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SUMMARY RECORD OF THE FIRST MEETING

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on Friday, 26 March 1965, at 3.15 p.m.

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U THANT

Secretary-General

Mr. VELLODI

Secretary of the Committee

ADOPTION OF THE AGENDA (A/AC.121/Agenda 1)

The provisional agenda was adopted.

ORGANIZATION OF WORK

The CHAIRMAN said that he and the Secretary-General had held informal consultations with all the members of the Committee regarding various questions of procedure connected with its work. The meeting had been convened in response to a general desire to initiate the work of the Committee and agree on certain matters of procedure.

Some members had expressed the view that, because of the nature of the Committee's task, it might be preferable for it to hold closed meetings; others had expressed a clear preference for open meetings. He thought that the Committee should adopt a flexible approach and not take a firm decision on the matter at that stage. As far as the procedure for taking decisions was concerned, there was an almost unanimous feeling that the Committee should endeavour to reach agreement by general consensus without voting. It was understood, however, that a vote would be taken whenever any member felt and the Committee agreed that such a procedure was necessary. As far as the officers of the Committee were concerned, the informal consultations had conveyed the impression that there was no need for a Rapporteur. On the question of a Vice-Chairman, several suggestions had been put forward; fairly wide support had been given to the suggestion that the Committee should adopt a flexible and informal approach and not formally elect a Vice-Chairman. That procedure was in conformity with General Assembly resolution 2006 (XIX), which gave a specific mandate to the Chairman. He hoped that he would be able to carry out that mandate. If, however, he was ever unable to preside over a meeting of the Committee, he would request one of the members to replace him.

In accordance with operative paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 2006 (XIX), he and the Secretary-General had already made preliminary arrangements and intended to undertake a series of intensive consultations on the question of peace-keeping operations. They interpreted that paragraph to mean that the consultations should be as broad as possible and not restricted to the membership of the Committee. The views of all the Members of the United Nations should be taken into consideration.

There was a clear consensus in favour of the Committee recessing for a certain period of time to allow the consultations to take place, in the hope that they would produce a sound basis for the Committee to embark upon its substantive work. The Committee could meet again to discuss substantive matters on or about 22 April 1965.

Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) drew attention to the fact that the Committee was beginning its work at a time when the United States was engaged in activities in South-East Asia which were extremely dangerous to the cause of peace. The United States provocations against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam could only be described as piratical acts of planned aggression, flouting the basic rules of international law and the United Nations Charter and violating the Geneva Agreements on Indo-China. The United States had embarked upon the very slippery course of expanding the war in South-East Asia. Thousands of United States soldiers and foreign mercenaries were fighting against the South Viet-Namese patriots and their weapons included poison gas, whose use was a crime against mankind and a gross violation of the principles of international law. The Soviet Government called for an immediate end to the aggression in South Viet-Nam, which was undermining the only basis on which relations could exist between the Soviet Union and the United States - the principle of peaceful coexistence.

As far as the work of the Committee was concerned, the Soviet delegation considered that, since the question of United Nations peace-keeping operations was one of the most important issues facing the Organization, it should be dealt with in the Committee itself. All those concerned and all the members of the Committee should participate in the consideration of the question referred to the Committee by the General Assembly. All Member States could and should contribute to the task of strengthening the United Nations and solving its difficulties. It was for that very reason that the General Assembly had set up a Committee with a widely representative membership. However, discussion of all the issues in the Committee itself did not exclude the possibility of informal consultations among all delegations, with the participation of the Secretary-General and the Chairman.

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(Mr. Fedorenko, USSR)

The Soviet delegation agreed that decisions should be the result not of a vote but of a consensus, since it was clear that agreed solutions must be sought. That was the principle underlying General Assembly resolution 2006 (XIX). His delegation was in favour of open meetings, since the Committee had nothing to conceal from other Members of the United Nations or from world opinion. It had listened carefully to the Chairman's comments on the question of the Committee's officers and would study any views on the subject advanced by members.

It was well known that the current financial difficulties of the United Nations were the direct result of the flagrant violations of the Charter and of the illegality tolerated in the United Nations operations in the Congo and the Middle East. The Committee should therefore begin by discussing future United Nations peace-keeping operations and ways of ensuring that a similar situation did not recur. After such a discussion, it would be easier to find ways of overcoming the present financial difficulties of the Organization. Such an approach was in accordance with operative paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 2006 (XIX).

Like other States, the Soviet Union had joined the United Nations under specific conditions, clearly stated in the Charter, and it had always strictly adhered to the provisions of the Charter. It was in favour of strengthening the effectiveness of the United Nations in the safeguarding of international peace and security and on 10 July 1964 it had submitted a memorandum containing a number of important proposals on the subject (S/5811). He requested that the memorandum should be circulated as an official document of the Committee.

The Soviet Union memorandum, after outlining the peaceful means of settling disputes at the disposal of Members of the United Nations and urging their wider use, recognized that situations might arise in which the maintenance of peace in a given area might be difficult to secure by peaceful means of settlement alone and might even require the use of force by the Organization. However, at all times and in all circumstances there should be scrupulous compliance with all the provisions of the Charter dealing with the use of force for the maintenance or restoration of international peace.

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(Mr. Fedorenko, USSR)

The Charter clearly defined the competence of the Security Council and that of the General Assembly in such matters. Members conferred on the Security Council "primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security" and agreed that "in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf". In Article 25 of the Charter, the Members of the United Nations agreed to accept and carry out the decisions of the Council. Chapter VII of the Charter contained several provisions confirming that the Security Council was the only body authorized to take action in the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security and to adopt decisions in all matters relating to the establishment of United Nations armed forces. Some people were trying to create the impression that the Soviet Union wished to deny some of the Assembly's rights with respect to the maintenance of international peace and security. That was a flagrant distortion of the true position of the Soviet Union. While proposing greater use of the Security Council in that matter, it also supported the exercise by the General Assembly of those rights conferred upon it by the Charter. In Articles 11, 12, 14 and 35, for example, the Charter conferred upon the Assembly the right to discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of international peace and security and, within the limits of its powers, to make recommendations with regard to any such questions. However, any such question on which action was necessary had to be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly. If for any reason the Security Council was unable to take a decision on any matter connected with the maintenance of peace, there was nothing to prevent the Assembly from reconsidering the matter and making further recommendations.

The need for agreement among the permanent members of the Security Council ensured that United Nations armed forces would not be used in the narrow unilateral interest of any individual States or groups of States. A further safeguard was the inclusion in the United Nations armed forces of contingents from the socialist countries, as well as from the western and neutralist States. It was inadvisable to include contingents from States which were permanent members of the Council. In accordance with Articles 46 and 47 of the Charter, the Military Staff Committee was to assist the Council in making plans for the application of armed force.

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(Mr. Fedorenko, USSR)

The financing of United Nations peace-keeping operations was of considerable importance also, but was a derivative of the basic issue. Under the Charter, all questions concerned with financing must be decided by the Security Council. In the opinion of the Soviet Government, the decision should take into account the generally recognized principle of international law that aggressor States bore political and material responsibility for the aggression they committed and for the material damage it caused. His Government recognized, however, that it might be necessary for Member States to contribute to the cost of peace-keeping operations. In such case in the future, when the Security Council adopted decisions to establish and finance United Nations armed forces in strict compliance with the provisions of the Charter, the Soviet Union would be prepared to take part in defraying the expenditure involved. The agreements concerning the provision of military contingents prescribed in Article 43 of the Charter should be concluded between the Security Council and Member States desiring to furnish such contingents. Proposals to that effect had already been made by the Governments of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the People's Republic of Bulgaria.

The Soviet Government called upon all countries interested in strengthening international peace and security to support its constructive programme, which was based on the Charter of the United Nations.

Mr. TREMBLAY (Canada) supported the Chairman's recommendations for the organization of the Committee's work. His delegation's overriding concern was with time; if a further confrontation was to be avoided when the General Assembly resumed its nineteenth session, the Committee would have to reach an agreed conclusion, and it was doubtful whether it would be clear, until informal consultations had taken place, what elements could form the basis for an agreed settlement. The lengthy discussions at the nineteenth session had demonstrated that the past alone could not provide a basis for a unanimously acceptable agreement, and the additional elements involving present and future arrangements for peace-keeping operations which might provide such a basis would become apparent only after serious negotiations had begun.

The failure of the Working Group of Twenty-One to find a solution had been due primarily to the fundamental disagreement, basically political in character, between

(Mr. Tremblay, Canada)

the permanent members of the Security Council. No settlement could emerge unless there were substantial compromises by all the parties concerned, but especially by the permanent members of the Council, among whom the most intensive consultations should therefore take place. The first aim of negotiations should be the elaboration of a framework of agreement, without which the Committee's work could not be successful, and to hold formal meetings at the present stage would be of only limited value. Many members of the Committee had already put their views on record in the Working Group of Twenty-One or in the General Assembly, and he suggested that members, or indeed non-members, of the Committee which considered that they had new ideas to submit might do so in writing to the Secretariat at any time, either as a help to the Chairman in conducting informal consultations or for circulation to all members of the Committee.

His delegation believed that that approach was an amplification of the philosophy which underlay General Assembly resolution 2006 (XIX). The members of the Committee must, of course, keep the informal consultations under constant review, in order that the Committee might, if necessary, revitalize the negotiations by re-emphasizing the need for a basic framework of agreement. When the Committee reconvened in late April, it could review the results of the first round of informal consultations and, depending on the success achieved, his delegation might consider it appropriate at that time to recommend raising the level of the negotiations, in order to ensure that Governments were fully committed to reaching a settlement.

Mr. LEKIC (Yugoslavia) said that his delegation was deeply disturbed by the present situation, both in the United Nations and in the world. When the General Assembly had agreed to the adjournment of the nineteenth session and the establishment of the Special Committee, the vast majority of the Members had accepted that procedure as a necessary means of achieving the ultimate normalization of the Assembly's work. Since the establishment of the Committee there had been a perceptible deterioration in the international situation, primarily because of the expansion of the war in Viet-Nam which, if it continued, would be more and more difficult to control and could easily draw the world into broader conflict. The Yugoslav Government condemned the aggressive actions of the United States against the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Democratic

(Mr. Lekic, Yugoslavia)

Republic of Viet-Nam through the continued bombing of its territory, and it most vigorously condemned the use of poisonous gas as a flagrant violation of the norms of international law and custom, which carried with it the responsibility for unforeseeable consequences. South-East Asia was merely the focal point of a widening spectrum of international crises, and it was impossible to believe that the General Assembly, if it had been confronted with the present situation, would have adjourned without taking steps to solve the crisis.

Consequently, it would be most useful to adapt the task of the Committee to the new situation, which greatly increased its responsibility and made the execution of its mandate a matter of extraordinary importance. While the crisis in the United Nations might reflect certain crises in international relations, it was also true that the passivity of the United Nations, and specifically the blocking of the work of the General Assembly, could not but have a most undesirable effect on the development of events, whereas the normal functioning of all its organs would contribute immeasurably to an easing of tension and would facilitate the most effective and democratic method of solving conflicts, namely, negotiations. That being so, the work of the Committee must be accelerated and its task completed before the time-limit of 15 June 1965 established in General Assembly resolution 2006 (XIX).

His delegation considered that priority should be given to the question of normalizing the work of the General Assembly, and a sense of urgency in undertaking that task should be the basic principle in organizing the Committee's work. It would be useful if the Chairman held immediate consultations with the members of the Committee and with other Member States on the necessity for the speedy normalization of the General Assembly's work and reported on the results of those consultations at the earliest possible date, in order that the Committee might concentrate on that fundamental question.

Under the terms of General Assembly resolution 2006 (XIX), the Committee's task with respect to peace-keeping operations was to undertake a comprehensive review of the whole question, and it would be most appropriate to begin, without delay, a general debate in the plenary. So far as ways of overcoming the Organization's present financial difficulties were concerned, many proposals had been submitted since December 1964, and the opposing positions had come closer

(Mr. Lekic, Yugoslavic)

together in many ways; the General Assembly had been informed of a consensus on a number of points, which represented a solid basis for continuing the work. The best organization of work for the purpose of finding a solution to "the present financial difficulties" might be the establishment of a limited working group, which would submit a report to the Committee within a specified time. In his view, the so-called consultations had been conceived as a complementary means of accelerating the work of the Committee and making it more effective, and they could serve that purpose only if they developed parallel with the work of the Committee and its bodies. The system of consultations must therefore be further improved in the future work of the Committee, whose aim should be to carry out the task entrusted to it with a maximum of success; but whatever the final outcome of its work, it should not hinder the normal continuation of the General Assembly and the ultimate normalization of the Organization.

Mr. de BEUS (Netherlands) agreed with the Chairman's suggestions concerning the organization of the Committee's work, and emphasized two aspects of General Assembly resolution 2006 (XIX), namely, the primary importance given in operative paragraph 1 to the consultations on the whole question of peace-keeping operations to be undertaken by the Secretary-General and the President of the General Assembly, and the need for the Committee as a whole to work with the greatest possible speed in accordance with the terms of operative paragraph 3. Where the first of those elements was concerned, it seemed obvious that the Committee could do little constructive work unless a certain degree of basic understanding was first achieved in informal high-level talks with the parties most directly concerned, including, first and foremost, the permanent members of the Security Council. That applied, in particular, to "ways of overcoming the present financial difficulties of the Organization". The need for speed was equally obvious, if the United Nations was to regain the prestige and the world confidence which in great measure it had lost as a result of the General Assembly's failure to solve the question of the Organization's finances at its nineteenth session. There again, however, the Committee could not fruitfully undertake the substance of its task until some basic progress had been made in the first round of consultations with the parties mainly concerned.

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Mr. TINE (France) said that the Chairman's suggestions would undoubtedly facilitate the smooth progress of the Committee's work. However, the notion of a consensus was subject to different interpretations and, in order to avoid subsequent misunderstandings, he wished to state that his delegation regarded a decision adopted by consensus as being no more and no less than a decision adopted unanimously. If unanimity could not be achieved and the Committee still wished to take a decision, the procedure to be followed must be such as to leave no doubt concerning the position of every Member State represented in the Committee; in other words, a vote must be taken, if necessary, as the only means of enabling each delegation to express the views of its Government without ambiguity. He welcomed the Chairman's statement on that point, while hoping that it would be possible to achieve unanimity on the matters before the Committee. His delegation would express its views on those matters at the appropriate time. At the present stage, he would merely state that the Committee would do well to concentrate in the first instance on the problem that was really of most importance, namely, future peace-keeping operations.

Mr. ALVAREZ VIDAURRE (El Salvador), speaking on behalf of the delegations of Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, Mexico and Venezuela, said that the fact that General Assembly resolution 2006 (XIX) authorized the President of the General Assembly to serve ex officio as Chairman of the Special Committee was no impediment to the procedure, customary in any collective body, of electing other officers to assist and advise the Chairman and the Secretary-General in the important negotiations entrusted to them. The delegations for which he spoke would not object to a decision not to elect other officers for the time being, but reserved the right to raise the question again if they felt that such action might be conducive to the normalization of the work of the General Assembly, which was the fundamental purpose of the Committee.

Mr. LEWANDOWSKI (Poland) observed that patient search for the solution of difficult problems and for compromises which would facilitate agreement on even the most complicated issues had always been in the tradition of his delegation. While the proper functioning of the United Nations hinged on concerted action by the great Powers, other States must also play their part, and it was in that spirit that his delegation approached the Committee's task, which was to remove all the

(Mr. Lewandowski, Poland)

obstacles that had paralysed the work of the Assembly at its nineteenth session and jeopardized the very existence of the United Nations.

During the negotiations at the nineteenth session, his delegation had expressed its support for the proposal of the Afro-Asian delegations of 30 December 1964, and it was still prepared to consider its implementation as a means of overcoming the Organization's present financial difficulties. The voluntary contributions provided for in that proposal should be truly voluntary, with no preconditions attached, and the Committee should assure the General Assembly that the only obstacle to the normalization of its work, namely, the threat to apply Article 19 of the Charter to those who for reasons of principle refused to support, financially or otherwise, the illegal operations of the past and the present, would be removed once and for all. His delegation would express its views on the comprehensive review of the whole question of peace-keeping operations in detail at a later stage, and it believed that the proposals outlined in the USSR memorandum of 10 July 1964 (S/5811) provided a good basis for an agreement.

The Committee was not working in a political vacuum, and the world was gravely concerned at the dangerous situation developing in South-East Asia. The continued aggression by the United States against the people of Viet-Nam and the prolonged violation of the Geneva Agreements had been widely condemned; yet, step by step, new means of destruction had been introduced - intensified bombing, napalm, and finally the use of poisonous gas. The aggression against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam must stop, and foreign troops must be removed from South Viet-Nam, in order to permit a peaceful solution of the conflict in accordance with the sovereign rights of the Viet-Nameese people.

His delegation believed that whatever procedural measures were adopted by the Committee should lead to the fulfilment of its main task, namely, the normalization of the work of the General Assembly. It would therefore agree to the Chairman's suggestions if they were approved by the Committee as a whole, but it was strongly in favour of open meetings, in order to prevent any suspicion of connivance at an agreement that would run counter to the interests of non-members of the Committee. In that connexion, he welcomed the Chairman's suggestion that all Member States which wished to participate in the forthcoming consultations should be able to do so. He agreed that the Committee should strive to achieve unanimous decisions on

(Mr. Lewandowski, Poland)

the important issues before it, for past experience had shown that the United Nations never profited from decisions taken by a majority vote which ran counter to the interests or positions of other delegations. His delegation had no strong views on the election of additional officers, and it would accept the decision of the majority on that point.

Mr. PLIMPTON (United States of America) regretted that certain representatives had injected into the first meeting of the Committee a discordant, irrelevant and cold-war propagandistic note to which he had no intention of replying in detail, since most of the statements in question did not warrant the Committee's serious attention. Out of respect for the truth, however, he wished to reiterate the basic, essential facts, which had been repeatedly set forth in official statements by his Government during the past few weeks.

The facts were that the totalitarian communistic régime in Hanoi was conducting a war of aggression against its neighbour, the Republic of Viet-Nam, and that the subjugation by force of the Republic of Viet-Nam was the formal, announced, official policy of the Hanoi régime. The continuing aggression was conducted to a major degree through active assistance and leadership supplied by the North Viet-Nameese authorities to the Viet-Cong, whose officers, specialists, technicians, intelligence agents, political organizers and propagandists had been trained, equipped and supplied in North Viet-Nam and then sent into the Republic of Viet-Nam under the military orders of Hanoi. Most of the weapons, ammunition and other supplies used by the Viet-Cong had been sent from North to South Viet-Nam. That continuing pattern of activity by the Hanoi régime was in violation of the general principles of international law, the Charter of the United Nations, and the Geneva Agreements of 1954. Long-term aggression through infiltration was a relatively new type, but it was still aggression, and the defensive measures taken in recent weeks by the Government of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States Government were designed solely to counter that aggression and to emphasize their joint determination, not only to resist the aggression, but also to hold the Hanoi régime fully accountable for it. The United States threatened no régime and coveted no territory; it sought no wider conflict, but only the termination of aggression, and nothing stood in the way of peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam except the determination of the Hanoi régime to continue its efforts to

(Mr. Plimpton, United States)

destroy its neighbour. The United States continued to await the first indication from some source that Hanoi was willing to abandon its aggression and to return to the ways of peace and to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

An attempt had been made in the Committee to foster the totally false impression that the Republic of Viet-Nam and the United States were embarking upon gas warfare. The truth was that the United States was not embarking upon gas warfare in Viet-Nam, the gas referred to was entirely non-lethal and no different from the anti-riot substances used by many of the police forces of the world. As the United States Secretary of State had done in his statement of 24 March, he would express the hope that those who were concerned about tear gas would be concerned about the fact that during 1964 over 400 civilian officials and 1,300 other civilians had been killed, and over 9,000 civilians kidnapped, in South Viet-Nam. Surely those statistics were sufficient to demonstrate the urgency of restoring peace to Viet-Nam, which could be achieved through a simple decision of the Hanoi régime to stop its aggression and to leave the people and Government of South Viet-Nam free to settle their own future. In the meantime, as President Johnson had stated on 25 March, it was, and would remain, the policy of the United States to furnish assistance to South Viet-Nam for as long as was required to bring communist aggression and terrorism under control, and the military actions of the United States would be such, and only such, as served that purpose at the lowest possible cost in human life to both sides.

The USSR representative had once again repeated the arguments with which his Government had tried to justify its refusal to pay assessments levied by the General Assembly; the United States delegation regretted in particular his reiteration of the position that only the Security Council could take any action for the maintenance of peace, and that the General Assembly had no right whatsoever as concerned the keeping of the peace or its financing. Thus, if he had understood the USSR representative correctly, his Government still insisted that there must be a perpetual veto by any permanent member of the Security Council on the authorization, conduct and financing of any peace-keeping operations. The members of the Committee and of the General Assembly would have to decide whether that was the position they really wished to prevail.

In broad terms, the Committee was faced with two major problems - firstly, to ensure the solvency of the United Nations, and secondly, to arrive at a workable understanding concerning the respective roles of the Security Council and the

(Mr. Plimpton, United States)

General Assembly in the maintenance of peace. His delegation was prepared to consider seriously and with an open mind all proposals designed to find solutions to those two problems. It agreed with the Chairman's view that the primary emphasis in the coming weeks should be on informal negotiations to lay the groundwork for the substantive meetings of the Committee, and it was prepared to begin such negotiations immediately. While agreeing on the importance of negotiation among the larger Powers, his delegation considered it equally important that other members of the Committee, and indeed other Members of the General Assembly, should be involved in the informal consultations. The United States had no illusions about the difficulty and complexity of the problems, but they must be solved if the United Nations was to fulfil its essential role in the maintenance of peace, as envisaged in the Charter.

Mr. HASEGANU (Romania) said that the organization of the Committee's work must be based on the terms of General Assembly resolution 2006 (XIX) and on the procedures laid down in the Charter and in the rules of procedure. The Committee's primary task was to eliminate all the difficulties which prevented the normalization of the work of the General Assembly. Once that problem had been solved, attention could be given to the other aspects of the question, but it was scarcely desirable that the General Assembly should remain paralysed until all the problems connected with peace-keeping operations had been resolved.

Since the Committee was not a mere working group, but a most important political body, it should follow the normal procedure of the Main Committees of the General Assembly and of its special organs established to deal with major questions. Meetings must therefore be open and statements recorded, in order that all Member States might be informed of the proceedings. He hoped that the Committee's decisions would be unanimous, and he believed that unanimity - rather than a "consensus" - could be obtained through constructive negotiations between all the interested parties. His desire for unanimity should not be interpreted as a suggestion that the members of the Committee should waive their right to vote, or to request a vote, on problems of interest to them, since voting was the expression of the will of the independent and sovereign States participating in the Committee's work. The Committee should begin its work as soon as possible in order to be able to submit its report to the General Assembly by 15 June 1965.

(Mr. Haseganu, Romania)

His delegation agreed with others which had expressed their indignation at the continuing acts of aggression by the United States against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, and at the use of gas by the United States Armed Forces as a weapon of war against the Viet-Nameese people. The Romanian Government had demanded, in its statement of 9 March 1965 (S/6224), that the United States Government should cease its interference in the internal affairs of the South Viet-Nameese people and its military intervention in South Viet-Nam and should strictly apply the Geneva Agreements of 1954.

Mr. WALDHEIM (Austria) said that his delegation was open-minded on the question whether to hold closed or open meetings, both of which had their advantages. The Committee should, in general, try to reach its decisions by consensus - a procedure which had been used successfully in the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space - although situations might arise in which a vote was unavoidable. While all members were eager to begin work as soon as possible in order to meet the time-limit set by the General Assembly, his delegation believed that the consultations referred to in operative paragraph 1 of resolution 2006 (XIX) were of the utmost importance to the Committee's deliberations, and it therefore agreed with the Chairman's suggestion that the Committee should adjourn until 22 April. Since the Committee had been set up for a very special purpose under the chairmanship of the President of the General Assembly, his delegation agreed that there was no need to elect other officers, and it would be glad to leave the conduct of business to a representative nominated by the Chairman if he was unable to preside at any meeting.

Since it was most important to achieve the solvency of the United Nations at the earliest possible date, his delegation considered it desirable to stress that aspect of the problem, although the very important question of future peace-keeping operations would obviously arise during the negotiations. Lastly, he wished to stress the importance of an agreement between the permanent members of the Security Council, without which it would be difficult for the Committee to succeed in its task.

Lord CARADON (United Kingdom) said that the unanimous agreement which appeared to prevail in the Committee with respect to the Chairman's procedural proposals marked an important first step in its work. In the interest of continued progress, he cautioned against introducing controversial questions which were not

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(Lord Caradon, United Kingdom)

directly related to the problems referred to the Committee by the General Assembly and against a mere restatement of previously-held views on those problems. The Committee had the task of finding new methods, new machinery and new ideas for peace-keeping in the world and nothing should be brought in which would stand in the way of agreement.

He expressed confidence in the decision taken by the General Assembly, that in the first stage the initiative should come from the Chairman, and the Secretary-General, and that at a subsequent stage the support of the General Assembly should be sought through the Committee.

Mr. MISKE (Mauritania) expressed his delegation's support for the Chairman's proposals regarding the Committee's procedure. He hoped that when it resumed its work in the future, it would hear concrete proposals for a solution of the problems before it rather than statements of principle. It might be desirable at times to hold closed meetings during the discussion of those proposals so that speakers might not be influenced by the public.

Mr. HAJEK (Czechoslovakia) emphasized that the Committee's task was to extricate the General Assembly and the United Nations as a whole from the impasse which had frustrated the work of the nineteenth session and rendered the Organization powerless at a time when the world situation was fraught with danger to peace. In particular, the situation in South-East Asia, which was a matter preoccupying all delegations, cast its shadow on the efforts to solve the United Nations peace-keeping problems; it could not be regarded as an extraneous or irrelevant question. It was the direct responsibility of those who were waging a murderous war against the people of South Viet-Nam and illegally bombing the territory of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam in defiance of international law and the provisions of the 1954 Geneva Agreements and in violation of the basic principles of human conduct. The White Paper published by the United States Government in an effort to justify its criminal aggression against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam had been, as stated in The New Republic, entirely unconvincing, illogical and misleading, and had been designed to prepare a moral platform for widening the war. The further efforts of the State Department to justify the napalm bombing of villages and the use of poisonous gas could not quiet the indignation of people all over the world.

(Mr. Hajek, Czechoslovakia)

It was not accidental that those who were engaged in escalating the aggression in Viet-Nam without regard for public opinion and for the danger to human life had not hesitated to paralyse the General Assembly by brandishing the threat of invoking Article 19 of the Charter against States refusing to recognize illegal operations undertaken by the United Nations in the past, and had obstinately refused to consider even the moderate Afro-Asian compromise plan for solving the peace-keeping crisis. He regretted that he had felt compelled to refer to those facts but he had done so in order to place the crisis in its historical context.

The Czechoslovak delegation considered that the Committee's work should encompass all aspects of the question of peace-keeping operations, as specified in operative paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 2006 (XIX), and should not be limited to the financial aspect only. It believed that the effectiveness of the United Nations should be strengthened through improvement of its machinery for collective security. However, all endeavours to regulate future peace-keeping activities should take into account one basic prerequisite, namely, respect for the provisions of the Charter. His delegation was satisfied that the Soviet statement of position based on its earlier memorandum (S/5811) met that condition.

Meetings of the Committee should be open to avoid the risk of leakage and misrepresentation which might mislead public opinion and impair the prestige of the United Nations. In exceptional cases, however, the Committee might decide to hold closed meetings. Decisions of the Committee should be taken by unanimous agreement, but such unanimity should not be construed to mean consensus at any price: It must be achieved as the result of patient and systematic negotiations. Although the Committee had little time in which to achieve a solution which would facilitate a resumption of the Assembly's nineteenth session and normalize the work of its twentieth session, every effort must be made to do so, taking into account the historical and political context of the crisis and the situation as a whole. The Chairman's task might be facilitated by the designation of a number of Vice-Chairmen from the basic groups represented in the Committee, but that was a matter for further negotiation. His delegation would be happy to co-operate fully in the negotiations.

Mr. HAY (Australia) regretted the introduction into the discussion of matters which, though in all representatives' minds, were not likely to further

(Mr. Hay, Australia)

the Committee's immediate purpose. However, since the situation in South Viet-Nam and the surrounding area was a matter of intimate concern to Australia, he wished to state his Government's position on it. The fact was that a dissident communist-controlled movement had been created in South Viet-Nam from outside to wage war against the established social order and Government. The Australian Government had evidence of this from its own diplomatic missions, which had been in the area for many years, and from many other sources, including the 1962 report of the International Control Commission, which had condemned North Viet-Nam for violating the Geneva Agreements by sending men and arms from the North and inciting and encouraging hostilities in the South. The force which had established itself in South Viet-Nam had done so not through a programme of economic and social reform, but by coercion and terrorism. The aggression from the North could be halted only if the authorities in North Viet-Nam changed their policies. In those circumstances the people of South Viet-Nam would have the possibility of genuine self-determination. Until those policies were changed, there was no alternative for Governments which valued the freedom of the peoples of the area but to try to stop the aggression. Australia intended to honour its obligations under international law and custom to that end.

His delegation generally supported the Chairman's proposals for the organization of the Committee's work, but considered that open meetings would be fruitful only if members exercised restraint and confined their remarks to the specific problems assigned to the Committee by the General Assembly. The Committee should give attention to the explicit priority given in General Assembly resolution 2006 (XIX) for the arrangements for appropriate consultations which are left in the hands of the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary-General. It might therefore be preferable to leave the date of the Committee's next meeting to a time when the President and the Secretary-General felt it most appropriate in the light of their consultations. His Government attached great importance to the urgency of these consultations.

Mr. Amjad ALI (Pakistan) said that events in the world outside served to re-emphasize the urgency and necessity of creating effective United Nations peace-keeping machinery. With regard to the Chairman's procedural proposals, his delegation favoured open meetings unless closed meetings were absolutely necessary. It would prefer to have agreement than a consensus; in the absence of agreement, decisions should be taken by a vote.

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(Mr. Amjad Ali, Pakistan)

The object of the consultations to be undertaken by the Chairman and the Secretary-General was to obtain great-Power agreement. However, if such agreement could not be achieved, it devolved upon the majority of Member States to keep the United Nations intact and functioning in the usual manner. They would have to discharge that responsibility at some time during the resumed nineteenth session. The Committee should seek to achieve a twofold purpose: the normalization of the functioning of the General Assembly and the restoration of financial integrity to the United Nations.

Mr. FEDORENKO (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) said that it was the height of cynicism for the Soviet Union to be accused of injecting the cold war into the discussion by the very persons who were responsible for the bloodshed in Viet-Nam and the use of napalm and poisonous gases against the Viet-Nameese people. The use of those barbarous weapons constituted a crime against humanity and a gross violation of international law. It was now clear why the United States had never subscribed to the Geneva Protocol of 1925. In its note to the United States Government dated 26 March, the Soviet Government had resolutely condemned the use of poisonous substances by the United States against the population of South Viet-Nam. The United States, the note had stated, should weigh carefully the responsibility it assumed by resorting to such an inhuman act as the use of chemical weapons and take the necessary steps to cease the use of such weapons immediately. No Government could proceed in its international behaviour on the assumption that it could do something which was prohibited to all the States. Clearly the world would be in serious danger if all States felt free to take the kind of arbitrary action on which the United States had embarked. It was impossible to reconcile the frequent assurances given by the United States that it wished to improve international relations, strengthen international co-operation and promote observance of the United Nations Charter with its actions in Viet-Nam where it was violating universally recognized rules of international relations enshrined in the Charter and international agreements.

The facts were that a national war of liberation was being fought in South Viet-Nam against United States imperialism and a bankrupt puppet Government in Saigon which was being kept in power by United States military forces. It was the height of hypocrisy for the United States representative to speak of freedom and humanitarianism when his Government was engaged in flagrant violation of international law, repression of freedom and forcible interference in Indo-Chinese internal affairs. It was sanctimonious for that Government to say that the

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(Mr. Fedorenko, USSR)

Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam must show signs of readiness to negotiate while it continued its own lawless bombing of that sovereign country. The truth was that United States provocations against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam made a mockery of the Geneva Agreements and many Member States had resolutely condemned them. Moreover, the war fanned by United States imperialism in Viet-Nam threatened to spread to other regions of the world. In the interest of preserving world peace, the United States should end its criminal aggression in Viet-Nam and withdraw its troops immediately.

The United States representative had once again attempted to distort the Soviet position regarding the peace-keeping functions of the General Assembly by implying that the Soviet Union sought to deny the rights of the General Assembly in regard to the maintenance of international peace and security. On the contrary, the Soviet Union favoured the full exercise by the Assembly of its rights within its sphere of competence as defined in Articles 11, 12, 14 and 35 of the Charter. When the Security Council was unable to act in matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security, there was nothing to prevent the Assembly from considering such matters further and, within the framework of its competence, from making further recommendations regarding them.

Mr. VINCI (Italy) considered it inappropriate to inject into the Committee's discussion controversial matters which were very far from the Committee's real objective. All Member States were seriously concerned by the situation in South-East Asia and desired a peaceful settlement. For its part, the Italian Government had expressed confidence in the sense of responsibility of the United States and had approached the principal Governments concerned in an effort to ease the situation and pave the way for the opening of negotiations.

He endorsed the practical arrangements for the organization of the Committee's work suggested by the Chairman and emphasized that the Committee could not afford to fail in its important task because the very survival of the United Nations was at stake. In the circumstances, despite the pressure of time, it should not embark upon a substantive discussion until the ground had been thoroughly prepared through consultations.

He sought clarification and further exploration of the Soviet representative's statement that if the Security Council should find itself unable to act on a matter relating to the maintenance of peace and security, the General Assembly might consider the matter again and make further recommendations concerning it.

(Mr. Vinci, Italy)

He would also welcome some elucidation of the Soviet Representative's reference to the fact that, in matters of peace-keeping, all Member States were on an equal footing. While the sovereign equality of Member States was guaranteed by the Charter to which they had subscribed and the forum of the United Nations was open to all, surely the Soviet representative had not meant to suggest that each individual State should be free to fix the price of its participation in the Organization.

The need to ensure the solvency of the United Nations, to which the United States representative in particular had referred, was regarded by the Italian delegation as a matter of paramount and primary importance. Efforts must be made to meet the existing emergency and at the same time to prevent a recurrence of financial crisis in future, without impairing the effectiveness of the United Nations.

Mr. CHIBA (Japan) supported the procedure for the organization of work outlined by the Chairman.

Although it was vitally important to make the United Nations solvent as soon as possible, the Committee should not limit itself to the problem of financial solvency but should adopt a flexible attitude and be prepared to deal with any aspect of the over-all problem that seemed likely to promote agreement.

His delegation attached primary importance to the consultations envisaged in operative paragraph 1 of General Assembly resolution 2006 (XIX). It hoped that the consultations, which must be pursued actively and without loss of time, would produce positive and constructive guidelines.

Mr. CSATORDAY (Hungary) said that the consultations had shown that much goodwill and co-operation would be needed if the Committee was to carry out its task, which was political as well as procedural and financial.

In speaking about the problem of keeping the peace, one could hardly ignore events in which peace was being destroyed. Despite the condemnation voiced by the Hungarian Government and by other Governments throughout the world, the United States was accelerating the pace of its mad war in Viet-Nam. The world had been shocked to learn about the use of gas in that country. The United States

(Mr. Csatorday, Hungary)

representative had dismissed the statements made by several delegations in the Committee as communist propaganda. However, The New York Times, which could not be regarded as a source of communist propaganda, had strongly condemned the use of gas in Viet-Nam. The attempts made in the United States White Paper to show that people had come from North Viet-Nam to launch a revolution in South Viet-Nam were unconvincing. It should rather be asked where the United States soldiers were coming from. If the United States would abandon its imperialist war in South-East Asia, the task of the Committee, in which strict adherence to the United Nations Charter was essential would be facilitated. Discussing the problems before the Committee in all their aspects should necessarily include the measures of paramount importance, namely, those for normalization of the work of the General Assembly and that of the whole of the United Nations, ensuring their proper functions under the Charter of the Organization.

Referring to a point made by the representative of Italy to the effect that individual States were not free to fix the price of their participation in the Organization, the Hungarian representative indicated that in reality the problem was that some States were expected to defray the costs of special actions in which they did not participate and to which they objected.

In accordance with rule 62 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, the meetings of the Committee should be held in public, unless it decided otherwise. The Committee had an obligation to keep the public informed about its work and, if the meetings were closed, there might be speculation and rumours. The positions of various delegations had been widely publicized and the Committee's report on the work would be published and discussed by the General Assembly. As regards voting procedures, the Hungarian delegation thought that the word "unanimity" was more suitable than the word "consensus". It did not think that there would be any need to elect officers of the Committee. The consultations would complement rather than replace discussion in the Committee; they should be held in addition to Committee meetings and should be as broad as possible. In conclusion, he assured the Committee of his delegation's support and co-operation to achieve its goals as set forth in General Assembly resolution 2006 (XIX).

Mr. PAZHWAQ (Afghanistan) said that anything which prevented the United Nations from functioning normally or reduced its effectiveness was contrary to the interests of the Organization. Unless the Committee achieved constructive results, there could be no normal or effective United Nations. His delegation fully supported the procedure outlined by the Chairman. It hoped, however, that at the proper time - after a clear understanding of the general situation had been obtained through a broad exchange of views - the Committee would bear in mind the idea of a working group. Particularly in the absence of agreement, a working group composed of members of the Committee would facilitate appropriate initiatives, based on the wishes of all the Members of the United Nations.

Only a political solution could achieve a settlement of the problems facing the United Nations, and such a solution had to be sought. It was to be hoped that the collective political understanding which had resulted in the establishment of the Committee would ensure the success of its work.

The CHAIRMAN suggested that the Committee should adopt the procedure he had outlined, noting the reservation made by the Latin American members. He and the Secretary-General would immediately start consultations on the substantive aspects of the Committee's work. He urged delegations to submit any ideas or suggestions they might have. The Committee would reconvene on or about 22 April 1965.

It was so decided.

OTHER MATTERS

Mr. CHAKRAVARTY (India) proposed that verbatim records of the Committee's debates should be issued.

The CHAIRMAN said that a verbatim record would be provided, unless the Committee decided to hold closed meetings, in which case it would have to decide whether it wanted a verbatim record.

The meeting rose at 6.50 p.m.