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General and complete disarmament

Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction

Report of the Secretary-General

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* [A/77/50](#).



I. Introduction

1. The General Assembly, in its resolution [76/28](#), entitled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”, called upon all Member States to support international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery; appealed to all Member States to consider early accession to and ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, and encouraged States parties to the Convention to review its implementation; and urged all Member States to take and strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture.

2. The General Assembly encouraged cooperation among and between Member States and relevant regional and international organizations for strengthening national capacities in that regard.

3. Furthermore, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to compile a report on measures already taken by international organizations on issues relating to the linkage between the fight against terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and to seek the views of Member States on additional relevant measures, including national measures, for tackling the global threat posed by the acquisition by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction and to report to the Assembly at its seventy-seventh session. The present report is submitted in response to that request.

4. By note verbale dated 26 January 2022, Member States were invited to communicate their views on the issue until 31 May 2022. Letters dated 26 January 2022 were dispatched to relevant international organizations, including relevant bodies and agencies of the United Nations system to communicate their views on the issue until 31 May 2022. Member States and relevant international organizations were invited to provide executive summaries of their contributions for inclusion in the report of the Secretary-General, while their submissions in extenso would be posted on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs (www.un.org/disarmament), if so requested by the Member State or international organization. The replies received are contained in sections II and IV of the present report. A reply from the European Union has been received and is reproduced in section III, in accordance with the modalities set out in resolution [65/276](#). Any views received after 31 May 2022 will be posted on the website of the Office for Disarmament Affairs in the original language received. No addenda will be issued.

II. Replies received from Governments

Cuba

[Original: Spanish]

[9 May 2022]

Cuba neither possesses nor intends to acquire weapons of mass destruction and firmly supports their total and complete prohibition and elimination in a transparent, verifiable and irreversible manner, within timelines agreed multilaterally.

Cuba has not allowed terrorist acts of any kind against any State to be carried out, planned or financed on its territory. We have consistently and strongly condemned all acts, methods and practices of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, including State terrorism, by whomever, against whomsoever and wherever committed, regardless of motivation.

The foreign policy principles set out by the Republic of Cuba in its Constitution, promulgated on 24 February 2019, include promoting general and complete disarmament and rejecting the existence, proliferation and use of nuclear weapons, weapons of mass destruction and other weapons with similar effects, as well as the development and use of new weapons and new forms of warfare, such as cyberwarfare, which violate international law.

Cuba has an effective, predictable and reliable system for the national implementation of its international obligations as a State party to instruments such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Biological Weapons Convention. Following the entry into force of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, Cuba, as a State party to the Treaty, renewed its aspiration to see a “nuclear-weapon-free world” and reaffirmed that promoting the universalization of the Treaty involves preventing terrorists from acquiring such weapons.

Cuba implements the guidelines set out in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Sources, approved by the Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on 8 September 2003, and its supplementary guidance documents.

In addition, as a State party to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment, Cuba strictly complies with its obligations and guarantees the physical security of its material. Cuba has no undeclared nuclear material and uses all its declared nuclear material for peaceful activities, in strict compliance with IAEA standards.

Cuba has signed the Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan and its supplementary implementation plan with IAEA in order to strengthen controls at ports, airports, hospitals and other institutions that work with radioactive materials, thereby demonstrating its commitment to nuclear security.

Cuba has also ratified the 19 international conventions relating to terrorism. The Counter-Terrorism Act (Act No. 93), as amended by Decree-Law No. 316 of 2013, and Decree-Law No. 317 of 2013, concerning the prevention and detection of operations in order to combat money-laundering, the financing of terrorism, arms proliferation and illicit capital flows, reinforce the national measures. The Criminal Code sets out penalties for all acts of terrorism, including those involving weapons of mass destruction.

The United Nations should focus its efforts on combating terrorism by promoting effective international cooperation to prevent and combat terrorist acts, on the basis of strict compliance with international law and the Charter of the United Nations. Global efforts to combat terrorism should be guided by the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

India

[Original: English]
[31 May 2022]

The pursuit of global peace faces unprecedented challenges from terrorism, which threatens to endanger the very foundation of democratic societies. India is greatly concerned by the increasing linkages between terrorism and weapons of mass destruction and is fully cognizant of the need to urgently address this grave threat to humanity through international cooperation and within the United Nations framework. Threats arising from terrorism transcend borders, which necessitates a

robust and coordinated response at the national as well as global levels. The international community must augment its efforts to eliminate the risks of sensitive materials and technologies falling into the hands of covert networks, terrorists and armed non-State actors.

Having fought the menace of terrorism for many decades, India, through its annual resolution at the General Assembly entitled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”, has drawn the attention of the international community to the dangers of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the potential for its exploitation by terrorists and non-State actors for hostile purposes. Tabled since 2002 and adopted by consensus, the resolution urges Member States to support international efforts and to take and strengthen national measures, as appropriate, to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery. India is pleased that resolution 76/28 was adopted without a vote and received the support of almost 92 sponsors and cosponsors.

India believes that it is incumbent upon every Member State to combat terrorism, dismantle its support infrastructure and curb its linkages with weapons of mass destruction. For its part, India has a comprehensive law in its domestic legislation, the Weapons of Mass Destruction Act 2005, which effectively translates at the operational level the firm commitment of India to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems. The growing industrial and commercial applications of dual-use items and the rapidly evolving nature of technologies have lowered the technical and material barriers to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials, equipment and technology to clandestine networks and non-State actors, including terrorist groups. The Indian national export control system based on legislation, regulations and a control list of sensitive material, dual-use items, equipment and technologies is consistent with the highest international standards. India believes that multilateral export control regimes contribute to the goals of non-proliferation through guidelines for export controls and lists of specific goods and technologies whose exports should be regulated. The national export control list of dual-use material, equipment and technologies of India, called Special Chemicals, Organisms, Materials, Equipment and Technologies is updated annually to take into account the emerging trends.

India is a party to all the 13 international instruments accepted as benchmarks for a State’s commitments to combat all forms of terrorism, including chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear terrorism. India has also ratified the instruments such as the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment, which provide an effective framework for translating broader political commitments into legally binding measures.

India recognizes the role of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) to prevent the risk of access of non-State actors to weapons of mass destruction. In this context, India engages with the reporting and review process of national measures by the Committee. We believe that outreach efforts under resolution 1540 (2004) to various countries and regions will also complement the implementation of the objectives of General Assembly resolution 76/28. We also fully support the Committee’s enhanced cooperation and coordination with international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), other relevant United Nations bodies such as the Office for Disarmament Affairs and the Security Council’s counter-terrorism committees to prevent non-State actors from acquiring weapons of mass destruction.

India believes that government-industry partnership could strengthen an effective export control system. Awareness about their export control obligations, the nature of industry-level checks and compliance with them by industry is integral to the success of national export control systems. Accordingly, the Government of India, along with its industry partners, remains engaged throughout the year in outreach activities, which comprises region-specific and sector-specific events, both in-person and online.

India actively participates across various multilateral forums, including through the United Nations, IAEA, Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and other relevant forums to step up efforts and international cooperation to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction. India has regularly participated in the International Conferences on Nuclear Security hosted by IAEA, including the recent one on the theme “Sustaining and strengthening efforts (ICONS 2020)”, held in Vienna from 10 to 14 February 2020. India is also an active participant at the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and the Nuclear Security Contact Group.

The Indian Global Centre for Nuclear Energy Partnership, established in April 2017, has conducted over 33 international programmes, including training courses, workshops and technical meetings, and drawing approximately 500 participants from approximately 60 member States. The Global Centre has also signed 14 memorandums of understanding with various countries and organizations, including the United States of America, France, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, IAEA, Argentina, Uzbekistan, the African Commission on Nuclear Energy and Ghana, for strengthening global nuclear security. Under the OPCW National Authority Mentorship/Partnership Programme, India is engaged with Afghan authorities to share its knowledge, skills and experience relevant to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction.

Jamaica

[Original: English]
[31 May 2022]

As a member of the international community, Jamaica remains committed to supporting international efforts to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, including various resolutions adopted by the General Assembly concerning non-proliferation and counter-terrorism.

Non-proliferation and strategic trade control developments

Jamaica enacted the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Act, 2015, to regulate the activities, practices and facilities involving ionizing radiation and nuclear technology for the protection of people, property and the environment from the harmful effects of ionizing radiation. The Act also provided for the establishment of the Hazardous Substances Regulatory Authority, which became operational in 2017 as the national regulator. Building on this, Jamaica passed the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Regulations in 2019 for the administration of the Nuclear Safety and Radiation Protection Act and to strengthen the regulatory Authority’s oversight of the industry.

Jamaica ratified the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in October 2020, which was instrumental in the Treaty’s entry into force in January 2021.

Jamaica has been collaborating with the United Nations Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean, with assistance

from the bilateral partners and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Implementation Agency for Crime and Security, to develop an appropriate control list for the trade in strategic goods and dual-use items. To this end, Jamaica is exploring pathways for establishing the legal basis for comprehensive treatment of strategic trade items, towards meeting obligations under Security Council resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) on weapons of mass destruction.

Between 2018 and 2020, with the assistance of the CARICOM Secretariat and Global Affairs Canada, Jamaica was one of several Caribbean States to benefit from a resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) implementation programme project. The project financed the provision of human resource expertise at the CARICOM Secretariat for coordinating the development of strategic trade and control legislation related to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials and technologies. During this period, Jamaica also benefited from assistance facilitated by the Organization of American States to build capacities for combating proliferation and proliferation financing.

Jamaica continues to work with the International Atomic Energy Agency with revising and implementing its Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan, which serves as a road map for coordinating activities and functionalities in Jamaica's nuclear security architecture. Jamaica also receives assistance with technical capacity-building and other forms of support from the United States Department of Energy, including for aspects of the physical protection of Jamaica's nuclear research facility.

Counter-terrorism

A possible feature of a potential terrorist threat emanating from the Caribbean region is a connection to transnational organized crime. Well-established networks of narcotics and weapons trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, money-laundering and extortion provide channels through which terrorist groups can operate with impunity.

Jamaica recognizes that the spread of weapons of mass destruction to terrorist groups poses a potential threat to peace and security within the region, and remains committed to international standards established to counter terrorism and proliferation financing. Our commitment to these global best practices is evidenced by our continuous review and improvement of our domestic legislative framework governing anti-money laundering, counter-terrorism financing and counter-proliferation financing. To this end, several pieces of legislation have been enacted and amended over the past decade, to ensure alignment of our national framework with international standards on terrorism and counter-proliferation financing, to include the Proceeds of Crime Act, the United Nations Security Council Resolution Implementation Act and the Terrorism Prevention Act.

In furtherance of our commitment to global counter-terrorism and non-proliferation financing efforts, in August 2021, Jamaica concluded the Financial Action Task Force national risk assessment. Another significant achievement is the establishment of the National Counter Terrorism Forum, which serves as the central hub and integrated platform that coordinates and facilitates the exchange of intelligence and information-sharing on terrorist threats among the various law enforcement and intelligence agencies, as well as border security authorities. The National Counter Terrorism Forum provides a mechanism for the maintenance of a national watch-list system of known and suspected terrorists, including foreign terrorist fighters. The Forum also allows for the monitoring of our national systems and framework, against the tenets of the Security Council resolution relating to the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Jamaica continues to appreciate the importance of capacity-building to the success of our national control systems and framework and has invested in the training

of 250 local experts who are directly or indirectly responsible for countering terrorism and violent extremism, in countering violent extremism, crime scene management, strategic counter-terrorism management and proliferation financing.

Jamaica is also currently finalizing a National Counter Terrorism Strategy and the National Integrated Counter Terrorism Response Readiness Plan.

While the access to and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is neither novel or mundane, Jamaica recognizes the importance of border security resilience in the fight against terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. To this end, we continue to give relevant consideration of measures that can prevent the transfer or distribution of weapons of mass destruction across our borders. Accordingly, the strengthening of our maritime domain awareness and response capabilities continues to be of critical importance. Significant focus has also been placed on the amendment of our border security legislative framework, to support the implementation of resolutions 2396 (2017) and 2178 (2014), which impose legal obligations on States to establish systems for the collection, processing and analysis of large amounts of personal passenger data. These systems will enable the identification, detection and prevention of terrorist travel, and the successful interception of foreign terrorist fighters, while facilitating international travel.

Jamaica is also in the process of upgrading the technology of its non-intrusive inspection systems at major ports of entry, to improve the effectiveness of cargo screening at these border facilities.

The enactment of these border security controls will allow us to address the implementation of the revised guidance of the Council of the International Civil Aviation Organization on advance passenger information and passenger name records of the Standards and Recommended Practices, under annex 9 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation.

Jamaica strongly reaffirms its commitment and support of international standards and mechanisms to mitigate the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and measures to prevent access to and the use of these weapons by terrorists.

In addition, we encourage States, and in particular small island developing States with limited resources and capabilities, to capitalize on opportunities that facilitate greater information-sharing, intelligence gathering and joint military and security forces training exercises with international counterparts, on measures to mitigate terrorism and access of terrorists to weapons of mass destruction. This will facilitate greater exposure and understanding of international best practices that can aid in preventing or mitigating the effects of weapons of mass destruction by members of the security forces; an opportunity for international military, security forces and other subject matter experts to gain familiarity with various geographic locations outside of their own borders and jurisdictions that could be exploited by terrorist organizations; and the establishment of guiding principles or standard operating procedures that can be used by local military and security forces in collaboration with international partners, should the need arise to collectively combat terrorist or weapons of mass destruction threats.

Qatar

[Original: Arabic]
[31 March 2022]

Measures taken by Qatar to combat terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction:

I. New institutions

With a view to contributing to international stability, peace and security, the State of Qatar established the National Committee for the Prohibition of Weapons as a standing committee in the Ministry of Defence with Cabinet Decision No. 26 (2004), as amended by Decision No. 45 (2007). It is the body responsible for contributing to State policy and representing the State abroad in connection with conventions on weapons of mass destruction.

In 2012, the Doha Regional Centre for Training on Conventions on Weapons of Mass Destruction was opened. It was the first centre of its kind in the Middle East. It holds conferences and conducts practical training workshops on the prohibition of weapons of mass destruction.

II. National legislation

- Act No. 17 (2007) on chemical weapons, as amended by Act No. 16 (2013)
- Act No. 4 (2016) on biological weapons
- Act No. 3 (2018) on a national system for inventory and control of nuclear materials
- Act No. 28 (2002) on combating money-laundering, article 2 of which penalizes all forms of acquisition or possession of funds that are the proceeds of crimes, including the offences of illegal trafficking in weapons, ammunition and explosives, or terrorist offences
- Act No. 40 (2002) on customs and control of the State's exports and imports
- Act No. 3 (2004) on counter-terrorism
- Council of Ministers Decree No. 7 (2007) establishing the National Counter-Terrorism Committee
- Council of Ministers Decree No. 17 (2014) establishing a national committee on explosives

III. International treaties

- Pursuant to Article 68 of the Constitution of Qatar, all treaties and agreements ratified by the State of Qatar have the force of law once they are ratified and published in the Official Gazette.
- On 29 January 1989, Qatar issued an instrument of accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons; Decree No. 38 (1989) was issued approving accession to the Treaty.
- On 24 September 1996, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was signed; on 8 December 1999, Decree No. 54 (1999) was issued ratifying it.

- On 4 July 2001, Qatar ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction under Decree No. 32 (2001).
- Qatar ratified the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction under Decree No. 58 (2003) of 25 August 2003.
- It acceded to the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident on 4 November 2005.
- It acceded to the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency on 4 November 2005.
- It acceded to the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material on 1 December 2004.
- It ratified the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material on 11 November 2014.
- It ratified the 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism on 2 October 2014.

IV. Awareness and training workshops

- The National Committee for the Prohibition of Weapons holds awareness and training programmes on conventions on weapons of mass destruction. They include university and secondary students and students at military institutes, colleges and academies. They also include customs officers and State agencies that deal with chemical, biological and nuclear materials.
- The Committee has hosted numerous conferences, workshops and training courses through the Doha Regional Centre for Training on Conventions on Weapons of Mass Destruction. They offer practical training for representatives of States parties on the conventions on weapons of mass destruction (chemical, nuclear and biological).
- The Committee began holding courses and workshops in 2007. It started with one event that year. Event followed event and its schedule has expanded to 10 events annually.

V. Responding to emergencies during major incidents

The competent State authorities are setting up national teams to address emergencies and potential nuclear, chemical and biological terrorist acts as part of their preparations for the 2022 World Cup to be held in Qatar. Cooperation and coordination are being carried out with international disarmament and counter-terrorism organizations to train national teams on biological, chemical and nuclear security. The National Committee for the Prohibition of Weapons is organizing the following anti-terrorist training programmes:

- A biological security programme through the Biosafe project of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) Secretariat and the INTERPOL National Central Bureau in Doha;
- A nuclear security and radiological emergency preparedness and response programme in cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA);
- A chemical security programme in cooperation with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).

Spain

[Original: Spanish]
[31 May 2022]

In its 2021 national security strategy, Spain identifies as a threat to its national security the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including among non-State actors such as criminal networks and terrorist organizations.

Spain has signed and ratified the main non-proliferation and disarmament treaties and conventions, including:

- The 1925 Geneva Protocol
- The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
- The International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism
- The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities
- The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction
- The Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, whose implementing body is the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons

Spain also belongs to all the export control regimes relating to weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery (the Zangger Committee, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group and the Missile Technology Control Regime) and participates in various operational initiatives, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism.

Preventing terrorist organizations from acquiring weapons of mass destruction is one of the objectives of the Proliferation Security Initiative, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and, in particular, Security Council resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#). Such prevention requires coordinated and agile State- and interministerial-level action by the entire public administration, as well as between the public administration and various relevant private sector actors, such as customs agents, consignees and carriers. In accordance with Security Council resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#), through Order No. PRA/29/2018 of 22 January 2018, the Specialized Committee on the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction was established within the National Security Council.

The Specialized Committee is chaired by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Global Affairs and is composed of representatives of all relevant ministries, including the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Justice. Its responsibilities include:

- Supporting the National Security Council in making decisions relating to the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by analysing, examining and proposing initiatives at both the national and international levels
- Strengthening relations with relevant public bodies, as well as coordination, collaboration and cooperation between the public and private sectors
- Assessing risks and threats and analysing possible crisis scenarios, particularly those that could lead to national security incidents

The Working Group on the Interdiction of Weapons of Mass Destruction, which is an operational and advisory body, was established within the Specialized Committee to evaluate possible cases of the diversion of weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems and related materials, and to provide a coordinated and effective response on behalf of all ministries involved, in order to prevent the proliferation of such weapons and materials.

In order to more effectively combat proliferation and achieve the established objectives, the Working Group is discussing a protocol on interministerial action to interdict weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials. Such action, like the activities carried out in relation to the transit and transfer of such materials in Spain, requires interministerial cooperation in order to enable more effective and immediate intelligence and police responses in this area. The goal is to prevent weapons of mass destruction from being diverted to State and non-State actors of concern, such as terrorist organizations. One of the first steps in this direction has been to consider the actors involved in each ministry and to foster a commitment to strengthening coordination, support and responses through channels that are specialized in the interdiction of weapons of mass destruction.

There are also other working groups and commissions at the national level whose work is related to the ultimate goal of preventing terrorist groups from gaining access to weapons of mass destruction. Such groups include the Nuclear Affairs Contact Group, the Contact Group for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons, the Working Group of the National Authority for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the National Working Group for the Implementation of the European Union Action Plan to enhance preparedness against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security risks, and the 1540 Interministerial Contact Group. These working groups interact in accordance with guidelines for interministerial coordination, given the cross-cutting nature of their areas of responsibility. As a result, it has been possible to reverse the scattering of expertise in accordance with the basic principles guiding the national security policy, specifically, unity of action, early warning, prevention, efficiency, the sustainable use of resources, the capacity for resilience and recovery, coordination and collaboration.

Also at the national level, as a result of the growing complexity and sophistication of money-laundering and terrorism financing schemes associated with the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and related materials, the Executive Service of the Commission for the Prevention of Money-Laundering and Monetary Offences conducts risk analyses, financial intelligence reporting and information exchanges in order to enable the detection of indications of the acquisition of such weapons. The Executive Service's financial intelligence reports are forwarded to the police for investigation. This is one of the ways in which the units dedicated to combating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction begin their investigations in order to prevent the potential diversion of these weapons to terrorist organizations.

Given the significant global dimension of money-laundering and the financing of terrorism, the investigation of economic flows related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction requires strong international cooperation. The Executive Service of the Commission for the Prevention of Money-Laundering and Monetary Offences therefore participates in the Financial Action Task Force, an intergovernmental body established in 1989 whose objectives include developing standards; effectively promoting legal, regulatory and operational measures to prevent money-laundering, the financing of terrorism and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and ensuring a coordinated response by the international financial system to these threats.

III. Reply received from the European Union

European Union

[Original: English]

[31 May 2022]

The European Union remains strongly committed to preventing terrorists from acquiring nuclear, chemical, biological, and missile materials, technical know-how and technology. This commitment is based on the European Union Common Foreign and Security Policy, the European Union Global Strategy (2016), the European Security Strategy (2003) and the European Union Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (2003), the counter-terrorism agenda for the European Union (2020) and the New Lines for Action by the European Union in Combating the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and their delivery systems (2008, 2013). The European Union and its member States apply comprehensive export controls and implement stringently resolutions [1540 \(2004\)](#), [2325 \(2016\)](#), [1887 \(2009\)](#) and [1977 \(2001\)](#). All European Union agreements with third countries contain a clause on the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

While States bear the prime responsibility for nuclear security, international cooperation helps to strengthen it. Throughout 2020, the European Union continued to promote the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism and the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material as fundamental elements of the global nuclear security and anti-terrorism architecture.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Office of Counter-Terrorism started implementing the Council of the European Union decision 2018/1939 on union support for the universalisation and effective implementation of the Convention. The Decision aims to increase the number of adherents to the Convention, to raise awareness among national policy- and decision-makers, to help improve national legislation and to strengthen the capacity of national stakeholders, including criminal justice officials, to investigate, prosecute and adjudicate cases of nuclear terrorism. The implementation of the Council decision started with launching events in New York and Vienna.

The European Union contributes to the implementation of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the 2018–2021 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Nuclear Security Plan through Council decision 2020/1656, which funds IAEA activities towards the universalization of international non-proliferation and nuclear security instruments, including the Amendment; enhancing Nuclear security culture; the development of information management with a focus on assessing nuclear security needs, priorities and threats; supporting nuclear security of materials and associated facilities with a focus on enhancing physical protection and nuclear material accounting and control for the whole fuel cycle and a concept paper on the application of physical protection measures in the age of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19); supporting nuclear security of materials out of regulatory control with a focus on institutional response infrastructure for material out of regulatory control; contributing to programme development and international cooperation with a focus on education and training programme development; supporting gender-focused capacity-building and education in nuclear security.

The European Union continued to support the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism and its mission to strengthen global capacity to prevent, detect,

and respond to nuclear terrorism. The European Union and its Member States are actively involved in the work of the Global Initiative in all areas: nuclear detection, nuclear forensics, and response and mitigation.

The European Union Nuclear Security Training Centre for detection and response to illicit acts with nuclear and other radioactive materials has operated since 2013 for the benefit of European Union member States and partner countries, among them several Global Initiative members. The Centre, operated by the European Commission Joint Research Centre, also organizes exercises on countering nuclear smuggling. The Centre is active in addressing the training needs of European Union member States and partners, including coordinated trainings for customs and law enforcement officers. Upon request by European Union member States, it also provides assessment of equipment performance.

The European Commission and the European Union member States continued their nuclear forensics activities on the basic characterization of intercepted nuclear material, using an advanced nuclear forensic investigation at the Joint Nuclear Research Centre site in Karlsruhe, Germany. Overall, nuclear materials detected and seized in more than 50 incidents have been examined, thus providing support to competent authorities in European Union member States and beyond.

The European Union and its member States have been at the forefront of international efforts to bring into existence a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, and continue to call for immediate commencement and early conclusion of such negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, on the basis of document [CD/1299](#) and the mandate contained therein. Through Council decision 2017/2284, the European Union provided financial support to the Office for Disarmament Affairs to facilitate the participation of African, Asian, Latin American and Caribbean countries in related consultations and other activities.

The European Union continued to support the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) politically, diplomatically and financially to ensure full and effective implementation of Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction. The European Union also engaged in extensive diplomatic outreach to contribute to a successful outcome of the 26th Conference of States Parties to the Convention, held from 29 November to 2 December 2021.

The European Union continued its firm support for the work of the OPCW Fact Finding Mission and the Declaration Assessment Team in investigating reports of chemical weapons use in the Syrian Arab Republic and seeking to verify that country's declaration. Implementation of the Council decision 2017/2303 in support of the continued implementation of Security Council resolution [2118 \(2013\)](#) and OPCW Executive Council decision EC-M-33/DEC.1 on the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons through the provision of satellite imagery in support of the OPCW operations in the Syrian Arab Republic was continued. Upon expiry of this action, the Council of the European Union adopted a new decision 2021/2073 in support of enhancing the operational effectiveness of OPCW through satellite imagery.

On 12 October 2020, the European Union extended by Council decision 2020/1466 its regime of restrictive measures to address the use and proliferation of chemical weapons for a further 12 months.

The implementation of Council decision 2017/1252 in support of the strengthening of chemical safety and security in Ukraine in line with the implementation of resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) on the non-proliferation of weapons of

mass destruction and their means of delivery continued. A six-month extension of the implementation period of this decision was provided through Council decision 2020/796 of 16 June 2020.

The European Union continued its strong political and financial support for the full and effective implementation and universalization of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. The implementation of the fifth consecutive Council decision in support of the Convention continued. Council decision 2019/97 of 21 January 2019 provides for a budget of 3 million euros to the Office for Disarmament Affairs for the period from 2019 to 2022. This allows the Convention implementation support unit to facilitate six new projects in support of universalization, capacity-building for national implementation, including three peer review exercises, fostering biosecurity in the global south, developing tools for outreach, education and engagement, and increasing preparedness to respond to biological attacks. Decision 2019/97 will also support the Convention's intersessional programme and the preparation of the ninth review conference in 2022. On 25 November 2021, the European Union furthermore adopted Council decision 2021/2072 in support of building resilience in biosafety and biosecurity through the Convention that provides a further 2 million euros for projects enhancing biosecurity in Africa in the framework of the Group of Seven global partnership signature initiative for Africa.

The implementation of Council decision 2019/1296 of 31 July 2019 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Ukraine in line with the implementation of resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery continued. This decision provides for 1.9 million euros in support over three years. With the decision, the European Union aims at strengthening the biological safety and security in Ukraine, notably by improving the legislative and regulatory basis of Ukraine and its human and animal health systems, and by raising the awareness among scientists.

The implementation of Council decision 2019/2108 of 9 December 2019 in support of strengthening biological safety and security in Latin America in line with the implementation of resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) on non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery continued. The decision provides for 2.7 million euros over three years. With the decision, the European Union aims at strengthening the biological safety and security in beneficiary countries, notably by improving their legislative and regulatory basis and by raising the awareness among relevant sectors, including through the enforcement of effective domestic measures to prevent the proliferation of biological weapons and their means of delivery.

In its statements at the meeting of experts and the Meeting of States Parties to the Biological Weapons Convention in 2021, the European Union reaffirmed its strong support to the Convention as a key pillar of the rules-based international system and recalled its longstanding efforts to strengthen the Convention, promote its universalization and enhance its implementation. The European Union priorities in the context of the Convention include enhancing national implementation and compliance, promoting confidence-building and transparency measures such as peer reviews, voluntary visits and other initiatives, facilitating cooperation on science and technology, operationalizing article V consultative provisions and article VII provisions on assistance, response and preparedness, promoting universal adherence to the Convention, and gender equality and the empowerment of women as an important cross-cutting priority.

The European Union actively participated in the review process of resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#), which led to the unanimous adoption of resolution [2325 \(2016\)](#). The

European Union provided a report on the implementation of resolution 1540 (2004), with concrete proposals concerning the implementation, assistance, international cooperation, transparency and outreach related to the resolution, as well as the role and competence of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004). Through Council decision 2017/809, the European Union provides 2.7 million euros over a period of three years for the effective implementation of resolution 1540 (2004). The implementation period of this decision was extended by eight months, until 25 April 2022, by Council decision 2021/1025 of 21 June 2021.

The European Union Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative is a worldwide capacity-building programme, currently gathering 62 partner countries grouped around eight regional secretariats, located in the following regions: the African Atlantic facade; Central Asia; Eastern and Central Africa; the Gulf Cooperation Council Countries; the Middle East; North Africa and the Sahel; South-East Asia; South-East and Eastern Europe.

The Initiative is financed under the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument 2021–2027 and is aimed at mitigating risks related to chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear materials, strengthen partner countries' preparedness, and nurture security culture and governance. Participating countries are supported in their efforts to establish, on a voluntary basis and following a demand-driven, regional approach, national and regional coordination and governance structures. These platforms develop and reinforce national chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear policies and build capacities based on specific needs assessments and national action plans. They are supported through several regional cooperation projects funded under the Initiative and open to other financing instruments. Since 2010, 90 regional projects have been funded. The budget for the initiative for the 11-year period starting in 2010 amounts to approximately 275 million euros.

The Centres of Excellence network is now well developed and allowed the European Union to undertake training tabletop and field cross-border exercises on matters including civil protection, incident response, biosecurity and waste management in the framework of Centres of Excellence projects, in order to enhance visibility and concretely assess their impact. Regional chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear action plans have started to be developed as has inter-regional cooperation. Moreover, the Initiative is mature enough to support further actions addressing security governance issues related to cybercrime, terrorism, critical infrastructure, falsified medicines, hybrid threats and explosives, and to further develop cooperation on nuclear forensics, border control and export control of dual-use items. In 2020, in the framework of the Centres of Excellence network, the European Union Joint Nuclear Research Centre, in collaboration with the United States Department of Energy and the Kiev Institute for Nuclear Research, developed nuclear security education and training activities for participants from Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and the Republic of Moldova to enhance nuclear security in the Black Sea region, and supported the implementation of three nuclear-security-related projects in Georgia, Ukraine, Azerbaijan and the Republic of Moldova. Desktop and field exercises based on nuclear smuggling scenarios were conducted in Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. Training of young nuclear security professionals was offered at the Kyiv Institute for Nuclear Research and the Kharkiv Institute for Physics and Technology. Additionally, a regional nuclear forensics information system was established. For sustaining nuclear forensics capabilities in the Black Sea region, three follow-up projects managed by the Science and Technology Centre in Ukraine were initiated.

The 2017 action plan to enhance preparedness against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security risks, reviewed at the end of 2019, remains valid

and provides a general policy framework in the chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear area at the European Union level. The current action plan, building on the achievements of the European Union chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear action plan for 2010–2015, introduced a wide range of measures to improve preparedness, resilience and coordination at European Union level. Some of the activities had to be put on hold owing to the global pandemic situation, others continued as planned. The Commission continued its engagement with detection equipment manufacturers in order to see how these substances could be better detected. In parallel, the Commission is looking at the feasibility of restricting access to these chemicals. Additionally, the pandemic drew the attention of policymakers to the biological threat, including through the creation of a biosecurity toolbox by a consortium of member States authorities, which provides responsible national authorities with a large number of instruments to better address this issue. In the near future, as announced in December 2020 in the counter-terrorism agenda for the European Union, these two areas will remain main priorities when it comes to chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threats. The implementation of the action plan has been supported financially via the Internal Security Fund (Police). Among the selected projects, there are cross-border initiatives looking at addressing chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threat in areas such as shopping malls, sport arenas or cross-border tunnels. The chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear action plan has also received scientific and technical support from a range of research projects funded under the Horizon 2020 programme. The research covers the entire crisis management cycle, from prevention to recovery.

The European Union supports the implementation and functioning of and universal adherence to the only multilateral transparency and confidence-building instrument against ballistic missile proliferation, the Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation. Through a successive series of decisions, the European Union has financed the Hague Code of Conduct outreach activities, including side events, research papers, expert meetings and regional awareness seminars. These activities are carried out by the Paris-based Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, frequently also involving the rotating chairpersonship of the Hague Code of Conduct. They aim to support the full implementation of the Code; promote dialogue among subscribing and non-subscribing States, encourage restraint and create more stability and security for all; reinforce the Code's visibility and raise public awareness about the risks and threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation; and explore possibilities of enhancing the Code and of promoting cooperation between the Code and other relevant multilateral instruments. With Council decision 2017/2370 (11) of 18 December 2017, the European Union continues to promote the subscription to the Code and ultimately its universality; support the full implementation of the Code; promote dialogue among subscribing and non-subscribing States with the aim of helping to build confidence and transparency, encouraging restraint and creating more stability and security for all; reinforce the Code's visibility and raise public awareness about the risks and threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation; and to explore, in particular through academic studies, possibilities of enhancing the Code and of promoting cooperation between the Code and other relevant multilateral instruments.

The European Union also works to strengthen the multinational efforts to stop proliferation-related trade in weapons of mass destruction, related materials and delivery systems by promoting the adherence to the principles of the Proliferation Security Initiative, a voluntary initiative geared toward enhancing individual and collective capabilities to take appropriate action to deal with proliferation networks.

By implementing the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Missile Technology Control Regime and Australia Group export control lists, the European Union contributes to

preventing the access of terrorist networks to weapons of mass destruction, and related technology and deters their efforts to develop such kind of weapons.

The European Union continued to participate actively in the meetings of the Group of Seven's non-proliferation directors' group. In 2020, the European Union participated in the meetings under the presidency of the United States.

The European Union supports other multilateral efforts, such as the Nuclear Security Contact Group, in our common interest to ensure worldwide commitment to nuclear security best practices in order to prevent terrorism acquiring nuclear weapons or materials.

In its bilateral relations with third countries and regional organizations, the European Union aims to strengthen the global non-proliferation infrastructure, enhance chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security and contribute to the prevention of acts of terrorism. Although the global pandemic situation has significantly reduced opportunities for diplomatic contact in 2021, work towards these goals has been continued with partners. Non-proliferation, chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security and counter-terrorism measures were also integral parts of dialogue with third countries.

The implementation of the European Union Partner to Partner Export Control Programme to enhance the effectiveness of export control systems of dual-use items and related materials, equipment and technologies continued. The European Union Partner to Partner portal¹ continued to serve as a platform for all European Union outreach programmes on export control of military and dual-use goods, with the aim of customizing information exchange with the European Union partner countries. The programme is funded under the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace.

As acknowledged in the 20th progress report towards an effective and genuine security union, the European Union has worked to counter terrorism by closing down the space in which terrorists operate, with new rules making it harder for them to access explosives, firearms and financing, and to restrict their movements. The deadline for the transposition of directive 2017/541 on combating terrorism expired on 8 September 2018. Of the 25 member States bound by the directive, by the report of the Commission on 30 September 2020, 23 adopted new legislation in order to ensure transposition of the directive. European Union support has helped to make cities more resilient against attacks, with action plans to support the protection of public spaces and to enhance preparedness against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear security risks. The European Union has addressed cybersecurity and cyberenabled threats by putting in place a new European Union cybersecurity strategy and adopting relevant legislation, and publishing the European Democracy Action Plan to tackle disinformation and better protect the electoral process. Cooperation on the cybersecurity of 5G networks across Europe has been reinforced, in particular on the European Union risk assessment report published on 9 October 2019. The European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation set up on 1 September 2019 a European judicial counter-terrorism register to gather judicial information to establish links in proceedings against those suspected of terrorist offences with potential cross-border implications.

¹ Available at <https://export-control.jrc.ec.europa.eu/>.

IV. Replies received from international organizations

Commonwealth of Independent States

[Original: Russian]

[22 March 2022]

The States members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) are working systematically to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery and materials and technologies related to their manufacture. Joint measures are carried out in that regard, with due consideration for the leading role of the United Nations and the development of cooperation with other international institutions and specialized bodies. CIS countries regularly submit relevant information on measures being taken to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004).

The regulatory and legal system established in CIS is being steadily improved to take into account the changing situation and threats, including the possible acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by terrorists.

As part of drafting proposals regarding future areas of cooperation to counter terrorism and extremism, the Interparliamentary Assembly of the States members of CIS began work on draft recommendations to CIS members for improving national laws aimed at preventing the use of radioactive substances, hazardous chemicals and biological pathogens for terrorist purposes.

On 11 October 2019, as part of implementing the programme of cooperation among the CIS member States in combating terrorism and other violent extremism for the period 2020–2022, the CIS Council of Heads of State approved the continuation of organizational and practical measures to:

Identify and dismantle laboratories used to assemble equipment and means for perpetrating terrorist and extremist offences, including materials for manufacturing weapons of mass destruction;

Prevent, detect and suppress activities associated with assisting terrorist organizations and criminal networks, groups and individuals involved in the illicit manufacture of and trafficking in arms, ammunition, explosives, explosive devices, toxic chemicals and biological pathogens, nuclear material and radioactive substances;

Ensure the protection of sites that pose a high technological and environmental risk.

Under the programme, special training is being provided to counter-terrorism forces and entities in suppressing criminal activity connected with the use of weapons of mass destruction.

The CIS Anti-Terrorism Centre has coordinated a joint counter-terrorism exercise entitled “The Caspian Sea and counter-terrorism 2021” and has gathered the heads of counter-terrorism units of CIS member States’ security agencies and intelligence services to fine-tune the coordination of security agencies, intelligence services and law enforcement agencies in uncovering and disrupting plans to carry out terrorist attacks against maritime infrastructure and oil and gas enterprises.

Systematic efforts continue to be made to improve the exchange of information related to security and law and order among States, in particular with regard to preventing crime in the territories of the CIS member States, and to develop automated databases that could help to detect and expose cross-border crimes and to detain individuals for whom an international arrest warrant has been issued.

There is no information pointing to the production or acquisition by terrorists of weapons of mass destruction or their components, or regarding their access to technologies for their manufacture, in the CIS region.

International Atomic Energy Agency

[Original: English]
[17 May 2022]

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) continued to assist States, upon request, through the implementation of its Nuclear Security Plan 2018–2021, while also adapting to the circumstances of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. IAEA also developed the next Nuclear Security Plan for 2022–2025.

IAEA continued to promote the universal adherence to and effective implementation of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its Amendment, one of the primary binding international instruments relevant to nuclear security, including through intensified efforts to assist parties in preparing for the conference of the parties to the Amendment, planned to be held from 28 March to 1 April 2022.

The Agency continued to develop comprehensive guidance on nuclear security with the active involvement of experts from member States. The Nuclear Security Guidance Committee met four times during 2021 and approved three new documents and three revisions of existing publications. By the end of 2021, IAEA issued a cumulative total of 42 publications in the Nuclear Security Series, with more than 12 draft publications under development.

To help member States to fulfil their international obligations, the Agency conducted six International Physical Protection Advisory Service missions in 2021. The total number of such missions conducted to date increased to 96. The Service provides member States with peer advice on implementing the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, other international instruments and Agency guidance on the protection of nuclear and other radioactive material, associated facilities and associated activities.

Incidents reported to the Incident and Trafficking Database demonstrate that illicit trafficking, thefts, losses and other unauthorized activities and events involving nuclear and other radioactive material continue to occur. In 2021, States reported 120 incidents involving nuclear and other radioactive material outside of regulatory control, bringing the total in the Database to 3,923 confirmed incidents reported by participating States.

In 2021, IAEA continued to advise States virtually on formal threat characterization and assessment; development, use and maintenance of design basis threats; vulnerability analysis; and the development of methodologies for performance assessment of physical protection systems. Other activities such as securing of vulnerable radioactive sources, upgrading facilities and repatriating high activity sources continued.

The Agency also continued to provide assistance to the member States in implementing nuclear security systems and measures for major public events. In 2021, such assistance was provided to eight States with 761 radiation detection instruments loaned to support States in securing major public events.

In 2021, the Agency conducted 110 nuclear and radiological security related training activities, including 59 training courses and workshops and 51 webinars, for more than 10,000 participants from 138 States. In addition, the Agency conducted

seven Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plan missions and 13 related progress review meetings with member States.

International Civil Aviation Organization

[Original: English]

[31 May 2022]

The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) supports the counter-terrorism objectives set out in General Assembly resolution 76/28, entitled “Measures to prevent terrorists from acquiring weapons of mass destruction”, by enhancing the security of the international civil aviation system through international legal instruments on counter-terrorism and through the development and review of the Standards and Recommended Practices in annex 17 (Security) to the Convention on International Civil Aviation.

ICAO continues to promote the universal adoption of the Convention on the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Relating to International Civil Aviation (Beijing Convention), which entered into force on 1 July 2018. The Beijing Convention criminalizes acts of using civil aircraft for the purpose of causing death, serious bodily injury or serious damage; of using civil aircraft to release or discharge any biological, chemical or nuclear weapon or similar substances to cause death, serious bodily injury or serious damage; and of using any biological, chemical or nuclear weapon or similar substances on board or against civil aircraft. It further criminalizes the unlawful transport of any biological, chemical or nuclear weapon, related material or other dangerous material. The Beijing Convention has 43 States parties, and at its fortieth session, the ICAO Assembly, through its resolution A40-11, entitled “Consolidated statement on continuing ICAO policies related to aviation security”, and resolution A40-28, entitled “Consolidated statement of continuing ICAO policies in the legal field”, urged States that had not ratified the Convention to do so as soon as possible.

To facilitate States’ assessment of risks faced by civil aviation security, ICAO periodically issues updates to its publication entitled *Aviation Security Global Risk Context Statement*, which includes an assessment of the global aviation threat picture, a description of the different threat scenarios that are considered, the utilized methodology and the obtained risk levels. The third edition of that document, expected to be published in English in September 2022 and other languages to follow, will provide States and other stakeholders with risk information arising from threat scenarios including but not limited to attacks using remotely piloted aircraft systems on aviation targets; aircraft used as a weapon; chemical threats; missiles and other attacks from distance (in and outside conflict zones); and biological and radiological threats.

Other guidance material includes the 12th edition of the ICAO Aviation Security Manual, which is available in all ICAO languages. This document includes updated guidance on explosives detection methods, such as on the use of explosives trace detection equipment, body scanners, explosives detection systems for cabin baggage and explosives detection dogs for air cargo screening. The Manual also addresses the protection of civil aviation infrastructure against unmanned aircraft, as this vector of attack is of growing concern, especially in conflict zone areas. Furthermore, recognizing the need to continue to address new and evolving threats to civil aviation, additional guidance material was developed and published in July 2021, providing best practices on establishing a risk-based prohibited item list, determining the role of airports and aircraft operators in one-stop security arrangements, and applying alternative security measures for lower-risk airports. Progress has also been made in the development of best practices aimed at assisting States in applying the upcoming provisions set by amendment 18 to annex 17.

With regard to the legal transport of dangerous goods as cargo on aircraft, annex 18, on the safe transport of dangerous goods by air, together with the detailed specifications contained in the Technical Instructions for the Safe Transport of Dangerous Goods by Air, 2021–2022 edition, provide States with an internationally agreed set of provisions governing their safe transport for all international operations of civil aircraft. With regard to the transport of high-consequence dangerous goods, additional security measures are contained therein. Furthermore, ICAO has worked with the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons to facilitate their work when transporting samples for analysis. In December 2020 and January 2021, two addenda to the Instructions amended provisions related to the transport of infectious substances in order to facilitate the safe transport of pharmaceuticals related to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19).

Office of Counter-Terrorism

[Original: English]
[31 May 2022]

Work of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact

In 2021, the Office of Counter-Terrorism, through the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Coordination Compact and its Working Group on Emerging Threats and Critical Infrastructure Protection provided a forum to exchange information and coordinate support to Member States to prevent and respond to emerging terrorist threats, including those related to the misuse of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials.

In addition to its regular meetings, the Working Group invited the Counter-Terrorism Compact community to thematic briefings with the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, focusing on Da'esh's development, use and deployment of chemical and biological weapons and materials.

The Working Group also completed its joint project entitled "Technology and security: enhancing knowledge about advances in science and technology to combat weapons of mass destruction terrorism", funded and co-implemented by the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre of the Office of Counter-Terrorism, together with the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute. The project developed a report, presented during the second Counter-Terrorism Week at the United Nations in June 2021, which focuses on science, technology and innovation from the perspective of combating weapons of mass destruction terrorism and aims to support Member States in developing appropriate measures and practices.

In December 2021, the Working Group launched phase III of the project on "Ensuring effective inter-agency interoperability and coordinated communication in case of chemical and/or biological attacks". The project is led by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre, with seed-funding from Office and the Centre, and technical support from the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, Office for Disarmament Affairs and the World Health Organization (WHO). It is designed to promote enhanced inter-agency coordination for the preparedness and support to Member States, on their request, to respond to chemical and biological attacks. This project builds on the results of the previous two phases, which conducted a mapping of the United Nations entities engaged and issued recommendations on the response.

Work of the Office of Counter-Terrorism and its United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre

In 2021, the Office, through the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre and its global programme on preventing and responding to weapons of mass destruction and chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear terrorism, delivered outreach and capacity-building activities at the global, regional and national levels, benefiting 2,900 officials from over 100 Member States. Activities included a briefing for Member States on the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, a web dialogue on preventing and countering bioterrorism in the wake of COVID-19, a workshop on countering nuclear terrorism in the Horn of Africa and a series of workshops to develop strategic plans on the chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear response for Iraq and Jordan. The Centre implemented these activities in partnership with the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), Kazakhstan and the United States of America.

In addition, the Centre launched a global portfolio of 20 courses to counter weapons of mass destruction and chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear terrorism, which have been used to train over 2,000 officials. Courses on prevention and response to biological terrorism were delivered for Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Nigeria, and the Philippines, while trainings to enhance the capacities in countering chemical terrorism benefitted Iraq and Jordan. Moreover, courses on radiological and nuclear threats and countermeasures were delivered in Malaysia and courses on chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear countermeasures were conducted for Australia, Kenya and New Zealand. In partnership with the Biological Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit of the Office, the Centre held a joint training on biological preparedness and response for Nigeria.

Furthermore, together with INTERPOL, the Centre completed the first and second phase of its global threat study on non-State actors and their potential use of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive materials, focusing on the Middle East and North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa regions. The other phases of the study include South-East Asia, Western, Central, and Southern Asia and the Americas.

The Office and the Centre continued coordination and close cooperation with numerous United Nations entities, international organizations and initiatives, including the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#), the International Atomic Energy Agency, NATO, OPCW, the Office of Legal Affairs, the World Customs Organization, WHO, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the Global Partnership Against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction and the Nuclear Threat Initiative.
