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Proposed programme budget for 2023

Proposed programme budget for 2023

Part II

Political affairs

Section 3

Political affairs

Special political missions

Thematic cluster I: special and personal envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General

Summary

The present report contains the proposed resource requirements for 2023 for 10 special political missions grouped under the thematic cluster of special and personal envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General.

The proposed resource requirements for 2023 for special political missions grouped under this cluster amount to \$50,779,400 (net of staff assessment).

* Reissued for technical reasons on 6 October 2022.

** [A/77/50](#).



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** The part consisting of the proposed programme plan for 2023 is submitted for the consideration of the General Assembly in accordance with the established budgetary procedures and practices reaffirmed in paragraph 13 of resolution [72/266 A](#).

*** In keeping with paragraph 11 of resolution [72/266 A](#), the part consisting of the post and non-post resource requirements is submitted through the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions for the consideration of the General Assembly.

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I. Financial overview

1. The proposed resource requirements for 2023 for the 10 special political missions grouped under thematic cluster I amount to \$50,779,400 (net of staff assessment). Table 1 provides a comparison between the resources proposed for 2023 and the resources for 2022 as approved by the General Assembly in its resolution 76/246 A.

Table 1

Resource requirements

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2021	2022	2023		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent	2023 vs. 2022 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus	2 745.9	2 955.0	3 050.7	–	95.7
Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide	2 094.5	2 698.3	2 820.4	–	122.1
Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara	109.6	476.5	477.5	–	1.0
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)	335.2	338.6	376.6	–	38.0
Office of the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions	1 757.8	2 045.0	1 987.9	–	(57.1)
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria	11 928.0	16 132.6	15 565.7	–	(566.9)
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa	1 594.9	1 763.6	1 921.0	62.7	157.4
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region	4 202.4	5 133.9	5 740.4	–	606.5
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen	16 726.3	17 202.0	17 430.6	–	228.6
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar	1 184.0	1 153.5	1 408.6	–	255.1
Total	42 678.6	49 899.0	50 779.4	62.7	880.4

2. For the sake of brevity, the present document will include a section on extrabudgetary resources only for those missions that have projected extrabudgetary resources in 2022 or 2023.

II. Special political missions

Cross-cutting information

Gender perspective

3. Special political missions are guided by Security Council resolutions [1325 \(2000\)](#), [1820 \(2008\)](#), [1888 \(2009\)](#), [1889 \(2009\)](#), [1960 \(2010\)](#), [2106 \(2013\)](#), [2122 \(2013\)](#), [2242 \(2015\)](#), [2467 \(2019\)](#) and [2493 \(2019\)](#), which together constitute the women and peace and security agenda and mandate the incorporation of a gender perspective into the political work of the United Nations, including in special political missions. The missions are also guided by General Assembly resolution [75/100](#) on the comprehensive review of special political missions, in which the Assembly reaffirmed the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding and recognized the importance of the equal and effective participation and the full involvement of women at all levels, at all stages and in all aspects of the peaceful settlement of disputes, conflict prevention and conflict resolution.
4. Specific examples of how special political missions integrate a gender perspective into their operational activities, deliverables and results are given under the individual missions in the present report.

Disability inclusion

5. In line with the United Nations Disability Inclusion Strategy, special political missions review the Strategy with a view to further advancing disability inclusion through inclusive messaging, awareness-raising and promoting the Strategy through their work, including in political and peace processes. The missions also support mitigating measures to overcome accessibility challenges, in addition to the efforts by relevant United Nations entities to ensure the accessibility of facilities, platforms, security and other infrastructure to facilitate easy access and use by persons with disabilities.

Evaluation activities

6. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs will support the biennial assessment by the Office of Internal Oversight Services on strengthening the role of evaluation and the application of evaluation findings on programme design, delivery and policy directives. Mission-specific evaluation activities are described, as applicable, under the specific missions in the present report.

Impact of the pandemic

7. The continuation of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic into 2021 had an impact on the implementation of mandates in the special political missions. Specific examples are provided under the individual missions in the present report.
8. Reflecting the importance of continuous improvement and responding to the needs and requests of Member States, the proposed programme plans for the special political missions for 2023 continue to incorporate lessons learned and best practices related to the adjustments to and adaptation of the programme owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same time, it is assumed that those operational conditions have improved and allow for mandate implementation through formerly established approaches. Any modifications to planned deliverables would be in pursuance of the objectives, strategies and mandates and would be reported as part of the programme performance information.

1. Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus

(\$3,050,700)

Foreword

In December 2021, I assumed the function of Deputy Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders both expressed to me their wish for continued engagement and their support for confidence- and trust-building activities. To that end, their agreement in January 2022 on the action plan on ways to ensure women's full, equal and meaningful participation in the settlement process/an eventual settlement process in Cyprus was an encouraging development, as was their agreement on several other matters since the beginning of the year.

The technical committees have continued to achieve practical improvements in the daily lives of Cypriots, even in the absence of active peace talks. The Technical Committee on Health, for example, was instrumental in achieving harmonization of restrictions related to COVID-19 at the crossing points and the exchange of pandemic-related information. I see prospects for further positive achievements of the technical committees that can help to create conducive conditions for reaching common ground towards bringing the peace process back on track, and I will continue exploring opportunities to bring the two communities together on the island, as well as press for more measures that have a positive impact on people's lives and build confidence between the two sides.

However, the passage of time continues to complicate efforts to find a mutually acceptable solution in Cyprus. The Secretary-General held several meetings in 2021 that kept communication lines open. In 2023, I will also continue my engagement as Deputy Special Adviser with the two Cypriot leaders and their teams, civil society and the international community to maintain continuous contact and dialogue with all parties in support of the Secretary-General's efforts towards finding a lasting settlement in Cyprus.

(Signed) Colin **Stewart**

Deputy Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus

A. Proposed programme plan for 2023 and programme performance in 2021

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

9. The mandate of the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus derives from the priorities established in relevant Security Council resolutions and decisions and an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2008/456 and S/2008/457). In resolution 1818 (2008), the Council welcomed the intention of the Secretary-General to appoint a Special Adviser at the appropriate time. In a letter dated 10 July 2008 addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2008/456), the Secretary-General announced his intention to appoint his Special Adviser on Cyprus as from 14 July 2008. Relevant Security Council resolutions from which the mandate derives include resolution 186 (1964) and subsequent Council resolutions, including resolutions 367 (1975), 1250 (1999), 1475 (2003), 1758 (2007), 1818 (2008), 1873 (2009), 1930 (2010), 1986 (2011), 2026 (2011), 2058 (2012), 2114 (2013), 2135 (2014), 2168 (2014), 2197 (2015), 2234 (2015), 2263 (2016), 2300 (2016), 2338 (2017), 2369 (2017), 2398 (2018), 2430 (2018), 2453 (2019), 2483 (2019), 2506 (2020), 2537(2020), 2561 (2021), 2587 (2021) and 2618 (2022).
10. In its resolution 2618 (2022), the Security Council noted with regret the lack of progress made towards restarting formal negotiations, fully supported the Secretary-General's ongoing engagement with the sides and encouraged further rounds of informal talks. The Council urged the sides to engage actively and with an increased sense of urgency with the Secretary-General and his team, including by reaching an agreement regarding the proposal of the Secretary-General to appoint a United Nations envoy.
11. The Secretary-General, in his latest report (S/2021/1109), stressed that without decisive action, continuing dynamics in and around Cyprus and electoral timelines could render future efforts to reach a mutually agreeable settlement to the Cyprus issue unattainable. The Secretary-General urged the parties to engage constructively on finding and building common ground, with a view towards a resumption of meaningful peace talks. He noted that a United Nations envoy to lead that engagement could provide critical support in that respect and that the efforts of the United Nations continued to ascertain the modalities that would best support the search for a way forward.

Programme of work

Objective

12. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem.

Strategy

13. To contribute to the objective, the Office will:
 - (a) Use its best endeavours with the two leaders and the guarantor powers to promote a peaceful solution and to assist them, should they jointly agree, in the conduct of full-fledged negotiations;
 - (b) Regularly conduct bilateral meetings and facilitate joint meetings between the leaders, negotiators/representatives and their teams, working groups and experts;

- (c) Intensify its support for the implementation of confidence-building measures and the work of the technical committees to help both sides make progress towards promoting just, peaceful and inclusive societies.
14. For 2023, the mission's planned deliverables will also support, as needed, ongoing management of and recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. Such planned deliverables and activities include continued engagement with the leaders of the two communities, facilitation of meetings of their representatives and continued support for the technical committees, specifically the Technical Committee on Health to strengthen cooperation between the sides on epidemiological issues, including harmonized measures, the exchange of COVID-19-related information and access to COVID-19 vaccines. Efforts will also be extended to encouraging continued dialogue between the sides to reduce the socioeconomic disparity between the two Cypriot communities, which has been widened by the longer-term effects of the pandemic.
 15. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
 - (a) Continuation of dialogue towards an enduring, comprehensive and just settlement of the Cyprus problem. Should significant progress be achieved, the United Nations may be called upon to intensify its support, possibly also by convening the stakeholders to address substantive issues;
 - (b) Implementation of confidence-building measures;
 - (c) Empowerment of the work of the technical committees.

External factors for 2023

16. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2023 is based on the following planning assumptions:
 - (a) Continued and sustained political commitment of the parties to the political process and the implementation of confidence-building measures;
 - (b) Continued and sustained international support for the peace process.
17. With regard to cooperation with other entities at the global, regional, national and local levels, the mission, if so requested by the sides, will continue to coordinate the engagement of international financial institutions in support of the process, in particular, the European Central Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. In addition, the mission cooperates and coordinates activities with the European Commission as relevant to its support for the peace process.
18. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the mission, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) and the United Nations country team will continue to operate in an integrated way to maximize synergies and ensure coherent and effective support for United Nations peace efforts.
19. The Office integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. The Office supports activities by both sides, the work of the Technical Committee on Gender Equality and women's civil society platforms in both communities to advance gender-related issues and provides support for greater civic engagement towards a more inclusive peace process. In accordance with best practice, the mission will support the involvement of underrepresented groups, including women, minorities, youth and persons with disabilities, in discussions pertaining to the Cyprus issue and in any resumed negotiations.

Programme performance in 2021

Consistent engagement, conflict prevention and efforts to reach common ground towards resuming peace talks

20. In 2021, the mission continued its engagement with the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot leaders and their teams and supported the Secretary-General and United Nations senior officials in their engagements.
21. From 27 to 29 April 2021, the Secretary-General convened an informal five-plus-one meeting in Geneva, with the participation of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Greece and Turkey and the Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. While sufficient common ground could not be found to allow for the resumption of formal negotiations, it was agreed to continue the dialogue, with the objective of moving in the direction of reaching common ground, so as to allow for the start of formal negotiations.
22. On 27 September 2021, the Secretary-General hosted an informal lunch for the two leaders in New York to discuss the state of play in efforts to reach common ground. Both leaders lent their support to his efforts to appoint an envoy to pursue the search for common ground and indicated an interest in continued engagement. In the third quarter of 2021, Jane Holl Lute concluded conducting consultations on behalf of the Secretary-General.
23. On 14 December 2021, both leaders attended an end-of-year reception in Nicosia.
24. The mission continued to facilitate the meetings and the work of the technical committees and the implementation of confidence-building measures and also engaged with civil society, political parties, academia and the international community. Progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see table 2).

Table 2
Performance measure

2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)
Continued engagement with the two leaders and their teams and provision of the required support for senior-level engagement, including an informal joint meeting of the two leaders in Berlin, hosted by the Secretary-General	Continued engagement with the two leaders and their teams and provision of the required support for senior-level engagement, including consultations by a senior United Nations official aimed at achieving a consensus starting point for negotiations	Continued engagement with the two leaders and their teams and provision of the required support for senior-level engagement, including an informal five-plus-one meeting convened by the Secretary-General in Geneva and an informal lunch for the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders hosted by the Secretary-General in New York

Impact of the pandemic

25. The continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic into 2021 had an impact on the implementation of mandates in the following areas: (a) the restrictions put in place by both sides increased political tensions and posed practical challenges to movement across the divide and, while the harmonization of restrictions at crossings was an important step, the number of bicomunal contacts and trust-building activities on the island has not been restored to pre-COVID-19 levels; (b) despite the change from in-person meetings to virtual meetings, fewer meetings were held between the sides and between the mission and the leaders and their teams, and there were fewer meetings of the technical committees; (c) in-person meetings that required more than a very limited number of people were cancelled or held virtually with losses in the quality of discussions given the nature, complexity and

confidentiality of the interactions around the Cyprus issue; (d) travel to meetings outside Cyprus was severely reduced in 2021 and replaced by virtual contacts when possible and appropriate with reduced quality because of the lack of opportunity for in-depth discussion; and (e) travel to training and in-person training opportunities was severely reduced. The mission continued to implement alternative work arrangements in the office and strengthened its business continuity plan in accordance with COVID-19 regulations in Cyprus and United Nations policies. In addition, to support the communities on issues related to COVID-19, within the overall scope of the objectives, the mission engaged in dialogue with representatives of both sides and the Technical Committee on Health to strengthen cooperation on epidemiological issues, including harmonized measures related to crossing points, the exchange of COVID-19-related information and statistics and access to COVID-19 vaccines.

Planned result for 2023

Continued dialogue to assist in the search for common ground

Programme performance in 2021 and target for 2023


26. In 2021, the mission's work contributed to the holding of 93 bilateral and joint meetings with the leaders and their teams and 268 meetings of the technical committees and working groups, which did not meet the planned target of 135 bilateral and joint meetings with the leaders and their teams and 400 meetings of technical committees and working groups. This was because of the absence of active negotiations and COVID-19 related measures in 2021.
27. In 2023, the mission will continue its engagement with the sides and the guarantor powers to support efforts to find and build common ground with a view towards a resumption of meaningful peace talks. Should significant progress be achieved, the United Nations may be called upon to intensify its efforts, including by convening meetings of the stakeholders to address substantive issues. The requirement to coordinate technical work in preparation for settlement implementation may also increase. Efforts will include shuttle diplomacy and bilateral meetings, the facilitation of joint meetings and meetings of the sides' teams and working groups. The mission will also continue its support for the implementation of confidence-building measures and the work of the technical committees, with a particular focus on assisting the sides to follow up on the recommendations of the stocktaking exercise on the activities of the technical committees and the action plan for equal and meaningful participation of women in the peace process. The mission will engage in and support greater civic engagement, including with women, minorities, youth and persons with disabilities, to support a more inclusive peace process.

Lessons learned and planned change

28. The lesson for the mission was that the enhanced use of information technology for virtual meetings provided a time-effective alternative, but certain in-person meetings are indispensable owing to the nature, complexity and confidentiality of the interactions and thus could not be successfully conducted virtually. Another lesson learned marked the importance of the work of the technical committees to build trust, reduce tensions, avoid possible conflicts and improve the lives of Cypriots, in particular during a period when the fully fledged negotiations are in abeyance.
29. In applying the lesson, the mission will continue to utilize both in-person and virtual meetings, while ensuring the quality of the discussion and the necessary confidentiality, and will continue to engage with the sides to further empower the work of the technical committees. Ongoing dialogue will also be geared towards engaging with the two communities, resolving issues of conflict between them and exploring common ground towards possible peace talks. Progress towards the objective and the target for 2023 are presented in the performance measure below (see figure I).

Figure I

Performance measure: number of bilateral and joint meetings with key stakeholders and number of meetings of working groups and technical committees



Deliverables

30. Table 3 lists all deliverables of the mission.

Table 3

Deliverables for the period 2021–2023, by category and subcategory

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>	<i>2021 actual</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>	<i>2023 planned</i>
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	3	3	3	2
1. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council	3	3	3	2
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	3	3	2	2
2. Meetings of the Security Council	3	3	2	2
C. Substantive deliverables				
Good offices: provision of good offices through engagement and bilateral and joint meetings with the Greek Cypriot leader and the Turkish Cypriot leader and other stakeholders in both communities as well as the three guarantor powers towards a settlement of the Cyprus problem. Conduct and facilitation of bilateral and joint meetings with the leaders and their teams and facilitation of the technical committees and working groups, which, in 2021, resulted in the adoption of the action plan, as requested by the Security Council.				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: provision of advice on procedural, legal, technical and substantive issues towards a settlement of the Cyprus issue; coordination, management and facilitation of advisory meetings on issues related to the peace process; and advocacy on gender equality and encouragement of participation in and public support for the peace process. In 2021, the mission held 226 meetings with international and national stakeholders, including representatives of Cypriot civil society and political parties, women's and youth groups, academia, trade unions and religious leaders. The mission also engaged with members of the Security Council and other United Nations Member States, bodies of the European Union and representatives of the World Bank and cooperated closely with UNFICYP and other members of the United Nations country team.				
D. Communication deliverables				
External and media relations: interviews and press releases to inform the public about the peace process. The mission regularly posts on social networking sites, such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram, issued several press releases and published a number of articles on its website.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2023

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 4

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2021	2022	2023		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent	2023 vs. 2022 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	—	—	—	—	—
Civilian personnel costs	2 507.3	2 529.3	2 608.1	—	78.8
Operational costs	238.6	425.7	442.6	—	16.9
Total (net of staff assessment)	2 745.9	2 955.0	3 050.7	—	95.7

Table 5

Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff				
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service ^a	Total inter- national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteer	Total
Approved 2022	1 ^b	—	—	1	3	5	1	—	11	4	1	16	—	5	—	21
Proposed 2023	1 ^b	—	—	1	3	5	1	—	11	4	1	16	—	5	—	21
Change	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

^a Other level, unless otherwise stated.^b The Under-Secretary-General is on a when-actually-employed contract.

31. The proposed resource requirements for 2023 for the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus amount to \$3,050,700 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$2,608,100) for the continuation of 21 positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 D-1, 3 P-5, 5 P-4, 1 P-3, 4 Field Service, 1 General Service and 5 Local level), as well as operational costs (\$442,600), comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$31,800), official travel (\$111,500), facilities and infrastructure (\$100,500), ground transportation (\$41,100), communications and information technology (\$74,900), medical (\$300) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$82,500).
32. In 2023, no change is proposed to the number and levels of the positions.
33. A vacancy rate of 12.5 per cent has been applied to all international positions. Proposed resources for national positions are based on the assumption of full incumbency.
34. The increase in the requirements proposed for 2023 compared with the appropriation for 2022 is attributable primarily to increased requirements under civilian personnel costs, resulting from the application of the latest salary scale and post adjustment multiplier to the cost of international positions and the application of the latest operational rate of exchange to the cost of national positions.

2. Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide

(\$2,820,400)

Foreword

Prevention of genocide remains one of the key challenges facing the world. In 2021, we continued witnessing the impact of division and intolerance on vulnerable societies, which in the most serious cases can lead to the commission of genocide or related crimes. I remain alarmed at such dynamics, which challenge our collective resolve and capacity to prevent such crimes. While this is more visible where populations are at imminent risk, effective action also requires addressing long-term risk factors and preventing them from escalating to such crisis points.

The past two years have underscored the importance of technology for the work that we do. While attention has been focused on social media as deepening division, technology can enhance prevention as an outreach participatory tool. We must strive to harness technology in genocide prevention while strengthening women's participation and all-round community engagement.

The Office will continue to prioritize action against Holocaust and genocide denial and the glorification of war crimes and criminals. The universal ratification of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide remains a key priority of the Office. Other priorities of the Office include strengthening early warning and monitoring capacity, provision of technical assistance and capacity-building for Member States, regional organizations and civil society actors, including in the implementation of the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech. The Office will also aim to realign its structure and personnel skillset to emerging needs and challenges.

(Signed) Alice Wairimu **Nderitu**
Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide

A. Proposed programme plan for 2023 and programme performance in 2021

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

35. The Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide is mandated to collect information, in particular from within the United Nations system, on massive and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law of ethnic and racial origin that, if not prevented or halted, may lead to genocide; to act as a mechanism of early warning to the Secretary-General and, through him, to the Security Council, by bringing to their attention situations that could potentially result in genocide; to make recommendations to the Council, through the Secretary-General, on action to prevent or halt genocide; and to liaise with the United Nations system on activities for the prevention of genocide and on work to enhance the capacity of the United Nations to analyse and manage information regarding genocide or related crimes.
36. The mandate derives from the invitation of the Security Council to the Secretary-General in its resolution 1366 (2001) to refer to the Council information and analysis from within the United Nations system on cases of serious violations of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law. The Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide was appointed through an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2004/567 and S/2004/568). The mandate was reaffirmed in Council resolution 1674 (2006), a further exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the Council (S/2007/721 and S/2007/722) and resolutions of the General Assembly, the Commission on Human Rights and the Human Rights Council, including Assembly resolutions 60/1 and 63/308, Commission on Human Rights resolution 2005/62 and Human Rights Council resolutions 7/25, 22/22, 28/34, 33/19, 37/26 and 43/29.
37. With regard to the responsibility to protect, the General Assembly, in paragraphs 138 and 139 of its resolution 60/1 on the 2005 World Summit Outcome, addressed the responsibility of Member States and the international community to protect populations. This was reaffirmed by the Security Council in the context of its resolutions 1674 (2006) and 1706 (2006). Through an exchange of letters (S/2007/721 and S/2007/722), the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect was appointed and charged with the conceptual, institutional and operational development of the principle. The Assembly, in resolution 75/277, included the item on responsibility to protect on its agenda and requested the Secretary-General to report annually on that item.
38. The prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, together with the realization of the Sustainable Development Goals (especially Goals 10 and 16, on reduced inequalities and on peace, justice and strong institutions, respectively) remains a key part of the broader prevention strategy of the Secretary-General as well as of his call to action for human rights of 24 February 2020. The rise in hate speech, racism and xenophobia has continued and, in many situations, was exacerbated by the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic. Civilians continue to be targeted in armed conflict, and ensuring accountability remains a challenge. In addition, there are increasing concerns over trends of denial of past instances of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, even in situations where there have been international tribunals and verdicts affirming these crimes. These developments demonstrate again the importance of remaining vigilant concerning the indicators of risk and the early warning signs of these crimes.

Programme of work

Objective

39. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to advance national, regional and international efforts to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and their incitement

Strategy

40. To contribute to the objective, the Office will:
- (a) Raise awareness of the causes and dynamics of genocide through predictive and action-oriented analysis, enhanced by the collection and sharing of information from field missions and regional offices in accordance with the early warning mandate of the Office;
 - (b) Alert relevant actors where there is a risk of genocide, through the implementation of the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech launched by the Secretary-General in June 2019, capacity-building and advocacy, including providing timely recommendations on situations of concern. This includes implementing the Plan of Action for Religious Leaders and Actors to Prevent Incitement to Violence that could lead to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity;
 - (c) Advocate and mobilize for appropriate action through engagement within the United Nations and with external partners;
 - (d) Strengthen community-level efforts for prevention, including by assisting locally led initiatives aimed at bringing communities together;
 - (e) Harness technology to enhance prevention as an outreach participatory tool;
 - (f) Increase female participation and more women in decision-making roles and provide knowledge and skills to women to enable national and community efforts to improve genocide prevention and response;
 - (g) Prioritize action against Holocaust and genocide denial and the glorification of war crimes and criminals;
 - (h) Support the universal ratification of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.
41. For 2023, the Office's planned deliverables will include early warning, technical assistance and capacity-building support for Member States and regional organizations, among other partners, focusing on building capacity and structures for analysis, early detection and response to the risk factors of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
42. Reflecting the importance of continuous improvement and responding to the needs of Member States, the Office has mainstreamed lessons learned and best practices related to the adjustments to and adaptation of the programme owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. This includes maximizing the use of virtual engagement in situations where physical presence may not be specifically required. Largely, the Office has learned that in some cases general advocacy and capacity-building engagement can be conducted virtually. However, for its work related to assessment and analysis, visits to specific locations and meetings with country-level counterparts, including populations at risk, remain critical for the implementation of the mandate. The Office's work in advancing the implementation of the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech has provided equivalent lessons.
43. The above-mentioned work is expected to create conducive conditions for increased action by United Nations intergovernmental bodies, Member States and regional and subregional organizations to

prevent and mitigate, or to contribute to prevention or mitigation of, the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity, including their incitement.

External factors for 2023

44. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2023 is based on the following planning assumptions:
 - (a) Continued commitment on the part of Member States, as well as the Security Council and other intergovernmental bodies, to engage with the Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect to advance the prevention of genocide and enhance efforts aimed at conceptualizing the principle of the responsibility to protect;
 - (b) Active engagement of Member States and regional and other organizations to develop preventive capacity and take appropriate action for the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, including their incitement.
45. The Office will continue to work with the Department of Peace Operations, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, human rights mechanisms, including the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the Office of Legal Affairs, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict, the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Violence against Children and the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflict. The Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide will also continue to work closely with and support United Nations country teams on the implementation of the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech.
46. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Office of the Special Adviser will work in close collaboration with the United Nations Children's Fund, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), in particular in relation to the collection of information for early warning purposes, policy development and activities aimed at the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
47. The Office integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. This includes reflecting the gender dynamics in its monitoring and analysis and striving for the equal participation of women in its capacity-building events and workshops.
48. In line with the United Nations Disability Inclusion Strategy, the Office continues to review and examine the Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech with a view to further advancing disability inclusion, including in its programmatic and policy activities, and to review and develop a guidance note on hate speech that draws on the Strategy.

Programme performance in 2021

Collecting information, raising awareness and developing capacities to prevent and respond to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, as well as their incitement


49. In 2021, the Office, pursuant to its mandate, issued seven advisory notes to the Secretary-General and 10 public statements. The Special Adviser undertook four country visits and six field missions. As a result of the Special Adviser's visits to the Western Balkans, countries in the region prioritized initiatives to address accountability gaps and denial of genocide, as well as to support intercommunal reconciliation through local governments and civil society organizations. This was complemented by the development of country-specific action plans on hate speech. In addition, the Office launched two initiatives, in Africa and the Asia-Pacific region, to raise awareness and build capacity on the prevention of genocide through education. In Africa it launched the Africa genocide scholars forum

to develop curricula for genocide studies for universities, and in the Asia-Pacific region it developed teaching materials and curricula for schools and universities on the prevention of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. These curricula are currently being piloted in universities in the region.

50. As the United Nations focal point on hate speech, the Office supported advocacy that led to the adoption by the General Assembly of its resolution [75/309](#), proclaiming 18 June annually as the International Day for Countering Hate Speech. It organized 30 training and briefing sessions for Member States and United Nations country teams on the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech and supported eight United Nations country teams and peace operations to develop context-specific action plans. It also organized two webinars with faith-based actors on the interlinkages between COVID-19 and hate speech and genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and six webinars with the Higher Education Commission of Pakistan on countering hate speech.
51. The above-mentioned work contributed to the advancement of national, regional and international capacities and efforts to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and their incitement on the basis of timely and relevant analysis, recommendations and training provided by the Office of the Special Adviser, which met the planned target. Progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see figure II).

Figure II

Performance measure: action for the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity taken at the national, regional or international levels as a result of training and technical assistance provided by the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide



Impact of the pandemic

52. The continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic into 2021 had an impact on the implementation of mandates, resulting in the postponement of activities planned to be conducted in person in various countries. Whenever practical, especially in the field of equipping country teams with the tools to advance implementation of the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, the Office reconfigured seminars, workshops and training events to allow for their delivery online and provided technical assistance through webinars and other online means.

Planned result for 2023

Collecting and processing information, providing early warning, raising awareness, building capacities and making recommendations to Member States and regional and subregional organizations on the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, as well as their incitement

Programme performance in 2021 and target for 2023


53. The Office's work contributed to the advancement of national, regional and international capacities and efforts to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and their incitement, and met the planned target of 19 follow-up actions taken by Member States and regional and subregional organizations to prevent or mitigate the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity on the basis of timely and relevant analysis and recommendations provided by the Office.
54. In 2023, the Special Adviser and her Office will continue to collect and process information from United Nations sources to provide early warning and advice on the prevention of genocide and related crimes. The Office will conduct country visits, both technical and high-level, collect relevant information on political, human rights, humanitarian, social and economic developments in countries worldwide with the aim of identifying early warning signs of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The Office will also provide tailored training and technical assistance to Member States, regional and subregional organizations and civil society on the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

Lessons learned and planned change

55. The lesson for the Office was that partnerships are crucial for the implementation of the mandate of the Office, especially considering the absence of a field presence, whether in relation to the United Nations entities, government institutions or others. Effective coordination with United Nations field entities, country teams and peace operations is instrumental in strengthening and projecting the Office's assessment and response capacity and deepening its understanding of the degree of presence of risk factors for genocide and related crimes in multiple locations. The Office uses a combination of field missions and remote monitoring for its assessment and response initiatives and these cannot be implemented effectively without partnerships with counterparts in the field. With respect to non-United Nations partners, the Office was able to reach more Member States through regional organizations and coalitions of civil society actors, thus generating bigger ripple effects for its technical cooperation support. This in turn permitted the development of multilayered operational partnerships, including with regional, national and community actors, to apply the Office's risk assessment methodologies and discuss the result of this work for the purposes of advancing prevention.
56. In applying the lesson, the Office will intensify its efforts to build the capacity of the United Nations country teams and peace operations on the elements relevant to the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. The Office will also prioritize working through regional organizations and coalitions of civil society actors to reach more Member States and civil society actors, including at the community level, where prevention action will remain paramount. Expected progress towards the objective and the target for 2023 are presented in the performance measure below (see figure III).

Figure III

Performance measure: number of follow-up actions taken by Member States, regional and subregional organizations and civil society actors to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, as well as their incitement, as a result of early warning and recommendations provided by the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide



Deliverables

57. Table 6 lists all deliverables of the mission.

Table 6

Deliverables for the period 2021–2023, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2021 planned	2021 actual	2022 planned	2023 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	2	1	2	2
1. Report of Secretary-General on the responsibility to protect	1	1	1	1
2. Report of Secretary-General on the prevention of genocide to the Human Rights Council	1	–	1	1
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	6	6	4	5
3. Meetings of the General Assembly on the responsibility to protect	5	2	3	3
4. Meetings of the Human Rights Council on the prevention of genocide	1	4	1	2
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Field and technical cooperation projects (number of projects)	4	6	7	8
5. Projects on national mechanisms, including legislation, for the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity	4	6	7	8
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	25	45	35	45
6. Workshops on the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, including their incitement, and on the establishment and review of national and regional early warning mechanisms	25	45	35	45
Publications (number of publications)	1	1	1	2
7. Publication on the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity	1	1	1	2
Technical materials (number of materials)	–	1	2	4
8. Guidance notes on countering and addressing hate speech	–	1	1	2
9. Guidance notes on genocide denial, the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity	–	–	1	2

Category and subcategory	2021 planned	2021 actual	2022 planned	2023 planned
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C. Substantive deliverables

Consultation, advice and advocacy: advice on the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and on preventive measures; advocacy and consultations on the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity; briefings on country situations and thematic areas relevant to prevention.

Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions: country-specific assessment missions. The Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide undertook 4 country visits and 6 field missions in 2021.

D. Communication deliverables

Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: commemoration of the International Day of Commemoration and Dignity of the Victims of the Crime of Genocide and of the Prevention of This Crime; anniversary of the adoption of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; commemoration of the International Day for Countering Hate Speech.

External and media relations: public statements by the Special Adviser; media briefings; editorial opinions (op-eds). The Special Adviser issued 10 public statements in 2021 on situations of concern and conducted several media engagements.

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2023

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 7

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2021	2022	2023		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent	2023 vs. 2022 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	—	—	—	—	—
Civilian personnel costs	1 518.7	2 133.9	2 261.9	—	128.0
Operational costs	575.8	564.4	558.5	—	(5.9)
Total (net of staff assessment)	2 094.5	2 698.3	2 820.4	—	122.1

Table 8

Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories			National staff			
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service ^a	Total inter- national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteer	Total
Approved 2022	1	1 ^b	—	—	2	4 ^c	2	—	10	—	2	12	—	—	—	12
Proposed 2023	1	1 ^b	—	—	2	4	2	1	11	—	2	13	—	—	—	13
Change	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	1	—	—	1	—	—	—	1

^a Other level, unless otherwise stated.

^b The Assistant Secretary-General is on a \$1-per-year contract.

^c Includes one P-4 position approved as a general temporary assistance position for six months in the 2022 budget.

58. The proposed resources for 2023 for the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide amount to \$2,820,400 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$2,261,900) for the continuation of 12 positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 Assistant Secretary-General, 2 P-5, 4 P-4, 2 P-3, 1 P-2 and 2 General Service), the proposed conversion of 1 position at the P-4 level from a general temporary assistance position to a regular position and the creation of 1 additional position at the P-2 level, as well as operational costs (\$558,500), comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$39,600), official travel (\$245,100), facilities and infrastructure (\$206,600), ground transportation (\$3,600), communications and information technology (\$36,800) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$26,800).
59. For 2023, the following changes to the staffing complement are proposed:
- (a) Conversion of one position of Political Affairs Officer (P-4) from general temporary assistance to a regular position to enable the Office to continue its support for the implementation of the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, which was launched by the Secretary-General in 2019. The conversion from general temporary assistance for six months in 2022 to a regular position in 2023 would allow the Office to provide sustained assistance in response to requests from Member States, regional organizations and United Nations field presences for technical assistance and capacity-building in the development and implementation of context-specific action plans to address and counter hate speech. Such sustained assistance would include the deployment of this position to support these actors and to serve as a dedicated focal point for the establishment of a repository of good practices. It would also sustain the support for and engagement with field presences once action plans have been developed and are being implemented. While the Office partners with the Development Coordination Office and Department of Global Communications, which are also members of the United Nations Working Group on Hate Speech, the technical expertise and focal point responsibility for the implementation of the Strategy lies with the Office. The implementation of the 13 commitments of the Strategy necessitates a multisectoral approach linking addressing hate speech to broader United Nations prevention efforts, for which the coordination provided by a dedicated focal point located in the Office remains essential;
 - (b) Establishment of one position of Associate Political Affairs Officer (P-2) to strengthen the analytical capacity within the Office and support campaigns by the Office on Holocaust denial, countering hate speech and ratification of the Genocide Convention. These are linked to General Assembly resolutions [76/250](#) and [75/309](#) on Holocaust denial and commemoration of the International Day for Countering Hate Speech, respectively, and resolution [43/29](#) of the Human Rights Council on support for States on the implementation of the Genocide Convention and observance of the International Day of Commemoration and Dignity of the Victims of the Crime of Genocide and of the Prevention of This Crime. The Office is the only United Nations entity that undertakes analysis of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing and advises United Nations organs, including the Security Council, the General Assembly, the Secretariat and mechanisms such as the Human Rights Council and related bodies on the potential risks of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and measures to address them. With the risk factors and cases of such crimes on the ascendancy, the staffing of the Office requires strengthening. The new position will help in strengthening the analytical capacity within the Office, which is at the core of its role in early warning and prevention.
60. A vacancy rate of 5 per cent has been applied to the estimates for the continuing positions based on recent incumbency and projected recruitment and a vacancy rate of 50 per cent has been applied for the position proposed for establishment.
61. The increase in the requirements proposed for 2023 compared with the appropriation for 2022 is attributable primarily to increased requirements under civilian personnel costs, resulting from factors that include the full provision for one position for which only six months of funding was provided

in the 2022 approved budget, the proposed establishment of one P-2 position and the application of a higher percentage of common staff costs, based on recent expenditure patterns.

Extrabudgetary resources

62. In 2022, extrabudgetary resources amounting to approximately \$882,000 are estimated to be utilized mainly to provide for the staff costs of four positions (3 P-3 and 1 General Service), the Office's capacity-building and technical assistance programme and the preparation of the 2022 report of the Secretary-General on the responsibility to protect.
63. For 2023, extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$447,000 would provide for the continuation of four positions (3 P-3 and 1 General Service) and the Office's capacity-building and technical assistance programme.
64. The decrease in the estimated extrabudgetary resources to be utilized in 2023 as compared with 2022 is due to projections of donor support linked to the current global economic situation.

3. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara

(\$477,500)

Foreword

Further to the announcement by the Secretary-General on 6 October 2021 of my appointment as his Personal Envoy for Western Sahara, the Security Council, in its resolution [2602 \(2021\)](#), welcomed the appointment and urged the constructive resumption of the political process.

I took up my functions at the beginning of November 2021 and undertook my first visit to the region from 12 to 20 January 2022, travelling to Algiers and Tindouf, Algeria, Nouakchott and Rabat. I was well received at all my stops and engaged in serious discussions with all concerned, which gave me a valuable opportunity to hear their positions as well as their views on how to make progress towards a constructive resumption of the political process on Western Sahara.

Since the visit, I have continued with a proactive approach, engaging in further consultations, including with members of the Security Council and members of the Group of Friends on Western Sahara.

I have taken up my assignment faced with new challenges and setbacks on the ground. It will be essential for me to continue to rely on strong and united support from the international community and the appropriate resources to carry out my mandate.

(Signed) Staffan **de Mistura**
Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara

A. Proposed programme plan for 2023 and programme performance in 2021

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

65. The Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara is responsible for assisting the parties, Morocco and the Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el-Hamra y de Río de Oro (Frente POLISARIO), in finding a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations.
66. The mandate derives from the communications between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council dated 17 March 1997 (S/1997/236), 1 October 2021 (S/2021/851) and 5 October 2021 (S/2021/852), as well as from the priorities established in relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 1813 (2008), 2099 (2013), 2468 (2019), 2494 (2019) and 2548 (2020). In its resolution 2602 (2021), the Council welcomed the appointment of Staffan de Mistura as the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara and urged the constructive resumption of the political process. The Council expressed its full support for the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to facilitate the negotiating process. The Council called upon the parties to resume negotiations under the auspices of the Secretary-General without preconditions and in good faith, as well as to demonstrate political will and work in an atmosphere propitious for dialogue in order to advance the negotiations. The Council reaffirmed its commitment to assist the parties to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, based on compromise, which would provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara in the context of arrangements consistent with the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations, and noted the role and responsibilities of the parties in that respect.

Programme of work

Objective

67. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to advance the parties' efforts to achieve a just, lasting and mutually acceptable political solution, which will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.

Strategy

68. To contribute to the objective, the mission will:
 - (a) Encourage the parties to continue the discussion on the question of Western Sahara in order to identify elements of convergence, through bilateral consultations, including with the neighbouring countries of Algeria and Mauritania, conduct visits to the region to meet with key interlocutors and engage in shuttle diplomacy and other activities deemed useful in that regard;
 - (b) Consult with members of the Security Council and the Group of Friends on Western Sahara, both in their capitals and in New York, as well as with regional organizations, towards a solution;
 - (c) Work toward organizing two international meetings on Western Sahara.

69. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
 - (a) Building additional trust and strengthening involvement by the parties in the political process;
 - (b) Maintaining support by the international community for the political process.

External factors for 2023

70. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2023 is based on the following planning assumptions:
 - (a) The parties continue to show willingness to meet for direct negotiations;
 - (b) The security situation will remain conducive to the mission's objective for the region.
71. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the mission will regularly meet with representatives of regional organizations and other relevant stakeholders to exchange views on the United Nations-led political process.
72. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the mission will continue to receive support for visits and information on developments in Western Sahara from the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara, as well as coordinate and liaise with UNHCR with respect to visits to the refugee camps and on confidence-building measures and maintain close contact with OHCHR in Geneva on issues related to the human rights situation in its area of responsibility.

Programme performance in 2021

Resumed process on Western Sahara

73. Following the announcement of the appointment of Staffan de Mistura as the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General on 6 October 2021, the process on Western Sahara resumed through the diplomacy of the Personal Envoy, who consulted representatives of concerned stakeholders in the course of his introductory meetings in New York, as well as members of the Security Council and Group of Friends and other interlocutors, ahead of the continuation of his efforts in 2022. Until the appointment of the Personal Envoy, the Secretary-General had continued to maintain contact with the parties.

Planned result for 2023

Advancing the process on Western Sahara

Programme performance in 2021 and target for 2023

74. The mission's work contributed to maintaining contact with the parties, which did not meet the planned target of advancing the political process owing to the absence of a personal envoy until October 2021.
75. In 2023, the mission will continue to build on past work to advance the political process through consultations with all concerned, visits to the region to meet key interlocutors, including representatives of civil society and women's organizations, and other measures deemed useful in this regard. It will also continue to hold consultations with Member States in their capitals and in New York, as appropriate. In addition, the mission will continue to liaise with relevant United Nations entities in Geneva and other locations to discuss various aspects related to the conflict. The mission will also meet regularly with representatives of relevant regional organizations to exchange views on the United Nations-led political process.

Lessons learned and planned change

76. The lesson for the mission was to maintain the momentum in the political process. In applying the lesson, the mission will continue to engage regularly with the parties and neighbours to resume the discussion on the question of Western Sahara in order to identify elements of convergence, with a view to achieving a mutually acceptable political solution to the question of Western Sahara. Expected progress towards the objective and the target for 2023 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 9).

Table 9
Performance measure

2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (planned)	2023 (planned)
One roundtable meeting	No face-to-face meetings	Resumed engagement between the parties and neighbours	Continued engagement between the parties and neighbours	Two international meetings

Deliverables

77. Table 10 below lists all deliverables of the mission.

Table 10
Deliverables for the period 2021–2023, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2021 planned	2021 actual	2022 planned	2023 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	2	2	2	2
1. Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council	1	1	1	1
2. Report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly	1	1	1	1
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	2	2	2	2
3. Meetings of the Security Council	2	2	2	2
C. Substantive deliverables				
Good offices: provision of good offices for high-level dialogue involving the stakeholders concerned; good offices for informal negotiations between concerned stakeholders in the context of the political process on Western Sahara.				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: consultations through bilateral discussions on the political process on Western Sahara; engagement with women's groups and civil society groups.				
Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions: fact-finding missions to the region to improve the understanding of the situation on the ground and to improve coordination with United Nations partners and other stakeholders.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2023

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 11

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2021	2022	2023		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent	2023 vs. 2022 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	—	—	—	—	—
Civilian personnel costs	14.3	301.3	285.6	—	(15.7)
Operational costs	95.3	175.2	191.9	—	16.7
Total (net of staff assessment)	109.6	476.5	477.5	—	1.0

Table 12

Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff				
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter- national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteer	Total
Approved 2022	1 ^a	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	2
Proposed 2023	1 ^a	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	2	—	—	2	—	—	—	2
Change	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

^a The Under-Secretary-General is on a when-actually-employed contract.

78. The proposed resource requirements for 2023 for the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara amount to \$477,500 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$285,600) for the continuation of the two positions in the mission (1 Under-Secretary-General, on a when-actually-employed contract, and 1 P-3), as well as operational costs (\$191,900), comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$22,700), official travel (\$74,700), facilities and infrastructure (\$53,000), ground transportation (\$1,000), communications and information technology (\$11,400) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$29,100).
79. In 2023, no change is proposed to the number and levels of the positions. A vacancy rate of 5 per cent has been applied to the positions.
80. The increase in the requirements proposed for 2023 compared with the appropriation for 2022 is attributable to requirements under facilities and infrastructure and under communications and information technology for the Office of the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General in Brussels, offset in part by reduced requirements for common staff costs for international staff, based on recent expenditure patterns.

4. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)

(\$376,600)

A. Proposed programme plan for 2023 and programme performance in 2021

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

81. On 14 December 2004, the Secretary-General appointed his Special Envoy for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004) to enable him to report to the Council every six months on the implementation of Council resolution 1559 (2004), as requested by the Council in its presidential statement of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36). In carrying out this mandate, the mission consults with political interlocutors in Lebanon, the Council and other Member States to prepare the semi-annual reports of the Secretary-General. The mandate derives from the priorities established in relevant Council resolutions and decisions, including resolution 1559 (2004), and the statement by the President of the Security Council dated 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36). In addition, the mission has worked towards strengthening the response by relevant Member States in the implementation of the remaining provisions of Council resolution 1680 (2006).
82. On 17 May 2006, in response to the third semi-annual report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004) (S/2006/248), the Security Council adopted resolution 1680 (2006), in which it reiterated its call for the full implementation of the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004). Through that resolution, the Council also strongly encouraged the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to respond positively to the request made by the Government of Lebanon, in line with the agreements of the Lebanese national dialogue, to delineate their common border, especially in those areas where the border was uncertain or disputed.
83. On 11 August 2006, the Security Council adopted resolution 1701 (2006), in which it emphasized the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), and of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords. The Council requested the Secretary-General to develop, in liaison with relevant international actors and the parties concerned, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including with respect to disarmament and the delineation of the international borders of Lebanon. It also requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council on a regular basis on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).
84. In resolution 2236 (2015) and all subsequent resolutions on Lebanon, including, most recently, resolution 2591 (2021), the Security Council continued to urge all parties to make tangible progress towards all outstanding issues in the implementation of resolutions 1701 (2006), 1680 (2006) and 1559 (2004), and other relevant Council resolutions. On 4 February 2022, the Council issued a press statement to reaffirm the Council's strong support for the stability, security, territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon, consistent with Council resolutions 1701 (2006), 1680 (2006), 1559 (2004) and 2591 (2021), as well as other relevant Council resolutions and statements of the President of the Security Council on the situation in Lebanon. In 2016, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs was tasked by the Secretary-General with assuming the responsibility of reporting on the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004), an arrangement that has been maintained to date.
85. In October 2019, large-scale peaceful protests began countrywide, as a broad cross section of Lebanese society called for governmental change, just reforms, good governance, accountability for

corruption, better management of the economy, the end of sectarian patronage and early parliamentary elections. In subsequent protests in the first half of 2020, some groups called for, among other things, the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004). The COVID-19 pandemic, the 4 August 2020 explosion in the Port of Beirut and the government vacuum that followed compounded the effects of the socioeconomic crisis in the country. In September 2021, a new Government was formed and one of its priorities was to hold parliamentary elections in May 2022.

Programme of work

Objective

86. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to ensure full implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004) and all subsequent related resolutions of the Council.

Strategy

87. To contribute to the objective, the Office will:
- (a) Explore ways to foster consensus on a Lebanese-led and Lebanese-owned national dialogue, which is expected to result in progress on addressing the maintenance of weapons outside State authority. Past results in this area include the holding of a national dialogue by Lebanese political decision makers;
 - (b) Produce two semi-annual reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on developments of relevance to the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004). The reports will address a number of key issues, such as the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon; the extension of control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory; and the disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias. Reporting on these categories, the Secretary-General will inform the Council on political and security developments during the reporting period, violations of Lebanese sovereignty and the maintenance of weapons by Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.
88. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in informed Security Council deliberations on possible opportunities for Lebanon to make progress on the outstanding provisions of Council resolution 1559 (2004).

External factors for 2023

89. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2023 is based on the following planning assumptions:
- (a) Government formation after the elections will be challenging and the current economic and financial crisis remains a source of instability and social unrest;
 - (b) The tense and volatile regional environment affects Lebanon's internal stability and security;
 - (c) There is limited political will on the part of the parties concerned to address the disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias;
 - (d) The political goodwill of Member States has limited influence on the parties concerned;
 - (e) Tensions between Lebanon and other States in the region are somewhat eased.
90. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Office of the Special Envoy coordinates and works closely with the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon, in

particular in the process of developing the reports of the Secretary-General ahead of and during the visits to Lebanon by the staff of the Office of the Special Envoy.

Programme performance in 2021

Enhanced understanding of Security Council members on developments of relevance to the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004)

91. The Office undertook one trip to Lebanon in September 2021, which informed the October 2021 report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004). The Office also produced the April 2021 report of the Secretary-General.
92. The above-mentioned work contributed to the understanding of Security Council members on developments of relevance to the implementation of the outstanding provisions of Council resolution 1559 (2004).

Impact of the pandemic

93. The continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic into 2021 had an impact on the implementation of mandates, including the cancellation of one trip to Lebanon for consultations prior to the production of the April 2021 report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004). This limited the number and depth of consultations with actors from across the political spectrum.

Planned result for 2023

Informed Security Council deliberations through analytical reports of the Secretary-General Programme performance in 2021 and target for 2023

94. The Office's work contributed to informing Security Council deliberations on developments of relevance to the implementation of the outstanding provisions of Council resolution 1559 (2004). It partially met the planned target of Council discussions on the two semi-annual reports to reflect the outcome of consultations on the positions of Lebanese actors vis-à-vis the maintenance of weapons outside State authority. This was mostly because the focus of Lebanese actors was overwhelmingly on the economic and financial crisis, the after-effects of the 4 August 2020 explosion in Beirut and the challenges related to forming a Government that followed. No discussions were held on the national defence strategy. The cancellation of a trip to Lebanon due to restrictions related to COVID-19 also limited the number and depth of consultations with actors from across the political spectrum.
95. In 2023, the Office will continue to report to the Security Council semi-annually on progress in the implementation of the resolution, in particular the disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias.

Lessons learned and planned change

96. The lesson for the Office is that in-person consultations are necessary to contribute to the achievement of results. In applying the lesson, the Office will further leverage engagement with United Nations entities both at United Nations Headquarters and among the United Nations country team in Lebanon, in addition to maintaining its network of interlocutors in the country. Expected progress towards the objective and the target for 2023 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 13).

Table 13
Performance measure

2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (planned)	2023 (planned)
Discussions on the two semi-annual reports to reflect the outcome of consultations on positions of Lebanese actors vis-à-vis the maintenance of weapons outside State authority	Discussions on the two semi-annual reports, which did not reflect the outcome of consultations on the positions of Lebanese actors vis-à-vis the maintenance of weapons outside State authority	Discussions on the two semi-annual reports to reflect the outcome of consultations on the positions of Lebanese actors, which were only partially articulated, vis-à-vis the maintenance of weapons outside State authority	Discussions on the two semi-annual reports, which reflect the outcome of systematic consultations surveying the positions of Lebanese actors vis-à-vis the maintenance of weapons outside State authority	Discussions on the two semi-annual reports, which reflect the outcome of systematic consultations on the positions of Lebanese actors vis-à-vis the maintenance of weapons outside State authority

Deliverables

97. Table 14 below lists all deliverables of the mission.

Table 14
Deliverables for the period 2021–2023, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2021 planned	2021 actual	2022 planned	2023 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	2	2	2	2
1. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council	2	2	2	2
Substantive services for meetings (number of consultations)	–	2	2	2
2. Meetings of the Security Council on resolution 1559 (2004)	–	2	2	2
C. Substantive deliverables				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: consultations to gain an understanding of the political, socioeconomic and humanitarian situation in Lebanon, as well as its regional environment, as it may influence the implementation of resolution 1559 (2004) ; consultations on the positioning of actors vis-à-vis the maintenance of weapons outside State authority.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2023

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 15

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2021	2022	2023		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent	2023 vs. 2022 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	—	—	—	—	—
Civilian personnel costs	297.7	249.1	287.1	—	38.0
Operational costs	37.5	89.5	89.5	—	—
Total (net of staff assessment)	335.2	338.6	376.6	—	38.0

Table 16

Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories			National staff			
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service ^a	Total inter- national	National Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteer	Total
Approved 2022	1 ^b	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	2	—	1	3	—	—	—	3
Proposed 2023	1 ^b	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	2	—	1	3	—	—	—	3
Change	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

^a Other level, unless otherwise stated.^b The Under-Secretary-General is on a \$1-per-year contract.

98. The proposed resource requirements for 2023 for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004) amount to \$376,600 (net of staff assessment) and provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$287,100) for the continuation of three positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 P-4 and 1 General Service), as well as operational costs (\$89,500), comprising costs for official travel (\$43,500), facilities and infrastructure (\$34,500), ground transportation (\$2,000), communications and information technology (\$7,700) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$1,800).
99. In 2023, no change is proposed to the number and level of positions. A vacancy rate of 5 per cent has been applied to the positions.
100. The increase in requirements proposed for 2023 compared with the appropriation for 2022 is attributable primarily to the application of a higher percentage of common staff costs to salary costs of 41.3 per cent compared with 26.9 per cent applied to the 2022 approved budget, based on recent expenditure patterns.

5. Office of the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions

(\$1,987,900)

Foreword

In 2021, despite the COVID-19 pandemic, the Office of the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions, with the co-chairing organizations, the European Union and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), organized all planned four rounds of the Geneva International Discussions, in March, June, October and December. The Co-Chairs conducted four regular pre-round visits to Tbilisi and Moscow, as well as Sukhumi and Tskhinvali, and held consultations with the participants. In October, they held consultations in Washington, D.C., and in New York. The Co-Chairs had two retreats: one online in February, and one in Stockholm in September. In November, the Co-Chairs provided an in-person briefing to the OSCE Permanent Council about the Geneva International Discussions.

As the Chair of the joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism in Gali, suspended since June 2018, I undertook active negotiations with the participants, with the aim of resuming the meetings. Consultations are continuing and there is hope that the meetings will be resumed based on the ground rules and existing principles.

In further implementation of the Co-Chairs' joint strategy and action plan on women and peace and security in the framework of the Geneva International Discussions, I will persistently advocate for gender equality and promote the role of women in the peace process and peacebuilding.

In 2023, together with my Co-Chairs, I will pursue revitalization of the Geneva International Discussions to achieve concrete results. As the United Nations Representative, I will undertake bilateral consultations with participating groups to bring a lasting solution to the conflict.

(Signed) Ayse Cihan **Sultanoğlu**

United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions

A. Proposed programme plan for 2023 and programme performance in 2021

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

101. The Office of the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions is mandated to support the Geneva International Discussions and the Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism under United Nations auspices in Gali, Georgia, by facilitating the participation of the United Nations in the international discussions in Geneva and in the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism, and by liaising and coordinating with the relevant actors. The mission is also responsible for preparing, convening and facilitating, in consultation with the other Co-Chairs (European Union and OSCE), the sessions of the Geneva International Discussions as well as the periodic meetings of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism.
102. The United Nations has continued to support the Geneva International Discussions on security and stability and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, which commenced on 15 October 2008 in Geneva in accordance with the six-point agreement of 12 August 2008 and the implementing measures of 8 September 2008, mediated by the French Presidency of the European Union, following the hostilities of August 2008 (see [S/2009/254](#)). In its resolution [1866 \(2009\)](#), the Security Council welcomed the beginning of the discussions and requested the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, to continue to fully support the process. The Secretary-General addressed a letter on this matter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Georgia on 29 September 2009 and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Georgia replied to the Secretary-General on 28 October 2009.
103. Against the background of the “Proposals for joint incident prevention and response mechanisms”, agreed to in Geneva on 18 February 2009, the Secretary-General, on 28 September 2009, addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council in which he updated the members of the Council on the progress in the Geneva International Discussions and the convening of the joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism under United Nations auspices in Gali (*ibid.*, paras. 5 and 6). The Secretary-General also stated that, following consultations with the relevant stakeholders, the United Nations would continue to support the Geneva International Discussions and the Mechanism through a limited number of personnel with the task of facilitating the United Nations participation in the international discussions in Geneva and in the Mechanism, and liaising and coordinating with the relevant actors.
104. In a letter dated 28 December 2009 addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General noted that, given the important role of the Geneva International Discussions and the Mechanism in stabilizing the situation and building confidence, and in the light of the broad support, including from the main stakeholders, for a continued and effective United Nations engagement beyond 31 December 2009, the United Nations would continue to provide support for the Geneva International Discussions and the work of the Mechanism. In a letter dated 25 February 2010 addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2010/103](#)), the Secretary-General conveyed, following consultations, his intention to appoint a United Nations Representative responsible for United Nations support for the Geneva International Discussions and the Mechanism. In a letter dated 2 May 2011 ([S/2011/279](#)), the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Security Council had taken note of his intention and of the information contained in his letter of 25 February 2010. In a letter dated 2 July 2018 addressed to the President of the Security Council ([S/2018/665](#)), the Secretary-General conveyed, following consultations, his intention to appoint Ayşe Cihan Sultanoğlu as the United Nations Representative. In a letter dated 5 July 2018 ([S/2018/666](#)), the President of the Security Council informed the Secretary-General that the members of the Council had taken note of the intention expressed in his letter of 2 July 2018.

Programme of work

Objective

105. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to advance the main agenda items of the Geneva International Discussions, including the non-use of force/international security arrangements and addressing the issue of internally displaced persons and refugees, in the context of the Discussions and the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism.

Strategy

106. To contribute to the objective, the mission, in close partnership with the offices of the other Co-Chairs, will continue to step up efforts to support the revitalization of the Geneva International Discussions and the resumption of the regular meetings of the Mechanism as result-oriented platforms for dialogue and conflict prevention, which is expected to result in contributing to the ultimate goal of transitioning the Discussions from a conflict management to a conflict transformation and resolution process. Emphasis will be placed on addressing and making progress on central issues, including the non-use of force/international security arrangements and internally displaced persons and refugees.
107. In 2023, the mission's planned deliverables will support Member States' objectives through close cooperation with the Resident Coordinator Office in Georgia and the United Nations country team in their efforts in the ongoing management of and recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. Such planned deliverables and activities include advocacy for and facilitation of technical, material and financial support for the population who reside in Abkhazia, Georgia. Such assistance will be implemented by the United Nations specialized agencies, funds and programmes. The mission will also engage with relevant Member States in advocacy of assistance related to the COVID-19 pandemic in 2023.
108. Reflecting the importance of continuous improvement and responding to the needs of Member States, the mission adapted its working methods drawing on lessons learned during the pandemic, including through the efforts of the Resident Coordinator Office in Georgia and the country team to mainstream good practices.
109. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
 - (a) Contributing to the ultimate goal of transitioning the Discussions from a conflict management to a conflict transformation and resolution process;
 - (b) Addressing and making progress on central issues, including the non-use of force/international security arrangements and internally displaced persons and refugees.

External factors for 2023

110. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2023 is based on the following planning assumptions:
 - (a) All stakeholders will continue to support the International Discussions in Geneva and the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism and the continued engagement of the United Nations;
 - (b) All relevant stakeholders and participants in the Geneva International Discussions will continue to support efforts to help to revitalize the Discussions and enhance their effectiveness;
 - (c) The three organizations that serve as Co-Chairs will continue to collaborate closely to fulfil the mandate of the Discussions.

111. Regarding cooperation with other entities, the mission adopts a proactive approach to ensure close and regular coordination and information-sharing with the European Union and OSCE Co-Chairs and their teams. The mission will also continue to maintain close contact with the European Union Monitoring Mission in Georgia and OSCE, which jointly chair the Ergneti Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism. In addition, the mission will continue to pursue contacts with international non-governmental organizations and think tanks in the fields of conflict resolution, mediation and women and peace and security.
112. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the mission will continue to cooperate closely with the United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, such as the Resident Coordinator Office in Georgia, UNHCR, UNDP, the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women), OHCHR, the World Health Organization (WHO) and other actors so as to coordinate and strengthen the role and contribution of the United Nations within the framework of the Geneva International Discussions and the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism.
113. The mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate, including engaging in advocacy for gender equality and promoting the participation of women in the peace process, as well as their direct involvement in development programmes. In close cooperation with the other Co-Chairs and their focal points on women and peace and security, the mission continues to promote the role of women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding and works closely with the respective headquarters of the other Co-Chairs for that purpose and in the framework of the Co-Chairs joint strategy and action plan adopted in 2019. In 2023, the Co-Chairs will continue their engagement initiated in 2019 to take advantage of the synergies between the women and peace and security and the youth and peace and security agendas.

Programme performance in 2021

Continuation of efforts to achieve concrete results on key issues on the agenda of the Geneva International Discussions

114. The mission, in cooperation with the European Union and OSCE, continued its initiatives towards revitalizing the Geneva International Discussions despite the restrictions imposed by the COVID-19 pandemic during 2021. The planned four in-person rounds of the Geneva International Discussions and pre-round meetings were held, and the mission engaged closely and regularly with the other Co-Chairs and all participants virtually and in person. The mission substantively increased the number of regular senior-level and working-level virtual interactions with all participants to keep the platform for dialogue active and continue enabling result-oriented discussions in a consistent and uninterrupted manner. The mission continued to work on a strategic approach to the information sessions that would be aimed at sharing international practices and lessons learned, with a view to help make greater progress on the core issues of the agenda. Two successive information sessions on “Comprehensive/human dimensions of security” were held in 2021, as well a technical meeting of medical experts on COVID-19 and a sub-working group on the topic “Freedom of movement and other related aspects”. The Co-Chairs met with the representatives of young people in Zugdidi, Tbilisi and Tskhinvali as part of their outreach to civil society.
115. The above-mentioned work contributed to maintaining dialogue with the participants of the Geneva International Discussions with a view to making progress on key agenda items and to resolve emerging issues. However, it did not manage to achieve such progress on the non-use of force/international security arrangements and internally displaced persons/refugees owing to the hardening positions of the participants and the overall regional and global geopolitical context. The Co-Chairs’ initiatives to engender concrete discussions on the subjects did not gain traction among the participants. The mission effectively contributed to improving the living conditions of conflict-affected populations by facilitating the opening of humanitarian corridors for the people living in Abkhazia, and advocated for the same in the Tskhinvali region/South Ossetia, Georgia. Thanks in part to these efforts the former was fully opened in two locations from September 2021 onwards. Progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see table 17).

Table 17
Performance measures

2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)
More result-oriented discussions on the substantive Geneva International Discussions issues, such as the non-use of force/international security arrangements and the issues related to internally displaced persons and refugees, including with the support of the dedicated expert-level information sessions	Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, only one round of the Geneva International Discussions took place. Participants resumed engagement on the key agenda items in both Working Group I and II. No information session was organized	Four in-person rounds of the Geneva International Discussions took place Two information sessions on “Comprehensive/human dimension of security,” one technical meeting of medical experts on COVID-19 and a sub-working group on the topic “Freedom of movement and other related aspects” were organized

Impact of the pandemic

116. The continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic into 2021 had an impact on the implementation of mandates, as the regular missions of staff members to the region were curtailed, except for pre-round visits of the Co-Chairs of the Geneva International Discussions in which essential team members were included.

Planned result for 2023

Revitalizing the Geneva International Discussions to achieve practical results

Programme performance in 2021 and target for 2023

117. The mission's work contributed to the firm commitment of all participants of the Geneva International Discussions to continue engagement to prevent a resumption of hostilities, which met the planned target for 2021. In relation to the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism, it has not been possible to resume it since its suspension in June 2018. After the mission's active and continuous negotiations, in June 2021 one of the participants took the initiative to resume the meetings but with one precondition. Consultations to solve this issue are ongoing.
118. If the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism meetings fail to be resumed in 2022, in 2023 the mission will continue to make every effort to work with the participants to ensure the resumption of the meetings of the Mechanism. In close cooperation with the European Union and OSCE, the mission will facilitate engagement as appropriate between the relevant participants with a view to avoiding disruptions of the Discussions and the meetings of the Mechanism and closure of the crossing points.

Lessons learned and planned change

119. The lesson for the mission was the need to adapt to alternative (virtual) modes of engagement with the participants of the Geneva International Discussions and the participants of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism. While mission staff were able to work efficiently under such arrangements, the effectiveness and frequency of engagement with the local actors was sometimes reduced owing to the lack of face-to-face meetings. In applying the lesson, the mission will continue using virtual and alternate methods as appropriate in its engagement with the participants of the Discussions, especially with the participants of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism. Expected progress towards the objective and the target for 2023 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 18).

Table 18

Performance measure

<i>2019 (actual)</i>	<i>2020 (actual)</i>	<i>2021 (actual)</i>	<i>2022 (planned)</i>	<i>2023 (planned)</i>
Result-oriented discussions on the substantive Geneva International Discussions issues, such as the non-use of force/international security arrangements and other issues, including related to internally displaced persons, including with the support of the dedicated expert-level information sessions	One round of the Geneva International Discussions took place. No progress was made on substantive agenda items	Four rounds of the Geneva International Discussions took place. No progress was made on substantive agenda items. No meetings of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism took place during the period	Progress achieved by the stakeholders on the substantive issues of the Geneva International Discussions agenda and in the work of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism to promote peace and stability on the ground	Progress achieved by the stakeholders on the substantive issues of the Geneva International Discussions agenda and in the work of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism to promote peace and stability on the ground

Deliverables

120. Table 19 lists all deliverables of the mission.

Table 19

Deliverables for the period 2021–2023, by category and subcategory

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>	<i>2021 actual</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>	<i>2023 planned</i>
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	16	4	16	10
1. Rounds of the Geneva International Discussions	4	4	4	4
2. Meetings of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism	12	–	12	6
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Technical materials (number of materials)	2	2	2	2
3. Thematic non-papers prepared by the Co-Chairs on non-use of force, freedom of movement, internally displaced persons and other issues related to the Geneva International Discussions agenda	2	2	2	2
C. Substantive deliverables				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: consultations on thematic issues on the Geneva International Discussions agenda related to peace and security and humanitarian issues; advice through information sessions on specific thematic issues on the agenda for participants in the Geneva International Discussions; advocacy through information sessions on areas of interest to the participants related to the Geneva International Discussions agenda.				
D. Communication deliverables				
External and media relations: press communiqués of the Co-Chairs after each round of the Geneva International Discussions; press releases and summary conclusions of the Chair after each meeting of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism. While in 2021, as planned, four press communiqués were issued by the Co-Chairs, there were no press releases and summary conclusions of the Chair of the Gali Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism owing to the non-resumption of the Mechanism's meetings.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2023

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 20

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2021	2022	2023		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent	2023 vs. 2022 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	—	—	—	—	—
Civilian personnel costs	1 493.0	1 584.9	1 488.4	—	(96.5)
Operational costs	264.8	460.1	499.5	—	39.4
Total (net of staff assessment)	1 757.8	2 045.0	1 987.9	—	(57.1)

Table 21

Positions

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>									<i>General Service and related categories</i>		<i>National staff</i>				
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security Services</i>	<i>General Service^a</i>	<i>Total inter- national</i>	<i>National Professional Officer</i>	<i>Local level</i>	<i>United Nations Volunteer</i>	<i>Total</i>
Approved 2022	–	1	–	–	1	2	2	–	6	–	1	7	–	–	–	7
Proposed 2023	–	1	–	–	1	2	2	–	6	–	1	7	–	–	–	7
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

^a Other level, unless otherwise stated.

121. The proposed resource requirements for 2023 for the Office of the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions amount to \$1,987,900 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$1,488,400) for the continuation of six positions based in Geneva (1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 P-5, 2 P-4, 1 P-3 and 1 General Service) and one position based in Zugdidi, Georgia (P-3), as well as for operational costs (\$499,500), comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$8,900), official travel (\$246,700), facilities and infrastructure (\$127,700), ground transportation (\$23,400), communications and information technology (\$47,800) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$45,000).
122. In 2023, no change is proposed to the number and levels of the positions. The resource requirements are based on the assumption of full incumbency of the positions, based on the actual average vacancy rate in 2021.
123. The decrease in the requirements proposed for 2023 compared with the appropriation for 2022 is attributable mainly to the application of a lower percentage of common staff costs to salary costs of 36.1 per cent compared with 46.4 per cent applied to the 2022 approved budget, based on recent expenditure patterns, offset in part by increased requirements under official travel, owing to increased requirements for within-mission travel in Georgia.

6. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria

(\$15,565,700)

Foreword

As the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic enters its twelfth year, marking another grim milestone, Syrians continue to suffer in profound ways and the hardship is only deepening. We see growing humanitarian needs and the continued effects on the Syrian people of the destruction of the country and the collapse of the Syrian economy.

Beyond the humanitarian sphere, there is much else that could be done to build trust and confidence. After all, it is clear that no one actor or existing group of actors in the Syrian Arab Republic can determine the outcome of this conflict. A military solution is an illusion.

That is why I continue to engage with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic, the opposition Syrian Negotiations Commission and the men and women of the Syrian Arab Republic as widely as I can, as well as with all key international actors, to promote the full implementation of Security Council resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#), something that is perfectly doable if the political will is there.

With frontlines frozen, there is every reason to try to build a true nationwide ceasefire. Likewise, the parties share an interest and a duty to cooperate against listed terrorist groups. Any credible attempt to build trust must include serious steps forward on the plight of the detained, the abducted and the missing. There is much that can be done to address the real concerns of Syrian refugees. It is clear that all this will require progress on the core political issues in resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#) that are still unaddressed, including governance and elections.

My sincere appeal to the Syrian parties and all key international actors is to work with the United Nations in order to help advance this shared goal.

(Signed) Geir O. Pedersen
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria

A. Proposed programme plan for 2023 and programme performance in 2021

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

124. On 16 February 2012, the General Assembly, in its resolution [66/253 A](#), requested the Secretary-General and all relevant United Nations bodies to support the efforts of the League of Arab States aimed at promoting a peaceful solution to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, including through the appointment of a special envoy.
125. The Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria is responsible for facilitating an inclusive, comprehensive and credible Syrian-owned and led political solution to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic that will meet the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people for dignity, freedom and justice based on the principles of equality and non-discrimination. The mandate derives from the priorities established by the Security Council in resolutions [2118 \(2013\)](#), [2254 \(2015\)](#), [2268 \(2016\)](#) and [2336 \(2016\)](#), as well as by the General Assembly in resolution [66/253 A](#).
126. The conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, now entering its twelfth year, has caused enormous humanitarian suffering, a record number of refugees and internally displaced persons and vast destruction in the country. Amid the continued presence of foreign armies in the Syrian Arab Republic, the conflict continues to pose significant risks to regional and international security. Accordingly, it is critical to continue to work towards an inclusive, credible and comprehensive political solution to the conflict that sees the full implementation of Security Council resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#).

Programme of work

Objective

127. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to advance the full implementation of all the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions, including Assembly resolution [66/253 A](#) and Council resolutions [2118 \(2013\)](#), [2254 \(2015\)](#), [2268 \(2016\)](#) and [2336 \(2016\)](#), towards an inclusive, credible, comprehensive Syrian-owned and led political solution to the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people for dignity, freedom and justice, based on the principles of equality and non-discrimination and with the full and meaningful participation of women.

Strategy

128. To contribute to the objective, the Office will:
 - (a) Continue to engage with national, regional and international stakeholders; deepen the discourse with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the opposition; intensify efforts on the issue of detainees, abductees and missing persons; and work to create the conditions for a safe, calm and neutral environment conducive to advancing an inclusive, comprehensive and credible political settlement of the Syrian conflict in line with Security Council resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#);
 - (b) Focus on improving international cooperation to help international parties deepen their own dialogue in new formats towards the common purpose of a sustainable political settlement of the Syrian conflict that can enjoy international legitimacy and encompasses all elements of Security Council resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#). The Office will continue to convene and facilitate the work of the Constitutional Committee to catalyse a wider positive dynamic to move the political process forward, including working to create the conditions for inclusive, free and fair elections administered under United Nations supervision.

129. Reflecting the importance of continuous improvement and responding to the needs of Member States, the Mission has mainstreamed lessons learned and best practices related to the adjustments to and adaptation of its programme owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. This includes meetings of the Civil Society Support Room and meetings of the Special Envoy with regional and international stakeholders that took place online. The Office will continue to avail itself of alternative modes for such meetings and discussions where feasible and appropriate. The Office recognizes the explicit wish of all actors to return to in-person meetings where and when possible, owing to the intricate, delicate and sensitive nature of the issues at hand that are discussed in such meetings.
130. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
 - (a) Sustained, regular and substantive negotiations and discussions among relevant stakeholders on all issues outlined in Security Council resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#);
 - (b) Enhanced trust and confidence among the parties;
 - (c) Strengthened international consensus to advance the political process across all elements of Council resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#), notably the establishment of a credible, inclusive and non-sectarian governance, the setting of a schedule and process for drafting a new constitution, as well as free and fair elections, pursuant to the new constitution, to be administered under United Nations supervision and to the highest international standards of transparency and accountability, with all Syrians, including members of the diaspora, eligible to participate.

External factors for 2023

131. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2023 is based on the following planning assumptions:
 - (a) All national, regional and international stakeholders will cooperate with the Special Envoy;
 - (b) International consensus with regard to the Syrian Arab Republic will continue to be difficult to achieve and sustain;
 - (c) The security situation will remain volatile in 2023, posing a threat to regional and international peace and security;
 - (d) The conflict will continue to severely affect civilians, especially women and children, risking high levels of civilian casualties and other human rights violations. Lack of accountability for grave human rights violations will hamper genuine reconciliation among the parties.
132. With regard to cooperation with other entities, in line with its mandate, the Office will continue to partner with the international community and international non-governmental organizations to facilitate and support the work of the Civil Society Support Room and the Syrian Women's Advisory Board. The Office will also continue to liaise with specialized international organizations (for example, the International Committee of the Red Cross) in the context of its work on the file of detainees, abductees and missing persons.
133. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, cooperation will continue with the resident coordinators and the agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations operating in the Syrian Arab Republic and the region, including through the Office's presence in Damascus. In addition, agencies working in the Syrian Arab Republic are represented within the Inter-Agency Task Force on the country, which ensures the coordination and coherence of United Nations political, humanitarian, human rights and other efforts in the country.
134. The Office integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate, and will continue to consult regularly with the Syrian Women's Advisory Board and diverse women representatives from civil society to hear their perspectives on a sustainable and inclusive political solution.

Programme performance in 2021

Advancement of the implementation of the road map as outlined in resolution 2254 (2015) for the political process in the Syrian Arab Republic

135. The Special Envoy carried out the Secretary-General's good offices to advance towards the full implementation of Security Council resolution 2254 (2015). He prioritized engaging with the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the opposition in substantive negotiations. He also consulted broadly with national, regional and international stakeholders to end the violence and create the conditions for an inclusive, credible and comprehensive political solution.
136. The Special Envoy expended significant efforts towards facilitating the work of the Constitutional Committee. After the agreement of the Government and the Syrian Negotiation Commission to a package deal on the agenda, methodology and schedule of meetings, the members of the Committee started submitting proposed constitutional texts.
137. The Special Envoy also advocated progress on full, safe and unhindered humanitarian access. He emphasized the issue of detainees, abductees and missing persons and stressed the need to pursue meaningful action at scale. Furthermore, the Special Envoy continued to engage with Syrian women's representatives. Throughout 2021, the mission held regular meetings with the Syrian Women's Advisory Board and other civil society groups to ensure inclusivity and gender mainstreaming in the political process. Progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see table 22).

Table 22

Performance measure

2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)
Composition of the Constitutional Committee and its terms of reference and core rules of procedures negotiated and agreed, followed by its launch in Geneva	Constitutional Committee meetings in Geneva, in tandem with international engagements on other elements of the political process, in accordance with Council resolution 2254 (2015), to improve conditions on the ground, build trust and confidence and open a path to credible negotiations	Constitutional Committee started discussions, based on its terms of reference, to find agreement on basic constitutional principles, while international engagements on other elements of the political process, in accordance with Council resolution 2254 (2015), were deepened

Impact of the pandemic

138. The continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic into 2021 had an impact on the implementation of mandate as health protocols and travel limitations posed challenges to the format of political engagements. The Special Envoy continued to engage with national, regional and international stakeholders in face-to-face meetings to the extent possible owing to the sensitive nature of the discussions.

Planned results for 2023

Establishing and advancing a credible, inclusive and comprehensive political process to advance on all elements of Security Council resolution 2254 (2015)

Programme performance in 2021 and target for 2023

139. The mission's work contributed to the Constitutional Committee making progress in its discussions by securing the agreement of the parties to start submitting constitutional draft texts, which met the planned target of the Constitutional Committee making progress.

Lessons learned and planned change

140. The lesson for the mission was the need to continue to expand its engagement beyond the traditional interlocutors, including international stakeholders, firstly to broaden national ownership over the political process, and secondly to expand the scope of issues that are addressed in the political process. In applying the lesson, the mission will further broaden its scope and work with a wider range of stakeholders to ensure a comprehensive and holistic approach towards the implementation of Security Council resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#). Progress towards the objective and the target for 2023 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 23).

Table 23

Performance measure

<i>2019 (actual)</i>	<i>2020 (actual)</i>	<i>2021 (actual)</i>	<i>2022 (planned)</i>	<i>2023 (planned)</i>
Constitutional Committee launched in Geneva, facilitated by the United Nations, and discussions on other elements of the political process	Continuation of the work of the Constitutional Committee in tandem with progress on the broader political process in accordance with Security Council resolution 2254 (2015)	Constitutional Committee makes progress in its discussions, based on its terms of reference, in tandem with progress on the broader political process in accordance with Council resolution 2254 (2015)	Constitutional Committee produces tangible results in tandem with sustained and substantive negotiations between the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the opposition to advance the full implementation of Council resolution 2254 (2015)	Constitutional Committee continues producing tangible results in tandem with sustained negotiations and consultations to advance the full implementation of Council resolution 2254 (2015)

Deliverables

141. Table 24 below lists all deliverables of the mission.

Table 24

Deliverables for the period 2021–2023, by category and subcategory

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>	<i>2021 actual</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>	<i>2023 planned</i>
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	160	50	160	144
1. Meetings of the Security Council	12	12	12	12
2. Meetings of the Task Force on the Ceasefire of the International Syria Support Group	12	1	12	–
3. Meetings of the Task Force on Humanitarian Access of the International Syria Support Group	24	20	24	20
4. Meetings of the large body of the Constitutional Committee	12	–	12	12
5. Meetings of the small body of the Constitutional Committee	100	17	100	100
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	8	16	8	8
6. Workshops for all Syrian stakeholders on topics relating to the peace talks, such as governance, constitution, elections, security governance/counter-terrorism and confidence-building measures	8	16	8	8

Category and subcategory	2021 planned	2021 actual	2022 planned	2023 planned
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C. Substantive deliverables

Good offices: provision of good offices to facilitate an inclusive Syrian-led and owned political solution to the Syrian conflict, which will meet the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people to dignity, freedom and justice based on the principles of equality and non-discrimination.

Consultation, advice and advocacy: consultation, advice and advocacy in support of the political process with Member States and regional and international organizations; consultations and advice as a member of the Working Group on the release of detainees/abductees, the handover of bodies and the identification of missing persons; consultations in support of the political process with representatives of civil society organizations; consultations in support of the political process with women's representatives and women organizations.

D. Communication deliverables

External and media relations: press statements, interviews, video messages and briefings stressing the importance of political dialogue, the end of violence, human rights violations, humanitarian access and the role of women in the peace process.

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2023

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 25

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2021	2022	2023	Variance	
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent	2023 vs. 2022 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	—	—	—	—	—
Civilian personnel costs	8 652.6	9 169.8	8 406.1	—	(763.7)
Operational costs	3 275.4	6 962.8	7 159.6	—	196.8
Total (net of staff assessment)	11 928.0	16 132.6	15 565.7	—	(566.9)

Table 26

Positions

	Professional and higher categories								General Service and related categories		National staff				
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service ^a	Total inter- national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteer
															Total
Approved 2022	1	1	1	3	8	14	14	—	42	10	8	60	—	31	—
Proposed 2023	1	1	1	3	8	14	11	—	39	10	8	57	—	31	—
Change	—	—	—	—	—	—	(3)	—	(3)	—	—	(3)	—	—	(3)

^a Other level, unless otherwise stated.

142. The proposed resource requirements for 2023 for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria amount to \$15,565,700 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$8,406,100) for the continuation of 88 positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 3 D-1, 8 P-5, 14 P-4, 11 P-3, 10 Field Service,

8 General Service and 31 Local level), as well as operational costs (\$7,159,600), comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$142,400), official travel (\$1,141,100), facilities and infrastructure (\$3,502,200), ground transportation (\$367,700), air transportation (\$356,000), communications and information technology (\$396,400), medical (\$7,800) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$1,246,000).

143. For 2023, the following changes are proposed to the staffing complement:
 - (a) Abolishment of two P-3 positions in combination with the establishment of one P-4 position. It is proposed that one Political Affairs Officer (P-3) and one Finance and Budget Officer (P-3), both based in Geneva, be abolished, in combination with the proposed establishment of one Administrative Officer (P-4) in Geneva. The proposal will allow the Mission to widen its candidate pool to those competent in a wide range of functions including finance, budget and administrative matters, and to streamline its support for the Constitutional Committee and the overall mandate of the Special Envoy;
 - (b) Abolishment of two long-vacant positions in Damascus: 1 Military Adviser (P-4) and 1 Field Interpreter (P-3);
 - (c) Redeployment of one existing Finance Assistant position (Field Service) within the mission to the Kuwait Joint Support Office to supplement the staffing capacity of the back office.
144. A vacancy rate of 35 per cent has been applied to estimates for continuing international positions based on the average vacancy rate in 2021. A vacancy rate of 50 per cent has been applied to the position proposed to be established. Resource requirements for national positions were estimated on the assumption of full incumbency.
145. The decrease in the requirements proposed for 2023 compared with the appropriation for 2022 is attributable mainly to lower requirements under civilian personnel costs owing to the application of a higher vacancy rate of 35 per cent for international positions as compared with 27.6 per cent in the approved 2022 budget, as well as the proposed abolishment of long-vacant positions. The reduced requirements under civilian personnel are offset partly by increased requirements under operational costs, attributable mainly to additional requirements under air operations for charter air service due to the lack of commercial flights between Geneva and Damascus to transport members of the Constitutional Committee, partly offset by lower requirements under facilities and infrastructure due mainly to a new lower-cost contract for rental of office space in Damascus.

Extrabudgetary resources

146. In 2022, extrabudgetary resources of \$500,000 under the purview of the Office of the Special Envoy for Syria are supporting the Office of the Special Envoy in its role of facilitating the Constitutional Committee through the provision of substantive, logistical, security and support arrangements, including liaison with interlocutors of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the opposition, civil society, including women's groups and regional and international stakeholders, as well as other activities.
147. For 2023, extrabudgetary resources of \$500,000 under the purview of the Office of the Special Envoy for Syria are projected to support the Office of the Special Envoy in its role of facilitating the Constitutional Committee.

7. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa

(\$1,921,000)

Foreword

The establishment of the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa in 2018 was largely driven by dynamic changes in the region. The Office is mandated to support the Horn of Africa region in sustaining gains in peace and security, encompassing all the countries of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), including Eritrea. While new trends and challenges have emerged since 2018, and others have resurfaced, the Office has worked with partners to identify entry points for engagement to best address these challenges.

Over the course of 2023, the Office of the Special Envoy will adjust to the new challenges in the region, while continuing to coordinate and enhance the coherence of the collective work of the United Nations in the region, and focus on the prevention of crises affecting human security through joined-up action in support of Member States' national and regional strategies in the pursuit of lasting peace and sustainable development. In this regard, I will provide political leadership and coordinated implementation of the comprehensive regional prevention strategy for the Horn of Africa, with a focus on supporting regional peace, security and long-term stability; building resilience and promoting socioeconomic development; promoting inclusive and responsive governance; and supporting sustainable natural resources management and climate resilience. In addition, I will work closely with the African Union and IGAD to support their efforts in achieving a more peaceful and prosperous Horn of Africa. I look forward to representing the Secretary-General in this effort.

(Signed) Hanna **Tetteh**
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa

A. Proposed programme plan for 2023 and programme performance in 2021

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

148. The overall objective of the mission is to work closely with and support IGAD member States, in line with the framework for cooperation between the United Nations and IGAD signed in Djibouti on 17 November 2015, and other regional organizations in promoting peace and security across the Horn of Africa. This primarily involves enhancing subregional capacities for conflict prevention and mediation and addressing cross-cutting issues. On this basis, the mission supports the good offices of the Secretary-General. The mission has been tasked with enhancing linkages in the work of the United Nations and other partners in the Horn of Africa region, with a view to promoting a joined-up regional approach, including through facilitating coordination and information exchange within the United Nations system.
149. The mandate of the mission derives from an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2018/955](#) and [S/2018/979](#)), when the remit of the mandate of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan was expanded to cover the entire Horn of Africa region, following previous exchanges of letters (including [S/2016/258](#) and [S/2016/259](#)). In line with the letters of 2018, the mission also continues to carry out the functions previously performed by the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan relating to the maintenance of good and peaceful neighbourly relations between the Sudan and South Sudan, established pursuant to the exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council in 2011 ([S/2011/474](#) and [S/2011/475](#)). The mandate includes cooperation with the African Union High-level Implementation Panel in efforts to implement Security Council resolution [2046 \(2012\)](#), in which the Council called upon the Sudan and South Sudan to reach an agreement on critical issues, including: (a) the full and urgent advancement of all outstanding issues from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement; and (b) the easing of tensions and the facilitation of the resumption of negotiations on post-secession relations and the normalization of their relations.
150. The Horn of Africa region has long been a focus of United Nations engagement and investment. The region faces major challenges, including long-standing civil conflicts and unrest, poverty and vulnerability to climate change. The region also possesses significant opportunities, however, including rapid economic growth in several countries, a young and dynamic population and new momentum for regional cooperation. Realizing the region's enormous potential requires a collective approach, tackling shared challenges in a coordinated manner. The task of the mission is to support the region at this critical juncture and ensure that it benefits from the full range of the expertise and capacities of the United Nations.

Programme of work

Objective

151. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to establish and maintain good and peaceful neighbourly relations between the countries of the Horn of Africa region, encompassing Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, the Sudan and Uganda, with a view to consolidating and sustaining gains in peace and security and enhancing regional conflict prevention.

Strategy

152. To contribute to the objective, the Office will:
 - (a) Promote regional peace and security, resilience and socioeconomic development, inclusive and responsive governance and sustainable natural resources development and climate resilience. This will be done by providing political leadership for the United Nations engagement in these areas and ensure joined-up action and system-wide ownership of outcomes through the comprehensive regional prevention strategy for the Horn of Africa;
 - (b) Support IGAD in strengthening the link between early warning and early response, increasing its capacity to respond to and resolve conflicts, including through mediation and improving information-sharing and knowledge management by learning from good practices in the region and beyond. This will be done by deploying the Secretary-General's good offices and leveraging the collective influence of IGAD member States to support dialogue and joint initiatives among the countries;
 - (c) Work closely with and support the African Union, the African Union High-level Implementation Panel and other relevant regional organizations in addressing recent and emerging security threats. This will be done by information-sharing, the convening of regular meetings with relevant partners and other special envoys in the Horn of Africa region and the development of appropriate messages and approaches for supporting regional peace and security.
153. For 2023, the mission's planned deliverables will support Member States' ongoing management of and recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. Such planned deliverables and activities include continuing its enhanced partnership with IGAD and supporting IGAD in its regional response to the pandemic. Following the assistance that the mission provided to IGAD in 2020 by mobilizing United Nations experts to provide substantive support in finalizing the IGAD regional response strategy to address COVID-19, the mission will continue to support the implementation of the strategy, as needed and when requested.
154. Reflecting the importance of continuous improvement and responding to the needs of Member States, the mission has mainstreamed lessons learned and best practices related to the adjustments to and adaptation of its programme owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. This includes incorporating the issue of the impact of COVID-19 in the comprehensive regional prevention strategy and assessing the pandemic's impact in analytical reports and code cables.
155. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
 - (a) Strengthened subregional capacities and improved relations and enhanced mutual trust and confidence between countries of the region to address the root causes of conflicts. More specifically, these actions are expected to result in strengthened synergies between partners in the region and the alignment of interventions and responses with the respective strategic frameworks of the United Nations, IGAD and the African Union;
 - (b) Operationalizing the Secretary-General's vision of prevention through further implementing the action plan of the comprehensive regional prevention strategy;
 - (c) Strengthened partnership with IGAD and the African Union.

External factors for 2023

156. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2023 is based on the following assumptions:
 - (a) Opportunities exist to address long-standing sources of tension, particularly through shuttle diplomacy;
 - (b) IGAD and the African Union continue to be fully engaged in the maintenance of peace and security in the region, paying special attention to Ethiopia, Somalia, the Sudan and South Sudan;

- (c) States in the region continue to engage constructively with the Special Envoy and continue to work with the United Nations in the area of capacity-building, in particular in the area of mediation and conflict prevention and resolution;
 - (d) South Sudanese parties, with support from the region, progressively show commitment to the implementation of the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan and are prepared to consolidate gains;
 - (e) The relationship between the Sudan and South Sudan remains constructive, enabling direct negotiations between the two countries on outstanding bilateral issues, including the situation of Abyei and its final status.
157. Where feasible, the programme plan for 2023 continues to incorporate novel approaches to implement mandates that were put in place in response to the changed operational conditions associated with the COVID-19 pandemic. At the same time, the programme plan for 2023 assumes that those operational conditions have improved and allow for mandate implementation through formerly established approaches. Any modifications to planned deliverables would be in pursuance of the objectives, strategies and mandates and would be reported as part of the programme performance information.
 158. With regard to cooperation with other entities, in order to capitalize on the opportunities for closer cooperation on peace and security in the Horn of Africa, the mission will continue to work closely with IGAD and its member States and other organizations such as the African Union and the European Union. Support will be provided to address the regional dimensions of crises and conflicts in the Horn of Africa, with a particular focus on their cross-border and regional implications. The mission will also cooperate with the African Union High-level Implementation Panel to support the bilateral negotiations between the Sudan and South Sudan to resolve outstanding issues, including finding a settlement to the issue of the final status of Abyei. In addition, the mission will continue to work closely with the African Union, IGAD, the troika and other Member States supporting political cooperation in the region. The mission will continue to provide technical and advisory support for the IGAD secretariat, part of which will include supporting the implementation of the updated regional action plan on women and peace, and security in support of the implementation of Security Council resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#) and regional commitments by Member States.
 159. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the mission will engage with special representatives of the Secretary-General, resident coordinators and peace and development advisers in the countries of the region, and with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes that are active in the areas identified as collective priorities by the United Nations system.
 160. The mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate, and good offices and planned missions will include gender-sensitive and focused activities. With regard to seminars and workshops, gender-related aspects are included in the agenda of those events. Much of the Horn of Africa region's potential hinges on the meaningful involvement of women and youth in its efforts to promote stability and prosperity. With this in mind, the Special Envoy will continue to work with relevant stakeholders to promote inclusive messaging to enhance the participation of women in all political and peace processes. The Special Envoy will actively engage in regional and global meetings to lobby for the acceleration of the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda.

Evaluation activities

161. The following evaluations completed in 2021 have guided the programme plan for 2023: two biannual review reports on the implementation of the comprehensive regional prevention strategy and the United Nations-IGAD Secretariat-to-secretariat meeting reporting on implementation of the joint matrix.

162. The results and lessons of the evaluations referenced above have been taken into account for the programme plan for 2023. For example, the priority activities in the implementation matrix of the comprehensive regional prevention strategy have been adjusted to meet current trends and challenges in the Horn of Africa, including for example on climate security and the impact of COVID-19.
163. The following evaluations are planned for 2023: two biannual review reports on the implementation of the comprehensive regional prevention strategy and the annual United Nations-IGAD Secretariat-to-secretariat meeting reporting on implementation of the joint matrix.

Programme performance in 2021

Enhanced collective action in implementing the prevention agenda in the Horn of Africa and deepened partnership in the region through collaboration with the Intergovernmental Authority on Development

164. During 2021, the mission continued to coordinate the implementation of the comprehensive regional prevention strategy, encouraging collective action by United Nations entities in the Horn of Africa. Regular meetings were held with participation from across the United Nations family to review the status of the strategy's implementation and make adjustments on priority activities. Furthermore, in July 2021, the mission convened a workshop with the special representatives of the Secretary-General in the region to discuss developments in the Horn of Africa and identify areas of engagement for the United Nations. In addition, the mission continued its efforts to support regional peace, security and long-term stability, including for the crisis in Ethiopia and the relations between the Sudan and South Sudan. Collaboration with the IGAD Special Envoys, the African Union and the African Union High-level Implementation Panel deepened, which resulted in improved regional approaches to the prevention of crisis and conflict.
165. In line with the IGAD-United Nations joint framework for cooperation on peace and security, the mission supported the implementation of the matrix of joint activities and worked with IGAD units and programmes. In June, the mission and IGAD co-hosted the Secretariat-to-secretariat meeting, which brought together relevant United Nations entities and IGAD divisions to review activities proposed in the matrix. In addition, the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa continued consultations with IGAD counterparts, including the IGAD Executive Secretary, to coordinate efforts for peace and stability in the region, including support for the IGAD Special Envoy for South Sudan on issues related to the peace process, and held consultations with leaders in the region. Progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see table 27).

Table 27
Performance measure

2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)
Secretariat-to-secretariat meeting to translate the broad areas of collaboration into priority actions; and operationalization and implementation of joint activities	The capacity of IGAD to provide early warning and policy advice on conflict response measures to its member States was strengthened through the implementation of the joint framework for cooperation through joint initiatives and regular engagement	IGAD capacity to address cross-border and cross-cutting issues was strengthened, creating the conditions for joint action taken by IGAD member States on the prevention of conflict and on regional initiatives to reduce vulnerability and address the root causes of crises

Impact of the pandemic

166. The continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic into 2021 had an impact on the implementation of mandates, in particular in the following areas: (a) the cancellation of in-person consultations with South Sudanese authorities and stakeholders in preparation for the Security Council briefing on resolution 2046 (2012); (b) the cancellation of the annual IGAD-United Nations high-level dialogue on peace and security; and (c) the postponement of the in-person biannual meeting on the implementation of the comprehensive regional prevention strategy. As a result of the continuation of the pandemic, the mission employed alternative methods, including conducting and attending virtual meetings. Other meetings that could not be held virtually were cancelled or postponed.

Planned result for 2023**Enhanced collective action in implementing the prevention agenda in the Horn of Africa****Programme performance in 2021 and target for 2023**

167. The mission's work contributed to the maintenance of good and peaceful neighbourly relations between the countries in the Horn of Africa region and enhanced regional conflict prevention, as well as deepened collaboration in addressing peace and security issues between IGAD, the African Union and the United Nations, which met the planned target of enhancing regional capacity to address and prevent conflict.
168. In 2023, the mission will continue to provide the Secretary-General's good offices and will provide increased support for the IGAD Special Envoys, the African Union and the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, including by undertaking joint missions and messaging on conflict prevention and resolution in the Horn of Africa. This is expected to result in improved regional approaches to the prevention of crises and conflict by strengthening the capacity of the IGAD secretariat in conflict prevention, negotiation and mediation. This is also expected to deepen the collaboration between the African Union, IGAD and other regional and subregional organizations in supporting the implementation of existing peace agreements. Furthermore, the mission will continue to coordinate implementation of the United Nations comprehensive regional prevention strategy, encompassing peace and security issues, socioeconomic development, governance challenges and climate risks and resilience.

Lessons learned and planned change

169. The lesson for the mission was the need to adjust the implementation matrix to include new and emerging threats as well as to enhance implementation. In applying the lesson, the mission will continue to engage with United Nations entities and review the membership of the pillars to ensure that implementation of the strategy continues apace and that the strategy reflects an all-of-United Nations approach. In addition, in response to the biannual reviews of implementation, the activities in the implementation matrix of the prevention strategy will continue to be revised and updated to reflect priority engagements and realities on the ground. Expected progress towards the objective and the target for 2023 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 28).

Table 28
Performance measure

2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (planned)	2023 (planned)
The executive committee established by the Secretary-General endorses the prevention strategy; the Office of the Special Envoy for the Horn of Africa convenes a workshop to kick-start the implementation of the strategy	Implementation of the action plan through collective actions and messaging on conflict prevention	Regional capacity to address and prevent conflict and crisis in the region enhanced	Implementation of the action plan through partnerships and collaboration with other United Nations entities, as well as IGAD and the African Union	Revision and implementation of the prevention strategy through partnerships and collaboration with other United Nations entities, as well as IGAD and the African Union

Deliverables

170. Table 29 below lists all deliverables of the mission.

Table 29
Deliverables for the period 2021–2023, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2021 planned	2021 actual	2022 planned	2023 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	2	2	2	2
Meetings of the Security Council	2	2	2	2
C. Substantive deliverables				
<p>Good offices: provision of good offices through engagement, including shuttle and quiet diplomacy, on issues related to peace consolidation and conflict prevention, including the implementation of bilateral agreements and the completion of negotiations on outstanding bilateral issues. This includes engagements with the authorities in the Sudan and South Sudan on their bilateral relations, as well as other leaders, officials and stakeholders in the region regarding regional peace and security issues.</p> <p>Consultation, advice and advocacy: consultations and advice on consolidating recent gains in peace and security in the Horn of Africa region; advice on enhancing subregional capacities to address cross-border and cross-cutting issues. Consultations will be undertaken with IGAD member States and the IGAD secretariat, civil society organizations and partners working in or on the IGAD region. Engagement with the African Union, including the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, will also continue.</p>				
D. Communication deliverables				
<p>External and media relations: social media outreach and briefings to raise awareness of key developments and promote support for addressing challenges to peace and security in the region. Social media outreach and briefings will target United Nations entities working in the region, United Nations Headquarters, partners and IGAD member States.</p>				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2023

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 30

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2021	2022	2023		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent	2023 vs. 2022 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	—	—	—	—	—
Civilian personnel costs	1 489.1	1 581.8	1 657.9	—	76.1
Operational costs	105.8	181.8	263.1	62.7	81.3
Total (net of staff assessment)	1 594.9	1 763.6	1 921.0	62.7	157.4

Table 31

Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff				
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter- national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteer	Total
Approved 2022	1	–	–	1	–	2	1	–	5	–	–	5	2	2	–	9
Proposed 2023	1	–	–	1	–	2	1	–	5	–	–	5	2	2	–	9
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

171. In response to the new challenges and dynamics in the Horn of Africa, for 2023 it is proposed to reconfigure the Office of the Special Envoy by increasing its presence in the region through redeploying some of its staff to Nairobi, in line with the Office's regional mandate and to strengthen its engagement across the subregion. This reconfiguration will be implemented within the existing approved staffing resources.
172. Nairobi constitutes an important diplomatic hub in the Horn of Africa's dynamics. It provides a constructive centre for ongoing peace and mediation processes in the region, including those pertaining to Ethiopia, Somalia, South Sudan and the Sudan. By redeploying key staff resources to Nairobi, the Office will be able to engage on pertinent initiatives without having to incur additional expenses in the medium to long term. Furthermore, the synergies of joint work with the United Nations Environment Programme and the regional office of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, both based in Nairobi, could also be enhanced with respect to regional climate security and environmental risks, as part of the comprehensive regional prevention strategy.
173. In view of the above, the following staffing changes are proposed for 2023:
- Redeployment of three international positions from Addis Ababa to Nairobi, comprising the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General (Under-Secretary-General), one position of Principal Political Affairs Officer (D-1) and one position of Special Assistant, Political Affairs (P-3). The proposed redeployment will facilitate the direct engagement of the Office in regional initiatives on relevant matters by increasing its regional reach. The Office will also benefit from the proximity to other regional offices based in Nairobi with which it is mandated to work

and access to the regional platform, facilities and support of the United Nations Office at Nairobi;

- (b) Redeployment of one position of Political Affairs Officer (P-4) from Addis Ababa back to Khartoum, where the position was initially established in 2011 and where it was based until 2018 when the mandate of the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan was expanded to cover the entire Horn of Africa. In line with the above-proposed reconfiguration of the Office and its regional mandate, this position will return to its original location in Khartoum;
 - (c) Abolishment of two national positions in Addis Ababa, consisting of one Administrative Assistant (Local level) and one Driver (Local level), and re-establishment of these positions in Nairobi. While facilities, communications and information technology and logistical support will be provided by the United Nations Office at Nairobi, there is a need to ensure the continued availability of a dedicated capacity of an Administrative Assistant and a Driver to support the operations of the Office.
174. With the above proposed relocation and reconfiguration, there will be four positions that retain their original duty stations, consisting of two positions of Political Affairs Officer (1 P-4 and 1 National Professional Officer) in Khartoum and two positions of Political Affairs Officer (1 P-4 and 1 National Professional Officer) in Juba, all reporting directly to the Principal Political Affairs Officer (D-1) to be based in Nairobi. The Office will continue to maintain a strong presence in Addis Ababa utilizing extrabudgetary resources. The Office will put in place measures to enhance continuously the close coordination between its three teams deployed to the Sudan, South Sudan and Ethiopia and the team based in Nairobi, including through regular communication and joint missions in the Horn of Africa region.
 175. Reflecting the above proposals, the proposed resource requirements for 2023 for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa amount to \$1,921,000 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$1,657,900) for the nine positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 D-1, 2 P-4, 1 P-3, 2 National Professional Officer and 2 Local level), as well as operational costs (\$263,100), comprising costs for official travel (\$110,200), facilities and infrastructure (\$27,400), ground transportation (\$64,600), communications and information technology (\$41,200), medical (\$1,900) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$17,800).
 176. A vacancy rate of 3 per cent has been applied to the five international positions (comprising three to be redeployed to Nairobi and two that will be based in Khartoum and Juba, respectively) based on recent incumbency. The proposed resources for the two National Professional Officer positions that will continue to be based in the Sudan and South Sudan are calculated on the assumption of full incumbency based on actual incumbency. For the two Local level positions proposed to be re-established in Nairobi, a vacancy rate of 35 per cent is applied, according to standard budgeting practice, to take into account the time required for recruitment.
 177. The increase in the requirements proposed for 2023 compared with the appropriation for 2022 is attributable mainly to: (a) an increase of \$76,100 under civilian personnel costs due to application of the latest salary scales; and (b) an increase of \$81,300 under operational costs due mainly to the requirement to provide for rental of office premises at the United Nations Office at Nairobi and the non-recurring requirement to replace one of the mission's two United Nations-owned vehicles that has reached the end of its operational life.

Extrabudgetary resources

178. In 2022, extrabudgetary resources amounting to approximately \$1,064,400 are being utilized to provide for five positions (1 P-5, 1 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 P-2 and 1 Local level), for consultancy services and for temporary administrative support.

179. In 2023, extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$1,100,000 will be utilized to provide for the continuation of five positions (1 P-5, 1 P-4, 1 P-3, 1 P-2 and 1 Local level), as well as for consultancy and temporary administrative support services.
180. The increase in the estimated extrabudgetary resources to be utilized in 2023 as compared with 2022 is due to the anticipated resumption of in-person events.

8. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region

(\$5,740,400)

Foreword

The signatory countries of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region have further intensified diplomatic outreach and bilateral cooperation in various areas, notably political and security cooperation and economic integration. Despite the important progress that has been made, several challenges persist, such as the threat of armed groups, the illicit exploitation and trade in natural resources, human rights violations and humanitarian crises. All actors in and beyond the Great Lakes region must therefore remain firm in their support and commitment to sustain the progress achieved thus far and resolve remaining challenges.

The United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region ([S/2020/1168](#)) and its action plan, adopted in October 2020 and July 2021, respectively, have chartered a clear path for United Nations action in the region over the next few years, in support of the objectives of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for dialogue, durable peace and development.

In 2023, I will therefore continue working towards the implementation of the Strategy and its action plan, with a particular emphasis on good offices to promote greater trust and the normalization of relations between countries in the region. Strengthening partnerships with subregional, regional and international partners will remain central to these efforts, from political, security, economic and judicial cooperation to matters related to the women and peace and security and youth and peace and security agendas. In this regard, I count on Member States' continued support to advance the implementation of the mandate of my Office, in support of a peaceful, stable, inclusive and prosperous Great Lakes region.

(Signed) Huang Xia
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region

A. Proposed programme plan for 2023 and programme performance in 2021

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

181. Established in 2013, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region is responsible for supporting the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region, which was signed on 24 February 2013 by Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Uganda the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia, as well as representatives of the United Nations, the African Union, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the Southern African Development Community (SADC), acting as guarantors. On 31 January 2014, Kenya and the Sudan also signed the Framework. The Framework outlines key national, regional and international commitments required to end the recurring cycles of violence in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and address the root causes of conflict in the region.
182. The mandate of the mission derives from Security Council resolution [2098 \(2013\)](#) and subsequent Council resolutions and documents, including resolutions [2147 \(2014\)](#), [2211 \(2015\)](#), [2277 \(2016\)](#), [2348 \(2017\)](#), [2502 \(2019\)](#), [2556 \(2020\)](#) and [2612 \(2021\)](#). Recently, in a press statement of 28 April 2022, the Council reaffirmed its full support for the Special Envoy and encouraged further engagement with the region to address the remaining challenges in the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework and to promote peace and stability in the region. The Council further welcomed the United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region ([S/2020/1168](#)) and its action plan.
183. Since early 2019, a positive momentum has emerged to reinvigorate cooperation towards peace, stability and development in the region. Against this backdrop, on 22 October 2020 the Secretary-General approved the United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region, which was prepared by the mission and published on 4 December 2020. The Strategy, developed following extensive consultations, is designed to provide the political and operational framework for United Nations action to support the implementation of the commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework. It is structured around three pillars: peace, security and justice; sustainable development and shared prosperity; and resilience to longstanding and emerging challenges. The action plan to implement the Strategy, covering policy and programmatic priority activities for the period from 2021 to 2023, was adopted by the senior policy group for the strategy in July 2021.
184. In 2023, the Office will support the implementation of the Strategy and its action plan, including through the sustained engagement of the Governments of the signatory countries and key partners to seize and consolidate the positive momentum in the region. Through the Secretary-General's good offices, the Office will maintain its efforts towards easing tensions, building confidence and encouraging political dialogue between countries. The Office will also continue to support the regional priorities identified by the countries of the Great Lakes region in efforts to implement the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, including on security, economic and judicial cooperation and the rule of law. In the area of security, the Office will further step up its support for regional efforts aimed at putting an end to the persistent threat posed by armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, including with a view to the recent resurgence of the Mouvement du 23 mars and the continued activities of the Allied Democratic Forces. In doing so, the Office will also support, as appropriate, the decisions taken at the second conclave summit, which brought together Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda on 21 April 2022 in Nairobi, and at which it was agreed that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo would pursue political consultations with local armed groups active in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, the first phase of which took place from 23 to 27 April. It was also agreed at the summit that a regional force would be deployed to engage militarily those local armed groups unwilling to partake in the political consultations, as well as foreign armed groups that failed to disarm and return to their

countries of origin immediately and unconditionally. Finally, the Office will continue its efforts to support the women and peace and security agenda, as well as promote the economic empowerment and inclusion and the political participation of youth in matters of regional relevance.

Programme of work

Objective

185. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to advance the effective implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework by supporting and facilitating political, security and economic engagements among and between the signatory countries, while ensuring coherent and coordinated support from regional and international organizations and other partners, in line with the United Nations Strategy for the Great Lakes Region and its action plan.

Strategy

186. To contribute to the objective, the Office will:
- (a) Deploy the Secretary-General's good offices, including discreet and shuttle diplomacy, collaborate closely with the co-guarantors of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework and reinforce coordination with international partners, including the International Contact Group for the Great Lakes Region and international financial institutions;
 - (b) Support the implementation of a regional non-military approach against negative forces; facilitate confidence-building consultations between the chiefs of military and civilian intelligence and security services from concerned countries; help strengthen existing security cooperation mechanisms, taking into account the decisions of the second conclave summit and related follow-up efforts by countries in the region, as applicable; and promote the repatriation and reintegration of former combatants, in line with international standards;
 - (c) Promote cross-border investments and responsible trade projects, including by furthering the implementation of the recommendations and decisions of the high-level workshop on natural resources held in 2021 in Khartoum and of the Great Lakes Investment and Trade Conference, rescheduled to 2022 owing to COVID-19;
 - (d) Promote the rule of law and regional judicial cooperation, as well as the protection of human rights, including by supporting targeted initiatives towards supporting Member States in implementing the 2019 Nairobi Declaration on Justice and Good Governance;
 - (e) Advocate for and support the effective participation of women and youth in political and peace processes.
187. For 2023, the mission's planned deliverables will support Member States' ongoing management of and recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. Such planned deliverables and activities include engaging with international partners, including international financial institutions, to support resource mobilization efforts for COVID-19 recovery plans for the region; continuing to advocate for the Secretary-General's policy brief on COVID-19 and human rights of April 2020 and his call for a global ceasefire, as echoed in Security Council resolution [2532 \(2020\)](#); and working with civil society organizations to promote inclusive approaches to recovery programmes.
188. The above-mentioned work is expected to contribute to:
- (a) Enhanced mutual trust between countries of the region;
 - (b) Improved relations, including concrete steps taken by countries to address issues of contention among them;
 - (c) Increased resort to regional mechanisms to address impunity and the upholding of the rule of law in the fight against serious crimes with a transborder dimension;

- (d) Increased mobilization and harmonization of support from the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework guarantor institutions, international partners and other stakeholders;
- (e) Enhanced cooperation among concerned countries to neutralize negative forces and increase support for regional disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, resettlement and reintegration initiatives through the activities of the contact coordination group and its operational cell on non-military measures;
- (f) Joint initiatives on comprehensive regional non-military measures against negative forces, including the role of civil society organizations, women and youth in the peace-building processes;
- (g) Increased bilateral and multilateral economic cooperation and support for concrete initiatives to curb the illicit exploitation of and trade in natural resources;
- (h) Strengthened regional judicial cooperation through the Great Lakes Judicial Cooperation Network as the main mechanism for cross-border cases;
- (i) A decrease of human rights violations in the region and an increase in the number of perpetrators held accountable.

External factors for 2023

189. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2023 is based on the following planning assumptions:
 - (a) Political will among the signatory countries of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework to implement national and regional commitments for enhanced regional cooperation and the stabilization of the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region;
 - (b) Continued security challenges in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo linked to the activities of local and foreign armed groups;
 - (c) The situation in the region is conducive to continued political dialogue among countries and effective collaboration with relevant regional organizations;
 - (d) Continued support for and focus on the Great Lakes region by Member States and international partners, including coordinated action and support for signatory countries.
190. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the Office cooperates with and supports signatory countries of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework on priority political, security and socioeconomic initiatives aimed at ensuring the implementation of national and regional commitments under the Framework. In an effort to promote the alignment of approaches and a strengthening of partnerships as outlined in the United Nations Strategy for the Great Lakes Region, the Special Envoy also encourages joint and/or harmonized initiatives by the co-guarantor institutions of the Framework. He also participates in the International Contact Group and engages in regular exchanges with other special envoys for the Great Lakes region. In support of the Framework's economic focus, the Special Envoy also cooperates with financial institutions, including the World Bank Group, the African Development Bank and other relevant partners.
191. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Office works closely with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), including in the context of the joint strategy of MONUSCO and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on a progressive and phased drawdown of MONUSCO, in support of efforts by the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to achieve its national commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework. The senior policy group, which is chaired by the Special Envoy, along with its implementation support mechanism, both established to facilitate the implementation of the United Nations Strategy for the Great Lakes Region, will continue to ensure alignment among United Nations missions and offices in the region, including, among others, the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa, MONUSCO and the United

Nations Office to the African Union, in addition to regional coordinators and representatives of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OHCHR, UNHCR, the Economic Commission for Africa and other United Nations agencies, funds and programmes.

192. The Office integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. In addition to high-level advocacy meetings and missions by women leaders throughout the region, the Office supports the Advisory Board for Women, Peace and Security in the Great Lakes Region in its efforts to advocate for women's participation and representation in peacebuilding, political and electoral processes, to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation capacities of the mechanisms on sexual and gender-based violence of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and to support cross-border communities in the prevention and resolution of conflict and election-related violence.

Programme performance in 2021

Support for an institutional framework to implement non-military measures

193. In 2021, the Office supported countries in the region in their efforts to establish the institutional framework for implementing non-military measures against negative forces, notably through the operationalization of the Contact and Coordination Group, which included the adoption of the Group's two-year action plan and the development of the terms of reference and modalities of work of its operational cell, based in Goma, Democratic Republic of the Congo. The Office also initiated resource mobilization efforts to support the implementation of the aforementioned action plan and to build and enhance disarmament, demobilization and reintegration capabilities in the five States members of the Group (Burundi, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Uganda and United Republic of Tanzania). Those States appointed delegates to the operational cell and the cell's coordinator, recruited by the Office of the Special Envoy, took up his duties in November 2021.
194. Concurrently, the Office supported efforts at the national and regional levels to advance the implementation of the Nairobi Declaration on Justice and Governance, adopted in 2019, and to promote the effective functioning of the Great Lakes Judicial Cooperation Network. In addition to building the capacities of national human rights institutions, the Office facilitated agreement among countries in the region on harmonized procedures for mutual legal assistance in criminal matters. Progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see table 32).

Table 32

Performance measure

2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)
Initial confidence-building meeting among security agencies of the countries concerned	Participation in regular confidence-building meetings among security agencies of the countries concerned and agreement on priority initiatives on the negative forces	Operationalization of the Contact and Coordination Group and its operational cell
Adoption by the Ministers of Justice of the States members of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region of the Nairobi Declaration on Justice and Good Governance	Effective implementation of the Nairobi Declaration on Justice and Good Governance	Strengthening of national human rights institutions through regional capacity-building workshops, in line with the Nairobi Declaration
Operationalization of the Great Lakes Judicial Cooperation Network, including cooperation among judiciaries in between the meetings of the Network	Progress in facilitating cross-border judicial cooperation, including through capacity-building on remote access to justice for members of the Great Lakes Judicial Cooperation Network	Agreement among members of the Great Lakes Judicial Cooperation Network on recommendations for harmonizing procedures concerning mutual legal assistance in criminal matters

Impact of the pandemic

195. The continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic into 2021 had an impact on the implementation of mandates, including: (a) the postponement of the tenth Summit of the Regional Oversight Mechanism of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework; (b) the postponement of the Great Lakes Investment and Trade Conference; and (c) the postponement of selected conferences, workshops, training events and technical missions that could not be conducted using other means or delivered online. Wherever practical, the Office reconfigured workshops and training events to allow for their delivery online.

Planned result for 2023**Strengthened relations among countries of the Great Lakes region****Programme performance in 2021 and target for 2023**

196. The Office's work contributed, inter alia, to: (a) ongoing dialogue efforts between countries in the region through the Special Envoy's discreet and shuttle diplomacy; (b) further confidence-building between countries and consensus on the way forward towards a comprehensive approach to security, comprising military and non-military measures; (c) agreement on a set of recommendations to curb the illicit exploitation of and trade in natural resources; and (d) capacity-building of key stakeholders, including women, youth and national human rights institutions, which met the planned target of the continuation of incremental dialogue between Burundi and Rwanda, including information exchange at the technical level, such as on security along the common border and the return of refugees, as well as initiatives taken by regional and subregional organizations and signatory countries of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework to support peace and inclusive and credible political and electoral processes. As outlined above, the target of holding in 2021 the tenth Summit of the Regional Oversight Mechanism, organized by the Democratic Republic of the Congo with the support of the Office, was not met, owing mainly to pandemic-related concerns. The Summit was instead held on 24 February 2022. The resumption of dialogue between Rwanda and Uganda and the implementation of related decisions taken under the quadripartite process, facilitated by Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, started in January 2022, and not, as envisaged, in 2021.
197. In 2023, the Office will further increase its political engagements, including discreet and shuttle diplomacy, in favour of good neighbourly relations and the resolution of contentious bilateral and multilateral issues. The good offices efforts will be bolstered by enhanced joint analysis among United Nations presences and with regional stakeholders, as well as tailored interventions on technical aspects, such as the provision of technical support for existing regional security, economic cooperation and rule of law mechanisms, among others. Support for regional efforts to address the persistent threat posed by armed groups in the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region will also remain a priority and will be further stepped up in the context of the Contact and Coordination Group on non-military measures, as well as in view of the decisions taken at the second conclave summit, as applicable.

Lessons learned and planned change

198. A principal lesson for the Office was the imperative of regional ownership and political will for efforts to promote lasting peace and stability. In applying the lesson, the Office will continue to strengthen its interactions with stakeholders from the region at all levels, including civil society, women and youth, to further bolster the Special Envoy's engagement at the political level. The multilayered approach already adopted, combining security with human rights and inclusion concerns, among others, will be further reinforced. Progress towards the objective and the target for 2023 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 33).

Table 33
Performance measure

2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (planned)	2023 (planned)
Signing of the memorandum of understanding between Rwanda and Uganda, facilitated by Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and follow-up meetings to make progress in the implementation of the memorandum	<p>Holding of the fourth quadripartite summit on 21 February 2020 between Rwanda and Uganda, with the facilitation of Angola and the Democratic Republic of the Congo</p> <p>Meeting of the guarantors of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework on 2 April 2020</p> <p>Meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Burundi and Rwanda on 19 October 2020</p>	<p>Enhanced consultations, coordination and joint action among the guarantor institutions in support of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework</p> <p>Continuation of incremental dialogue between Burundi and Rwanda, including information exchange at the technical level, such as on security along the common border and the return of refugees</p> <p>Continued commitment and consultations between Rwanda and Uganda towards the normalization of their bilateral relations</p> <p>Initiatives taken by regional and subregional organizations and signatory countries of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework to support peaceful, inclusive and credible political and electoral processes</p> <p>Operationalization of the Contact and Coordination Group and its operational cell</p> <p>Agreement on recommendations to curb the illicit exploitation of and trade in natural resources</p>	<p>Holding of the tenth Summit of the Regional Oversight Mechanism, the Ministerial Conference on Enhancing Judicial Cooperation and the Great Lakes Investment and Trade Conference</p> <p>Rapprochement between Rwanda and Uganda and between Burundi and Rwanda is sustained</p> <p>Initiatives by regional and subregional organizations to support peaceful and credible political and electoral processes</p> <p>Launch of the implementation of the Contact and Coordination Group action plan and development of its engagement strategy with armed groups, taking into consideration the decisions of the second conclave summit</p> <p>Start of the implementation of the natural resources recommendations by member States of the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region</p> <p>Implementation of the United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the</p>	<p>Decisions of the tenth Summit of the Regional Oversight Mechanism are followed up on or implemented effectively and enable the region to advance its regional peace, security and cooperation agenda</p> <p>Holding of the eleventh Summit of the Regional Oversight Mechanism and commemoration of the tenth anniversary of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework</p> <p>Initiatives under the second and third phases of the action plan of the United Nations Strategy for Peace Consolidation, Conflict Prevention and Conflict Resolution in the Great Lakes Region are implemented</p> <p>Progress in the implementation of the Contact and Coordination Group action plan and support for other security-related cooperation efforts by the region</p> <p>Progress in the implementation of the recommendations to curb the illicit exploitation of and trade in natural resources</p>

2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (planned)	2023 (planned)
		Capacity-building of women and youth	Great Lakes Region leads to enhanced joint analysis and joint initiatives of United Nations entities in key areas of regional security and sustainable development	Initiatives taken by the Advisory Board for Women, Peace and Security in the Great Lakes Region contribute to advancing women's participation in peacebuilding at various levels

Deliverables

199. Table 34 below lists all deliverables of the mission.

Table 34

Deliverables for the period 2021–2023, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2021 planned	2021 actual	2022 planned	2023 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	2	2	2	2
1. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council	2	2	2	2
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	5	3	5	5
2. Meetings of the Security Council, the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1533 (2004) concerning the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Peacebuilding Commission	5	3	5	5
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Field and technical cooperation projects (number of projects)	3	3	3	3
3. Projects on economic cooperation, land and conflict	2	2	2	2
4. Projects to promote cross-border trade and investment	1	1	1	1
Seminars, workshops and training events (number of days)	4	8	2	9
5. Workshop on exchange of lessons learned from elections and political processes	1	1	–	1
6. Workshop on economic cooperation, land and conflict	–	2	–	3
7. Workshops on resolving existing challenges in the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework	2	3	2	2
8. Workshop on youth employment and engagement on peace and security	1	1	–	1
9. Advisory Board for Women, Peace and Security in the Great Lakes Region annual meetings to support national/regional-level initiatives to empower women and achieve 30 per cent women's representation	–	1	–	2
C. Substantive deliverables				
Good offices: provision of good offices through engagement, including shuttle and discreet diplomacy, as well as through the facilitation of direct exchanges with regional leaders and senior representatives of signatory countries and co-guarantors of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework to advance the implementation of the Framework and address challenges to peace and security, including impunity for gross human rights violations; provision of good offices to the follow-up mechanism on the repatriation of disarmed combatants in line with international standards; good offices to enhance coordination and cooperation against the armed groups in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo; good offices to sustain international support for the implementation of the United Nations Great Lakes Strategy and its action plan.				

Category and subcategory	2021 planned	2021 actual	2022 planned	2023 planned
<p>Consultation, advice and advocacy: consultations to gain a shared regional and international assessment of the situation in the region; consultation and advice to gain a shared vision of regional human rights and humanitarian trends in the Great Lakes region; consultation and advice on delinking negative forces from natural resources revenues; advocacy to facilitate political conversation and agreement on regional integration with natural resources as a driver of shared prosperity; advocacy to advance gender equality in the region; advocacy to promote a concerted approach on the way forward in the region.</p> <p>Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions: fact-finding mission on women's political participation; monitoring missions with the follow-up mechanism on the repatriation of disarmed combatants; fact-finding and monitoring missions of the Technical Support Committee on priorities determined by the signatory countries.</p>				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2023

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 35

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2021	2022	2023		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent	2023 vs. 2022 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	—	—	—	—	—
Civilian personnel costs	3 526.4	4 265.7	4 838.3	—	572.6
Operational costs	676.0	868.2	902.1	—	33.9
Total (net of staff assessment)	4 202.4	5 133.9	5 740.4	—	606.5

Table 36

Positions

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>									<i>General Service and related categories</i>			<i>National staff</i>			<i>Total</i>
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security Services</i>	<i>General Service^a</i>	<i>Total international</i>	<i>National Professional Officer</i>	<i>Local level</i>	<i>United Nations Volunteer</i>	
Approved 2022	1	–	1	1	5	7	5	–	20	1	1	22	1	7	–	30
Proposed 2023	1	–	1	1	5	7	5	–	20	1	1	22	1	7	–	30
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

^a Other level, unless otherwise stated.

200. The proposed resource requirements for 2023 for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region amount to \$5,740,400 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$4,838,300) for the continuation of 30 positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 1 D-1, 5 P-5, 7 P-4, 5 P-3, 1 Field Service, 1 General Service, 1 National Professional Officer and 7 Local level), as well as operational costs (\$902,100), comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$25,100), official travel (\$260,300), facilities and infrastructure (\$61,600), ground transportation (\$39,000), air operations (\$68,600), communications and information technology (\$153,100), medical (\$14,000) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$280,400).

201. A vacancy rate of 5 per cent has been applied to estimates for the international positions. Resource requirements for national positions are estimated on the assumption of full incumbency.
202. The increase in the requirements proposed for 2023 compared with the appropriation for 2022 is attributable mainly to: (a) civilian personnel costs, resulting from the delayed impact of three positions approved in 2022 for which a vacancy rate of 50 per cent was applied in the previous period; and (b) other services, owing to increased requirements under translation, interpretation and conference management services.

Extrabudgetary resources

203. In 2022, the mission projects that extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$1.3 million will be utilized to support the mission in its implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework through various projects under different thematic areas.
204. In 2023, the mission projects that extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$1.6 million will be utilized to support the mission in its implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework through various projects under different thematic areas.
205. The increase in the estimated extrabudgetary resources to be utilized in 2023 as compared with 2022 is due to: (a) increased support provided to the signatory countries and co-guarantor institutions (African Union, International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and SADC) of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework in implementing the resolutions of the Heads of State at the tenth Summit of the Regional Oversight Mechanism, held in Kinshasa; (b) scaled-up engagement by the Office of the Special Envoy in leading and coordinating the United Nations system's efforts on the implementation of the priority initiatives of the action plan of the United Nations Strategy for the Great Lakes Region for 2022 and 2023.

9. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen

(\$17,430,600)

Foreword

The year 2021 ended on a tragic note for Yemen, where millions struggle with poverty, hunger and severe restrictions on their freedom of movement. The armed conflict continued unabated, its complexities making the quest for peace both more challenging and urgent. However, in early April 2022, the continued engagement of my Office with the Government of Yemen, the Saudi-led coalition and the Houthis resulted in an agreement on a two-month nationwide, renewable truce in Yemen. While implementation of its various components is still ongoing and remains challenging, the truce has initially resulted in a significant reduction in violence and civilian casualties across the country and relative improvements in the freedom of movement of people and goods, as well as some reduction in regional tensions. Furthermore, if successful, the truce may serve as an opportunity to launch a multitrack political process to find a negotiated settlement to the conflict.

The significance of such a step could not be overemphasized. The parties to the conflict have not directly discussed a broader set of issues since 2016, let alone a comprehensive settlement, and armed conflict has continued for over seven years. Civilians, including many women and children, have been killed, displaced and impoverished. Yemen's war continues also in the economic arena, with the warring sides battling over resources, trade flows and monetary policy, which affects the entire population. These elements have left Yemenis in an indefinite state of war.

It is long overdue for the parties to the conflict to engage in peaceful dialogue with one another under United Nations facilitation. My conviction remains that a structured and focused approach that does not shy away from the fundamental and complex challenges is required. For too long Yemenis have been without a political process and without hope that this conflict can end. Through initiating a structured process that tries to address the key elements of the conflict, hope for an end to the devastating military, political and economic battles can be restored.

My Office will do its utmost to establish a multitrack process that can produce durable solutions to this conflict, while seeking further opportunities for immediate de-escalation and consolidating recent gains. My ambition is for immediate as well as long-term political, security and economic priorities to be addressed within a multitrack process under United Nations auspices. I will also work to ensure the meaningful participation of women in all aspects of our engagement and to integrate gender perspectives across all issues. It is incumbent that the international community support Yemenis to charter a new, peaceful way forward.

(Signed) Hans **Grundberg**
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen

A. Proposed programme plan for 2023 and programme performance in 2021

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

206. The Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen is responsible for carrying out the good offices of the Secretary-General to enable the resumption of a peaceful, inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led political transition process that meets the legitimate demands and aspirations of the Yemeni people, including women and youth, for peaceful change and meaningful political, economic and social reform, as set out in the Initiative of the Gulf Cooperation Council and its implementation mechanism and the outcomes of the comprehensive National Dialogue Conference. The mandate derives from Security Council resolution 2014 (2011) and from subsequent Council resolutions, including resolutions 2051 (2012), 2140 (2014), 2201 (2015), 2216 (2015), 2266 (2015), 2342 (2017), 2402 (2018), 2451 (2018), 2452 (2019), 2456 (2019), 2481 (2019) and 2505 (2020), as well as exchanges of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2012/469 and S/2012/470, S/2016/488 and S/2016/489 and S/2018/126 and S/2018/127).
207. To ensure the full and effective implementation of Security Council resolutions 2014 (2011) and 2051 (2012), together with the political transition agreed in November 2011 under the Initiative of the Gulf Cooperation Council and its implementation mechanism for the political transition process in Yemen, the Secretary-General established the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen, in accordance with an exchange of letters with the President of the Security Council in June 2012, which was then subsumed into the Office of the Special Envoy (S/2012/469 and S/2012/470; see also S/2015/283 and S/2015/284 and S/2018/126 and S/2018/127).
208. In line with Security Council resolution 2216 (2015), as well as other Council resolutions on Yemen, including resolutions 2014 (2011), 2051 (2012), 2140 (2014), 2201 (2015), 2451 (2018) and 2452 (2019), and the letter from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/2016/488), the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen will continue to mediate between the parties with a view to ending the conflict. The mission will provide facilitation and technical advice on the negotiation and design of interim security arrangements, the restoration of State institutions and preparations for the resumption of political dialogue, including on finalizing and adopting a draft constitution and an electoral road map and on national reconciliation and transitional justice.
209. The mission also participates in the mediation of the political, security and economic arrangements to end the current conflict between the Government of Yemen and the Houthi movement and in supporting the resumption of the political transition, which began in 2011 and was interrupted by the current conflict. Against this backdrop, the two-month nationwide, renewable truce agreed by the parties in Yemen in April 2022 presents a very positive development and an important first step towards resuming an inclusive political process to reach a negotiated settlement to the conflict. In the delivery of these efforts, the mission shares its support component with the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA), which also reports to Headquarters through the Special Envoy.

Programme of work

Objective

210. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to achieve a negotiated political settlement between the parties to end the conflict in Yemen and enable the resumption of a peaceful, inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led political transition that will lead Yemenis towards a path of sustainable peace.

Strategy

211. To contribute to the objective, the mission will:
 - (a) Utilize negotiations, consultations and shuttle diplomacy to achieve an agreement between the parties to end the conflict in Yemen and resume the political transition;
 - (b) Support the Yemen peace process by providing political, technical and logistical support, including in supporting the parties to identify long-term measures and immediate priorities related to political, security and economic issues to resume the political process, implement the Stockholm Agreement and de-escalate the conflict at the local, national and regional levels;
 - (c) Work on a consultative process, which will include, among others, women, civil society and youth, including assessing the sentiments, views and recommendations of Yemenis through direct outreach and engagement or indirect and virtual methods and integrating gender-responsiveness and youth-engagement in its multitrack diplomacy and peace negotiations on the peace agreement and post-transition process;
 - (d) Foster international engagement in resolving the conflict in Yemen, notably through awareness-building and frequent dialogue and information exchange;
 - (e) Continue to adapt its posture and positioning to respond to the changing and evolving political context and operational environment in order to strengthen mandate implementation, with a focus on the mission's balanced representation and capacity in the territories controlled by each side.
212. For 2023, the mission's planned deliverables will support Member States' ongoing management of and recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. Such planned deliverables and activities include logistical arrangements in support of planned vaccination delivery programmes for Yemen-based staff and logistical and administrative support for possible medical evacuations.
213. Reflecting the importance of continuous improvement and responding to the needs of Member States, the mission has mainstreamed lessons learned and best practices related to the adjustments to and adaptation of its programme owing to the COVID-19 pandemic. This includes regularly updating the COVID-19 mitigation measures in line with WHO and governmental advice, while focusing on operational efficiencies where possible. This has been particularly important when implementing guidance on contact tracing and isolation protocols.
214. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
 - (a) A peace agreement with the parties to determine interim security and political arrangements for a sustainable, peaceful and inclusive transitional period;
 - (b) The development of an inclusive participatory mechanism for diverse political and social Yemeni stakeholders, including women and youth, to inform the track 1 United Nations-facilitated political process;
 - (c) Increased confidence of the parties and engagement in the United Nations-facilitated political process towards a resumption of political talks;
 - (d) Increased confidence of the parties towards a resumption of political talks, including through focusing on political, security and economic elements;
 - (e) Refined security governance options at both the national and local level;
 - (f) Effective and transparent implementation of negotiated transitional security arrangements;
 - (g) Prioritized work with community safety partners to support dialogue between communities and security actors;
 - (h) Development of an inclusive transitional agenda that will be informed by women's and gender perspectives and will include implementation mechanisms and bodies;

- (i) Continued implementation of the Stockholm Agreement, including the uninterrupted flow of commercial imports, including fuel, into the Hudaydah ports, and further prisoner exchanges;
- (j) Women's and gender perspectives informing all substantive areas, agreements, arrangements and implementation mechanisms, when relevant.

External factors for 2023

215. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2023 is based on the following planning assumptions:
 - (a) The parties to the conflict will engage in the peace process in the form of successive rounds of peace consultations under the auspices of the Special Envoy, with the aim of reaching a comprehensive negotiated political settlement;
 - (b) The Yemeni Women's Technical Advisory Group will continue to exist and contribute to the process by advising the mission and the peace process on women's concerns and perspectives;
 - (c) The mission will have greater access to key Yemeni stakeholders, albeit with some restrictions imposed by the parties and the security situation on the ground;
 - (d) The mission will strengthen its presence inside Yemen, including with women and youth, and will expand its outreach to Yemeni constituencies inside and outside the country through digital tools and specific outreach missions and visits.
216. With regard to cooperation with other entities, in the implementation of the good offices mandate the Special Envoy and his Office will continue to engage closely with Member States and the Security Council, as well as international and regional organizations, including the League of Arab States, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the European Union and other international partners. Furthermore, the Office will continue to pursue joint efforts with international financial institutions to facilitate joint response strategies for post-agreement planning, including recovery and peacebuilding activities.
217. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the mission will continue its cooperation with the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator and the United Nations country team in Yemen. In addition, United Nations agencies working in Yemen are represented in the Inter-Agency Task Force on Yemen at Headquarters, which ensures the coordination and coherence of United Nations political, humanitarian, human rights and other efforts in Yemen.
218. The mission will continue to consult and coordinate closely with the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and special political missions in the region, as appropriate. In line with Security Council resolution [2452 \(2019\)](#), the mission closely coordinates with UNMHA, which reports to Headquarters through the Special Envoy and the Under-Secretary-General for Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, and shares an integrated support structure with UNMHA.
219. The Office integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. The Office will continue to engage with initiatives at the national and local levels that promote women's political participation and representation, their full citizenship rights and the incorporation of women's human rights, security needs and concerns in the planning and preparation for the transition and early recovery, conflict resolution and peacebuilding processes.

Programme performance in 2021

Building momentum towards a comprehensive political solution

220. During 2021, the mission continued its efforts to resume the political process and bring the parties to an arrangement that would lead to a comprehensive peace agreement and end the war in Yemen. The mission conducted a wide range of meetings with the parties and regional actors through shuttle

diplomacy in Yemen, regional capitals and other locations outside the region. Achieving progress was challenging as military escalation occurred alongside a prolonged economic crisis.

221. To address these issues, the former Special Envoy focused on supporting efforts for the parties to resume an inclusive political process under United Nations auspices from January to July 2021 by pursuing a four-point proposal that focused on a nationwide ceasefire, facilitating the opening of Sana'a International Airport, ensuring the unhindered flow of fuel and other commodities into Yemen through Hudaydah ports, and the resumption of the political process.
222. The former Special Envoy left the mission in July 2021 to begin his appointment with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the newly appointed Special Envoy, Hans Grundberg, began his appointment in September 2021. He continued to pursue engagements with the parties to the conflict and expanded his visits to Yemen to include Aden, Ta'izz and Mukha'. These visits allowed the mission to gather diverse views on the current situation, the future of the country and viable modalities to reach a final resolution of the conflict.
223. The mission is initiating a structured process to address the key elements of the conflict by developing a framework to articulate its plan to move towards an inclusive political process by focusing on three tracks: political, security and economic.
224. The above-mentioned work contributed to building momentum towards a comprehensive political solution, however, it did not meet the target of the adoption of joint outcome documents and the formation of specific mechanisms to implement the agreements reached in consultations and negotiations. This was owing to diverging viewpoints, particularly on certain economic and humanitarian aspects of the text, and a lack of sufficient momentum to reduce the level of military confrontation. A meeting on prisoners, held in January 2021, was unsuccessful despite four weeks of consultations as the parties did not reach a new agreement to release more detainees; however, the parties did agree to continue discussing pending lists of detainees and committed to reach a resolution over disputed names. Progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see table 37).

Table 37
Performance measure

2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)
Talks on transitional political and security arrangements initiated; inclusivity (the south and women) enhanced; and implementation of confidence-building measures in progress	Joint outcome documents arising from the consultations and negotiations not agreed; and formation of specific mechanisms to implement the agreements not achieved	Implementation of joint outcome documents, including specific mechanisms that involve diverse Yemeni perspectives

Impact of the pandemic

225. The continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic into 2021 had an impact on the implementation of mandates, including postponement of in-person meetings and some planned travel to Yemen and the region. The mission utilized digital tools and virtual platforms to engage with the parties to the conflict and other Yemeni actors. Whenever practical, the Special Envoy travelled to meet with the parties to the conflict and other Yemeni actors, with a limited delegation and following necessary health procedures. The mission increased its use of information technology to organize virtual meetings and workshops, including with civil society representatives, women and youth. While some adaptation was possible, there were losses in terms of the quality of the discussions given the nature and complexity of the conversations. Additional challenges were found when the discussion required interpretation into or from local languages, particularly for larger meetings and workshops.

Planned results for 2023

Result 1: expanding political engagements and consultations to better include diverse Yemeni perspectives and enhance impetus towards a Yemeni-owned and sustainable peace

Programme performance in 2021 and target for 2023

226. The mission's work contributed to broadening inclusion in the peace process, including consultations and meetings with civil society actors, women, youth and various political actors. The target was not met because conflict escalated at an alarming rate, along with the economic crisis. The gap in trust between the parties to the conflict remained wide and grew. The parties also focused on the sequencing of possible interim steps, which overshadowed the need to begin discussing the parameters for an overall political settlement of the conflict. Progress towards the objective and the target for 2023 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 38).

Table 38

Performance measure

2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (planned)	2023 (planned)
Talks on transitional political and security arrangements initiated; inclusivity (the south and women) enhanced; and implementation of confidence-building measures in progress	The 2020 objective of adopting joint outcome documents from consultations and negotiations was not achieved	Despite progress in consultations, the 2021 objective of implementing joint outcome documents, including specific mechanisms that involve diverse Yemeni perspectives, was not yet achieved	Expanding the mission's political engagements and consultations to better include diverse Yemeni perspectives and enhance impetus towards a Yemeni-owned and sustainable peace	Continued expansion of the mission's political engagements across the spectrum of pertinent actors, including through consultations to better include diverse Yemeni perspectives and enhance impetus towards a Yemeni-owned and sustainable peace

Result 2: mobilize the international community in support of implementing a Yemeni-led, inclusive peace process

Proposed programme plan for 2023

227. The Special Envoy has emphasized that while the conflict in Yemen requires a peace process that is led by Yemenis, it is critical that the international community support these efforts. The mission has consistently involved the international community in efforts to identify ways to engage with Yemenis and move towards a sustainable peace process. As the conflict escalated, including with attacks on regional neighbours, the mission continued to hold regular and open dialogues with the international community to support its mandate implementation. The international community's endorsement of the mission's strategy is essential to the implementation of the mission's mandate and to having a collaborative approach towards ending the conflict. Most recently, the continued coordinated and collective support of the international community, and in particular that of regional partners, has proved to be key in leveraging support for the agreement on a two-month truce and its subsequent implementation. The international community can explore alternative dialogues with Yemeni actors that will feed into the peace process, as seen with the Riyadh Agreement. While the mission will lead the work with Yemenis to develop a peace process, the international community's support is crucial at all stages.

Lessons learned and planned change

228. The lesson for the mission was that the international community can strengthen the path towards a Yemeni-led peace process by establishing a variety of complementary communication channels with a broad range of Yemeni interlocutors in support of the mission. In applying the lesson, the mission will strengthen its engagement with the international community at all levels through the mission's focus on political, military/security and economic tracks. Strengthening the international community's engagement on Yemen will help to establish an inclusive political process that can provide a viable foundation for peace. At times, the mission has experienced limited access to Yemeni actors beyond the political parties. Working closely with the international community, including Track 1 and Track 2 actors, will allow the mission to work collaboratively to foster dialogue on finding a durable solution to the conflict. The international community can further support Yemenis by partnering with the mission to discuss and build consensus on peaceful and stable solutions. Expected progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see table 39).

Table 39

Performance measure

2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (planned)	2023 (planned)
—	—	—	—	Mobilize the international community to identify ways to engage with Yemenis and move towards a sustainable peace process

Deliverables

229. Table 40 below lists all deliverables of the mission.

Table 40

Deliverables for the period 2021–2023, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2021 planned	2021 actual	2022 planned	2023 planned
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	17	14	12	12
Meetings of the Security Council	17	14	12	12
C. Substantive deliverables				
Good offices: provision of good offices to end the conflict.				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: consultations and advice on political and security proposals aimed at mediating an agreement to end the conflict and enable the completion of the political transition.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2023

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 41

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2021	2022	2023		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Military and police personnel costs	–	–	–	–	–
Civilian personnel costs	10 627.6	11 292.5	11 717.6	–	425.1
Operational costs	6 098.7	5 909.5	5 713.0	–	(196.5)
Total (net of staff assessment)	16 726.3	17 202.0	17 430.6	–	228.6

Table 42

Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff				
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteer	Total
Approved 2022	1	–	1	1	6	15	11	–	35	25	1	61	11	29	–	101
Proposed 2023	1	–	1	1	6	15	10	–	34	26	1	61	13	28	–	102
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	(1)	–	(1)	1	–	–	2	(1)	–	1

230. The proposed resource requirements for 2023 for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen amount to \$17,430,600 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$11,717,600) for 102 positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 1 D-1, 6 P-5, 15 P-4, 10 P-3, 26 Field Service, 1 General Service (Other level), 13 National Professional Officer and 28 Local level), including the proposed establishment of 1 Field Service position in the Kuwait Joint Support Office, as well as operational costs (\$5,713,000), comprising official travel (\$456,500), facilities and infrastructure (\$2,697,000), ground transportation (\$284,500), air operations (\$904,000), communications and information technology (\$789,400), medical (\$298,900) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$282,700).
231. In 2023, the following changes to the staffing structure are proposed: the establishment of two positions, the abolishment of one position, the reassignment of one position and the conversion of one position, as detailed below:
- Conversion of one position of Political Affairs Officer in the Political Affairs Section in Sana'a from the P-3 level to National Professional Officer to ensure the representation of national staff at an appropriate level and to strengthen the liaison and coordination function with officials of the Government of Yemen as well as national political actors and interlocutors, including women in Sana'a and other parts in the north;
 - Abolishment of one position of Human Resources Assistant (Local level) in the Human Resources Unit in Amman. After careful review of the human resources workflow, the Mission plans to enhance its capabilities for coordination of staff training and capacity-building activities, particularly for national staff, in addition to the routine operational human resources

functions for which the Human Resources Unit is responsible. As a result, new functions will be needed, which will require different and more advanced skills sets. It is therefore proposed to abolish one position of Human Resources Assistant (Local level) in the Human Resources Unit;

- (c) Establishment of one position of Assistant Human Resources Officer (National Professional Officer) in Amman, in combination with the abolishment of the position of Human Resources Assistant (Local level), to coordinate staff training and capacity-building activities, particularly for national staff, in addition to the routine operational human resources functions of the Human Resources Unit;
 - (d) Reassignment of one Movement Control Assistant (Field Service) as a Logistics Assistant (Field Service) to perform asset and inventory management functions;
 - (e) Establishment of one position of Finance Assistant (Field Service) in the Kuwait Joint Support Office as part of an effort of the Secretariat to align the funding sources of the Support Office to better reflect the workload and the client base that the Support Office services. Such an exercise aims to achieve a more balanced distribution of the workforce of the Support Office among the special political missions, with proposals being made to reduce a total of six positions from the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan and the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) and to establish those positions in four special political missions, including the Office of the Special Envoy for Yemen.
232. A vacancy rate of 15 per cent has been applied to estimates for continuing international and national positions.
233. The increase in requirements proposed for 2023 compared with the appropriation for 2022 is attributable primarily to increased requirements for civilian personnel costs, resulting mainly from the proposed establishment of one Field Service position, and the revised salary scales for international positions and national positions, as well as increased requirements for operational costs, resulting mainly from: (a) the additional requirement for new office premises in Aden; (b) the additional requirement for increased Internet services in Sana'a and Aden; (c) an increased requirement for mandatory training of safety and security staff; and (d) an increase in fuel prices in Yemen, offset in part by reduced requirements for operational costs, resulting mainly from: (e) the reduced cost-share ratio of the rental and operation costs of one fixed-wing aircraft with UNAMI, from 30 per cent in 2022 to 25 per cent in 2023; and (f) the reduced requirements for freight cost owing to reduced acquisitions.

Extrabudgetary resources

234. In 2022, the mission projects that extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$381,300 will be utilized to support economic advisory consultancies and political affairs expertise for the Special Envoy's economy and political tracks.
235. No extrabudgetary resources are projected for 2023 owing to the expected conclusion of the consultancies in 2022 required for advising the Special Envoy on the economic and political tracks.

10. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar

(\$1,408,600)

Foreword

Since my appointment in late 2021, I have engaged with all stakeholders in Myanmar to understand the challenges of different communities and their unprecedented vision for a just, inclusive and peaceful future for their country in the wake of the tremendous vulnerabilities since the military takeover. I took office at a time of heightened violence and brutality and a humanitarian crisis exacerbated by COVID-19. The crisis has affected national and regional stability, further compounding the desperate situation of Rohingya and ethnic minorities.

I will continue to focus my mandate delivery on building cooperation with national and regional stakeholders to facilitate a Myanmar-led process as the only viable solution to the conflict. I will work in partnership with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Special Envoy with a view to delivering urgently needed assistance, building trust through de-escalation of violence and facilitating the safe and unhindered access to affected communities through all channels, and in close coordination with the United Nations country team. Through the initiation of an ASEAN-United Nations women and peace and security platform I hope to bring forward the voices of the most marginalized women and advance their protection agenda at the local level.

Helping to address the root causes of the disenfranchisement of the Rohingya and ethnic minorities and ensuring their safe, dignified, voluntary and sustainable return will remain at the centre of my mandate. In advancing these objectives, I will promote a coherent and coordinated system-wide approach in regular liaison with the Security Council and the General Assembly.

(Signed) Noeleen **Heyzer**
Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar

A. Proposed programme plan for 2023 and programme performance in 2021

Overall orientation

Mandates and background

236. The Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar is responsible for the provision of the Secretary-General's good offices through discussions involving all relevant stakeholders and assistance to Myanmar. The mandate was defined by the General Assembly in its resolution [72/248](#) and renewed in its resolutions [73/264](#), [74/246](#), [75/238](#) and [76/180](#). On 16 December 2021, the Assembly extended the mandate to 31 December 2022 in its resolution [76/180](#). The next extension of the mandate will be considered by the Assembly at its seventy-seventh session.
237. The Office of the Special Envoy will continue to provide the good offices of the Secretary-General in the broadened conflict environment since the military takeover on 1 February 2021, which has compounded pre-existing challenges facing vulnerable communities like the Rohingya, by supporting a Myanmar-led process to find a viable solution to the conflict, addressing underlying issues and striving to create conducive conditions for the safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return of refugees and forcibly displaced persons to their place of origin or choice and facilitating unhindered humanitarian access to populations in need. Accountability for those responsible for mass atrocities and human rights violations and abuses, the promotion of human rights more broadly and the meaningful participation of women in all decision-making processes will remain a cross-cutting focus. This will require the Special Envoy to work in close and trusted partnership with all stakeholders, including local communities and civil society, neighbouring countries and regional partners, notably the Government of Bangladesh and ASEAN, while keeping the broader membership of the United Nations informed of the Special Envoy's activities and their impact.

Programme of work

Objective

238. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to support Myanmar-led democratic and peaceful nation-building.

Strategy

239. To contribute to the objective and address the deterioration of the situation in Myanmar, the Office will:
- (a) Implement a multitrack approach, including strengthening cooperation between the United Nations and ASEAN to address humanitarian and other critical needs on the ground without discrimination. In close partnership with the ASEAN Special Envoy, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General will seek to facilitate the delivery of assistance to affected communities through all existing channels and address the multiple priority needs of the people across the country, including civilian protection, food security, socioeconomic resilience and humanitarian and COVID-19 assistance. The Special Envoy will complement regional efforts towards and support effective implementation of the five-point consensus of the ASEAN Leaders' Meeting in alignment with the will of the people of Myanmar;
 - (b) Advocate a Myanmar-led process towards a peaceful, democratic and inclusive future. In support of this, the Special Envoy will mobilize a coherent international approach based on regional unity. She will facilitate initiatives to support a gradual return to civilian rule and advance the implementation of democratic and human rights norms towards a path of democratic consolidation and reform. The Special Envoy will initiate inclusive and participatory approaches

with minorities, youth and women whose voices and empowerment are critical to developing a viable way out of the current political crisis and in line with the will of the people;

- (c) Continue efforts to create a conducive environment for the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable return of the forcibly displaced Rohingya in Bangladesh to Rakhine State. To that end, the Special Envoy will continue promoting a political solution in consultation with the Rohingya and other key stakeholders to improve the conditions of Rohingyas on the ground in line with recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State, while soliciting greater regional and international support towards Rohingyas and the Bangladeshi host communities in a spirit of shared responsibility.
240. For 2023, the mission's planned deliverables will support Member States' ongoing management of and recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. Such planned deliverables and activities include supporting United Nations country team efforts to facilitate the delivery of lifesaving assistance and COVID-19 vaccines through all channels and for all vulnerable communities, especially conflict-affected populations and internally displaced persons.
241. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
- (a) Improved conditions for the safe, voluntary, dignified and sustainable return of forcibly displaced populations;
 - (b) Creating conducive conditions for a de-escalation of violence and an increase in trust among communities;
 - (c) Greater international and regional political support towards improved humanitarian assistance for populations in need, whose conditions have dramatically worsened countrywide since the military takeover;
 - (d) The initiation of a Myanmar-led process with key stakeholders to advance discussions on restoring democratic and human rights norms as part of a negotiated political solution. Ending the disproportionate use of force by the Tatmadaw will be an essential step and pre-requisite.

External factors for 2023

242. With regard to external factors, the overall plan for 2023 is based on the following planning assumptions:
- (a) The current high level of violence since the military takeover, numerous human rights violations, the scale of repression and the need for civilian protection will continue to present a significant challenge in securing a coherent policy, notably for narrowing the trust deficit towards national reconciliation;
 - (b) The plight of the Rohingya refugees will continue to require concrete actions for their safe, dignified, voluntary and sustainable return and reintegration in Myanmar; illicit activities and related financial flows, closely linked to conflict in Myanmar and the downfall of the formal economy, will continue to hamper conflict resolution and impede the strengthening of rule of law, institution-building, socioeconomic and development efforts.
243. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the Office works in partnership with ASEAN, especially the ASEAN Special Envoy, other key regional organizations especially the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the European Union, neighbouring countries and international donors to mobilize constructive support to initiate a humanitarian pause, support dialogue among all concerned parties and facilitate refugee returns.
244. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Special Envoy will continue to coordinate closely with the United Nations system through established inter-agency channels, in close consultation with the Resident Coordinators in Myanmar and Bangladesh. The Special Envoy continues to carry out the good offices mandate in close cooperation with the United Nations country

team and specialized offices at Headquarters, as well as various human rights mechanisms on Myanmar mandated by the Human Rights Council.

245. The Office integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate, and will co-facilitate with key relevant regional leaders an ASEAN-United Nations women and peace and security platform to amplify the voices of the most marginalized women and advance their protection agenda.

Programme performance in 2021

Safe, dignified and voluntary repatriation

246. The mission maintained close contact with all stakeholders, including local communities in Rakhine State, throughout 2021, while progress in Myanmar was curtailed by the 1 February 2021 military takeover. The Special Envoy continued to engage with civil society, community leaders and other key stakeholders in Myanmar, with a view to building on and consolidating newly established horizontal lines of social cohesion among communities, including with the Rohingya minority. The Special Envoy continued her close consultation with Rohingya groups and engagement with key Member States to support the creation of conditions conducive to the safe, dignified and sustainable return of the Rohingya population to Myanmar in a rapidly changing political context. She mobilized constructive support from international and regional partners, ASEAN and OIC towards addressing the root causes of conflict in Rakhine State to enable returns, including through her participation in a side-event of the General Assembly at its seventy-sixth session convened by Bangladesh on the Rohingya crisis. However, the conflict spreading throughout Myanmar, the broad humanitarian crisis and the significant economic downturn following the military takeover undermined reconciliation and repatriation efforts. In this context, the Special Envoy continued her close engagement with key ethnic armed organizations and other stakeholders with a view to promoting an inclusive Myanmar-led process out of the ongoing crisis and in line with Security Council's pronouncements calling for United Nations-ASEAN complementarity. Progress towards the objective is presented in the performance measure below (see table 43).

Table 43

Performance measure

2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)
Creation of enabling conditions for a smooth repatriation process	Return of refugees in a more enabling environment was not realized; efforts continued nevertheless	Preparation for repatriation was disrupted by the military takeover and the interventions had to be reformulated taking into consideration the changing political dynamics

Impact of the pandemic

247. The continuation of the COVID-19 pandemic into 2021 had an impact on the implementation of mandates, but the Office continued to mitigate the impact of COVID-19 on operational activities by actively pursuing online engagement with all relevant stakeholders, including virtual briefings to the Security Council, online convening with key partners, including the informal women's advisory platform and the Rohingya community, as well as regular bilateral engagement online with all national and international actors. When conditions allowed, the Special Envoy was able to conduct in-person discussions, including during her visits to the region, which allowed for more effective discussions and follow-up on proposed initiatives.

Planned result for 2023

Progress towards improved humanitarian conditions and a Myanmar-led inclusive, democratic and peaceful nation-building process

Programme performance in 2021 and target for 2023

248. In 2021, the mission's work contributed to creating conditions for the safe, voluntary, sustainable and dignified return of Rohingya refugees, including through regular consultation with Rohingya groups and with key regional stakeholders, but efforts towards achieving the planned target were disrupted by the military takeover and deterioration of security conditions in Myanmar.
249. In 2023, the Office, in close cooperation with ASEAN, will concentrate its efforts on improving the security and humanitarian situation in Myanmar in line with the ASEAN five-point consensus, reducing violence against civilians and enabling a Myanmar-led process to identify a political solution to the current crisis and build an inclusive, democratic and peaceful country.
250. The Office will continue to focus on improving the conditions of Rohingyas remaining in Rakhine State by engaging with key stakeholders to build confidence and improve the reintegration prospects of the returning refugees. These efforts will be supported by enhanced coordination among agencies providing support to Rohingyas, as well as improved support towards displaced Rohingyas and Bangladeshi host communities as a gesture of shared responsibility.

Lessons learned and planned change

251. The lesson for the mission was that strengthening cooperation with ASEAN, especially the ASEAN Special Envoy, was important to garner regional support and engage effectively with stakeholders. In applying the lesson, the mission will formalize cooperation arrangements with ASEAN and other regional actors, including joint platforms, to advance key policy areas on expanding humanitarian access and the women and peace and security agenda. Progress towards the objective and the target for 2023 are presented in the performance measure below (see table 44).

Table 44
Performance measure

2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (actual)	2022 (planned)	2023 (planned)
Bilateral discussions between Myanmar and Bangladesh on a repatriation framework continued	The Special Envoy advocated for tangible commitments from the Government of Myanmar on the implementation of the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State	The military takeover and ensuing broader conflict and humanitarian crisis forced the Special Envoy to reformulate her strategy on Rohingya repatriation	The mission facilitates local initiatives in support of social cohesion	The Special Envoy engages with key actors towards a cessation of violence and improved humanitarian conditions, including in Rakhine State to support the return of refugees

Deliverables

252. Table 45 below lists all deliverables of the mission.

Table 45

Deliverables for the period 2021–2023, by category and subcategory

<i>Deliverables</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>	<i>2021 actual</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>	<i>2023 planned</i>
A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies				
Parliamentary documentation (number of documents)	1	1	1	1
1. Reports of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly	1	1	1	1
Substantive services for meetings (number of three-hour meetings)	4	10	4	4
2. Meetings of the Security Council	2	8	2	2
3. Meetings of the General Assembly	2	2	2	2
B. Generation and transfer of knowledge				
Seminars, workshops, and training events (number of days)	–	–	–	6
4. Workshops supported by the mission on social cohesion and anti-discrimination, women's political empowerment, power-sharing arrangements, strengthening of the rule of law and accountability for serious human rights violations, fundamental freedoms, and implementation of the recommendations of the Advisory Commission on Rakhine State	–	–	–	6
C. Substantive deliverables				
Good offices: 200 good offices engagements with the Government, political parties, civil society, ethnic armed organizations and countries in the region in support of a return to democratic reforms, peace and stability at the national, subnational and local levels, humanitarian access to help support the 14 million people in need of assistance in Myanmar and the voluntary, safe, dignified and sustainable repatriation of the Rohingya and durable solutions and reintegration of forcibly displaced persons.				
Consultation, advice and advocacy: 200 consultations with the Government, civil society and the international community, including all ASEAN member States, on electoral and constitutional issues, options for power-sharing arrangements, federalism, accountability for serious human rights violations and cooperation with international accountability mechanisms, good governance and the strengthening of the rule of law, and human rights issues, including fundamental freedoms, civilian protection, child rights, the elimination of discrimination and violence against minorities, the promotion of gender equality and the involvement of women and youth in peace initiatives.				
D. Communication deliverables				
Outreach programmes, special events and information materials: 20 outreach activities with local communities, government partners, opinion leaders, the media, civil society and other agents of change to support the implementation of the Office's mandate.				
External and media relations: press conferences, statements, advisories, backgrounders, interviews and other media engagements related to the Office's objective; development of additional communication capacities, including a special political mission website.				

B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2023

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 46

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2021	2022	2023	Variance	
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent	2023 vs. 2022 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	–	–	–	–	–
Civilian personnel costs	948.9	862.2	1 116.6	–	254.4
Operational costs	235.1	291.3	292.0	–	0.7
Total (net of staff assessment)	1 184.0	1 153.5	1 408.6	–	255.1

Table 47

Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories			National staff				Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter- national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteer		
Approved 2022	1	–	–	1	1	1	–	–	4	–	–	4	–	1	–	5	
Proposed 2023	1	–	–	1	1	1	–	–	4	–	–	4	–	1	–	5	
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	

253. The proposed resource requirements for 2023 for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar amount to \$1,408,600 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$1,116,600) for the continuation of five positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 D-1, 1 P-5, 1 P-4 and 1 Local level), as well as operational costs (\$292,000), comprising costs for official travel (\$150,700), facilities and infrastructure (\$52,600), ground transportation (\$4,800), communications and information technology (\$14,000), medical (\$1,000) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$68,900).
254. For 2023, no change is proposed to the number and levels of the positions. A vacancy rate of 5 per cent has been applied to international positions. Proposed resources for one national position are based on the assumption of full incumbency.
255. The increase in the requirements proposed for 2023 compared with the appropriation for 2022 is attributable mainly to increased requirements for civilian personnel costs, resulting from the application of the revised salary scales and the fixed-term contract of the Special Envoy compared with the when-actually-employed contract of the previous incumbent.

Extrabudgetary resources

256. In 2022, the mission projects that extrabudgetary resources estimated in the amount of \$850,000 will be used to support activities and relevant initiatives aimed at promoting the implementation of General Assembly resolution 76/180 and provide for three positions (1 P-5, 1 P-3 and 1 National Professional Officer). These activities and initiatives include: (a) support towards the return of

Rohingya refugees and internally displaced persons; (b) intercommunal dialogues; (c) anti-discrimination and countering hate speech; and (d) national reconciliation.

257. In 2023, extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$850,000 are projected to support the mission's efforts to further the consolidation of democracy and to advance justice, peace and human rights in Myanmar.

Annex I

Summary of follow-up action taken to implement relevant recommendations of advisory and oversight bodies

Brief description of the recommendation

Action taken to implement the recommendation

Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions [A/76/7/Add.2](#)

Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide

The Advisory Committee notes that the proposed position would provide support on hate speech for the United Nations system, and is of the view that the justifications provided for the systemwide funding of the functions lack clarity, and trusts that the Secretariat will undertake a review of the appropriate funding mechanism for these functions (para. 12).

As United Nations systemwide focal point on hate speech and chair of dedicated inter-agency arrangements on this topic, the Office plays a key policy development and leading operational and coordination role, which requires the dedicated capacity this P-4 position would provide. While the theme of hate speech relates to a number of mandates within the system, the leading and coordinating responsibilities lie with the Office of the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide. The P-4 position is also instrumental in supporting the Office in delivering on its assistance to United Nations country teams and peace operations in the implementation of the United Nations Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech.

The Secretariat will continue to pursue opportunities to seek funding from other funds, programmes and agencies to supplement such efforts.

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen

The Advisory Committee recalls that, in the context of the proposed programme budget for 2020, the Secretary-General proposed seven redeployments between Amman, Sana'a and Aden. In the context of the proposed programme budget for 2021, the Secretary-General proposed the redeployment of five positions from Sana'a to Amman. For 2022, seven more redeployments are being proposed. The Committee expresses concern about the continual redeployments between mission locations and is of the view that the concept of operations and deployment plan should be included in the context of next year's proposed budget, as well as a detailed explanation of the continual need for redeployments (para. 18).

The mission support concept developed for the Office of the Special Envoy for Yemen foresaw that the mission support component would execute its activities in Amman, Sana'a and Aden, as well as throughout the region. Mission support services are provided by a mission support component integrated between the Office of the Special Envoy and the United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA). The integrated support structure concept was reviewed in March 2021. A copy of the mission support concept document and the deployment plan will be provided as supplementary information to the Advisory Committee.

According to the mission support concept, the passenger booking function is centralized in the Movement Control Team in Sana'a for passenger road and air movements, while cargo movements are arranged by the Movement Control Unit in Amman, utilizing the missions' air and ground transportation assets. The Unit based in Amman is also responsible for customs clearance-related operations and tax exemption requests, starting by

*Brief description of the recommendation**Action taken to implement the recommendation*

requesting the required clearances from the relevant authorities, to clearing shipments and getting them delivered to end locations.

Based on this mission support concept, the Amman movement control operations are separate from those in Sana'a and need dedicated resource to interact with local and international counterparts in support of clearances and shipments through Amman.

Other matters


In paragraph 111 of the report, planning assumptions are set out regarding external factors for the overall plan for 2022 of the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#). The Advisory Committee notes that the assumptions differ from those set out in respect of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon. The Advisory Committee recalls that it previously noted the differences in the planning assumptions for two missions operating in the same country and reiterates that missions should ensure more consistency in the reflection of their operational environment (para. 29).

Planning assumptions for the Office of the Special Envoy for the implementation of Security Council resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#) have been coordinated with missions in the region, including the Office of the Special Coordinator for Lebanon, but remain separate and distinct, reflecting the separate and distinct mandates of the two missions, which are both related to the same operational environment. The Secretariat believes there is consistency in how both missions view the operational environment; the Office of the Special Envoy for the implementation of Security Council resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#) is not based in Lebanon, and its planning assumptions are indicated reflecting the specific mandate of the mission.


Annex II

Organizational structure and post distribution for 2023

A. Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus



B. Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide



C. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara

Office of the Personal Envoy

RB (2 positions)
1 USG, 1 P-3

D. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#)

Office of the Special Envoy


RB (3 positions)
1 USG, 1 P-4, 1 GS (OL)

E. Office of the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions


**Office of the United Nations
Representative**

RB (7 positions)
1 ASG, 1 P-5, 2 P-4, 2 P-3, 1 GS (OL)


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
G. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa



H. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region



I. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen



J. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar

Office of the Special Envoy

RB (5 positions)
1 USG, 1 D-1, 1 P-5, 1 P-4, 1 LL

XB (2 positions)
1 P-5, 1 NPO

Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs

XB (1 position)
1 P-3

Abbreviations: ASG, Assistant Secretary-General; FS, Field Service; GS (OL), General Service (Other level); LL, Local level; NPO, National Professional Officer; PK, peacekeeping; RB, regular budget; USG, Under-Secretary-General; XB, extrabudgetary. These abbreviations apply to all organization charts in annex II.

^a Establishment.

^b Conversion.

^c Redeployment.

^d Abolishment.

^e Reclassification.

^f Reassignment.