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Proposed programme budget for 2023

Proposed programme budget for 2023

Part II

Political affairs

Section 3

Political affairs

Special political missions

Estimates in respect of special political missions

Second report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions on the proposed programme budget for 2023

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* [A/77/150](#).



Special political missions

Thematic cluster I

Special and personal envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General

Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus

Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide

Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#)

United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar

Thematic cluster II

Sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels, and other entities and mechanisms

Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Panel of Experts on the Sudan

Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Panel of Experts on Libya

Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic

Panel of Experts on Yemen

Panel of Experts on South Sudan

Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolutions [1526 \(2004\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities

Office of the Ombudsperson established pursuant to resolution [1904 \(2009\)](#)

Implementation of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)

Panel of Experts on Mali

Panel of Experts on Somalia

Support to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) on the non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction

Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate

United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (UNITAD)

Thematic cluster III**Regional offices, offices in support of political processes and other missions**

United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS)

United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)

United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia

United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission

Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon

United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA)

United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)

United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia

United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA)

United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH)

United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS)

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)

United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)

I. Introduction

1. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has considered an advance version of the report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions ([A/77/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1](#)). During its consideration of the report, the Committee met with representatives of the Secretary-General, who provided additional information and clarification, concluding with written responses received on 29 July 2022.

2. The Secretary-General, in addendum 1 to section 3, Political affairs, of his report on the proposed programme budget for 2023 ([A/77/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1](#)), provides an overview of the proposed resource requirements for 2023 for 38 special political missions and related cross-cutting issues. Detailed information in respect of each special political mission is contained in five addenda to section 3 of the proposed programme budget.¹ The addenda cover the specific requirements for thematic clusters I to III, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI).

3. The resource requirements of the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar (cluster I), whose mandate emanates from the General Assembly, are included in the report of the Secretary-General under cluster I, in order to consolidate the overall resource requirements for all special political missions, while the mandate of the Office will be brought to the attention of the Assembly, in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the Assembly.

4. In the present report, the Advisory Committee addresses issues of a cross-cutting nature pertaining to special political missions for which budgetary requirements are requested by the Secretary-General for 2023, while its specific comments and recommendations relating to the budget proposals for thematic clusters I to III, UNAMA and UNAMI are presented in separate related reports.²

Status of mission mandates

5. The status of the 38 missions for which budgetary requirements are requested by the Secretary-General for 2023 are contained in his report ([A/77/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1](#), para. 5). Taking into account recent decisions on mandate extensions by the Security Council, the status of the mandates of the missions are as follows:

- (a) 12 missions have open-ended mandates;
- (b) 12 missions have mandates renewed or extended into 2023 or later;
- (c) 14 missions have mandates that are anticipated to be extended into 2023 or later.

Budgeting for special political missions

6. The Advisory Committee recalls that, with the change from the biennial to the annual programme budget on a trial basis (see [A/74/7/Add.1](#), paras. 6–10), the total resource requirements of special political missions are now derived from the actual resource estimates of the individual missions (contained in addenda 2–6 to section 3 of the proposed programme budget for 2023), which are included within the overall resource level proposed for 2023 by the Secretary-General (see [A/77/6 \(Introduction\)](#)).

¹ [A/77/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.2](#), [A/77/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.3](#), [A/77/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.4](#), [A/77/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.5](#) and [A/77/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.6](#).

² [A/77/7/Add.2](#), [A/77/7/Add.3](#), [A/77/7/Add.4](#), [A/77/7/Add.5](#) and [A/77/7/Add.6](#).

7. In its first report on the proposed programme budget for 2023 (see [A/77/7](#), chap. I), the Advisory Committee makes comments and recommendations, including on the budget methodology, format and presentation, as well as on policy matters, which also apply to the reports of the Secretary-General on the estimates in respect of special political missions ([A/77/6 \(Sect.3\)/Add.1](#)–6).

II. Overview of resource requirements for 2023

A. Budget performance for 2021 and 2022

8. Total expenditure for 2021 amounted to \$666,604,800 (or 91.3 per cent) against the approved resources of \$730,359,800 for 40 special political missions (38 continuing and 2 discontinued missions). Excluding the two discontinued missions, expenditure for the 38 continuing missions amounted to \$661,253,800 (or 91.6 per cent) against the provision of \$721,866,900 for the year. The Advisory Committee notes that underexpenditure for the continuing 38 missions amounted to \$60,613,100 (or 8.4 per cent). Information on expenditure for 2021, by mission and by major component, is provided in tables 7 and 8 of the report of the Secretary-General ([A/77/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1](#)).

9. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee received information on the budget performance for the first six months of 2022 for the special political missions. As at 30 June 2022, expenditure amounted to \$398,690,500 (or 66 per cent) against the appropriation of \$603,377,000 for the period (see para. 11 below). **The Advisory Committee trusts that updated information on the actual budget performance, including information by mission and by major component, will be provided to the General Assembly at the time of its consideration of the present report.**

B. Resource requirements for 2023

10. The overall resource requirements proposed for 38 special political missions for 2023 amount to \$767,075,300 net, inclusive of an estimated provision of \$2,144,300 for the share of special political missions in the budget of the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda (see paras. 12 and 13 below). The summary of requirements by cluster, by mission and by major component are presented in tables 5 to 8 of the report of the Secretary-General. Resource changes for 2023 by thematic cluster are explained in paragraphs 123 to 127 of the report.

11. The overall resource level of \$767,075,300 proposed for 2023 for 38 special political missions represents an increase of \$161,878,100 (or 26.7 per cent), compared with the resources of \$605,197,200 approved for 37 missions for 2022. As explained in notes b and c to table 5 of the report of the Secretary-General, in accordance with established practice, the approved resources of \$603,377,000 (excluding the provision for the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe) for 2022 do not include commitments for the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) (\$17,945,500) and UNAMA) (\$107,636,800) for 2022, for which no appropriations had yet been made. In addition, the Secretary-General has submitted revised estimates in an amount of \$133,609,900 for UNAMA for 2022 ([A/76/6 \(Sect.3\)/Add.9](#)) and the comments and recommendations of the Advisory Committee thereon are contained in its related report ([A/76/7/Add.41](#)). For the purpose of comparison only, taking into account the two commitments totalling \$125,582,300, the resources for 2022 would amount to \$728,959,300; the proposed resources for 2023 would represent an increase of \$38,116,000 (or 5.2 per cent). **The Advisory Committee notes that, subject to the approval by the General Assembly of appropriations for 2022 for UNAMA and**

UNSMIL, the overall level of appropriation for the special political missions would be increased for 2022. Consequently, an analysis between the resources approved for 2022 and the requirements proposed for 2023, at this stage, is subject to change.

12. Concerning the estimated provision for the share of special political missions in the budget of the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe for the 2022/23 peacekeeping financial period, it is indicated that the estimated provision of \$2,144,300 represents an increase of \$324,100 (or 17.8 per cent) attributable to the increase in the share of special political missions of the costs of the Centre (from 4.3 per cent for the 2021/22 period to 5.1 per cent for the 2022/23 period), and other factors as explained in the report of the Secretary-General, including the increase in the costs of international and national staff ([A/77/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1](#), para. 129). The estimated provision is subject to a final adjustment to be made in accordance with the decision of the General Assembly in the context of the budget of the Regional Service Centre for the 2022/23 peacekeeping financial period (*ibid.*, para. 56).

13. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that nine special political missions based in Africa³ receive support from the Regional Service Centre. In keeping with existing practice, the costs of the Centre are apportioned on a pro rata basis among the budgets of its active client missions (see also para. 54 below). The estimated provision of \$2,144,300 was included in the proposed programme budget for 2023 for the collective share of the nine special political missions, which is centrally presented in the main report of the Secretary-General (no such provisions are included in the respective budgets of the nine missions). The Committee was further informed that, pursuant to paragraph 7 (c) of General Assembly resolution [76/278](#), the share borne by the special political missions for 2023 amounts to \$2,141,100, reflecting a decrease of \$3,200 compared with the estimated provision of \$2,144,300. **The Advisory Committee therefore recommends a reduction of \$3,200 in the proposed estimates for 2023 for the share of special political missions in the budget of the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe.**

Staffing requirements for 2023

14. The proposed resources of \$462,227,800 for 2023 for civilian personnel represent an increase of \$117,336,900 (or 34 per cent), compared with the appropriation for 2022 (see para. 11 above). The number of civilian personnel proposed for 2023 reflects a net decrease of 39 positions (from 4,661 for 2022 to 4,622 for 2023), representing a total reduction of 59 positions (1 in cluster I, 27 in UNAMA and 31 in UNAMI), offset in part by a total increase of 20 positions (1 in cluster II and 19 in cluster III) ([A/77/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1](#), Table 9). A breakdown of the proposed changes in civilian positions for 2023 is provided in annex XVIII to the report of the Secretary-General, while information on the staffing requirements for each mission is contained in table 10 of the report.

15. With regard to the policy on evaluation in the United Nations Secretariat promulgated in administrative instruction [ST/AI/2021/3](#), upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that entities are required to develop their own evaluation policy and dedicated capacity, and that that process was ongoing. The precise needs

³ Comprising two missions in cluster I (the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa); one mission in cluster II (the Panel of Experts on Somalia), and six missions in cluster III (United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS), United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)).

and capacity requirements for the evaluation function differ from mission to mission. While the evaluation-related responsibilities for most special political missions will rest with designated focal points (usually within the Office of the Chief of Staff, in addition to existing duties and responsibilities), it may not be feasible to add such responsibilities to the portfolio of existing staff members for some larger missions, given their overall capacity constraints, and consequently, additional positions may be proposed. This is the case with respect to the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), for which a P-2 post of Associate Evaluation Officer is proposed for 2023 (see [A/77/7/Add.4](#)).

16. The comments and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on the proposed staffing requirements for individual missions are contained in its related reports ([A/77/7/Add.2–6](#)).

Budgeting for the positions of double- or triple-hatted Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and related support capacity in integrated missions

17. The Advisory Committee discussed matters related to the budgeting for the positions of double- or triple-hatted Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and related support capacity in integrated missions (see [A/76/7/Add.1](#), paras. 20–25; [A/75/7/Add.2](#), paras. 21–23; [A/74/7/Add.1](#), paras. 26–34). It is indicated that, in response to the recommendation of the Committee ([A/76/7/Add.38](#), para. 23), the Secretary-General, with the involvement of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Department of Peace Operations, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the Development Coordination Office, has reviewed the overall funding arrangements pertaining to the financing of multi-hatted Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, as well as the staffing capacity in their respective offices in the seven integrated special political missions (United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH), Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, UNAMA, UNAMI, United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS), UNSMIL and UNSOM) and peacekeeping operations concerned ([A/77/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1](#), paras. 78–85). The review concluded that, notwithstanding the move of the funding source of the 50 per cent of the cost of the multi-hatted Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) to the resident coordinator system managed by the Development Coordination Office as part of the Secretariat, the cost-sharing concept, principle and arrangement have not only remained valid and relevant, but are also an equitable, sustainable and effective way to ensure that the intents and purposes of the integrated mission concept are manifested and achieved. The review also found that the staffing and capacities in the related offices continue to be required in order to respond to country-specific needs and the mandated tasks entrusted to the missions by the legislative bodies in the area of development coordination.

18. The Advisory Committee received, upon request, an update to the table contained in its previous report ([A/76/7/Add.1](#), table 3), with information showing current and proposed support staff capacity in the Offices of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Deputy Special Coordinator) in the seven integrated special political missions in which the Deputy Special Representative/Deputy Special Coordinator is double- or triple-hatted as Resident Coordinator and/or Humanitarian Coordinator, along with information on member organizations of the United Nations country teams and their international staff (see table 1).

Table 1

Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator in integrated missions

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Special political mission resources for Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator</i>	<i>Member organizations of the United Nations country team under the leadership of the resident coordinator</i>	<i>Number and grade levels of the staff members of these organizations in the country team</i>
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia	Approved 2022: 2 (1 P-4, 1 FS) +1 additional P-4 (Environmental) and +1 P-3 (Programme Management) proposed for establishment in the 2023 budget	DSS, FAO, IFAD, ILO, IOM, OCHA, OHCHR, UNCDF, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN-Habitat, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNMAS, UNODC, UNOPS, UNV, UN-Women, WFP, WHO, World Bank	24 representatives of country team organizations (6 D-2, 6 D-1, 7 P-5, 4 P-4 and 1 NPO)
Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon	(See note below)	DSS, ESCWA, FAO, ILO, IOM, OCHA, OHCHR, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN-Habitat, UNHCR, UNIC (Beirut), UNICEF, UNIDO, UNMAS, UNODC, UNOPS, UNRWA, UNSCOL, UNTSO, UNV, UN-Women, WFP, WHO	26 representatives of country team organizations (1 USG, 2 ASG, 4 D-2, 5 D-1, 7 P-5, 3 P-4 and 4 NPO)
United Nations Support Mission in Libya	Approved 2022: 4 (2 P-4, 1 FS, 1 NPO)	FAO, UNDP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN-Habitat, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNODC, UNOPS, UNV, UN-Women, WFP, WHO, World Bank	19 representatives of country team organizations (15 D-1, 4 P-5)
United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti	Approved 2022: 2 (1 P-4, 1 FS)	DSS, FAO, IFAD, ILO, IMF, IOM, OCHA, OHCHR, PAHO/WHO, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNOPS, UN-Women, WFP, World Bank	20 representatives of country team organizations (9 D-1, 1 P-6, 8 P-5, 1 P-4 and 1 NPO)
United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan	Approved 2022: 5 (1 P-5, 2 P-4, 1 FS, 1 NPO) +1 additional P-5 (Coordination) proposed for establishment in the 2023 budget	DSS, FAO, IAEA, IFAD, ILO, IMF, IOM, OCHA, OHCHR, UNAIDS, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN-Habitat, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNMAS, UNODC, UNOPS, UNV, UN-Women, WFP, WHO	25 representatives of country team organizations (4 D-2, 6 D-1, 8 P-5, 1 P-4, 1 P-3, 5 NPO)

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Special political mission resources for Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator</i>	<i>Member organizations of the United Nations country team under the leadership of the resident coordinator</i>	<i>Number and grade levels of the staff members of these organizations in the country team</i>
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	<p>Approved 2022: 3 (1 P-3, 1 NPO, 1 LL)</p> <p>+1 D-1 (Coordination) proposed for reassignment from existing mission staffing resources in the revised 2022 budget</p> <p>+1 NPO (Coordination) proposed for establishment in the 2023 budget</p>	FAO, IFAD, ILO, IOM, ITC, OCHA, UNAIDS, UNCTAD, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN-Habitat, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNIDO, UNITAR, UNMAS, UNODC, UNOPS, UN-Women, WFP, WHO, World Bank	24 representatives of country team organizations (5 D-2, 10 D-1, 6 P-5, 1 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 NPO)
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq	Approved 2022: 3 (1 P-4, 1 FS, 1 LL)	DSS, ESCWA, FAO, IFC, ILO, IMF, IOM, ITC, OCHA, OHCHR, UNCTAD, UNDP, UNEP, UNESCO, UNFPA, UN-Habitat, UNHCR, UNICEF, UNMAS, UNODC, UNOPS, UN-Women, WFP, WHO, World Bank	25 representatives of country team organizations (3 D-2, 11 D-1, 1 P-6, 8 P-5, 2 P-3)

Note: The Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon does not have an Office of the Deputy Special Coordinator. Given that the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator is a “single pillar” mission, the Deputy Special Coordinator is integrated into the front office of the Special Coordinator insofar as her mission functions (including office re-in-charge) are concerned. In this context, the mission’s Coordination Unit, as with its other units, supports both the Special Coordinator and the Deputy Special Coordinator, according to their joint mission requirements. The coordination officers of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator focus on political files that require coordination with members of the United Nations country team and the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, and with external interlocutors, such as embassies and government institutions. For non-mission resident coordinator and humanitarian coordinator functions, the Deputy Special Coordinator/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator is supported by the Resident Coordinator Office and the offices of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs that are not part of the structure of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator.

Abbreviations: ASG, Assistant Secretary-General; DSS, Department of Safety and Security; ESCWA, Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations; FS, Field Service; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IFAD, International Fund for Agricultural Development; IFC, International Finance Corporation; ILO, International Labour Organization; IOM, International Organization for Migration; ITC, International Trade Centre; LL, local level; NPO, National Professional Officer; OHCHR, Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Human Rights; OCHA, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; PAHO/WHO, Pan American Health Organization; UNAIDS, Joint United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS; UNCDF, United Nations Capital Development Fund; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNDP, United Nations Development Programme; UNEP, United Nations Environment Programme; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNFPA, United Nations Population Fund; UN-Habitat, United Nations Human Settlements Programme; UNHCR, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; UNIC (Beirut), United Nations information centre in Beirut; UNICEF, United Nations Children’s Fund; UNIDO, United Nations Industrial Development Organization; UNITAR, United Nations Institute for Training and Research; UNMAS, Mine Action Service; UNODC, United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime; UNOPS, United Nations Office for Project Services; UNRWA, United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East; UNSCOL, Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon; USG, Under-Secretary-General; UNTSO, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization; UNV, United Nations Volunteers; UN-Women, United Nations Entity for Gender and the Empowerment of Women; WFP, World Food Programme; WHO, World Health Organization.

19. As reflected in table 1, it is proposed to establish four positions for 2023 in the offices of double- or triple-hatted Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General, as follows: two positions (1 P-4 and 1 P-3) in UNSOM, one position (1 P-5) in UNITAMS and one position (1 NPO) in UNAMA, with the proposed reassignment of one D-1 position in UNAMA. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that, in countries where special political missions are deployed, while the presence of the United Nations system varies from country to country, it is geared towards supporting host countries in the achievement of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Specific areas of emphasis in the cooperation and support provided by the United Nations system in host countries are best reflected in the respective United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Frameworks signed between the United Nations and the host country. The Committee's recommendations on the proposed staffing changes in the offices of double- or triple-hatted Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General of the integrated special political missions are contained in its related reports ([A/77/7/Add.4–6](#)).

20. **The Advisory Committee recalls that in its resolution 75/253 A (section XVIII), the General Assembly endorsed its recommendation and requested the Secretary-General to continue to review, and adjust as appropriate, the relevant organizational structures and support capacity in the offices of the Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General in the integrated special political missions. The Committee reiterates that the Secretary-General should ensure that the arrangements proposed for the double- or triple-hatted Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and the related support capacity in the integrated missions are consistent with the provisions of General Assembly resolution 72/279 ([A/76/7/Add.1](#), para. 25; [A/75/7/Add.2](#), para. 23; [A/74/7/Add.1](#), para. 34).**

21. In response to the recommendation of the Advisory Committee ([A/76/7/Add.1](#), para. 26), information, including lessons learned, on the transfer of functions of closed special political missions to the resident coordinator system is provided in paragraphs 41 to 49 of the report of the Secretary-General. Such lessons include the continuity of leadership and of engagement of stakeholders, the integration of core functions of closing missions into the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework and the roles played by regional special political missions. Upon enquiry, the Committee was informed that when field missions – whether special political missions or peacekeeping operations – close, challenges often remain with respect to sustaining peace and many of the challenges are political in nature. Recognizing this, the United Nations presents a vision for the transition process that aims to ensure meaningful political engagement, including by fostering national ownership of the transition, beyond mission withdrawal. In this context, lessons learned from the closure of special political missions and peacekeeping operations are critical and mutually relevant.

Mine action activities and budgeting positions under special political missions

22. The Secretary-General indicates that the Mine Action Service has taken significant steps to address the findings of the Board of Auditors and engaged a consulting firm to undertake an independent review of the cost-effectiveness of the mine action delivery model. Given that the Mine Action Service is the service provider to all Secretariat entities on mine action, the review covers peacekeeping operations, special political missions and non-mission settings. The review will assess the cost-effectiveness of the current Mine Action Service-United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) partnership and identify opportunities for improvement and alternative delivery models using the current performance as the baseline. It is indicated that the review will be concluded in September 2022 and that its findings

will be presented to the General Assembly at its seventy-seventh session (A/77/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1, paras. 86–94).

23. The Advisory Committee recalls that four positions⁴ of mine action programme manager that were previously under UNOPS contracts are now established on the staffing tables of the respective special political missions for 2022. In response to the recommendation of the Committee contained in its previous report (A/76/7/Add.1, para. 29), the Secretary-General indicates that the mine action programmes, including staffing requirements and management levels in the four special political missions, have been reviewed. The review has confirmed that the staffing requirements are appropriate for UNSOM, UNSMIL, United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) and UNITAMS (A/77/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.1, para. 90). Upon enquiry, the Committee was informed that the positions of Chief of Mine Action Programme in UNSMIL, UNMHA and UNITAMS had been filled by Secretariat-contracted staff members since 1 July 2021, following the approach of the “lift and shift” in relation to the previous programme managers contracted by UNOPS. For the D-1 position in UNSOM, upon the approval of its establishment on 1 January 2022, UNSOM proceeded with the recruitment process and it was anticipated that the position would be filled in September 2022.

24. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was also provided with information on mine action resources proposed for 2023 (see table 2).

Table 2

Proposed mine action resources for 2023

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Special political mission	Regular budget – civilian personnel, Chief, Mine Action Programme posts	Other supplies, services and equipment – mine detection and mine clearing services			Total
		Personnel and other operating costs	UNOPS fees	Total budget	
UNSOM	260.1	733.1	42.4	775.5	1 035.6
UNSMIL	190.8	1 475.9	119.5	1 595.4	1 786.2
UNMHA	153.2	–	–	–	153.2
UNITAMS	211.2	1 713.9	138.1	1 852.0	2 063.2
UNAMA ^a	233.8	136.5	11.1	147.6	381.4

Abbreviations: UNAMA, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan; UNITAMS, United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan; UNMHA, United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement; UNSMIL, United Nations Support Mission in Libya; UNSOM, United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia.

^a In its resolution 2626 (2022), the Security Council mandated UNAMA to improve the overall security situation in Afghanistan through assessments of the explosive ordnance threat and its impact on civilians, including children, and the provision of advice on and coordination of explosive ordnance threat mitigation measures in support of humanitarian and development initiatives. Therefore, one Senior Programme Management Officer, Mine Action (P-5) position is proposed as a reassignment of one Senior Judicial Affairs Officer (P-5) position in UNAMA in the revised proposed budget for 2022 (A/76/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.9). The budgeted amount shown in table 2 reflects the full year cost in 2023 for the continuation of that position, should the proposal be approved.

25. With respect to the cost-sharing of a P-4 position of Programme Management Officer in the Mine Action Service, between the budgets of the peacekeeping support account and special political missions (A/76/808, para. 45), upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the General Assembly had endorsed the

⁴ 1 D-1 in UNSOM, 1 P-5 in UNSMIL, 1 P-4 in United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) and 1 P-4 in UNITAMS.

recommendation of the Committee in its resolution [76/279](#); however, given that there is no provision for this requirement in either the approved budget for 2022 or the proposal for special political missions for 2023, the Secretariat was evaluating options to implement the resolution. **The Advisory Committee trusts that the Secretariat will update the General Assembly on the cost-sharing of the P-4 position of Programme Management Officer in the Mine Action Service by the special political missions during its consideration of the present report.**

Nationalization of positions

26. The Secretary-General indicates that special political missions have made steady progress in the nationalization of positions in recent years, with 12 positions nationalized in 2016, 1 in 2017, 2 in 2018, 5 in 2019, 7 in 2020, 4 in 2021 and 19 in 2022. For 2023, a total of 9 positions are proposed for nationalization, comprising the following: 1 position in the Office of the Special Envoy for Yemen, 1 in the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (UNITAD), 1 in the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon and 6 in UNAMI ([A/77/6 \(Sect.3\)/Add.1](#), para. 69).

27. Furthermore, the Department of Operational Support issued a guide on planning the nationalization of the workforce in December 2021, which builds on the guidelines on nationalization in peace operations issued by the former Department of Field Support in October 2018 (*ibid.*, para. 68). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the new guide offers an expanded perspective on the approach to nationalization and provides a consistent and uniformed approach to nationalization across all entities. In the preparation of the guide, the Department had liaised with many entities, including peacekeeping operations, special political missions, service centres, regional commissions, and also with United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), to collect different perspectives on the nationalization of positions.

28. **The Advisory Committee welcomes the issuance of the workforce planning nationalization guide by the Secretariat and trusts that progress in the implementation of the guide will be reported on in the context of future budget submissions. The Committee has recognized the progress in the nationalization of international positions in special political missions and trusts that continued efforts will be made. The Committee recalls that, further to its resolutions [61/276](#) and [66/264](#), the General Assembly, in its resolution [74/263](#), requested the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to promote the nationalization of positions, whenever appropriate, as well as to build local capacity within the special political missions and to report thereon in the context of future budget submissions ([A/76/7/Add.1](#), para. 31).** The Committee makes comments and recommendations on nationalization with respect to individual missions in its related reports (see [A/77/7/Add.2–6](#)).

Vacant positions

29. The Secretary-General indicates that, since May 2021, recruitment activities, which initially resumed in a gradual manner owing to remaining uncertainties, have accelerated in 2022 to fill vacant positions, especially long-vacant positions. During the preparation of the proposed programme budget for 2023, special political missions critically reviewed vacant positions, with proposals to abolish some of them ([A/77/6 \(Sect.3\)/Add.1](#), paras. 137–139). The Advisory Committee notes the higher number of long-vacant positions, for instance 103 such positions in cluster III missions (the majority within UNSMIL), as well as long-vacant positions particularly at the national level, such as at UNAMI (27 of the 31 long-vacant positions were national

positions) (A/77/7/Add.4, paras. 24 and 48; A/77/7/Add.6, para. 18). **The Advisory Committee reiterates that vacant positions should be filled expeditiously and trusts that updated information on the recruitment status of all vacant positions will be provided to the General Assembly during the consideration of the present report and related reports on special political missions, as well as in the next budget submission (A/76/7/Add.1, para. 35).** The Committee discusses the matter further with respect to individual missions in its related reports (A/77/7/Add.2–6).

Vacancy rates

30. Annex XV to the report of the Secretary-General contains information on vacancy rates by mission, including actual average rates for 2021, budgeted rates for 2022, actual rates as at 30 April 2022 and proposed rates for 2023. The Advisory Committee notes that for cluster III missions, the proposed vacancy rates are not aligned with actual or actual average vacancy rates, with proposed rates under some missions/categories of personnel reflecting higher-than-actual rates, while others reflect lower-than-actual rates (A/77/7/Add.4, para. 49) **The Advisory Committee trusts that further justifications regarding the vacancy rates experienced during 2022 and budgeted for 2023 will be provided to the General Assembly at the time of its consideration of the present report.**

31. On a related matter, the Advisory Committee notes that during 2021, UNAMI maintained a hold on recruitment activities, in part to ensure that the Mission remained within the approved resources for staffing costs for 2022. At UNAMA, one P-4 position, with a staff member encumbering the position in receipt of special post allowance since February 2021, was kept vacant in order to manage vacancy rates. The Committee discusses matters relating to the management of vacant posts and positions and vacancy rates in its first report on the proposed programme budget for 2023 (A/77/7, chap. I).

Special post allowance

32. The Secretary-General indicates that, in keeping with the practice of other sections of the proposed programme budget, information on positions vacant and encumbered through special post allowances for more than one year is included in the supplementary information for each thematic cluster. The Advisory Committee notes from the supplementary information that, of the 38 special political missions, a total of eight positions were encumbered through special post allowance for one year or longer, comprising one for cluster I, three for cluster III, three for UNAMA and one for UNAMI. Of those positions, three had been encumbered through special post allowance for two years or longer, owing to delayed onboarding, temporarily halted recruitment due to uncertainty associated with its mandate extension in the case of UNAMA and the fact that one of the positions had been maintained for a staff member on special leave without pay. **The Advisory Committee emphasizes that the granting of special post allowance is intended as an exceptional and temporary measure and that the related staff rules and policies should be strictly adhered to by the missions.** In its first report on the proposed programme budget for 2023 (see A/77/7, chap. I and section 3), the Committee discusses the granting of special post allowance over extended periods, which, as a policy matter, applies to the special political missions.

Common staff costs

33. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was provided with information regarding common staff costs, including the provision for 2021, expenditures and percentage. The Committee was informed that common staff costs are driven by the profile of staff members, thereby showing variations across missions and across time

for the same mission. For special political and peacekeeping missions, the actual expenditures on common staff costs and net salaries for the recently concluded 12-month period are usually used to calculate the percentage of common staff costs in the proposed budgets adjusted for any anticipated changes in the costs structure, especially for missions in transition. Furthermore, a multi-year comparative analysis and a more detailed analysis by commitment item are used for each mission to determine if there were any substantive or operational reasons for the changes. The Committee was further informed that, as regards the other parts of the regular budget, the Secretariat had explored refined ways of calculating common staff cost provisions and identified a mixed approach, whereby projected common staff costs were calculated on the basis of a percentage of staff salaries in terms of pension contribution, while the calculation of provisions for all other benefits was based on a per-person cost. The Committee was provided with further information on the refined approach applied in the proposed programme budgets for 2022 and 2023 and notes the continuing differences in the calculation of the common staff costs between the regular budget and the special political and peacekeeping missions. The Committee makes further observations in its first report on the proposed programme budget of 2023 (A/77/7, chap. I).

Operational costs for 2023

34. The proposed resources under operational costs amount to \$266,098,800 for 2023, representing an increase of \$45,146,100 (or 20.4 per cent), compared with the provision for 2022 (see para. 11 above). The Advisory Committee discusses cross-cutting issues in the present section, and its specific comments and recommendations on proposed requirements under operational costs for 2023 for individual missions are provided in its related reports (A/77/7/Add.2–6).

35. Upon request, the Advisory Committee received a revised version of table 8 of the report of the Secretary-General, with information on the appropriation for 2021 and 2022, and on expenditures for 2021 and 2022 as at 30 June, respectively. The related information on operational costs contained therein is provided in table 3.

Table 3

Operational costs

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2021		2022		2023	Variance	
	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation	January-June expenditure	Requirement	Amount	Percentage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)=(5)-(3)	(7) = (6)/(3)
Operational costs							
1. Experts	13 367.5	10 041.2	13 450.5	9 256.9	13 571.1	120.6	0.9
2. Consultants and consulting services	3 302.5	1 586.1	2 793.2	1 095.3	3 274.2	481.0	17.2
3. Official travel	14 524.8	11 959.8	12 299.2	7 147.8	14 557.4	2 258.2	18.4
4. Facilities and infrastructure	96 443.1	87 814.3	76 952.7	61 949.5	100 034.6	23 081.9	30.0
5. Ground transportation	8 943.9	9 308.0	8 313.1	5 091.7	9 608.5	1 295.4	15.6
6. Air operations	56 722.4	40 244.3	49 062.6	36 093.7	55 693.9	6 631.3	13.5
7. Marine operations	325.5	313.8	382.9	100.6	298.9	(84.0)	(21.9)
8. Communications and information technology	33 042.2	31 624.7	28 431.7	17 418.4	37 001.2	8 569.5	30.1

Category of expenditure	2021		2022		2023	Variance	
	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation	January-June expenditure	Requirement	Amount	Percentage
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)=(5)-(3)	(7) = (6)/(3)
9. Medical	11 578.1	5 911.9	7 857.8	3 793.7	9 316.4	1 458.6	18.6
10. Other supplies, services and equipment	20 792.8	17 006.2	21 409.0	10 564.1	22 542.6	1 133.6	5.3
11. Quick impact projects	—	—	—	—	200.0	200.0	—
Total, operational costs	259 042.8	215 810.3	220 952.7	152 511.6	266 098.8	45 146.1	20.4

Official travel and compliance with the policy for advance booking of air travel

36. The overall resources proposed for official travel for 2023 amount to \$14,557,400, representing an increase of \$2,258,200 (or 18.4 per cent), compared with the approved resources for 2022 (see para. 11 above). The Advisory Committee notes that the proposed resources for official travel for 2023 reflect the following: (a) small decreases for 7 missions (4 under cluster I and 3 under cluster III); and (b) increases for 11 missions (1 under cluster I, 3 under cluster II and 7 under cluster III, including UNAMI). Information on the proposed official travel resources for 2023, with an explanation of variance by mission and cluster, is contained in annex XIII to the report of the Secretary-General.

37. **The Advisory Committee reiterates its view that, in applying lessons learned from the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, travel for workshops, conferences or meetings should be kept to a minimum and more use should be made of virtual meetings and online training tools (see also A/77/7, chap. I, para. 73; A/76/7/Add.1, para. 40).** The Committee makes specific comments and recommendations relating to travel resources for individual missions in its related reports (A/77/7/Add.2–6).

38. Information on the annual rates of compliance with the 16-day advance booking policy by mission is contained in annex XIV to the report of the Secretary-General. The Advisory Committee has discussed the persistently low rates of compliance with the policy by special political missions (A/76/7/Add.1, para. 41; A/75/7/Add.2, para. 31; A/74/7/Add.1, para. 42; A/73/498, paras. 32–34; A/72/7/Add.10, para. 37; A/71/595, para. 32; and A/70/7/Add.10, para. 37). The Committee notes from annex XIV that for 2021, 6 of the 38 missions reached compliance rates of 50 per cent or higher, compared with 9 for 2020, 5 for 2019, 7 for 2018 and 5 for 2017. The Secretary-General indicates that sustainable advance travel planning has remained a challenge for many missions owing to a number of factors, such as ad hoc COVID-19 restrictions, the need to remain flexible in order to take advantage of the availability of witnesses for interviews and to be able to respond to Government counterparts' requests for meetings and support, as well as the volatile political and security environment in which some of the missions operate (A/77/6 (Sect. 3), paras. 117–119 and annex I).

39. **Noting with concern the persistently low rates of compliance with the 16-day advance booking policy by the special political missions, the Advisory Committee recalls that the General Assembly, in its resolution 74/262, expressed concern at the low rate of compliance with the advance purchase policy directive and requested the Secretary-General to make stronger efforts to further enhance the rate of compliance with the advance purchase policy directive across all travel categories, taking into account the patterns and nature of official travel**

and the reasons for non-compliance by each department, office and field mission (see [A/76/7/Add.1](#), para. 41).

Air operations

40. The proposed resource requirements for air operations amount to \$55,693,900 for 2023, reflecting an overall increase of \$6,631,300 (or 13.5 per cent), compared with the provision approved for 2022 (see para. 11 above). Annex VII to the report of the Secretary-General provides information on air operations resources and flight hours, by mission, from 2021 to 2023. Information on special flights for 2021 and 2022, with justifications, by mission, as well as estimates for 2023, are contained in annex VIII to that report.

41. Of the 14 missions with air operations resources proposed for 2023, 8 missions reflect reduced requirements (the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS), UNSOM, the United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, UNMHA, UNITAMS and UNAMI), while 4 missions (the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, UNITAD, the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) and UNSMIL) propose increased resources. The proposed resources for 1 mission (the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region) remain unchanged for 2023. An amount of \$8,464,000 is proposed for UNAMA for 2023 under air operations. As the Mission does not have appropriation approved for 2022 (see para. 11 above), no comparison is made between the resources for 2022 and 2023.

Communications and information technology

42. The proposed provision under communications and information technology amounts to \$37,001,200 for 2023, representing an increase of \$8,569,500 (or 30.1 per cent), compared with the resources approved for 2022 (see para. 11 above). Annex X to the report of the Secretary-General contains consolidated information on financial and human resources for communications and information technology. Information on the acquisition of satellite imagery, with justifications, is provided in annex IX to the report.

43. As shown in annex X to the report of the Secretary-General, the proposed higher requirements for 2023 reflect the following: (a) proposed increases for 19 missions (7 under cluster I, 2 under cluster II and 10 under cluster III); (b) proposed decreases for 5 missions (2 under cluster II and 3 under cluster III); and (c) the same level of resources proposed for 14 missions (3 under cluster I and 11 under cluster II).

Standard ratios for vehicles and information technology equipment

44. Information on the planned holdings of vehicles and information technology equipment is provided in paragraphs 99 to 104 of the report of the Secretary-General ([A/77/6 \(Sect.3\)/Add.1](#)). It is indicated therein that the holdings of special political missions have been reviewed and aligned, where possible, with the standard ratios promulgated in the Standard Cost and Ratio Manual. The holdings are proposed on the basis of the anticipated personnel incumbency levels planned for 2023, as opposed to the full authorized level of personnel.

45. The overall allocation of vehicles proposed for 2023 is 21.5 per cent above the standard ratio, compared with the lower-than-standard ratios of 2.3 per cent and 10 per cent proposed for 2022 and 2021, respectively, and higher-than-standard ratios of 5.1 per cent and 16.4 per cent for 2020 and 2019, respectively ([A/77/6 \(Sect. 3\)/Add.1](#), table 3; [A/76/7/Add.1](#), para. 47). The Advisory Committee notes

from table 3 of the report of the Secretary-General that the overall higher-than-standard ratio applied for vehicle holdings for 2023 reflects higher-than-standard ratios proposed for nine missions (compared with five for 2022), standard ratios for eight missions (compared with six for 2022) and lower-than-standard ratios for two missions (compared with eight for 2022). Justification for each of the nine missions⁵ with higher-than-standard ratios is provided in paragraph 102 of the report of the Secretary-General.

46. The Advisory Committee also received, upon request, information on actual vehicle holdings by mission. The Committee was informed that the actual holdings of vehicles include all categories of vehicles (such as light passenger vehicles, special purpose vehicles, ambulances and armoured vehicles), while the standard vehicle ratio excludes guard-forces-carrying vehicles, armoured vehicles (except in missions where the security environment requires elevated use of armoured vehicles), utility vehicles, buses, electric carts and vehicles assigned for security and close protection details. Furthermore, the Committee was informed that the Department of Operational Support currently does not have the means to undertake an assessment of the average usage of vehicles by continuously monitoring and analysing their usage data. However, in cooperation with the World Food Programme (WFP) and the Office of the United Nations Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Department is in the process of sourcing an online vehicle tracking system, which is expected to provide visibility over vehicle utilization. The solicitation of the system is anticipated to be closed in October 2022. It was indicated to the Committee that, once the new online system is implemented, the Department would have better visibility over vehicle utilization. **The Advisory Committee trusts that an update on the procurement and operation of a new online vehicle tracking system will be provided in the next budget submissions for peacekeeping operations and special political missions.**

47. The overall allocation of information technology equipment proposed for 2023 is 1.9 per cent higher than the standard ratio, compared with higher-than-standard ratios of 1.5 per cent, 4.6 per cent, 5.6 per cent and 4.9 per cent proposed for 2022, 2021, 2020 and 2019, respectively (see [A/76/7/Add.1](#), para. 48). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the standard allocation of information technology equipment excludes training requirements; however, those requirements are included in the projected holdings.

48. The Advisory Committee notes from table 4 of the report of the Secretary-General that the overall higher-than-standard ratio for 2023 for the holding of information technology equipment reflects the application of the standard ratio for 31 missions (the same number for 2022), higher ratios for 4 missions (compared with 5 for 2022), and lower ratios for 3 missions (compared with 2 for 2022). In response to its comment regarding the absence of specific justifications for the application of higher-than-standard ratios for 2022 for information technology equipment ([A/76/7/Add.1](#), para. 48), justification for each of the 4 missions⁶ with higher-than-standard ratios for 2023 is now provided in paragraph 103 of the report of the Secretary-General.

49. The Advisory Committee notes the inclusion of justification, by mission, for the application of higher-than-standard ratios for information technology equipment for 2023 and trusts that such information will continue to be provided

⁵ United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions, UNITAD, UNSOM, United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, UNSMIL, BINUH, UNAMA and UNAMI.

⁶ Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, UNOWAS and UNSMIL.

in future budget submissions. The Committee reiterates that, as requested by the General Assembly in its resolution 74/263, the Secretary-General should continue to ensure that actual allocations of vehicles and information technology equipment will be regularly reviewed and aligned with the standard ratios, and that specific justification for higher allocations by missions will be provided in the context of future budget submissions (A/76/7/Add.1, para. 49).

Quick-impact projects

50. A provision of \$200,000 is proposed for 2023 under quick-impact projects for UNMHA. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that resources for quick-impact projects had previously been approved as part of the budgets and deliverables of special political missions, notably UNAMA and UNAMI in 2012 and 2013. UNMHA is a special political mission with the deployment of military and police monitors to support ceasefire implementation and monitoring on the ground. The proposed funding would provide a valuable tool to address the challenges experienced by UNMHA with respect to generating and sustaining local confidence in the Mission, while engaging the communities on both sides of the frontline, and in strengthening local participation in the implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement, inclusivity and women's empowerment.

III. General observations and recommendations

Backstopping support to special political missions at Headquarters

51. Information concerning the lead departments and backstopping support positions at Headquarters funded from special political mission budgets is provided in annexes II and III to the report of the Secretary-General. A total of 49 backstopping positions are proposed for 2023, compared with 50 positions approved for 2022, reflecting a decrease of 1 P-4 position in UNITAD due to the proposed redeployment of the position to Baghdad to meet the increasing demand for legal advice in the Mission. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs leads and provides substantive backstopping to 34 of the 38 special political missions.

52. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, as a Headquarters-based office, does not have a lead department, and that UNITAD does not have a lead department at Headquarters given its unique mandate and orientation. As for the delegation of authority for the 38 special political missions, the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs has the delegated authority for the 12 groups and panels of experts under cluster II, as well as the Office of the Special Envoy for the Implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004). For the support to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction, the delegation of authority is under the Office for Disarmament Affairs. For the remaining 24 missions, authority is delegated to the respective head of mission for administrative and resource management, while the lead department continues to provide substantive support and guidance to those missions.

53. The Advisory Committee reiterates its expectation that consolidated information on backstopping positions at Headquarters will continue to be provided in future budget submissions. The Committee continues to believe that the existing backstopping positions at Headquarters should be reviewed annually in order to realign the capacities when changes in the mandates of the missions occur with a view to achieving more efficiency in backstopping support (A/76/7/Add.1, para. 52; see also A/77/7/Add.2-6).

Support services provided by the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda and the Kuwait Joint Support Office

54. The Secretary-General indicates that the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe currently supports nine Africa-based special political missions, six peacekeeping missions and one support office, and the United Nations Office to the African Union (a total of 17 client entities) (A/77/6 (Sect.3)/Add.1, paras. 54 and 55).

55. Background information on the initial establishment of the Kuwait Joint Support Office for UNAMA and UNAMI, the expansion of its client missions and the revised staffing proposal of the Secretary-General for 2023 is provided in paragraphs 57 to 65 of the report of the Secretary-General. According to the Secretary-General, reflecting its growing importance in the landscape of support to field operations, the client base of the Support Office has gradually increased over time. Currently, of its 18 client missions, 8 (3 special political missions and 5 peacekeeping operations) contribute to the staffing costs of the Joint Support Office (see *ibid.*, table 1), with UNAMA and UNAMI providing 72 of the 83 positions (or 87 per cent).

56. It is indicated that the Kuwait Joint Support Office currently serves as a back-office structure that reports to the Department of Operational Support. Under the leadership of the Department, a revised allocation of the current post contributions is proposed for 2023, taking into account the reduced staffing levels in UNAMA and UNAMI and recognizing the significant additional impact of other client missions. While a longer-term funding model for the Support Office requires a more comprehensive proposal for consideration by the General Assembly, an immediate solution seeking a more balanced contribution of staffing costs is proposed for 2023, as a first step towards achieving a better balance among the sources of funding. Specifically, it is proposed that a total of six positions (three positions (1 Field Service and 2 Local level) each in UNAMA and UNAMI) be abolished under the two missions, and the same number of positions (with no change to the functional titles and grade levels) be established under four other client missions: the Office of the Special Envoy for Yemen (1 Field Service), UNITAD (1 Local level), the United Nations Verification Mission for Colombia (1 Local level) and UNMHA (1 Field Service and 2 Local level) (see *ibid.*, table 2). In addition, it is proposed to redeploy one existing position (Field Service) in the Office of the Special Envoy for Syria to the Kuwait Joint Support Office to supplement its staffing capacity (see *ibid.*, table 2). **The Advisory Committee notes that the proposed redistribution of staffing positions for 2023 would increase the contributing missions to the Kuwait Joint Support Office from 8 in 2022 to 13 in 2023 of its 18 client missions.**

57. Information on the current and proposed staffing contributions to the Kuwait Joint Support Office by its client missions is contained in tables 1 and 2 of the report of the Secretary-General. Upon request, the Advisory Committee was provided with a list of contributing missions to the Joint Support Office since its establishment in 2012, with staffing positions and funding sources for each year (see table 4). The Committee was informed that those positions remain within the staffing table of the client missions in accordance with the funding model of the Support Office.

Table 4
Contributing missions to Kuwait Joint Support Office (2012–2022)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Positions</i>	<i>Contributing missions</i>
2012	88	
2013	88	
2014	88	Regular budget: UNAMA and UNAMI
2015	83	
2016	87	
2017	83	Regular budget: UNAMA, UNAMI Peacekeeping operations: UNDOF, UNFICYP, UNIFIL, UNMIK, UNLB
2018	82	Regular budget: UNAMA, UNAMI
2019	83	Peacekeeping operations: MINUJUSTH, UNDOF, UNFICYP, UNIFIL, UNLB, UNMIK
2020	83	Regular budget: UNAMA, UNAMI, BINUH
2021	83	Peacekeeping operations: UNDOF, UNFICYP, UNIFIL, UNLB, UNMIK
2022	83	

Abbreviations: BINUH, United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti; MINUJUSTH, United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti; UNAMA, United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan; UNAMI, United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq; UNDOF, United Nations Disengagement Observer Force; UNFICYP, United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus; UNIFIL, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon; UNLB, United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy; UNMIK, United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo.

58. The Advisory Committee recalls that a similar staffing redistribution proposal was submitted in the proposed budgets for 2019 for special political missions, in which the Secretary-General proposed to redistribute positions funded by UNAMA and UNAMI by reducing a total of 11 positions in UNAMA (5) and UNAMI (6), while adding a total of 9 positions in three other missions for which services were provided by the Support Office (the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen and UNITAD) (see [A/73/498](#), para. 52). **The Advisory Committee further recalls that the General Assembly, in its resolution 73/279 A, decided not to establish or abolish any positions in the Kuwait Joint Support Office (ibid., sect. XIV, para. 12). The Committee recommends against the proposed redistribution of staffing positions in the Kuwait Joint Support Office in the missions concerned for 2023 (see [A/77/7/Add.2–6](#)).**

59. With respect to the functions of the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the Centre is not the designated service provider for the Special Envoy for Yemen and UNMHA, and that it should be noted that the Regional Service Centre was established by the General Assembly in July 2010, in its resolution [64/269](#), specifically to support peacekeeping and special political missions in Africa. The Secretariat has been cautious about extending the geographical scope of the services of the Regional Service Centre to other field missions outside the region without careful assessment and endorsement by the Assembly. **The Advisory Committee notes that, as a shared service centre established by the General Assembly, the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe currently has 17 client entities limited to Africa, while the Kuwait Joint Support Office, which was established by the Secretariat initially for UNAMI and UNAMA only, has become a service provider to support a total of 18 client**

missions⁷ across regions covering Asia, the Middle East, Europe and Latin America and Caribbean, as designated by the Secretariat. Furthermore, the Committee notes the lack of clear criteria in the designation of service providers to peacekeeping and special political missions by the Secretariat (see para. 61 below; and [A/77/7](#), Sect. 29B, para. VIII.49).

60. The Advisory Committee has discussed the provision of support services to the special political missions by the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe and the Kuwait Joint Support Office over the years (see [A/76/7/Add.1](#), para. 62; [A/75/7/Add.2](#) paras. 54 and 55; [A/74/7/Add.1](#), para. 51; and [A/73/498](#), paras. 49–55). The Committee recalls that, pursuant to General Assembly resolution [73/279 A](#), the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe has expanded its full-service coverage to all special political missions based in Africa pending the approval and implementation of a global service delivery model (see also [A/74/7/Add.1](#), para. 15). **The Advisory Committee reiterates that the Kuwait Joint Support Office is not a shared service centre approved by the General Assembly. Furthermore, in accordance with Assembly resolution [70/248 A](#), any changes to the existing and future service delivery model must be approved by the Assembly (see also [A/76/7/Add.1](#), para. 62; [A/75/7/Add.2](#), para. 55; [A/74/7/Add.1](#), para. 51; [A/73/498](#), paras. 54 and 55; [A/72/7/Add.10](#), paras. 56 and 58; and [A/71/595](#), para. 55).**

61. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the Kuwait Joint Support Office would have been affected by the potential introduction of the global service delivery model had it been approved, since that arrangement would likely have subsumed most or all of the functions carried out by the Support Office. The General Assembly's decision to take no action on that proposal presents an opportunity for the Secretariat to develop an improved service delivery concept, taking into account recent changes in the field of service delivery, related technological advances, experience gained by the Secretariat and the present organizational structures. With respect to an improved service delivery concept, the Committee makes a recommendation in its consideration of the proposed programme budget for 2023 that the Assembly request the Secretary-General to present a proposal on the planned improved service delivery concept for the consideration and approval of the Assembly in the context of the next budget submission (see [A/77/7](#), Sect. 29B, para. VIII.49).

Mission support structure

62. As regards the proposal to streamline the mission support structure in UNAMI, upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the two-pillar structure in some special political missions, including UNAMI, is intended as a refinement to enhance effectiveness by making the structure leaner through the merging of related functions. The segregation of duties and responsibilities is ensured by separating transactional sections (procurement, contracts management) from technical sections (see [A/77/7/Add.6](#)). Furthermore, the Committee was informed that the Department of Operational Support is reviewing the mission support structure guiding principles in order to tailor them to special political missions that are smaller than peacekeeping operations, with a view to assisting entities, especially non-peacebuilding or smaller missions, in determining appropriate structures, functions and resources, while

⁷ UNAMA, UNAMI, BINUH, Office of the Special Envoy for Syria, Office of the Special Envoy for Yemen, UNITAD, United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, UNMHA, Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, and UNIFIL, UNDOF, United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon, UNMIK, UNFICYP, United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) and Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process.

maintaining a level of standardization and ensuring the segregation of duties for functions such as procurement. **The Advisory Committee trusts that an update on the review of mission support structure guiding principles for special political missions will be provided in the next budget submission.**

Support provided by host countries

63. Annex V to the main report of the Secretary-General contains information on support provided free of charge by host countries to special political missions, as requested by the Advisory Committee in its previous report ([A/71/595](#), para. 47). **The Advisory Committee welcomes and notes with appreciation the contributions made by the host countries to the special political missions (see [A/76/7/Add.1](#), para. 66).**

Other matters

Gender balance and geographical representation

64. Annex XVI to the report of the Secretary-General contains information on the gender distribution of civilian staff and experts in the special political missions. As at 30 April 2022, female staff represented 27 per cent of the total of civilian personnel, with 52 per cent for positions at the levels of Under-Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-General, 33 per cent for D-1 and D-2 levels, and 27 per cent for P-5 and below. Furthermore, the annex shows that female staff continued to represent less than 50 per cent of civilian personnel in all the field missions under cluster III, including UNAMA and UNAMI, compared with 4 of the 10 missions under cluster I and 4 of the 15 missions under cluster II. **The Advisory Committee notes that in response to its recommendation ([A/76/7/Add.1](#), para. 63) as approved by the General Assembly in its resolution [76/246 A](#), information on positions at the D-1 and D-2 levels and at the levels of Under-Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-General is included under separate groups in the gender distribution of staff.**

65. The report of the Secretary-General includes a new annex (annex XVII) on geographical representation of international civilian staff and experts in the special political missions, in response to the comment of the Advisory Committee ([A/76/7/Add.1](#), para. 64). As at 30 April 2022, of the total of 1,557⁸ international civilian staff, Western European and other States were represented by 497, Africa by 387, Asia and the Pacific by 362, Eastern Europe by 197 and Latin America and the Caribbean by 101. Of the 33 positions at the levels of Under-Secretary-General and Assistant Secretary-General, 14 incumbents were from Western Europe and other States, 10 from Africa, 4 from Asia and the Pacific, 3 from Eastern Europe and 2 from Latin America and the Caribbean. Furthermore, of the 60 positions at the D-1 and D-2 levels, 36 incumbents were from Western Europe and other States. **The Advisory Committee continues to note the disparity in the representation among regional groups, in particular in senior positions at the levels of D-1 up to Under-Secretary-General, for which one regional group represented 50 of the total of 93 positions, or approximately 54 per cent as at 30 April 2022 (increased from 50 per cent as at 31 December 2020), and, relatively, the highest number in international staff composition (see *ibid.*, para. 65).**

66. The Advisory Committee recalls that, in its resolution [75/253 A](#) (sect. XVIII), the General Assembly has requested the Secretary-General to make stronger efforts to improve gender balance and geographical representation in special political missions (see [A/76/7/Add.1](#), para. 65 and

⁸ Includes also 13 staff under the category “Other” (see [A/77/6 \(Sect.3\)/Add.1](#), annex XVII, note c).

[A/75/7/Add.2](#), para. 60). Furthermore, in its resolution [76/246 A](#) (sect. X), the Assembly has also requested the Secretary-General to take measures, including through the recruitment of new staff and by strengthening the accountability framework of the managers, to improve geographical representation and gender balance in all the special political missions and provide an update in future budget submissions, including on geographical representation by nationality (see [A/76/7/Add.1](#), para. 65). In its first report on the proposed programme budget for 2023 ([A/77/7](#), chap. I), the Advisory Committee makes comments and recommendations related to matters of gender balance and geographical representation, which, as policy matters, also apply to the special political missions.

Mission subsistence allowance

67. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee received information on the rates of mission subsistence allowance for 2022 and 2023 (see table 5), as well as the approved resources and expenditure for 2021 and 2022, and the proposed resources for 2023, by mission (see table 6).

Table 5
Mission subsistence allowance rates for 2022 and 2023

(United States dollars)

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Country/area</i>	<i>Proposed programme budget 2022</i>		<i>Proposed programme budget 2023</i>	
		<i>First 30 days</i>	<i>After 30 days</i>	<i>First 30 days</i>	<i>After 30 days</i>
United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel	Senegal	175	175	261	118
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia	Somalia	85	85	201	101
United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission	Senegal	175	175	261	118
United Nations Support Mission in Libya	Libya	128	128	146	65
United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia	Colombia	92	92	119	66
United Nations Mission to Support the Hdaydah Agreement	Yemen	145	83	174	84
United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti	Haiti	216	150	234	140
United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan	Sudan	136	136	146	64.5

Table 6
Resources related to mission subsistence allowance, by mission, covering 2021 to 2023

(United States dollars)

Mission	2021		2022		2023	Variance 2023 vs 2022 appropriation	Explanation for variance 2023 vs 2022
	Appropriation	Expenditure	Appropriation	Expenditure as at 30 June 2022	Proposed		
United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel	121 700	55 448	127 800	30 055	94 700	(33 100)	Lower “after 30 days” rate in 2023
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia	1 052 000	885 142	1 030 200	517 181	1 182 800	152 600	Higher rates in 2023
United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission	60 800	63 875	63 900	31 675	47 400	(16 500)	Lower “after 30 days” rate in 2023
United Nations Support Mission in Libya	186 700	117 508	233 600	70 498	154 600	(79 000)	Lower “after 30 days” rate in 2023
United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia	3 908 700	3 536 020	3 908 700	1 712 578	2 989 200	(919 500)	Lower “after 30 days” rate in 2023
United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement	2 170 500	180 161	1 929 300	69 508	2 006 600	77 300	Higher “first 30 days” rate in 2023
United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti	851 000	795 408	851 000	389 472	808 800	(42 200)	Lower “after 30 days” rate in 2023
United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan	521 200	605 701	1 811 900	493 398	1 898 200	86 300	Lower vacancy rate offset by lower “after 30 days” rate in 2023
Total	8 872 600	6 239 263	9 956 400	3 314 365	9 182 300	(774 100)	

68. The Advisory Committee recalls that in its review of the peacekeeping budgets for the 2022/23 financial period, it was informed that a new methodology had been introduced, in administrative instruction [ST/AI/2021/2](#), for the determination of mission subsistence allowance rates based on actual cost-of-living data collected by the International Civil Service Commission, while the previous methodology had relied on input from recipients of mission subsistence allowance on the ground. Under the new methodology, mission subsistence allowance rates are established for a full calendar year and based on the cost-of-living data applicable on 1 December of the preceding year. The Committee was informed that the differences in terms of reductions or increases in the rates between countries and mission areas were the result of the application of the new methodology ([A/76/760/Add.10](#), para. 15). The Committee discussed the introduction of the new methodology in its report on the cross-cutting issues related to peacekeeping operations ([A/76/760](#), paras. 36–38) and reiterated its recommendation that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to present detailed information on the data and the methodology for the calculation and application of the rates of mission subsistence allowance, along with

the financial implications, for the consideration of Member States in the next peacekeeping overview report and the individual peacekeeping mission budget submissions.

Cost-sharing arrangements

69. Information on cost-sharing arrangements among special political missions and United Nations entities is provided in annex VI to the report of the Secretary-General. In addition, in its review of the mission budgets under thematic cluster III, the Advisory Committee was provided with a table on cost-sharing, with two more columns containing information on budgeted amounts and reasons for cost-sharing. **The Advisory Committee trusts that annex VI to the report of the Secretary-General will be expanded to include the information on budgeted amounts and reasons for cost-sharing in future budget submissions.**

70. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that some of the challenges encountered by missions included partial recovery of costs for the security services, as well as delayed payments, from the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. In addition, when co-location is involved, the lead mission may have to cover the shortfall in operating costs when an entity decides to leave. **The Advisory Committee trusts that more detailed information on the challenges encountered in cost-sharing arrangements by the special political missions and options to address those challenges will be provided in the context of the next budget submission.**

Review of options for full cost-recovery for transfer of assets between field operations

71. The Advisory Committee discussed options for full cost-recovery for the transfer of assets between field operations, with a recommendation contained in the previous report ([A/76/7/Add.1](#), paras. 54–59). The Secretariat presented an analysis, covering transfers from peacekeeping operations that closed during the period from 2012 to 2021, in the context of the overview report of the Secretary-General on the financing of peacekeeping operations ([A/76/717](#), annex X), in which it was indicated that the total quantity of property transferred to special political missions from peacekeeping missions was 2,242 property items, with a net book value of \$4.3 million. The largest transfer occurred during the liquidation of MINUJUSTH to the follow-on political mission BINUH, as part of the transition plan developed in accordance with Security Council resolution [2476 \(2019\)](#) to ensure the continuity of operations in Haiti. The transfer of property, including from peacekeeping operations to special political missions, is a disposal method that occurs during a peacekeeping mission's liquidation in compliance with financial regulation 5.14. With respect to the option of the transfer or redeployment of property on a full recovery basis, under financial rule 105.23 or financial regulation 5.14 (b), respectively, the Secretariat considers that the terms "transfer" or "redeployment" do not imply cost recovery. The Committee will consider the related matters in its review of the overview report for peacekeeping operations.

Format and presentation

72. Concerning the programme planning format and methodology, upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that special political missions adhere to the programme planning format and methodology used in the regular budget. However, a nuanced approach is necessary in order to ensure that the presentation is meaningful. One important fact to consider is that the 38 special political missions that are currently active are quite different in their mandates, activities, staffing level and financial resources (with the smallest mission having a budget less than \$0.5 million,

and the largest mission with a budget of over \$130 million). Such wide variation does not lend itself to setting a predefined number of results to all 38 missions. Nevertheless, in order to ensure overall comparability, efforts have been made in the proposed budget for 2023 according to the following general criteria: (a) for larger missions (UNSOM, UNSMIL, United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, UNITAMS, UNAMA, UNAMI), three results are presented; (b) for medium-sized missions (Special Envoy for Yemen, UNITAD, UNOWAS, Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, BINUH), two results are presented; and (c) for smaller missions (comprising the majority of cluster I and cluster II missions, as well as the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia, United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission and UNOCA), one result is presented. Moreover, the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and the Department for Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance review the budget proposals to ensure accuracy and consistency and ensure that the strategic priorities under the different mandates are taken into account in the respective programme plans.

73. The Advisory Committee was further informed that, for the fact-finding and investigation missions, the Secretariat has explored the option of presenting the missions' deliverables in a quantified manner. However, it was soon realized that a majority of fact-finding and investigation missions are often ad hoc and cannot be planned in advance with specific numbers envisaged to be attained. For example, in cluster II, the Chairs of sanctions committees may conduct visits to relevant regions and countries in order to undertake consultations with Member States, including neighbouring and concerned Member States, to gain a first-hand understanding of sanctions implementation, or achieve other goals which may be identified by the Chair and agreed upon by Committees. Such visits are conducted on an ad hoc basis. Furthermore, the number of Committees that conducted such visits varied, ranging between 2 and 9 Committees in the five years prior to the COVID-19 pandemic. The number of visits also varied, with one Committee conducting only a single visit in five years, while others had three or nine visits within the same period. In addition, the travel of the Chairs themselves is funded from section 3, Political affairs, of the programme budget, and not under the special political missions. For the reasons outlined above, it is considered appropriate to present the deliverables for the missions of sanctions committees in the current format. The Committee discusses the presentation of deliverables in its first report on the proposed programme budget for 2023 ([A/77/7](#), chap. I, para. 11).

74. The Advisory Committee was informed that, guided by the recommendations of the Committee (see [A/76/7/Add.1](#), para. 69), the Secretariat continues its efforts to further improve the content, format and presentation of the budget proposals of special political missions. In the budget proposals for 2023, improvements include the standardization of the organizational charts and the inclusion of the following: a new annex on geographical representation and gender distribution data for positions at the D-1 level and above of civilian personnel in all the missions; mission-specific explanations for instances where the holdings of computing devices (in addition to vehicles) deviate from the standard allocation ratio; and a new annex in the supplementary information on strategic workforce planning undertaken by missions that informed proposals for position changes, nationalization and adjustment to staffing structure. The Committee has noted the efforts made over the years to improve the format and presentation of the budget proposals of special political missions (see [A/76/7/Add.1](#), para. 69; [A/72/7/Add.10](#), para. 51; [A/70/7/Add.10](#), para. 46). **The Advisory Committee acknowledges the latest improvements to the presentation of the budget proposals of special political missions, including the information on strategic workforce planning by missions, and trusts that such efforts will continue in future budget submissions.**

IV. Conclusion

75. As indicated in paragraph 6 above, the total resource requirements of the 38 special political missions (contained in addenda 1–6 to section 3 of the proposed programme budget for 2023) are included within the overall resource level proposed by the Secretary-General for the proposed programme budget for 2023. **The Advisory Committee therefore notes that its recommendation in paragraph 13 above and those pertaining to the budget proposals for 2023 for the individual missions under thematic clusters I to III, UNAMA and UNAMI, which are presented in separate related reports (A/77/7/Add.2–6), would require adjustments to the overall resource level proposed by the Secretary-General for the proposed programme budget for 2023 (see A/77/6 (Introduction)).**
