



# General Assembly

Distr.: General  
2 May 2023

Original: English

## Seventy-seventh session

Agenda item 151

### Administrative and budgetary aspects of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations

## Observations and recommendations on cross-cutting issues related to peacekeeping operations

### Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

## Contents

	<i>Page</i>
Abbreviations . . . . .	3
I. Introduction . . . . .	5
II. Reports of the Secretary-General on the financing of peacekeeping operations . . . . .	5
A. General observations and recommendations . . . . .	5
B. Planning, budgeting and financial management . . . . .	7
C. General cross-cutting matters . . . . .	42
D. Other matters . . . . .	51
III. Conclusion . . . . .	59
Annexes	
I. Reports considered by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions on issues related to peacekeeping . . . . .	60
II. Summary information on redeployment across groups . . . . .	62
III. Proposed requirements for the 2023/24 period by class of expenditure, compared with the 2021/22 and 2022/23 periods . . . . .	65
IV. Proposed resource requirements for the 2023/24 period, compared with approved budgets for the 2017/18 to 2022/23 periods . . . . .	67
V. Statements of financial position and performance . . . . .	68



---

VI.	Delayed deployment factors and vacancy rates . . . . .	70
VII.	Mission subsistence allowance levels for all categories in all missions . . . . .	74
VIII.	Breakdown of approved civilian staff by mission in the last three periods and proposed level for 2023/24. . . . .	75
IX.	Staff members in peacekeeping missions, including the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe and the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, by mission and gender, from 30 June 2018 to 31 December 2022 . . . . .	76
X.	Post nationalization . . . . .	80
XI.	Comparison of air operations in 2022/23 and 2023/24 by budget class per mission . . . . .	82
XII.	Budgeted and expenditure levels for stationery for the periods from 2020/21 to 2022/23 and proposed resources for 2023/24 . . . . .	85
XIII.	Analysis of the impact of fuel prices on the proposed budget for the 2023/24 period . . . . .	86
XIV.	Enterprise and field-specific software and applications . . . . .	89

## Abbreviations

AMISOM	African Union Mission in Somalia
BINUH	United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti
DCO	Development Coordination Office
ICSC	International Civil Service Commission
MINUJUSTH	United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti
MINURSO	United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSCA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic
MINUSMA	United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
MINUSTAH	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MONUSCO	United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
RSCE	Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda
UNAMID	African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur
UNAVEM	United Nations Angola Verification Mission
UNCRO	United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia
UNDOF	United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNFICYP	United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNHCR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNIFIL	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIKOM	United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission
UNISFA	United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNITAMS	United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan
UNLB	United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy
UNMIK	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL	United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMISS	United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNMOGIP	United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNOCI	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire
UNOPS	United Nations Office for Project Services
UNOSOM II	United Nations Office in Somalia II

UNPREDEP	United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
UNPROFOR	United Nations Protection Force
UNSOS (formerly UNSOA)	United Nations Support Office in Somalia (formerly United Nations Support Office for AMISOM)
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UNTSO	United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
WFP	World Food Programme

## I. Introduction

1. The present report contains the observations and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions on cross-cutting issues and addresses matters arising from the reports of the Secretary-General on peacekeeping operations, including his most recent report on the overview of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations ([A/77/779](#)). The Advisory Committee's comments on the findings of the Board of Auditors on the accounts of the United Nations peacekeeping operations for the period ended 30 June 2022 ([A/77/5 \(Vol. II\)](#)) and the related report of the Secretary-General ([A/77/766](#)) are contained in its report [A/77/802](#).

2. The list of reports related to peacekeeping considered by the Advisory Committee during its 2023 winter session is provided in annex I to the present report. During its consideration of the cross-cutting issues relating to peacekeeping operations, the Committee met with representatives of the Secretary-General, who provided additional information and clarification, concluding with written responses received on 19 April 2023.

## II. Reports of the Secretary-General on the financing of peacekeeping operations

### A. General observations and recommendations

3. The Secretary-General explains that pursuant to General Assembly resolution [59/296](#), his report provides an overview of the financial and administrative aspects of United Nations peacekeeping operations. The report presents consolidated information on the budget performance for the period from 1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022, the budget proposals for the period from 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024, and the status of the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund as at 30 June 2022 ([A/77/779](#), summary and paras. 1 and 3). **The Advisory Committee acknowledges the efforts of the Secretary-General to provide information and data to address the requests of the General Assembly in its latest resolution on cross-cutting issues (resolution [76/274](#)) as well as recommendations of the Committee included in its previous report on cross-cutting issues related to peacekeeping operations ([A/76/760](#)) and trusts that the Secretary-General will maintain and, where needed, increase these efforts, including by providing updates to the harmonized tables and annexes included in the present report in the context of future overview reports.**

4. The Advisory Committee makes observations and recommendations on the overview and peacekeeping reports and gives its analysis of the overall trends in financing and resource requirements for peacekeeping operations. The Committee's specific observations and recommendations with respect to individual mission budget proposals, as well as UNLB, RSCE and the support account, are contained in its reports on those subjects (see annex I).

#### 1. Operating context and planning assumptions for peacekeeping

5. In his overview report, the Secretary-General states that peacekeeping operations remain one of the most effective multilateral tools available to help to prevent the outbreak of or relapse into conflict and pave the way to sustainable peace. However, peacekeeping operations continue to face increasing challenges, including wide-ranging mandates, reduced resources, increasingly complex political and security environments, threats targeted at United Nations personnel and transnational threats that affect stability in some host countries. To address those challenges, the

Secretary-General launched the Action for Peacekeeping initiative in March 2018 to renew the collective engagement of all stakeholders with United Nations peacekeeping. Three years on, in early 2021, the Secretariat took stock and assessed the achievements, challenges and gaps of the Action for Peacekeeping initiative. Based on that analysis, an updated implementation strategy for Action for Peacekeeping for 2021–2023, entitled Action for Peacekeeping Plus, was developed (A/77/779, paras. 2 and 18–20). Sections III to XI of the report include updated information on actions taken to implement cross-cutting requests by the General Assembly in its resolution 76/274 and other actions to address relevant developments in peacekeeping operations, including efforts to improve the management and functioning of peacekeeping operations, and on priorities for the coming 2023/24 period. In accordance with General Assembly resolution 49/233 A, sections XII to XVII and the annexes to the overview report present information on the budget preparation and management of resources; multi-year trends in peacekeeping; the budget performance for the period from 1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022; consolidated information on the budget proposals for the period from 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024; cash liquidity analysis; and information on the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund as at 30 June 2022. **The Advisory Committee trusts that updated information, including on specific initiatives, achievements and challenges, will be provided in the context of the future overview and mission-specific budget reports. The Committee also trusts that every effort will be made to identify efficiencies across the board in the planning phase and that the approved resources will be managed in an effective and efficient manner.**

6. The report of the Secretary-General concludes with a request that the General Assembly take note of the report (ibid., para. 364). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that when the General Assembly “takes note” of reports of the Secretary-General or elements therein, this means that the Assembly neither agrees nor disagrees. In the annex to its decision 55/488, the General Assembly decided that the terms “takes note of” and “notes” are neutral terms that constitute neither approval nor disapproval. By doing so, the Assembly is effectively indicating that it has seen the reports and that they are no longer on the list of documents to be considered by the Assembly. The Secretariat confirms that it will abide by the mandates given by the legislative bodies. **The Advisory Committee reiterates that the “taking note” by the General Assembly of the overview report of the Secretary-General should not be viewed as an endorsement for any initiatives referred to therein on which no specific action is proposed. Any resource implications related to such initiatives will be considered on their own merits when proposed or found (see A/76/760, para. 7, A/75/822, para. 7, A/74/737, para. 9 and A/73/755, para. 8).**

7. In responding to General Assembly resolution 76/274 (paras. 10–12), the Secretary-General explains the impact of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) on the operations and the implementation of its budgets, flexible work arrangements, staff entitlements, and public health and health-care management. He also enumerates the lessons learned from the pandemic (A/77/779, paras. 8–17). According to the Secretary-General, in line with the request of the General Assembly to the Secretary-General, expressed in its resolution 76/246 B, section I, paragraph 6, the Secretary-General will include information on the organizational response to the COVID-19 pandemic, including lessons learned, as an annex to the progress report on the implementation of the organizational resilience management system at the seventy-ninth session of the General Assembly (ibid., para. 17). **The Advisory Committee notes the measures taken to facilitate the continued implementation of mandates while ensuring the health and safety of peacekeeping personnel and local communities. The Committee looks forward to the progress report on the organizational response to the COVID-19 pandemic and trusts that lessons will**

continue to be consolidated to appropriately respond to the COVID-19 pandemic as well as to future similar situations.

## **2. Overview of financial and human resources for peacekeeping**

8. In his report, the Secretary-General indicates that the total proposed resource requirements for peacekeeping operations for the financial period from 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024, inclusive of RSCE, UNLB and the support account, are currently estimated at \$6,812.1 million, excluding budgeted voluntary in-kind contributions.<sup>1</sup> Compared with the approved resources for the 2022/23 period in the amount of \$6,452.6 million, the 2022/23 proposed budget represents an increase of \$359.5 million, or 5.6 per cent, and relates to increases in the missions' budgets (\$339.1 million, or 5.7 per cent); the support account (\$19.4 million, or 5.2 per cent); RSCE (\$0.7 million, or 1.5 per cent); and UNLB (\$0.3 million, or 0.5 per cent) (*ibid.*, summary and table 6). The Advisory Committee makes further comments on the resource requirements for 2023/24 in the relevant paragraphs below.

## **B. Planning, budgeting and financial management**

### **1. Budget performance for the period 1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022**

9. The Secretary-General states that for the period from 1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022, expenditures of \$6,393.7 million were made in support of 11 active peacekeeping operations, UNSOS, UNLB, RSCE and the support account, against the total approved resources of \$6,445.3 million for the same period, exclusive of budgeted voluntary contributions, resulting in an overall unencumbered balance of \$51.6 million, or 0.8 per cent. This reflects an overall budget implementation rate of 99.2 per cent, compared with a rate of 96.9 per cent for the 2020/21 period (*ibid.*, summary and para. 350, tables 9 and 30 and annex III). Table 1 provides information on the budget performance for the 2021/22 period by class of expenditure. The table shows overall progress in the budget implementation rate under expenditures under military and police personnel in the amount of \$84.7 million. The Advisory Committee notes, however, that during the reporting period, there was an overall underexpenditure under both uniformed military and police personnel and civilian personnel in the amounts of \$84.7 million (3.0 per cent) and \$26.3 million (1.5 per cent), respectively. With respect to operational costs, the Committee notes the overexpenditure in the amount of \$56.6 million (3.1 per cent), owing mainly to overexpenditures under facilities and infrastructure (\$66.7 million, or 13.8 per cent), ground transportation (\$35.4 million, or 44.7 per cent), marine operations (\$2.3 million, or 41.0 per cent) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$17.0 million, or 5.0 per cent), which are offset in part by underexpenditures under consultants and consulting services (\$0.8 million, or 12.6 per cent), official travel (\$1.4 million, or 5.4 per cent), air operations (\$55.7 million, or 10.0 per cent), communications and information technology (\$3.4 million, or 1.2 per cent); medical (\$3.1 million, or 9.8 per cent); special equipment (\$0.1 million, or 100 per cent); and quick-impact projects (\$0.2 million, or 1.4 per cent).

<sup>1</sup> An amount of \$0.7 million in voluntary in-kind contributions is expected in 2023/24.

Table 1  
**Budget performance for the 2021/22 period, by class of expenditure**

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Class of expenditure	Appropriation (1)	Expenditure (2)	Variance	
			Amount (3)=(1)-(2)	Percentage (4)=(3)÷(1)
<b>Military and police personnel</b>				
Military observers	63 665.1	62 469.0	1 196.1	1.9
Military contingents	2 472 397.5	2 412 108.6	60 288.9	2.4
United Nations police	110 210.3	98 478.6	11 731.7	10.6
Formed police units	211 610.9	200 052.4	11 558.5	5.5
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>2 857 883.8</b>	<b>2 773 108.6</b>	<b>84 775.2</b>	<b>3.0</b>
<b>Civilian personnel</b>				
International staff	1 209 106.5	1 167 847.6	41 258.9	3.4
National staff	382 712.1	394 352.3	(11 640.2)	(3.0)
United Nations Volunteers	82 278.6	82 009.9	268.7	0.3
General temporary assistance	43 147.3	47 023.4	(3 876.1)	(9.0)
Government-provided personnel	11 438.7	11 152.1	286.6	2.5
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>1 728 683.2</b>	<b>1 702 385.3</b>	<b>26 297.9</b>	<b>1.5</b>
<b>Operational costs</b>				
Civilian electoral observers	—	—	—	—
Consultants and consulting services	6 390.0	5 584.2	805.8	12.6
Official travel	26 075.5	24 658.0	1 417.5	5.4
Facilities and infrastructure	482 333.1	549 018.6	(66 685.5)	(13.8)
Ground transportation	79 268.6	114 678.7	(35 410.1)	(44.7)
Air operations	558 397.8	502 656.9	55 740.9	10.0
Marine operations	5 509.5	7 766.8	(2 257.3)	(41.0)
Communications and information technology	279 812.4	276 462.5	3 349.9	1.2
Medical	31 940.5	28 801.9	3 138.6	9.8
Special equipment	100.0	—	100.0	100.0
Other supplies, services and equipment	337 159.5	354 153.6	(16 994.1)	(5.0)
Quick-impact projects	13 000.0	12 823.7	176.3	1.4
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>1 819 986.9</b>	<b>1 876 604.9</b>	<b>(56 618.0)</b>	<b>(3.1)</b>
Enterprise resource planning	15 799.5	15 799.5	—	—
Death and disability claims for closed peacekeeping operations	—	4 416.6	(4 416.6)	—
Global service delivery model	868.5	868.5	—	—
Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System	3 881.6	2 323.1	1 558.5	40.2
Umoja maintenance and support costs	18 221.4	18 211.7	9.7	0.1
<b>Gross requirements</b>	<b>6 445 324.9</b>	<b>6 393 718.2</b>	<b>51 606.7</b>	<b>0.8</b>
Staff assessment income	165 326.0	170 306.8	(4 980.8)	(3.0)
<b>Net requirements</b>	<b>6 279 998.9</b>	<b>6 223 411.4</b>	<b>56 587.5</b>	<b>0.9</b>
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	962.0	487.6	474.4	49.3
<b>Total requirements</b>	<b>6 446 286.9</b>	<b>6 394 205.8</b>	<b>52 081.1</b>	<b>0.8</b>



10. The Secretary-General explains that the unencumbered balance of \$51.6 million for the 2021/22 period stems mainly from the unencumbered balances of (a) MONUSCO (\$23.9 million, or 2.3 per cent of the approved resources); (b) UNAMID (\$14.0 million, or 17.7 per cent of the approved resources); and (c) UNSOS (\$3.5 million, or 0.7 per cent of the approved resources). The unencumbered balances for the three missions are explained under figure XIII in section XIII of the report of the Secretary-General (*ibid.*, para. 295). The Advisory Committee makes further comments in the context of its reports on the respective peacekeeping missions.

#### *Commitment authorities*

11. The report also includes an overview of the authorities to enter into commitments during the periods from 2017/18 to 2021/22 and the expenditures incurred against those authorities, as summarized in table 2. The request to enter into commitments with respect to UNISFA for the 2021/22 period was a result of the adoption of Security Council resolution 2609 (2021), which had a significant impact on the resource requirements for the 2021/22 period, including unforeseen requirements for the additional deployment and/or repatriation of uniformed personnel and the related operational costs. The additional required resources exceeded the approved resources, prompting the request for the authority to enter into commitments for the 2021/22 period in the amount of \$84.4 million. On 23 March 2022, the Advisory Committee approved a reduced authority to enter into commitments for UNISFA for the 2021/22 period in the amount of \$67.5 million. The expenditure under the authority to enter into commitments amounted to \$66.4 million, representing a utilization rate of 98.3 per cent. The variances are described in further detail in the performance report of UNISFA (*ibid.*, para. 309 and table 11).

Table 2

#### **Overview of authorities to enter into commitments, 2017/18 to 2021/22**

(Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Peacekeeping mission</i>	<i>Approved</i>				
	<i>2017/18</i>	<i>2018/19</i>	<i>2019/20</i>	<i>2020/21</i>	<i>2021/22</i>
MINUSCA	20 211.5	—	—	—	—
MINUSMA	43 174.0	32 600.0	—	—	—
MONUSCO	47 922.7	80 000.0	36 437.6	—	—
UNAMID	—	—	—	484 687.1	—
UNDOF	4 111.8	—	—	—	—
UNISFA	—	—	—	—	67 503.7
UNMISS	65 157.1	25 933.6	—	—	—
Total commitment authorities approved	180 577.1	138 533.6	36 437.6	484 687.1	67 503.7
Total expenditure against approved commitment authorities	127 900.0	138 470.0	23 839.2	477 342.8	66 364.7
<b>Utilization of commitment authorities (percentage)</b>	<b>70.83</b>	<b>99.95</b>	<b>65.42</b>	<b>98.48</b>	<b>98.31</b>

#### *Cancellation of prior-period obligations*

12. Figure XII of the overview report depicts the level and trend in the cancellation of prior-period obligations, in thousands of dollars, in the 2021/22 period and in the periods from 2017/18 to 2020/21, while figure XIV provides the percentage of cancellation of prior-period obligations compared with all unliquidated obligations for the same periods. According to the Secretary-General, the increase of \$9.5 million (from \$140.0 million in the 2020/21 period to \$149.5 million in the 2021/22 period) in the cancellation of prior-period obligations was attributable primarily to MINUSMA (\$39.1 million), UNAMID (\$35.8 million), UNMISS (\$26.7 million) and MONUSCO (\$18.2 million). Upon

enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with information on the cancellation of prior-period obligations in the 2020/21 and 2021/22 periods by mission and for the support account, UNLB and RSCE (see table 3). The Committee was informed that, of the \$149.5 million in cancelled prior-period obligations in the 2021/22 period, \$42.3 million related to commitments or obligations to Governments that were held for five years in accordance with financial regulation 5.5. The Committee was also informed, upon enquiry, that the year-end obligations for reimbursements to troop- and police-contributing countries for deployed formed units were recorded in compliance with the International Public Sector Accounting Standards. Some of these year-end obligations are estimates based on activity during the last quarter of the financial period. Where valid, year-end obligations are also recorded in anticipation of the applicable memorandum of understanding with the troop- or police-contributing country being signed. Signed memorandums of understanding are required for the disbursement of the applicable reimbursements for contingent-owned equipment. The applicable reimbursements, supported by the requisite documentation, are charged to these year-end obligations over a period of five years. Any obligations that cannot be used in the five-year period are cancelled. Such cancelled amounts are returned to Member States through the peacekeeping operations' budget performance reports in the year following the cancellation of the obligations. Between 1 July 2015 and 30 June 2017, some memorandums of understanding were not signed for newly established missions at the time (MINUSCA and MINUSMA), and the commitments were estimated on the basis of the draft memorandums of understanding. In addition, the contingent-owned equipment claims could not be processed until the memorandums of understanding had been signed, which also caused some differences between the signed memorandums of understanding and the equipment deployed, leading to the cancellation of Government obligations.

Table 3

**Cancellation of prior-period obligations in the 2020/21 and 2021/22 periods, by peacekeeping operation**

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Mission	2020/21 period			2021/22 period			Variance		
	Cancellation of financial year 2020 commitments	Cancellation of financial year 2019-and-prior commitments	Cancellation of prior-period commitments (subtotal)	Cancellation of financial year 2021 commitments	Cancellation of financial year 2020-and-prior commitments	Cancellation of prior-period commitments (subtotal)	Cancellation of financial year 2021 commitments	Cancellation of financial year 2020-and-prior commitments	Cancellation of prior-period commitments (subtotal)
MINURSO	1 149	57	1 206	881	—	881	(269)	(57)	(326)
MINUSCA	5 446	13 697	19 143	5 185	2 816	8 001	(260)	(10 881)	(11 142)
MINUSMA	25 055	20 772	45 827	25 379	13 756	39 135	324	(7 016)	(6 692)
MONUSCO	13 019	6 880	19 899	12 508	5 646	18 154	(511)	(1 234)	(1 745)
UNAMID	8 417	657	9 073	28 314	7 462	35 776	19 897	6 805	26 703
UNDOF	134	9	143	443	133	576	309	124	432
UNFICYP	426	104	530	166	—	166	(260)	(104)	(364)
UNIFIL	1 144	1 939	3 083	804	5 893	6 697	(341)	3 954	3 613
UNISFA	1 110	115	1 225	2 967	96	3 063	1 857	(18)	1 838
UNMIK	18	—	18	19	—	19	1	—	1
UNMISS	15 767	9 382	25 149	11 620	15 121	26 741	(4 147)	5 740	1 593
UNSOS	12 498	156	12 654	5 293	3 038	8 331	(7 205)	2 883	(4 323)
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>84 183</b>	<b>53 767</b>	<b>137 950</b>	<b>93 577</b>	<b>53 962</b>	<b>147 538</b>	<b>9 394</b>	<b>194</b>	<b>9 588</b>
UNLB	173	—	173	133	—	133	(40)	—	(40)
RSCE	380	—	380	49	—	49	(331)	—	(331)
Support account	1 162	363	1 525	1 765	0	1 765	603	(363)	240
<b>Total</b>	<b>85 898</b>	<b>54 130</b>	<b>140 028</b>	<b>95 524</b>	<b>53 962</b>	<b>149 485</b>	<b>9 626</b>	<b>(168)</b>	<b>9 457</b>

### *Unliquidated obligations*

13. Unliquidated obligations at the end of the 2021/22 period amounted to \$1.11 billion, compared with \$1.05 billion at the end of the 2020/21 period. The Secretary-General notes that, for peacekeeping operations, the absolute value of cancelled prior-period obligations in any given year can comprise obligations raised in respect of reimbursements to troop- and police-contributing countries, which are valid for an additional period of four years following the end of the 12-month period, in accordance with financial regulation 5.5 of the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations. **The Advisory Committee notes the high amounts of unliquidated obligations, which, while not uniform, continue to increase from one financial period to another in some peacekeeping missions. The Committee trusts that updated information on the unliquidated obligations at the level of items of expenditure, including obligations to Governments, showing new commitments for each budget cycle along with their explanation, will be provided in all future mission and overview reports.**

### *Redeployment between expenditure groups and budget lines*

14. The overview report provides an explanation for the redeployment of approved resources for peacekeeping operations owing to unforeseen requirements. In order to meet those unforeseen requirements, the Secretary-General has the authority to redeploy funds between expenditure groups within any budgetary period. For peacekeeping budgets, heads of missions or entities are delegated the authority to redeploy resources across expenditure groups (I, II and III) within the overall amount approved, allowing them to deliver on their mandates in a flexible manner. Accordingly, the redeployment of funds is not an indication of any deficiency in either budgetary planning or financial control but instead shows that a mission or entity is proactively meeting the shifting operational priorities in response to both internal and external factors. During the 2021/22 performance period, the previous trend for the redeployment of approved resources for peacekeeping operations to cover higher-than-budgeted civilian personnel costs under group II was almost eliminated. This was due mainly to a strengthened United States dollar against local currencies that led to savings in national staff salaries and to higher-than-budgeted vacancy rates that were used for critical shortages in other groups, such as fuel budget shortages. The trend had changed over the past five years, from an inflow of around 5 to 8 per cent in the three financial periods from 2017/18 to 2019/20 to 1.1 per cent during the 2020/21 period and, most recently, to a small redeployment inflow of 0.01 per cent to civilian personnel in the 2021/22 period. Another change in the 2021/22 period was the inward redeployment for operational costs (group III) from military and police personnel (group I). In the periods from 2017/18 to 2019/20, resources approved for operational costs (group III) had been reprioritized and redeployed to civilian personnel (group II). With a view to improving budget assumptions and reducing the need for redeployments, in response to paragraph 13 of General Assembly resolution [76/274](#), new budget methodologies have been introduced, including for estimating the remuneration of civilian personnel, and a study of fuel methodology has been undertaken, which is described in the section on budget preparation and management of resources (*ibid.*, paras. 303–307).

15. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with information on redeployments between budget lines for the past three years in all peacekeeping operations (see annex II) and was informed that the redeployment of approved resources from group I, military and police personnel, representing 0.6 per cent of the original appropriation in the 2020/21 period, was possible because of the postponement of rotations and emplacements in connection with travel restrictions during the COVID-19 pandemic. Continuing the trend in the past three periods, in the

2020/21 period, there was also an inflow relating to the authority to enter into commitments. In the 2020/21 period, three commitment authorities were approved for UNAMID. While noting that, according to the Secretariat, the rules do not apply to peacekeeping budgets, the Advisory Committee recalls that, in its resolution [55/231](#) on results-based budgeting, the General Assembly decided that any transfer of resources between post and non-post objects of expenditure would require the prior approval of the Assembly. The Committee also recalls that, in its report [A/69/839](#), while acknowledging the need for budgetary flexibility to accommodate the volatility of peacekeeping operations and to enable responsiveness to changing circumstances on the ground, the Committee considered that redeployments between groups and classes of expenditure should be kept to a minimum to ensure that fiscal discipline and control were properly maintained. Further, the Committee noted that the oversight by the General Assembly with respect to the nature and extent of the redeployments was currently limited to its review of the budget performance reports, which were considered long after such redeployments had been made. The Advisory Committee made its recommendation, which was endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution [69/307](#), that the Assembly request the Secretary-General to provide the Committee with a written update on the nature and extent of the budgetary redeployments in peacekeeping for information purposes every six months. **The Advisory Committee notes the efforts made to reduce the need for the redeployment of resources between groups and expects that the Secretary-General will continue efforts to keep the redeployment of resources to a minimum, including through assisting missions in formulating realistic, consistent and reliable budgets that strictly abide by legislative mandates and exploring ways to anticipate and mitigate the impact of external factors such as decisions of ICSC or the evolution of fuel prices on the execution of the budgets, delayed deployment factors, and recruitment, in accordance with General Assembly resolution [76/274](#), and to report thereon in the context of his future overview reports. The Committee also trusts that the rules governing the transfer of resources between post and non-post objects of expenditure will be clarified and that an update will be provided in the next overview report.**

#### *Liquidity situation and cross-borrowing*

16. With regard to cash liquidity, the report indicates that since July 2019, there has been an improvement in the ability of the Secretariat to manage the cash situation of active peacekeeping operations pursuant to General Assembly resolutions [73/307](#) and [76/272](#), in which the Assembly approved cross-borrowing among active peacekeeping operations through the concept of management of cash balances of all active peacekeeping operations as a pool. Pursuant to Assembly resolution [76/272](#), the trial period for the management of cash resources of the active peacekeeping operations as a pool will continue for another five years. In the same resolution, the General Assembly endorsed the report of the Advisory Committee ([A/76/7/Add.29](#)), including the use of the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund as a first-choice liquidity mechanism, up to the level of \$110 million, while preserving \$40 million as a reserve for new and expanding missions ([A/77/779](#), paras. 311–312). As reflected in table 4, during the 2021/22 period, UNSOS, MINURSO and UNMIK utilized their cross-borrowing ability with loans mainly from MINUSMA. In July and August 2022, borrowings amounting to \$96.9 million from active peacekeeping operations were replaced by borrowings from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund, while preserving \$40 million as a reserve, in line with Assembly resolution [76/272](#). From September to December 2022, the total borrowings required by active peacekeeping operations in the amount of \$75 million were provided by the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund. According to the Secretary-General, until the balance of outstanding assessed contributions improves, borrowings will continue to be required by MINURSO and UNMIK to pay their

commitments under approved budgets (*ibid.*, para. 313 and table 12). The table shows that in addition to the three missions that continued to face shortages in assessed contributions (MINURSO, UNMIK and UNSOS), two additional missions have been added to the list since the end of the previous budget period (UNISFA and UNMISS). **The Advisory Committee acknowledges the positive impact of cross-borrowing and notes that in addition to the traditional borrowing missions (MINURSO, UNMIK and UNSOS), UNISFA and UNMISS also face liquidity challenges due to unpaid arrears of contributions of Member States, despite the use of loans from MINUSMA. The Committee trusts that updated information on the status of loans, including on potential loss on investment due to borrowing, which could have been returned to Member States or offset against their contribution, will be provided to the General Assembly during the consideration of the present report.**

Table 4

**Cross-borrowing among active peacekeeping operations and with the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund during the 2021/22 period and in the 2022/23 period as at 31 March 2023**

(Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>As at date</i>	<i>Borrowing missions</i>					<i>Lending missions</i>			<i>Peacekeeping Reserve Fund</i>
	<i>MINURSO</i>	<i>UNISFA</i>	<i>UNMIK</i>	<i>UNMISS</i>	<i>UNSOS</i>	<i>MINUSMA</i>	<i>MONUSCO</i>	<i>UNIFIL</i>	
31 July 2021	15.0	—	32.5	—	65.0	(112.5)	—	—	—
31 August 2021	15.0	—	32.5	—	65.0	(112.5)	—	—	—
30 September 2021	15.0	—	32.5	—	—	(47.5)	—	—	—
31 October 21	15.0	—	32.5	—	—	(47.5)	—	—	—
30 November 2021	15.0	—	32.5	—	—	(47.5)	—	—	—
31 December 2021	15.0	—	32.5	—	—	(47.5)	—	—	—
31 January 2022	15.0	—	32.5	—	—	(47.5)	—	—	—
28 February 2022	15.0	—	32.5	—	—	(47.5)	—	—	—
31 March 2022	15.0	—	32.5	—	—	(47.5)	—	—	—
30 April 2022	15.0	—	32.5	—	—	(47.5)	—	—	—
31 May 2022	15.0	—	32.5	—	—	(47.5)	—	—	—
30 June 2022	15.0	40.0	32.5	80.0	25.0	(112.5)	(40.0)	(40.0)	—
31 July 2022	15.0	40.0	32.5	100.0	25.0	(115.6)	—	—	(96.9)
31 August 2022	15.0	40.0	32.5	100.0	25.0	(115.6)	—	—	(96.9)
30 September 2022	15.0	40.0	20.0	—	—	—	—	—	(75.0)
31 October 2022	15.0	40.0	20.0	—	—	—	—	—	(75.0)
30 November 2022	15.0	40.0	20.0	—	—	—	—	—	(75.0)
31 December 2022	15.0	40.0	20.0	—	—	—	—	—	(75.0)
31 January 2023	12.0	26.0	20.0	—	—	—	—	—	(58.0)
28 February 2023	12.0	26.0	20.0	—	39.9	—	—	—	(97.9)
31 March 2023	12.0	26.0	20.0	111.0	39.9	(111.0)	—	—	(97.9)

17. In its report on the financial report and audited financial statements for the 12-month period from 1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022 ([A/77/5 \(Vol. II\)](#)), the Board of Auditors stated that the financial position varied between the different peacekeeping operation entities, especially concerning liquidity. While the cash ratio, which measures the ability of an entity to cover its current liabilities with cash (cash equivalent or invested funds) from its current asset, was above or close to 1 for most

of the missions and support activities, it was close to zero for other missions (UNAMID, UNMIK and UNISFA) as at 30 June 2022, showing their difficulties in paying off their debts of less than one year. According to the Board of Auditors, the investments made in the financial year 2021/22 using the cash pool resulted in a loss of \$5.7 million against a gain of \$10.0 million in 2020/21, while these investments remained within a low-risk profile in accordance with the Financial Regulations and Rules (rule 104.12 b). The Secretariat explained that the situation was due to the increase in interest rates and the reduction in the market value of securities, all attributable to high inflation, which had resulted in an unrealized loss of mark-to-market valuation for year-end reporting purposes. Detailed information regarding the financial position of peacekeeping operations for the 2021/22 period is provided in the report of the Board of Auditors, including information, as at 30 June for each year from 2018 to 2022, on the four financial ratios, namely, the assets-to-liabilities ratio, the current ratio, the quick ratio and the cash ratio, as reflected in table 5 below (A/77/5 (Vol. II), chap. II, paras. 15–20 and table II.2).

Table 5  
**Financial ratios for peacekeeping operations as at 30 June, 2018 to 2022**

Ratios	30 June 2018	30 June 2019	30 June 2020	30 June 2021	30 June 2022
<b>Asset position</b>					
<b>Assets-to-liabilities ratio<sup>a</sup></b>	1.19	1.07	1.11	1.09	1.18
Total assets: total liabilities					
<b>Current ratio<sup>b</sup></b>	1.23	1.27	1.25	1.38	1.32
Current assets: current liabilities					
<b>Liquidity position</b>					
<b>Quick ratio<sup>c</sup></b>	1.08	1.12	1.11	1.22	1.17
Cash + short-term investments + accounts receivable: current liabilities					
<b>Cash ratio<sup>d</sup></b>	0.45	0.49	0.47	0.47	0.48
Cash + short-term investments: current liabilities					

Source: Board of Auditors, based on the financial statements of peacekeeping operations.

<sup>a</sup> A high ratio (generally at least 1) indicates an entity's ability to meet its overall obligations.

<sup>b</sup> A high ratio (generally at least 1) indicates an entity's ability to pay off its current liabilities.

<sup>c</sup> The quick ratio is more conservative than the current ratio, because it excludes inventory and other current assets, which are more difficult to turn into cash. A higher ratio means a more liquid current position.

<sup>d</sup> The cash ratio is an indicator of an entity's liquidity; it measures the amount of cash, cash equivalents or invested funds that are in current assets to cover current liabilities.

18. The Secretary-General states in his report that, notwithstanding the improved ability to borrow from the Peacekeeping Reserve Fund and active peacekeeping operations, historical unpredictability and delays in the receipt of assessed contributions from Member States have had an impact on overall cash liquidity in active peacekeeping operations. According to the Secretary-General, the percentage of unpaid assessments has increased over the past five periods, from 17.5 per cent as at 30 June 2016 to 25.8 per cent as at 30 June 2022. As at 30 June 2022, the unpaid assessment was \$1.6 billion (A/77/779, paras. 316–317, table 13 and figure XIII). **The Advisory Committee recalls paragraph 7 of General Assembly resolution 76/274 and that the Assembly has repeatedly urged all Member States to fulfil their financial obligations, as set out in the Charter of the United Nations, on time, in full and without conditions. The Committee trusts that an updated status of contributions for all missions will be provided to the General Assembly during its consideration of the present report (see also A/76/760, para. 31).**

### *Investment revenue and loss*

19. It is noted from information provided in the mission budget reports that the interest loss for peacekeeping amounted to \$1.4 million in the 2021/22 period. Investment losses occurred in MINURSO (\$16,700), MINUSCA (\$393,300), MINUSMA (\$913,800), MONUSCO (\$583,200), UNDOF (\$45,400), UNFICYP (\$24,100), UNIFIL (\$457,700), UNMIK (\$16,200) and UNLB (\$30,700). Conversely, investment revenues were realized by UNISFA (\$139,500), UNMISS (\$744,000), UNSOS (\$173,500) and RSCE (\$700). The Advisory Committee was informed that investment revenue/loss is the net of realized revenue and unrealized gain/loss. During the reporting period, the cash pool generated realized revenue (credit) and an unrealized loss (debit). Regarding realized revenue, during the 2021/22 period, interest rates for the United States dollar were generally very low and there was a decline in the overall realized rate of return for the pool compared with the prior reporting period. For the majority of the reporting period, interest rates earned remained near zero. The investment pool unrealized loss is due to the decline in the market value of securities between the start and end dates of the period. This decline in the market value of securities is recorded as an unrealized loss for financial statement reporting purposes only. In the latter part of 2021, longer-term interest rates for the United States dollar began to rise. Securities are typically held to maturity and the unrealized gains or losses are reversed when the security is matured/no longer held, making unrealized gains or losses temporary in nature. These gains or losses are reported for financial statement purposes only and are not realized. There was no impairment of investment assets during the period. Because the share of realized revenue and unrealized loss received by each mission depends on the fund balances on each day (realized) and on 30 June (unrealized), missions will have different investment return figures depending on the amount and timing of their balances in the pool. It is not unusual to have some unrealized losses, but if in the prior period, realized income was greater, the overall position would be reported as positive investment income. This is the first time that the unrealized loss has been greater than the realized income for the pool, owing to the rapid increases in the interest rate of the United States dollar. Realized revenue is actual and permanent in nature but is difficult to forecast. Conversely, unrealized gain/loss is temporary in nature and reversed on the first day of the next financial reporting period and should not be considered in the budget of peacekeeping operations. **The Advisory Committee notes the information on realized revenue and unrealized loss and trusts that this information will be systematically provided in future overview reports on peacekeeping operations and the mission budget submissions.**

## **2. Information on the current financial period: 2022/23**

20. The report of the Secretary-General contains information on the total approved budgets for the 2022/23 period in the amount of \$6,452,563.0 (ibid., tables 5–8, 10, 14, 16 and annex II, table 1). In addition, the Secretary-General requested additional requirements for the 2022/23 period in the total amount of \$24.3 million for (a) UNDOF, in the amount of \$2.1 million ([A/77/754](#)); (b) UNISFA, in the amount of \$12.1 million ([A/77/836](#)); and (c) UNMISS, in the amount of \$10.1 million ([A/77/786](#)). **The Advisory Committee notes the additional requirements for UNDOF, UNISFA and UNMISS, which increase the appropriation for the 2022/23 period by about 0.4 per cent and make it close to being equivalent to the initial resource requirements for that period.** The Advisory Committee makes further comments and observations in the context of its reports on UNDOF ([A/77/767/Add.2](#)), UNISFA ([A/77/767/Add.10](#)) and UNMISS ([A/77/767/Add.11](#)). Upon enquiry, the Committee was informed that, as at 31 March 2023, the preliminary amount of expenditure was \$5,466,328.1, or 84.7 per cent of the total approved budget. The Committee was provided, upon enquiry, with information on the expenditure for the 2022/23 period by class of expenditure as at 31 March 2023, compared with 2021/22, which is contained in annex III, as well as information on



the expenditure in 2022/23 and the previous five periods, which is contained in annex IV. The annex shows that, as at 31 March 2023, the expenditure under military and police personnel amounted to \$2,631.0, or 94.3 per cent of the 2022/23 appropriation, while the expenditure under civilian personnel was \$1,260.0 million, or 71.7 per cent of the 2022/23 appropriation. The expenditure under operational costs amounted to \$1,539.4 million, or 83.1 per cent of the appropriation for 2022/23.

21. Regarding the status of liabilities to troop- and police-contributing countries, annex VI to the overview report provides information on the status of liabilities to troop- and police-contributing countries for capabilities deployed to United Nations peacekeeping operations. As shown in annex VI, the total liabilities to troop- and police-contributing countries for both personnel reimbursement and contingent-owned equipment and self-sustainment in the calendar year 2022 amount to \$553.5 million, including \$287.7 million for personnel reimbursement and \$265.9 million for contingent-owned equipment and self-sustainment (A/77/779, annex VI, tables 1–3). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with detailed information, by mission, on the liabilities owed and total payments made during the 2022/23 period as at 31 March 2023, which amount to \$552.7 million, including \$291.6 million for personnel reimbursement and \$261.2 million for contingent-owned equipment and self-sustainment. The Committee was also provided with information on the statement of financial position as at 28 February 2023 and the statement of financial performance for the period from 1 July 2022 to 28 February 2023 (see annex V). The Advisory Committee also received a list of pending death and disability claims as at 6 March 2023, as reflected in table 6. **The Advisory Committee recalls paragraph 25 of General Assembly resolution 76/274 and trusts that information on the outstanding payments for uniformed personnel and contingent-owned equipment, by mission, will be provided to the General Assembly during the consideration of the present report and that updated information will be included in future overview reports and mission budget submissions.**

Table 6  
**List of pending death and disability claims received by 6 March 2023**

	<i>Death claims</i>		<i>Disability claims</i>	
	<i>Number of claims</i>	<i>Amount claimed (United States dollars)</i>	<i>Number of claims</i>	<i>Amount claimed<sup>a</sup> (United States dollars)</i>
<b>Active missions</b>				
MINUSCA	10	779 288	19	472 010
MINUSMA	22	1 701 972	70	490 980
MONUSCO	5	385 000	25	443 450
UNFICYP	–	–	1	13 860
UNIFIL	5	378 000	63	1 552 635
UNISFA	1	82 000	1	23 100
UNMISS	2	157 616	5	158 620
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>3 483 876</b>	<b>184</b>	<b>3 154 655</b>
<b>Closed missions</b>				
MINUSTAH	–	–	1	10 780
UNAMID	1	77 000	2	TBD
UNAVEM II	–	–	1	30 800
UNCRO	–	–	3	71 750
UNIKOM	–	–	1	9 240



	<i>Death claims</i>		<i>Disability claims</i>	
	<i>Number of claims</i>	<i>Amount claimed (United States dollars)</i>	<i>Number of claims</i>	<i>Amount claimed<sup>a</sup> (United States dollars)</i>
UNMIS	–	–	1	15 400
UNOCI	–	–	4	16 170
UNOSOM II	–	–	1	15 400
UNPREDEP	–	–	2	19 250
UNPROFOR	–	–	49	693 670
UNTAC	–	–	1	2 310
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>77 000</b>	<b>66</b>	<b>884 770</b>

<sup>a</sup> Final disbursement will be determined following the mandated medical review.

### 3. Proposed resources for the period from 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024

22. In his report, the Secretary-General indicates that the total proposed resource requirements for peacekeeping operations for the financial period from 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024, inclusive of RSCE, UNLB and the support account, are currently estimated at \$6,812.1 million, excluding budgeted voluntary in-kind contributions.<sup>2</sup> Compared with the approved resources for the 2022/23 period in the amount of \$6,452.6 million (or \$6,476.9 million inclusive of the \$24.3 million in additional resource requirements as referred to in para. 20 above), the 2023/24 proposed budget represents an increase of \$359.5 million (or \$383.8 million inclusive of the additional resource requirements of 24.3 million for the 2022/23 period referred to in para. 20 above), or 5.6 per cent (or 5.9 per cent, taking into account the additional requirements of \$24.3 million). This increase relates to increases in the missions' budgets (\$339.1 million, or 5.7 per cent); the support account (\$19.4 million, or 5.2 per cent); RSCE (\$0.7 million, or 1.5 per cent); and UNLB (\$0.3 million, or 0.5 per cent) (*ibid.*, summary). The net increase for active peacekeeping missions relates to increases in all missions, with the exception of UNMIK, which has a decrease of \$1.25 million, or 3.0 per cent, compared with its appropriation for 2022/23 (*ibid.*, table 16). The Advisory Committee makes comments and recommendations in its reports on the respective mission budgets for 2023/24 (see annex I). While the proposed resource requirements for 2023/24 decreased under civilian personnel by \$4.7 million, or 0.3 per cent, compared with the approved resources for 2022/23, they increased under military and police personnel by \$125.8 million, or 4.5 per cent, and under operational costs by \$234.8 million, or 12.7 per cent (*ibid.*, table 14). Table 7 provides an overview of the financial and human resource requirements for 2023/24 compared with the approved resources for 2022/23 and with the previous five budget periods. It is indicated in the table that the Organization is currently engaged in 10 peacekeeping missions, as well as UNMOGIP and UNTSO, which are funded under the programme budget. For 2023/24, United Nations peacekeeping operations would require a projected deployment of some 87,157 United Nations uniformed personnel, 17,626 military personnel deployed by the African Union in Somalia and 14,176 civilian personnel. Information on the main factors for variance in the resource requirements by class of expenditure for the 2023/24 period compared with the 2022/23 period is provided in table 15 of the report of the Secretary-General. A detailed analysis of the proposed resources for the 2023/24 period by mission is also provided in annex II to the report (see annexes III and IV to the present report).

<sup>2</sup> An amount of \$0.7 million in voluntary in-kind contributions is expected in 2023/24.

Table 7

**Overview of financial and human resources for peacekeeping operations, 2017/18–2023/24**

<i>Peacekeeping component</i>	<i>Actual</i>					<i>Approved</i>	<i>Proposed</i>
	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21	2021/22	2022/23	2023/24
<b>Number of ongoing missions and support operations<sup>a</sup></b>							
Funded by peacekeeping budgets	13	12	12	11	11	10	10
UNSOs	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
UNMOGIP and UNTSO	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
<b>Total, active missions and support operations</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>13</b>
<b>Financial resources</b>							
(Millions of United States dollars (gross))							
Peacekeeping missions and UNSOS	6 984.1	6 678.8	6 263.9	6 156.5	5 934.9	5 971.7	6 310.8
RSCE	32.8	31.4	35.4	36.3	39.8	43.1	43.8
UNLB	80.2	82.1	63.3	62.1	65.6	66.0	66.3
Support account (includes corporate costs)	325.8	324.7	348.9	355.5	353.4	371.8	391.2
<b>Subtotal, peacekeeping operation budgets<sup>b</sup></b>	<b>7 422.9</b>	<b>7 117.0</b>	<b>6 711.4</b>	<b>6 610.3</b>	<b>6 393.7</b>	<b>6 452.6</b>	<b>6 812.1</b>
UNMOGIP and UNTSO	49.2	46.9	43.2	44.6	48.3	48.9	48.9
<b>Total, financial resources</b>	<b>7 472.1</b>	<b>7 163.9</b>	<b>6 754.6</b>	<b>6 654.9</b>	<b>6 442.0</b>	<b>6 501.5</b>	<b>6 861.0</b>
<b>Number of personnel<sup>c</sup></b>							
<b>Uniformed personnel</b>							
United Nations uniformed personnel	106 862	99 072	95 537	92 457	94 147	86 797	87 157
ATMIS/AMISOM uniformed personnel	21 586	21 626	20 626	19 626	19 626	19 626	17 626
<b>Subtotal, peacekeeping operation budgets</b>	<b>128 448</b>	<b>120 698</b>	<b>116 163</b>	<b>112 083</b>	<b>113 773</b>	<b>106 423</b>	<b>104 783</b>
UNMOGIP and UNTSO	197	197	197	197	197	197	197
<b>Total, uniformed personnel</b>	<b>128 645</b>	<b>120 895</b>	<b>116 360</b>	<b>112 280</b>	<b>113 970</b>	<b>106 620</b>	<b>104 980</b>
<b>Civilian personnel</b>							
Civilian personnel in missions and UNSOS <sup>d</sup>	18 241	15 925	14 173	13 734	12 398	11 772	11 876
Civilian personnel at RSCE	427	406	404	404	424	405	402
Civilian personnel to support missions <sup>e</sup>	1 885	1 872	1 873	1 868	1 863	1 882	1 898
<b>Subtotal, peacekeeping operation budgets</b>	<b>20 553</b>	<b>18 203</b>	<b>16 450</b>	<b>16 006</b>	<b>14 685</b>	<b>14 059</b>	<b>14 176</b>
UNMOGIP and UNTSO	318	309	309	309	303	303	303
<b>Total, civilian personnel</b>	<b>20 871</b>	<b>18 512</b>	<b>16 759</b>	<b>16 315</b>	<b>14 988</b>	<b>14 362</b>	<b>14 479</b>

<sup>a</sup> The number of ongoing missions in the 2021/22 period includes UNAMID.

<sup>b</sup> Variance in subtotals is due to rounding in millions. Table 3 of annex I and table 2 of annex II to the overview report provide detailed breakdowns by mission.

<sup>c</sup> Highest level of personnel authorized.

<sup>d</sup> Excludes resources under UNLB, RSCE and the support account for peacekeeping operations.

<sup>e</sup> Personnel under UNLB and the support account for peacekeeping operations.

23. The overall increase in resources under uniformed personnel is attributable mainly to increased requirements under military contingents (\$105.8 million) and formed police units (\$20.7 million). The increased requirements under military contingents are attributable mainly to higher costs of contingent-owned equipment as well as improved

performance; an increase in the costs of strategic rotation charter aircraft; an increase in rations contractual costs; and a higher rate for standard troop reimbursement costs approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 76/276. The increased requirements under formed police units are attributable mainly to the deployment of additional formed police personnel and related equipment (MONUSCO) and the higher costs of rations. Under civilian personnel, the overall decrease is attributable mainly to lower requirements under international staff, which is based on the application of lower common staff costs; the revised post-adjustment multiplier; and the higher budgeted vacancy rates in several missions (ibid., table 15). **The Advisory Committee notes the increase in proposed resources for 2023/24 compared with the 2022/23 budget. The Committee further notes that while the overall number of uniformed personnel has decreased, including since 2017/18, due mainly to the closure of some missions, the number of proposed civilian personnel for 2023/24 is increasing.**

24. In the overview report, the Secretary-General provides the proportions between major groups of expenditure in resource requirements for peacekeeping missions in 2023/24 compared with the previous budget periods (ibid., para. 290, table 7 and figure X). According to the Secretary-General, group I, military and police personnel costs, represents 46.2 per cent of the resource requirements proposed for peacekeeping missions in the 2023/24 period, which is similar to the average of 46.9 per cent during the past six years. Group II, civilian personnel costs, represents 22.0 per cent of the proposed budget in the 2023/24 period, which is lower than the average of 23.3 per cent during the past six years. Group III, operational costs, represents 31.8 per cent of the resources proposed in the 2023/24 period, which is approximately 2 percentage points higher than the average of 29.8 per cent during the past six years.

#### *Exchange rates*

25. In the overview report, the Secretary-General indicates that the proposed resource requirements for the 2023/24 period were estimated using the exchange rates prevailing at the time of budget finalization, which were the 1 December 2022 rates (ibid., para. 328). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with the exchange rates applied for the 2022/23 and 2023/24 periods. The Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that the missions affected by the volatility of the exchange rates in relation to the proposed budget for the 2023/24 period are primarily UNFICYP, UNIFIL, UNMIK, UNLB and MINURSO (see table 8). The impact of the exchange rates resulted in reduced requirements mainly for national General Service staff, National Professional Officers and the mission subsistence allowance for military and police personnel in UNFICYP, UNMIK and UNLB, owing to the depreciation of the euro against the United States dollar. The reduced requirements for MINURSO are attributable primarily to national General Service staff and National Professional Officers, owing to the depreciation of the Moroccan dirham against the United States dollar. In UNIFIL, according to information received during the Committee's consideration of the mission budget, with effect from 1 November 2022, the exchange rate source for Lebanon was changed to the Sayrafa rate, which is the average rate for the daily buy/sell rates of foreign exchange transactions performed by banks and currency exchange houses on Sayrafa, the platform of the Lebanese Central Bank. It was also indicated that the United Nations operational rate of exchange used prior to November 2022 for the conversion from Lebanese pounds to United States dollars had been stable, at 1 dollar to 1,500 Lebanese pounds, for the past decade. With the adoption of the Sayrafa rate, the conversion rate was 1 dollar to 30,000 Lebanese pounds.

Table 8  
**Exchange rate variance**  
 (United States dollars)

<i>Mission</i>	<i>2023/24 (proposed budget)</i>	<i>Exchange rate variance</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
	<i>(a)</i>	<i>(b)</i>	<i>(c)=(b)/(a)</i>
MINURSO	65 182 000	(1 606 290)	(2.4)
MINUSCA	1 157 676 000	(7 147 618)	(0.6)
MINUSMA	1 277 808 700	(7 107 227)	(0.6)
MONUSCO	1 078 212 400	(451 026)	0.0
UNDOF	70 875 800	(202 143)	(0.3)
UNFICYP	57 444 700	(1 730 592)	(3.0)
UNIFIL	551 113 500	(1 152 534)	(0.2)
UNISFA	293 589 900	(1 142 415)	(0.4)
UNMIK	40 701 500	(1 112 058)	(2.7)
UNMISS	1 161 509 500	(861 058)	(0.1)
UNSOS	556 707 900	(600 599)	(0.1)
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>6 310 821 900</b>	<b>(23 113 560)</b>	
UNLB	66 284 600	(2 527 000)	(3.8)
RSCE	43 754 000	(593 892)	(1.4)
Support account	391 223 100	–	0.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>6 812 083 800</b>	<b>(26 234 452)</b>	

26. According to the information received, the peacekeeping budget is much more concentrated in the United States dollar than the regular budget, with almost 90 per cent of peacekeeping outflows being in the United States dollar (compared with 74 per cent in the case of the regular budget). The Organization receives incoming payments in euros in significant sizes, resulting in a lower need to purchase euros. Given this high concentration of peacekeeping outflows in the United States dollar and the offsetting impact of euro receipts, the amount of cash exposed to exchange rate fluctuations in peacekeeping is not significant. Therefore, currency hedging tools such as forward contracts are not used in peacekeeping. In addition, there is no General Assembly resolution that authorizes the Secretariat to utilize forward purchasing for peacekeeping. **The Advisory Committee notes the significant change in the applicable exchange rate in some missions and trusts that the most up-to-date information on rates of exchange will be provided to the General Assembly at the time of its consideration of the present report.**

#### *Vacancy rates*

27. The Secretary-General explains that the proposed vacancy rates applied in the budget take into account the experience of the respective missions to date and mission-specific circumstances in relation to the deployment of uniformed personnel and the recruitment of civilian staff. The assumptions considered for the proposed vacancy factors include the current 12-month average vacancy rate, from January to December 2022, or the actual vacancy rate as at 31 December 2022, as well as the projected planned deployment of uniformed personnel and the onboarding of civilian staff. This is in line with the policy guidance provided to improve the accuracy and consistency of the vacancy factors applied in the proposed budgets for the 2023/24 period and ensures that proposed vacancy rates are based, as much as possible, on actual rates. A vacancy rate

of 50 per cent has been applied in the calculation of costs for the proposed reassignments and the establishment of new posts and positions ([A/77/779](#), para. 330). In tables 19 to 22, the Secretary-General provides information for each mission on the actual average vacancy rates for the 2021/22 period, the budgeted vacancy rates for the 2022/23 period and the proposed vacancy rates applied in the budget for the 2023/24 period. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that, for military and police personnel, the variables considered for the proposed delayed deployment factors for the 2023/24 period include (a) the current 12-month average vacancy rates, from January to December 2022, or the actual vacancy rate as at 31 December 2022, based on the one that is lower; and (b) the projected planned deployment of uniformed personnel, as applicable. Similarly, for civilian personnel, the proposed vacancy factors reflect (a) the current 12-month average vacancy rates, from January to December 2022, or the actual vacancy rate as at 31 December 2022, based on the one that is lower; and (b) the onboarding of civilian staff, as applicable. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with information on the planned and actual vacancy rates for the 2021/22 and 2022/23 periods, as well as the proposed delayed deployment factors for uniformed personnel and vacancy rates for international and national personnel for 2023/24, as reflected in annex VI. **The Advisory Committee notes the efforts to improve the accuracy and consistency of the vacancy rate factors applied in the proposed budgets for the 2023/24 period, based on the Headquarters guidelines to the field missions. However, the Committee notes the lack of consistency in the application of the vacancy rate and clear justifications in many cases and reiterates its view that efforts should continue to be made to ensure that the proposed vacancy rates are based, as much as possible, on actual rates.** The Committee makes further comments and recommendations in its mission-related reports.

#### *Vacant posts*

28. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that as at 31 December 2022, 54 posts had been vacant for more than 24 months in peacekeeping operations. **The Advisory Committee recalls that the General Assembly has reiterated its concern about the high number of vacancies in civilian staffing and its request to the Secretary-General to ensure that vacant posts are filled expeditiously and has requested the Secretary-General to review the posts that have been vacant for 24 months or longer and to propose in his next budget submission either their retention, with a clear justification of need, or their abolishment (see General Assembly resolution [76/274](#), para. 33).** The Committee trusts that an update on the long-vacant posts and their recruitment status will be provided to the General Assembly at the time of its consideration of the present report and that consolidated information on posts vacant for more than two years will be provided in the next overview report. The Advisory Committee makes further comments and recommendations in its reports on mission budget proposals.

#### *Mission subsistence allowance*

29. As explained by the Secretary-General in his report, the mission subsistence allowance is the daily allowance payable by the United Nations to cover the cost for accommodation, meals and miscellaneous expenses within a mission area incurred by eligible non-staff personnel during their tour of duty in a field mission. It is not a salary or a fee for a service. Eligible non-staff personnel include those personnel provided by Governments to serve with the United Nations when they are deployed in an individual capacity to field missions or to serve as United Nations police officers, military observers, military advisers, military liaison officers, staff officers and justice and corrections officers as well as non-uniformed civilian government-provided personnel. The new methodology for establishing mission subsistence allowance ([ST/AI/2021/2](#)) uses pre-existing ICSC data applicable to the mission areas

updated on an annual (calendar year) basis. According to the Secretary-General, the new rates are more reflective of actual costs incurred in a mission area, and transitional measures have been put in place to ensure that already serving eligible non-staff personnel are not negatively affected by changes during their ongoing tour of duty. When the new methodology was first applied in 2022, the rates decreased in approximately one third of the mission areas; however, for such circumstances, a transitional measure was introduced to protect the position of recipients of the higher rate. The annual review for the 2023 rates was completed in December 2022 and new rates are effective 1 January 2023 (*ibid.*, paras. 341–345). Table 28 of the report of the Secretary-General shows the financial implications between the approved budget for the 2022/23 period and the proposed budget for the 2023/24 period by mission.

30. The Advisory Committee recalls that under the new methodology, two mission subsistence allowance rates have been established for the mission area, namely, the “first 30 days” rate and the “after 30 days” rate. The “first 30 days” rate is payable at the start of the tour of duty in a mission area and upon any subsequently authorized relocation to a different country within the mission area, provided it is beyond commuting distance. This rate is identical to the “first 60 days daily subsistence allowance rate”. Upon request, the Committee was provided with information on the mission subsistence allowance rates for the 2021/22 and 2022/23 periods (before and after December 2022) and the rates included in the proposed 2023/24 budget for the “first 30 days” and “after 30 days”, as reflected in table 9. Upon enquiry, the Committee was informed that under the methodology, the mission subsistence allowance rates were updated annually and were based on the data available on 1 December preceding the calendar year in which the mission subsistence allowance rates would be applied. With respect to mission subsistence allowance rates that decreased on 1 January of a new calendar year (on the basis of the aforementioned data), personnel in a location where mission subsistence allowance rates decreased, who were in receipt of the higher rate, continued to receive the higher mission subsistence allowance rate until the end of their tenure or until a transition to a location with a different rate. The Secretariat will continue to monitor the transitional measure in place for currently serving mission subsistence allowance recipients. According to the information provided, for its part, the Department of Peace Operations is leading a working group with the Department of Operational Support and the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance to explore options that could address the impact of the reduction in rates on the recruitment of military, police and correctional personnel. These options would complement the mission subsistence allowance. Any of such proposals that may have financial implications will be reported to the General Assembly for approval. The Advisory Committee was also provided, upon request, with mission subsistence allowance rates for all categories in all peacekeeping missions in the past two periods compared with the 2023/24 period, which is reflected in annex VII. **The Advisory Committee expects that the Secretary-General will provide the outcome of the discussions in the working group, including options on addressing the negative impact of significant reductions of the rates of mission subsistence allowance on the recruitment of military, police and correctional personnel, in the next overview report and the mission budget submissions (see also [A/76/760](#), para. 38).**

Table 9

**Mission subsistence allowance rates and the budgeted amounts in the 2023/24 period, by peacekeeping mission**

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Mission subsistence allowance rates prior to December 2022<sup>a</sup></i>		<i>Mission subsistence allowance rates promulgated by ST/IC/2022/14/Amend.1<sup>a</sup></i>		<i>Mission subsistence allowance in the proposed budget for the 2023/24 period (thousands of United States dollars)</i>				
	<i>First 30 days</i>	<i>After 30 days</i>	<i>First 30 days</i>	<i>After 30 days</i>	<i>Military observers</i>	<i>Military contingents</i>	<i>United Nations police</i>	<i>Government-provided personnel</i>	<i>Total</i>
MINURSO					4 396.9	187.3	53.5	32.3	4 670.0
Morocco	147	83	119	69	4 348.3	187.3	53.5	32.3	4 621.4
Algeria	228	137	199	115	48.6	–	–	–	48.6
MINUSCA	198	150	181	143	7 708.5	20 728.1	30 591.9	5 678.2	64 706.7
MINUSMA	228	119	210	113	–	17 761.1	1 262.1	708.3	28 731.5
MONUSCO	231	138	231	145	28 195.3	–	2 816.5	3 227.7	54 239.5
UNDOF	283	158	283	175	–	3 662.0	–	–	3 662.0
UNFICYP	215	126	196	121	–	2 512.9	3 117.9	–	5 630.8
UNIFIL	147	115	232	134	–	9 429.3	–	–	9 429.3
UNISFA	165	89	165	135	5 121.9	4 880.2	3 317.7	–	13 319.8
UNMIK	125	101	125	67	227.3	–	304.6	–	531.9
UNMISS	128	86	128	99	6 305.0	12 383.7	2 220.3	1 041.8	39 950.8
UNSOS	201	101	201	99	–	–	–	282.6	282.6
<b>Total</b>					<b>51 954.9</b>	<b>71 544.6</b>	<b>90 684.5</b>	<b>10 970.9</b>	<b>225 154.9</b>

<sup>a</sup> All rates are based on full mission subsistence allowance without reductions for the provision of accommodation, meals or miscellaneous deductions.

**Human resources**

31. The Secretary-General states that peacekeeping operations are provided with advice and guidance through strategic workforce planning processes to build workforce capabilities necessary for the delivery of their mandates in changing operating environments, with new technologies available and in line with the strategic direction of the Secretariat. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with a breakdown of the civilian staff in peacekeeping operations during the 2020/21, 2021/22 and 2022/23 periods, as well as the proposed levels for 2023/24 (see annex VIII).

*Civilian staffing reviews*

32. The Secretary-General explains that with respect to the mission support staffing, in line with the delegated authority to heads of missions, missions are responsible for regularly reviewing their workforce planning, including the mission support component, to ensure that it is fit for purpose. The Department of Operational Support provides advice on the staffing review process, in accordance with the guidance materials previously issued on mission support structures in 2014 and the supplementary guidance issued in 2017. Although the guidance materials are not overly prescriptive and reflect a function-based approach, they provide standardization in terms of the functions, roles and responsibilities of the support components across the missions for their workforce planning. It is also emphasized in the guidance that required resources, including the levels of posts, are to be set out in each mission's budget proposal. Furthermore, in response to paragraph 28 of General Assembly resolution 76/274, the Department of Operational Support issued guidance on 4 October

2022, in which it encouraged the missions to consider conducting civilian staffing reviews every four years, with the support of the Human Resources Services Division of the Department of Operational Support and other Headquarters offices. According to the Secretary-General, to date, staffing reviews have taken place for MINURSO and UNSOS, in 2022, and a review is currently under way for MINUSCA and UNISFA, to which the Department of Operational Support will provide advisory views ([A/77/779](#), para. 275). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with an overview of the civilian staffing reviews of peacekeeping operations, which is reflected in table 10.

Table 10

**Overview of civilian staffing reviews of peacekeeping missions**

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Last review</i>	<i>Planned review</i>
MINURSO	July 2022	2026
MINUSCA	March 2023	2027
MINUSMA	November 2016	2023
MONUSCO	July 2016	TBD <sup>a</sup>
UNDOF	April 2015	2023
UNFICYP	March 2018	TBD <sup>a</sup>
UNIFIL	November 2020	2024
UNISFA	July 2022	2026
UNMIK	September 2015	TBD <sup>a</sup>
UNMISS	October 2020	2024
UNMOGIP	July 2016	2023
UNSOS	August 2022	2026
UNTSO	December 2016	2025

<sup>a</sup> The mission has been contacted, but an exact date for the civilian staffing review has yet to be determined.

33. The Advisory Committee notes that some mission staffing reviews did not result in concrete efficiencies and recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to conduct periodic civilian staffing reviews at mission levels, including the support account, RSCE and UNLB, in a transparent and objective manner, with the aim of identifying efficiencies and avoiding redundancy and overlap, including through consolidation of functions and repurposing vacant posts and positions, while factoring in workload analysis, based on verifiable and consistent methodology, with proper classification of functions as per ICSC standards, and ensuring the full implementation of the provisions of General Assembly resolutions [76/274](#), [70/286](#) and [66/264](#) (see also [A/76/760](#), para. 82). The Committee also recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to ensure that staffing reviews do not focus solely on the mission support component but rather expand to cover substantive staff, with the support of all the relevant departments, in particular the Departments of Peace Operations, Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, and Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance. The Committee considers that the limited tailored mission reviews in specific fields should be done regularly during the preparation of the respective missions' budget



proposals, including through assessing the need for long-vacant posts and the possibility of repurposing them to meet new requirements, as applicable. The Advisory Committee makes further comments and recommendations on scalability and staffing reviews in its reports on the support account ([A/77/833](#)), RSCE ([A/77/767/Add.5](#)) and UNLB ([A/77/767/Add.6](#)).

#### *Mission support ratio*

34. In paragraph 27 of its resolution [76/274](#), the General Assembly requested that future budget proposals demonstrate the scalability of mission support components, including their staffing and operational costs, be proportionate in relation to the changing level of other mission components and include standard indicators. In his report, the Secretary-General explains that the Secretariat conducted a preliminary study on field support scalability in consultation with the missions. In order to identify the relative scale of the mission support components vis-à-vis the changing level of other mission components, the mission support ratio has been calculated by comparing the total number of mission support and security personnel for every 1,000 total mission personnel. The study shows that the overall mission support ratio has been decreasing from a high of 112.82 in 2010/11 to a low of 58.34 in 2022/23, as detailed in figure IX of the report, which shows that the ratio will increase to 59.75 in 2023/24. While the support ratio is not entirely comparable among missions given that their staff configuration is subject to multiple factors, one of the main reasons for the overall downward trend is attributable to a smaller increase in the support staff against larger increased uniformed personnel in MINUSCA and UNMISS and the outcome of several staffing reviews in MONUSCO ([A/77/779](#), paras. 272–280 and figure IX).

35. The Advisory Committee was also informed that mission support structure guiding principles for small missions were being developed, building on the 2017 guidelines on mission support structures, which did not address such missions. The guiding principles are to assist entities with decisions on structures, functions and levels and on how to use existing resources to continue operations while maintaining a level of standardization and segregation of duties. This guidance is being finalized and will be issued soon. The Committee was further informed that the Department of Operational Support was continuing to further develop the Secretariat's existing global operational support architecture to ensure more competitive and responsive support arrangements, in accordance with General Assembly resolution [77/262](#), in which the Assembly endorsed the Advisory Committee's recommendation that the Secretary-General present a proposal on the global operational support architecture concept in the context of the next seventy-eighth session budget submission ([A/77/7](#), para. VIII. 49). According to the information provided, the proposal will include comprehensive information on the purpose and principles underpinning the global operational support architecture concept, the designation of service providers and services to be provided, the plans and timelines for implementation, expected efficiency gains and budgetary impact, as well as the incorporation of lessons learned. **The Advisory Committee notes the proposed mission support ratios for 2023/24 and trusts that efforts will continue to be made to ensure that the mission support structure is based on workload analysis and that further efforts will be undertaken to regularly identify efficiencies. The Committee looks forward to the mission support structure guiding principles, as well as to the global support service architecture.**

#### *Backstopping to peacekeeping missions*

36. With regard to backstopping requirements for 2023/24, the Advisory Committee notes that resource requirements for peacekeeping missions and UNSOS are projected at \$6.3 billion, while those for support elements (UNLB, RSCE and the support account, excluding the corporate costs) would amount to a total of \$445.2 million, representing an increase of \$16.7 million, or 3.9 per cent, compared with the approved

resources for the 2022/23 period. As in previous years, in the 2023/24 budget proposal, corporate or cross-cutting peacekeeping initiatives costs are to be charged to the support account for peacekeeping operations, including the enterprise resource planning (\$17.7 million); death and disability claims for closed peacekeeping operations (\$0.5 million), the Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System (\$3.3 million); the efficiency model for management services (\$0.9 million); Umoja maintenance and support cost (\$20.9 million); and after-service health insurance (\$12.9 million). Table 8 of the report provides information on the financial resources of the support account, UNLB and RSCE compared with missions under peacekeeping budgets for the 2023/24 period and the previous four periods (A/77/779, summary, para. 291 and table 8). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with information on the financial resources of the peacekeeping operations, RSCE, UNLB and the support account from 2013/14 to 2021/22 and the proposed resources for 2023/24, along with information on the support account ratio and the field support ratio during the same periods. The information shows a slight decrease in both ratios in 2023/24 compared with 2022/23, after a steady increase over the past 10 budget periods, as reflected in table 11.

Table 11

**Financial resources of RSCE, UNLB and the support account compared with missions under peacekeeping budgets from 2013/14 to 2021/23 and proposed resources for 2023/24**

(Millions of United States dollars)

<i>Peacekeeping component</i>	<i>2013/14 (actual)</i>	<i>2014/15 (actual)</i>	<i>2015/16 (actual)</i>	<i>2016/17 (actual)</i>	<i>2017/18 (actual)</i>	<i>2018/19 (actual)</i>	<i>2019/20 (actual)</i>	<i>2020/21 (actual)</i>	<i>2021/22 (actual)</i>	<i>2022/23 (approved)</i>	<i>2023/24 (proposed)</i>
Peacekeeping missions and UNSOS	7 111.2	7 861.7	7 584.7	7 354.6	6 984.1	6 678.8	6 263.9	6 156.5	5 934.9	5 971.7	6 310.8
RSCE	25.6	38.6	29.7	36.3	32.8	31.4	35.4	36.3	39.8	43.1	43.8
UNLB	68.5	66.5	67.1	82.2	80.2	82.1	63.3	62.1	65.6	66.0	66.3
Support account <sup>a</sup>	287.5	294.2	294.8	299.4	288.9	287.5	292.7	306.2	300.1	319.8	335.1
<b>Field support ratio<sup>b</sup> (percentage)</b>	<b>5.37</b>	<b>5.08</b>	<b>5.16</b>	<b>5.68</b>	<b>5.75</b>	<b>6.00</b>	<b>6.25</b>	<b>6.57</b>	<b>6.83</b>	<b>7.18</b>	<b>7.05</b>
<b>Support account ratio (percentage)</b>	<b>4.04</b>	<b>3.74</b>	<b>3.89</b>	<b>4.07</b>	<b>4.14</b>	<b>4.30</b>	<b>4.67</b>	<b>4.97</b>	<b>5.06</b>	<b>5.35</b>	<b>5.31</b>

<sup>a</sup> Excluding provisions for corporate costs.

<sup>b</sup> Field support ratio: support account for peacekeeping operations, RSCE and UNLB, compared with peacekeeping missions (percentage).

37. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that entities funded under the support account had reviewed and updated previous studies on scalability based on a workload analysis as part of the budget process for the 2023/24 period. The results confirmed that resource requirements under the support account are not linked solely to the number of missions or the number of personnel deployed across missions, but also to the role of Headquarters and the increased complexity of peacekeeping operations, which constitutes the central element in the identification of support account resources needed to backstop current missions. Many of the functions currently funded under the support account are associated with strategic and cross-cutting functions and issues that go beyond one specific mission, while contributing to the overall achievement of peacekeeping mandates. As a result, many entities do not structure their resources to be specific to individual missions, although the regional divisions, including integrated operational teams, continue to do so. Some other functions, such as a resident audit office in missions, are also directly related to a specific mission. The Advisory Committee's observations and

recommendations with respect to the resource requirements and scalability are included in its report on the support account for peacekeeping operations ([A/77/833](#)), RSCE ([A/77/767/Add.5](#)) and UNLB ([A/77/767/Add.6](#)).

#### *Field recruitment*

38. According to the Secretary-General, in line with paragraph 35 of General Assembly resolution [76/274](#), the Human Resources Services Division under the Department of Operational Support publishes generic job openings to support recruitment in the field. The Division establishes and manages rosters across all job families, organizes testing and examinations, provides the full spectrum of operational support and other advisory services for clients in the exercise of their delegated authority and supports managers and business partners in the use of non-staff personnel. For the rostering process, the Human Resources Services Division uses expert panels to assess and recommend candidates who have applied against generic job openings for posts in field missions in order to reduce the administrative timeline for individual hiring managers. The use of expert panels will continue in the 2023/24 period in a hybrid format, building on lessons learned from the pandemic. Since candidates that are rostered as a result of such global exercises are subsequently selected by all missions, an amount of \$0.86 million is apportioned among the missions on a pro rata basis through a cost-sharing model, with each active peacekeeping operation contributing in accordance with its size ([A/77/779](#), para. 101).

39. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the expert panel assessed and recommended candidates who had applied to generic job openings for posts in field missions in order to reduce the administrative timeline on individual hiring managers and to enhance the quality, consistency and integrity of the recruitment process by centralizing the assessment. As outlined in administrative instruction [ST/AI/2010/3/Rev.2](#), the expert panels are normally comprised of at least three currently serving staff members, with two being subject matter experts at the same or higher level of the job opening and at least one being a woman and one being from outside the work unit where the job opening is located. Contractors are used to address specific areas that require special expertise that is not available among currently serving staff. To keep rosters up to date, efforts are being made to clean them up, consistent with the staff management consultation agreement and the principle of “active” roster membership, whereby rostered candidates need to confirm their continued interest in each roster membership. The Committee was also informed, upon enquiry, that during the period from 2018 to 2022, there were 2,122 selections in peacekeeping missions, of which 1,670 (or 79 per cent) were filled through recruit-from-roster job openings. Of those posts, 958 selections from the roster in peacekeeping missions were at the P-2 to D-1 levels. The Advisory Committee was also provided with a breakdown of the selections from rosters by mission during the same period. The information shows that there has been an almost steady decrease in the percentage of roster selections, from 85 per cent in 2018 to 75 per cent in 2022. The Committee recalls that the General Assembly endorsed the Committee’s recommendation that the Secretary-General provide detailed information on the challenges facing the recruitment process, as well as a breakdown of the funding of the different aspects of the process, including from field missions, in the next report on the overview of human resources management (see [A/77/728/Add.1](#), para. 30). **The Advisory Committee stresses the need for rosters to be kept up to date and fit for the purpose of facilitating recruitment in the field and trusts that lessons learned by missions from roster selections and a breakdown of the selections, by level and nationality, and statistics by gender, as well as information on the costs of roster management, will be included in future overview reports.**

### *Flexible work arrangements*

40. The Secretary-General explains that, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance led the adaptation of the policy framework to address critical issues such as flexible work arrangements, staff entitlements, rest and recuperation, mission footprint modifications and home leave. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that all staff were required to work in their duty station and that telecommuting from outside the duty station was approved only for personal and compelling circumstances. The Secretary-General's bulletin on flexible working arrangements ([ST/SGB/2019/3](#)) foresees, in section 1.3, the possibility of requesting staff members to work from an alternate work site (alternate working arrangements) to facilitate business continuity during crises. While flexible working arrangements are optional and voluntarily agreed upon between staff and managers, alternate working arrangements are implemented at the request of the Organization and are mandatory. Both modalities include the possibility of working from an alternate worksite at the duty station or outside the duty station, depending on the nature and requirements of the work. This is particularly relevant in field duty stations where personnel live and work in the same United Nations compound and where the separation between home and office is not so distinct. Regarding danger pay, according to the information provided, it is indicated in paragraph 6.1 of administrative instruction [ST/AI/2020/6](#), inter alia, that danger pay is payable to eligible staff members who are present in a location approved for danger pay. Where a staff member assigned to a location approved for danger pay resides in a different location that is not approved for danger pay, the allowance is payable only for the days that the staff member reports to work and is present in the location approved for danger pay. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with the number of staff, by mission, working outside of their duty station under both flexible and alternate work arrangements. The information shows that 134 staff benefit from both arrangements in almost all peacekeeping missions, except for UNDOF, UNISFA and RSCE. The Committee recalls that the General Assembly encouraged the Secretary-General to support managers in monitoring staff attendance to ensure that the Organization continues to be responsive to Member States and maintains effective and efficient delivery of the work of the Organization to assist legislative bodies in their work and to carry out their decisions, and to report thereon to the Assembly at the first part of its resumed seventy-eighth session (see General Assembly resolution [77/278](#), para. 40). **The Advisory Committee trusts that best practices and lessons learned, as well as the impact of the experience with flexible working arrangements and remote working, will be provided in the next overview report.**

### *Equitable geographical representation*

41. In the overview report, the Secretary-General also presents the efforts made in response to General Assembly resolution [76/274](#) (paras. 28, 35, 39–41 and 44) to ensure the attainment of equitable geographical distribution in the peacekeeping missions and the Secretariat and to ensure as wide a geographical distribution of staff as possible in all departments and offices at all levels ([A/77/779](#), para. 99). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with a breakdown of staff members in peacekeeping missions, including RSCE and UNLB, by regional group, during the period from 30 June 2018 to 31 December 2022, as reflected in table 12, as well as the number of active staff members in positions funded by the support account during the same period, as reflected in table 13. The Committee was also provided, upon request, with a breakdown of staff members in peacekeeping missions, by category and country of nationality, as at 31 December 2022. The Committee was informed that a number of initiatives had been launched in recent years, such as the Geographical Diversity

Strategy in 2020, and were serving as a basis for the development of relevant proposals. Moving forward, a programme to undertake a fundamental revision of recruitment is being initiated in the Secretariat to deliver a modern and professionalized selection system (staff selection 2.0). The new approach is expected to be consistent with the current delegation of authority framework and to ensure quality standards for all stages of the recruitment process, while allowing for the necessary flexibility, across the diverse and multifaceted operational contexts of the United Nations, including in the peacekeeping operations. **The Advisory Committee recalls that Article 101, paragraph 3, of the Charter states that due regard shall be paid to the importance of recruiting the staff on as wide a geographical basis as possible. The Committee trusts that the Secretary-General will provide detailed and disaggregated information on the geographic representation and the representation of troop- and police-contributing countries in the field missions, as well as in the departments funded by the support account, in his next overview report (see also [A/76/760](#), para. 51 and [A/75/822](#), para. 44). The Committee makes further comments and recommendations in its report on the support account for peacekeeping operations ([A/77/833](#)).**

Table 12

**Staff members in peacekeeping missions, including RSCE and UNLB, by regional group, during the period from 30 June 2018 to 31 December 2022**

Staff group	Regional group	30 June 2018		30 June 2019		30 June 2020		30 June 2021		30 June 2022		31 December 2022	
		Staff	Percentage	Staff	Percentage	Staff	Percentage	Staff	Percentage	Staff	Percentage	Staff	Percentage
International staff (Professional and higher categories and Field Service category)	Africa	2 322	45	2 272	45	2 198	46	2 092	46	1 978	47	1 944	47
	Asia-Pacific	995	19	972	19	930	20	869	19	804	19	780	19
	Eastern Europe	496	10	481	10	453	10	422	9	400	9	399	10
	Latin America and the Caribbean	253	5	256	5	240	5	229	5	220	5	216	5
	Western Europe and Others	1 032	20	1 015	20	898	19	877	19	825	19	786	19
	Other	28	1	24	0	23	0	20	0	19	0	19	0
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>5 126</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>5 020</b>	<b>37</b>	<b>4 742</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>4 509</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>4 246</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>4 144</b>	<b>39</b>
National staff (General Service and related categories)	Africa	7 507	82	7 010	81	6 023	80	5 534	79	5 099	78	5 044	78
	Asia-Pacific	879	10	886	10	879	12	863	12	861	13	857	13
	Eastern Europe	221	2	221	3	223	3	224	3	221	3	223	3
	Latin America and the Caribbean	173	2	171	2	4	0	1	0	2	0	1	0
	Western Europe and Others	362	4	347	4	345	5	341	5	349	5	340	5
	Other	29	0	28	0	31	0	29	0	29	0	28	0
	<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>9 171</b>	<b>64</b>	<b>8 663</b>	<b>63</b>	<b>7 505</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>6 992</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>6 561</b>	<b>61</b>	<b>6 493</b>	<b>61</b>
<b>Total</b>		<b>14 297</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>13 683</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>12 247</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>11 501</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>10 807</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>10 637</b>	<b>100</b>

Table 13

**Number of active staff members in positions funded by the support account from 2018 to 2022, by regional group**

Regional group	30 June 2018		30 June 2019		30 June 2020		30 June 2021		30 June 2022		31 December 2022	
	Staff	Percentage	Staff	Percentage	Staff	Percentage	Staff	Percentage	Staff	Percentage	Staff	Percentage
Africa	222	18	222	18	226	18	242	19	234	19	255	20
Asia-Pacific	246	19	253	20	248	20	255	20	261	21	270	22
Eastern Europe	81	6	80	6	88	7	92	7	87	7	78	6
Latin America and the Caribbean	99	8	101	8	100	8	90	7	95	8	102	8
Western Europe and Others	617	49	582	47	571	46	576	46	557	45	547	44
Other	3	0	2	0	1	0	2	0	2	0	2	0
<b>Total</b>	<b>1 268</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1 240</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1 234</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1 257</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1 236</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1 254</b>	<b>100</b>

*Gender balance*

42. In section X of the overview report, the Secretary-General explains the efforts made to increase women's participation in peacekeeping, including the Elsie Initiative for Field Missions<sup>3</sup> project, which is aimed at developing innovative methods to increase the participation, retention and overall security of women in peace missions. Such efforts also included conducting analyses of progress and challenges in missions with high staff turnover, taking steps to implement more inclusive hiring practices, providing guidance on the application of the temporary special measures for the achievement of gender equality and intensifying outreach to women applicants (A/77/779, paras. 212–222). According to the Secretary-General, the second phase of the Elsie Initiative for Field Missions project, which is aimed at supporting missions' efforts in the implementation of enhanced accommodation standards, was launched in April 2021. Six pilot projects have been identified across five peacekeeping operations (MINUSMA, MINUSCA, MINURSO, MONUSCO and UNISFA), of which 50 per cent have been completed, with the remaining projects estimated to be finalized by the second quarter of 2023. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with information on gender representation in all peacekeeping missions as well as in UNLB and RSCE for both international and national staff during the period from 30 June 2018 to 31 December 2022. As presented in figure V of the overview report, the information provided to the Committee confirms the low representation of civilian female staff in most of the missions at almost all levels, in particular the P-4 and above levels (see annex IX). The Advisory Committee requested data on the overall distribution of women in the Professional and higher categories as well as in the Field Service category in peacekeeping operations for the past 10 years but was provided with data for the past five years, as the data for the 10-year period were not readily available from the system. The Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that with respect to civilian personnel, the participation of women in peacekeeping operations was recorded in Umoja and the data and statistics were available in the management dashboard. Data on women uniformed peacekeepers were maintained in the Department of Peace Operations. Regarding the Elsie Initiative, upon enquiry, the Committee was informed that the expenditure for the

<sup>3</sup> The Elsie Initiative for Field Missions project was initiated in April 2018 and is aimed at developing innovative methods to increase the participation, retention and overall security of women in peace operations through gender-sensitive designs to improve the safety and well-being of women personnel in United Nations peace operations.



implementation of the Initiative, which is fully funded through voluntary contributions from the Government of Canada, was \$1.2 million during the first phase. The estimated cost for the second phase, which will continue until 31 March 2026, is \$6.5 million. **The Advisory Committee recalls Article 101, paragraph 3, of the Charter of the United Nations and General Assembly resolution 76/274 and reiterates that more efforts should be made to address the gender imbalance in the staffing of peacekeeping operations, in particular at the Professional and senior levels (see General Assembly resolution 76/274, para. 41; see also A/76/760, para. 50). The Advisory Committee trusts that the Secretary-General will continue to provide detailed data on gender representation in field missions in his future overview reports.**

#### *Mobility*

43. Regarding the impact of mobility, the Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that at the entity level, the new approach to staff mobility might have an impact on the geographic distribution, as well as on gender balance, depending upon movements of staff from and to entities through the mobility exercise. However, there will be no impact on peacekeeping operations, given that they do not have any geographical posts. According to the information provided, the first mobility exercise under the new approach is expected to be launched in the third quarter of 2023. As the mobility exercise rolls out, the Secretariat will provide support to missions to establish entity-specific targets and plans to address equitable geographical distribution and gender parity. The Committee recalls that in its resolution 77/278, the General Assembly reaffirmed its role in providing guidance on the mobility framework and requested the Secretary-General to report to the Assembly, at the first part of its resumed seventy-ninth session, details on the policy and progress of implementation of the new consolidated mobility framework, including non-financial incentives at the Secretariat and entity levels to encourage mobility and motivate staff to participate in the programme, in particular, movements between Headquarters and field duty stations; impact on the composition of the Secretariat, diversity targets and external recruitment; cost implications and measures to mitigate future increased resource requirements; linkage to career development; and an assessment of the current policy of liens and its impact on mobility (see General Assembly resolution 77/278, para. 18).

#### *Nationalization of posts*

44. In paragraph 34 of its resolution 76/274, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to consider options for greater nationalization of functions when formulating budget submissions, commensurate with mission mandates and requirements, where applicable. In his report, the Secretary-General identifies 35 posts proposed for nationalization in 2023/24, mostly in MONUSCO (A/77/779, para. 336 and table 23). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with a list of nationalized posts from the 2018/19 period to the 2022/23 period. The information shows that except for the 2018/19 and 2019/20 periods, in which 8 posts and 10 posts were nationalized, respectively, primarily in MONUSCO, a modest number of posts (between 2 and 5 posts) were nationalized during the other periods. The Committee was also provided with the percentage of national posts in the peacekeeping operations, UNSOS, UNLB, RSCE and the support account, in 2023/24 and the previous five periods, as well as information on proposals for nationalization during the same periods, as reflected in annex X. The information provided shows that during the reporting periods, while the percentage remained almost unchanged in some missions (MINURSO, UNDOF, UNMIK and UNMISS), it has been decreasing in others (MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, UNFICYP, UNIFIL, UNISFA, UNSOS and RSCE). Regarding the policy governing the employment of national staff, the Advisory Committee was informed that the intent and purpose of the use of the category had been identified during the review by ICSC of the use of National Professional Officers. The review led to the issuance of the guidelines for



the use of the National Professional Officer category (see 2017 ICSC report [A/72/30](#), annex II), which were endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution [72/255](#). The Committee recalls that the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to consider options for greater nationalization of functions when formulating budget submissions, commensurate with mission mandates and requirements where applicable (see Assembly resolution [76/274](#), para. 34). **The Advisory Committee acknowledges the considerable increase in the number of posts proposed for nationalization in 2023/24, concentrated mostly in MONUSCO. The Committee trusts that the Secretary-General will continue to include more proposals for nationalization in future mission budgets, as appropriate.**

### **Operational matters**

45. The proposed resource requirements for 2023/24 reflect an overall increase of \$234.8 million compared with the approved resources for 2022/23. The increase is attributable mainly to increased requirements under air operations (\$111.0 million), facilities and infrastructure (\$84.6 million), communications and information technology (\$13.6 million) and ground transportation (\$11.8 million). A common factor to which the increases in air operations, facilities and infrastructure, and ground transportation are attributed is the increase in fuel prices. ([A/77/779](#), table 15).

#### *Air operations*

46. The resource requirements for the 2023/24 period under air operations amount to \$690.9 million, representing an increase of \$111.0 million, or 19.1 per cent, compared with the 2022/23 appropriation. This increase represents approximately 47.3 per cent of the total increase in the proposed operational costs for the 2023/24 period. According to the Secretary-General, the higher costs of air operations are attributable mainly to higher contractual costs for the rental and operation of aircraft; higher average costs per litre for jet fuel; increased consumption of jet fuel; and the additional deployment of aircraft in UNSOS (10 additional military helicopters) and in UNISFA (one additional helicopter) (*ibid.*). In the 2021/22 period, the expenditure was \$502.7 million, or 90 per cent, compared with the appropriation for the same period, representing an underexpenditure in the amount of \$55.7 million. The expenditure in the 2022/23 period, as at 31 March 2023, was \$447.0 million, or 77.1 per cent of the appropriations (see annex III and table 1 of the present report). The Advisory Committee was provided, upon request, with a comparison of air operations by budget class per mission for the 2022/23 and 2023/24 periods, which is reflected in annex XI.

47. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that, in general, the increased costs in 2023/24 were common to the business area of provision of aviation services worldwide and were due to a variety of factors, including supply chain disruptions resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, changes in the political and security landscape and, consequently, changes in the economic environment and increased inflation. As such, it is difficult to establish direct causal relations between the relative increase in the aviation budget and the issuance by ICAO of Significant Safety Concerns regarding aircraft registered in one country. It should also be noted that, while the Secretariat succeeded in keeping the provision of aviation solutions cost-efficient, prices have risen since 2022. The generation of those solutions is in line with the Secretariat's strategy to progressively diversify the air fleet, allowing for efficiency, including in terms of fuel consumption and agility, by allowing for a portfolio of solutions that can cater to different needs. As part of the business continuity exercise following the issuance by ICAO of a Significant Safety Concern regarding aircraft registered in one country, the Secretariat established new contracts for helicopters, which saw increases of between 55 to 152 per cent in MINURSO, UNISFA, UNMISS and UNSOS. At the same time, changes in missions' concept of operations and expiration of contracts required the Secretariat to source new assets.

48. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with a list of air assets in each peacekeeping operation and their respective sources (sourced commercially or through a letter-of-assist arrangement with a Member State). Upon enquiry, the Committee was also provided with a list of the types and costs of aircraft not yet deployed by missions and the reasons for the non-deployment. The Committee was further provided, upon request, with information on the monthly use of air assets in field missions during the period from January to December 2022, as well as with information on the sharing of aircraft assigned to one mission with other missions and the sharing of contracts with one or multiple aircraft between two or more missions.

49. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that over the past five years, the Secretariat had used the invitation-to-bid methodology for long-term air charter services and for procuring mission air assets. While the use of the invitation-to-bid solicitation methodology is ongoing, a request-for-proposal exercise in support of UNITAMS is currently being prepared and is expected to be launched in 2023. Further requests for proposals for long-term air charter services in support of other field missions are anticipated for 2024 and beyond. While it is expected that the costs for long-term air charter services will increase in the 2023/24 period owing to a variety of factors, including supply chain disruptions resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic, political and security developments, and the change in the economic environment and its impact on inflation, as well as limitations in the supply market, there is no indication that increased use of the request-for-proposal solicitation methodology versus the use of the invitation-to-bid solicitation methodology would lead to any higher costs. The Committee was also informed that while the acquisition of commercial air charter services, including fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters, was conducted centrally at Headquarters, freight-forwarding services by air could be acquired by individual field missions, supported by centrally established framework agreements as needed. According to the information, owing to the highly specialized and strategic nature of air charter services, as well as aviation safety concerns, it has proved beneficial to acquire such services centrally at Headquarters. Currently, the typical contract duration for long-term aviation contracts is one year and two additional one-year optional periods at the sole discretion of the United Nations. The Department of Operational Support is currently assessing the impact of longer contract durations on prices, while factoring in the payments that would need to be made if early termination of such contracts is required on account of changes in mandate, downsizing or liquidation of the mission concerned. The Committee was further informed that although leasing aircraft can run as high as tens of thousands of dollars per hour, that price is still lower than the millions of dollars required to purchase an aircraft. Leasing an aircraft also provides flexibility to the Organization when the mandate of the mission changes. From a procurement perspective, purchasing an aircraft would also mean locking into a large investment for a long period of time and might be considered at odds with the principle of regular competition. Lastly, according to the information provided, with purchased aircraft, the United Nations would have to operate like an airline, which would require a major shift in current operational procedures including, among other things, identification of the country of registration as required by the Chicago Convention on International Civil Aviation and maintaining the Organization's own base, crew, staff and so forth, with further additional costs. Legally, the United Nations is not in a position to produce an air operator certificate or register civil aircraft, as required by the Chicago Convention.

**50. The Advisory Committee notes the significant level of resource requirements under air operations and the low utilization rate of air assets, including unmanned aircraft systems, and recommends that missions make concrete efforts to use their air assets efficiently and effectively, in particular the flight hours, and develop a framework for intermission cooperation, including through sharing of leased aircraft among missions within the same proximity**

area, based on lessons learned from existing cooperation, in line with the Financial Regulations and Rules of the Organization. The Committee trusts that the Secretary-General will include comprehensive information on the sharing of air assets, as well as efficiencies generated, including from the effective use of the aviation fleet, in future overview reports. The Committee also emphasizes that the Secretary-General should ensure that the procurement process for air operations contracts is conducted in full compliance with general procurement principles as set out in financial regulation 5.12, namely: (a) best value for money; (b) fairness, integrity and transparency; (c) effective international competition; and (d) the interest of the United Nations.

*Unmanned aircraft systems in peacekeeping operations*

51. Information on the generation and deployment of unmanned aircraft systems in peacekeeping operations is provided in paragraphs 89 to 95 of the overview report. It is also mentioned that a newly developed category management strategy for unmanned aircraft systems and airborne peacekeeping-intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance comprises 13 different improvement opportunities that are being implemented, including a lessons-learned programme that will be used to develop and implement different lessons learned on an annual basis. The improvement initiatives also include a complete renewed set of rules and guidance and specific training solutions for different staff audiences, in accordance with the request of the General Assembly that staff have the capacity to provide technical oversight of the use of the systems technologies (see Assembly resolution 76/274, paras. 54–55). According to the Secretary-General, all procurement and sourcing activities in this category are planned and conducted at the Headquarters strategic level, in strict compliance with the United Nations Financial Regulations and Rules. Information on the deployment status, including estimated resource requirements for systems to be provided under commercial, memorandum-of-understanding and letter-of-assist arrangements, are set out in annex IV to the overview report. The proposed resource requirements for these systems at MINUSCA, MINUSMA and MONUSCO amount to approximately \$54.4 million for 2023/24. The Advisory Committee was provided, upon request, with information on the monthly use of unmanned aircraft systems and airborne peacekeeping-intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance during the periods from 2018 to 2022. The information shows a significantly low utilization rate for most of the systems in the operations where they are deployed. The Committee recalls that the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to continue to build on lessons learned to improve the reliability, adaptability and cost-effectiveness of unmanned aerial and aircraft systems technologies (ibid., para. 54).

52. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that, for the procurement of unmanned aircraft systems, the Secretariat had conducted competitive solicitation exercises through requests for proposal in support of MONUSCO, MINUSMA and MINUSCA over the past 10 years. According to the information provided, request for proposals was one of the solicitation methodologies used to acquire goods and services in the Secretariat, in accordance with the Financial Regulations and Rules and the Procurement Manual. While the interest of the United Nations was equally reflected in invitation-to-bid and request-for-proposals methodologies, the three other procurement principles, namely, fairness, integrity and transparency, best value for money, and effective international competition, were better reflected by the request-for-proposal methodology in the sourcing of long-term air charter services. Regarding the training of staff, the Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that between 2018 and 2022, dedicated training on micro unmanned aircraft systems had been delivered to 869 persons. However, in order to improve the quality and diversity of the training options available to staff both at the mission and Headquarters levels, the Secretariat is developing a complete training programme, within the scope of the recently developed category

management strategy for the systems. The programme is expected to be fully developed and implemented by the end of June 2023. It will include training modules and plans for all the different audiences involved in the management and governance of unmanned aircraft systems and airborne peacekeeping-intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance. **The Advisory Committee recalls General Assembly resolution 76/274, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to ensure consistency, transparency and cost-efficiency in the budgeting for unmanned aerial systems in individual peacekeeping operation budget proposals; and to ensure that the procurement of unmanned aerial systems from commercial providers complies with the United Nations Procurement Manual and that reimbursement of such systems provided by troop-contributing countries is consistent with the framework set out in the Contingent-Owned Equipment Manual.**

#### *Facilities and infrastructure*

53. The resource requirements for facilities and infrastructure for the 2023/24 period amount to \$580.4 million, representing an increase of \$84.6 million, or 17.1 per cent, compared with the 2022/23 appropriation. According to the Secretary-General, the increased requirements under facilities and infrastructure are attributable mainly to the higher cost of fuel for generators, including the higher cost per litre; higher costs for construction, renovation and major maintenance; and the acquisition of additional equipment, supplies and prefabricated structures. In the 2021/22 period, there was an overexpenditure in the amount of \$66.7 million, or 13.8 per cent, compared with the appropriation for the same period. The expenditure in the 2022/23 period is \$447.0 million, or 76.3 per cent of the appropriations, as at 31 March 2023 (see annex III and table 1). Upon enquiry, the Committee was provided with a table showing the number of generators acquired for all missions in the past five budget periods and the number projected for 2023/24, as well as the performance over time for the indicators contributing to efficiency (see tables 14 and 15). **The Advisory Committee trusts that updated information on the acquisition of hybrid generators along with the efficiency gains, as well as the volume of fuel consumption, will be provided in future mission budget submissions and overview reports.**

Table 14  
Number of generators acquired for all missions from 2017/18 to 2022/23 and projection for 2023/24

	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20	2020/21	2021/22	2022/23 <sup>a</sup>	2023/24	Total
MINURSO	3	8	11	–	14	2	–	38
MINUSCA	177	31	30	24	24	24	16	326
MINUSMA	3	21	9	33	7	45	50	168
MONUSCO	–	14	–	6	12	14	–	46
UNDOF	2	16	10	–	2	7	2	39
UNFICYP	2	–	4	2	3	–	2	13
UNIFIL	20	12	6	2	1	–	14	55
UNISFA	5	24	16	1	–	–	1	47
UNLB	1	–	1	3	–	–	–	5
UNMIK	–	4	3	2	3	–	–	12
UNMISS	93	40	16	13	28	16	10	216
UNSOS	32	94	36	19	63	1	11	256
<b>Total</b>	<b>338</b>	<b>264</b>	<b>142</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>157</b>	<b>109</b>	<b>106</b>	<b>1 221</b>

<sup>a</sup> Information as at 16 March 2023.

Table 15  
Performance over time for the indicators contributing to efficiency

Indicator	2017/18	2018/19	2019/20 (baseline)	2020/21	2021/22
Generator fuel consumption per capita per day (litres)	4.51	4.88	3.5	3.5	3.4
Greenhouse gas emissions per capita per year (tons of carbon dioxide equivalent)	7.8	8.3	7.5	7.0	7.3
Freshwater use per capita per day (litres)	121	127	159	123	114
Generation of solid waste per capita per day (kilograms)	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.5

54. Upon request, the Advisory Committee was provided with information on budgeted and expenditure levels for stationery in peacekeeping operations during the periods from 2021/22 to 2022/23 and the proposed resources for the 2023/24 period, which is reflected in annex XII. **The Advisory Committee recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to review the per-person allocation and budgeting of stationery, with a view to identifying efficiencies, and trusts that an update will be provided in the next mission budget submissions.**

#### *Ground transportation*

55. The resource requirements for the 2023/24 period for ground transportation amount to \$104.7 million, representing an increase of \$11.8 million, or 12.7 per cent, compared with the 2022/23 appropriation. According to the Secretary-General, the higher costs of ground transportation result primarily from the higher cost of fuel for vehicles and the acquisition of vehicles. In the 2021/22 period, the expenditure was \$114.7 million, or 144.7 per cent, compared with the appropriation for the same period, representing an overexpenditure in the amount of \$35.4 million. The expenditure in the 2022/23 period is \$70.8 million, or 76.3 per cent of the appropriations, as at 31 March 2023 (see annex III and table 1). According to the Secretary-General, the Department of Operational Support continues to provide guidance and advice to missions and other Secretariat entities to ensure effective and efficient fleet management, including through sourcing options for less expensive vehicles with reduced environmental footprint and collaborative sourcing for enhancing inter-office or inter-entity cooperation, and thereby benefit from comparative advantages of different United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. The Standard Cost and Ratio Manual provides the suggested vehicle allocation ratios to guide missions in the determination of the ceiling of light passenger vehicles for operational purposes. The actual holdings are determined by missions based on their unique operational requirements. The composition of combined peacekeeping vehicle fleets is presented in table 25 of the overview report. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with a list of vehicles acquired for all missions in the budget periods from 2016/17 to 2021/22. The Committee was also provided, upon request, with the vehicle acquisition plans by mission over the past five periods. **The Advisory Committee trusts that comprehensive information on vehicle acquisition plans, including an updated table on the number of vehicles acquired in the past five years, will be systematically included in future mission budget reports. The Committee recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to continue to review and optimize the composition of mission vehicle fleets and ensure that the vehicles are fit for purpose; and to submit a cost-benefit analysis outlining, inter alia, the type, quality, efficiency, maintenance cost and environmental impact of vehicle adjustments in the context of the next overview report (see also General Assembly resolution 70/286, para. 40). The Committee further recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to include in his next overview**

**report comprehensive detailed information on vehicles leased/rented in missions for the last five budget periods, including the purpose, duration and costs of the leases.**

56. Regarding the vehicle tracking systems, the Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that such systems had been used by the Department of Operational Support for many years. Most of the existing vehicles in the United Nations-owned fleet currently have hardware installed referred to as the CarLog System, which is a system that was first introduced more than 20 years ago. The original CarLog System does not provide real-time data but transfers data to a central server only when in range of a radio frequency modem or receiver, which is usually located at the mission base. An updated version of CarLog offers data transfer through the global system for mobile communications. According to the information provided, the fixed costs of the existing CarLog System range from between \$500 and \$650 per vehicle, depending on the accessories required. In addition, recurrent costs amount to \$10 per month per vehicle for communication, which may differ based on geographical location. The information provided indicates that, in 2021, a procurement exercise, led by WFP, in collaboration with UNHCR, and the Department of Operational Support, was initiated to jointly develop the requirements for a tender for the provision of new vehicle-tracking and telematic systems and related services. The procurement exercise is currently in the final stages and is scheduled to be finalized by WFP in the second quarter of 2023. The benefit of this collaborative exercise is to have a standardized platform for United Nations organizations with the largest vehicle fleets. That will allow not only for better contract conditions, but also for the establishment and tracking of a global United Nations vehicle fleet. Compared with the existing CarLog System, the new system will facilitate real-time tracking capabilities of vehicles, thereby increasing the overall reliability and oversight necessary to further improve the safety and security of United Nations personnel and equipment. In addition, the new system will have sophisticated functionality, such as remote disabling. The replacement of the current CarLog System with the new system will be gradual, starting with new vehicles and vehicles that operate in high-risk security areas. **The Advisory Committee notes that the current CarLog System will be gradually replaced with the new system, starting with new vehicles and vehicles that operate in high-risk security areas, and trusts that detailed analysis of the overall reliability and oversight necessary to improve the monitoring of vehicles will be provided in future overview reports and mission-specific budget submissions.**

*Medical services*

57. In his report, the Secretary-General indicates that improved health-care management is being accomplished through a medical performance framework using the hospital evaluation tool, evidence-based clinical pathways aimed at standardizing clinical care, clinical audits to ensure compliance with said pathways, root cause analysis, patient experience surveys and responses to patient complaints. He also provides information on different initiatives to ensure the delivery of high-quality health services in peacekeeping operations ([A/77/779](#), paras. 159–163). The resource requirements under medical for the 2023/24 period amount to \$27.4 million, representing a decrease of \$2.5 million, or 8.5 per cent, compared with the 2022/23 appropriation. In the 2021/22 period, the expenditure was \$28.8 million, or 90.2 per cent, compared with the appropriation for the same period, representing an underexpenditure in the amount of \$3.1 million. The expenditure in the 2022/23 period is \$20.0 million, or 66.3 per cent of the appropriations, as at 31 March 2023 (see annex III and table 1). According to the Secretary-General, the decreased requirements are attributable mainly to revised contractual agreements for specialized care for aeromedical evacuation services in MINUSMA (\$2.1 million). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the standard approach had changed from being HIV-focused to a comprehensive disease perspective portfolio, to ensure that United

Nations personnel benefited from the in-house expertise in the formal HIV/AIDS unit and that the unit provided health promotion and awareness in addition to its work on HIV/AIDS. Upon request, the Committee was also provided with information on the resource proposals for medical supplies for the 2023/24 period, including vaccines, manual test kits, calibrators, condoms, drugs and so forth, as reflected in table 16. According to the Secretariat, the information reflects the missions' best estimate for the requirements for medical supplies, based on past expenditure trends and adjusted for planned changes in medical requirements, as well as the changes in stock levels in the prior and current years. The Advisory Committee makes further comments and observations in its report on MINUSCA ([A/77/767/Add.13](#)).

Table 16

**Proposed resource requirements for medical supplies in 2023/24**

(United States dollars)

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Amount</i>
MINURSO	85 500
MINUSCA	1 437 600
MINUSMA	779 100
MONUSCO	616 100
UNDOF	91 000
UNFICYP	73 400
UNIFIL	281 800
UNISFA	315 000
UNMIK	40 700
UNMISS	814 300
UNSOS	2 188 100

*Supply chain management: procurement*

58. The Secretary-General states in his report that the Office of Supply Chain Management of the Department of Operational Support finalized and disseminated the global supply chain plan for the 2022/23 period, which contained a total of 19,077 demand lines for goods and services valued at a total of \$2.07 billion. In providing strategic sourcing guidance, the plan has identified that 70.6 per cent (\$1.46 billion) of the total demand can be satisfied by centrally managed solutions through system contracts, turnkey contracts, aviation services and strategic movements, memorandums of understanding and letters of assist. Other sources include regional and local contracts, which incorporate, among other things, low-value acquisitions, local lease contracts and one-time purchases by missions. The Secretary-General also provides updates on the development and implementation of category management; vendor outreach efforts, including through targeted outreach to Member States, in particular vendors from developing countries and countries with economies in transition; soliciting methods; and the contract performance reporting tool ([A/77/779](#), paras. 118–128). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that in accordance with the management reform, the Office of Supply Chain Management oversees the development and management of the global supply chain plans for demand, source and delivery requirements for Secretariat entities. The plans are developed at the entity level using the local planner functionalities in the recently introduced supply chain planning tool. Upon further enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the Procurement Division of the Office of Supply Chain Management in the Department of Operational Support is responsible for procuring



goods and/or services that are identified as falling within the scope of a centre-led procurement approach in the strategic goods and services matrix and for establishing and administering contracts for requisitioners at Headquarters. Other Secretariat entities may place purchase orders against the system contracts established by the Division. Within the Procurement Division, the Global Procurement Support Section functions as a regional hub, among other things, that establishes regional system contracts, administers various global freight-forwarding contracts, leads the category of office supplies and provides acquisition support to various clients and mission-specific support for various categories of goods and services. The delegation of authority framework, with its clearly defined roles and responsibilities, allows the client entities to have fully delegated authorities and ownership, with aligned accountability. In accordance with the related section on local procurement authority in the Procurement Manual, strategic goods and services include the following two categories: (a) goods and/or services that fall, for reasons such as safety and security, within the scope of a centre-led approach (e.g., aviation, ammunition, counter-rocket and artillery radars, information, surveillance and reconnaissance systems, food rations and body armour); and (b) goods and/or services needed by a broad range of clients to meet commonly required, high-volume needs, which lend themselves to centre-led procurement for reasons of economies of scale, standardization or other reasons and which are usually available under long-term agreements. Such goods and services can be procured by any Secretariat entity up to the established threshold. For local procurement of strategic goods and services above the established thresholds, entities may seek local procurement authority through the relevant process. The Advisory Committee was provided, upon request, with information on the solutions centrally managed by the Procurement Division and the Global Procurement Support Section, as reflected in table 17. **The Advisory Committee recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to include in his future overview report disaggregated information, including the related resources, on the centrally managed contracts, including system contracts, turnkey contracts, aviation services and strategic movements, memorandums of understanding and letters of assist, as well as detailed information, including delegated procurement exceptions, on locally managed contracts and regional procurement.**

Table 17

**Solutions centrally managed by the Procurement Division and the Global Procurement Support Section**

(United States dollars)

	2020		2021		2022	
	Amount	Percentage	Amount	Percentage	Amount	Percentage
Procurement Division (Headquarters)	1 801 899 254.75	66.60	1 703 221 632.88	62.39	1 856 995 593.59	59.36
Global Procurement Support Section	50 925 204.17	1.88	41 586 945.50	1.52	29 602 676.53	0.95
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>1 852 824 458.92</b>	<b>68.48</b>	<b>1 744 808 578.38</b>	<b>63.92</b>	<b>1 886 598 270.12</b>	<b>60.30</b>
Other	852 692 832.01	31.52	984 952 432.78	36.08	1 241 952 686.61	39.70
<b>Total</b>	<b>2 705 517 290.93</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>2 729 761 011.16</b>	<b>100.00</b>	<b>3 128 550 956.73</b>	<b>100.00</b>

59. The Advisory Committee recalls that the Board of Auditors indicated that a recent internal audit of demand and source planning for peace operations had concluded that many of the objectives of this scheme had not yet been reached, owing primarily to inaccurate data in demand and source plans (see [A/76/595](#)). In addition, the Board found that performance indicators available to monitor the quality of demand planning were not effectively used ([A/77/5 \(Vol. II\)](#), chap. II, para. 316



and 321). **The Advisory Committee also trusts that more efforts will be made to improve the quality of data entered in the supply chain planning tool and to refine the key performance indicators to monitor the quality of demand planning (see also A/77/802 paras. 46–48).**

#### *Assets management*

60. The Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that peacekeeping operations were required to ensure full accountability and quality of property records by conducting 100 per cent physical verification of property, plant and equipment, as well as physical cycle counts of inventory. The Secretariat has established a framework for the peacekeeping operations to monitor their property holdings, including their utilization ratios, ageing of stocks in terms of time on shelves and remaining economically useful life, as well as operational readiness. The framework also enables monitoring of the identification and declaration of surplus property that meets the criteria for transferability to other peacekeeping operations. Property that is identified as surplus, slow-moving or obsolete is considered for inter-mission transfer, disposal or write-off based on demonstrated requirements, cost-benefit analyses, actual technical condition and the remaining useful life of the property items. A dedicated property management performance framework that includes key actions and corresponding performance indicators allows peacekeeping operations to monitor and assess the progress in the achievement of the physical verification and counts targets, as well as the process of reconciliation of discrepancies, identification and declaration of surplus for further utilization.

61. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was also informed that the Secretariat was undertaking efforts to utilize property, plant and equipment beyond an initial life cycle of utilization in a single entity by means of the clearing house function in UNLB. This function ensures that equipment that is declared surplus by one entity is transferred for another life cycle to another entity. Such transfers can be made directly and without adjustment of the operational useful life and book value or can undergo refurbishment at UNLB prior to reuse in another entity. This second option is managed by the Secretariat under the return, refurbish and reuse programme, under which mainly fixed assets of high acquisition value and low utilization throughout their previous life cycle are refurbished and their operational useful life is extended by up to a full period corresponding to its original life. Should the fixed asset as a whole not be suitable for refurbishment or direct transfer, the Secretariat also considers the opportunity for cannibalization of the fixed assets to recycle or reuse rotatable parts or to repurpose elements of the original assets. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was also provided with information on the number and value of assets that were not in use by the mission or transferred to other missions. The information shows that as at 25 February 2023, the total number of assets that were not in use was 7,713 items, with current acquisition and production costs of \$181.7 million and a current book value of \$100.1 million. This amount includes 6,860 operational items with current acquisition and production costs of \$157.1 million and a current book value of \$86.0 million and 853 items under review for repair or disposal with current acquisition and production costs of \$24.6 million and a current book value of \$14.0 million. According to the Secretariat, the items under review for repair or disposal will be reviewed by missions, which will determine whether the assets can be repaired or disposed of in line with the Financial Regulations and Rules of the United Nations and the delegation of authority. The disposal review process would be based on demonstrated requirements, conditions, remaining useful life and cost-benefit analysis. The Advisory Committee recalls that the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to improve asset disposal in the liquidation process of closing missions, consistent with the Financial Regulations and Rules to enhance accountability in this regard, and make every effort to dispose of future assets at a

minimal loss for the Organization by transferring to other missions, where appropriate, or in other ways, and to include disaggregated information for assets over 300,000 United States dollars disposed of in the pre-liquidation and liquidation periods in the performance reports of closing missions (see General Assembly resolution 76/274, para. 23). **The Advisory Committee reiterates its recommendation that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to include disaggregated information on the disposition of all assets in all missions, including liquidating and closed missions, including the nominal and depreciated value of all assets and those gifted/donated and written off, as well as the revenue generated by and the costs recovered for assets transferred to other entities, if any, in the performance reports of missions (see A/77/780, para. 17). The Committee also considers that a general review of the life expectancy of assets could also be conducted to identify possible regeneration of the life cycles of assets in order to update the standards and efficiently use the existing resources.** The Advisory Committee makes further comments and observations, including on the management of stocks and inventory, in its report on UNLB (A/77/767/Add.6).

62. Regarding the management of mission stocks, the Advisory Committee was provided with information, in the context of its consideration of the proposed budget of UNLB, on the “smart warehouse” project, which is aimed at transforming warehouse operations from a custodian-focused function to a value-adding, customer service-oriented function that supports the United Nations Supply Chain Strategy. Specifically, the project will focus on end-to-end supply chain visibility for assets, equipment and inventory. The expected result is that warehouse operations will be more cost-effective and easier to manage. **The Advisory Committee trusts that detailed information by mission on stocks and their values, including strategic stocks, as well as the update on the “smart warehouse” project and the efficiency gains will be included in the mission budgets and the next overview report.** The Committee makes further comments and observations in the context of its report on UNLB (ibid.).

## C. General cross-cutting matters

### 1. Fuel prices

63. The Secretary-General explains in his report that the current methodology used to calculate the budgeted fuel price per litre is based on the weighted average price per litre for the most recent six-month period; historically, this average has been based on the weighted average prices from July to December of the budget preparation cycle. That approach, however, cannot take into account the evolution in prices that can occur between the time when budgets are prepared and the time when they are considered by the General Assembly during its second resumed session. Under this methodology, there is no revision process in the level of appropriations for peacekeeping missions, regardless of variations in operational rates of exchange or actual inflation experience. As a result, each mission has to contain expenditures within the approved budget, by reprioritizing activities to meet unforeseen requirements under operational expenditures. According to the Secretary-General, in line with paragraph 13 of General Assembly resolution 76/274, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to continue to improve methodologies to assist missions in formulating realistic, consistent and reliable budgets, including by exploring ways to anticipate and mitigate the impact of the evolution of fuel prices, the Secretariat analysed the costs, trends and the impact of changing fuel prices on the execution of the budgets and studied the utility of a linear regression model to estimate fuel costs. The linear regression could provide one model for more accurate fuel costs (for budgeting purposes) based on an algorithm that takes into account market trends, direction and external variables. As part of the study, an analysis was

conducted to assess what the estimated fuel requirements would have been in the 2022/23 proposed budget had the regression model been applied during budget preparation, using fuel data over a 12-month period and projecting 6 months ahead. The study showed that the Secretary General's budget proposal would have been more representative of actual fuel costs, at approximately \$23.4 million higher, which was relatively closer to the updated requirements of an additional \$17.3 million provided to the Fifth Committee in May 2022, noting that fuel prices continued their upward trajectory through the end of June, when the budgets were approved. Table 2 of the report provides details on the fuel cost requirements in the 2022/23 proposed budget compared with linear regression model requirements. As indicated by the Secretary-General, a review to assess what the currently proposed fuel requirements would amount to at the time of budget submission, had the regression model been applied during budget preparation based on fuel trends leading up to December 2022, showed that the proposed fuel requirements for 2023/24 would have been higher by 17 per cent to 18 per cent, or approximately \$50 million more than current budgeted amounts (A/77/779, paras. 257–261).

64. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that linear regression is a statistical method used to model the relationship between a dependent variable and one or more independent variables. The objective of linear regression is to find a linear relationship between the independent variable and the dependent variable that can be used to forecast the value of the dependent variable. In the study, the price of fuel represents the dependent variable and time (months) represents the independent variable. The Committee was also informed that the linear regression model is aimed at providing reliable estimates that are reflective of the trends, which will already have been included in the proposed budgets, rather than providing revised estimates at the time of deliberations, given that there is no recosting exercise for peacekeeping missions. According to the information provided, a six-month projection time frame is applied as a projection in the short term, which presents a more reliable estimate that projects further out into the financial year. However, the linear regression model is too simplistic to capture real-world complexity and anticipate the fuel prices accurately for the next 12 or 18 months. As such, given the extreme volatility of fuel prices, the linear regression model is not intended to project the fuel prices during the implementation of the budget. Accordingly, it is not unreasonable to expect that variances will occur between the approved budget and its actual implementation. Such variances are reported to the General Assembly in budget performance reports. The information provided reiterated the view of the Secretary-General that the upcoming second part of the resumed session would provide a useful opportunity to consider the evolution in fuel prices and the accuracy of the linear regression model. The Secretariat will also continue to consider alternative methodologies and models, as appropriate. The Advisory Committee was also provided, upon request, with an analysis of fuel cost variances for the 2022/23 and 2023/24 periods for all peacekeeping missions.

65. The Advisory Committee was informed that, currently, the price of fuel is calculated monthly for each distribution point and is applicable to the fuel delivered during the month. For each distribution point, the total price of fuel per litre consists of the sum of the fixed price per litre and the variable price per litre. The fixed price includes all costs associated with the delivery of fuel to a specific distribution point, for all modes of transportation proposed by the contractor. This price also includes costs associated with the importation of fuel, interim storage and transportation and refuelling services. The fixed price remains unchanged throughout the initial three-year contract period. The variable price per litre of fuel is based on the independent fuel index that is most relevant for each mission. The Committee was also informed that there are four main concepts driving costs in the turnkey contracts for fuel: (a) the price of the fuel itself, payable for each litre of fuel delivered into a vehicle, aircraft or generator; (b) operations and maintenance fees, which have a monthly recurrence

and compensate the contractor for the services associated with the operation of distribution points and reserves; (c) mobilization fees, which are paid at the onset of the contract to compensate for the mobilization of equipment and personnel; and (d) other items, such as fuel drums, oils and lubricants, paid by the unit delivered. The component of the cost on which market fluctuations have a direct impact month to month is the variable price of fuel, which is part of the total price of fuel. This comprises 30 per cent to 65 per cent of the fuel price. The variable price of fuel has an overall weight in the total mission fuel services expenditure of between around 24 per cent and 50 per cent, depending on the specific mission and contract. In 2022, that percentage was substantially higher owing to the increase in oil prices. According to the Secretariat, despite the decline in fuel prices experienced during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, the overall trend has continued to exhibit a positive slope over the past five years across missions. While a periodic short-term decrease in fuel prices has also been notable over the past few years owing to overall conditions in the market and global economics, the overall trend reflects that a positive slope continues to be maintained. The Advisory Committee was provided with information on the monthly fuel price data until March 2023, along with the unit and overall financial implications for the mission budgets based on the previous six-month average from September 2022 to February 2023 (see annex XIII). The information shows a potential cost reduction in the amount of \$21.7 million.

66. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was also informed that no activities were deferred in the 2022/23 period owing to increased fuel prices in any peacekeeping missions. The Committee was also provided with information on the approved resources and expenditures for fuel by mission, fuel type, quantity and related amounts for the 2020/21, 2021/22 and 2022/23 periods as at 31 March 2023. The Committee was further provided with information on the approved resources for fuel by mission in 2022/23 compared with the proposed resources for 2023/24. The information shows an increase in the total amounts of fuel, from 243.1 million litres at the cost of \$297.3 million in 2022/23 to 247.5 million litres at the cost of \$390.2 million. **The Advisory Committee notes the information provided on the methodology and the latest calculation of the fuel costs, including the potential reduction of \$21.7 million, and trusts that the updated information on the fuel prices and the potential financial implications will be provided to the General Assembly at the time of its consideration of the present report. The Committee further trusts that the Secretary-General will continue to efficiently use fuel resources and consider alternative methodologies and models to refine the projections and report thereon in the next overview report.**

## 2. Issues relating to environmental management and energy efficiencies

67. In response to the requests made by the General Assembly in its resolution [76/274](#) (paras. 83–84), the Secretary-General explains in his report the progress made in the implementation of the six-year environment strategy for peace operations (2017–2023). The Advisory Committee was informed that phase 1 of the strategy (2017–2020) focused primarily on reducing environmental risks, implementing a performance and risk management framework and establishing various supporting frameworks for improving environmental outcomes. Phase 2 (2021–2023) focuses on implementation, giving high priority to energy efficiency and renewable energy. The focus on renewable energy is therefore relatively recent and according to the information provided, when all the renewable energy projects planned by missions up to 2024 are completed, the share of renewable energy used in peacekeeping for generation is expected to increase by 3 per cent.<sup>4</sup> As it is estimated that the full transition of missions to renewable energy would require investments in the order of

<sup>4</sup> Currently, the share of renewable energy is at 6 per cent.

hundreds of millions of dollars, only incremental improvements can be expected when funded through mission budgets. Supported by the Department of Operational Support, missions are currently exploring alternative mechanisms to accelerate this transition, including through outsourced renewable energy supply, through connection to existing local grids with a share of renewable energy or through power purchase agreements with utilities or private power producers. Three specific outsourcing projects are under development or at the planning stage. According to the Secretariat, when completed, these outsourcing projects are expected to increase the share of renewable energy in peacekeeping operations by 3 per cent by the 2024/25 period.

68. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that introducing solar photovoltaic systems or connecting mission sites to a local grid with a share of renewable energy, in order to reduce the reliance on diesel generators, which are still responsible for about 90 per cent of the electricity used in the field and for the emission of about 55 per cent of the emissions from peacekeeping operations, was considered the most efficient way to reduce emissions related to facilities and infrastructure and was therefore prioritized by the United Nations. Several other initiatives have been undertaken to lower carbon emissions through the reduction of electrical demand. Throughout the implementation of the environment strategy for peace operations, a strong focus has been placed on energy efficiency projects to minimize the energy consumption of missions through projects that have a low payback time of investment. The two highest sources of energy consumption in missions are air conditioning units (up to 50 per cent of the total energy consumption owing to very hot environments in some missions) and lighting (approximately 10 per cent to 15 per cent of the total energy consumption). As a result, replacing existing energy-intensive fluorescent lights with energy-efficient light emitting diode (LED) lights and substituting old air conditioning units with high-efficiency inverter type units have been prioritized by several missions to improve their energy efficiency. To enable missions to execute such energy efficiency projects, the Department of Operational Support established global system contracts for the procurement of LED lights (first quarter of 2021) and energy-efficient air conditioning units (most recent contract issued in the third quarter of 2022) with a unit price that is comparable if not lower than the previously available, less energy-efficient units. According to the information provided, while such energy efficiency measures are being implemented progressively by missions as part of their energy infrastructure management plan rather than through a single one-time project, it is challenging to demonstrate the benefits that they are having in respect of the energy demand and, eventually, the use of fuel for electricity generation, as those benefits are incremental over time. However, to demonstrate the value of such initiatives, case studies from missions indicate that the replacement of fluorescent lights with LED lights, the substitution of old air conditioning units with energy-efficient units and the replacement of old prefabricated accommodation and office units with new units that have better insulation can lead to energy savings of 50 per cent, 30 per cent and 30 per cent, respectively. Upon request, the Advisory Committee was provided with a list of the energy efficiency projects and activities in all peacekeeping missions, along with the energy infrastructure management plan, 2020–2024 for those missions.

69. The Advisory Committee was also informed, upon enquiry, that to date, missions had concentrated on implementing low-penetration photovoltaic projects with expected savings compared with a diesel generator-only system of up to 25 per cent, depending on the level of the integrated solar capacity. While the projects have a short payback period (with all the solar photovoltaic output being utilized during the daytime hours), owing to their limited capacity, low-penetration systems nevertheless do not allow for the removal of diesel generators from the power generation scheme, and the fuel savings that they generate may be overshadowed by an increase in electrical demand on site when the number of personnel on site is

increased or when new facilities are built or new equipment needing electricity is installed. As a result, fuel savings are generally based on estimates, calculated by using the average generating efficiency (e.g., the number of kilowatt-hours (kWh) of electricity produced for each litre of diesel fuel used in diesel generators) in United Nations peacekeeping missions. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with a list of estimated fuel savings by mission in 2021/22.

70. With regard to data pertaining to indicators that contribute to efficiency, the Advisory Committee was informed that such data were collected and analysed through the environmental performance and risk management framework developed for the environment strategy. These include some of the global strategy key performance indicators presented annually in the overview report, as well as data pertaining to additional indicators related to efficiency, which are being collected and included in mission environmental scorecards. Table 18 shows the data for the key and some of the additional indicators during the period from 2017/18 to 2021/22. The table shows that overall, the majority of indicators exhibit positive trends across the strategy period.

Table 18

**Key and additional indicators contributing to energy efficiency**

<i>Indicator</i>	<i>2017/18</i>	<i>2018/19</i>	<i>2019/20 (baseline)</i>	<i>2020/21</i>	<i>2021/22</i>
<b>Key indicators</b>					
Generator fuel consumption per capita per day (litres)	4.51	4.88	3.5	3.5	3.4
Greenhouse gas emissions per capita per year (tons of carbon dioxide equivalent)	7.8	8.3	7.5	7.0	7.3
Freshwater use per capita per day (litres)	121	127	159	123	114
Generation of solid waste per capita per day (kilograms)	1.7	1.6	1.6	1.7	1.5
<b>Additional indicators</b>					
LED lights (percentage)	28	43	44	46	54
Synchronized generators (percentage)	30	50	60	57	61

71. In the report, it is stated that a review of the implementation of the environment strategy will be conducted following its completion in June 2023, which will be reported to the Member States in the context of the next overview report, together with a proposal for a way forward in which implementation to date has been fully taken into account. According to the Secretary-General, a consultation process with Member States has been initiated with the Group of Friends on Leading Environmental Management in the Field to ensure that the needs and expectations of all stakeholders are taken into account in outlining that way forward. Preliminary consultations with missions indicate that continued technical assistance and strategic direction will be important to sustain progress during the period in which the review is conducted, and structures currently in place to support missions and work will continue during the 2023/24 period, in line with the priorities set out in the five pillars of the strategy. A total amount of \$1.35 million has been accordingly included in the budgets of peacekeeping missions, on a pro rata basis, extending the current Rapid Environment and Climate Technical Assistance facility project to June 2024 (A/77/779, paras. 189–192). **The Advisory Committee notes the progress made in the implementation of the multi-year environmental strategy to reduce the footprint of peacekeeping operations and looks forward to the findings of the review of the implementation of the strategy in the next overview report. The Committee also trusts that the Secretary-General will continue his efforts, including through the possibility of developing, in consultation with Member**

States, another phase of the environmental strategy, building on the lessons learned in the implementation of the strategy, in accordance with the legislative mandates and particular conditions on the ground and in full compliance with the relevant rules and regulations, and to report thereon in the context of his overview report in the seventy-ninth session. The Committee makes further observations and recommendations on efficiency from the implementation of the environmental initiatives in the context of its mission reports.

### 3. Quick-impact projects

72. As reflected in annex III to the present report, the resources proposed in 2023/24 for quick-impact projects amount to \$14.1 million, reflecting an increase of \$0.8 million, or 5.3 per cent, compared with the 2022/23 appropriation of \$13.3 million. Expenditures as at 31 March 2023 amount to \$10.0 million, or 75.1 per cent. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with the amounts and percentages of resources allocated to quick-impact projects by mission during the periods from 2018/19 to 2022/23, as reflected in table 19.

Table 19

#### Resources allocated to quick-impact projects, 2018/19–2022/23

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Mission	2018/19		2019/20		2020/21		2021/22		2022/23	
	Amount	Percentage	Amount	Percentage	Amount	Percentage	Amount	Percentage	Amount	Percentage
MINUJUSTH	1 100	0.9	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
MINUSCA	3 000	0.3	3 000	0.3	3 000	0.3	3 000	0.3	3 000	0.3
MINUSMA	4 000	0.4	4 000	0.4	4 800	0.4	4 800	0.4	4 800	0.4
MONUSCO	1 500	0.1	1 500	0.1	1 500	0.1	1 500	0.1	1 250	0.1
UNDOF	–	–	200	0.3	200	0.3	200	0.3	300	0.5
UNIFIL	500	0.1	500	0.1	500	0.1	500	0.1	500	0.1
UNISFA	500	0.2	500	0.2	500	0.2	500	0.2	500	0.2
UNMISS	1 200	0.1	1 500	0.1	2 000	0.2	2 500	0.2	3 000	0.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>11 800</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>11 200</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>12 500</b>	<b>0.2</b>	<b>13 000</b>	<b>0.3</b>	<b>13 350</b>	<b>0.3</b>

73. In his report, the Secretary-General reviews the role of the quick-impact projects in building confidence with local stakeholders, thus improving the operational environment, and delivering tangible peace dividends for local populations, therefore contributing to sustaining peace. A recent survey highlighted that about 40 per cent of quick-impact projects in MINUSMA, 65 per cent of those in MINUSCA and MONUSCO and 80 per cent of those in UNMISS and UNISFA had been implemented to rehabilitate and provide functioning infrastructures for mayors and central government representatives, as well as rule of law institutions. According to the Secretary-General, the Secretariat is finalizing a revision of the quick-impact project policy and guidelines to further streamline procedures and improve technical knowledge with peacekeeping operations through dedicated training materials (*ibid.*, paras. 69–71). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the revision had been put on hold pending the revision of guidance on programme management intended to be issued across the board for the entire United Nations Secretariat, which would then need to be included in the quick-impact project policy and guidelines. However, on the basis of a survey and informal consultations, the areas recommended for updating include increasing the budget for individual quick-



impact projects from \$50,000 to a higher amount, which is being considered by the Secretariat; flexibility in the six-month time frame implementation; and simplification of the quick-impact project procedures and the evaluation and impact analysis conducted after completion of the project.

74. The Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that according to the quick-impact project policy, missions were required to conduct an annual evaluation of their programmes, which also provided an opportunity to share lessons learned and recommendations. For example, in UNIFIL, the 2021/22 quick-impact project programme assessment outlined lessons that should inform how the programme is managed in the future as well as lessons learned that could be useful to other missions in the management of programmes. The Committee was also informed that, in general, civilian components worked with the military components through civil-military coordination in all phases of the implementation of quick-impact projects for effective mandate implementation based on the needs of communities. The 2017 quick-impact project policy emphasizes the importance of close coordination among mission components, including through civil-military coordination officers. In the 2022 civil-military coordination policy, it is stated that one of the core tasks of civil-military coordination is to support the implementation of quick-impact projects. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was also informed that during the first two quarters in the 2022/23 period, the majority of the projects were implemented with local non-governmental organizations (63.0 per cent), local governments (23.5 per cent), local associations (2.5 per cent), mission components (2.5 per cent), community-based organizations (4.9 per cent) and international non-governmental organizations (1.0 per cent). The Committee makes further comments and recommendations in its reports on mission budget proposals, such as MONUSCO ([A/77/767/Add.8](#)) and MINUSMA ([A/77/767/Add.12](#)).

#### 4. Programmatic activities

75. The Secretary-General explains, as in his previous reports, that missions carry out programmatic activities in a range of mandated areas, which are aimed at advancing missions' mandates and reflect the missions' strategic priorities, as identified in strategic integrated frameworks, transition plans and other planning instruments. Information on the proposed programmatic activities for the 2023/24 period is included in annex IX to the overview report. The activities in the peacekeeping missions, estimated at \$195.2 million, comprise a civilian arms control programme (\$1.6 million); community stabilization projects (\$3.5 million); rule of law/human rights/security institutions/security sector reform (\$14.0 million); peace consolidation (3.7 million); confidence-building (\$3.6 million); community violence reduction (\$3.5 million); electoral support (\$5.1 million); gender activities (\$0.8 million); disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (\$13.9 million); and mine action (\$137.8 million) ([A/77/779](#), paras 72–75, and annex IX). As in previous years, the Advisory Committee notes the inclusion of a category of programmatic activities referred to as “other”, comprising \$7.8 million for MINUSCA. Upon enquiry, the Committee was provided with information on the resources and expenditures for programmatic activities in 2021/22. The Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that programmatic funding and associated activities were guided by the guidelines on mandated programmatic activities funded through peacekeeping assessed budgets, according to which programmatic activities should be implemented by the entity or partner organization best placed to implement the activity. To determine comparative advantage, the missions are required under the guidelines to conduct an analysis, taking into account three elements: (a) mandate; (b) demonstrated capacity; and (c) a unique contribution in the selected area of contribution. The criteria applied are focused primarily on efficiency and value-for-money considerations. In the absence of additional internal criteria for the selection



of implementing partners, some missions require submitting offices to justify their selection through the standard submission forms. In some contexts, missions simply do not have the option or only a very limited choice of implementing partners owing to the latter's reduced presence or lack of capacity, such as in the Central African Republic and northern Mali. According to the Secretariat, monitoring and evaluation programmatic activities are conducted using tools provided as annexes to the guidelines, such as standardized progress reports for programme delivery initiatives, which require reporting on outputs, achievements against outputs and so forth. The Advisory Committee was informed that, unlike quick-impact projects, the impact of programmatic activities was more difficult to measure given that they included, but were not limited to, capacity-building, infrastructure projects, training, procurement of material and equipment, temporary consultancies and technical expertise.

76. The Advisory Committee recalls that in its resolution [76/274](#), the General Assembly reiterated its request to the Secretary-General to ensure that missions were responsible and accountable for the use of their programmatic funds, in line with relevant guidance and bearing in mind the specific context in which the missions operated, and requested the Secretary-General to further improve accountability and transparency by providing, in his next budget submissions and performance reports, detailed information on the programmatic activities of missions, including their expenditures and proposed amount per category of a breakdown of "other" programmatic activities and information on how those activities had contributed to the implementation of mission mandates, on the linkage to the mandates, on the implementing entities, on the performance by missions of appropriate oversight, and on the partnerships with host Governments, civil society, and regional and subregional organizations in implementing programmatic activities and the impact of these partnerships where applicable (resolution [76/274](#), para. 81). **The Advisory Committee trusts that comprehensive information on the scope of programmatic activities, including a breakdown of the category of "other" programmatic activities, as well as an impact analysis of the activities, will be included in future overview reports (see para. 89 below; see also [A/76/760](#), para. 66).**

## 5. Mine action

77. In annex VIII to his report, the Secretary-General provides information on mine action activities and related resources, including summarized information on the planning and budget assumptions, as well as proposed resources and staffing structures. It is noted that the proposed resource requirements relating to mine action activities for 2023/24 amount to \$137.8 million for nine missions, compared with \$143.6 million approved for the 2022/23 period. **The Advisory Committee notes the information provided, including the expenditures and resource requirements, and trusts that an evaluation of the demining activities, including their scope, costs and impact will be included in the next overview report.** In the overview report, the Secretary-General also refers to his report on the summary of findings and recommendations of the independent review of the delivery model of the United Nations Mine Action Service ([A/77/747](#)). The Advisory Committee recalls the concerns expressed by the General Assembly about the management of mine action activities in missions and the shortcomings in partnership operations between the Mine Action Service and UNOPS (see Assembly resolution [76/274](#), para. 79 and resolution [75/298](#), para. 12). The Committee makes its comments and observations in its report on the findings and recommendations of the independent review ([A/77/816](#)).

## 6. Cost recovery

78. In table 27 of his report, the Secretary-General provides a summary of the estimated cost recovery for the 2023/24 period. Detailed information about the type

of activity and support provided and the providing and receiving entity is included by each peacekeeping operation in the supplementary information provided with the reports of respective peacekeeping missions. Upon request, the Advisory Committee was provided with information on costs recovered by peacekeeping missions during the periods from 2017/18 to 2022/23, as reflected in table 20. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that spendable revenue was the revenue generated through cost recovery for services provided when there was no assessed budget allotted to the service provider. Most operational cost recovery revenue is spendable and allotted back to service providers to cover associated expenses. In principle, such expenses must be incurred in the areas for which the relevant costs were charged. The non-spendable revenue is the revenue generated through cost-recovery mechanisms for services provided when there is an assessed budget allotted to the service provider. The non-spendable revenue will be passed back to Member States (e.g., commercial activities under income section 3, rental revenue) in accordance with financial regulation 3.3. According to the Secretariat, when a Secretariat entity is asked to provide goods or services that it is not resourced to provide, related costs should be recovered from service recipient entities. All cost-recovery activities must be transacted in the established cost-recovery funds, which are distinct for each volume of the financial statements. Cost-recovery funds follow the respective financial periods (i.e., 1 July to 30 June for peacekeeping operations and the calendar year for all other operations). **The Advisory Committee trusts that the Secretary-General will continue to improve the cost recovery in the mission context and provide, in all future overview reports, as well as in the context of mission budget reports, detailed information on cost recovery, including but not limited to, activities subject to cost recovery, mission-related human and financial resources utilized, and justifications based on trend analysis for the classification of non-spendable and spendable revenue and the amounts to be returned to Member States, as well as the use of the peacekeeping cost-recovery fund (see also [A/76/760](#), para. 78).**

Table 20  
**Summary of cost recovery for the periods from 2017/18 to 2022/23**  
 (Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Mission</i>	<i>2017/18</i>	<i>2018/19</i>	<i>2019/20</i>	<i>2020/21</i>	<i>2021/22</i>	<i>2022/23</i>
MINURSO	69.1	26.5	10.0	23.9	15.4	6.4
MINUSCA	920.0	4 172.9	2 746.4	2 948.4	4 959.5	5 435.1
MINUSMA	1 917.8	7 918.4	14 397.4	15 979.0	17 429.1	8 419.9
MONUSCO	1 267.7	10 362.9	10 888.3	6 514.2	7 720.0	4 666.0
UNDOF	64.5	122.5	90.0	98.2	217.4	227.6
UNFICYP	134.1	75.3	209.6	237.2	167.9	87.0
UNIFIL	505.2	398.2	442.7	314.9	481.8	596.7
UNISFA	2 004.7	1 375.0	1 361.7	1 580.7	2 441.6	1 468.6
UNMIK	70.0	40.0	29.9	22.6	24.3	13.9
UNMISS	12 580.3	12 500.0	11 003.1	11 664.8	13 246.3	9 199.4
UNSOS	8 261.7	6 618.5	6 977.6	6 935.3	6 351.1	5 941.7
UNLB	12 193.6	10 092.8	15 077.1	15 457.1	35 857.7	16 958.5
RSCE	19.1	17.2	43.2	112.9	91.4	357.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>50 007.7</b>	<b>53 720.1</b>	<b>63 277.0</b>	<b>61 889.4</b>	<b>89 003.6</b>	<b>53 377.9</b>

## D. Other matters

### 1. Cooperation with host countries

79. As indicated in the report, peacekeeping operations work closely with host Governments and will continue to use the established strong channels with them to strengthen relations on the basis of trust, which is a necessary ingredient for the effective implementation of mandates and for fostering national ownership (A/77/779, paras. 200–207). **The Advisory Committee underlines the importance of continuous partnership and engagement between peacekeeping operations and the host countries and reiterates its appreciation for the continued contribution and support of host countries to peacekeeping operations.**

### 2. Mission planning: positive legacy strategy

80. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the strategic vision for United Nations peacekeeping is focused on being better prepared to address and respond to the confluence of new security threats and challenges. It is important to continue sustained investment in understanding the drivers and enablers of conflict, such as misinformation and disinformation, cyberwarfare and digital warfare, and political economy. The Committee was also informed, upon enquiry, that in order to effectively deliver in increasingly complex settings, integrated mission-wide and United Nations-wide planning as well as data-based assessments of mission impact and performance are paramount. As part of the assessment and planning cycle, missions translate strategic guidance on mandates and their political strategies into whole-of-mission integrated plans and further operational planning, ensure alignment between plans and resources, make adjustments to the course of action based on an assessment of performance and impact, and plan with partners. As applicable to each specific mission context, the Comprehensive Planning and Performance Assessment System can be used to support integrated planning, help to translate strategic priorities and the vision of mission leadership into a mission-wide plan, and link planning with data-based impact assessment in iterative cycles. Structures and capacities related to this important work are not uniform across United Nations peacekeeping. Regarding dedicated mission-wide planning capacity, in some missions, planning is carried out by a planning unit, while in other missions, it is carried out by individual(s), located primarily in the office of the chief of staff. Some missions, such as MINUSMA and MINUSCA, have established joint planning units. Other missions, such as MINURSO, do not have planning capacity in their budgets. To strengthen planning structures and capacities in field missions, the Department of Peace Operations supports missions in establishing dedicated mission-planning capabilities, where relevant, that are appropriately adapted to mission contexts and empowered by leadership to engage in integrated planning with civilian and uniformed counterparts. That initiative will be formalized in a policy, currently under development, that will clarify the structures, roles and responsibilities of mission planning units. **The Advisory Committee, while acknowledging the specificities of each mission's size, complexity and capacities, considers that peacekeeping missions have the potential of establishing a legacy for the United Nations where they operate, through successful, impactful and responsible implementation of policies and activities related to areas such as strategic communications, environmental initiatives, conduct and discipline, including the prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse, programmatic activities, construction of hard-wall accommodation for personnel and quick-impact projects, among others, and trusts that the Secretary-General will develop a holistic and strategic policy aiming at establishing a positive legacy, to be implemented throughout the missions' life cycle and report thereon in his next overview report (see para. 81 below; see also General Assembly resolution 76/274, para. 81).**

### 3. Strategic communications: misinformation and disinformation

81. The Advisory Committee recalls that, in its resolution [76/274](#), the General Assembly emphasized the importance of strategic communications to the implementation of mission mandates in a rapidly changing communications landscape and recognized that the efficient use of strategic communications and the distribution of accurate content by peacekeeping missions helps to build trust with local communities, manage expectations among relevant stakeholders and contribute to countering disinformation and misinformation that might impede the ability of the missions to implement their mandates. In the same resolution, the Assembly also requested the Secretary-General, in implementing mission strategic communication objectives, to take all appropriate steps to track sources of disinformation and misinformation, to analyse trends and to mitigate any negative impacts on mission mandate or personnel, and to report on progress in his next overview report (resolution [76/274](#), paras. 85–86). The Secretary-General dedicates section VIII of the report to strategic communications, with a focus on efforts to address misinformation and disinformation affecting peacekeeping missions, including a survey of all peacekeeping personnel conducted in March 2022 to help assess the scope and nature of misinformation and disinformation, and the project to upgrade United Nations peacekeeping and mission websites, which is under way to ensure continued long-term security and software updates and to modernize the platform by leveraging new and improved features, such as improvements in theming, language support and responsive user experiences (mobile and tablet), among other things ([A/77/779](#), paras. 194–199).

82. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that anti-peacekeeping sentiment had been witnessed, especially in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali and the Central African Republic. The Department of Peace Operations is supporting missions in developing a whole-of-mission approach to monitoring, analysis and responding to the challenge of misinformation and disinformation. As part of that effort, the Department will develop a guidance framework, including guidelines and training to establish the parameters for United Nations peacekeeping work in this area. Member States will be duly consulted, inclusively and transparently, regarding guidelines and training. To enable missions to understand emerging digital narratives on peacekeeping and missions' information environments, they are being offered a tool that aggregates digital information and enables the identification of trends and patterns in what is being said about peacekeeping. That, in turn, will help to inform proactive and responsive actions. According to the Secretariat, peacekeeping missions have extensive experience in engaging communities through traditional media and human outreach. United Nations-supported radios have been critical to communicating the role of the Organization. In a rapidly digitalizing world, it is important for peacekeeping to also strengthen its online communications and build linkages between online and offline strategic communications. To achieve that, strategic communications components should continue to strengthen their digital strategic communications expertise, including developing digital content, conducting social listening and collaborating with proxy communicators that have online and offline presence. Regarding the survey conducted in March 2022, the Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that of the 242 responses received, 190 of the respondents were from the four largest missions, namely, MONUSCO, MINUSCA, MINUSMA and UNMISS (more specific information on efforts and challenges are also included in the mission budget reports). Of the total responses received, 70 per cent reported that misinformation and disinformation had a severe or critical impact on mandate implementation and 75 per cent said that it had the same effect on the safety and security of peacekeepers. Respondents also provided narrative details on the extent to which misinformation and disinformation impede mandate

implementation within missions, their personal experience of this challenge, and what actions had been taken by the mission and other key actors (host Governments, civil society organizations and media) in response, among other things. According to the information provided, a new survey for all mission personnel on this issue is in development until/through the second quarter of 2023. **While noting the guidance framework under development by the Department of Peace Operations, the Advisory Committee considers that a more comprehensive strategic-level framework that can be tailored to the circumstances of each mission could be developed, in close cooperation with the relevant departments and based on lessons learned, with the efficient use of available resources, as appropriate. The Committee trusts that in the context of the whole-of-mission approach to monitoring, analysis and responding to the challenge of misinformation and disinformation, efforts could be also made to improve the perception of the missions, in close cooperation with host countries and relevant entities, including through better designed and more impactful programmatic activities, quick-impact projects and environmental initiatives.**

#### 4. Standing capacities

83. According to the Secretary-General, the Department of Peace Operations operates thematic standing capacities in the areas of police and justice and corrections, based at UNLB. These are cost-efficient, flexible and rapidly deployable assets to provide surge capacities in peacekeeping operations, when needed. In response to paragraph 31 of the report of the Advisory Committee ([A/76/760/Add.5](#)), endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution [77/277](#), the budget report of UNLB for the 2023/24 period contains an assessment of those standing capacities. In addition, building on positive lessons from operating those standing capacities, the Department of Peace Operations has been piloting the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standing capacity and security sector reform standing capacity in Brindisi, Italy, with limited extrabudgetary funding. A mine action rapid response capacity will also be piloted in Brindisi, using voluntary contributions, to benefit from the synergies in planning and deployment with other standing capacities ([A/77/779](#), para. 33). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the Department of Peace Operations had established the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standing capacity and security sector reform standing capacity in UNLB, with extrabudgetary funding, in 2019 and 2021, respectively. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standing capacity initiative was funded by Italy, while the security sector reform standing capacity was funded by Germany, Italy and Norway and was recently complemented with one gratis personnel from the Netherlands. Both capacities have been valuable to peacekeeping operations and are regularly requested to share their expertise with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, resident coordinator offices or other United Nations entities, including on coordination and planning. Their location in Brindisi is optimal for the type of service they provide, in the light of the time zone, geographical proximity and economies of scale drawn from the administrative and logistical assistance of UNLB. The establishment of these capacities in Brindisi also allows beneficial synergies in planning and deployment with other standing capacities.

84. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was also informed that the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section of the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions had been receiving extrabudgetary resources from Italy since 2019, which allowed the establishment of the related standing capacity. The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section currently has one post funded with extrabudgetary resources, which is presently under recruitment. The estimated deployment of the incumbent is at 80 per cent. The deployments to date have been related to transitions, in Haiti and the Sudan, and urgent capacity

replacement needs, specifically, a gap in staffing in UNSOM. In 2022, the incumbent was deployed for the majority of the first half of the year, before vacating the post; owing to competing priorities, not all deployment requests could be met, as that would have added up to about 125 per cent of the incumbent's time. The disarmament, demobilization and reintegration standing capacity fills an important gap when the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Section, which has tried to accommodate urgent support requests in the past, does not have any spare capacity to deploy rapidly and for prolonged periods of time. According to the Secretariat, the security sector reform standing capacity consists of one Senior Security Sector Reform Officer (P-5) and one gratis security sector reform expert (type 1). The security sector reform standing capacity has a planned deployment rate of between 60 per cent to 70 per cent per year. Since its establishment in March 2021, the security sector reform standing capacity has been deployed to Burkina Faso, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Gambia, Libya and Somalia. The Advisory Committee was further informed that no resources were currently dedicated to this mine action rapid response capacity, but that it would be established with one P-5 post and one P-4 post funded from extrabudgetary resources. The planned level of deployment is approximately 80 per cent of the year in the service of a Mine Action Service field programme or United Nations system request to the Mine Action Service for support. **The Advisory Committee trusts that any establishment of standing capacities, including the choice of location, will be presented for the consideration and approval of the General Assembly.**

## 5. Risk management

85. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that United Nations peacekeeping operations were exposed to a wide range of strategic and operational risks, owing to the complexities of the environments in which they operated and the increased scope and complexity of their mandates. In the broadest terms, the top three risks that missions have to contend with are political climate risks, ranging from geopolitical tensions at the global level to stalled political processes in host countries, with emerging risks, such as misinformation, further contributing to the latter; safety and security risks, notably, the increase in targeted attacks against peacekeepers; and risks related to the misconduct of personnel, most egregiously, any instance of sexual exploitation and abuse, which tarnishes peacekeeping overall. The three risks affect missions differently. The first risk affects all missions but, although the latter two are a high-level risk for only some, because of their seriousness, initiatives to address them have been given priority by the Organization. It should nevertheless be emphasized that, just as missions face many other risks in addition to the top three risks, the Organization considers and manages a larger set of risks across peacekeeping, which are integrated in the development of the cross-cutting strategic and policy priorities for peacekeeping presented to legislative bodies, notably in the overview report.

86. The Secretary-General indicates that the implementation of the enterprise risk management framework continues, with a focus on two complementary levels to improve organizational performance. At the corporate level, the Management Committee endorsed two progress reports on the implementation of risk treatment and response plans for 16 critical risk areas emerging from the Secretariat-wide risk assessment. A full Organization-wide risk assessment and updates to the Secretariat-wide risk register have been initiated. At the entity level, all peacekeeping operations have completed their risk registers and nine missions are in the process of developing and implementing their risk treatment plans. The Secretariat will continue to strengthen the system of internal controls in support of the prudent management of peacekeeping resources in the context of the decentralized delegation of authority framework and to achieve greater accountability for results. During the 2023/24



period, work will continue on documenting and assessing the effectiveness of the internal control environment, including through a cross-cutting analysis workshop to enhance feedback to and foster exchanges between peacekeeping missions, and on further integrating risk management components (*ibid.*, para. 168).

87. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that in each mission, the senior management team assumes the role of the local risk management committee, embedding enterprise risk management in already established managerial mechanisms. The committee provides overall guidance and direction on the measures to be taken to mitigate the risks, regularly reviews the local risk profile, as well as the adequacy of risk response strategies, and provides relevant advice to the head of mission. The Secretariat considers that the role recommended by the Board of Auditors for the second line of defence aligns with the oversight responsibilities of the Department of Peace Operations over peacekeeping operations. It is also necessary and distinct from the current role and responsibilities of the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance in the implementation of enterprise risk management. According to the Secretariat, the Department of Peace Operations has accepted the recommendation, and the related recommendations on risk management in peacekeeping operations, in principle, while noting that the departmental contributions to their implementation are subject to additional resources being made available to the Department. Given that the Department of Peace Operations currently has no resources for supporting peacekeeping operations in the implementation of risk management, this role will require additional dedicated capacities, as noted by the Board in its report. It is too early to detail the specific roles and responsibilities of the Department of Peace Operations and the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance in the second line of defence. However, broadly defined, while the Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance would retain its overarching responsibility in the development of methodological guidance and the coordination of and support to the implementation of enterprise risk management across the Organization, the responsibilities of the Department of Peace Operations would focus on tailoring and monitoring the effective implementation of enterprise risk management in peacekeeping. That would align with its dual role of oversight of peacekeeping operations and provision of substantive expertise and support to missions in the various areas of mandate implementation (e.g., protection of civilians and rule of law and security institutions) and in such key processes as force generation, integrated planning, performance management, political analysis and guidance, and support to legislative decision-making. **The Advisory Committee trusts that every effort will be made to mitigate strategic and operational risks in the missions.** The Advisory Committee makes comments and recommendations in its report on the report of the Board of Auditors on the accounts of the United Nations peacekeeping operations ([A/77/802](#)).

## 6. Safety and security

88. The Secretary-General indicates that fatalities due to malicious acts rose in 2021, when the number of fatalities was 25, and 2022, when the number of fatalities was 32, reversing the year-on-year decreasing trend since 2017 that ended with a low of 13 fatalities due to malicious acts in 2020. He also enumerates the actions taken to improve the safety and security of peacekeepers ([A/77/779](#), paras. 138–146). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with information on the fatalities in peacekeeping operations due to malicious acts from 2017 to 2022, which is contained in table 21. **The Advisory Committee commends all United Nations uniformed and civilian personnel for their work under challenging circumstances and pays tribute to those who have lost their lives in the service of peace. The Committee recalls General Assembly resolution 76/274 and trusts that the Secretary-General will intensify his efforts to mitigate the risks to the safety and security**

of all personnel in peacekeeping operations and provide an update on those efforts in the next overview report (see also Assembly resolution [76/274](#), paras. 73–74).

Table 21

**Number of fatalities in peacekeeping missions, 2017–2022**

<i>Mission</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>2018</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>
MINUSCA	15	7	2	6	4	3
MINUSMA	24	11	22	6	20	15
MONUSCO	19	8	–	1	1	13
UNAMID	1	–	–	–	–	–
UNIFIL	–	–	–	–	–	1
UNISFA	–	–	1	–	–	–
UNMISS	–	1	–	–	–	–
<b>Total</b>	<b>59</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>13</b>	<b>25</b>	<b>32</b>

**7. Sexual exploitation and abuse**

89. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the Secretariat considers that the zero tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuse, as well as other forms of misconduct, means zero tolerance for inaction on misconduct. This implies that all measures will be taken to ensure that individuals are held accountable if they engage in sexual exploitation and abuse or other forms of misconduct. Zero tolerance also entails ensuring that, when acts of misconduct, in particular sexual exploitation and abuse, occur in a manner that points to a general context or pattern indicating that uniformed personnel from a particular Member State are not abiding by the expected highest standards of conduct and/or when a Member State fails to take accountability measures or fails to inform the United Nations of such measures having been taken, then the United Nations has ended and will continue to end the participation or not allow renewed participation of uniformed personnel from such a Member State in United Nations peacekeeping operations. The Secretariat does not consider such action to be punitive in nature but rather a means of ensuring that Member States comply with their obligations under the memorandums of understanding and fully embrace zero tolerance for misconduct and that uniformed personnel in United Nations peace operations uphold the highest standards of conduct. **The Advisory Committee trusts that the Secretary-General will pursue further efforts to prevent sexual abuse and exploitation and enhance the accountability of perpetrators, while ensuring protection of and support to victims.** The Committee further discusses protection from sexual exploitation and abuse in the context of its report on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse ([A/77/831](#)).

**8. Strengthening coherence and collaboration between mission pillars**

90. The Secretary-General explains that depending on the context of the country and/or mission, deputy special representatives of the Secretary-General may be triple-hatted to also perform the function of resident coordinators and humanitarian coordinators. These deputies constitute the link between the political work of the mission and the United Nations entities implementing development and humanitarian activities in coordination with the mission. The Secretary-General also explains the responsibilities of the triple-hatted deputy special representatives. The Secretariat



conducted an initial review of existing capacities supporting the deputy special representative of the Secretary-General in performing management functions, as deputy head of mission, with regard to reporting units and working in areas linked to the mandates of the missions. The initial review found that an appropriately sized and dedicated capacity in the office of the deputy special representative/resident coordinator/humanitarian coordinator was required to support the incumbent in driving successful integrated analysis and planning, including transition planning through the integrated strategic framework and/or cooperation framework, in close coordination between the mission and the United Nations country team and other stakeholders. The Secretariat will continue to review the staffing and support capacity in the offices of deputy special representatives/resident coordinators/humanitarian coordinators, to ensure that the mandate-related functions performed by the incumbent are effectively supported (A/77/779, paras. 56–60). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that currently, there were 12 structurally integrated field missions in which the head of mission (special representative of the Secretary-General or special coordinator) is supported by a deputy special representative of the Secretary-General or deputy special coordinator who simultaneously serves as resident coordinator and humanitarian coordinator.<sup>5</sup> These deputy special representatives/resident coordinators/humanitarian coordinators are supported in the mission area by some mission-funded positions. Where multidimensional peacekeeping operations or field-based special political missions are not structurally integrated, the resident coordinator may also be the humanitarian coordinator. According to the Secretariat, the initial review found that the existing cost-sharing arrangement continues to fundamentally reflect the notion that the position of the multi-hatted deputy special representative of the Secretary-General (deputy special representative/resident coordinator/humanitarian coordinator) straddles special political missions/peacekeeping operations and the development system, thereby personifying the integrated nature of missions, where this is mandated and applicable. If financed exclusively under mission budgets or under the development system, those positions would no longer reflect the integrated nature of missions to the same extent and, as a result, the incentive for integration would be weakened. Because both sides contribute to the funding of the position, the deputy special representative/resident coordinator/humanitarian coordinator truly reflects and brings together the peace and security and other mandates of missions and the broader development objectives pursued by the country team, integrating the capacities and activities of the United Nations, in keeping with the logic of the integrated nature of those special political missions and peacekeeping operations that are integrated.

91. The Advisory Committee was also informed that the review had been undertaken with the objective of supporting deputy special representatives/resident coordinators/humanitarian coordinators and deputy special coordinators/resident coordinators/humanitarian coordinators with the required and dedicated capacities to assist them in managing a large number of senior staff in the various substantive components within the mission with a reporting line to the deputy special representative/resident coordinator/humanitarian coordinator and to ensure that mandated functions under their management and oversight were effectively implemented. The review identified gaps in capacity to support deputy special representatives on mandate implementation, such as, *inter alia*, lack of capacities to successfully drive integration in support of mission planning efforts, including integrated mission planning and analysis, as well as transition planning. According to the Secretariat, efforts will continue to be made to assess such capacity gaps and propose adjustments, in line with specific mission mandates and requirements. The Committee was further

<sup>5</sup> BINUH, MINUSCA, MINUSMA, MONUSCO, UNAMA, UNAMI, UNITAMS, UNMISS, UNSCO, UNSCOL, UNSMIL and UNSOM.

informed that the reporting line of staff under each hat of the deputy special representative/resident coordinator/humanitarian coordinator depended on their source of funding and organizational mandate. Personnel supporting the deputy special representative's functions, who are funded from assessed contributions, assist the deputy special representative in their role as the deputy head of mission to ensure that Security Council mandate-related functions performed by the deputy special representative/resident coordinator/humanitarian coordinator are effectively delivered. Staff supporting the resident coordinator's development coordination function, who are funded through the special purpose trust fund, are geared towards executing General Assembly mandates on the coordination of United Nations operational activities for development. Staff provided by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs supporting the humanitarian coordinator function focus on the coordination of humanitarian response, in line with General Assembly resolution [46/182](#) and subsequent humanitarian resolutions. The Advisory Committee recalls that in its resolution [75/253](#) A (section XVIII), the General Assembly endorsed its recommendation and requested the Secretary-General to continue to review, and adjust as appropriate, the relevant organizational structures and support capacity in the offices of the deputy special representatives of the Secretary-General in the integrated special political missions. In its resolution [77/263](#) the General Assembly endorsed the Committee's recommendation that the Secretary-General should ensure that the arrangements proposed for the double- or triple-hatted deputy special representatives of the Secretary-General and the related support capacity in the integrated missions are consistent with the provisions of Assembly resolution [72/279](#) (see [A/77/7/Add.1](#), para. 20; [A/76/7/Add.1](#), para. 25; [A/75/7/Add.2](#), para. 23; and [A/74/7/Add.1](#), para. 34). **The Advisory Committee notes the results of the initial review of existing capacities supporting the double- or triple-hatted deputy special representatives of the Secretary-General and trusts that detailed information will be provided in the context of the reports on integrated peacekeeping operations and the next overview report.**

## 9. Mission transition

92. According to the Secretary-General, early integrated planning of transitions of United Nations peace operations remains an important priority that has financial, material and reputational impacts on peacekeeping operations as well as the United Nations country team. A strategic and integrated approach to United Nations transitions is at the core of efforts by the Department of Peace Operations to ensure the prospect of durable peace and to address the remaining challenges in the context of a drawdown or withdrawal of a peacekeeping mission. In the context of transitions, the deputy special representatives/resident coordinators/humanitarian coordinators are responsible for ensuring that the peacekeeping operations, in the earliest possible stages, engage the United Nations country team, other United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and other actors in the integrated planning and coordination on transitions. The lessons learned from the drawdown and liquidation of UNAMID will be included in the guide for senior leadership on field entity closure and the United Nations Transitions Project. A parallel initiative to develop a checklist for mission preparedness for closure is aimed at strengthening the support response for entities facing drawdown, mission closure and/or transitions ([A/77/779](#), paras. 61–67)). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the Transitions Project was an innovative partnership among the Department of Peace Operations, the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, DCO and UNDP that supports the strategic reconfiguration of the United Nations in peace operation settings, to ensure that the Organization responds as efficiently and effectively as possible to evolving needs on the ground. As a cross-pillar mechanism, the Project serves the United Nations system and its partners as a “one-stop-shop” for transitions. The Project is often the first point

of call for planning support by senior leadership in the field and has directly supported United Nations transitions in more than a dozen countries, including. Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Liberia and the Sudan, where it has been the leading mechanism providing dedicated transition planning capacities, organizing transition training, exchanging lessons and convening leadership dialogues. According to the information provided, in its new phase, which will begin in early 2024, the Project will build upon the United Nations reforms and leverage the achievements made, while ensuring the sustainability of efforts, by (a) ensuring that the evolution in thinking brought about at the policy level guides practice in the field; and (b) providing assistance not only to active transition settings, but also to early transition settings where a mission drawdown request has not yet been received, but where needs for integrated and forward-looking planning support are high. Moreover, it will work on strengthening staff capacities to mainstream transition capacities in the United Nations system. The Advisory Committee recalls that, in its resolution [76/274](#), the General Assembly reiterated the importance of thorough, responsive and advance planning for any mission transition process based on operational drawdown and transition plans that draw on lessons learned and take account of specific circumstances, in consultation with all relevant United Nations system entities, relevant regional and subregional organizations and the host Government, to ensure a timely, efficient and effective transfer of relevant roles, responsibilities and activities and the disposal of assets and property, in full compliance with relevant regulations and rules, at minimal loss and at best feasible cost-effective use when responding to changes in the mandate which require the mission to consider options for, prepare or commence mission drawdown or liquidation. **The Advisory Committee considers that preliminary transition planning should be readily available before the formal drawdown and liquidation and start at the early stages of a mission life cycle and be based, inter alia, on lessons learned from previous transition/drawdown experiences, as well as approved recommendations of oversight bodies.**

#### 10. Peacekeeping technology tools

93. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with information on enterprise and field-specific software and applications used in the missions, as reflected in annex XIV. **The Advisory Committee expects that the Secretary-General will provide consolidated information on technology tools used in peacekeeping missions, including the related costs and efficiencies generated with their implementation, in his future overview reports.**

### III. Conclusion

94. **Subject to its observations and recommendations above, the Advisory Committee recommends that the General Assembly take note of the report of the Secretary-General ([A/77/779](#)).**

**Annex I****Reports considered by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions on issues related to peacekeeping**

Financial report and audited financial statements for the 12-month period from 1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022 and report of the Board of Auditors on United Nations peacekeeping operations ([A/77/5 \(Vol. II\)](#)), the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the recommendations of the Board of Auditors concerning United Nations peacekeeping operations ([A/77/766](#)) and related report of the Advisory Committee ([A/77/802](#));

Report of the Secretary-General on special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and abuse ([A/77/748](#)) and related report of the Advisory Committee ([A/77/831](#));

Reports of the Secretary-General on the budget performance of peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2021 to 30 June 2022, on proposed budgets for the period from 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024 and on the disposition of assets, received by the Advisory Committee in advance or final form and the related reports of the Committee, as follows:

MINURSO	<a href="#">A/77/731</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/598</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/767/Add.3</a>
MINUSCA	<a href="#">A/77/758</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/633</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/767/Add.13</a>
MINUSMA	<a href="#">A/77/755</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/624</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/767/Add.12</a>
MINUJUSTH	<a href="#">A/77/620</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/775</a>
MONUSCO	<a href="#">A/77/745</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/609</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/767/Add.8</a>
UNAMID	<a href="#">A/77/638</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/780</a>
UNDOF	<a href="#">A/77/725</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/594</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/754</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/767/Add.2</a>

---

UNFICYP	<a href="#">A/77/722</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/595</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/767/Add.1</a>
UNIFIL	<a href="#">A/77/740</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/602</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/767/Add.9</a>
UNISFA	<a href="#">A/77/769</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/603</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/836</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/767/Add.10</a>
UNLB	<a href="#">A/77/741</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/613</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/767/Add.6</a>
UNMIK	<a href="#">A/77/723</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/589</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/767/Add.4</a>
UNMISS	<a href="#">A/77/752</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/627</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/786</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/767/Add.11</a>
UNSOS	<a href="#">A/77/746</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/684</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/767/Add.7</a>
RSCE	<a href="#">A/77/732</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/612</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/767/Add.5</a>
Support account for peacekeeping operations	<a href="#">A/77/771</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/631</a>
	<a href="#">A/77/833</a>
Overview of the financing of the United Nations peacekeeping operations	<a href="#">A/77/779</a>

## Annex II

## Summary information on redeployments across groups

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Mission	2020/21 budget performance			2021/22 budget performance		
	Original distribution	Redeployment	Revised distribution	Original distribution	Redeployment	Revised distribution
<b>MINURSO</b>						
I. Military and police personnel	7 664.5	–	7 664.5	7 703.9	–	7 703.9
II. Civilian personnel	21 011.7	1 047.7	22 059.4	22 178.1	682.0	22 860.1
III. Operational costs	28 848.5	(1 047.7)	27 800.8	26 655.8	(682.0)	25 973.8
<b>Total</b>	<b>57 524.7</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>57 524.7</b>	<b>56 537.8</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>56 537.8</b>
<b>MINUSCA</b>						
I. Military and police personnel	479 285.4	(10 257.0)	469 028.4	576 938.4	(40 667.9)	536 270.5
II. Civilian personnel	214 387.0	(5 161.4)	209 225.6	221 795.3	(4 498.6)	217 296.7
III. Operational costs	244 039.3	15 418.4	259 457.7	237 861.9	45 166.5	283 028.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>937 711.7</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>937 711.7</b>	<b>1 036 595.6</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>1 036 595.6</b>
<b>MINUSMA</b>						
I. Military and police personnel	493 922.9	(3 287.3)	490 635.6	485 350.5	17 816.0	503 166.5
II. Civilian personnel	196 654.7	9 444.1	206 098.8	223 648.5	87 732	223 736.3
III. Operational costs	492 807.1	(6 156.8)	486 650.3	462 613.5	(17 904.0)	444 709.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>1 183 384.7</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>1 183 384.7</b>	<b>1 171 612.5</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>1 171 612.5</b>
<b>MONUSCO</b>						
I. Military and police personnel	526 078.6	–	526 078.6	522 261.7	(7 468.7)	514 793.0
II. Civilian personnel	258 006.7	–	258 006.7	265 262.5	–	265 262.5
III. Operational costs	291 253.3	–	291 253.3	255 204.7	7 468.7	262 673.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>1 075 338.6</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>1 075 338.6</b>	<b>1 042 728.9</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>1 042 728.9</b>
<b>UNAMID</b>						
I. Military and police personnel	198 786.8	–	198 786.8	13 317.0	2 170.0	15 487.0
II. Civilian personnel	197 791.1	–	197 791.1	44 749.3	(5 819.4)	38 929.9

Mission	2020/21 budget performance			2021/22 budget performance		
	Original distribution	Redeployment	Revised distribution	Original distribution	Redeployment	Revised distribution
III. Operational costs	88 109.2	–	88 109.2	20 789.6	3 649.4	24 439.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>484 687.1</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>484 687.1</b>	<b>78 855.9</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>78 855.9</b>
<b>UNDOF</b>						
I. Military and police personnel	37 186.7	–	37 186.7	36 584.9	(419.5)	36 165.4
II. Civilian personnel	16 206.5		16 206.5	15 223.4	386.5	15 609.9
III. Operational costs	9 950.0		9 950.0	9 409.9	33.0	9 442.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>63 343.2</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>63 343.2</b>	<b>61 218.2</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>61 218.2</b>
<b>UNFICYP</b>						
I. Military and police personnel	21 870.5	627.8	22 498.5	22 432.9	215.3	22 648.2
II. Civilian personnel	15 537.4	919.2	16 456.6	16 654.2	–	16 654.2
III. Operational costs	14 342.2	(1 547.0)	12 795.2	14 710.9	(215.3)	14 495.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>51 750.1</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>51 750.1</b>	<b>53 798.0</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>53 798.0</b>
<b>UNIFIL</b>						
I. Military and police personnel	341 303.5	(3 615.2)	337 688.3	331 053.6	(11 964.4)	319 089.2
II. Civilian personnel	95 653.0	3 934.4	99 587.4	99 180.3	7 668.9	106 9.2
III. Operational costs	43 692.6	(319.2)	43 373.4	46 608.1	4 295.5	50 903.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>480 649.1</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>480 649.1</b>	<b>476 842.0</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>476 842.0</b>
<b>UNISFA</b>						
I. Military and police personnel	131 539.4	(11 846.1)	119 693.3	125 665.2	(10 296.0)	176.535.3
II. Civilian personnel	45 205.0	–	45 205.0	51 380.7	(3 160.0)	48 220.7
III. Operational costs	87 039.5	11 846.1	98 885.6	83 399.4	13 456.0	103 193.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>263 783.9</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>263 783.9</b>	<b>260 445.3</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>327 949.0</b>
<b>UNMIK</b>						
I. Military and police personnel	730.0	(118.8)	611.2	768.5	–	768.5
II. Civilian personnel	30 745.2	216.6	30 961.8	32 534.4	–	32 534.4
III. Operational costs	8 352.1	(97.8)	8 254.3	7 995.6	–	7 995.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>39 827.3</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>39 827.3</b>	<b>41 298.5</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>41 298.5</b>

Mission	2020/21 budget performance			2021/22 budget performance		
	Original distribution	Redeployment	Revised distribution	Original distribution	Redeployment	Revised distribution
<b>UNMISS</b>						
I. Military and police personnel	538 695.1	–	538 695.1	527 924.6	(5 118.1)	522 806.5
II. Civilian personnel	313 776.6	–	313 776.6	310 436.9	4 224.2	314 661.1
III. Operational costs	326 043.4	–	326 043.4	277 272.4	893.9	278 166.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>1 178 515.1</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>1 178 515.1</b>	<b>1 115 633.9</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>1 115 633.9</b>
<b>UNSOS</b>						
I. Military and police personnel	136 659.4	14 495.0	151 154.4	146 716.5	(5 996.5)	140 720.0
II. Civilian personnel	86 364.2	–	86 364.2	90 657.9	572.1	91 230.0
III. Operational costs	327 585.0	(14 495.0)	313 090.0	282 500.1	5 424.4	287 924.5
<b>Total</b>	<b>550 608.6</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>550 608.6</b>	<b>519 874.5</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>519 874.5</b>
<b>UNLB</b>						
I. Military and police personnel	–	–	–	–	–	–
II. Civilian personnel	41 287.3	3 133.9	44 421.2	45 326.4	(1 783.3)	43 543.1
III. Operational costs	20 770.9	(3 133.9)	17 637.0	20 368.3	1 783.3	22 151.6
<b>Total</b>	<b>62 058.2</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>62 058.2</b>	<b>65 694.7</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>65 694.7</b>
<b>RSCE</b>						
I. Military and police personnel	–	–	–	–	–	–
II. Civilian personnel	29 983.0	–	29 983.0	33 049.5	529.9	33 579.4
III. Operational costs	7 176.2	–	7 176.2	7 222.8	(529.9)	6 692.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>37 159.2</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>37 159.2</b>	<b>40 272.3</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>40 272.3</b>
<b>Support account</b>						
I. Military and police personnel	3 882.0	(1 111.0)	2 771.0	3 882.0	2 858.0	6 740.0
II. Civilian personnel	254 797.0	1 014.0	255 811.0	256 606.0	(2 485.0)	254 121.0
III. Operational costs	97 015.0	97.0	97 112.0	95 925.0	(373.0)	95 552.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>355 694.0</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>355 694.0</b>	<b>356 413.0</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>356 413.0</b>



## Annex III

## Proposed requirements for the 2023/24 period by class of expenditure, compared with the 2021/22 and 2022/23 periods

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Class of expenditure	2021/22			2022/23			2023/24	Variance	
	Apportionment	Expenditure	Percentage	Apportionment	Expenditure <sup>a</sup>	Percentage	Cost estimates	Amount	Percentage
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)÷(1)	(4)	(5)	(6)=(5)÷(4)	(7)	(8)=(7)-(4)	(9)=(8)÷(7)
<b>Military and police personnel</b>									
Military observers	63 665.1	62 469.0	98.1	57 506.0	46 799.4	81.4	57 464.6	(41.4)	(0.1)
Military contingents	2 472 397.5	2 412 108.6	97.6	2 427 139.9	2 309 625.9	95.2	2 532 966.1	105 826.2	4.2
United Nations police	110 210.3	98 478.6	89.4	97 963.8	77 552.0	79.2	97 219.0	(744.8)	(0.8)
Formed police units	211 610.9	200 052.4	94.5	207 761.0	196 991.8	94.8	228 481.3	20 720.3	9.1
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>2 857 883.8</b>	<b>2 773 108.6</b>	<b>97.0</b>	<b>2 790 370.7</b>	<b>2 630 969.1</b>	<b>94.3</b>	<b>2 916 131.0</b>	<b>125 760.3</b>	<b>4.3</b>
<b>Civilian personnel</b>									
International staff	1 209 106.5	1 167 847.6	96.6	1 230 830.5	873 250.4	70.9	1 212 352.7	(18 477.8)	(1.5)
National staff	382 712.1	394 352.3	103.0	—	—	—	—	—	—
National Professional Officer	—	—	—	83 630.6	64 318.6	76.9	87 126.1	3 495.5	4.0
National General Service staff	—	—	—	309 992.4	237 947.7	76.8	324 927.8	14 935.4	4.6
United Nations Volunteers	82 278.6	82 009.9	99.7	85 101.4	52 529.4	61.7	84 374.5	(726.9)	(0.9)
General temporary assistance	43 147.3	47 023.4	109.0	35 470.2	23 395.8	66.0	31 658.0	(3 812.2)	(12.0)
Government-provided personnel	11 438.7	11 152.1	97.5	11 564.3	8 380.6	72.5	11 421.7	(142.6)	(1.2)
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>1 728 683.2</b>	<b>1 702 385.3</b>	<b>98.5</b>	<b>1 756 589.4</b>	<b>1 259 822.5</b>	<b>71.7</b>	<b>1 751 860.8</b>	<b>(4 728.6)</b>	<b>(0.3)</b>
<b>Operational costs</b>									
Consultants and consulting services	6 390.0	5 584.2	87.4	5 700.2	3 854.8	67.6	6 440.7	740.5	11.5
Official travel	26 075.5	24 658.0	94.6	22 777.3	18 825.6	82.7	26 007.2	3 229.9	12.4
Facilities and infrastructure	482 333.1	549 018.6	113.8	495 801.0	427 564.4	86.2	580 435.8	84 634.8	14.6
Ground transportation	79 268.6	114 678.7	144.7	92 890.3	70 831.7	76.3	104 722.6	11 832.3	11.3
Air operations	558 397.8	502 656.9	90.0	579 872.5	446 968.9	77.1	690 889.7	111 017.2	16.1
Marine operations	5 509.5	7 766.8	141.0	6 853.4	6 548.1	95.5	8 629.4	1 776.0	20.6
Communications and information technology	279 812.4	276 462.5	98.8	270 873.9	239 612.4	88.5	284 462.1	13 588.2	4.8

Class of expenditure	2021/22			2022/23			2023/24	Variance	
	Apportionment	Expenditure	Percentage	Apportionment	Expenditure <sup>a</sup>	Percentage	Cost estimates	Amount	Percentage
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)÷(1)	(4)	(5)	(6)=(5)÷(4)	(7)	(8)=(7)-(4)	(9)=(8)÷(7)
Medical	31 940.5	28 801.9	90.2	29 966.1	19 955.2	66.6	27 418.6	(2 547.5)	(9.3)
Special equipment	100.0	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Other supplies, services and equipment	337 159.5	354 153.6	105.0	335 152.6	295 163.4	88.1	344 882.1	9 729.5	2.8
Quick-impact projects	13 000.0	12 823.7	98.6	13 350.0	10 031.0	75.1	14 100.0	750.0	5.3
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>1 808 896.9</b>	<b>1 864 958.8</b>	<b>103.1</b>	<b>1 853 237.3</b>	<b>1 539 355.5</b>	<b>83.1</b>	<b>2 087 988.2</b>	<b>234 750.9</b>	<b>11.2</b>
Enterprise resource planning	15 799.5	15 799.5	100.0	17 196.9	17 196.6	100.0	17 659.5	462.6	2.6
Death and disability claims for closed peacekeeping operations	—	4 416.6	—	—	—	—	518.4	518.4	—
Efficiency model for management services	868.5	868.5	100.0	868.5	868.5	100.0	868.5	—	—
Peacekeeping capability readiness	3 881.6	2 323.1	59.8	3 881.6	2 293.5	59.1	3 326.8	(554.8)	(16.7)
Umoja maintenance and support cost	18 221.4	18 211.7	99.9	18 588.6	7 138.1	38.4	20 875.4	2 286.8	11.0
After-service health insurance	11 090.0	11 646.1	105.0	11 830.0	8 684.4	73.4	12 855.2	1 025.2	8.0
<b>Gross requirements</b>	<b>6 445 324.9</b>	<b>6 393 718.2</b>	<b>99.2</b>	<b>6 452 563.0</b>	<b>5 466 328.2</b>	<b>84.7</b>	<b>6 812 083.8</b>	<b>359 520.8</b>	<b>5.3</b>
Staff assessment income	165 326.0	170 306.8	103.0	168 577.1	130 000.9	77.1	174 898.3	6 321.2	3.6
<b>Net requirements</b>	<b>6 279 998.9</b>	<b>6 223 411.4</b>	<b>99.1</b>	<b>6 283 985.9</b>	<b>5 336 327.3</b>	<b>84.9</b>	<b>6 637 185.5</b>	<b>353 199.6</b>	<b>5.3</b>
Voluntary contributions in kind (budgeted)	962.0	487.6	50.7	827.7	285.3	34.5	679.1	(148.6)	(21.9)
<b>Total</b>	<b>6 446 286.9</b>	<b>6 394 205.8</b>	<b>99.2</b>	<b>6 453 390.7</b>	<b>5 466 613.5</b>	<b>84.7</b>	<b>6 812 762.9</b>	<b>359 372.2</b>	<b>5.3</b>

<sup>a</sup> As at 31 March 2023.

## Annex IV

### Proposed resource requirements for the 2023/24 period, compared with approved budgets for the 2017/18 to 2022/23 periods

Missions	2017/18		2018/19		2019/20		2020/21		2021/22		2022/23		2023/24
	Approved	Expenditure	Approved	Expenditure	Approved	Expenditure	Approved	Expenditure	Approved	Expenditure	Approved	Expenditure <sup>a</sup>	
MINUJUSTH	88 111.2	87 811.2	121 455.9	121 266.6	49 122.9	38 694.4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
MINURSO	52 000.0	51 424.7	52 350.8	52 315.1	56 347.4	55 734.0	57 524.7	56 239.8	56 537.8	55 851.0	60 592.7	43 430.8	65 182.0
MINUSCA	903 011.5	879 872.9	930 211.9	900 643.4	910 057.5	895 690.3	937 711.7	936 317.8	1 036 595.6	1 036 279.0	1 074 387.7	928 930.8	1 157 676.0
MINUSMA	1 091 174.0	1 086 418.8	1 107 318.9	1 105 667.0	1 138 457.9	1 136 908.9	1 183 384.7	1 103 359.2	1 171 612.5	1 170 031.3	1 245 045.1	1 037 997.7	1 277 808.7
MINUSTAH	90 000.0	89 999.2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
MONUSCO	1 189 770.8	1 189 238.5	1 194 619.5	1 194 557.2	1 048 690.4	1 036 092.0	1 075 338.6	1 002 121.6	1 042 728.9	1 018 856.4	1 030 269.9	87 602.3	1 078 212.4
UNAMID	910 941.2	908 264.4	715 522.7	714 977.6	514 505.6	509 292.6	484 687.1	477 342.8	78 855.9	64 881.7	—	—	—
UNDOF	61 765.5	60 416.1	60 295.1	59 037.1	69 409.4	60 927.1	63 343.2	60 282.3	61 218.2	61 197.7	64 544.5	57 174.6	70 875.8
UNFICYP	54 000.0	53 977.8	52 938.9	51 556.9	50 785.3	49 392.5	51 750.1	51 726.3	53 798.0	52 139.2	54 018.6	43 952.9	57 444.7
UNIFIL	483 000.0	482 533.4	474 406.7	474 375.9	480 102.6	479 886.1	480 649.1	468 733.3	476 842.0	476 825.8	502 920.5	446 211.4	551 113.5
UNISFA	266 700.0	266 024.8	263 858.1	259 766.3	260 177.0	259 010.3	263 783.9	263 187.5	327 949.0	326 810.0	259 663.2	222 918.6	293 589.9
UNMIK	37 898.2	36 645.8	37 192.7	37 191.7	37 246.7	37 239.9	39 827.3	39 682.8	41 298.5	40 612.6	41 947.3	29 898.6	40 701.5
UNMIL	110 000.0	109 614.9	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
UNMISS	1 136 157.1	1 110 321.7	1 150 894.0	1 150 107.1	1 183 447.3	1 182 499.2	1 178 515.1	1 171 901.3	1 115 633.9	1 115 045.6	1 116 609.0	984 076.0	1 161 509.5
UNSOS	582 000.0	571 498.5	558 152.3	557 382.2	564 558.1	522 490.2	550 608.6	525 615.7	519 874.5	516 411.0	521 696.7	441 969.8	556 707.9
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>7 056 529.5</b>	<b>6 984 062.7</b>	<b>6 719 217.5</b>	<b>6 678 844.1</b>	<b>6 362 908.1</b>	<b>6 263 857.5</b>	<b>6 367 124.1</b>	<b>6 156 510.4</b>	<b>5 982 944.8</b>	<b>5 934 941.3</b>	<b>5 971 695.2</b>	<b>5 112 163.5</b>	<b>6 310 821.9</b>
UNLB	81 000.0	80 196.2	82 448.9	82 078.8	63 381.4	63 266.5	62 058.2	62 053.1	65 694.7	65 621.7	65 958.6	47 633.1	66 284.6
RSCE	33 000.0	32 842.1	31 438.9	324 703.5	35 386.9	35 375.9	37 159.2	36 284.5	40 272.3	39 751.4	43 122.2	29 800.4	43 754.2
Support account	325 800.0	325 781.2	324 703.5	31 436.1	348 868.0	348 867.4	355 694.2	355 492.9	356 413.1	353 403.8	371 787.0	276 731.1	391 223.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>7 496 329.5</b>	<b>7 422 882.2</b>	<b>7 157 808.8</b>	<b>7 117 062.5</b>	<b>6 810 544.4</b>	<b>6 711 367.3</b>	<b>6 822 035.7</b>	<b>6 610 340.9</b>	<b>6 445 324.9</b>	<b>6 393 718.2</b>	<b>6 452 563.0</b>	<b>5 466 328.1</b>	<b>6 812 083.8</b>

<sup>a</sup> As at 31 March 2023.

## Annex V

## Statements of financial position and performance

Table 1

## Statement of financial position as at 28 February 2023

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	<i>UNFICYP</i>	<i>UNDOF</i>	<i>UNIFIL</i>	<i>MINURSO</i>	<i>UNMIK</i>	<i>MONUSCO</i>	<i>UNSOS</i>	<i>UNISFA</i>	<i>UNMISS</i>	<i>MINUSMA</i>	<i>MINUSCA</i>	<i>Total</i>
<b>Assets</b>												
Cash, cash equivalents and investments	9 952	18 379	215 540	10 607	4 334	124 895	51 772	29 192	39 219	650 196	266 297	1 420 383
Assessed contributions receivable	25 131	41 230	211 222	62 994	37 104	62 014	206 793	120 374	322 655	287 852	451 096	2 391 465
Other receivables	10 875	82	2 697	435	—	—	574	39	—	146	—	14 848
Inventories	1 883	2 077	15 012	4 385	992	34 395	43 263	21 513	55 338	97 727	37 888	314 473
Property, plant and equipment	5 347	30 949	72 847	12 202	1 676	91 861	168 818	80 897	224 918	215 823	167 677	1 073 015
Other assets	361	545	2 145	2 482	1 904	34 347	24 518	11 482	32 565	35 810	44 173	190 332
<b>Total assets</b>	<b>53 549</b>	<b>93 262</b>	<b>519 463</b>	<b>93 105</b>	<b>46 010</b>	<b>910 512</b>	<b>495 738</b>	<b>263 497</b>	<b>674 695</b>	<b>1 287 554</b>	<b>967 131</b>	<b>5 404 516</b>
<b>Liabilities</b>												
Accounts payable	755	5 976	56 717	1 755	360	122 897	27 476	22 748	83 060	111 602	89 680	523 026
Total employee benefits	274	227	1 719	637	646	3 264	2 502	659	3 492	3 108	3 571	20 099
Other liabilities and provisions	2 152	757	6 594	13 602	23 454	57 599	98 052	31 632	113 097	52 833	15 988	415 760
<b>Total liabilities</b>	<b>3 181</b>	<b>6 960</b>	<b>65 030</b>	<b>15 994</b>	<b>24 460</b>	<b>183 760</b>	<b>128 030</b>	<b>55 039</b>	<b>199 649</b>	<b>167 543</b>	<b>109 239</b>	<b>958 885</b>
<b>Net of total assets and total liabilities</b>	<b>50 368</b>	<b>86 302</b>	<b>454 433</b>	<b>77 111</b>	<b>21 550</b>	<b>726 752</b>	<b>367 708</b>	<b>208 458</b>	<b>475 046</b>	<b>1 120 011</b>	<b>857 892</b>	<b>4 445 631</b>
<b>Net assets</b>												
Accumulated surplus – unrestricted	50 368	50 315	434 868	77 111	21 550	726 752	367 708	208 458	475 046	1 120 011	857 892	4 390 079
Accumulated surplus – restricted	—	35 987	19 565	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	55 552
<b>Total net assets</b>	<b>50 368</b>	<b>86 302</b>	<b>454 433</b>	<b>77 111</b>	<b>21 550</b>	<b>726 752</b>	<b>367 708</b>	<b>208 458</b>	<b>475 046</b>	<b>1 120 011</b>	<b>857 892</b>	<b>4 445 631</b>

Table 2

**Statement of financial performance for the period from 1 July 2022 to 28 February 2023**

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	<i>UNFICYP</i>	<i>UNDOF</i>	<i>UNIFIL</i>	<i>MINURSO</i>	<i>UNMIK</i>	<i>MONUSCO</i>	<i>UNSOS</i>	<i>UNISFA</i>	<i>UNMISS</i>	<i>MINUSMA</i>	<i>MINUSCA</i>	<i>Total</i>
<b>Revenue</b>												
Assessed contributions	33 123	69 197	539 176	65 414	44 971	1 112 242	422 404	280 323	852 241	1 344 106	1 159 870	<b>5 923 067</b>
Voluntary contributions/other transfers and allocations	24 854	–	387	1 724	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	<b>26 965</b>
Investment revenue	286	415	3 520	22	8	4 709	1 206	31	2 033	11 283	3 928	<b>27 441</b>
Other revenue	42	16	327	2	12	1 776	477	92	57	319	1 073	<b>4 193</b>
<b>Total revenues</b>	<b>58 305</b>	<b>69 628</b>	<b>543 410</b>	<b>67 162</b>	<b>44 991</b>	<b>1 118 727</b>	<b>424 087</b>	<b>280 446</b>	<b>854 331</b>	<b>1 355 708</b>	<b>1 164 871</b>	<b>5 981 666</b>
<b>Expenses</b>												
Employee salaries, allowances and benefits	9 974	9 893	78 286	13 696	19 283	150 895	56 394	30 179	189 426	135 567	124 236	<b>817 829</b>
Contingent contracted services	5 967	14 139	83 586	299	–	147 726	17 777	29 468	170 938	150 733	197 607	<b>818 240</b>
Other expenses	14 635	15 098	81 080	22 850	7 574	269 326	241 084	92 727	331 404	352 462	273 658	<b>1 701 898</b>
<b>Total expenses</b>	<b>30 576</b>	<b>39 130</b>	<b>242 952</b>	<b>36 845</b>	<b>26 857</b>	<b>567 947</b>	<b>315 255</b>	<b>152 374</b>	<b>691 768</b>	<b>638 762</b>	<b>595 501</b>	<b>3 337 967</b>
<b>Surplus for the year</b>	<b>27 729</b>	<b>30 498</b>	<b>300 458</b>	<b>30 317</b>	<b>18 134</b>	<b>550 780</b>	<b>108 832</b>	<b>128 072</b>	<b>162 563</b>	<b>716 946</b>	<b>569 370</b>	<b>2 643 699</b>

## Annex VI

## Delayed deployment factors and vacancy rates

Table 1  
**Planned and actual delayed deployment factors for military personnel**  
 (Percentage)

Mission	Military observers						Military contingents					
	Budgeted 2021/22	Actual average 2021/22	Budgeted 2022/23	Actual average (July 2022– 31 March 2023)	Actual average 31 March 2023	Projected 2023/24	Budgeted 2021/22	Actual average 2021/22	Budgeted 2022/23	Actual average (July 2022– 31 March 2023)	Actual average 31 March 2023	Projected 2023/24
MINURSO	10.0	10.6	10.0	9.6	13.3	10.1	1.0	(11.1)	1.0	(7.4)	–	–
MINUSCA	12.5	14.2	5.0	4.5	11.6	1.0	2.0	18.0	5.5	8.4	2.7	5.0
MINUSMA	–	–	–	–	–	–	6.0	5.7	2.3	7.8	10.3	6.9
MONUSCO	23.0	25.0	23.0	25.0	24.7	23.0	5.7	6.5	2.1	5.9	5.1	4.7
UNAMID	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
UNDOF	–	–	–	–	–	–	11.7	10.9	8.0	9.4	9.4	6.2
UNFICYP	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	4.0	6.6	5.1	–	5.0
UNIFIL	–	–	–	–	–	–	22.9	25.1	22.9	26.2	26.3	22.8
UNISFA	25.0	26.2	14.6	12.3	12.3	10.8	3.0	6.6	1.5	16.8	6.0	2.3
UNMIK	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	n/a	–	–
UNMISS	5.0	9.5	2.9	13.2	3.3	10.3	17.3	17.8	18.1	20.3	18.8	19.0
UNSOS	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

Table 2  
**Planned and actual delayed deployment factors for police personnel**  
 (Percentage)

Mission	United Nations police						Formed police units					
	Budgeted 2021/22	Actual average 2021/22	Budgeted 2022/23	Actual average (July 2022– 31 March 2023)	Actual average 31 March 2023	Projected 2023/24	Budgeted 2021/22	Actual average 2021/22	Budgeted 2022/23	Actual average (July 2022– 31 March 2023)	Actual average 31 March 2023	Projected 2023/24
MINURSO	90.0	83.3	83.0	83.3	83.0	83.3	–	–	–	–	–	n/a
MINUSCA	8.0	18.2	5.0	8.3	6.2	1.0	1.0	21.8	4.0	7.9	0.4	1.0
MINUSMA	9.9	13.9	9.9	16.8	15.9	15.4	7.9	8.3	7.0	11.1	16.1	8.3
MONUSCO	23.0	30.3	26.4	34.7	39.9	30.6	12.8	12.7	12.8	13.0	13.3	–
UNAMID	–	50.0	–	–	–	–	–	38.5	–	–	–	–
UNDOF	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
UNFICYP	3.0	8.7	2.9	5.8	5.8	2.9	–	–	–	–	–	–
UNIFIL	5.1	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
UNISFA	25.0	68.2	33.8	68.2	70.9	47.3	91.6	100.0	91.6	100.0	100.0	91.6
UNMIK	5.0	10.0	5.0	10.0	10.0	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
UNMISS	4.0	22.2	13.9	12.7	19.1	5.0	46.9	33.7	33.6	33.8	33.8	33.7
UNSOS	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

Table 3  
**Planned and actual vacancy rates for international staff**  
 (Percentage)

Mission	International staff							General temporary assistance – international staff						
	Budgeted 2021/22	Actual average 2021/22	Budgeted 2022/23	Actual average January– December 2022	Actual 31 March 2023	Actual average 31 March 2023	Projected 2023/24	Budgeted 2021/22	Actual average 2021/22	Budgeted 2022/23	Actual average January– December 2022	Actual 31 March 2023	Actual average 31 March 2023	Projected 2023/24
MINURSO	7.0	9.8	7.0	12.0	11.9	13.1	12.0	–	–	50.0	–	–	–	–
MINUSCA	13.0	14.7	13.0	15.3	16.2	15.9	15.3	10.0	19.7	15.0	30.4	25.8	45.2	30.4
MINUSMA	6.0	7.6	6.0	9.6	11.4	10.9	9.6	–	–	50.0	–	–	–	–
MONUSCO	11.5	11.9	11.5	11.7	11.6	11.4	11.5	16.7	25.0	16.7	40.0	40.0	40.0	20.0
UNAMID	–	10.5	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
UNDOF	9.4	7.5	9.4	9.4	9.4	9.4	5.7	25.0	–	–	–	100.0	50.0	–
UNFICYP	2.0	2.6	2.0	7.7	5.1	7.7	7.7	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
UNIFIL	5.1	5.1	2.0	5.9	9.1	7.5	3.9	–	–	50.0	–	–	–	–
UNISFA	10.0	10.9	10.0	12.3	10.4	13.1	12.3	10.0	50.0	10.0	33.3	–	–	–
UNMIK	10.0	11.5	10.0	13.3	16.8	15.9	13.3	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
UNMISS	5.4	6.9	5.4	7.5	7.1	7.3	7.5	–	6.3	5.4	25.0	–	20.0	25.0
UNSOS	8.0	7.7	8.0	8.7	11.7	11.2	8.7	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
RSCE	11.0	12.4	8.0	11.2	11.3	11.3	10.4	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
UNLB	13.0	16.5	13.0	18.4	19.0	19.7	15.5	–	66.7	–	66.7	50.0	50.0	–



Table 4  
**Planned and actual vacancy rates for national staff**  
 (Percentage)

Mission	National Professional Officers							National General Service staff						
	Budgeted 2021/22	Actual average 2021/22	Budgeted 2022/23	Actual average January– December 2022	Actual 31 March 2023	Actual average 31 March 2023	Projected 2023/24	Budgeted 2021/22	Actual average 2021/22	Budgeted 2022/23	Actual average January– December 2022	Actual 31 March 2023	Actual average 31 March 2023	Projected 2023/24
MINURSO	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2.0	6.2	2.0	8.1	6.8	6.8	6.8
MINUSCA	10.5	9.3	11.0	9.0	7.9	9.6	8.8	4.0	4.6	5.0	4.0	4.8	4.4	4.0
MINUSMA	12.0	8.7	6.0	11.1	12.9	12.9	11.1	11.0	5.4	5.0	4.8	4.8	4.6	4.5
MONUSCO	10.6	7.3	6.0	8.3	9.5	8.9	8.3	4.6	5.7	4.6	6.4	6.0	6.3	6.4
UNAMID	–	22.2	–	–	–	–	–	–	31.1	–	–	–	–	–
UNDOF	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	5.0	6.7	9.0	4.5	3.3	3.3	2.2
UNFICYP	5.0	–	–	–	14.3	–	7.7	2.0	0.9	1.0	1.7	3.5	2.6	1.7
UNIFIL	4.3	8.7	2.2	8.7	2.2	6.5	2.2	2.0	5.5	1.5	5.9	6.8	5.3	2.4
UNISFA	–	28.6	–	33.3	30.0	40.0	33.3	10.0	6.0	10.0	7.8	7.2	3.6	1.2
UNMIK	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1.0	2.7	1.0	2.2	2.2	1.6	1.1
UNMISS	4.0	2.4	4.0	2.4	5.4	3.0	2.4	4.0	3.0	4.0	2.3	2.7	2.1	2.0
UNSOS	20.0	22.5	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	20.0	29.5	20.0	25.7	21.1	23.5	21.1
RSCE	8.0	11.1	8.0	13.5	10.5	10.5	10.5	8.0	14.3	8.0	7.9	9.2	8.8	7.9
UNLB	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	4.0	6.6	4.0	5.9	7.2	6.2	5.9

## Annex VII

## Mission subsistence allowance levels for all categories in all missions

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Mission	Military observers						Military contingents					United Nations police					Government-provided personnel					Total				
	2021/22	2022/23	2023/24	Variance		2021/22	2022/23	2023/24	Variance		2021/22	2022/23	2023/24	Variance		2021/22	2022/23	2023/24	Variance		2021/22	2022/23	2023/24	Variance (2023/24 vs. 2022/23)		
				Amount	%				Amount	%				Amount	%				Amount	%				Amount	%	
MINURSO	4 865.6	5 567.0	4 396.9	(1 170.1)	(21.0)	209.9	223.2	187.3	(35.9)	(16.1)	36.4	64.4	53.5	(10.9)	(16.9)	30.3	32.2	32.3	0.1	0.3	5 142.2	5 886.8	4 670.0	(1 216.8)	(20.7)	
MINUSCA	7 070.6	7 462.9	7 708.5	245.6	3.3	19 071.5	21 632.7	20 728.1	(904.6)	(4.2)	25 206.1	30 466.9	30 591.9	125.0	0.4	5 009.1	5 807.7	5 678.2	(129.5)	(2.2)	56 357.3	65 370.2	64 706.7	(663.5)	(1.0)	
MINUSMA	–	–	–	–	–	19 400.5	18 935.1	1 761.1	(1 174.0)	(6.2)	10 876.2	11 256.2	10 262.1	(994.1)	(8.8)	700.4	794.0	708.3	(85.7)	(10.8)	30 977.1	30 985.3	28 731.5	(2 253.8)	(7.3)	
MONUSCO	30 349.4	27 479.1	28 195.3	716.2	2.6	–	–	–	–	–	27 206.6	23 543.5	22 816.5	(727.0)	(3.1)	3 292.3	2 979.1	3 227.7	248.6	8.3	60 848.3	54 001.7	54 239.5	237.8	0.4	
UNDOF	–	–	–	–	–	2 429.1	2 738.2	3 662.0	923.8	33.7	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2 429.1	2 738.2	3 662.0	923.8	33.7	
UNFICYP	–	–	–	–	–	931.3	2 628.2	2 512.9	(115.3)	(4.4)	2 393.7	3 261.0	3 117.9	(143.1)	(4.4)	–	–	–	–	–	4 325.0	5 889.2	5 630.8	(258.4)	(4.4)	
UNIFIL	–	–	–	–	–	5 603.3	7 694.8	9 429.3	1 734.5	22.5	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	5 603.3	7 694.8	9 429.3	1 734.5	22.5	
UNISFA	4 331.6	3 654.7	5 121.9	1 467.2	40.1	5 787.1	3 396.1	4 880.2	1 484.1	43.7	5 117.5	3 252.5	3 317.7	65.2	2.0	–	–	–	–	–	15 236.2	10 303.3	13 319.8	3 016.5	29.3	
UNMIK	268.1	252.7	227.3	(25.4)	(10.1)	–	–	–	–	–	318.4	300.1	304.6	4.5	1.5	–	–	–	–	–	586.5	552.8	531.9	(20.9)	(3.8)	
UNMISS	10 493.8	7 200.2	6 305.0	(895.2)	(12.4)	19 664.4	13 222.1	12 383.7	(838.4)	(6.3)	32 120.0	19 360.7	20 220.3	859.6	4.4	1 747.6	1 288.7	1 041.8	(246.9)	(19.2)	64 025.8	41 071.7	39 950.8	(1 120.9)	(2.7)	
UNSOS	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	219.0	219.0	282.6	63.6	29.0	219.0	219.0	282.6	63.6	29.0	
Total	57 379.1	51 616.6	5 954.9	338.3	0.7	74 097.1	70 470.4	71 544.6	1 074.2	1.5	103 274.9	91 505.3	90 684.5	(820.8)	(0.9)	10 998.7	11 120.7	10 970.9	(149.8)	(1.3)	245 749.8	224 713.0	225 154.9	441.9	0.2	

## Annex VIII

## Breakdown of approved civilian staff by mission in the last three periods and proposed level for 2023/24

Missions	2020/21 (approved)					2021/22 (approved)					2022/23 (approved)					2023/24 (proposed)				
	Inter-national	National	Temporary	United Nations Volunteers	Subtotal	Inter-national	National	Temporary	United Nations Volunteers	Subtotal	Inter-national	National	Temporary	United Nations Volunteers	Subtotal	Inter-national	National	Temporary	United Nations Volunteers	Subtotal
MINURSO	82	163	–	18	263	82	163	–	18	263	84	163	1	17	265	87	164	1	18	270
MINUSCA	687	602	69	266	1 624	694	604	69	281	1 648	730	615	32	294	1 671	741	624	41	303	1 709
MINUSMA	825	905	2	204	1 936	827	903	–	206	1 936	827	910	1	206	1 944	827	909	2	226	1 964
MONUSCO	720	1 720	60	347	2 847	697	1 653	60	327	2 737	687	1 597	61	322	2 667	670	1 608	62	324	2 664
UNAMID	527	872	97	68	1 564	130	155	3	15	303										
UNDOF	53	90	3	–	146	53	90	2	–	145	53	90	2	–	145	53	90	2	–	145
UNFICYP	38	122	2	–	162	38	122	1	–	161	39	122	2	–	163	40	122	2	–	164
UNIFIL	256	633	–	–	889	254	590	–	–	844	254	590	1	–	845	254	590	1	–	845
UNISFA	174	88	2	36	300	174	90	2	36	302	183	93	3	37	316	193	95	4	38	330
UNMIK	113	219	–	24	356	113	219	–	24	356	113	219	–	24	356	113	219	–	24	356
UNMISS	923	1 442	42	450	2 857	900	1 441	16	450	2 807	916	1 445	15	451	2 827	917	1 458	23	451	2 849
UNSOS	368	189	–	20	577	366	189	–	20	575	366	187	–	20	573	369	186	–	25	580
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>4 766</b>	<b>7 045</b>	<b>277</b>	<b>1 433</b>	<b>13 521</b>	<b>4 328</b>	<b>6 219</b>	<b>153</b>	<b>1 377</b>	<b>12 077</b>	<b>4 252</b>	<b>6 031</b>	<b>118</b>	<b>1 371</b>	<b>11 772</b>	<b>4 264</b>	<b>6 065</b>	<b>138</b>	<b>1 409</b>	<b>11 876</b>
UNLB	139	305	2	–	446	139	305	3	–	447	142	305	2	–	449	143	305	2	2	452
RSCE	127	271	–	6	404	137	280	–	7	424	133	265	–	7	405	132	263	–	7	402
Support account	958	396	68	–	1 422	959	397	60	–	1 416	966	396	71	–	1 433	974	396	76	–	1 446
<b>Total</b>	<b>5 990</b>	<b>8 017</b>	<b>347</b>	<b>1 439</b>	<b>15 793</b>	<b>5 563</b>	<b>7 201</b>	<b>216</b>	<b>1 384</b>	<b>14 364</b>	<b>5 493</b>	<b>6 997</b>	<b>191</b>	<b>1 378</b>	<b>14 059</b>	<b>5 513</b>	<b>7 029</b>	<b>216</b>	<b>1 418</b>	<b>14 176</b>

## Annex IX

# Staff members with peacekeeping missions, including the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe and the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, by mission and gender, from 30 June 2018 to 31 December 2022

	30 June 2018				30 June 2019				30 June 2020				30 June 2021				30 June 2022				31 December 2022			
	Female		Male		Female		Male		Female		Male		Female		Male		Female		Male		Female		Male	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
MINURSO																								
International staff																								
P-5 and above	2	33	4	67	2	33	4	67	3	43	4	57	3	43	4	57	2	33	4	67	2	25	6	75
P-1 to P-4	4	27	11	73	6	29	15	71	5	28	13	72	8	33	16	67	8	35	15	65	8	36	14	64
Field service	7	14	43	86	9	20	37	80	9	19	38	81	8	18	36	82	8	18	36	82	9	21	34	79
National Staff																								
National Professional Officers	0	0	1	100	0	0	2	100	0	0	2	100	0	0	2	100	0	0	2	100	0	0	2	100
National General Service	30	19	128	81	29	19	127	81	30	19	129	81	30	19	129	81	38	26	111	74	39	26	110	74
MINUSCA																								
International staff																								
P-5 and above	14	23	46	77	13	23	43	77	13	24	41	76	13	24	41	76	18	29	44	71	17	27	45	73
P-1 to P-4	68	31	152	69	69	31	152	69	79	33	157	67	79	32	171	68	72	30	166	70	69	31	155	69
Field service	106	30	249	70	98	29	240	71	94	27	249	73	99	29	248	71	99	29	245	71	100	29	239	71
National Staff																								
National Professional Officers	21	21	78	79	21	22	76	78	22	23	75	77	22	24	70	76	21	21	78	79	22	22	79	78
National General Service	69	16	351	84	82	18	378	82	89	18	395	82	88	19	386	81	90	19	393	81	92	19	382	81
MINUSMA																								
International staff																								
P-5 and above	14	24	45	76	18	28	47	72	16	26	45	74	21	31	47	69	25	37	43	63	25	37	42	63
P-1 to P-4	71	30	169	70	83	31	188	69	89	32	188	68	95	35	179	65	99	38	163	62	105	41	154	59
Field service	92	23	302	77	105	25	318	75	112	25	328	75	118	27	322	73	114	26	325	74	114	26	317	74
National Staff																								
National Professional Officers	26	21	96	79	24	20	99	80	24	18	106	82	26	19	114	81	27	20	109	80	26	19	109	81
National General Service	123	20	488	80	123	19	521	81	124	19	542	81	130	19	569	81	140	19	583	81	142	20	582	80

	30 June 2018				30 June 2019				30 June 2020				30 June 2021				30 June 2022				31 December 2022			
	Female		Male		Female		Male		Female		Male		Female		Male		Female		Male		Female		Male	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
<b>MONUSCO</b>																								
International staff																								
P-5 and above	18	31	40	69	19	32	41	68	15	29	37	71	17	30	40	70	23	35	42	65	22	35	41	65
P-1 to P-4	85	28	216	72	74	28	193	72	69	28	175	72	77	32	160	68	73	32	154	68	77	33	153	67
Field service	127	30	296	70	116	29	282	71	107	30	244	70	104	30	239	70	103	31	233	69	98	31	222	69
National Staff																								
National Professional Officers	28	15	156	85	29	15	170	85	25	14	151	86	24	13	164	87	22	12	161	88	21	12	158	88
National General Service	300	15	1 711	85	291	15	1 651	85	252	17	1 246	83	246	17	1 217	83	238	17	1 178	83	230	17	1 124	83
<b>UNDOF</b>																								
International staff																								
P-5 and above	1	25	3	75	0	0	3	100	0	0	2	100	0	0	4	100	0	0	4	100	0	0	4	100
P-1 to P-4	1	8	12	92	2	14	12	86	2	13	14	88	2	12	15	88	3	17	15	83	3	20	12	80
Field service	10	33	20	67	10	32	21	68	11	37	19	63	9	31	20	69	11	37	19	63	11	37	19	63
National Staff																								
National Professional Officers	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	100	0	0	1	100	0	0	1	100
National General Service	14	18	66	83	12	15	68	85	11	14	67	86	14	18	64	82	20	24	65	76	19	22	67	78
<b>UNFICYP</b>																								
International staff																								
P-5 and above	4	44	5	56	4	44	5	56	5	50	5	50	5	50	5	50	3	33	6	67	3	33	6	67
P-1 to P-4	6	43	8	57	6	38	10	63	4	29	10	71	6	40	9	60	4	29	10	71	6	40	9	60
Field service	8	53	7	47	8	50	8	50	8	47	9	53	8	47	9	53	8	50	8	50	8	50	8	50
National Staff																								
National Professional Officers	2	0	0	0	3	75	1	25	3	75	1	25	4	57	3	43	4	57	3	43	4	57	3	43
National General Service	44	39	70	61	42	38	70	63	44	39	69	61	46	40	68	60	47	41	67	59	45	41	66	59
<b>UNIFIL</b>																								
International staff																								
P-5 and above	3	14	19	86	6	27	16	73	5	21	19	79	6	26	17	74	9	36	16	64	9	35	17	65
P-1 to P-4	25	41	36	59	26	41	37	59	33	50	33	50	33	49	35	51	35	48	38	52	28	44	36	56
Field service	49	31	107	69	50	32	104	68	52	34	99	66	52	34	100	66	51	35	95	65	50	35	94	65

	30 June 2018				30 June 2019				30 June 2020				30 June 2021				30 June 2022				31 December 2022			
	Female		Male		Female		Male		Female		Male		Female		Male		Female		Male		Female		Male	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
National Staff																								
National Professional Officers	19	48	21	53	22	50	22	50	22	50	22	50	20	48	22	52	20	49	21	51	21	49	22	51
National General Service	136	25	412	75	136	25	408	75	138	26	402	74	134	26	389	74	135	26	379	74	131	26	382	74
<b>UNISFA</b>																								
International staff																								
P-5 and above	2	25	6	75	3	30	7	70	2	18	9	82	4	36	7	64	2	18	9	82	2	15	11	85
P-1 to P-4	6	15	35	85	7	15	39	85	9	18	40	82	11	22	39	78	12	22	42	78	14	24	44	76
Field service	18	20	73	80	22	24	71	76	25	26	72	74	25	27	66	73	25	27	69	73	25	27	68	73
National Staff																								
National Professional Officers	0	0	3	100	0	0	3	100	0	0	3	100	0	0	3	100	0	0	6	100	0	0	6	100
National General Service	5	7	68	93	6	8	69	92	9	9	94	91	14	12	101	88	16	14	97	86	21	18	96	82
<b>UNMIK</b>																								
International staff																								
P-5 and above	8	40	12	60	7	37	12	63	6	29	15	71	9	45	11	55	11	50	11	50	9	45	11	55
P-1 to P-4	22	45	27	55	32	58	23	42	30	54	26	46	26	48	28	52	22	41	32	59	25	45	30	55
Field service	9	35	17	65	6	26	17	74	8	32	17	68	8	32	17	68	6	29	15	71	5	25	15	75
National Staff																								
National Professional Officers	17	53	15	47	16	50	16	50	16	48	17	52	16	48	17	52	16	48	17	52	15	47	17	53
National General Service	67	37	115	63	70	38	113	62	69	38	114	62	70	38	114	62	70	39	111	61	72	39	112	61
<b>UNMISS</b>																								
International staff																								
P-5 and above	20	31	45	69	19	29	47	71	25	34	48	66	26	37	45	63	26	37	44	63	27	38	44	62
P-1 to P-4	85	27	230	73	96	30	228	70	86	28	216	72	92	29	221	71	100	33	206	67	100	33	202	67
Field service	121	25	372	75	130	26	376	74	132	26	370	74	129	26	363	74	122	25	359	75	124	26	356	74
National Staff																								
National Professional Officers	38	25	115	75	39	25	117	75	40	25	118	75	41	26	118	74	42	26	118	74	43	27	117	73
National General Service	160	13	1 075	87	158	13	1 067	87	154	13	1 068	87	162	13	1 061	87	178	14	1 072	86	184	15	1 068	85

	30 June 2018				30 June 2019				30 June 2020				30 June 2021				30 June 2022				31 December 2022			
	Female		Male		Female		Male		Female		Male		Female		Male		Female		Male		Female		Male	
	Number		%		Number		%		Number		%		Number		%		Number		%		Number		%	
	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%	Number	%
<b>UNSOS</b>																								
International staff																								
P-5 and above	4	21	15	79	4	19	17	81	4	17	19	83	4	18	18	82	5	23	17	77	9	38	15	63
P-1 to P-4	24	26	68	74	33	31	75	69	28	27	77	73	33	31	73	69	42	38	68	62	37	37	63	63
Field service	52	27	140	73	55	27	152	73	58	28	148	72	60	28	151	72	64	30	151	70	62	31	140	69
National Staff																								
National Professional Officers	11	39	17	61	12	41	17	59	14	48	15	52	15	47	17	53	15	48	16	52	15	48	16	52
National General Service	43	32	92	68	46	33	93	67	38	34	74	66	34	32	72	68	35	32	74	68	34	29	83	71
<b>UNLB</b>																								
International staff																								
P-5 and above	1	10	9	90	1	10	9	90	1	11	8	89	3	25	9	75	6	40	9	60	6	43	8	57
P-1 to P-4	25	36	45	64	29	35	54	65	24	31	54	69	25	35	47	65	28	36	49	64	27	36	48	64
Field service	6	23	20	77	8	25	24	75	7	24	22	76	6	18	28	82	6	18	27	82	6	19	25	81
National Staff																								
National General Service	121	40	185	60	114	39	180	61	112	38	180	62	110	38	178	62	114	38	183	62	113	39	177	61
<b>RSCE</b>																								
International staff																								
P-5 and above	1	20	4	80	2	33	4	67	2	29	5	71	3	43	4	57	3	38	5	63	3	43	4	57
P-1 to P-4	13	39	20	61	10	32	21	68	7	21	26	79	7	21	27	79	12	31	27	69	14	38	23	62
Field service	28	40	42	60	26	38	43	62	28	40	42	60	31	43	41	57	31	44	39	56	29	43	38	57
National Staff																								
National Professional Officers	10	42	14	58	11	46	13	54	10	38	16	62	9	33	18	67	13	48	14	52	14	54	12	46
National General Service	130	64	74	36	137	63	80	37	137	65	75	35	128	64	72	36	135	64	76	36	136	63	79	37

## Annex X

## Post nationalization

Table 1

## Percentage of national posts to the total staffing table of the missions

Mission	2018/19 (approved)			2019/20 (approved)			2020/21 (approved)			2021/22 (approved)			2022/23 (approved)			2023/24 (proposed)		
	Total staff	National posts	%	Total staff	National posts	%	Total staff	National posts	%	Total staff	National posts	%	Total staff	National posts	%	Total staff	National posts	%
MINURSO	263	163	62.0	263	163	62.0	263	163	62.0	263	163	62.0	265	163	61.5	270	164	60.7
MINUSCA	1 524	602	39.5	1 559	607	38.9	1 624	602	37.1	1 648	604	36.7	1 671	615	36.8	1 709	624	36.5
MINUSMA	1 899	898	47.3	1 919	903	47.1	1 936	905	47.0	1 936	903	47.0	1 944	910	47.0	1 964	909	46.2
MONUSCO	3 604	2 252	62.5	2 850	1 725	60.5	2 847	1 720	60.4	2 737	1 653	60.40	2 667	1 597	59.9	2 664	1 608	60.4
UNAMID	1 574	878	55.8	1 573	878	55.8	1 564	872	55.8	303	155	51.2	—	—	—	—	—	—
UNDOF	143	88	61.5	144	88	61.1	146	90	61.6	145	90	62.1	145	90	62.1	145	90	62.1
UNFICYP	158	119	75.3	161	121	75.2	162	122	75.3	161	122	75.8	163	122	74.8	164	122	74.3
UNIFIL	889	634	71.3	889	633	71.2	889	633	71.2	844	590	69.9	845	590	69.8	845	590	69.8
UNISFA	280	86	30.7	286	86	30.1	300	88	29.3	302	90	29.8	316	93	29.4	330	95	28.8
UNMIK	355	219	61.7	356	219	61.5	356	219	6.02	356	219	62.0	356	219	62.0	356	219	62.0
UNMISS	2 829	1 426	50.4	2 834	1 426	50.3	2 857	1 442	50.5	2 807	1 441	51.3	2 827	1 445	51.1	2 849	1 458	51.2
UNSOS	559	189	33.8	577	189	32.8	577	189	32.8	575	189	32.8	573	187	32.6	580	186	32.1
UNLB	445	288	64.7	446	306	68.6	446	305	68.3	447	305	68.2	449	305	67.9	452	305	67.4
RSCE	406	269	66.3	404	267	66.1	404	271	67.1	424	280	66.0	405	265	65.4	402	263	65.4
Support account	1 427	399	28.0	1 427	398	27.9	1 422	396	27.8	1 416	397	28.0	1 433	396	27.6	1 446	396	27.4



Table 2  
Proposals for nationalization

Mission	2018/19			2019/20			2020/21			2021/22			2022/23			2023/24		
	No. of posts	Original level	New level	No. of posts	Original level	New level	No. of posts	Original level	New level	No. of posts	Original level	New level	No. of posts	Original level	New level	No. of posts	Original level	New level
MINURSO	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
MINUSCA	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
MINUSMA	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
MONUSCO	3	FS	NGS	1	P-4	NPO	–	–	–	3	P-3	NPO	–	–	–	3	P-4	NPO
	1	FS	NPO	7	P-3	NPO	–	–	–	1	FS	GS	–	–	–	7	P-3	NPO
	1	P-3	NPO	2	FS	GS	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	2	P-2	NPO
	2	P-2	NPO	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	5	FS	NGS
	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	16	IUNV	NUNV
UNAMID	1	FS	NGS	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
UNDOF	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
UNFICYP	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
UNIFIL	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
UNISFA	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
UNMIK	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
UNMISS	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	IUNV	NPO
UNSOS	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
UNLB	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
RSCE	–	–	–	–	–	–	3	P-3	NPO	–	–	–	2	FS	NPO	1	P-2	NPO
	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	P-2	NPO	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	IUNV	NUNV	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

## Annex XI

## Comparison of air operations in 2022/23 and 2023/24 by budget class per mission

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Mission	Sub-class description	2022/23 (approved)	2023/24 (proposed)	Variance	
				Amount	Percentage
MINURSO	Equipment and supplies	50 300	43 800	(6 500)	(12.9)
	Services	181 900	173 800	(8 100)	(4.5)
	Landing fees and ground handling charges	188 900	168 900	(20 000)	(10.6)
	Aircrew subsistence allowance	12 800	12 800	—	—
	Petrol, oil and lubricants	2 050 800	2 294 500	243 700	11.9
	Rental and operation: Fixed-wing aircraft	3 325 700	3 430 100	104 400	3.1
	Rental and operation: Helicopters	5 411 800	12 163 600	6 751 800	124.8
	Liability insurance	48 500	37 300	(11 200)	(23.1)
<b>Total MINURSO</b>		<b>11 270 700</b>	<b>18 324 800</b>	<b>7 054 100</b>	<b>62.6</b>
MINUSCA	Equipment and supplies	480 600	468 700	(11 900)	(2.5)
	Services	13 202 800	22 254 700	9 051 900	68.6
	Landing fees and ground handling charges	749 200	622 900	(126 300)	(16.9)
	Aircrew subsistence allowance	96 700	109 800	13 100	13.5
	Petrol, oil and lubricants	14 839 500	20 746 300	5 906 800	39.8
	Rental and operation: Fixed-wing aircraft	15 351 500	19 493 100	4 141 600	27.0
	Rental and operation: Helicopters	23 275 500	30 209 300	6 933 800	29.8
	Liability insurance	153 700	283 600	129 900	84.5
	Spare parts	56 600	49 900	(6 700)	(11.8)
<b>Total MINUSCA</b>		<b>68 206 100</b>	<b>94 238 300</b>	<b>26 032 200</b>	<b>38.2</b>
MINUSMA	Equipment and supplies	2 420 600	426 600	(1 994 000)	(82.4)
	Services	28 136 600	26 922 700	(1 213 900)	(4.3)
	Landing fees and ground handling charges	3 116 200	3 121 800	5 600	0.2
	Aircrew subsistence allowance	166 600	202 100	35 500	21.3
	Petro, oil and lubricants	18 394 700	20 527 600	2 132 900	11.6
	Rental and operation: Fixed-wing aircraft	52 187 500	52 267 700	80 200	0.2

Mission	Sub-class description	2022/23 (approved)	2023/24 (proposed)	Variance	
				Amount	Percentage
	Rental and operation: Helicopters	85 783 300	87 572 300	1 789 000	2.1
	Liability insurance	1 171 900	910 600	(261 300)	(22.3)
	Spare parts	443 500	471 500	28 000	6.3
<b>Total MINUSMA</b>		<b>191 820 900</b>	<b>192 422 900</b>	<b>602 000</b>	<b>0.3</b>
MONUSCO	Equipment and supplies	376 200	368 000	(8 200)	(2.2)
	Services	13 150 700	15 739 400	2 588 700	19.7
	Landing fees and ground handling charges	895 400	487 000	(408 400)	(45.6)
	Aircrew subsistence allowance	234 100	234 700	600	0.3
	Petrol, oil and lubricants	14 771 900	18 926 500	4 154 600	28.1
	Rental and operation: Fixed-wing aircraft	22 529 100	22 972 200	443 100	2.0
	Rental and operation: Helicopters	47 414 200	59 683 900	12 269 700	25.9
	Liability insurance	294 500	364 900	70 400	23.9
	Spare parts	10 000	65 000	55 000	550.0
<b>Total MONUSCO</b>		<b>99 676 100</b>	<b>118 841 600</b>	<b>19 165 500</b>	<b>19.2</b>
UNFICYP	Equipment and supplies	15 400	4 300	(11 100)	(72.1)
	Services	4 500	5 800	1 300	28.9
	Petrol, oil and lubricants	147 600	237 400	89 800	60.8
	Rental and operation: Helicopters	2 143 500	2 143 500	—	—
	Liability insurance	24 500	32 500	8 000	32.7
<b>Total UNFICYP</b>		<b>2 335 500</b>	<b>2 423 500</b>	<b>88 000</b>	<b>3.8</b>
UNIFIL	Equipment and supplies	45 000	48 000	3 000	6.7
	Services	2 766 200	2 788 700	22 500	0.8
	Landing fees and ground handling charges	15 000	33 000	18 000	120.0
	Aircrew subsistence allowance	19 900	3 500	(16 400)	(82.4)
	Petrol, oil and lubricants	457 000	750 100	293 100	64.1
	Rental and operation: Helicopters	3 650 000	4 010 000	360 000	9.9
	Liability insurance	54 300	54 300	—	—
<b>Total UNIFIL</b>		<b>7 007 400</b>	<b>7 687 600</b>	<b>680 200</b>	<b>9.7</b>

Mission	Sub-class description	2022/23 (approved)	2023/24 (proposed)	Variance	
				Amount	Percentage
UNISFA	Equipment and supplies	–	730 000	730 000	–
	Services	281 300	441 900	160 600	57.1
	Landing fees and ground handling charges	383 600	1 069 400	685 800	178.8
	Aircrew subsistence allowance	122 800	162 500	39 700	32.3
	Petrol, oil and lubricants	3 241 500	4 490 500	1 249 000	38.5
	Rental and operation: Fixed-wing aircraft	6 980 200	7 863 400	883 200	12.7
	Rental and operation: Helicopters	14 308 100	22 661 100	8 353 000	58.4
	Liability insurance	94 100	103 100	9 000	9.6
<b>Total UNISFA</b>		<b>25 411 600</b>	<b>37 521 900</b>	<b>12 110 300</b>	<b>47.7</b>
UNMISS	Equipment and supplies	541 100	1 152 100	611 000	112.9
	Services	149 300	378 400	229 100	153.4
	Landing fees and ground handling charges	345 800	345 800	–	–
	Aircrew subsistence allowance	354 100	365 100	11 000	3.1
	Petrol, oil and lubricants	23 465 500	31 041 100	7 575 600	32.3
	Rental and operation: Fixed-wing aircraft	22 366 300	24 352 300	1 986 000	8.9
	Rental and operation: Helicopters	53 366 100	66 328 100	12 962 000	24.3
	Liability insurance	215 700	230 100	14 400	6.7
<b>Total UNMISS</b>		<b>100 803 900</b>	<b>124 193 000</b>	<b>23 389 100</b>	<b>23.2</b>
UNSOS	Equipment and supplies	–	264 000	264 000	–
	Services	935 700	980 200	44 500	4.8
	Landing fees and ground handling charges	1 421 000	1 173 000	(248 000)	(17.5)
	Aircrew subsistence allowance	1 023 600	1 079 600	56 000	5.5
	Petrol, oil and lubricants	15 314 500	15 806 400	491 900	3.2
	Rental and operation: Fixed-wing aircraft	15 595 700	14 847 000	(748 700)	(4.8)
	Rental and operation: Helicopters	38 898 500	60 836 100	21 937 600	56.4
	Liability insurance	148 300	240 800	92 500	62.4
<b>Total UNSOS</b>		<b>73 337 300</b>	<b>95 227 100</b>	<b>21 889 800</b>	<b>29.8</b>
<b>Total air operations</b>		<b>579 869 500</b>	<b>690 880 700</b>	<b>111 011 200</b>	<b>19.1</b>

**Annex XII****Budgeted and expenditure levels for stationery for the periods from 2020/21 to 2022/23 and proposed resources for 2023/24**

(United States dollars)

<i>Missions</i>	<i>2020/21</i>				<i>2021/22</i>				<i>2022/23</i>				<i>2023/24</i>		
	<i>Approved civilian personnel</i>	<i>Cost per person</i>	<i>Budget</i>	<i>Expenditure</i>	<i>Approved civilian personnel</i>	<i>Cost per person</i>	<i>Budget</i>	<i>Expenditure</i>	<i>Approved civilian personnel</i>	<i>Cost per person</i>	<i>Budget</i>	<i>Expenditure</i>	<i>Proposed civilian personnel</i>	<i>Cost per person</i>	<i>Proposed</i>
MINURSO	263	175	46 100	57 814	263	257	67 500	110 102	265	240	63 700	135 643	270	251	67 800
MINUSCA	1 624	230	373 700	303 530	1 648	237	391 100	393 477	1 671	268	447 300	468 769	1 709	338	577 800
MINUSMA	1 936	356	688 900	788 798	1 936	382	739 200	531 843	1 944	436	848 300	475 666	1 964	266	523 400
MONUSCO	2 847	90	25 800	237 106	2 737	90	247 100	337 956	2 667	90	241 100	155 898	2 664	94	249 400
UNDOF	146	224	32 700	38 732	145	226	32 700	23 272	145	226	32 700	29 157	145	226	32 700
UNFICYP	162	255	41 300	17 168	161	274	44 100	15 423	163	289	47 100	21 293	164	265	43 400
UNIFIL	889	127	113 100	168 439	844	134	113 100	127 469	845	164	138 200	153 090	845	164	138 200
UNISFA	300	114	34 200	51 068	302	98	29 700	125 881	316	52	16 300	101 227	330	101	33 300
UNMIK	356	32	11 400	25 958	356	45	15 900	10 781	356	47	16 700	5 929	356	29	10 400
UNMISS	2 857	180	514 100	355 596	2 807	183	513 000	457 090	2 827	181	513 000	253 100	2 849	196	558 300
UNSOS	577	528	304 600	225 201	575	647	372 300	192 683	573	576	330 200	85 347	580	450	260 800
UNLB	446	86	38 500	20 878	447	32	14 200	13 933	449	30	13 600	11 440	452	54	24 400
RSCE	404	388	156 900	142 387	424	393	166 700	216 558	405	394	159 700	6 517	402	307	123 600
Support account	1 422	185	262 500	20 736	1 416	183	258 600	9 654	1 433	186	266 200	9 802	1 446	186	268 800

## Annex XIII

## Analysis of the impact of fuel prices on the proposed budget for the 2023/24 period

(United States dollars)

Mission	Class	Type	Actual monthly weighted average price litre								Estimates 2023/24 budget				
											Average fuel price applied in the budget (based on July–Dec. 2022)	Average fuel prices (based on Sept. 2022–Feb. 2023)	Budgeted costs	Recosting scenarios	Impact: increase (decrease)
			July 2022	Aug. 2022	Sept. 2022	Oct. 2022	Nov. 2022	Dec. 2022	Jan. 2023	Feb. 2023	(Applying Sept. 2022–Feb. 2023 average)	(Applying Sept. 2022 to Feb. 2023 average)			
UNMISS	Facilities and infrastructure	Diesel fuel	1.566	1.370	1.332	1.262	1.323	1.252	1.143	1.178	1.351	1.248	38 436 493	35 506 102	(2 930 391)
	Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	1.543	1.339	1.322	1.238	1.311	1.241	1.141	1.165	1.333	1.237	4 268 754	3 961 327	(307 427)
	Air operations	Aviation fuel	1.512	1.312	1.286	1.197	1.249	1.222	1.125	1.219	1.296	1.216	27 791 827	26 076 282	(1 715 545)
	Marine operations	Petrol fuel	1.637	1.637	1.635	1.240	1.437	1.404	1.447	1.463	1.498	1.438	134 408	129 025	(5 383)
MONUSCO	Facilities and infrastructure	Diesel fuel	1.416	1.297	1.208	1.144	1.212	1.136	1.048	1.042	1.236	1.132	8 388 226	7 682 421	(705 805)
	Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	1.416	1.297	1.208	1.144	1.212	1.136	1.048	1.042	1.236	1.132	4 477 143	4 100 425	(376 718)
	Air operations	Aviation fuel	1.334	1.190	1.138	1.065	1.060	1.045	0.983	1.041	1.139	1.055	15 417 381	14 280 366	(1 137 015)
	Facilities and infrastructure	Kerosene fuel	1.366	1.154	1.177	1.083	1.104	1.104	1.025	1.025	1.165	1.086	417 988	389 644	(28 344)
UNISFA	Facilities and infrastructure	Diesel fuel	1.278	1.064	1.056	1.009	1.054	0.983	0.890	0.930	1.074	0.987	8 592 000	7 896 000	(696 000)
	Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	1.278	1.064	1.056	1.009	1.054	0.983	0.890	0.930	1.074	0.987	1 288 800	1 184 400	(104 400)
	Air operations	Aviation fuel	1.227	1.047	1.037	0.955	0.981	0.957	1.030	1.060	1.034	1.003	4 490 475	4 355 847	(134 628)
	Facilities and infrastructure	Petrol fuel	1.188	0.974	0.915	0.826	0.819	0.839	0.780	0.850	0.927	0.838	7 231	6 536	(695)
UNMIK	Facilities and infrastructure	Diesel fuel	0.981	0.958	0.916	0.974	0.940	0.790	0.823	0.731	0.927	0.862	63 963	59 478	(4 485)
	Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	0.981	0.958	0.916	0.974	0.940	0.790	0.823	0.731	0.927	0.862	50 985	47 410	(3 575)
	Ground transportation	Petrol fuel	0.896	0.774	0.690	0.722	0.792	0.629	0.696	0.686	0.751	0.703	17 273	16 169	(1 104)
	Facilities and infrastructure	Liquid propane/gas fuel	0.515	0.526	0.494	0.478	0.478	0.477	0.477	0.477	0.495	0.480	31 185	30 240	(945)

Mission	Class	Type	Actual monthly weighted average price litre										Estimates 2023/24 budget		
			July 2022	Aug. 2022	Sept. 2022	Oct. 2022	Nov. 2022	Dec. 2022	Jan. 2023	Feb. 2023	Average fuel price applied in the budget (based on July– Dec. 2022)	Average fuel prices (based on Sept. 2022– Feb. 2023)	Budgeted costs	Recosting scenarios (Applying Sept. 2022– Feb. 2023 average)	Impact: increase (decrease) (Applying Sept. 2022 to Feb. 2023 average)
MINURSO	Facilities and infrastructure	Diesel fuel	1.350	1.140	1.152	1.110	1.352	1.241	1.271	1.167	1.224	1.216	856 800	851 200	(5 600)
	Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	1.350	1.140	1.152	1.110	1.352	1.241	1.271	1.167	1.224	1.216	601 425	597 494	(3 931)
	Air operations	Aviation fuel	1.220	1.060	1.136	1.016	1.063	1.014	1.006	0.966	1.085	1.034	2 294 532	2 186 678	(107 854)
UNSOS	Facilities and infrastructure	Diesel fuel	1.437	1.243	1.206	1.138	1.199	1.135	1.102	1.229	1.226	1.168	23 857 965	22 729 285	(1 128 680)
	Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	1.437	1.243	1.206	1.138	1.199	1.135	1.102	1.229	1.226	1.168	4 413 600	4 204 800	(208 800)
	Air operations	Aviation fuel	1.359	1.180	1.180	1.076	1.102	1.082	1.025	1.240	1.163	1.118	14 334 850	13 780 191	(554 659)
	Marine operations	Petrol fuel	1.219	1.089	0.948	0.861	0.854	0.874	0.811	1.002	0.974	0.892	116 880	107 040	(9 840)
UNDOF	Facilities and infrastructure	Diesel fuel	2.052	1.394	1.899	1.186	1.146	0.861	1.010	1.005	1.423	1.185	2 545 007	2 119 349	(425 658)
	Facilities and infrastructure	Liquid propane/gas	1.080	1.080	1.080	1.080	1.080	1.080	1.080	1.080	1.080	1.080	29 160	29 160	–
	Ground transportation	Petrol/Benzene	1.500	1.500	1.500	1.500	1.500	1.500	1.500	1.500	1.500	1.500	900	900	–
	Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	2.052	1.394	1.899	1.186	1.146	0.861	1.010	1.005	1.423	1.185	1 090 730	908 303	(182 427)
UNIFIL	Facilities and infrastructure	Diesel fuel	1.178	1.058	1.082	1.085	1.083	0.930	0.931	0.904	1.069	1.003	16 436 121	15 415 587	(1 020 534)
	Facilities and infrastructure	Liquid propane/gas fuel	1.414	1.309	1.317	1.418	1.431	1.401	1.413	1.511	1.382	1.415	371 552	380 479	8 927
	Ground transportation	Petrol fuel	1.270	1.086	0.991	0.999	1.057	0.946	0.954	0.996	1.058	0.990	157 615	147 485	(10 130)
	Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	1.178	1.058	1.082	1.085	1.083	0.930	0.931	0.904	1.069	1.003	4 365 093	4 094 059	(271 034)
	Air operations	Aviation fuel	1.329	1.158	1.131	1.077	1.091	1.074	0.978	1.049	1.143	1.067	750 093	699 973	(50 120)
MINUSCA	Facilities and infrastructure	Diesel fuel	2.132	1.975	1.890	1.861	1.942	1.601	1.749	1.577	1.900	1.770	32 470 036	30 245 218	(2 224 818)
	Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	2.132	1.975	1.890	1.861	1.942	1.601	1.749	1.577	1.900	1.770	14 641 678	13 638 443	(1 003 235)

Mission	Class	Type	Actual monthly weighted average price litre										Estimates 2023/24 budget		
			July 2022	Aug. 2022	Sept. 2022	Oct. 2022	Nov. 2022	Dec. 2022	Jan. 2023	Feb. 2023	Average fuel price applied in the budget (based on July– Dec. 2022)	Average fuel prices (based on Sept. 2022– Feb. 2023)	Budgeted costs	Recosting scenarios (Applying Sept. 2022– Feb. 2023 average)	Impact: increase (decrease) (Applying Sept. 2022 to Feb. 2023 average)
RSCE	Air operations	Aviation fuel	1.845	1.674	1.646	1.593	1.965	1.619	1.495	1.565	1.724	1.647	16 342 381	15 615 322	(727 059)
	Facilities and infrastructure	Petrol	2.066	1.899	1.757	1.688	1.736	1.758	1.749	1.577	1.817	1.711	55 371	52,129	(3 242)
	Facilities and infrastructure	Diesel fuel	1.554	1.397	1.306	1.273	1.322	1.241	1.160	1.208	1.349	1.252	52 333 440	48 577 600	(3 755 840)
	Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	1.554	1.397	1.306	1.273	1.322	1.241	1.160	1.208	1.349	1.252	9 485 635	8 804 875	(680 760)
	Ground transportation	Petrol fuel	1.627	1.500	1.318	1.227	1.301	1.328	1.089	1.285	1.384	1.258	49 806	45 288	(4 518)
	Air operations	Aviation fuel	1.544	1.382	1.363	1.295	1.279	1.291	1.149	1.281	1.359	1.276	17 522 287	16 450 914	(1 071 373)
	Facilities and infrastructure	Diesel fuel	1.348	1.235	1.116	1.046	1.109	1.043	0.943	0.969	1.149	1.038	287 363	259 500	(27 863)
	Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	1.348	1.235	1.116	1.046	1.109	1.043	0.943	0.969	1.149	1.038	28 736	25 950	(2 786)
UNLB	Facilities and infrastructure	Diesel fuel	1.096	1.096	1.096	1.096	1.096	1.096	1.096	1.096	1.096	1.096	61 387	61 376	(11)
	Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	1.096	1.096	1.096	1.096	1.096	1.096	1.096	1.000	1.096	1.080	71 253	70 200	(1 053)
	Facilities and infrastructure	Diesel fuel	1.824	1.824	1.824	1.824	1.824	1.824	1.824	1.824	1.824	1.824	10 944	10 944	–
UNFICYP	Facilities and infrastructure	Diesel fuel	1.110	1.051	0.964	1.045	0.938	0.853	0.938	0.848	0.994	0.931	17 536	16 425	(1 111)
	Facilities and infrastructure	Heating oil	1.077	0.993	1.035	1.045	0.938	0.853	0.910	0.824	0.990	0.934	92 902	87 647	(5 255)
	Facilities and infrastructure	Propane/liquid propane gas fuel	1.258	1.190	1.227	1.261	1.261	1.203	1.319	1.344	1.233	1.269	46 329	47 681	1 352
	Ground transportation	Diesel fuel	1.137	1.076	1.046	1.129	1.046	0.913	0.952	0.868	1.058	0.992	578 339	542 261	(36 078)
	Ground transportation	Petrol fuel	1.103	1.030	0.856	0.921	0.915	0.749	0.828	0.842	0.929	0.852	18 753	17 198	(1 555)
	Air operations	Aviation fuel	1.443	1.272	1.243	1.243	1.204	1.204	1.092	1.162	1.268	1.191	237 361	222 947	(14 414)
<b>Total</b>													<b>330 447 992</b>	<b>308 765 573</b>	<b>(21 682 419)</b>



**Annex XIV****Enterprise and field-specific software and applications**

<i>Software/application</i>	<i>In use by missions</i>
Uniformed capabilities management	All missions
Contingent-owned equipment management	All missions
Fuel management	All missions
Rations management	All missions
United Nations Operations and Crisis Centre Contact Database	All missions
Unite ID	All missions
iNeed (customer relationship management)	All missions
Inspira	All missions
Careers portal	All missions
Unite Web	All missions
Official Document System	All missions
Enterprise Feedback Management System	All missions
Results-oriented management and accountability	All missions
Information and communications technology Security Compliance Site	All missions
Operational Reports Repository	All missions
Call operations management and electronic tracking (COMET)	All missions
Policy practice database	All missions
Knowledge Gateway	All missions
Umoja document repository	All missions
United Nations Force Link	All missions
Notification of casualties (NOTICAS) database	All missions
Videoconference management – Event booking management system	All missions
Board of Inquiry tracker	All missions
Vehicle acquisition system	All missions
Case Management Tracking System	All missions
Incident reporting form	All missions
Telephone billing system (e-billing)	All missions

<i>Software/application</i>	<i>In use by missions</i>
Field access control system (ID card processing)	All missions
Uniformed personnel management systems	All missions
Victim Assistance Tracking System	All missions
Troop- and police-contributing countries tracking database (Security Council resolution <a href="#">2272 (2016)</a> )	All missions
Database of Crimes Against Peacekeepers (Security Council resolution <a href="#">2589 (2021)</a> )	All missions
Aircraft information management system	All missions
Check in/Check out systems	All missions
Accommodation management system	All missions
Cargo movement systems	All missions
Education grant intake module	All missions
Leave management for United Nations Volunteers and contractors	All missions
Passenger movement systems	All missions
National police recruitment system	MINUSCA
Reporting, analytics and business intelligence reporting tools and dashboards	All missions
Unite Aware	Complete version – MINUSCA and UNFICYP; Medical version – UNMISS and MINUSMA, in addition to MINUSCA
Enterprise – Office 365 Suite	All missions
Enterprise – Umoja	All missions
Field Remote Infrastructure Management (FRIM)	UNICTF (Valencia), UNISFA, UNGSC (Brindisi), MONUSCO, RSCE, UNAMI, UNFICYP, UNHQ, UNMIK, UNSOS, UNIFIL, MINUSCA, MINUSMA, UNMOGIP, UNAMA, UNMISS, UNITAMS, UNDP
Unite GeoPortal	All missions