put into the Arab Zone. Canalisation would be greatly split. Partition would also delay the development of springs.

6) The main electric power generated is concentrated at the influx of the Jarmuk into the Jordan; the electricity generated at the Jordan Hydro-Electric Powerhouse is transmitted to Haifa and Tel-Aviv. The total sales in Palestine in 1945 surpassed 215 million KWH and the requirements cannot be met by the additional power stations (the Haifa and the "Reading" power station near Tel-Aviv). On the other hand, the production of refined oil is concentrated in Haifa Bay.

7) The railway system and the main roads would be cut into several sections. (The main railway line, Ghaza-Haifa, would be cut five times, according to the proposal of the Royal Commission).

- 8) Haifa Port, the only first-class harbour, and the Lydda airport would cease to serve the needs of the whole country.
- 9) Industries, which are mostly concentrated in the Haifa Bay and the industrial belt of the Tel-Aviv area, would be cut off from the more agricultural zones.
- 10) Partition would adversely affect most all aspects of economic life, including the labour market (with its seasonal and other migrations) as well as the other factors which make for the unity of the country (trade union and political organisations embracing the urban and rural working class).

b) The Morrison Plan

- 11) The Morrison plan for a federalised Palestine does not remove British rule. It would, moreover, increase antagonism between Arabs and Jews. Different immigration laws would be adopted in the four parts of the country, necessitating provincial border control, followed by border incidents. An overpopulated coastline would be set against a sparsely populated hinterland. The provinces would strive for extension of their areas. There would be a minority question in each province and district, with the British Government as arbiter.

c) The Bevin Plan

- 12) In the Bevin plan for cantonisation the minority question is also introduced. After five years of British trusteeship, a transition to independence is envisaged on condition that both peoples will agree to the new constitution. "The fostering of antagonism in the interim period will see to it that the constitution cannot

dition cannot be fulfilled".

D. The Solution of the Communist Party

(a) Palestine would be declared free and independent. The Security Council would appoint a Commission to carry out the appropriate decisions taken by the United Nations, and to restore the democratic liberties of which the inhabitants have been deprived.

(b) The United Nations should assist the peoples of Palestine in setting up a democratic Arab-Jewish State, based on an internationally guaranteed democratic institution.

(c) The United Nations Commission to be appointed would convene a Constituent Assembly, formed of representatives of both peoples democratically elected.

(d) The future regime should conform to the realities of Palestine: the existence of two peoples to which must be granted full equality of rights, irrespective of numbers. Conditions must be created that would render impossible domination of one people by the other and allow the full and free national, economic and cultural development of Arabs and Jews alike.

(e) Jews and Arabs would freely decide whether independent single-dual Palestine should have a bi-national or federative structure (Memorandum to UNSCOP and hearings, 29th Meeting).

(f) The Constitution might provide for a House of Representatives elected democratically on the basis of proportional representation and a House of Peoples elected democratically on a regional basis and comprising an
/equal number

equal number of Jewish and Arab representatives.

(g) After the abolition of the Mandate and the evacuation of British troops, there would be revolutionary changes.

The peasantry, the working class and the intellectuals would be free to mobilise the masses for the protection of the independence and the democratic State (Mr. Mikunis, 32nd Meeting of UNSCOP, page 3).

/11) CENTRAL COMMITTEE

11) CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE COMMUNIST
UNION OF PALESTINE

(Memorandum and Hearings - 35th Meeting)

1. A bi-national state would mean:

- (1) the denial of sovereign rights to one of the nations.
- (2) the complete mobilization of the other nation against such a state.
- (3) economic and political boycott and possibly armed risings.

2. Partition has the appearance of doing justice to both groups but has grave disadvantages:-

- (1) The Arabs will constitute a minority of 1/3 in the Jewish State.
- (2) 2/3 of the land in the Jewish State would be held by Arabs.
- (3) The problem of development will be more difficult because raw materials (e.g., Dead Sea resources) and water resources could not be exploited effectively on a partition basis.
- (4) Industry, already suffering from marketing difficulties would suffer by boycotts and in other ways, from partition.
- (5) Neither of the small nations would be likely to be able to maintain its independence.

3. Proposals

- (1) The abolition of the Mandate.
- (2) The international recognition of the independence of Palestine, with the right of self-determination, including the right of secession.
- / (3) In carrying out

(3) In carrying out the above principle it is proposed that there will be bi-national regions and institutions of government which will be based on parity. There will also be one national region and institutions of government based on the democratic principle of election by individual vote. A parity constituent assembly will be elected on a democratic basis in each of the two groups. It would then meet under a United Nations Commission to demarcate the territorial regions and work out a future constitution. Each of the bi-national groups will have the right to secede from the one national state. It is argued that the interests of the two parties are in cooperation to this extent and that the right of secession provides the basis for voluntary cooperation.

(4) The Federal State Government would be concerned with relations with other countries, financial questions, questions of development and especially the development schemes for the absorption of a large number of Jewish immigrants.

(Memorandum of the Central Committee of the Communist Union of Palestine, pp. 26-27. Hearings: 35th Meeting)

/12) COUNCIL OF THE

12) COUNCIL OF THE ASHKENASIC JEWISH
COMMUNITY OF JERUSALEM

(Statements to UNSCOP, July 1947)

1. The Orthodox Community Council represents those Jews who are loyal to the Laws of Moses as handed down from generation to generation. They do not belong to the Vaad Leumi and oppose the immigration policy of the Jewish Agency, and its advocacy of a Jewish State.

2. Proposals

Jewish State: We express our definite opposition to a Jewish State which is not based on the principles of traditional Jewish Law.

Immigration: We demand that the gates of Palestine be opened by the Government to all those Jews who have no home and wish to live here Jewish lives in accordance with the Commandments of the Lord.

Land Laws: We demand categorically the abolition of discriminatory Land Laws as at present enforced.

Recognition: Orthodox Jewry should be officially recognized by confirming their Community Council in law. The legal requirements concerning registration in Jewish Community affairs should be abolished and authority in matters concerning personal status, such as marriage, divorce, wills, bequests, etc., should once again be vested in the Ashkenasic Jewish Community.

/Democratic Club

13) DEMOCRATIC CLUB, TEL-AVIV
(Letter, 1 July 1947)

1. Partition is in the present circumstances the only right solution.
2. Both the Jewish and Arab States should be fully independent one of the other and also of any foreign power.
3. The Jewish State should include the present Jewish settlements, Haifa, Jerusalem and the uncultivated land of the Negeb. The Arab State should include the Arab settlements and Jaffa.
4. The Holy Places should be entrusted to the Arab State, as custodian under the supervision of the United Nations.
5. The United Nations should take an interim decision requesting all its Members to open their countries and Great Britain to open Palestine to displaced Jews in Europe.

14) HAPOEL HAMIZRAHI ORGANIZATION
IN ERETZ ISRAEL - EXECUTIVE
COMMITTEE

This Organization of the Palestine Orthodox Jewish Workers
is an integral part of the World Zionist Organization. Its
political attitude is identical with that of the Jewish Agency.

/Ihud

15) IHUD (UNION) ASSOCIATION
OF PALESTINE

1. There may be attempts to evade facing the main problem by laying emphasis on other very important aspects, but Arab-Jewish relations are the kernel of the problem. (Dr. Magnes, 30th Meeting of UNSCOP, page 2)

2. Ihud, in its Written Statement, submitted to UNSCOP, takes as a basis the Bevin plan of 7 February 1947 (page 11 of Cmd. 7044) and presents the following comments and amendments:

a) Transitional period of trusteeship:

3. Despite very serious disappointments with Great Britain, Ihud wishes to believe that she is capable of applying her experience of a generation in Palestine to the benefit of the country. It assumes that the Trusteeship Council will have much more authority than the Mandates Commission and that the Administering Authority will be subject to real control of the Trusteeship Council.

(Visits of the country, etc. . . .)

4. The Trusteeship Agreement should include provisions for progressive self-development and for the safeguarding of the essential civil rights; for Jewish-Arab cooperation as the chief objective of major policy; and for constructive social, financial and economic policy for the benefit of all of Palestine.

5. The Consultative (not merely Advisory) Body to be formed by the High Commissioner should comprise representatives not only of the Arab and Jewish local administrations, but also of labour and other organised interests.

6. The Consultative Body would be supplanted as early as possible by an elected Legislative Assembly composed equally of
/Jews and

Jews and Arabs.

7. The High Commissioner should, without further delay, introduce into his Executive Council an equal number of Jews and Arabs. Their number should be progressively increased. Similarly, Jews and Arabs in equal numbers should be appointed in key central positions, to the Secretariat, as heads of certain government departments, Presidents of Courts, and District Commissioners.
8. One of the first tasks of the High Commissioner - not one of his last tasks - would be the appointment of a Commission containing, among others, an equal number of Jews and Arabs, to draft the text of a Constitution for a bi-national Palestine of two equal nationalities.
9. The Draft Constitution would be submitted to a Constituent Assembly elected with equal Arab-Jewish representation.
10. The Constitution would contain a Bill of Rights guaranteeing the equality of the two nationalities, as also religious, educational and economic freedom to all the inhabitants.
11. The Constitution would be confirmed by the United Nations which would also safeguard its execution.
12. If the Constituent Assembly does not agree on a Constitution, the Trusteeship Council would advise upon future procedure.
13. All this should take place during the Trusteeship period (including the Legislative Assembly after the Constitution has been adopted).
14. Ihud is convinced that the five-year trusteeship period suggested in the British proposals is not sufficient to get an agreed solution. After 25 years of misunderstanding and struggle, time should be given to the two peoples to work together. Ihud knows they can and is sure they will.

/Bi-national

b) Bi-national Palestine as an independent constitutional State

15. Any Union or Federation of States limits the independence of its constituent bodies.

16. In the very special case of Palestine, the Constitution should be guaranteed by the United Nations, to which recourse might have to be had in case of a deadlock. Basic internal disputes should be submitted to the United Nations or the International Court of Justice.

17. Independent bi-national Palestine would be responsible for its foreign relations and join the United Nations. The Constitution would provide for equal representation of Jews and Arabs at the United Nations.

c) Special Questions

18. While accepting the Bevin proposal that during the trusteeship period the Jewish members of the Advisory Council would supersede the Jewish Agency for Palestine as the official channel of communication between the Jewish Community and the High Commissioner, Ihud would not agree to the dissolution of the Jewish Agency, which, particularly if constituted upon a broad basis, represents the Jews of the Dispersion in their relation to Palestine.

19. There should be cooperation between the future bi-national Palestine and the neighbouring countries. It would probably join the League of Arab States or some form of regional federation.

20. As regards immigration, the Bevin plan provides for 100,000 Jewish immigrants to be admitted in Palestine in the course of two years, at the rate of 4,000 monthly. The tempo might be made more rapid and be fixed after consultation with such bodies as may be responsible for the financing, planning and implementation of
/this large

this large programme.

21. As there was during the war very little Jewish immigration and as the Arab natural increase is almost twice as much as that of the Jews, if 100,000 Jews were brought into the country at once, the increase of the Jewish population in relation to the Arab would be only about 30,000.

22. Further immigration would be determined by the principle of the Churchill White Paper of 1922: "economic absorptive capacity . . . at the time to absorb new arrivals". The Trusteeship Agreement would lay down that the principle is not to be applied restrictively but on the contrary, that economic absorptive capacity ought to be enlarged by increasing economic opportunities both for the present inhabitants and for new immigrants. Paragraph 10 of the Bevin plan might be amended to read that the continuance of immigration and the rate of entry would be determined, primarily in accordance with the principle of economic absorptive capacity, by the High Commissioner in consultation with his Consultative Body. In the event of disagreement, the final decision would rest with an arbitration tribunal appointed by the United Nations and on which, among others, the Jewish Agency and the League of Arab States should be represented.

23. During the transition period, the Jews should be free to reach numerical parity with the Arabs - which means another 500,000 or 600,000 Jewish immigrants.

24. When and if parity is reached, the Legislature of the independent bi-national Palestine may review the immigration situation and further immigration will depend on agreement between Jews and Arabs .

25. A Development Commission should be appointed at once by
/the appropriate

the appropriate agency of the United Nations and prepare a plan, which would be carried out by a Central Development Board, Jews and Arabs participating equally in this constructive work.

26. As regards the organisation of the future bi-national state, the country would be divided into local administrative units: counties or cantons (some with mixed population). There would also be a Jewish National Council and an Arab National Council, with cultural functions primarily - and religious courts, both Jewish and Moslem.

27. Ihud favours elections by counties which would be regulated in such a way as in the final analysis to produce in the Constituent Assembly, then in the Legislative Assembly, an equal number of Jews and Arabs.

28. Drawing administrative boundary lines for a Jewish province and an Arab province as the Morrison plan did, Ihud regards as dangerous and almost impossible, as it is dangerous and almost impossible to draw any boundary line for the partition of Palestine.

29. It may be that any solution will have more or less to be imposed by the United Nations. The question is: What can be imposed with least difficulty? Partition cannot be imposed. It is going to create war. The great majority of the Arabs and large numbers of Jews are against it. It is going to create irredentism and outbursts. The one thing that can be imposed is the bi-national State. (Dr. Magnes, 30th Meeting, page 129).

30. In the bi-national State composed of two equal nationalities, with equal political powers, the equality of basic national rights will be protected against majority rule, according to the principle of "political parity".

/Moreover, Palestine

31. Moreover, Palestine being the Holy Land of three religions, it is not enough that a few sacred places should be held intact. The whole country is Holy Land. It should be made perpetually neutral (no military base for any Power).

d) Summary of the Proposal

32. Self-government based on parity rights might be introduced in three stages:

a) Immediate appointment, while the Mandate lasts, of an equal number of Jews and Arabs to the Executive Council of the Government, the Secretariat, non-controversial Central Government departments, Presidents of Courts, District Commissioners.

b) Transfer of Palestine for an agreed transitional period to the Trusteeship system. When that step is reached, appointment of a Commission on Constitution, composed, among others, of an equal number of Jews and Arabs, which, under the auspices of the Trusteeship Council, will draft a Constitution for the bi-national Palestine. If the Constituent Assembly, elected on the basis of parity between Jews and Arabs, cannot reach agreement on this or that point, the decision will be taken by the Trusteeship Council.

c) The Trusteeship system will come to an end after a Trusteeship period of several years, during which the population will have been trained in self-government and the independent, perpetually neutral, bi-national Palestine will come into existence.

16) IRGUN ZVAI LEUMI

(Memorandum, June 1947, pp. 36-42)

1. The Irgun opposes all the plans which have been proposed for Palestine because they are "impossible of execution". It rejects both partition and a bi-national state flatly and in specific terms. (pp. 37-41).

2. Partition is proposed on the basis of the contentions that (a) Jews and Arabs cannot live together in one state, and (b) it would not be fair to allow a Hebrew Government to govern Arab inhabitants. The first contention is flatly contradicted. As to the second, it is agreed that Palestine is the only home of the Hebrew people, while the Arab inhabitants of the country are only one-fortieth of the Arab people.

In any case, however, if the contentions were true, partition would not be a solution. Under partition, both Jews and Arabs would be living together in an even smaller area, and Jews would be governing an Arab population.

If the contentions do not stand, and if the principle of a Hebrew State is accepted, "then no ground is left for committing injustice or against converting the eternal Hebrew Homeland into a Hebrew State, free and democratic, based on absolutely equal rights for all its citizens". (p. 38)

Either peace will reign in all Palestine, or, if harmony is inconceivable between the two peoples, it will be broken in that part of the country which is designated as the Jewish State.

3. A bi-national state is distinguished from a bi-national government. Palestine will always be a bi-national state, i.e., one in which two peoples reside. The question is which of those people will govern. In a bi-national government, each side would

/control 50%

control 50% of the state.

The plan for a bi-national government is based upon the assumption that practical cooperation between Arabs and Jews is impossible, and that therefore, neither side should gain control. Such a government would be paralyzed ab initio. It could not reach decisions, nor could it carry them. Such a state could never be independent, but would require a third party to arbitrate. The plan is utopian, impractical and incapable of achievement. (p. 40).

4. The solution of the problem is:

(a) To abolish British occupation of Palestine.

(b) To constitute a Hebrew Provisional Government, and to provide for aid by an international body to enable this Government to carry out the task of repatriation in the shortest possible time. The Government should hold, on the conclusion of the repatriation, democratic general elections for state institutions to which it will hand over its prerogatives.

(c) To obtain an international loan to carry out development plans in Palestine.

/17) League for

17) LEAGUE FOR JEWISH-ARAB RAPPROCHEMENT
AND COOPERATION

(Memorandum and Hearing in UNSCOP)

1. It is not sufficient to grant equality to the individual Jew or the individual Arab. Equality must be possessed by the Jewish people as a whole and by the Arab people. The solution is bi-national self-government as soon as possible. (Dr. Simon, 32nd Meeting of UNSCOP, page 19).
2. The difference between Ihud and the League is that Ihud upholds the principle of numerical priority, and the League the principle of political parity (same rights for Arabs and Jews, irrespective of the fact of which is the majority or the minority at a given moment).

/18) League for Peace

18) LEAGUE FOR PEACE WITH JUSTICE IN PALESTINE

(Memorandum, June 5, 1947)

1. In reality, there is no "Palestine problem". An established people, exercising their recognized right to restrict immigration, cannot be said to create a "problem".
2. A settlement of the issue in Palestine requires only the fulfillment of the 1915 pledges of independence to the Arabs, and the application of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which recognizes the provisional independence of the Arab communities under Turkish domination.
3. In arriving at this solution, it should not be considered that all the Jews in the world are Zionists, or support Zionist interests. In fact, it would be a "fatal blow" to the millions of Jews throughout the world if the Zionists should succeed in establishing a Jewish State. (p. 33)
4. A Jewish State already exists in the Jewish Socialist Republic of Birobidjan. (pp. 34-35)

/19) Ligue Mondiale

19) LIGUE MONDIALE DE LA PAIX, JERUSALEM

(Memorandum, 13 June 1947)

PROPOSALS

1. Immediate creation on the lands colonised by the Jews and on the Negeb of the Kingdom of Israel, with Jerusalem as its capitol.
2. The rest of the country to be under U.N. mandate. It should also be open to Jewish colonisation and after 5 years it should form part of the Kingdom of Israel.

/20) Bohamey Heruth

20) LOHAMEY HERUTH ISRAEL

(Fighters for the Freedom of Israel)

(Memorandum entitled "For Justice, Freedom, and Peace",
alleging to come "from underground")
(p. 42-47)

1. The demand of the Jewish nation from the United Nations Organization is a free and independent Palestine within the historic boundaries, in a "state of alliance with the nations of the independent and democratic Middle East, free from the political and military control of foreign factors".
2. The "historic boundaries" of Palestine are the Mediterranean on the west, the desert on the east, the Lebanon and Hermon on the north, and the Sinai Desert and Red Sea on the south.
3. Once British military and political control is removed from the Middle East, and those countries are in fact independent, there is no longer any danger of war. The Middle East should be "recognized" as a neutral area by international guarantee". A regional federation of Middle East nations - including independent Palestine - should be established (without the British influence which dominates the Arab League).
4. Proposals for a bi-national state and for the partition of Palestine are emphatically rejected. (p. 50-52).
5. The plan for a bi-national state lacks "the fundamental basis for Jewish-Arabic understanding - riddance of British rule for good and all". Moreover, it suggests absolute parity without taking into consideration the numerical relation between the two peoples. The Arabs cannot be expected to support the plan because they are in a majority. The first clash and deadlock would come on the question of Jewish immigration.

Equal racial representation in the Government would lead to filling posts not on the basis of personal qualifications and /competence

competence, but according to a prescribed racial formula.

Examples of bi-national statehood abroad prove nothing. In Czechoslovakia there are two full-fledged nations, each of which rules its own territory. This could not be the case in Palestine, since (a) the Arabs of Palestine are part of a great Arab nation which is artificially divided by foreign-imposed boundary lines and (b) there can be no line in Palestine which will separate Arabs from Jews. (p. 51)

6. Partition is rejected for the following reasons:

(a) This generation has "no right to give up in the name of future generations the greatest part of our Homeland".

(b) Both "states" would be unable to achieve real independence, but would still be under British domination. British troops would remain "by arrangement with the respective governments".

(c) Both "states" would be unable to enjoy economic independence. One will suffer from the surplus of industrial production, the other from its shortage. The Jewish state could depend for a time upon funds from outside, but its national future cannot rest upon alms.

(d) Partition would not improve relations between Arabs and Jews. If it is imposed by force, neither party will accept it. Border disputes will occur, and both states will be obliged to maintain large forces. And foreign rule will incite conflict in order to appear in the role of supreme judge.

(e) Economic development will be impossible without the political unity of the country.

(f) Economic depression and political unrest will pave the way for the rise of reaction and fascism.

/(g) Partition

(g) Partition would abandon the majority of the Jewish people, because a restricted Jewish state would be unable to absorb "all those masses who want to and must be repatriated". (pp. 52-53).

7. Until a democratic constitution can be drawn up, a Temporary Government of Independent Eretz Israel should function under the supervision of the United Nations. An authorised Jewish institution under the temporary supervision of the United Nations should undertake the repatriation of "all Jews who wish to return to their Homeland".

/31) NATION

21) NATION ASSOCIATES

(Memorandum, April 1947)

1. As preliminary steps

(a) The General Assembly should adopt the ruling of the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations that the White Paper of 1939 is illegal and that it should be abandoned.

(b) The General Assembly should repudiate the unilateral action of the United Kingdom establishing Transjordan as an independent state.

2. Proposals for a permanent solution

(a) Two independent States - Jewish and Arab - should be created.

(b) In planning the area of these States, account should be taken of the original area assigned under the Balfour Declaration and the Mandate (Palestine and Transjordan) and the concession already made to satisfy Arab demands.

(c) The Jewish State should be established in a contiguous area large enough to constitute a viable national territory and to allow for the absorption of as many of the surviving Jews of Europe as wish to immigrate.

(d) Both states should guarantee equality of rights to all inhabitants without distinction of race or religion, and should allow all communities full autonomy in the administration of their religious, educational and social institutions.

(e) The Jewish state should grant official recognition to the Arabic language and to Arab schools.

(f) Upon their establishment, the Jewish and Arab states should be admitted to the United Nations.

/3. Specific

3. Specific Plan of Partition

Two alternative plans are proposed as follows:

(a) Plan I. The Jewish State should be established in an area of 10,400 square miles to include those parts of Palestine, chiefly in the West, already closely settled by Jews, together with additional areas of Palestine at present undeveloped and lightly populated, including 4,500 square miles in the Negev and an area of 3,400 miles, now either uninhabited or very sparsely settled, to be detached from Transjordan.

The Arab state would include Transjordan, less the area detached, and an area of 3,300 square miles to be attached from Palestine in which some 500,000 Arabs now live. Thus it would comprise an area of 34,600 square miles.

(b) Plan II. The Jewish State should be established in an area of 7,600 square miles to include those parts of Palestine chiefly in the West already closely settled by Jews, together with 4,500 square miles of the Negev.

The Arab State would include the remaining 2,800 square miles of Palestine in the hill district of Samaria, forming a rectangle with Nablus as the center. This area might be "merged politically" with Transjordan, in which case its total area would be 37,200 square miles.

4. As an Interim Program

(a) Until two independent states can be created, the Mandate should be withdrawn from Great Britain, and Palestine should be placed under the United Nations with a High Commissioner appointed by the United Nations and the protection of an international police force.

(b) In this interim period the United Nations should promote the economic development of the region.

/5. As an

5. As an Immediate Program

(a) The British military force should be reduced to "its normal garrison size" and retained until the international force can take over, and martial law should be ended.

(b) The present Jewish population of the displaced persons camps in Europe - 250,000 persons - should be admitted immediately to Palestine and "settled in those sections certain to be allocated to the Jewish State".

(c) Until the Jewish state is constituted, the Jewish Agency should be authorized to regulate immigration. The Jewish Agency should be recognized as the "official provisional representatives" of the Jewish State to be established.

6. The idea of a bi-national State is rejected on the ground that such a State would not "satisfy the needs of the Jews to migrate to Palestine - particularly in view of the consistent opposition of the Arabs to the admission of any Jews - or . . . develop their own institutions there. Nor will it satisfy the ambitions of the Arabs for sovereign control in a country of their own. Moreover, if the scheme were actually put into effect, conflict would inevitably develop between two peoples whose cultural and industrial development is on such contrasting levels and whose approach to social and political problems is so different". (pp. 111-112)

7. Cantonization is rejected on the grounds that it does not satisfy the political demands and the nationalist aspirations of either side. Under the Morrison Plan, "the area set aside for the Jews was obviously too small to take care of even the minimum needs of Jewish life". (pp. 112-113)

8. As to the Arab demand for immediate independence, the Memorandum states that in such a state "the Jewish population, progressive and industrialized, would be at the mercy of a backward /and antagonistic

and antagonistic Arab majority, led by the arch-enemy, the Mufti". Moreover, the aim of the Arabs is to reduce the Jews to the status of a permanent minority, as is revealed by their plan submitted at the London Conference in September 1946. The treatment of minorities in other Arab states reveals that there is nothing to justify confidence in the Arab promise to treat the Jews equally in an independent state. (pp. 115-120)

9. The Jews are confident, however, that in a Jewish state good relations between Jews and Arabs will prevail. "Although at present collaboration between Jewish Palestine and the Arab world may seem unlikely, mutual interests are bound sooner or later to bring them closer together . . . Once the Jewish Commonwealth has been set up, the stimulative effect of its example and technical resources will operate more freely than it does at present, when the Palestine issue is still in the balance".

10. The Memorandum quotes a number of persons to the effect that partition is practical and enforceable, and that the Arabs will not stage a revolt, or, if they do, the British will be to blame. (pp. 122-127)

/22) PROGRESSIVE

22) PROGRESSIVE ZIONIST DISTRICT 95 OF NEW YORK

(Plan for the Creation of the Jewish Republic)

1. Convocation of a Jewish World Convention.
2. Establishment of a Jewish Republic and of a Provisional Government - which would at first reside abroad - by delegates from Palestine, from the Jews in displaced persons camps, and Jews who want to adopt Jewish citizenship.
3. Support of the movement by Jews who prefer to remain American (British, etc.) citizens.

/23) SEPHARDIC

23) SEPHARDIC AND ORIENTAL JEWISH COMMUNITIES

(Statements and Memorandum, July 1947)

1. The Sephardic and Oriental Jewish Community politically identifies itself with the demands of the Jewish Agency and the Vaad Leumi.
2. In particular, Jews of the Orient should be given the opportunity of freeing themselves from their oppression and joining their brothers, the builders of the Homeland and founders of the future of the whole nation.
3. The only possibility of doing away with the hatred of the Oriental lands other than Palestine towards the Jews, is to establish the Jewish people as an independent nation with equal rights for all in Palestine.

/24) UNION FOR THE

24) UNION FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE HUMAN PERSON

(Memorandum, 4 June 1947)

PROPOSALS

1. Ideal solution a bi-national Arab-Hebrew State including Transjordan.
2. This is not possible. Therefore: Proposed partition of Palestine including Transjordan into two States. Area of Hebrew State to permit immigration and economic absorption of 250,000 displaced persons. The boundaries of the Hebrew State must begin at Ras An Naqoura, follow the northern and eastern frontier of Palestine as far as Lake of Tiberiade, cross the lake up to the emerging of the Jordan. North of Beissane the boundary should cross the Beissane Plain, follow the southern border of the Plain of Jezreel, cross the Plain of Esdrelon and cross the Mount Carmel in the neighbourhood of the Megidde Road. On the seashore plain, the boundary is going to the south on the oriental border of this plain. Toul Kerem remains Arab. Jaffa should remain an Arab port. Bir es Seba, Negeb, the southern part of the Dead Sea and of Transjordan should be included in the Hebrew state for the future development of these semi-desert territories.

The Arab State of Palestine and Transjordan must include sub-districts of Naplouse, Ramalla, Jericho, Hebron; parts of the sub-districts of Beissane, Djenine, Toul Kerem, Jaffa, Remleh, Jerusalem and Bethlehem, all northern Transjordan and all Central Transjordan.

The Hebrew State should include the sub-districts of Acrea, Safed, Tiberiade, Nazareth, Haifa, Gaza and Bir es Seba, the parts of the sub-districts of Djenine, of Toul Kerem, of Beissane, and of Ramleh, and the southern Transjordan as well as the southern /part of

part of the Dead Sea.

3. International financial help to each state.
4. Both states to adopt equal import tariffs for a maximum of merchandise and to facilitate exchange between two states.
5. United Nations trusteeship for Holy Places under the same Power which held the trusteeship before the partition.
6. Jordan Valley Authority scheme to be adopted.

/25) VAAD LEUMI

25) VAAD LEUMI

(Hearings in UNSCOP)

1. In the first testimony presented by the Vaad Leumi, its Chairman declared that the organisation identifies itself fully with the political demands of the Jewish Agency.

2. In summing up the testimony of the Vaad Leumi before the Committee, a representative of that organisation indicated the three essential points of their case:

(a) No more delay.

(b) No solution that is not a real solution, i.e., not one which makes the Jewish people dependent upon those who deny them the right to return to Palestine and to develop it as a homeland.

(c) No further patronage. The consummation of the Jewish enterprise as well as the creation of friendly relations between Jews and Arabs are contingent upon an independent Jewish state.

3. At the 24th meeting, Dr. Blom asked whether any discussion of the problem of Palestine and the suggestion proposed by the Jewish Agency had taken place in the representative bodies of the Yishuv, and if so, what was its result? The reply was yes, but, "as a part of the Jewish people, we are included in a World Organisation, and we accept the decisions made by the Zionist Congress as binding for us as well". Constitutionally the Yishuv is a part of the World Jewish Organisation. In addition, the Elected Assembly has adopted by a large majority a resolution "identifying the Yishuv with the establishment of a Jewish State". (pp. 59-60)

4. At the same meeting Dr. Brilej put the following question:

/May I

"May I ask which groups within the Jewish Agency and the Jewish Community are in favour of establishment of independence of Palestine as a Jewish State in the whole of Palestine? Which groups are in favour of establishment of a State in an adequate territory? Which groups are for a bi-national State?

Mr. ELIASH: If I may say so, some part of this information is contained in the statement which has been prepared by the Government, which more or less accurately represents the position. You will find there stated that the Hashomer Hatzair are the protagonists of the bi-national independent State in Palestine based on the principles of Zionism and socialism. You will also find there that some of the parties share part of these views. The matter really cannot be stated with great brevity. It has taken the Government about half a dozen pages to state it.

If the Committee desires, the Vaad Leumi will present a statement which accurately sets out the views of the various parties. We will also give their numerical proportion."
(page 64 of the Record of the 24th Meeting.)

/26) DR. WEIZMANN

26) DR. WEIZMANN

(Hearing in UNSCOP)

1. Along with "a great many Jews", Dr. Weizmann favours "a form of partition which would satisfy the just demands of both the Jews and the Arabs".

2. The two great advantages of partition are: one, that it is final and it helps to dispel some of the Arab fears; and two, that it means to the Jews equality with their Arab neighbours, the most important requisite for good relations between them. Although it represents "a new and great sacrifice on the part of the Jewish people" it has the advantage that it cannot be whittled down, and it is a place into which a million and a half people could be brought in a comparatively short time. (p. 29-30)

3. As the boundary of the Jewish State, Dr. Weizmann suggests "a somewhat improved Peel line", an area "sufficiently adequate to absorb something in the nature of a million and a half people in addition to the present population". By adding the area known as the Negev to the Jewish state proposed by the Peel Commission, the requirement would be filled.

4. If the project is set in motion with all the moral force of the United Nations, it is his opinion that the Arabs will eventually acquiesce, apart from some extremists.

5. In the question period, Sir Abdur Rahman observed that a line of partition is not a permanent thing: if the Arabs have more force, they will try to break it, and if the Jews have more force they may do so. Dr. Weizmann replied that he believed that partition could eventually be a permanent solution, if the United Nations, with its full authority, proclaims that it is a sacred covenant and it must not be broken.

/6. The Chairman

6. The Chairman queried Dr. Weizmann as to his views on proposals for a federal state. Dr. Weizmann replied that he had arrived at the solution of partition by process of elimination. Other solutions did not have the advantage of being final, definite, and crystallized. "Anything that will leave an uncertainty will leave room for pulling by the two forces. The Jews will want to get something better. The Arabs will want to push us out of what we have. Therefore, I believe although partition means a sort of Solomon's judgment, it is under the circumstances perhaps the better."

7. In response to further inquiries by Mr. García-Granados as to Dr. Weizmann's views on a federal state, the latter asked that his answer be deferred until he could give the matter further thought.

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ANNEX A to PART II

1) Various individuals as well as organizations presented plans to the Committee. One, submitted by Captain L. Kotz*, a British army officer stationed in Alexandria, Egypt, offered a plan not contained in the other proposals submitted to the Committee by the organisations and individual referred to in this document. Captain Kotz suggests, in his own words:

"1. Palestine is to be divided. An Arab State and a SMALL Jewish State (or possibly a Dominion) to be created. The Jewish State to be limited to an area mostly inhabited by Jews. As an example the proposed southern boundary could run along the Jaffa-Jerusalem Road.

2. Unlimited Jewish immigration to be allowed into the Jewish State,

O N C O N D I T I O N T H A T

for every immigrant entering the State, one immigrant has to leave the country. (in accordance with para. 3) Thus the total Jewish population in the Jewish State will not exceed 3/4 of a million.

3. A Jewish Colony to be created on the African Coast. Immigration into this Colony would be controlled by the Government of the Jewish State.

The above arrangement would enable to:

a. Satisfy the Arabs through a reassurance that the Jewish State will not become a threat to the stability of the Arab State or Arab Nations. That no further expansion of world Zionism would take place. That a large part of Palestine would be included into the territory of the Arab State. That Arabs left in the Jewish territory would get compensation through acquisition of lands and transfer to land at present in possession of Jews (e.g. Rehovoth).

b. Satisfy the Jews i.e. enabling them to receive considerable numbers of Displaced Persons into Palestine. These could be trained, equipped and sent in batches large enough to establish self-supporting settlements. It would give them a spiritual Mother-country, though small, yet in accordance with Zionist demands. Jews left in the Arab part of Palestine could be gradually moved to the Jewish State or to the Colony in Africa.

c. This arrangement would allow the British Government to come to an agreement with both parties. The British Government or U.N.O. would be asked to provide a territory of approx. 20,000

* For text of communication see Document A/AC.13/25, 5.

/ square miles

square miles and if possible with a low native population. A part of one of the mandated territories in Africa could be considered for this purpose. The Colony could come under U.N.O. trusteeship or become a British Mandated Territory."

Once these arrangements have been completed, all Jews reaching the age of 21 should be given the option of emigrating to Palestine or its colony, or of declaring their loyalty to the state in which they reside.

ANNEX I

LIST OF DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED TO UNSCOP BY
THE GOVERNMENT OF PALESTINE, THE JEWISH
AGENCY, AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS BEFORE
DEPARTURE FROM PALESTINE

1. Government of Palestine

- a) A Survey of Palestine - Volumes I and II - prepared in December 1945 and January 1946 for the information of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry (Volumes I and II, 1139 pages, with a table of contents at the beginning of each Volume and an Index at the end of Volume II).
- b) A Survey of Palestine - Volume III - containing analyses and additional information compiled in March 1946 at the request of members of the Anglo-American ^{Committee} of Inquiry. This Volume (pages 1141 to 1371) supplements the first two volumes; its table of contents refers to the relevant chapters in Volumes I and II.
- c) Supplement to Survey of Palestine - "notes compiled for the information of UNSCOP", June 1947, 153 pages. Its table of contents refers to the relevant pages in the first two Volumes of the Survey of Palestine.
- d) Memorandum on the Administration of Palestine under Mandate, dated Jerusalem, June 1947 (14 pages).
- e) The Political History of Palestine under British Administration, Memorandum presented to UNSCOP, dated London, July 1947 (41 pages).
- f) Supplementary Memorandum by the Government of Palestine, including notes on evidence given to UNSCOP up to 12 July 1947. (59 pages).
- g) Survey of Social and Economic Conditions in Arab Villages, 1944 prepared by the Government's Department of Statistics (including a section on Education and Literacy, pages 32 and following).

2. Jewish Agency for Palestine

- a) Book of Documents submitted to the General Assembly of the United Nations relating to the establishment of the National Home in Palestine. - New York, May 1947 (318 pages).
- b) The Jewish Case before the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, 1947 (including a Political Memorandum, pages 263 and following) 686 pages. There is an index at the end of the volumes.
- c) Political Survey 1946-47, Jerusalem, 1947 (71 pages).
The Survey "is to be read as a continuation of the Political Memorandum" contained in the "Jewish Case" (see (b) above).
- d) The Palestine Issue, preliminary memorandum submitted to UNSCOP, 1947. (48 printed pages).
- e) Memorandum on Zionism and the Arab World (amplifying and bringing up to date the relevant section in the "Jewish Case" (pages 43 and following). This roneoed memorandum, which includes an appendix on "Pledges to the Arabs", is dated Jerusalem, July 1947 (46 pages).
- f) Memorandum on the Position of the Jewish Communities in the Oriental Countries (revised version of the relevant chapter in the "Jewish Case", pages 372 and following). This roneoed memorandum is dated Jerusalem, June 1947 (27 pages).
- g) Memorandum on Reconversion in Palestine (bringing up to date the relevant section in the "Jewish Case", pages 429 and following). This roneoed document is dated Jerusalem, June 1947 (26 pages).
- h) Supplementary Note on the Immediate Prospects of Employment for Immigrants and their Housing, Jerusalem, July 1947 (roneoed, 9 pages)

/i) Memorandum

- i) Memorandum on The Problem of the Displaced and Insecure Jews of Europe, Jerusalem, July 1947 (renewed; 11 pages).
 - j) Memorandum on the Cyprus camps, Jerusalem, July 1947, (10 pages).
 - k) Memorandum on Youth Aliyah activities (amplifying and bringing up to date the relevant note in the "Jewish Case", pages 551 and following. This memorandum is dated Jerusalem, June 1947 (9 pages, renewed).
 - l) Some Legal Aspects of the Jewish Case (36 printed pages) July 1947.
 - m) Trends of Economic Development in Palestine (a series of 36 commented diagrams) May 1947.
- Organizations other than the Jewish Agency
- 1. Agudath Israel World Organisation
(Central executive: London; branch offices: Jerusalem and New York): Renewed Memorandum, 18 pages, dated June 1947 and signed by Rabbi I. M. Lewin, Chairman.
 - 2. Alliance Israelite Universelle
Paris: typewritten memorandum (in French) on the problem of Palestine, 3 pages, dated 9 June 1947, and signed Rene Cassin, President.
 - 3. American Council for Judaism
New York: printed "memorandum on aspects of the problem of Palestine", 27 pages, dated June 4, 1947 and signed Lessing J. Rosenwald, President.
 - 4. American Jewish Committee
New York: printed statement, 13 pages, dated May 31, 1947, and signed J. M. Proskaner, President, and Jacob Blaustein, Chairman, Executive Committee.
 - 5. American Jewish Conference
New York, printed statement, 18 pages, dated June 3, 1947 and signed Louis Lipsky, Chairman, Executive Committee.

6. Anglo-Jewish Association
Roneoed memorandum, 5 pages, dated 24 June 1947.
7. Bne-Horin Movement
Haifa, roneoed memorandum entitled "Solution of the Palestine Problem", 9 pages, dated 28 June 1947 and signed by the Chairman of the Executive Committee.
8. Catholic Near East Welfare Association, New York
Typewritten letter, 5 pages, dated June 5, 1947 and signed by the National Secretary, Msgr. Thomas J. McMahon.
9. Central Committee of the Communist Party of Palestine
Tel-Aviv, one roneoed memorandum, 12 pages, dated 7 February 1947 and one roneoed memorandum 27 pages, dated 5 July 1947.
10. Central Union of Landlords' Associations
Tel-Aviv, roneoed memorandum, 7 pages, signed by the Chairman of the Executive.
11. Church of England in Jerusalem
Roneoed memorandum, 11 pages, dated March 1946.
12. Church of England and Church of Scotland in Jerusalem
Roneoed memorandum, 5 pages, dated June 1947.
13. Council of Jewish Women's Organisations in Palestine
Roneoed memorandum on "Jewish Women and the upbuilding of Palestine", 8 pages, July 1947.
14. Council of the Ashkenasic Jewish Community, Jerusalem
Roneoed statement, 13 pages, July 1947.
15. Custody of the Holy Land
Statement presented to UNSCOP, July 1947 (3 roneoed pages).
16. Democratic Club, Tel-Aviv
Roneoed letter, 2 pages, signed by M. Stein, Chairman, July 1, 1947.
17. Executive Committee of the Hashomer Hatzair Workers' Party in Jerusalem: The Case for a bi-national Palestine, New York, May 1947 (160 printed pages).

18. Fighters for the Freedom of Israel (Lohamey Heruth Israel)

Roneoed memorandum entitled "For Justice, Freedom and Peace", 55 pages, June 1947.

19. General Federation of Jewish Labour in Eretz-Israel (Histadrut)

"Survey of Histadrut activities", roneoed, 86 pages, Tel-Aviv, July 1947.

20. Greek Orthodox Patriarchate of Jerusalem

Roneoed memorandum, 3 pages, submitted by the Greek Archdiocese of North and South America, New York, 5 June 1947.

21. Horowitz S. and Co., Jerusalem

Letter dated July 1, transmitting copies of the proceedings in High Court Case No. 19 of 1947, referring to the validity of the Land Transfer Regulations of 1940 (about 80 pages roneoed).

22. Jhud (Union) Association of Palestine, Jerusalem:

- a) Written statement to the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, March 5, 1946 (57 pages, roneoed);
- b) Written statement to the UNSCOP, June 1947 (12 pages, roneoed);
- c) "Towards Union in Palestine, essays on Zionism and Jewish-Arab Cooperation", Jerusalem 1947, printed, 124 pages).

23. Irgun Zvei Leumi:
 - a) Roneoed Memorandum, dated June 1947 (42 pages);
 - b) typewritten letter dated 16 June 1947 (7 pages) concerning the appeal by the General Assembly of the U.N. to refrain from the threat or use of force; c) typewritten letter dated 8 July 1947 (one page) appealing to prevent the carrying out of three death sentences.
24. League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement and Cooperation
Memorandum to U.N.S.C.O.P. (8 roneoed pages).
25. League for the Equal Right to Work, Tel Aviv
Memorandum on Colonial Practice in Palestine, etc. (4 roneoed pages).
26. League for Peace with Justice in Palestine, New York
"Views on the question of Palestine for U.N.S.C. O.P.",
New York, June 5, 1947, 19 roneoed pages and exhibits.
27. Ligue Mondiale de la Paix, Jerusalem
Roneoed memorandum, 5 pages, dated 13 June 1947.
28. Manufacturers' Association of Palestine
Memorandum on Jewish Industry in Palestine (16 roneoed pages plus annexes) Tel Aviv, July 3, 1947.
29. The Nation Associates, New York
 - a) Memorandum on The Palestine Problem and proposals for solution submitted to the General Assembly of U.N., April 1947 (133 printed pages); b) Documentary Record on The Arab Higher Committee, its Origins, Personnel and Purposes, submitted to the U.N. (9 pages, plus annexes) May 1947.
30. Oeuvres Françaises en Terre Sainte
Memorandum communicated to U.N.S.C.O.P. by the French Consul-General (15 printed pages)
31. Palestine Communist Union, Central Committee
Memorandum on the Problem of Palestine (54 pages roneoed) dated Tel-Aviv, June 1947.
32. Palestine Economic Corporation, New York
Memorandum to U.N.S.C.O.P., June 19, 1947 (16 printed pages).
33. Palestine Jewish Colonisation Association
(Edmond de Rothschild Foundation)
Memorandum to U.N.S.C.O.P., Jerusalem, June 1947 (13 roneoed pages).

34. Palestine Orthodox Jewish Workers' Organisation
(Hapoel Hamizrahi) Tel Aviv.
Memorandum, 4 July 1947 (6 roneoed pages)
35. Political Action Committee for Palestine, New York
a) typewritten letter (2 pages) to Dr. Hoo, dated June 4, 1947; b) Report to the President of the U.S.A. together with certain recommendations, January 19, 1947 (20 roneoed pages)
36. Progressive Zionist District 95, New York
"Plan for the creation of the Jewish Republic of Palestine"
(32 printed pages)
37. Relatives Committee for Detainees and Exiled Persons
Letter to the Chairman of U.N.S.C.O.P., Tel-Aviv, 20 June 1947 (8 roneoed pages).
38. Lephardic and Oriental Community, Jerusalem
Memorandum submitted by representatives of the Communities, July 1947 (21 roneoed pages)
39. Union for the Protection of the Human Person, New York
a) Letter to U.N.S.C.O.P. dated 4 June 1947 and containing a proposal for partition (5 roneoed pages); b) Memorandum on the Problem of the Palestine Mandate before U.N., dated April 23, 1947. (8 printed pages).
40. United Israel World Union, New York
Printed letter to U.N.S.C.O.P., 4 June 1947 (3 pages)
41. United Zionist Revisionist Organisation, Jerusalem
Memorandum entitled: "The Jewish State as the Complete Solution of the Jewish Problem", July 1947 (19 roneoed pages)
42. Vaad Leumi, Jerusalem
a) Memorandum on Features of Emergency Legislation in Palestine, 1947 (printed, 15 pages).
b) Memorandum on Local Government in Palestine, 1947 (printed, 46 pages, including appendices).
c) Memorandum on The Jewish Community of Palestine and its social services, 1947 (49 printed pages)
d) Historical Memoranda dealing with: 1) the number and density of population in Ancient Palestine; 2) the Jewish population in Palestine from the fall of the Jewish State
/to the...

to the beginning of Zionist pioneering; 3) the waves of immigration into Palestine between 640 and 1882 (104 printed pages).

43. Jewish Resistance Movement

Memorandum dated July 11, 1947 (9 roneoed pages).

44. Women's International Zionist Organisation of America (Hadassah)

Memorandum on its activities, June 1947 (16 roneoed pages).

45. World Jewish Congress, New York

Letter dated June 11, 1947 and signed Stephen S. Wise, President (2 pages).

46. Yemenite Community

Memorandum (7 roneoed pages) dated June 1947 on the plight of Jews in Yemen.

47. Zion Apostolic Mission, Jerusalem

Letter dated July 4, 1947, supporting on behalf of "large number of Christians" the return of the Jews to Palestine (5 pages).

OTHER DOCUMENTS

48. Memorandum on Education submitted by an anonymous group of Arab and Jew "Democratic Students" (8 pages), 8 July 1947.

49. Memorandum on the Administration of Justice in Palestine by R. Nochimowski, advocate, Tel-Aviv, 3 July 1947 (14 roneoed pages).

50. Memorandum by the Managing Director of Palestine Potash Limited, submitted in view of the possibility of partition or other political and/or economic division of Palestine (9 pages, plus annexes and maps).

51. Memorandum on the Irrigation Bill, 1947 submitted to the Government of Palestine and communicated to U.N.S.C.O.P. by the Agricultural Workers' Organisation, etc., July 1947 (13 roneoed pages). The memorandum opposes the bill and "points out the constructive work that could be done in the field of water distribution" for the benefit of agriculture.

52. Workers' Housing in Palestine, 1946, memorandum submitted by the Workmen's Housing Co. Ltd. (35 printed pages).

53. Vaad Mishmereth Hazniuth, Jerusalem, letter dated 19 June 1947 (opposes mixed bathing).

54. Municipal Corporation of Tel-Aviv. Memorandum July 1947 (11 roneoed pages) claiming "that the inclusion of the Jewish quarters of Jaffa within the Tel-Aviv area" should be carried into effect.

ANNEX II

LIST OF ORAL HEARINGS BEFORE UNSCOP
BEFORE ITS DEPARTURE FROM PALESTINE

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Individual</u>	<u>No. of Meeting</u>	<u>Date of Meeting</u>
Govt. of Palestine	Sir Henry Gurney	6, 36*	16 June & 19 July
"	Mr. MacGillivray	6, 36*	19 July
"	Mr. de Bunsen	36*	19 July
"	Mr. Hogan	36*	19 July
"	Mr. Stubbs	36*	19 July
"	Mr. Couzens	36*	19 July
Jewish Agency for Palestine	Mr. Shertok	8, 33, 35	17 June, 16 and 17 July
"	Mr. Horowitz	8, 16, 24	17 June, 6 and 9 July
"	Mr. Ben-Gurion	16, 19, 21	4, 7, 8 July
"	Rabbi Fishman	16, 24	4, 9 July
"	Mr. Bernstein	17, 24	6, 9 July
"	Mr. Kaplan	17, 24	6, 9 July
Agudath Israel	Rabbi Lewin	26	10 July
"	Rabbi Klein	26	10 July
"	Rabbi Glikman-Porush	26	10 July
Ashkenazi Jewish Community	Rabbi Duschinsky	33	16 July
"	Rabbi Bengis	33	16 July
Chief Rabbinate	Chief Rabbi Dr. Herzog	26	10 July
"	Rabbi Ben Zion Ouziel	26, 31	10, 15 July
Church of England	The Right Rev. Mr. Stewart	27	11 July
Church of Scotland	The Rev. Mr. Clark-Kerr	27	11 July
Communist Party of Palestine	Mr. Mikunis	29, 32	13, 15 July
"	Dr. Ehrlich	29, 32	13, 15 July

/ Mr. Vilner

<u>Organization</u>	<u>Individual</u>	<u>No. of Meeting</u>	<u>Date of Meeting</u>
Communist Party of Palestine	Mr. Vilner	29, 32	13, 15 July
Father Custos of the Holy Land	Brother Bonaventure	31	15 July
General Federation of Jewish Labour (Histadrut)	Mr. Rubashov	33	16 July
"	Mr. Lubianiker	33	16 July
"	Mr. Shkelnik-Levy	33	16 July
Ihud (Union) Association	Dr. Magnes	30	14 July
"	Dr. Rainer	30	14 July
Jewish Women's Organisation of Palestine	Mrs. Kaznelson-Rubatchov	27	11 July
"	Mrs. Sieff	27	11 July
League for Jewish-Arab Rapprochement & Cooperation	Dr. Simon	32	15 July
"	Mr. Cohen	32	15 July
Palestine Communist Union	Mr. Preminger	35	17 July
Sephardic Community	Mr. Eliacher	31	15 July
"	Mr. Elmaleh	31	15 July
"	Mr. Sassoon	31	15 July
Vaad Leumi	Mr. Ben-Zevie	24	9 July
"	Dr. Eliash	24, 26	9, 10 July
"	Dr. Kaznelson	24, 26	9, 10 July
"	Mr. Remez	24	9 July
" - - - - -	Dr. Weizmann	21	8 July

* The testimony presented by representatives of the Government of Palestine at the 36th meeting of the Committee is not summarized in this document, but will be the subject of an addendum to be issued shortly.