



# General Assembly

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## Seventy-sixth session

Item 140 of the preliminary list\*

### Proposed programme budget for 2022

## Proposed programme budget for 2022

### Part II

#### Political affairs

### Section 3

#### Political affairs

#### Special political missions

#### Thematic cluster III:

#### regional offices, offices in support of political processes and other missions

### *Summary*

The present report contains the proposed resource requirements for 2022 for 11 special political missions grouped under the thematic cluster of regional offices, offices in support of political processes and other missions.

The proposed resource requirements for 2022 for special political missions grouped under this cluster amount to \$382,938,900 (net of staff assessment).

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\* A/76/50.



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\*\* The part consisting of the proposed programme plan for 2022 is submitted for the consideration of the General Assembly in accordance with the established budgetary procedures and practices reaffirmed in paragraph 13 of resolution [72/266 A](#).

\*\*\* In keeping with paragraph 11 of resolution [72/266 A](#), the part consisting of the post and non-post resource requirements is submitted through the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions for the consideration of the General Assembly.

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## I. Financial overview

1. The proposed resource requirements for 2022 for special political missions grouped under thematic cluster III amount to \$382,938,900 (net of staff assessment). Table 1 provides a comparison between the resources proposed for 2022 and the resources for 2021 as approved by the General Assembly in its resolution [75/253 A](#).

Table 1  
**Resource requirements**  
 (Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2020	2021	2022		Variance
	Expenditure (1)	Appropriation (2)	Total requirements (3)	Non-recurrent requirements (4)	2022 vs. 2021 Increase/ (decrease) (5)=(3)-(2)
United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel	12 400.0	13 950.0	14 777.3	–	827.3
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia	102 193.4	103 438.1	99 160.0	–	(4 278.1)
United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia	2 859.7	2 865.0	2 927.2	–	62.2
United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission	3 431.7	3 638.4	3 620.0	–	(18.4)
Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon	8 826.0	9 698.6	9 586.6	–	(112.0)
United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa	7 165.2	7 901.7	8 611.7	–	710.0
United Nations Support Mission in Libya	71 579.7	69 244.1	70 494.4	–	1 250.3
United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia	59 301.7	62 942.5	60 669.7	–	(2 272.8)
United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement	46 710.9	48 569.2	45 559.1	–	(3 010.1)
United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti	19 933.8	19 271.6	21 936.2	–	2 664.6
United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan	1 420.0	34 070.4	45 596.7	417.5	11 526.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>335 822.1</b>	<b>375 589.6</b>	<b>382 938.9</b>	<b>417.5</b>	<b>7 349.3</b>

## II. Special political missions

### 1. United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel

(\$14,777,300)

#### Foreword

The West Africa and the Sahel region continued to face serious challenges in the course of 2020. An increase in terrorist activities and intercommunal violence contributed to a further deterioration in the regional security environment. Systematic attacks by armed groups on civilian and military targets in Burkina Faso, Mali, the Niger and Nigeria posed serious threats to peace and stability in the region and beyond. The risk that terrorist violence will shift towards coastal States, as already illustrated by the deadly attack against a security post at the Ivorian border with Burkina Faso in June 2020, remains high and threatens to undo the subregion's democratic governance gains. In addition, according to the International Maritime Bureau, 90 per cent of worldwide incidents of maritime piracy and hijackings occurred in the Gulf of Guinea. As a result of the prevailing insecurity, the humanitarian situation in the region was further aggravated, triggering new population displacements, which reached a cumulative figure of 5 million people in 2020, 1.4 million higher than in 2019. While Governments in the subregion were responsive to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) outbreak, the pandemic triggered a severe economic slowdown, which, along with the new outbreak of the Ebola virus disease in Guinea in 2021 and adverse climatic conditions, risked reversing the modest gains made in achieving the Sustainable Development Goals.

Apart from these unsettling security, humanitarian and socioeconomic developments, the political situation was marked by uneven progress. Elections were held in 2020 in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia and the Niger. Despite contestations and unacceptable levels of violence in Côte d'Ivoire and Guinea, the polls overall went well. Electoral management bodies were largely able to maintain their electoral calendars and demonstrated impressive technical capacity to organize and conduct elections amidst a global pandemic. Increasingly, elections were funded exclusively from national budgets. Notwithstanding an overall decrease in the number of women elected to office, there was also notable progress in the participation and representation of women and youth in political and peace processes in several countries.

I intend to offer my good offices and support in the area of mediation to contribute to the conduct of peaceful, inclusive and transparent elections scheduled to take place in the Gambia, Senegal and Sierra Leone in 2022, as well as in Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Togo in 2023. The United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS) will conduct several stakeholders' forums with candidates and national actors across political divides, contributing to peaceful pre-election periods in those countries.

Throughout, UNOWAS will work hand in glove with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union and other subregional and international partners to foster regional cooperation and promote preventive diplomacy to the benefit of the people of the region and beyond.

(Signed) Annadif Khatir **Mahamat Saleh**  
Special Representative of the Secretary-General  
United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel

## **A. Proposed programme plan for 2022 and programme performance for 2020**

### **Overall orientation**

#### **Mandates and background**

2. The United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel is responsible for conflict prevention and ensuring sustainable peace and security in West Africa and the Sahel. The mandate of UNOWAS derives from an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2016/88, S/2016/89, S/2016/1128, S/2016/1129, S/2019/1009 and S/2020/85), as well as Security Council resolution 2349 (2017).
3. UNOWAS will continue to monitor political developments, identify emerging peace and security threats and conduct good offices activities to prevent conflict, sustain peace and consolidate peacebuilding efforts and political stability in West African and Sahelian countries; enhance regional and subregional partnerships to address cross-border and cross-cutting peace and security threats in West Africa and the Sahel; support, through political advocacy and convening, the implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel; and promote good governance, respect for the rule of law, human rights and the mainstreaming of gender in conflict prevention, management and resolution. In doing so, it will work closely with regional and subregional entities and will enhance its collaboration across the United Nations system.

### **Programme of work**

#### **Objective**

4. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to achieve peace and security in West Africa and the Sahel.

#### **Strategy**

5. To contribute to the objective, the mission will monitor political developments in West Africa and the Sahel and deploy good offices in partnership with regional and subregional entities, especially with regard to presidential and parliamentary elections to be held in Côte d'Ivoire, the Gambia, the Niger and Senegal in 2021 and 2022, as well as three presidential elections scheduled for 2023. Particular attention will be given to the United Nations transition in Guinea-Bissau, following the closure of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS) on 31 December 2020. UNOWAS will also support inclusive and transparent constitutional and electoral reform processes in the subregion, including support for the reform agenda of Guinea-Bissau, with a particular emphasis on extending good offices to the constitutional review.
6. The mission will intensify its analytical work, including with respect to the adverse implications of climate change, energy poverty, ecological change and natural disasters, among other factors, in line with its expanded mandate.
7. UNOWAS will also mobilize support and provide advocacy to advance the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel, working closely with the Office of the Special Coordinator for Development in the Sahel and the United Nations coordination mechanisms at the regional level to ensure a harmonized approach. It will maintain continuous engagement, including through political support to advance United Nations regional programmes in coordination with partners, including the European Union, the World Bank and the African Development Bank. UNOWAS will continue to hold meetings to increase coherence and information exchange between United Nations regional entities, as well as regional and subregional organizations, including ECOWAS, the Lake Chad Basin

Commission, the Group of Five for the Sahel and the Mano River Union. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General will continue to co-chair the Ministerial Coordination Platform for the Sahel together with the African Union. The Special Representative will also co-chair two meetings of the steering committee in 2022 with regional United Nations entities. UNOWAS will continue to provide political and strategic leadership to the United Nations system for the implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel, and work with the United Nations development system towards ensuring a more coherent, comprehensive and integrated approach to addressing the root causes of instability and conflict in the Sahel.

8. Furthermore, UNOWAS will provide support for the building of local and national capacities related to good governance, mediation, the rule of law and human rights, as well as security sector governance and the mainstreaming of gender, including by facilitating the participation of civil society in these efforts.
9. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
  - (a) Prevention of conflict, strengthening of inclusive political dialogue and consolidation of political stability through consensual constitutional and electoral processes;
  - (b) Strengthening of subregional and cross-border responses to challenges related to security sector reform, climate insecurity, transnational organized crime, illicit trafficking, farmer and herder dynamics, terrorism and violent extremism;
  - (c) Enhanced regional and subregional partnerships, in particular with the African Union, ECOWAS, the Group of Five for the Sahel, the Mano River Union, the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the African Development Bank;
  - (d) A more coherent, comprehensive and integrated approach to addressing the root causes of instability, intercommunal violence and conflict in the Sahel;
  - (e) Mainstreaming of gender in conflict prevention, management and resolution activities in West Africa and the Sahel.

### **External factors for 2022**

10. The overall plan for 2022 is based on the following planning assumptions:
  - (a) Violent extremism, terrorism and intercommunal violence in the Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin, on top of the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Ebola virus disease, will continue to pose challenges to peace and stability in the subregion;
  - (b) Conflicts over natural resources affecting relations between herders and farmers and other factors related to the adverse impact of climate change will continue to increase;
  - (c) There will be no new major conflicts in the subregion that would bring about a shift in priorities;
  - (d) Legislative elections will be held, as scheduled, in the Gambia, Senegal and Sierra Leone in 2022;
  - (e) Elections will be held in Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Togo in 2023;
  - (f) The demand for the good offices of UNOWAS will remain high, especially prior to elections scheduled for 2023;
  - (g) The demand for monitoring and good offices in Guinea-Bissau will remain high following the closure of UNIOGBIS in December 2020 and prior to legislative and presidential elections in 2023;

- (h) The Heads of State and Government of West Africa, ECOWAS, the Lake Chad Basin Commission, the Mano River Union, the African Union and the Group of Five for the Sahel will demonstrate a commitment to mobilizing resources to address challenges to peace and stability, as well as the political will to ensure that regional peace and security mechanisms are operationalized;
  - (i) The ECOWAS early warning and response mechanism and other regional conflict prevention instruments will be fully operationalized at the regional, national and local levels, in close collaboration with civil society;
  - (j) Peacebuilding and peace consolidation efforts by partners such as regional organizations, including in post-electoral contexts, will continue;
  - (k) Strong political commitment on the part of Member States and regional organizations to work with the United Nations in the context of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel will continue;
  - (l) Countries in the region will continue to make progress in implementing their obligations under national and international human rights standards and in upholding the rule of law;
  - (m) Jointly with the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA), there will be continued engagements at the political and technical levels with and in support of the Gulf of Guinea Commission and the Interregional Coordination Centre for Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea.
11. With regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, the proposed programme plan is based on the assumption that the proposed deliverables and activities for 2022 will be feasible to implement. However, if the pandemic were to continue to have an impact on the planned deliverables and activities, they would be adjusted during 2022 within the scope of the overall objectives, strategies and mandates. Any such adjustments would be reported as part of the programme performance information.
12. UNOWAS integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. The good offices role of the Special Representative will include consultations with women's groups and young people, and UNOWAS will continue to advocate for the implementation of Security Council resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#) and subsequent resolutions on women and youth and peace and security through the formulation and implementation of national and regional action plans.
13. With regard to cooperation with other entities, as stipulated in its expanded mandate, UNOWAS will be an active partner of the African Union, ECOWAS, the Group of Five for the Sahel, the Mano River Union, the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the African Development Bank in developing and harmonizing regional capacities for conflict prevention, conflict resolution, peacebuilding and sustaining peace; advancing the promotion of good governance and respect for human rights and the rule of law, the promotion of gender and the participation of young people in democratic processes; and supporting regional responses to address cross-border threats to peace and security, including transnational organized crime, illicit trafficking, farmer and herder dynamics, terrorism and violent extremism. UNOWAS will also continue to collaborate with regional and subregional partners through joint high-level missions, as well as technical assessment and fact-finding missions. It will continue to host the secretariat and ensure coordination of the Working Group on Women, Youth, Peace and Security in West Africa and the Sahel.
14. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, UNOWAS will promote synergies with the regional collaborative platform, the regional Development Coordination Office, resident coordinators, humanitarian coordinators, United Nations country teams and other United Nations entities to address the multifaceted challenges facing the region. Coordination with United Nations entities, including with the Office of the Special Coordinator for Development in the Sahel, will continue within the framework of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel. The engagement of UNOWAS will remain consistent with the priorities of the integrated strategy, with a focus on cross-border threats to peace and security and efforts to counter radicalization. UNOWAS will work closely with the resident coordinators in its mission area on the sustaining peace agenda

and other priority issues. In that context, it will strengthen its coordination with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and leverage its relationship with the Peacebuilding Support Office in the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs of the Secretariat for targeted interventions. UNOWAS will deepen its engagement with UNOCA on issues affecting West and Central Africa, including the threats posed by Boko Haram factions, as well as conflicts related to pastoralism, piracy and maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.

15. In addition to raising awareness of the issues affecting the Lake Chad Basin region, UNOWAS will support efforts to advance the implementation of the Regional Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience Strategy for Areas Affected by Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin Region, through advocacy and participation in its steering committees. UNOWAS will maintain continuous links to the Lake Chad Basin Commission and the secretariat of the Regional Stabilization Facility for Lake Chad. UNOWAS will also participate in the technical and high-level meetings of the Lake Chad Basin Governors' Forum on stabilization and recovery in the Lake Chad Region.

### **Evaluation activities**

16. An evaluation of UNOWAS support for elections in West Africa and the Sahel is planned for 2022.
17. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs will lead a systematic assessment with the overall purpose of improving the gender sensitivity of the political analyses developed by the Department and the special political missions.

### **Programme performance in 2020**

#### **Accompanying electoral processes throughout West Africa and the Sahel<sup>1</sup>**

18. Due to five high-stakes elections in 2020, UNOWAS was faced with a high number of requests to support mediation efforts and dialogue with multiple stakeholders in the relevant countries in the periods leading up to, during and in the aftermath of the elections. This was coupled with increasing threats to peace and security posed by violent extremism and terrorism, as well as latent and active intercommunal conflicts. In response, the Special Representative intensified his preventive diplomacy engagements and undertook several pre- and post-electoral missions, including jointly with ECOWAS and the African Union, to countries that held elections in 2020. During the pre-electoral period, the Special Representative also facilitated stakeholders' forums in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Guinea and the Niger, in collaboration with ECOWAS and the African Union, aimed at reducing tensions and advocating for the peaceful acceptance of election results. Furthermore, the Special Representative coordinated closely with resident coordinators, United Nations country teams and other United Nations entities in the context of the elections and reform processes in the region.


#### *Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

19. The above-mentioned work contributed to 14 good offices and mediation missions, resulting in collective attainment of overall peaceful and credible elections in West Africa and the Sahel, which exceeded the planned target of 12 good offices and mediation missions carried out to prevent election-related tensions and consolidate political stability, in partnership with regional and subregional entities and other national and international actors, reflected in the programme budget for 2020 (see figure I).

<sup>1</sup> As reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020 (A/74/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.4).

Figure I

**Performance measure: high-level joint mediation activities with the Economic Community of West African States and regional partners for conflict prevention in West Africa and the Sahel**



### **Impact of COVID-19 on programme delivery**

20. Owing to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic during 2020, some of the high-level and technical-level missions planned to assist in defusing tensions, support the prevention of electoral violence, advocate against hate speech and foster dialogue between political stakeholders ahead of elections scheduled for the second half of 2020 in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea and the Niger had to be cancelled or postponed. Moreover, UNOWAS was unable to undertake physical visits to countries in West Africa and the Sahel, which limited its ability to monitor first-hand or engage with national stakeholders on sensitive political and security developments on the ground. Where possible, the mission conducted regional consultations and engagements with national authorities, United Nations resident coordinators and stakeholders on mandated areas through virtual means from March through September 2020.

### **Planned result for 2022**

#### **Reduced election-related tensions throughout West Africa and the Sahel**

21. In 2023, a series of presidential or legislative elections will be held in Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Togo. Legislative elections will also be held in 2022 in the Gambia and Senegal, while local elections will be held in Sierra Leone. Generally, in the lead-up to presidential, legislative or local elections in the subregion, UNOWAS closely monitors developments at the country level in coordination with United Nations actors on the ground and conducts early warning or good offices missions aimed at identifying and defusing emerging peace and security threats or pre-electoral tensions. In 2020, the mission conducted several good offices missions in the lead-up to the elections in Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea and the Niger that contributed to peaceful outcomes and the acceptance of results. The mission has already begun engaging with United Nations and national stakeholders in the countries where elections will be held in 2022 and 2023 with a view to closely monitoring pre-electoral political developments. It also plans to conduct stakeholders' forums with political candidates and national actors across the political divide in some of these countries to support efforts to reduce tensions and contribute to the peaceful acceptance of results.

#### *Lessons learned and planned change*

22. The lesson for the mission in 2020 was the importance of extending its good offices and preventive diplomacy engagements beyond capital cities to the interior of the countries. For example, in the lead-up to presidential elections in Ghana, the mission worked with national and United Nations actors to organize two stakeholders' forums in Kumasi and Tamale, which are regions located outside of the capital city of Accra. These regional-level forums proved to be of immense benefit, as the Special Representative was able to convey key messages, as part of his good offices, to national stakeholders at the community level. Furthermore, close coordination between the Special Representative and the heads of elections observation missions was critical in enhancing joint

advocacy and responses to issues that arose within the post-election period in several countries. In applying these lessons, the mission will invest time in organizing activities beyond capital cities to include the interior of countries and further enhance its coordination with election observation missions.

*Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

23. This work is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated in the prevention of pre-electoral tensions, in partnership with regional and subregional entities, as well as national and international actors, in the lead-up to elections in several countries in the subregion in 2022 and 2023 (see table 2).

Table 2  
**Performance measure**

<i>2018 (actual)</i>	<i>2019 (actual)</i>	<i>2020 (actual)</i>	<i>2021 (planned)</i>	<i>2022 (planned)</i>
Revitalized peace architecture that promoted an environment conducive to peaceful elections ahead of the electoral cycle in 2019	The conduct of generally peaceful, inclusive and credible elections in Nigeria	The conduct of generally peaceful, inclusive and credible elections in five countries in West Africa	Increased good offices and mediation efforts to address election-related tensions throughout West Africa and the Sahel	Enhanced good offices and mediation efforts to address election-related tensions throughout West Africa and the Sahel

### Deliverables

24. Table 3 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2020–2022 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 3  
**Deliverables for the period 2020–2022, by category and subcategory**

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2020 actual</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>
<b>A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies</b>				
<b>Parliamentary documentation</b> (number of documents)	2	2	2	2
1. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council	2	2	2	2
<b>Substantive services for meetings</b> (number of three-hour meetings)	2	2	2	2
2. Meetings of the Security Council	2	2	2	2
<b>B. Generation and transfer of knowledge</b>				
<b>Seminars, workshops and training events</b> (number of days)	9	9	9	9
3. Workshops on peace and security, including violent extremism, terrorism, transnational organized crime, human rights and the implementation of Security Council resolution <a href="#">1325 (2000)</a> and subsequent resolutions on women's rights	9	9	9	9
<b>Technical materials</b> (number of materials)	4	4	4	4
4. Issue papers on peace and security, human rights, gender and young people	4	4	4	4

Category and subcategory	2020 planned	2020 actual	2021 planned	2022 planned
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**C. Substantive deliverables**

**Good offices:** provision of good offices, including jointly with ECOWAS and the African Union, on conflict prevention and in consideration of human rights and gender aspects.

**Consultation, advice and advocacy:** monitoring missions to countries of West Africa and the Sahel to analyse developments and emerging threats and identify entry points for early warning and conflict prevention activities; monitoring missions to Burkina Faso and the Gambia to support United Nations initiatives to sustain peace; and pre- and post-electoral missions to countries conducting elections in West Africa and the Sahel to monitor tensions related to the electoral process.

**Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions:** advocacy and support for integrated subregional and cross-border responses on cross-cutting threats to peace and security, in particular election-related instability and challenges related to security sector reform, transnational organized crime, illicit trafficking, terrorism and violent extremism; consultations on human rights during political and electoral processes; advocacy for the effective implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel in addressing the root causes of instability in the Sahel; and advocacy for enhanced strategic cooperation and coordination in the Sahel in fulfilment of the objectives of the integrated strategy.

**D. Communication deliverables**

**Outreach programmes, special events and information materials:** electronic and print magazines, brochures, flyers, information kits and special events to promote the activities of UNOWAS and enhance the visibility of the mission.

**External and media relations:** press conferences, press releases and media interaction on the activities of UNOWAS.

**Digital platforms and multimedia content:** dissemination of information on the activities of UNOWAS through its website and social media platforms.

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2022

### Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 4

**Financial resources**

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2020	2021	2022		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2022 vs. 2021 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	87.2	139.6	146.6	–	7.0
Civilian personnel costs	7 852.4	8 517.1	9 361.0	–	843.9
Operational costs	4 460.4	5 293.3	5 269.7	–	(23.6)
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>12 400.0</b>	<b>13 950.0</b>	<b>14 777.3</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>827.3</b>

Table 5  
Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff				
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	Total
Approved 2021	1	1	–	2	9	14	10	1	38	6	–	44	9	21	–	74
Proposed 2022	1	1	–	2	9	14	10	1	38	6	–	44	9	21	–	74
<b>Regular positions, change</b>	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
Approved general temporary assistance 2021	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1
Proposed general temporary assistance 2022	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1
<b>General temporary assistance positions, change</b>	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
<b>Total approved 2021</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>Total proposed 2022</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>75</b>
<b>Total change</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>

25. The proposed resource requirements for 2022 for UNOWAS amount to \$14,777,300 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the deployment of one military adviser and one police adviser (\$146,600), salaries and common staff costs (\$9,361,000) for 44 international positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 Assistant Secretary-General, 2 D-1, 9 P-5, 14 P-4, 10 P-3, 1 P-2 and 6 Field Service) and 31 national positions (9 National Professional Officer and 22 Local level positions, including 1 general temporary assistance Local level position), as well as operational costs (\$5,269,700), comprising the costs for consultants and consulting services (\$133,800), official travel (\$860,200), facilities and infrastructure (\$310,400), ground transportation (\$66,200), air operations (\$2,692,800), communications and information technology (\$602,100) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$604,200).
26. It is proposed that one general temporary assistance position of Finance and Budget Assistant (Local level) be continued in 2022, to ensure segregation of duties and maintain internal control over the financial transactions of the mission.
27. A vacancy rate of 16 per cent has been applied to the estimates for international positions, and 8 per cent to estimates for national positions, based on the latest vacancy rates and projected deployment. An assumption of full incumbency has been applied to the estimates for military and police advisers.
28. The increase in requirements for 2022 compared with the appropriation for 2021 is attributable mainly to (a) the delayed impact of 12 positions approved in 2021; and (b) the application of a higher percentage of common staff costs, based on recent expenditure patterns, offset by (c) decreases in requirements for consultants and facilities and infrastructure.

#### Extrabudgetary resources

29. In 2021, extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$464,000 are estimated to support activities aimed at promoting peaceful 2021 elections in Benin, building the capacity of women in politics, promoting gender equality and the empowerment of women in the security sector, fighting hate

speech and divisive discourse in the Mano River Basin, holding the UNOWAS regional forum of peace and development advisers for West Africa and the Sahel and addressing climate change and related security risks in West Africa and the Sahel.

30. In 2022, extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$300,000 are projected to continue supporting activities aimed at achieving peace and security in West Africa and the Sahel.

## 2. United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

(\$99,160,000)

### Foreword

Over the course of 2022, Somalia will need to continue to make progress in peace, stability and sustainable development, with a new administration expected to be in place following the indirect elections in 2021. Somalia will continue efforts to strengthen the federal- and State-level institutions, and prepare for the next elections, scheduled for 2024/2025 under a one-person, one-vote process, the first in Somalia since 1969. This will require continued political engagement, dialogue and support to achieve a universal electoral process, and further advance female political participation. Progress will also need to be made towards finalizing and adopting the revised Constitution and deepening federalism.

For Somalia, 2022 marks the midpoint in its ambitious ninth national development plan, covering the period 2020–2024 and outlining national priorities in the areas of inclusive politics and reconciliation, security and the rule of law, and economic and social development, with linkages to human rights and protection, and placing the empowerment of women, youth and other marginalized groups at the forefront of development efforts. It will also be the second year of its three-year security transition plan towards the federal Government assuming full responsibility for security in 2023.

Somalia continues to face a significant security threat posed by terrorism and violent extremism. Al-Shabaab remains in control of parts of the country and has shown resilience and the ability to adapt and carry out attacks in Mogadishu, southern and central parts of the country and the region. Somalia is increasingly taking the lead responsibility for security from the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), but still requires further progress in building capacities and establishing a federated security sector. Sustained and coordinated support from the international community in this regard will be important. Longstanding inter- and intra-clan tensions and conflicts will also need to be addressed through reconciliation efforts at the community level.

The United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) remains a crucial partner of the Government and institutions of Somalia in coordinating peace and development priorities in support of the national development plan and through the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework for the period 2021–2025. The United Nations remains a key source of support and is well positioned to coordinate international and regional engagement in addressing the country's challenges.

Somalia faces a myriad of persistent and protracted humanitarian challenges, which include recurrent climatic disasters, the worst desert locust infestation in generations, widespread insecurity and displacement. Most recently, the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic has stretched the fragile health-care system in the country. The primary focus of humanitarian action continues to be on building the resilience of Somali society and communities, but also on addressing protection concerns, ranging from attacks on civilians, to widespread gender-based violence, to violence against children to forced displacement. Too often, protection threats continue to impede the lives of internally displaced persons, women and girls, persons with disabilities and persons with minority clan affiliation. The pandemic has aggravated the already dire situation further.

In 2022, Somalia can be expected to face many of the same challenges it has encountered on its peacebuilding and State-building path so far. The new administration will need to address many of the reconciliation, institution and capacity-building priorities in 2022, which will depend on the extension of State authority, the rule of law, the protection and promotion of human rights, and access to sustainable financing.

I take this opportunity to reiterate the strong commitment of the United Nations to supporting Somalia on this challenging but critical journey.

*(Signed)* James Swan  
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia  
Head of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia

## A. Proposed programme plan for 2022 and programme performance for 2020

### Overall orientation

#### Mandates and background

31. UNSOM is responsible for: (a) providing good offices to help advance inclusive political processes and reconciliation led by the Government of Somalia, notably by providing support for efforts towards high-level dialogue between the Federal Government and federal member States and intra- and inter-klan reconciliation; (b) furnishing technical, operational and logistical support for elections and ensuring as wide as possible representation in the process; (c) supporting security sector reform and the improvement of key security law and rule of law institutions; (d) supporting a comprehensive approach to security and the revised transition plan; and (e) providing system-wide support for the implementation of the human rights due diligence policy, and monitoring and reporting on human rights violations. The Mission also provides support and strategic policy advice to bolster the ability of the Federal Government of Somalia to deliver services and attract investment and the efforts of Somalia to advance the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, working closely with the United Nations country team. The mandate is defined in Security Council resolutions [2102 \(2013\)](#), which established UNSOM, and was renewed by its resolutions [2158 \(2014\)](#), [2221 \(2015\)](#), [2232 \(2015\)](#), [2275 \(2016\)](#), [2358 \(2017\)](#), [2408 \(2018\)](#), [2461 \(2019\)](#), [2516 \(2020\)](#) and, most recently, [2540 \(2020\)](#), by which the Council extended the mandate of UNSOM until 31 August 2021.
32. The Security Council, by its resolution [2408 \(2018\)](#) and subsequent resolutions, also requested UNSOM to support Somali efforts in countering and preventing violent extremism, to enhance its interaction with civil society and youth and to support system-wide implementation of the human rights due diligence policy across all United Nations support to AMISOM and the Somali security sector.
33. UNSOM will also continue its support for stakeholders in the Somali justice and security sector to improve the corrections and judicial systems, reform the judiciary, strengthen the security service delivery capacity of the police forces, improve equitable access to justice and protect the most vulnerable. The support provided by the Mission will focus on priorities identified in the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework, the mutual accountability framework and related Sustainable Development Goal targets.

### Programme of work

#### Objective

34. The objective, to which the Mission contributes, is to achieve peace, security, political stability and national reconciliation in Somalia through the delivery of the mandate established by the Security Council as described above and in line with the priorities of Federal Government of Somalia.

#### Strategy

35. To contribute to the objective, the mission will support, through outreach, good offices and strategic policy advice: (a) advancing national priorities with the new Government, in close coordination with national and international partners; (b) fostering an inclusive political settlement through progress towards the completion of the constitutional review exercise and subsequent adoption of an amended constitution by the two houses of Parliament to deepen federalism, as well as reconciliation; and (c) reforming the security sector, implementing the Somalia transition plan and facilitating the delivery of the comprehensive approach to security in compliance with the human rights due

diligence policy. These strategic priorities are also in line with the ninth national development plan, which focuses on inclusive politics, security and justice, as well as social and economic development.

36. The Mission will support the newly established administration in making progress in the achievement of the country's national priorities, through inclusive political processes and in coordination with international partners. UNSOM will continue to advocate for accelerated inclusive decision-making and political agreements on outstanding issues. In this regard, the Mission will closely engage with national stakeholders, including the Federal Government, federal member States and civil society. In close coordination with national and international partners, UNSOM will support Somali-led initiatives, as guided by the national reconciliation framework, towards the peaceful resolution of local conflicts.
37. The Mission will continue to provide strategic advice to national counterparts to support implementation of the national security architecture, facilitate the delivery of the comprehensive approach to security in compliance with the human rights due diligence policy, exercise the convening role of UNSOM to coordinate related international support, continue to enhance the Somali security forces' ability to mitigate the threat from improvised explosive devices and work closely with national counterparts to align stabilization initiatives with the priorities identified in the transition plan.
38. The Mission will continue to assist Somalia on issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic by supporting the health-care sector, monitoring the socioeconomic and humanitarian implications of the COVID-19 pandemic in Somalia and supporting the response and vaccine roll-out efforts.
39. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in achieving the objectives of the United Nations Sustainable Development Coordination Framework developed in close cooperation with the Government of Somalia, and further guiding the Mission's support in delivering the national development plan, as well as ensuring that the key priorities established in the mutual accountability framework – inclusive politics, security and justice, and social and economic development – are accomplished.

### **External factors for 2022**

40. With regard to the external factors, the overall plan for 2022 is based on the following planning assumptions:
  - (a) Political dialogue between the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member States is expected to continue at a differing pace;
  - (b) The new administration will support the ninth national development plan and the road maps in keeping the same priorities or making no major changes;
  - (c) Progress on the constitutional review process will continue, with some critical federalism-related issues still requiring attention;
  - (d) Somalia will progressively assume responsibility for security matters, with the Federal Government and federal member States remaining committed to and making progress towards building security and justice institutions as outlined in the national security architecture and the transition plan. Forums to facilitate a meaningful dialogue between the Federal Government and federal member States will remain essential for decision-making on outstanding issues;
  - (e) Human rights violations by parties to the conflict will continue to remain of concern, with young Somalis remaining particularly vulnerable to radicalization and recruitment by extremist groups;
  - (f) Somalia will continue to experience widespread insecurity stemming from Al-Shabaab attacks, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant-affiliated activities, inter-clan tensions and climate-related shocks;

- (g) The Security Council, the African Union Peace and Security Council and the wider international community will continue to support the transition of security from AMISOM to the Somali Security Forces;
  - (h) Regional relations will remain conducive to regional stability.
41. With regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, the proposed programme plan is based on the assumption that the proposed deliverables and activities for 2022 will be feasible to implement. However, if the pandemic were to continue to have an impact on the planned deliverables and activities, they would be adjusted during 2022 within the scope of the overall objectives, strategies and mandates. Any such adjustments would be reported as part of the programme performance information.
  42. The Mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. UNSOM will continue to support the increased participation of women in peacebuilding, including by promoting their involvement in the development of a strategy for the effective and sustainable rehabilitation of disengaged female combatants and their dependants.
  43. In line with the United Nations Disability Inclusion Strategy, the Mission will review and specifically examine the strategy to further advance disability inclusion. It will include mitigating measures to overcome any challenges while operationalizing disability inclusion. The Mission will liaise with relevant United Nations entities to ensure the accessibility and management of facilities, security and other improvements and the adaptation of office layout, amenities, furniture and fixtures to facilitate easy access and use by persons with disabilities, in close collaboration with the United Nations Support Mission in Somalia (UNSOS).
  44. The partnership between AMISOM and UNSOM remains strong. The Mission will continue to work closely with AMISOM to ensure the alignment of strategic priorities and operational efforts, including through the Senior Leadership Coordination Forum comprising the Heads of AMISOM, UNSOM and UNSOS. Furthermore, the United Nations-AMISOM joint working group on the human rights due diligence policy, as well as United Nations human rights due diligence policy task force (comprising United Nations entities that deliver support to AMISOM and the Somali security forces), will be strengthened to guide and ensure robust implementation of prevention and response measures in line with the human rights due diligence policy.
  45. UNSOM will further advance cooperation and integration with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes to enhance and accelerate the delivery of results in Somalia in line with the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework. In close coordination with the United Nations country team and international partners, the Mission will work closely with the Federal Government of Somalia in implementing the mutual accountability framework to ensure the consistency and alignment of international support for the country's priorities. In addition, UNSOM will continue to implement joint programmes with the United Nations country team entities to advance peacebuilding and State-building goals. Existing integrated teams will continue to collaborate in the areas of electoral support, constitutional review support, rule of law, integrity systems, security sector reform, economic development and gender.

### **Evaluation activities**

46. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs will lead a systematic assessment with the overall purpose of improving the gender sensitivity of the political analyses developed by the Department and the special political missions.

## Programme performance in 2020

### Effective and coordinated approach by the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member States to conflict prevention and resolution<sup>2</sup>

47. UNSOM provided good offices and strategic advice to parties to address the root causes of conflict and resolve them in a sustainable manner. To enhance the capacity-building of partners in mediation and conflict resolution, UNSOM facilitated training sessions for Somali institutions and civil society, including women and youth. UNSOM, through its good offices in the federal member States, strengthened the ability of State administrations to promote reconciliation in line with the national reconciliation framework. The Mission and government partners undertook joint analysis, planning and implementation of the activities that prevented emerging conflicts from turning violent and resolved the issues through peaceful means.

#### *Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

48. The above-mentioned work contributed to the prevention of conflict and violence during political discussions about the electoral model for the 2020–2021 elections. It also contributed to peace efforts in the disputed areas between Puntland and “Somaliland” by supporting the peace activities of grass-roots organizations through the Peacebuilding Fund. Despite two important face-to-face meetings held between the leaders of the Federal Government and “Somaliland” in 2020, the resumption of talks did not gain traction due to both administrations’ preoccupation with domestic issues. Although the national reconciliation process was gradually rolled out to the federal member States level, it was not launched at the federal level as had been agreed in the mutual accountability framework due to the country’s increasing focus on electoral issues. A whole-of-government approach in achieving a lasting peace, as reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020, was not fully developed. Further, the outbreak of COVID-19 did not allow for physical meetings and workshops on reconciliation. However, the Group of Friends of Reconciliation meetings, community of practice sessions and consultations on specific conflicts were held virtually (see table 6).

Table 6  
Performance measure

2018 (actual)	2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)
Ad hoc conflict resolution and reconciliation mechanisms	Adoption of a national reconciliation framework	A national reconciliation framework aimed at promoting a whole-of-government approach, inclusive of the federal, State and district tiers, in developing comprehensive responses covering governance, development and rule of law initiatives to sustain a lasting peace was not launched

### Completion of voter registration across Somalia<sup>2</sup>

49. UNSOM, building on progress made in 2018 and 2019, planned the voter registration mapping exercise in order to provide the National Independent Electoral Commission with a more limited list of potential voter registration sites and allow security verification of those sites with the relevant security actors. These sites were to be used as polling centres for the 2020 elections. Somali security forces and AMISOM were to play an instrumental role in securing voter registration, including the vetting and securing of voter registration sites. The securing of the voter registration process was to

<sup>2</sup> As reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020 (A/74/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.4).

be jointly planned, monitored and implemented through an integrated Somali-led electoral security task force, comprising both national and international security forces, at both the national and subnational levels.

50. The National Independent Electoral Commission, with the support of the Integrated Electoral Support Group, launched the voter registration site-mapping exercise in 2019, and a list of potential sites was established. These sites were also to be considered as potential polling centres for the 2020–2021 one-person, one-vote elections. The list of sites remained incomplete, however, due to the inability of the Commission to operate in Puntland and Jubbaland and delays in the establishment of the national electoral security task force in charge of vetting and securing the venues. Furthermore, the change in the electoral model in September 2020, resulting in a shift from one person, one vote to an indirect electoral process, excluded the Commission from the process and made voter registration redundant. The scope of operation for the indirect model limited polling to 11 cities, with Somali and AMISOM security forces in charge of security at the polling locations.

*Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

51. The above-mentioned work contributed to meeting the target of having a voter registration mapping exercise. However, due to the change in the electoral model, the list of potential polling sites could not be completed, and the voter registration exercise did not take place (see table 7).

Table 7

**Performance measure**

<i>2018 (actual)</i>	<i>2019 (actual)</i>	<i>2020 (actual)</i>
Conduct of a pilot project to test recruitment and training procedures, as well as hardware and software, for the voter registration site-mapping operation scheduled in 2019 by the National Independent Electoral Commission	Conduct of the voter registration site mapping operations	Conduct of the voter registration exercise by the National Independent Electoral Commission did not take place in all identified areas across the country

**Somalia taking greater ownership of its security<sup>2</sup>**

52. An enhanced Somali and UNSOM partnership, including at the federal member State level, resulted in effective support in the coordination of international partners towards the Somali-led conditions-based handover of security responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali security forces and institutions, and the implementation of related capacity-building initiatives, in accordance with phase 2 of the initial Somalia transition plan of 2018. The Federal Government completed the revision of the Somalia transition plan in February 2021. Moreover, the Federal Government took an increased leadership role in the mechanisms of the comprehensive approach to security to guide the support of international partners. As a result of the security transition, Somali institutions assumed greater responsibility for providing security across the country. In addition to individual strands of the comprehensive approach to security directly supporting the implementation of the Somali transition plan at a technical level, the Office of the Prime Minister and its Security Advisory Unit, which assumed the role of secretariat for the approach, provided increased direction and coordination by working jointly with technical strand components to prepare discussions at the executive group and other senior-level meetings.

*Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

53. The above-mentioned work contributed to the first meeting of the high-level Security and Justice Committee, demonstrating enhanced Somali engagement in coordination of partners' activities, including more effective dialogue between federal and State security institutions, with the Office of

National Security and the regional security offices within each federal member State undertaking regular meetings that generated greater awareness of security policy matters and some enhanced operational planning. However, while the capacity-building of security institutions has progressed in some areas at both the federal and State levels, these have not resulted in a notable handover of security responsibilities from AMISOM to the Somali security forces, mainly due to the limitations in the generation of sufficient national forces or the mobilization of the required resources, resulting in partial attainment of key milestones in the national security architecture and transition plan, as reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020. Therefore, the actual performance did not meet the planned target of gradual handover of security responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali security forces (see table 8).

Table 8  
Performance measure

<i>2018 (actual)</i>	<i>2019 (actual)</i>	<i>2020 (actual)</i>
Development of a framework/plan for the transition of security responsibilities to Somali security forces and institutions	Gradual handover of security responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali security forces and institutions, and implementation of related capacity-building initiatives, in accordance with locations outlined under phase one of the transition plan	Improved civilian oversight and direction of security institutions at both the federal and State levels, but limited handover of security responsibilities from AMISOM to Somali security forces and institutions, including the reconfiguration of some forward operating bases, and implementation of related capacity-building initiatives, in accordance with locations outlined under phase two of the transition plan, including enhanced preparations aimed at security of the national elections

#### Impact of COVID-19 on programme delivery

54. During 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic had an impact on the planned deliverables and activities of the Mission. Certain critical Mission activities had to be cancelled or postponed, including support for local reconciliation efforts, the verification of Somali National Army forces, workshops on traditional justice mechanisms and linkages to the formal justice system and on the roll-out of the federated justice and corrections model, the security assessment of voter registration sites by the national electoral security task force and the monitoring of the recently commenced Galmudug disarmament process. There was also a significant reduction of interactions with local interlocutors, such as clan elders, religious figures and local authorities, as they lacked the connectivity to meet virtually, and this impediment could only be partially compensated through national staff engagement or third-party facilitation. UNSOM continues to identify ways to support communities in dealing with the technological transformation in the COVID-19 context. In situ capacity-building, such as mentoring of police and advancing stabilization efforts, has also proven more challenging under COVID-related restrictions, and less effective, which resulted in using some of the resources earlier reserved for supporting the 2020–2021 national election campaigns.
55. At the same time, however, the Mission identified new and modified planned activities within the overall scope of the objectives of the mission. UNSOM provided support and technical advice to national authorities in preventing the spread of the virus in prisons and other detention facilities, as well as advocacy for their decongestion. Jointly with UNDP, the Mission also supported religious leaders in developing an awareness-raising campaign on COVID-19, combining health-related information with religious guidance. The United Nations family in Somalia also implemented

measures to prevent the risk of spreading COVID-19 among United Nations and associated staff. Further, UNSOM also supported the strategic communications aspects of the Federal Government's response to the pandemic.

## **Planned results for 2022**

### **Engendering public confidence in security and justice institutions post-security transition**

56. In 2020, UNSOM continued its work towards capacity-building of the security and rule of law institutions and provided strategic inputs into the revision of the Somalia transition plan, with the overall objective of Somali security forces assuming lead responsibility for providing security across Somalia. UNSOM also provided technical advice and support through the joint security sector governance programme to enhance civilian oversight in the security sector by undertaking a series of capacity-building sessions and developing institutional capacity plans for Parliament's defence committees, staff of the federal Ministry of Internal Security, federal member State ministries, regional security councils, the Office of the National Security Adviser and civil society. In addition, UNSOM provided technical advice and deployed its good offices to encourage a decision on the justice and corrections model and continued advocacy for an independent judiciary. Furthermore, UNSOM provided technical advice leading to the adoption of a two-year road map for drafting an amnesty bill and secured agreement from the Federal Government of Somalia to adopt a national weapons and ammunition strategy. UNSOM, in its advisory role, supported the Federal Government and federal member States in building the capacity of their police forces, particularly Darwish and community police contingents.

#### *Lessons learned and planned change*

57. UNSOM identified the continued need to address the absence of clear strategies on force generation, limited coordination among institutions responsible for providing security and a lack of public confidence in the capacity of the security forces to assume security from AMISOM, as well as the still developing justice and other institutions and bodies that exercise oversight of the security forces. The revised Somalia transition plan introduces principles, key milestones and deliverables towards a transition of lead responsibility for providing security from AMISOM to the Somali security forces. It also includes the objective of establishing effective and accountable civilian institutions to exercise control over security forces. Political commitment of both the Federal Government and federal member States will remain key to its implementation, as well as the need to use the agreed comprehensive approach to security with its respective strands. The comprehensive approach will continue to be guided by the Security and Justice Committee, which serves as an executive-level political, security and justice interface between the Federal Government of Somalia, the federal member States and international partners. In applying the lesson, UNSOM will provide good offices and strategic advice to improve coordination mechanisms, such as the comprehensive approach to security and the National Security Council. It will also support the acceleration of force-generation capabilities; transition objectives; the delineation of tasks and responsibilities among the Somali security forces, in line with the national security architecture agreement; the improvement of the maritime security of Somalia, particularly with regard to women in the maritime sector; the establishment of an independent judiciary; and the continued implementation of a federated policing system, encouraging the Federal Government to adapt and implement a national weapons and ammunition management strategy and a national arms control legislation that conforms to the international treaty obligations of Somalia.

#### *Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

58. The work is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated by (a) an improved level of awareness of civilian governance structures and oversight mechanisms of the security forces, including parliamentary oversight bodies; (b) various strategic decision-making bodies within the security sector, such as the Strategic Security Committee on the Somalia transition plan, composed

of the Federal Government and federal member States, and the Security and Justice Committee continuing to play key roles; (c) coordination mechanisms contributing to providing effective security to the population, and progress in the transition of the Somali Police Force into a federal service; (d) expansion of the maritime capability of Somalia in its territorial waters and economic exclusion zone; (e) advancement of amnesty legislation to provide a strategic legal tool to handle defecting Al-Shabaab fighters in a transparent and holistic manner; (f) resort to the courts to resolve grievances; and (g) progress towards national weapons and ammunition management strategy and national arms control legislation (see table 9).

Table 9  
Performance measure

<i>2018 (actual)</i>	<i>2019 (actual)</i>	<i>2020 (actual)</i>	<i>2021 (planned)</i>	<i>2022 (planned)</i>
		Revision of Somalia transition plan	Somali security forces gradually assume lead responsibility for providing security from AMISOM	Able, acceptable, affordable and accountable Somali security forces protect the civilian population
		Good offices used to build an independent judiciary	UNSOM provides good offices to reach a political agreement on a justice and corrections model	External civilian oversight bodies exercise control over security forces
		Capacity-building and formulation and implementation of an institutional development plan for civilian institutions in the security sector	Appointment of Judicial Service Commission members and establishment of the Constitutional Court	Strategic coordination mechanisms within the security sector are functional, with the expansion of the federated policing model
		Strengthening of the role of civil society		Improved maritime law enforcement, and adoption and enactment of a national weapons and ammunition management strategy and national arms control legislation, as well as amnesty legislation

#### **Progress and challenges related to constitutional reform in the constitutional review process**

59. During the term of the tenth Parliament, the constitutional review support project made progress in a number of critical areas, including completing the technical review of the provisional Constitution. The three mandated institutions, namely the Ministry of Constitutional Affairs, the Joint Parliamentary Constitutional Review Oversight Committee and the Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission, finalized their third draft of the reviewed Constitution in early December 2020. The constitutional review process has been an opportunity to consider the

nature and character of the new federal dispensation with the establishment of all the federal member States. Progress has been made in defining the nature and federal structure of the judiciary, public finance management and the security architecture. However, key contentious issues between the Federal Government and federal member States have yet to be resolved. The constitutional review process ensured the inclusion of a wide range of views during the consultation process, giving them an opportunity to raise concerns and share their opinions. To safeguard the achievements, UNSOM, together with international partners, advocated for locking in the amendments proposed thus far through adoption by the tenth Parliament. However, the Federal Government in late December 2020 postponed the constitutional review process to the eleventh Parliament.

*Lessons learned and planned change*

60. The lesson for the mission was the importance of consultations on non-contentious technical issues and of making meaningful progress towards the completion of the process. In applying the lesson, UNSOM will continue to engage with Federal Government and federal member State stakeholders to help establish mutual confidence between the two layers of the government so that outstanding issues of concern can be addressed through compromise and consensus-based solutions. UNSOM will renew its effort to advocate for the establishment of a constitutionally grounded intergovernmental platform with the new administration. Further, with the key donors supporting the constitutional review process, the Mission will continue intensive advocacy efforts to ensure that at least some of the contentious issues are negotiated and legal texts are developed for amendments. UNSOM will also redouble its efforts to raise awareness among the general public on the constitutional review process to build momentum from the grass-roots level.
61. Towards the adoption of a new amended constitution, the following steps will be critical: (a) continued support for the three mandated institutions to achieve consensus between the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member States until the review is finalized; (b) reaching consensus between the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member States to adopt technical articles of the Constitution and start negotiating on the controversial aspects of the Constitution; (c) adoption of the Constitution by the Parliament after consensus on the technical issues has been reached; and (d) harmonization of the constitutional framework of federal member States to the federal Constitution once adopted.

*Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

62. The Mission's work is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated by deepening collaboration between the Federal Government and federal member States, as well as civil society, to raise public awareness about all those processes and ensure public support and the conduct of regular and constructive negotiations between the Federal Government and federal member States on politically contentious issues, the development of legal texts that define the federal structure of Somalia and progress towards the adoption of the amended provisional Constitution that enjoys broad public support. The first set of activities should best be undertaken during the first and second sessions of the eleventh Parliament and should include the following: (a) providing technical support that will assist in ensuring that the quality of the text of the draft amendments complies with human rights conventions; (b) supporting the federal member States in the development of their constitutional submissions on the third revised constitutional text and engaging the political stakeholders in the federal member States to secure their support; (c) reaching out to the Jubbaland and Puntland administrations to ensure their participation in the review process; and (d) encouraging the Ministry of Constitutional Affairs, the Joint Parliamentary Constitutional Review Oversight Committee and the Independent Constitutional Review and Implementation Commission to continue consultations with actors such as civil society organizations, the media and the academic community, and ensuring that the voices of women, youth, minorities, persons with disabilities and other marginalized groups are included to enhance buy-in and shape public opinion (see table 10).

Table 10  
Performance measure

2018 (actual)	2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (planned)	2022 (planned)
		Technical review of the 15 chapters of the provisional Constitution completed and the draft of the reviewed provisional Constitution finalized by the three mandated institutions	Adoption of the reviewed provisional federal Constitution by the eleventh Parliament, commencement of discussions among the federal Government and federal member States on politically contentious issues and development of legal texts as per agreement	Adoption of amended articles by the Parliament and harmonization of the constitutional framework between the federal Government and federal member States

**Effective and coordinated stabilization and complementary strategies and action plans on preventing and countering violent extremism pursued by the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member States**

63. In 2020, under the comprehensive approach to security framework, UNSOM provided technical support and strategic advice to the Ministry of Interior, Federal Affairs and Reconciliation and the federal member States' ministries of interior in support of the implementation of the national stabilization strategy and the State stabilization plans. Similar technical support and strategic advice were provided by the United Nations joint pilot project to the Prevention and Countering of Violent Extremism Coordination Unit in the Office of the Prime Minister and the federal member States. The line ministries of the Federal Government and federal member States have developed their respective action plans to prevent and counter violent extremism, which were informed by dedicated assessments on that subject conducted in identified risk areas in districts controlled by the Government of Somalia. In areas newly recovered from Al-Shabaab, the aim has been to contribute to the credible and legitimate extension of State authority and services and, in doing so, initiate a range of early recovery activities to establish the building blocks for longer-term development programmes upon which to build. The Somali National Army recovered the towns of Sabiid (April 2019), Bariirre (May 2019), Awdheegle (August 2019) and Jannaale (March 2020) with support from AMISOM and international partners. Following the military operations to remove Al-Shabaab elements from the towns, the stabilization actors provided early recovery activities, designed to improve the material conditions of the population, increase engagement and acceptance of the local administration and support the entry of longer-term security, governance and development actors.

*Lessons learned and planned change*

64. The lesson for the mission was that, following the recovery operations in Lower Shabelle, the comprehensive joint planning of a whole-of-government approach was identified as a key element to better define common goals and build consensus around the roles and responsibilities of all involved. In addition, due to the still unstable and threatening environment, dedicated consultation on preventing and countering violent extremism could not take place as planned in newly recovered areas. There is a need to find innovative ways to conduct such consultation, providing evidence-based and participatory responses to conditions conducive to violent extremism to degrade the influence of Al-Shabaab. In applying the lesson, UNSOM will use its good offices, advisory role

and technical support to help further improve coordination mechanisms, taking into consideration the different actors and political dynamics, as well as approaches to preventing and countering violent extremism, in the different areas where stabilization occurs, as well as in other areas to reduce risks of relapsing, encourage dialogue and tolerance and prevent further extreme violence and stigmatization, including violence and stigmatization related to the COVID-19 pandemic.

*Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

- 65. This work is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated by effective strategic coordination mechanisms among all civil and military stakeholders, ensuring the sustained and credible presence of local governance, providing immediate recovery support and initiating long-term service delivery, strengthening the ability of Somali authorities to address local grievances through dialogue and tolerance, and promoting political solutions, mediation and a growing public confidence in peace (see table 11).

**Table 11**  
**Performance measure**

<i>2018 (actual)</i>	<i>2019 (actual)</i>	<i>2020 (actual)</i>	<i>2021 (planned)</i>	<i>2022 (planned)</i>
		Government led a whole-of-government approach to stabilization and preventing and countering violent extremism	Information-sharing and joint planning are established for areas to be recovered under the transition plan, and the national strategy on preventing and countering violent extremism and the plan for implementing the strategy are both revised, ensuring a good combination of military response and a soft power approach	Coordination mechanisms and joint planning among security and stabilization actors are an established way of working and taking different actors and political dynamics into consideration, with increasing soft power approaches, opening up possibilities to address conflict through political dialogue

**Deliverables**

- 66. Table 12 below lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2020–2022 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 12  
**Deliverables for the period 2020–2022, by category and subcategory**

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2020 actual</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>
<b>A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies</b>				
<b>Parliamentary documentation</b> (number of documents)	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>8</b>
1. Reports of the Secretary-General for the Security Council	4	4	4	4
2. Meetings of the Security Council	4	4	4	4
<b>B. Generation and transfer of knowledge</b>				
<b>Field and technical cooperation projects</b> (number of projects)	<b>4</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>2</b>
3. Joint projects on a United Nations anti-corruption programme, support for universal suffrage elections and the political empowerment of women, as well as a stabilization project	4	4	4	2
<b>Seminars, workshops and training events</b> (number of days)	<b>304</b>	<b>205</b>	<b>314</b>	<b>310</b>
4. Seminars to support the development of child protection laws	3	2	3	3
5. Seminars on police reform	4	–	6	2
6. Seminars on the coordination and implementation of federal political agreements on rule of law	10	10	–	4
7. Seminars on rightsizing of Somali security forces	14	–	4	8
8. Seminars on security- and justice-focused public expenditure	6	6	3	2
9. Workshops on addressing conflict-related sexual violence (women's protection)	7	3	7	5
10. Workshops on setting up and operationalizing the National Human Rights Commission	4	2	6	6
11. Workshops with civil society on human rights throughout Somalia	22	7	22	18
12. Thematic workshops on human rights issues, such as those dealing with minorities, people with disabilities and women and children, civil society engagement and basic human rights obligations	19	8	19	14
13. Workshops for monitoring and reporting on the human rights performance of Somali security forces and their ability to foster trust and confidence in communities	3	4	9	5
14. Workshops for the country task force on monitoring and reporting on violations against children, including children and armed conflict (8 days)	2	2	6	4
15. Workshops to enhance the capacity and harmonize the implementation of the national defector rehabilitation programme	2	1	2	2
16. Workshops on traditional justice mechanisms and linkage to formal justice system	6	2	6	6
17. Workshops on the roll-out of the federated justice and corrections model	6	–	6	6
18. Workshops for the custodial corps on prison management	30	4	15	20
19. Workshops on civilian oversight of security institutions	10	12	6	8
20. Workshops on implementation of maritime priorities in accordance with the Somali maritime resource and security strategy	8	10	6	8
21. Workshops on strengthening legislation for maritime security and mainstreaming gender equity into maritime law enforcement agencies	6	8	6	4
22. Workshops to support institutional capacity-building towards the implementation of the national security architecture and the transition plan	13	15	6	6
23. Workshops on integrity system to enhance anti-corruption capacities of national authorities and civil society organizations	–	–	1	1
24. Workshops, training and capacity-building on a comprehensive approach to security stabilization to review implementation of and update the national stabilization strategy and to review, develop and update State stabilization plans	13	6	7	7

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2020 actual</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>
25. Workshops on preventing and countering violent extremism, including with international partners	12	6	6	6
26. National youth seminar, held in partnership with the Federal Government of Somalia/ federal member States' Ministries of Youth and Sports, on youth priorities for Somalia	1	2	7	7
27. Workshops to enhance local authorities' and civil society organization anti-corruption capacities	1	1	1	2
28. Workshops, assessments, consultations and/or training sessions to support institutions at the Federal and federal member State level with advice on weapons and ammunition management to reduce the risk to the civilian population	12	12	12	40
29. Training on protection of civilians	6	4	18	12
30. Workshops on lessons learned to assess performance and delivery of electoral processes	8	–	8	1
31. Workshops/seminars/training activities on the electoral legal framework, including regulations on the National Independent Electoral Commission civic and voter education curriculum and on action plans to strengthen the Commission's interaction with electoral stakeholders at the national and subnational levels	27	27	27	20
32. Workshops on prevention of and response to electoral violence against women leaders	4	2	2	2
33. Workshops/seminars/training activities for the National Independent Electoral Commission and political parties on stakeholder consultation, procedures and conflict resolution, as well as training to the Commission on data-entry operations	17	17	15	10
34. Workshops/seminars/training activities to increase mediation and conflict resolution capacity in the post-election period	12	8	6	6
35. Workshops/seminars/training activities in journalism, social media and coverage of 2020–2021 one-person, one-vote election campaign	16	4	16	16
36. Miscellaneous workshop/seminars/training activities by Rule of Law and Security Institutions Group of UNSOM on implementation of transition plan/new policing model/comprehensive approach to security	–	–	14	6
37. Seminars in support of the national development plan inclusive politics committee	–	–	6	6
38. Workshops on peacebuilding and conflict prevention, resolution and mediation	–	5	5	5
39. Workshops on the constitutional review process, including discussions about the harmonization of constitutions	–	5	5	5
40. Technical workshops to assist the Somali National Youth Council/Youth Advisory Board	–	–	6	6
41. Workshops to build the capacity of civil society for monitoring and reporting on the human rights performance of Somali security forces and their ability to foster trust and confidence in communities, including with regard to conflict-related sexual violence	–	4	7	6
42. Consultations with and workshops/working sessions on mediation, reconciliation, negotiation and policy dialogues for women civil society leaders and women Members of Parliament and Senators	–	6	8	15
<b>Publications</b> (number of publications)	<b>40</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>49</b>	<b>47</b>
43. Human Rights and Protection Group reports on freedom of expression and/or protection of civilians in Somalia and human rights in the electoral process of Somalia	2	1	2	2
44. Fragility index and maturity model national summary and district-level reports	32	32	32	32
45. Report on joint evaluation of integrity systems	–	–	1	1
46. Reports on analysis, procedures, processes and best practices on mitigating the threat from improvised explosive devices	6	6	8	8
47. Materials on lessons learned from the 2020 electoral process	–	–	4	1
48. Factsheets on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration-related interventions in Somalia	–	–	2	2

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2020 actual</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>
49. Study report on the experiences of Somali women and their aspirations with regard to peace and politics in the country	-	-	-	1

### C. Substantive deliverables

**Good offices:** assist in resolving pre- and post-election differences among stakeholders; facilitate political dialogue between the Federal Government and federal member States and provide support for advancing the national priorities, including the constitutional review process and the implementation of the national security architecture; and strategic planning workshops on reconciliation and Federal Government and federal member States consultations. Continued advocacy for women's enhanced representation in elected offices and participation in politics and decision-making and leadership roles in governance institutions.

**Consultation, advice and advocacy:** Consultations with civil society on federalization, constitutional review, local conflict management and resolution, and the national reconciliation process; consultation and information-sharing with international and national stakeholders; sustainable public financial management of the security sector; advice on the drafting of the provisional Constitution amendment; advocacy on support for the joint electoral logistics working group (National Independent Electoral Commission, UNSOM and UNSOS); support for the Somali national electoral security task force to ensure coordination of security forces on security planning for the electoral operations; and advocacy to the National Independent Electoral Commission. Continued strategic and technical advice to the National Independent Electoral Commission, Parliament and other stakeholders on improvements to the electoral legal framework; advocacy to strengthen participation of women and other marginalized groups in political processes, including elections and reconciliation processes; technical advice and advocacy to strengthen the national protection framework and institutionalize accountability mechanisms, including through the human rights due diligence policy mechanisms, and in the implementation of human rights commitments, including the recommendations emerging from the 2021 human rights universal period review process; advice to the Ministry of Ports and Marine Transport on the maritime economy, and enhancement of the Somali Maritime Administration and the women in maritime sector; advice to the Ministry of Internal Security on maritime police units and coordination with the Ministry of Defence for Somali Navy and Coast Guard issues; advice to Parliament, the Federal Government of Somalia and federal member States on security sector legislation and budgetary measures; advice on and support for human rights due diligence assessments; technical advice on "right-sizing" the Somali National Army and force generation; consultation on the legal framework to implement the national security architecture, including support for the review of interventions related to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; consultations and advice on inclusive coordination mechanisms and the sustainability of stabilization activities; advocacy for joint planning between security services and stabilization actors in recovered areas; facilitating technical consultations, planning and advocacy for the establishment of functioning, independent and accountable rule of law institutions and the development of a legal aid model and State-level oversight mechanisms; convening federal and State-level ministers and other officials to build consensus on the justice and corrections architecture as part of wider constitutional and security reform efforts; support for the formation and gradual expansion of justice services, including through the use of mobile courts and legal aid in the federal member States; advocacy activities with State authorities on addressing violations committed by international and national forces; and strategic policy and technical advice to the Federal Government and federal member State counterparts on explosive hazard threat mitigation, along with weapons and ammunition management initiatives.

Support towards the development of child protection laws; addressing conflict-related sexual violence; advocacy and technical support for setting up and operationalizing the National Human Rights Commission; training of civil society organizations on human rights, including the rights of minorities, persons with disabilities, women and children; technical support and training for the country task force on monitoring and reporting on violations against children, including children and armed conflict; and training sessions for various interlocutors on protection of civilians, which will be prioritized.

**Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions:** Continuation of human rights monitoring, reporting and investigations, including on conflict-related sexual violence and child protection; through the human rights due diligence policy, monitoring, advocacy and follow-up on the incidents involving security forces supported by the United Nations; monitoring missions throughout the country to address human rights violations, abuse, civilian casualties, and children and armed conflict.

### D. Communication deliverables

**Outreach:** Strategic messaging campaigns linked to the thematic work of UNSOM sections, such as the Integrated Electoral Support Group and partners on the 2020–2021 and the 2024–2025 elections and the importance of participation, and the Rule of Law and Security Institutions Group on the treatment and handling of disengaged combatants and young people at risk in Somalia, and on the new policing model. Targeted interventions to guarantee the gender responsiveness of communication products and ensure the consideration of women's rights issues. A separate stream of communications on output highlighting United Nations support for and engagement with Somalis through the production of multimedia coverage and video and radio material linked to topics of public interest relevant to the mandate of UNSOM, as well as visits of high-level United Nations officials to Somalia; support, through its chairing of the United Nations Communications Group-Somalia, for wider efforts of the United Nations system's communications efforts in Somalia.

Category and subcategory	2020	2020	2021	2022
	planned	actual	planned	planned

**External and media relations:** Production and dissemination of regular products (i.e. newsletters, reports, infographics) highlighting the United Nations system's support in Somalia, such as the UNSOM quarterly newsletter, the Resident Coordinator Office country results report (annual), the Integrated Electoral Support Group newsletter (monthly/bimonthly) and the social media infographic on United Nations family activities (monthly), as well as support and output for the observance of United Nations international days with a range of communications output; holding regular press conferences for United Nations leadership and arranging media interviews; support for media capacity development in partnership with major media associations to improve skills and understanding in a range of related areas.

**Digital platforms and multimedia content:** multimedia output for new (social and digital media) platforms and traditional ones (radio, television, outreach events), highlighting United Nations support for and engagement with Somalia through the production of multimedia coverage and video/radio material linked to topics of public interest relevant to the mandate of UNSOM and the United Nations system in Somalia (e.g. good offices, human rights, gender equality, role of youth in society, economic development), as well as activities of United Nations officials in Somalia; capacity-building and training for Somali institutions.

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2022

### Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 13

#### Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2020	2021	2022	Variance	
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2022 vs. 2021 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	15 612.0	16 095.7	16 284.3	–	188.6
Civilian personnel costs	38 769.1	43 942.5	41 623.7	–	(2 318.8)
Operational costs	47 812.3	43 399.9	41 252.0	–	(2 147.9)
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>102 193.4</b>	<b>103 438.1</b>	<b>99 160.0</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>(4 278.1)</b>

Table 14

#### Positions

	Professional and higher categories								General Service and related categories			National staff			United Nations Volunteers	Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total international	National Professional Officer	Local level		
Approved 2021	1	2	1	7	30	50	36	–	127	57	–	184	84	45	38	351
Proposed 2022	1	2	1	8	29	51	39	–	131	57	–	188	84	45	18	335
<b>Regular positions, change</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>(1)</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>(20)</b>	<b>(16)</b>
Approved general temporary assistance 2021	–	–	–	–	–	–	3	–	3	–	–	3	8	–	–	11
Proposed general temporary assistance 2022	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>									<i>General Service and related categories</i>		<i>National staff</i>			<i>Total</i>	
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security Services</i>	<i>General Service</i>	<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National Professional Officer</i>	<i>Local level</i>		<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>
<b>General temporary assistance positions, change</b>	-	-	-	-	-	-	(3)	-	(3)	-	-	(3)	(8)	-	-	(11)
<b>Total approved 2021</b>	1	2	1	7	30	50	39	-	130	57	-	187	92	45	38	362
<b>Total proposed 2022</b>	1	2	1	8	29	51	39	-	131	57	-	188	84	45	18	335
<b>Total change</b>	-	-	-	1	(1)	1	-	-	1	-	-	1	(8)	-	(20)	(27)

67. The proposed resource requirements for 2022 for UNSOM amount to \$99,160,000 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the deployment of 625 United Nations Guard Unit personnel and 14 United Nations police officers (\$16,284,300) and salaries and related costs (\$41,623,700) for 188 international positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 2 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 8 D-1, 29 P-5, 51 P-4, 39 P-3 and 57 Field Service), 129 national positions (84 National Professional Officer and 45 Local level), 18 United Nations Volunteers and 23 government-provided personnel, as well as operational costs (\$41,252,000), comprising the costs for consultants and consulting services (\$779,400), official travel (\$1,224,900), facilities and infrastructure (\$20,031,800), ground transportation (\$1,289,500), air operations (\$7,954,600), communications and information technology (\$6,142,100), medical (\$1,276,500) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$2,553,200).
68. A vacancy rate of 13 per cent has been applied to the estimates for continuing international positions, while a vacancy rate of 50 per cent has been applied for the three positions that are proposed for establishment in 2022. Vacancy rates of 17 per cent and 11 per cent have been applied to the estimates for National Professional Officer and Local level positions, respectively. Vacancy rates of 8 and 10 per cent have been applied to the estimates for United Nations Volunteers and government-provided personnel, respectively. Taking into account the actual average deployment of 2020 and the projected deployment schedule for 2022, the estimates for the United Nations Guard Unit personnel are based on the assumption of full deployment, and a delayed deployment factor of 5 per cent has been applied to the estimates for United Nations police personnel.
69. In 2022, the following changes are proposed to the staffing complement: the establishment of 3 positions, the reassignment of 1 position, the reclassification of 1 position, the conversion of 1 position and the abolishment of 30 positions, as detailed below:

*Rule of Law and Security Institutions Group*

- (a) Establishment of one position of Chief of Service, Programme Management (D-1), in Mogadishu. This function will lead the mine action component in the mission. This is not a new function; the chief of the mine action component has to date been contracted by the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) as an implementing partner for the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS), and funded from the Mission's budget. The proposed establishment of this position on the Mission's staffing table is to ensure Secretariat leadership of the mine action programme and increase the accountability, effectiveness and efficiency of the services provided by UNMAS to the Mission. This is in alignment with the recommendations of the Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) and the Board of Auditors, which called on UNMAS to reduce dependency on UNOPS and increase efforts to directly implement aspects of the mine action programmes;

- (b) Reclassification of one position of Senior United Nations Police Planning Officer (P-5) to United Nations Police Training Officer (P-4) in Mogadishu in the Police Section, to focus on advising and coordinating international and Somali support for police training;

*Safety and Security Section*

- (c) Establishment of one position of Field Security Officer (P-3) for the new regional office in Dhuusamarreeb, in order to provide that office with the same level of field security coordination leadership commensurate with the other UNSOM regional offices;

*Office of the Chief of Staff*

- (d) Establishment of one position of Information Analyst, Political Affairs (P-3) in Mogadishu in the Integrated Analysis Team, to provide the Team with the capacity for quantitative data analysis and enhanced data management to enable the implementation of the Secretary-General's data strategy;
- (e) Reassignment of one position of Translator (P-3) in the Translation/Interpretation Unit in Mogadishu as Programme Management Officer (P-3) in the Office of the Chief of Staff in Mogadishu, to coordinate and liaise with relevant partners to strengthen programming and mandate delivery, including the consolidation of federalism and the security transition in Somalia;

*Integrated Electoral Support Group*

- (f) Conversion to a regular position of one general temporary assistance position of Electoral Officer (P-3) that was established in 2020 to support the electoral process in 2020 and 2021. The proposed conversion would ensure the continued availability of this capacity, which combines gender and electoral experience and enables the Group to support the National Independent Electoral Commission in delivering gender-sensitive universal elections in 2024–2025 by providing specific gender expertise for capacity-building, policy support and programme advice to promote the full participation of women in political and electoral processes;
  - (g) Abolishment of two general temporary assistance positions of Electoral Officer (P-3) that were approved in 2020 to support the electoral process in 2020 and 2021, comprising one position for training and one for the data processing centre;
  - (h) Abolishment of eight general temporary assistance positions of Electoral Officer (National Professional Officer) that were approved in 2020 in order to support the electoral process in 2020 and 2021, comprising one position for electoral security, one for voter education and outreach and six for logistics for field office reinforcement;
  - (i) Abolishment of 20 Electoral Officer (United Nations Volunteer) positions that were approved in 2020 to support the electoral process in 2020 and 2021, comprising 10 positions in Mogadishu, and two each in Baidoa, Dhuusamarreeb, Garoowe, Kismaayo and Jawhar.
70. The decrease in requirements for 2022 compared with the appropriation for 2021 is attributable mainly to reduced requirements for civilian personnel costs, owing to the proposed abolishment of 2 international and 8 national general temporary assistance positions and 20 United Nations Volunteer positions, offset in part by the proposed establishment of 3 new positions, as well as to reduced requirements for operational costs under (a) air operations, due mainly to lower projected fuel costs and a lower anticipated number of flight hours; (b) ground transportation, due mainly to lower anticipated fuel costs and lower anticipated consumption; (c) medical, due to the use of UNSOM air assets for medical evacuations in 2022; (d) communications and information technology, due mainly to lower requirements for spare parts, and (e) official travel due to the increased use of virtual platforms. The reduced requirements for operational costs are offset in part by additional requirements for security services for the new UNSOM regional office in

Dhuusamarreeb, and higher costs for military and police personnel due mainly to higher costs for travel on emplacement, rotation and repatriation for United Nations Guard Unit personnel.

**Extrabudgetary resources**

71. UNSOM manages the trust fund for peace and reconciliation in Somalia. As of 31 January 2021, the trust fund had a balance of approximately \$860,000.
72. In 2022, UNSOM projects extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$60,000.



### 3. United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia

(\$2,927,200)

#### Foreword

Cooperation at the bilateral and multilateral levels in Central Asia has continued to grow over the past year and the countries of the region were able to find innovative and creative ways to address both longstanding and newly emerging challenges. The fact that the States of Central Asia have strengthened their cooperation during the challenging times of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic in 2020 and 2021 further validates this positive trend. Despite the constraints related to border closures, the Central Asian States managed to maintain economic connectivity and provided humanitarian assistance to each other, which was reinforced by regular interaction between the Governments of the region at all levels, including Heads of State. It is extremely important that efforts be made to further strengthen the positive trend towards increased regional trust and cooperation built during the past few years.

The increased interest by the countries of the region in working together has increased the demand for the unique platform for regional cooperation offered by the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia. Regardless of the operational challenges imposed by the pandemic, in particular the absence of in-person contact, the Regional Centre was nevertheless able to support countries of the region in building trust, developing mutual contacts and implementing existing and new regional initiatives on the issues pertaining to its mandate. To remain fully operational during the pandemic, the mission used innovative methods and tools offered in the field of information technologies. To further strengthen its engagement, the Regional Centre is also using examples of “best practices” in bilateral and multilateral cooperation in Central Asia seen during the pandemic to develop new proposals for regional interaction. This approach of the Centre, based on the emerging needs of the States of the region, is expected to help reinforce political will to advance regional cooperation for the coming years.

The mission’s core functions remain the provision of good offices to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, as well as the monitoring and analysis of regional developments and the maintenance of contact with relevant regional organizations and other parts of the United Nations system. In 2021, the Regional Centre launched a renewed framework for the period 2022–2025 to promote agreement on transboundary water management in the region. It also launched the fourth phase of the joint project with the Office of Counter-Terrorism to implement the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia on the basis of a new joint plan of action, adopted in 2021. In addition, the Centre continued its efforts to engage with young men and women in some of the region’s most marginalized areas through the United Nations Regional Centre’s “preventive diplomacy academy”, which aims to consolidate the first-ever regional government-youth platform for dialogue in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Another important endeavour is the Central Asian Women Leaders’ Caucus, initiated by the Regional Centre and UNDP, the first of its kind in the region, combining the women and peace and security agenda and the development agenda with the overarching goal of attaining greater participation of women in the socioeconomic and political spheres in Central Asia.

Convening the annual meeting of deputy ministers for foreign affairs of Central Asia is another important part of the mission’s work. Responding to the priority set by the countries of the region, the Regional Centre also involves representatives of Afghanistan in these meetings. Despite positive new developments and initiatives, further work is needed to ensure long-term stability in Central Asia. Against the backdrop of a rapidly changing environment and the new transnational threats to security caused by the global pandemic, terrorism and climate change, there is a growing demand from the States of the region for the support, expertise and facilitation of the Regional Centre at the political level. The Centre will harness this demand to further strengthen its efforts to consolidate and intensify cooperation and trust-building to the benefit of the people of the region.

*(Signed)* Natalia **Gherman**  
Special Representative of the Secretary-General  
Head of the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia

## **A. Proposed programme plan for 2022 and programme performance for 2020**

### **Overall orientation**

#### **Mandates and background**

73. The United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia is responsible for supporting national authorities in identifying and addressing existing and emerging threats to regional peace and security. The open-ended mandate was defined through an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2007/279](#) and [S/2007/280](#)).
74. The Regional Centre plays a central role in preventive diplomacy efforts in Central Asia and provides a platform for regional dialogue on the most pressing challenges to security and stability. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the Regional Centre provides good offices in Central Asia to promote regional cooperation through meetings with authorities, civil society and other stakeholders.
75. The main function of the Regional Centre is to strengthen United Nations capacity for conflict prevention in Central Asia through the implementation of its mandate, which includes liaising with the Governments of the region and, with their concurrence, engaging with other concerned parties on issues relevant to preventive diplomacy; monitoring and analysing the situation on the ground and providing the Secretary-General of the United Nations with up-to-date information related to conflict prevention efforts; maintaining contact with relevant regional organizations, encouraging their peacemaking efforts and initiatives and facilitating coordination and information exchange, with due regard to their specific mandates; providing a political framework and leadership for the preventive activities of the United Nations country teams in the region and supporting the efforts of the resident coordinators and representatives of the United Nations system, including the Bretton Woods institutions, in promoting an integrated approach to preventive diplomacy and humanitarian assistance; and maintaining close contact with the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) to ensure a comprehensive and integrated analysis of the situation in the wider region.
76. The Regional Centre's current work is guided by a five-year programme of action for the period 2021–2025, which was adopted at the annual meeting of deputy ministers for foreign affairs in December 2020.

### **Programme of work**

#### **Objective**

77. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to enhance regional security and stability in Central Asia.

#### **Strategy**

78. To contribute to the objective, the mission will continue to engage regularly with the region's capitals, regional organizations and relevant Member States. The Centre will also carry out good offices functions for preventive diplomacy in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, as well as monitor and analyse regional developments, while maintaining contact with regional organizations and other parts of the United Nations system on behalf of the Secretary-General. Using its extrabudgetary funding, the Centre will implement activities such as meetings of senior officials, expert forums, workshops and training sessions to support cooperation among Central Asian States and increase capacity on issues related to preventive diplomacy.

79. The Regional Centre will continue to convene preparatory expert forums to inform the annual consultative meetings of the Central Asian Heads of State. It will continue to organize an annual meeting of deputy ministers for foreign affairs of Central Asia, including the participation of Afghanistan. In addition, the Centre will convene meetings of Central Asian parliamentarians with the goal of creating a “Central Asian parliamentarians’ friendship group”. The Centre, in cooperation with UNDP, will also promote the increased political participation of women in the region through the engagement of senior women political leaders on issues relevant to preventive diplomacy through the Central Asian Women Leaders’ Caucus regional platform.
80. The Regional Centre will continue to promote agreement on transboundary water management in the region, which remains a divisive issue. Specifically, the Centre will focus its work on fostering and supporting initiatives, both continuing and new. Its new water project for 2022-2025 will be implemented with the close involvement of representatives of Afghanistan. Through convening a series of seminars and workshops, the Centre will work to increase decision-makers’ knowledge of international water law, best practices from around the world and possible options for regional agreements tailored to the specific needs and circumstances of Central Asia.
81. The Regional Centre will implement, in 2022, the fourth phase of the joint project with the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre, under the Office of Counter-Terrorism. Close cooperation with the Office is largely based on the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate’s assessments and local needs. In addition, through the preventive diplomacy academy project, the Centre will continue its efforts to engage young people in some of the region’s most marginalized areas. Lastly, the Centre will continue to partner with relevant United Nations entities and regional organizations on the implementation of projects to promote preventive diplomacy in the region. The threats of terrorism and extremism, the lack of an agreement on transboundary water management, the developing effects of climate change and a growing youth population seeking new opportunities remain key challenges for stability and security in the region.
82. The Regional Centre will continue to support the five States of Central Asia in addressing emerging threats to security and stability and humanitarian assistance during emergency situations, especially in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic. Relevant proposals will be developed and put forward for discussions at the meetings of deputy ministers for foreign affairs in 2022.
83. The Regional Centre will continue to monitor the political situation in Kyrgyzstan, especially the implementation of the joint statement of intent between the Government of Kyrgyzstan and the United Nations, in cooperation and coordination with a broad range of stakeholders, including the Government of Kyrgyzstan, the United Nations country team, political parties, civil society groups, the business community, regional organizations and the resident diplomatic community. It will explore possible avenues for a consolidated United Nations response to the crisis.
84. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in improved regional cooperation among the five Governments of Central Asia in addressing transnational threats of terrorism, drug trafficking and organized crime, as well as coping with regional challenges concerning the management of water and natural resources. Through enhanced cooperation and trust-building in the region, the Governments of the Central Asian states would be more prepared for a deeper engagement in promoting sustainable peace and stability in the region, including on high-level platforms such as a consultative meeting of Heads of State.

### **External factors for 2022**

85. The overall plan for 2022 is based on the following planning assumptions:
  - (a) The continued commitment by the five Governments of the region and national stakeholders to preventive diplomacy and regional cooperation;
  - (b) The five countries of the region continue to engage Afghanistan in regional cooperation.

86. With regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, the proposed programme plan is based on the assumption that the proposed deliverables and activities for 2022 will be feasible to implement. However, if the pandemic were to continue to have an impact on the planned deliverables and activities, they would be adjusted during 2022 within the scope of the overall objectives, strategies and mandates. Any such adjustments would be reported as part of the programme performance information.
87. The Regional Centre integrates a gender perspective and mainstreams the women and peace and security agenda in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. The Regional Centre encourages participating countries to ensure gender balance in their delegations and include gender-related issues in the agendas of the deliverables of three regional expert-level workshops on issues related to preventive diplomacy and confidence-building for officials from the Central Asian States and Afghanistan.
88. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the Regional Centre maintains contact with the Commonwealth of Independent States, the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and other relevant organizations. The Centre will continue the useful practice of convening “troika” coordination meetings among the Centre, OSCE and the European Union.
89. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Regional Centre closely cooperates with the resident coordinators in the five countries, the Development Coordination Office and the entities represented in the United Nations country teams, including UNDP and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) on gender issues and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization on water issues. The Centre provides overall policy guidance to the United Nations country teams in the field of preventive diplomacy to ensure the coherence and complementarity of efforts in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. It will also continue to cooperate with relevant actors, including international financial institutions such as the World Bank. On Afghanistan-related issues, the Centre regularly shares information and coordinates activities with UNAMA.

### **Evaluation activities**

90. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs will lead a systematic assessment with the overall purpose of improving the gender sensitivity of the political analyses developed by the Department and the special political missions.

### **Programme performance in 2020**

#### **Support for the positive regional momentum<sup>3</sup>**

91. In 2020, the Regional Centre, in line with its programme of action for 2018–2020, continued to support the positive regional dynamics at various levels of society, including through implementing important regional initiatives aimed at fostering a culture of prevention among the region’s young men and women, supporting the implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia, encouraging closer cooperation on transboundary water management and, with UNDP, launching a new (and the first of its kind in the region) initiative on establishing a high-level platform for dialogue among women leaders.

#### *Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

92. The above-mentioned activities of the Centre, including the establishment of a political dialogue that is more inclusive of all groups of society, particularly youth and women, and its efforts to safeguard international peace and security in Central Asia for the long term, contributed to greater engagement by key stakeholders in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and

<sup>3</sup> As reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020 (A/74/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.4).

Uzbekistan in joint efforts to tackle regional challenges. In 2020, the Regional Centre convened two online meetings of Central Asian deputy ministers for foreign affairs (exceeding its planned target of one such meeting), which facilitated in-depth discussions between the Regional Centre and the Central Asian countries on existing and emerging challenges, including the COVID-19 pandemic, and threats to peace in the region. For the fourth year in a row, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Afghanistan and representatives of UNAMA joined parts of this meeting. This encouraged constructive talks in a “Central Asia + Afghanistan + United Nations (C5+1+UN)” format and demonstrated the continuing expansion of cooperation between the countries of Central Asia and Afghanistan.

93. The work of the Regional Centre also contributed to the enhancement of regional cooperation, including in the context of security and stability in Central Asia, through convening two online meetings of the Central Asian Expert Forum (in May and June 2020) in preparation for the consultative meeting of Central Asian Heads of State. In particular, the participating institutions came up with concrete recommendations related to anti-crisis measures in the COVID-19 context with regard to health care, sustainable transport corridors and regional tourism.
94. Following the political crisis that erupted in Kyrgyzstan in early October 2020, the Special Representative travelled to Bishkek on a fact-finding mission at the request of the Kyrgyz leadership to offer the good offices of the United Nations to help resolve the situation. In consultation with the Government and a broad range of stakeholders, including the political parties, civil society groups, the business community, regional organizations and the resident diplomatic community, the Special Representative explored possible avenues for a consolidated United Nations response to the crisis. A joint statement of intent between the Government of Kyrgyzstan and the United Nations was endorsed as a result. According to the statement, the United Nations would provide an integrated and tailored socioeconomic support package to alleviate the impact of the pandemic, which would target the most vulnerable populations in rural and urban areas, encompassing various actions to support socioeconomic stabilization. Special emphasis would be placed on creating employment opportunities for young people and women, enhancing systems for food security and social protection, and sustaining access to critical health services and quality education for all. The joint statement remains a political document of reference, in which the new Government of Kyrgyzstan has reiterated its commitment to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and its partnership with the United Nations (see table 15).

Table 15  
Performance measure

<i>2018 (actual)</i>	<i>2019 (actual)</i>	<i>2020 (actual)</i>
The first Central Asian Expert Forum was held in Tashkent and Bukhara, in October 2018	The second Central Asian Expert Forum was held with Kazakh partners in Nur-Sultan and Burabay, in preparation for the 2020 consultative meeting	Two online meetings of Central Asian deputy ministers for foreign affairs were held, one of which was an extraordinary meeting devoted to COVID-19 in the region; a fact-finding mission to Kyrgyzstan to solicit a United Nations response to the political crisis was undertaken; and the programme of action for the period 2021-2025 was endorsed by the Central Asian deputy ministers for foreign affairs

### **Impact of COVID-19 on programme delivery**

95. Owing to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic during 2020, travel throughout the mission area, which included the five Central Asian states and beyond, became impossible, limiting good offices functions, which were critical for preventive diplomacy. The only exceptional travel was to Kyrgyzstan in October 2020. Events held in an online format were rare in Central Asia before 2020. It took several months for the authorities to adjust to this concept. Even after all major technical issues were resolved, online meetings with the authorities continued to be more formal, as the audience was not used to video communication. Events in an online format also lost their networking component, which had a negative effect on the potential impact such events could have on building trust and confidence.
96. Despite such impact, the Regional Centre continued to implement its mandate in the key priority areas relevant to maintaining peace and stability in the region. To the extent possible, the Centre adjusted its operations to the new environment using online platforms and other innovative tools. Following the well-established practice, the Centre engaged Afghan representatives, in addition to its longstanding Central Asian partners, in most of its activities.

### **Planned result for 2022**

#### **Enhanced regional security and stability in Central Asia through promoting prevention**

97. In accordance with its programme of action for 2021–2025, the Centre will continue to engage regularly with the capitals of the region, regional organizations and relevant Member States, to promote consultation and build consensus in relation to situations that could generate conflict in the region. At the same time, the Centre will offer its good offices for preventive diplomacy in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, as well as monitor and analyse regional developments, while maintaining contacts with regional organizations and other parts of the United Nations system. The Regional Centre will implement activities, such as meetings of senior officials, expert forums, workshops and training sessions, to support cooperation among Central Asian States and increase capacity on issues related to preventive diplomacy.
98. The Regional Centre's work has been guided by a five-year programme of action, most recently covering the period 2021–2025. This document was endorsed by the five deputy ministers for foreign affairs of the region in 2020 and lays out five key priorities: (a) promoting prevention among the Governments of Central Asia; (b) monitoring and early warning; (c) building partnerships for prevention; (d) strengthening United Nations preventive activities in the region; and (e) encouraging cooperation and interaction between Central Asia and Afghanistan. The Regional Centre will continue to support the development of a parliamentary friendship group between the parliaments of Central Asia and Afghanistan.
99. In 2022, the Regional Centre will strive to contribute to enhancing regional security and stability in Central Asia through implementation of its programme of action for 2021–2025, which includes: (a) supporting implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia; (b) supporting efforts towards regional cooperation on transboundary water management; and (c) working to instil a culture of prevention among the region's young people and organizing its annual Central Asian Expert Forum and meeting of deputy ministers for foreign affairs in a "C5+1+UN" format involving Afghanistan; and (d) contributing to the preparation process for the consultative meeting of Central Asian Heads of State.
100. In the context of the women and peace and security agenda, the Regional Centre's work to expand the involvement of women in governmental and public affairs throughout the region will be intensified in 2022 through promoting a regional platform for senior women political leaders, the Central Asian Women Leaders' Caucus.

101. The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the ground throughout the five Central Asian States will be monitored and analysed to allow for timely and effective conflict prevention efforts and informed United Nations decisions. The Regional Centre will continue to promote preventive diplomacy at all levels, including with State authorities and different civil society groups.

*Lessons learned and planned change*

102. The lesson for the Centre was the importance of the prioritization of the growing demands of the countries of the region and the fact that online meetings with authorities became less open and interactive. In applying the lesson, the mission will continue to coordinate with all relevant United Nations entities to provide adequate and timely support to the requesting parties, including by intensifying the use of remote engagement.

*Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

103. This work is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated by an expressed commitment and actions by the States of the region to take concrete steps in promoting peace and trust, creating more inclusive and open discussions by key stakeholders in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on the basis of the new initiatives of the five States of the region and the Centre (see table 16).

Table 16  
Performance measure

2018 (actual)	2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (planned)	2022 (planned)
N/A	Increased involvement of diversified key stakeholders in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, through the new youth initiative and water strategy	Expansion of involvement of additional groups to create more inclusive, structured discussions by key stakeholders in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan	The Regional Centre ensures further involvement of additional groups to create more inclusive discussions by key stakeholders in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan on the basis of the new initiatives of the Centre	The Regional Centre contributes to an enhancement of regional security and stability in Central Asia by supporting actions to promote peace and trust in the region through more inclusive and open discussions and new initiatives of the States of the region and the Centre

### Deliverables

104. Table 17 below lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2020–2022 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 17  
**Deliverables for the period 2020–2022, by category and subcategory**

Category and subcategory	2020 planned	2020 actual	2021 planned	2022 planned
<b>A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies</b>				
<b>Substantive services for meetings</b> (number of three-hour meetings)	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>
1. Meetings of the Security Council	2	2	2	2
<b>B. Generation and transfer of knowledge</b>				
<b>Seminars, workshops and training events</b> (number of days)	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>
2. Workshops on preventive diplomacy and confidence-building	3	3	3	3
<b>C. Substantive deliverables</b>				
<b>Good offices:</b> provision of good offices on issues related to preventive diplomacy, such as transboundary water management, drug trafficking and counter-terrorism.				
<b>Consultation, advice and advocacy:</b> consultations on political and security developments in the region and to seek areas for closer cooperation; and consultations and advice on implementing the joint plan of action for the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia.				
<b>D. Communication deliverables</b>				
<b>Outreach programmes, special events and information materials:</b> brochures and information kits on the activities of the mission; and publication of the <i>Aral Sea Basin Transboundary Water Early Warning Bulletin</i> and the annual <i>Yearbook on Water in Central Asia and the World</i> .				
<b>External and media relations:</b> press conferences and press releases on the activities of the mission.				
<b>Digital platforms and multimedia content:</b> dissemination of information through the mission's website and the "Matrix of activities on counter-terrorism and preventing violent extremism" website.				

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2022

### Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 18  
**Financial resources**  
 (Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2020	2021	2022		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2022 vs. 2021 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	—	—	—	—	—
Civilian personnel costs	2 315.6	2 198.0	2 202.1	—	4.1
Operational costs	544.0	667.0	725.1	—	58.1
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>2 859.6</b>	<b>2 865.0</b>	<b>2 927.2</b>	—	<b>62.2</b>

Table 19  
Positions

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>								<i>General Service and related categories</i>			<i>National staff</i>			<i>Total</i>		
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security Services</i>		<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National Professional Officer</i>			<i>Local level</i>	<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>
										<i>General Service</i>	<i>General Service</i>		<i>National Professional Officer</i>	<i>Local level</i>			
Approved 2021	–	1	–	–	1	2	2	–	6	2	–	8	4	18	–	30	
Proposed 2022	–	1	–	–	1	2	2	–	6	2	–	8	4	18	–	30	
<b>Change</b>	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	

105. The proposed resource requirements for 2022 for the Regional Centre amount to \$2,927,200 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$2,202,100) for the continuation of 30 positions (1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 P-5, 2 P-4, 2 P-3, 2 Field Service, 4 National Professional Officer and 18 Local level), as well as operational costs (\$725,100), comprising the costs for consultants (\$22,100), official travel (\$192,200), facilities and infrastructure (\$90,000), ground transportation (\$60,400), communications and information technology (\$265,400), medical supplies (\$4,000) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$91,000).
106. For 2022, it is proposed that the number and levels of the positions remain unchanged. A vacancy rate of 5 per cent has been applied to the estimates for all positions, based on the latest vacancy rates.
107. The increase in requirements for 2022 compared with the appropriation for 2021 is attributable primarily to higher requirements for operational costs under (a) ground transportation owing to the acquisition of a replacement vehicle; (b) communications and information technology, for the acquisition of videoconference equipment; (c) facilities and infrastructure, for the acquisition of air-conditioning units; (d) medical, for personnel protection supplies; and (e) other supplies, services and equipment, for freight services.

#### **Extrabudgetary resources**

108. In 2021, extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$360,000 are projected for a meeting of Central Asian and Afghanistan deputy ministers for foreign affairs, a Central Asian expert forum aimed at developing a regional interparliamentary assembly and a series of activities under the preventive diplomacy academy (youth project) aimed at fostering a culture of preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution among young people from Central Asian States and Afghanistan living in cross-border areas, with the overall goal of assisting and supporting regional Governments in building conflict-prevention capacities.
109. In 2022, extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$610,000 are projected for the relaunching of a Central Asia and Afghanistan regional cooperation project on transboundary water-sharing, with a renewed scope of activities, including meetings of experts, workshops and seminars; and for the creation of the Central Asian Women Leaders' Caucus to provide influential leadership within and among the countries of the region.



## 4. United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission

(\$3,620,000)

### Foreword

As Chair of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, I have actively engaged in mediation with the parties to resolve the remaining issues of contention in physically demarcating the land boundary shared by Nigeria and Cameroon. While the work of the Mixed Commission has been referenced as a good example of a peaceful resolution of a boundary conflict, the advances made over the past few years have the potential to unravel if the demarcation is not formally concluded by a final boundary statement listing the coordinates from all signed templates. Going forward, a well-demarcated boundary would greatly assist in governing relations between the two parties. The technical support of the United Nations in mapping the boundary, along with its transborder development projects and confidence-building initiatives, will deter potential disputes in border areas. Furthermore, the peaceful resolution of the demarcation dispute between key member States of ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) will greatly contribute to enhancing stability in the subregion.

I personally witnessed the importance of the work of the Mixed Commission when we completed the demarcation of the boundary between the villages of Tipsan in Nigeria and Kontcha in Cameroon. Kontcha village had always been dependent on receiving supplies from Tipsan because access to Cameroon was impeded by a large river. After the placement of pillars between the two villages, municipal officials were able to open customs posts and formalize business dealings, which has significantly increased trade between the two villages. In some cases, where communities had been divided by border demarcation works, the United Nations support team enhanced its monitoring of the situation to ensure that the rights of populations affected by the demarcation would be protected and to ensure that the border functioned as a bridge and not a barrier.

The work of the Mixed Commission continues to make progress. Of the estimated 2,100 km of the countries' shared boundary, approximately 75 km, cumulatively, remains to be agreed upon. I intend to continue working with the parties towards a conclusive resolution of the remaining disagreement areas and to advance the pillar emplacement project. The finalization of the mapping process and the execution of a boundary statement will bring closure to the demarcation. In addition, I will also continue to advocate for the implementation of joint economic ventures and cross-border development projects to build support for the demarcation among populations that have been affected by the process. The resources, energies and hopes invested in this process will eventually be secured by a binding agreement and the commitment and support of the populations of the two countries.

(Signed) Annadif Khatir **Mahamat Saleh**  
Chair of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission

## **A. Proposed programme plan for 2022 and programme performance for 2020**

### **Overall orientation**

#### **Mandates and background**

110. The Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission is responsible for the implementation of the judgment of the International Court of Justice of 10 October 2002 on the Cameroon-Nigeria boundary and territorial dispute. Its responsibilities include support for the demarcation of the land boundary and the delineation of the maritime boundary; facilitating the withdrawal and transfer of authority in the Lake Chad area, along the boundary and in the Bakassi Peninsula; addressing the situation of affected populations; and making recommendations on confidence-building measures.
111. The current mandate of the United Nations support team to the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission derives from an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (see [S/2017/78](#) and [S/2017/79](#), [S/2018/1130](#) and [S/2018/1131](#), [S/2019/1012](#) and [S/2019/1013](#) and, most recently, [S/2020/1322](#) and [S/2020/1323](#)).
112. Good progress has been made in implementing the judgment of the International Court of Justice, including the complete withdrawal and transfer of authority in the Lake Chad area (December 2003), along the land boundary (July 2004) and in the Bakassi peninsula (June 2006). Implementation of the Court's ruling in respect of the maritime boundary was completed following the formal approval of the maritime chart in March 2008 and an acknowledgement by the two States parties, Cameroon and Nigeria, in April 2011 that the Working Group on the Maritime Boundary had fulfilled its mandate. With the settlement of the maritime boundary, the role of the United Nations is to ensure that the boundary statement and final mapping accurately reflect the judgment of the Court. While advances have been made on the pacific settlement of the territorial and border dispute, this progress could unravel if the demarcation is not formally concluded through the signing of a final boundary statement following the emplacement of all pillars.

### **Programme of work**

#### **Objective**

113. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to achieve an orderly and peaceful implementation of the judgment of 10 October 2002 of the International Court of Justice regarding the land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria.

#### **Strategy**

114. To contribute to the objective, the mission will continue to facilitate cooperation between the parties to resolve the remaining eight points of disagreement in the demarcation of the land boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria.
115. The mission will support the parties in constructing approximately 383 additional boundary pillars along the land boundary.
116. The mission will produce the draft maps to graphically record the demarcation of the boundary and have them validated by experts from the parties.
117. The mission will organize and moderate meetings of the drafting committee to finalize a boundary statement at the conclusion of final mapping.

118. In addition, the mission will regularly monitor the situation of populations affected by the demarcation and promote cross-border development projects as confidence-building measures. These projects include livelihood support, access to potable water, capacity-building, green energy and security.
119. The mission will continue fundraising efforts among international donors and multilateral partners to finance the demarcation activities and confidence-building projects for populations affected by the demarcation.
120. Lastly, the mission will enhance subregional cooperation and good practices in the management of international boundaries by disseminating lessons learned from the Mixed Commission.
121. The mission plans to support Member States on issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic by including information about the pandemic in its awareness-raising among border communities during routine preparations for pillar construction. To minimize travel requirements and support social distancing, the mission will rely on telecommuting platforms, where possible.
122. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
  - (a) Consensus on the course of the boundary, as well as how the boundary will be physically demarcated;
  - (b) Physical demarcation of the land boundary shared by Cameroon and Nigeria through the construction and emplacement of boundary pillars;
  - (c) Final maps of the boundary, after which a boundary statement recording the field coordinates of the pillars will be prepared;
  - (d) Enhanced support for the demarcation work and improved living conditions of the affected populations;
  - (e) Consensus on best practices with respect to border management.

### **External factors for 2022**

123. The overall plan for 2022 is based on the following planning assumptions:
  - (a) The two States parties, Cameroon and Nigeria, will continue to adhere to the judgment of the International Court of Justice, as well as the workplan adopted by the Mixed Commission;
  - (b) Safety and security conditions will permit field operations to continue unimpeded;
  - (c) Extrabudgetary resources, including additional voluntary contributions, will continue to be made available for border demarcation, pillar construction and confidence-building initiatives.
124. With regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, the proposed programme plan is based on the assumption that the proposed deliverables and activities for 2022 will be feasible to implement. However, if the pandemic were to continue to have an impact on the planned deliverables and activities, they would be adjusted during 2022 within the scope of the overall objectives, strategies and mandates. Any such adjustments would be reported as part of the programme performance information.
125. The Mixed Commission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. Examples include targeting women's groups for the implementation of community development projects in the areas of potable water, capacity-building for employment and community access to the electricity network. The Mixed Commission will continue regular field visits along the land boundary to monitor respect for the legal rights and the well-being of the affected populations, with a special focus on women and young people, as well as other vulnerable groups.
126. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Mixed Commission cooperates with the United Nations country teams in Cameroon and Nigeria so as to jointly develop confidence-building

measures in accordance with the needs of the populations living along the land boundary and to ensure the conditions for peace, security and sustainable cross-border development. The secretariat of the Mixed Commission is hosted within the UNOWAS premises in Dakar. UNOWAS provides administrative and logistical support to the Mixed Commission.

### **Evaluation activities**

127. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs will lead a systematic assessment with the overall purpose of improving the gender sensitivity of the political analyses developed by the Department and the special political missions.

### **Programme performance in 2020**

#### **Political agreement on border reached, which allows the drafting of the final boundary statement to commence<sup>4</sup>**

128. Following bilateral consultations between the Chair of the Mixed Commission and the heads of the Nigerian and Cameroonian delegations to reconcile their divergent positions on 13 specific points of contention, a working session of the subcommission on demarcation had been scheduled to be held in March 2020. Unfortunately, due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the closure of borders in Senegal, Cameroon and Nigeria, the meeting was postponed. The session was held in late December 2020 after international airports and borders reopened. The meeting fostered progress and, as a result, the parties achieved consensus on 20 km out of the remaining 95 km. As a result, there has been a resolution in the demarcation of approximately 2,025 km of the boundary.
129. The construction of boundary pillars along the land boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria is ongoing. Ultimately, the goal is to construct 2,696 pillars along the land border. A total of 1,344 pillars have already been built, representing 50 per cent of the anticipated demarcation works. The procurement process for a multi-year contract was finalized for the construction of the remaining 1,352 boundary pillars. The initial phase had been anticipated to commence in October 2020, after the rainy season, with the construction of approximately 322 pillars, which would have brought the total number of pillars built along the border to 1,666 pillars. However, the construction work was postponed due to COVID-19-related border restrictions and closures. The construction work resumed in January 2021.
130. Confidence-building cross-border development projects in favour of populations affected by the demarcation are planned for both countries. These projects include improving food security, developing access to potable water and improving capacity-building for employment, access to energy and enhanced security. It is anticipated that fundraising efforts and project implementation will extend into 2022. In addition, implementation will include monitoring of the situation of populations affected by the demarcation, with a focus on human rights and gender.
131. Insecurity in the northern Cameroon-Nigeria border areas as a result of Boko Haram-related violence continued to adversely affect the work of the Mixed Commission, delaying field assessments and the demarcation work in several locations. Increased tensions in the north-west and south-west regions of Cameroon raised additional security concerns. As a result, the ongoing demarcation and pillar emplacement activities faced further challenges. The parties have put in place reinforced security measures for field operations to allow the demarcation work to proceed.


#### *Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

132. The above-mentioned activities contributed to the resolution and agreement on the demarcation of a further 20 km of the land boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria. The target was not fully met

<sup>4</sup> As reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020 (A/74/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.4).

due to national travel restrictions and international border closings in response to the COVID-19 pandemic (see figure II).

Figure II  
**Performance measure: number of pillars along the land boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (cumulative)**



### **Impact of COVID-19 on programme delivery**

133. Owing to the impact of COVID-19 during 2020, the mission postponed the working sessions of the subcommission on demarcation aimed at resolving the remaining 95 km. The prospect of meeting virtually was explored but it would have been a challenging alternative given the extensive discussions and break-out sessions that were anticipated for this exercise. Moreover, the supervision of pillar construction contracts could not be conducted given the need for the physical presence of personnel in the field to participate in the verification of control points and coordinates. The COVID-19 pandemic also had an impact on the progress made in the final mapping process and the drafting of a boundary statement, since both processes are dependent on the completion of the demarcation exercise.

### **Planned result for 2022**

#### **Achievement of consensus between Cameroon and Nigeria**

134. The Mixed Commission will continue to cooperate with the two parties in resolving the outstanding areas of disagreement and physically demarcating the Cameroon-Nigeria land boundary. While there has been significant progress in the pacific settlement of the territorial and border dispute, the advances made could unravel if the demarcation is not formally concluded by the signing of a final boundary statement. In efforts to facilitate resolution of the 13 outstanding areas of disagreement, the mission engaged both parties in a working session of the subcommission on demarcation in Yaoundé from 9 to 13 December 2020 to systematically review each point of contention. This work contributed to the resolution of five of the outstanding areas. Final mapping will result in a cartographic record, which will facilitate the drafting of a legally binding boundary statement. These are significant steps towards a conclusive resolution of the border dispute between the two countries, in accordance with the terms and decisions of the judgment rendered by the International Court of Justice.


#### *Lessons learned and planned change*

135. The lesson learned for the mission is the added traction in resolving disagreements among the parties gained by convening the leadership of the two delegations in bilateral meetings. In applying the lesson, the mission will continue to engage the technical experts of the States parties to make concessions towards settling the eight remaining points of contention. The Mixed Commission will also ensure that the necessary security protocols adopted by both parties are put in place to allow for enhanced access to worksites for the emplacement of pillars.

*Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

136. This work is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated by progress in resolving the eight remaining points of disagreement, construction of 2,696 boundary pillars along the land boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria, the production of a series of final maps of the entire border (approximately 132 maps at 1:50,000 scale, 3 maps at 1:500,000 scale and 1 map at 1:1,500,000 scale) and a final boundary statement to formalize the conclusive resolution of the border dispute between the two countries, in accordance with the judgment rendered by the Court (see figure III).

Figure III

**Performance measure: number of pillars constructed (cumulative)****Deliverables**

137. Table 20 below lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2020–2022 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 20

**Deliverables for the period 2020–2022, by category and subcategory**

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2020 actual</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>
<b>A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies</b>				
<b>Parliamentary documentation</b> (number of documents)	2	2	2	2
1. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council	2	2	2	2
<b>Substantive services for meetings</b> (number of three-hour meetings)	2	2	2	2
2. Meetings of the Security Council	2	2	2	2
<b>B. Generation and transfer of knowledge</b>				
<b>Technical materials</b> (number of materials)	22	3	10	10
3. Communiqué of the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission	3	–	3	2
4. Report of the subcommission on demarcation	3	1	3	3
5. Report of the project steering committee and technical monitoring team	16	2	16	4
<b>C. Substantive deliverables</b>				
<b>Good offices:</b> provision of good offices on issues related to the peaceful implementation of the relevant decision of the International Court of Justice, including on demarcation and cross-border cooperation, and good offices to build consensus on the border demarcation process.				
<b>Consultation, advice and advocacy:</b> technical advice to facilitate resolution of areas of disagreement; advocacy for cross-border cooperation and socioeconomic projects benefiting the affected population; and raising the awareness of affected local communities.				

Category and subcategory	2020 planned	2020 actual	2021 planned	2022 planned
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**Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions:** fact-finding and monitoring missions on the implementation of the construction of boundary pillars, field data and map validation; and monitoring missions on human rights and the well-being of the affected populations along the land boundary.

**Databases and substantive digital materials:** production of digital materials on pillar positions depicting the Cameroon-Nigeria boundary.

#### D. Communication deliverables

**Outreach programmes, special events and information materials:** electronic and print magazines, brochures, flyers, information kits and special events to promote the activities of the mission, notably the demarcation process, as well as to enhance its visibility.

**External and media relations:** press conferences, press releases and media interviews on the activities of the mission.

**Digital platforms and multimedia content:** social media platforms to disseminate information related to the mission.

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2022

### Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 21

#### Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2020	2021	2022	Non-recurrent requirements	Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements		2022 vs. 2021 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	43.2	72.0	75.3	–	3.3
Civilian personnel costs	1 666.6	1 751.5	1 765.4	–	13.9
Operational costs	1 721.9	1 814.9	1 779.3	–	(35.6)
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>3 431.7</b>	<b>3 638.4</b>	<b>3 620.0</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>(18.4)</b>

Table 22

#### Positions

	Professional and higher categories								General Service and related categories			National staff				Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter- national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	
Approved 2020	–	–	–	–	2	6	–	–	8	1	–	9	–	2	–	11
Proposed 2022	–	–	–	–	2	6	–	–	8	1	–	9	–	2	–	11
<b>Change</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>

138. The proposed resource requirements for 2022 for the Mixed Commission amount to \$3,620,000 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the deployment of one military adviser (\$75,300), salaries and common staff costs (\$1,765,400) for nine international positions (2 P-5, 6 P-4 and 1 Field Service) and two national positions (Local level), as well as operational costs (\$1,779,300), comprising the costs for consultants and consulting services (\$589,000), official travel (\$231,600), facilities and infrastructure (\$198,300), ground transportation (\$43,400), air operations (\$197,800),

communications and information technology (\$304,600) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$214,600).

139. In 2022, it is proposed that the number and levels of positions for the Mixed Commission remain unchanged. For international positions, a vacancy rate of 5 per cent has been applied to the estimates, whereas an assumption of full incumbency has been applied to the estimates for national positions on the basis of the most recent actual incumbency.
140. The decrease in requirements for 2022 compared with the appropriation for 2021 is attributable mainly to a reduction in rental rates arising from the establishment of new contracts for the Yaoundé and Calabar offices, offset by increased requirements for the share of the costs for the United Nations House in Dakar.

**Extrabudgetary resources**

141. In the Cameroon-Nigeria land boundary region, the Mixed Commission is utilizing extrabudgetary resources to support the land boundary demarcation. As of January 2021, the unspent balance available in the trust fund amounted to \$4.3 million, which is expected to be utilized in 2021.
142. In 2022, the Mixed Commission aims to continue fundraising activities to implement socioeconomic projects for the benefit of populations in the vicinity of the demarcation exercise.

## 5. Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon

(\$9,586,600)

### Foreword

The year 2020 proved to be exceptionally turbulent for Lebanon and its people. The social, economic and humanitarian conditions in the country continued to deteriorate precipitously as the Lebanese currency lost more than 80 per cent of its value. Faced with the devaluation of their salaries, lack of access to their savings and widespread price inflation, Lebanese households struggled to buy food and essentials to support their families. Amidst protracted political deadlock, poverty rates reached an unprecedented 50 per cent, and essential public services struggled to cope under growing budgetary strains.

In parallel, Lebanon faced a pronounced surge in the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic. The country's response was hindered by the deteriorating financial and socioeconomic conditions. A dangerous, resurgent wave of the outbreak in the second half of 2020 severely strained its health-care system. Acute pressures on the health-care sector were further compounded by the 4 August port of Beirut explosion, which killed over 200 people and injured more than 6,500 others. The financial crisis means that the roll-out of the COVID-19 vaccine in Lebanon will likely be slow.

In addition to the physical devastation, the port explosion triggered renewed public demands for systemic political change, institutional reform, reinforced accountability, an end to corruption and early parliamentary elections. The explosion precipitated the resignation of the Government, which by early 2021 had yet to be replaced. While the country's main donors provided immediate emergency support in response to the blast and the pandemic, they hesitated to commit to longer-term investments in the absence of a Government and a credible reform programme.

After several years of efforts, in October 2020 Israel and Lebanon agreed to a framework for discussions with respect to maritime boundaries between them, mediated by the United States of America. The United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon was called upon to host the negotiations. Although the framework agreement represented something of a breakthrough, it is expected that talks will require some time for positions to converge on a mutually beneficial outcome, a process the United Nations is committed to continuing to support.

The next 24 months will be critical for Lebanon. The continuing economic crisis will need to be addressed powerfully and decisively, and financial and institutional reforms implemented credibly, for Lebanon to restore the trust of its citizens and international partners. These steps will require a clear unity of purpose and an unbending political will. Public accountability will need to be strengthened tangibly, elections held on time in 2022 and the COVID-19 pandemic overcome. The country's humanitarian crisis, affecting Syrian and Palestine refugees, and now increasing numbers of Lebanese citizens, will continue to require urgent support. Failing these steps, Lebanon will continue to face negative implications for its security, stability and social contract that will be difficult to reverse. In this next period, the urgency of determined Lebanese decision-making and continued international support cannot be overstated.

With a more pronounced emphasis on crisis mitigation and preventive diplomacy in Lebanon, the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL) will, based on the implementation of Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) and other relevant resolutions, continue to support Lebanon in upholding its obligations and in disassociating itself from conflicts in the region. To achieve this, UNSCOL advances confidence-building measures between the parties to resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#) in the context of ongoing tensions between Lebanon and Israel. Together with the United Nations country team, UNSCOL will, through its good offices, political guidance and high-level advocacy, continue to address holistically the internal societal, economic and governance challenges facing Lebanon, and their implications for its security and stability.

*(Signed)* Najat **Rochdi**

Deputy Special Coordinator, officer-in-charge,  
Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon

## A. Proposed programme plan for 2022 and programme performance for 2020

### Overall orientation

#### Mandates and background

143. The United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon is the most senior United Nations official responsible for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) and is the representative of the Secretary-General to the Government of Lebanon, as well as the political parties and the diplomatic community based in Lebanon. The Special Coordinator provides political guidance and promotes coherence across the Organization's activities. The Deputy Special Coordinator and Resident Coordinator, who since 2012 has also been the Humanitarian Coordinator, leads the United Nations country team and humanitarian country team and is responsible for planning and coordinating United Nations humanitarian and development activities in Lebanon.
144. In 2013, in response to the call by the Security Council for strong, coordinated international support for Lebanon, given the multiple challenges to its stability and security (see [S/PRST/2013/9](#)), and to highlight the need for donor assistance in the humanitarian, development and security areas, the Secretary-General established the International Support Group for Lebanon as a platform for political support. Co-chaired by the Secretary-General and led in country by UNSCOL, this high-level coordination and support forum has spearheaded several ministerial meetings in Berlin, New York, Paris and Rome.
145. In line with the priorities adopted by the International Support Group for Lebanon and the Secretary-General's vision on prevention, UNSCOL structures its engagement on the basis of three strategic pillars of intervention: (a) peace and security; (b) stability; and (c) stabilization and development support. This "whole-of-Lebanon" approach is reflected in the United Nations strategic framework. In 2022, a revised United Nations strategic framework will be complemented by a United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework that will also encapsulate the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan and the joint United Nations-European Union-World Bank Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework.
146. The origin of the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon can be traced to the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) of 20 July 2000 ([S/2000/718](#)), in which the Secretary-General expressed the intention to appoint a senior official to be based in Beirut. This was followed by an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2005/216](#), [S/2005/725](#) and [S/2007/85](#)). In 2005, the Secretary-General appointed a Personal Representative for southern Lebanon (see [S/2005/216](#) and [S/2005/217](#)). Subsequently, as per the exchange of letters with the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General appointed a Personal Representative for Lebanon (see [S/2005/725](#) and [S/2005/726](#)).
147. Following the armed conflict between Israel and Hizbullah in July 2006 and the adoption of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), in 2007 the Secretary-General appointed a Special Coordinator for Lebanon (see [S/2007/85](#) and [S/2007/86](#)). The mandate of the Special Coordinator stems from Council resolution 1701 (2006), as well as subsequent decisions by the Council, including [S/PRST/2015/7](#) and [S/PRST/2016/10](#). In its resolution 2433 (2018), the Council stressed the need for enhanced cooperation between UNSCOL and UNIFIL, with the goal of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the missions. The Secretary-General outlined his recommendations in this regard in a letter to the Security Council dated 31 December 2018 ([S/2018/1182](#)). In its resolution 2485 (2019), the Council encouraged the Secretary-General to further these efforts, including through an assessment of UNIFIL. In this regard, the Secretary-General reported to the Council by letter dated 1 June 2020 ([S/2020/473](#)). In its resolution 2539 (2020), in which it extended the mandate of UNIFIL until 31 August 2021, the Council requested the Secretary-General to provide

updates on progress made in the implementation of the recommendations set out in S/2020/473 through his periodic reports to the Council on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).

148. Resolution 1701 (2006) was adopted to end the escalation of hostilities between Lebanon and Israel. Years later, key provisions of the resolution remain outstanding, which poses a threat to the stability of Lebanon and that of the region. Periodically, tensions between the parties escalate, requiring the conflict prevention efforts of UNSCOL, in close coordination with UNIFIL, to mitigate and contain them. Within the territory of Lebanon, the continued maintenance of armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon continues to undermine the authority of the Lebanese State and pose a risk of reigniting conflict. In this connection, challenges in maintaining law and order and protecting the peaceful character of continued popular protests have stretched the capacity of the security forces, especially the Lebanese Armed Forces, to meet competing obligations under resolution 1701 (2006). Meanwhile, ongoing violations by Israel of the sovereignty of Lebanon, on land and by air, impede efforts to work towards a permanent ceasefire between the parties. These challenges are magnified in a volatile regional context that poses further risks of escalation and spillover to Lebanon.
149. The complex political situation in Lebanon continues to call for the political good offices of the Special Coordinator and United Nations system-wide support. A continued United Nations political presence remains essential to support Lebanese and international efforts to create an enabling environment for and to promote the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006).

## **Programme of work**

### **Objective**

150. The objective, to which the mission contributes, is to prevent and mitigate conflict between Israel and Lebanon in line with the current cessation of hostilities and towards an eventual permanent ceasefire, and to extend and consolidate State authority in support of the territorial integrity, sovereignty and political independence of Lebanon.

### **Strategy**

151. To contribute to the objective, the mission will exercise its good offices between the parties to pursue confidence-building opportunities, defuse tensions through shuttle diplomacy and address violations of resolution 1701 (2006) before they escalate into conflict, and work towards the resolution of outstanding obligations of both parties under resolution 1701 (2006). This work will be carried out in coordination with UNIFIL, in cooperation with relevant Lebanese State authorities, including the Lebanese Armed Forces, and in line with relevant Security Council resolutions.
152. UNSCOL will advocate for the adoption of key structural, governance and economic reforms to address the ongoing financial and economic crisis and the demands of the people of Lebanon. This will be done in line with the commitments forged at the Economic Conference for Development through Reforms with the Private Sector in 2018 and the reform road map and the Reform, Recovery and Reconstruction Framework of 2020. UNSCOL will work for continued international support to legitimate security institutions at a time of depleting State resources and rising domestic tensions, in keeping with international human rights standards. It will also advocate and support preparations for presidential, parliamentary and municipal elections in Lebanon to be held on time in 2022, according to the country's constitution. UNSCOL will continue to advocate for the international community to support Lebanon fully in meeting its increasing humanitarian needs. This interrelated work will be carried out in coordination with UNIFIL and the United Nations country team, as well as in cooperation with relevant Lebanese State authorities and civil society, and in partnership with key donor countries, financial institutions and members of the International Support Group for Lebanon, aiming at the extension and consolidation of State authority throughout the country and

more effective governance, justice, transparency, accountability and public service delivery countrywide.

153. The mission plans to support the Government of Lebanon on issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic, which will be coordinated with relevant United Nations country team partners through the Deputy Special Coordinator, who serves also as the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Lebanon.
154. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in: (a) the upholding of commitments of the parties to the current cessation of hostilities; and (b) the creation of a conducive environment for dialogue to address outstanding obligations under resolution 1701 (2006) towards an eventual permanent ceasefire.

### **External factors for 2022**

155. The overall plan for 2022 is based on the following planning assumptions:
  - (a) The tense and volatile regional environment will continue to affect internal stability and security;
  - (b) International consensus with regard to Lebanon, while present, will continue to be challenged;
  - (c) Concerted political unity will be required for the country to move forward on the implementation of its reform agenda, including reaching an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and securing long-term international financing;
  - (d) While the situation may ease somewhat after the COVID-19 pandemic, the socioeconomic and humanitarian repercussions may be felt over a longer period;
  - (e) The internal socioeconomic and humanitarian crises, increasing poverty and governance challenges will continue to be sources of instability;
  - (f) The continued presence of large numbers of Palestine and Syrian refugees will pose challenges to the stability of Lebanon;
  - (g) Demonstrations in support of public demands for change will continue, with rising tensions and potential violence posing challenges at times for security forces in the maintenance of public order and security;
  - (h) The cessation of hostilities between Lebanon and Israel will hold, potentially allowing for further progress in line with Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), and the continuation of confidence-building efforts;
  - (i) Violations of resolution 1701 (2006) will continue to be perpetrated by the parties and tensions will remain, including over the prevalence and proliferation of weapons in Lebanon outside the authority of the State, as well as violations of Lebanese sovereignty and territorial integrity;
  - (j) Increased extension of State authority south of the Litani river and along the borders will depend on the pattern of law and order requirements elsewhere in the country, including on the budgetary positions of the State and security institutions.
156. With regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, the proposed programme plan is based on the assumption that the proposed deliverables and activities for 2022 will be feasible to implement. However, if the pandemic were to continue to have an impact on the planned deliverables and activities, they would be adjusted during 2022 within the scope of the overall objectives, strategies and mandates. Any such adjustments would be reported as part of the programme performance information.
157. The mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. In its good offices function and its support for strengthening State institutions, UNSCOL ensures that its political consultations include women in Government, security forces, political parties and civil society. As an example, UNSCOL has advocated for the inclusion of women in

government-formation processes, which reached 25 per cent, with six women ministers serving in the Government in office between January and August 2020. UNSCOL also worked to support the adoption on 12 September 2019 of the national action plan on women and peace and security, and in 2020 has supported its implementation in partnership with United Nations country team entities. UNSCOL is supporting the discussions among key stakeholders on electoral reform, including with respect to the inclusion of a gender quota. UNSCOL also participates in events highlighting opportunities and challenges facing women's political participation and involvement in civil society mobilization as part of its advocacy efforts.

158. In line with the United Nations Disability Inclusion Strategy, UNSCOL will review measures to further advance disability inclusion and to mitigate challenges in operationalization. As appropriate, such measures will cover the accessibility of facilities, facilities management, security and other improvements in audiovisual technology and office space management.
159. The mission cooperates closely with UNIFIL in the implementation of Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). Pursuant to the request to enhance mission efficiencies and effectiveness, as mandated by the Security Council in its resolutions [2433 \(2018\)](#) and [2485 \(2019\)](#), which culminated in an assessment of UNIFIL dated 1 June 2020 ([S/2020/473](#)), both missions are deepening collaboration and joint engagement with national and international stakeholders to maintain the cessation of hostilities and to strengthen the security sector and the extension of State authority across all of the territory of Lebanon, including in line with the Rome II communiqué dated 15 March 2018. In 2019, the heads of mission established a strategic forum between UNIFIL and UNSCOL to take stock of the implications of developments in Lebanon and the region for implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#). The forum continues to meet on a regular basis to produce shared assessments aimed at enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of both missions. Under a memorandum of understanding between UNIFIL and UNSCOL, UNIFIL supports UNSCOL in finance, procurement, engineering, communications, medical services, transport and logistics. UNSCOL also leverages the presence of other United Nations entities, bringing all the United Nations' political, security and development tools to bear in support of the stability of Lebanon.
160. With regard to cooperation with other entities, UNSCOL coordinates with the League of Arab States, the European Union, international financial institutions, the International Support Group for Lebanon and civil society, including women's groups, to sustain consensus and mobilize support for the stability, sovereignty and State institutions of Lebanon, including by convening members of the International Support Group for Lebanon to agree upon coordinated messaging and advocacy with the country's political leadership, as well as the issuance of joint statements.
161. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, to further integrate United Nations activities in Lebanon, the Special Coordinator, with the Deputy Special Coordinator/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator, interacts with other United Nations entities, the World Bank and international donors through the United Nations country team and the Lebanon Development Forum. Strengthening the United Nations partnership with international financial institutions, including the World Bank and IMF, has informed UNSCOL good offices and analysis during the crisis period. Joint collaborative efforts between UNSCOL and the United Nations country team have also been launched, including in the areas of anti-corruption and good governance, as well as in support of a Peacebuilding Fund project dedicated to post-conflict reconciliation.

### **Evaluation activities**

162. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs will lead a systematic assessment with the overall purpose of improving the gender sensitivity of the political analyses developed by the Department and the special political missions.

## Programme performance in 2020

### Promoting conditions for the further extension and consolidation of State authority<sup>5</sup>

163. UNSCOL advocated actively for the adoption of key structural, governance and economic reforms, including in line with the initial commitments forged at the Economic Conference for Development through Reforms with the Private Sector in 2018 and those of the reform road map of 2020. UNSCOL also convened regularly at the Beirut level the International Support Group for Lebanon and advocated for the Government of Lebanon to act expeditiously and accelerate the implementation of fiscal, structural, sectoral and governance reforms necessary to curb the country's economic decline, combat corruption, respond to the legitimate aspirations and demands of the Lebanese people and restore the confidence necessary to mobilize IMF and international assistance for Lebanon. Furthermore, following the 4 August port of Beirut explosion, which precipitated the resignation of the Government, UNSCOL advocated for the urgent formation of a unified, politically supported Government to respond to the multiple crises facing the country and to move forward the ambitious reform agenda. In September 2020, the United Nations and France co-chaired a high-level meeting of the International Support Group for Lebanon on the margins of the General Assembly. On 2 December 2020, the United Nations also co-chaired with France an international conference in support of the Lebanese population to take stock of international responses to the Beirut port explosion and to assess the need for continued humanitarian and early recovery assistance.

#### *Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measures*

164. The above-mentioned work contributed to promoting conditions for the further extension and consolidation of State authority and supported the pursuit by Lebanon of territorial integrity, sovereignty and independence.
165. At the same time, the economic and financial situation of Lebanon continued to deteriorate in 2020, reaching crisis levels, with an 80 per cent devaluation of the pound against the United States dollar, a tripling of the cost of basic goods and severe caps on what depositors could withdraw from their accounts. An increasing strain on foreign reserves jeopardized fuel imports, and thus electricity supply, and posed risks to the country's subsidies for fuel and other basic goods. In addition, the education and health-care sectors also came under unprecedented stress. Due notably to the absence of domestic political consensus and a new Government, preliminary discussions with IMF did not lead to the commencement of negotiations. The country has been without a Government since 10 August 2020, and a number of key reforms necessary to stabilize the political, security, economic and financial situation, as foreseen in the Economic Conference for Development through Reforms with the Private Sector and subsequent reform initiatives supported by the international community, have remained stalled (see table 23).

Table 23  
Performance measures

2018 (actual)	2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Convening of Economic Conference for Development through Reforms with the Private Sector</li> <li>• Elaboration of draft 2019 budget, first budget in 12 years</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agreement on Economic Conference for Development through Reforms with the Private Sector follow-up mechanism to track implementation</li> <li>• Adoption of 2019 State budget</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Agreement by political parties to the French-led reform initiative, with implementation pending.</li> <li>• 2021 budget preparations delayed</li> </ul>

<sup>5</sup> As reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020 (A/74/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.4).

2018 (actual)	2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Holding of first elections in 10 years</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Referral of 2020 State budget by Council of Ministers to Parliament within constitutional deadlines</li> <li>• Planning of by-elections for vacancies; holding of by-elections in Tripoli and Tyre</li> <li>• Adoption of an integrated border management strategy</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Stalling of discussions with the International Monetary Fund</li> <li>• Beginning of discussions on electoral reform</li> <li>• Adoption of legislation establishing the national anti-corruption institution</li> </ul>

### **Impact of COVID-19 on programme delivery**

166. Owing to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic during 2020, the mission scaled down the planned face-to-face meetings, as well as mandate-related travel in the region. At the same time, the mission identified activities to support Lebanon on issues related to COVID-19, within the overall scope of its objectives. Externally, the mission responded by analysing and highlighting through its interactions with national actors the impact of the pandemic on the economic, financial and social structure in the country, encouraging all political parties to cooperate for the country's common good. Internally, the mission responded by adopting a "clustered" rotating team modality, reducing the mobility and office presence to ensure the protection of staff while enabling business continuity.

### **Planned result for 2022**

#### **Supporting reform and the democratic process**

167. As a matter of domestic priority for 2022, UNSCOL will support institutional reform and the democratic process, as a means of promoting accountability, political legitimacy and economic improvement. These will be critical conditions for Lebanon to make good on its commitments and obligations under Security Council resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).
168. At present, parliamentary elections are due to be held in May 2022, following which the newly constituted Parliament would elect the next President of Lebanon in October 2022. UNSCOL will continue to advocate for electoral reform in line with international standards and encourage dialogue within civil society and among academics and other constituencies to ensure that the law is viewed as inclusive and broadly credible to govern the elections. In addition, through its political leverage with International Support Group members and engagement with national actors, UNSCOL will continue to emphasize the importance of adhering to the established electoral timetable, which entails timely adoption of the electoral law and allocation of the resources necessary to ensure that relevant electoral institutions are fully capacitated. In support of the technical work of the UNDP Lebanese electoral assistance project, UNSCOL will stress the importance of increased participation by women in the elections, broad civic education on the elections law in order to ensure a level playing field among candidates, and voters being fully apprised of their rights and of the implications of their decisions on election day. UNSCOL will continue to advocate, along with United Nations country team and International Support Group partners, for the full activation of the newly constituted National Anti-Corruption Commission in order to promote an end to endemic corruption, the strengthening of public accountability and the building of public trust in State and political institutions. Likewise, UNSCOL, with its partners, will press for an IMF programme to be agreed and implemented for the benefit of financial and macroeconomic reforms, and for Lebanon to regain access to international financing opportunities.

*Lessons learned and planned change*

169. A key lesson for the mission during 2020 emerged from the requirement to adapt programmes quickly and effectively to the conditions of a highly constrained operating environment. The mission successfully managed this by adopting new working modalities, including alternative and flexible working arrangements and remote conferencing systems. Despite the heavy constraints that this imposed on in-person interactions with key Lebanese and international counterparts and on regional travel, staff safety and mandate delivery were ensured, as were team engagement and harmonious working conditions. In applying the lesson, the mission will need to adapt its information gathering, investigative working methods and outreach due to significantly reduced travel activity as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic. In applying the lesson, the mission will increase its use of relevant information and communications technologies to conduct research, including by using databases and subscriptions procured by the United Nations, and to meaningfully engage with relevant interlocutors, including Member States, civil society groups, United Nations entities and regional and subregional organizations. These measures are not expected, however, to substitute for the value of the Secretary-General's good offices provided by face-to-face political meetings and physical travel to support addressing the national crisis in Lebanon.

*Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measures*

170. This work is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated by the launch of discussions in Parliament regarding a new electoral law. This would not only ensure that the State institutions of Lebanon represent and respond to the needs and demands of their electorate and are viewed as credible and empowered custodians in moving forward the country's reform agenda, but also enhance its State capacity to be a meaningful partner in the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) through helping create an enabling environment for the prevention and mitigation of conflict between Israel and Lebanon in line with the current cessation of hostilities and towards an eventual permanent ceasefire (see table 24).

Table 24  
Performance measures

<i>2018 (actual)</i>	<i>2019 (actual)</i>	<i>2020 (actual)</i>	<i>2021 (planned)</i>	<i>2022 (planned)</i>
Holding of parliamentary elections on time in line with new elections law	Holding of by-elections for vacated positions in Tyre and Tripoli	Launch of discussions in Parliament regarding a new elections law	Adoption of a revised elections law	Holding of parliamentary and presidential elections on time, in line with new elections law

**Deliverables**

171. Table 25 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2020–2022 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 25  
**Deliverables for the period 2020–2022, by category and subcategory**

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2020 actual</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>
<b>A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies</b>				
<b>Parliamentary documentation</b> (number of documents)	–	3	3	3
1. Inputs to the report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006)	–	3	3	3
<b>Substantive services for meetings</b> (number of three-hour meetings)	3	3	3	3
2. Meetings of the Security Council	3	3	3	3
<b>C. Substantive deliverables</b>				
<b>Good offices:</b> provision of good offices in support of the prevention of conflict, and the extension and consolidation of State authority; good offices on elections, peace and stability, including with respect to economic issues; and confidence-building measures between Israel and Lebanon, including with respect to the maritime boundary dispute.				
<b>Consultation, advice and advocacy:</b> consultations with Lebanese and Israeli interlocutors on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006); consultations with the International Support Group for Lebanon and other regional stakeholders on ensuring the stability of Lebanon; consultations on the economic and governance reform agenda and development priorities; advice on government accountability, governance policy formulation and public administration reforms; advocacy with international partners in support of the country's efforts for the extension of State authority, including strengthened security service agencies; consultations on integrated border management on the Lebanon-Syrian Arab Republic border; advocacy on key human rights standards and protections that could have an impact on long-term security and stability and the strengthening of human rights institutions in Lebanon; advocacy for the political participation and representation of women and youth; advocacy with international partners in support of Lebanon for continued donor involvement and resources as Lebanon responds to the presence of Palestine and Syrian refugees, taking into account the needs of refugees and host communities.				
<b>D. Communication deliverables</b>				
<b>Outreach programmes, special events and information materials:</b> outreach activities to support the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) and to strengthen the mission's working relationship with key Lebanese partners and stakeholders; outreach activities through special events such as United Nations Day and International Women's Day to help the mission's substantive sections communicate more effectively with local stakeholders to spread broader knowledge of the work being undertaken through UNSCOL information materials and joint outreach activities with other United Nations entities on the promotion of United Nations system-wide priorities, such as the Sustainable Development Goals.				
<b>External and media relations:</b> press conferences, press statements, background briefings, interviews, op-eds and other media engagements to communicate strategically on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) and to convey the strategic direction of the mission's senior leadership; press statements of the International Support Group for Lebanon on safeguarding the security, stability and sovereignty of Lebanon and the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).				
<b>Digital platforms and multi-media content:</b> utilization of the mission's website and Twitter account to deepen local and national understanding of and support for UNSCOL and its support for implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).				

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2022

### Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 26

#### Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2020	2021	2022		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2022 vs. 2021 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	–	–	–	–	–
Civilian personnel costs	7 247.2	8 275.7	8 216.7	–	(59.0)
Operational costs	1 578.8	1 422.9	1 369.9	–	(53.0)
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>8 826.0</b>	<b>9 698.6</b>	<b>9 586.6</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>(112.0)</b>

Table 27

#### Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff				Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total international	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	
Approved 2021	1	1	–	1	2	6	1	–	12	7	–	19	5	58	–	82
Proposed 2022	1	1	–	1	2	6	1	–	12	7	–	19	5	58	–	82
<b>Change</b>	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

172. The proposed resource requirements for 2022 for UNSCOL amount to \$9,586,600 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$8,216,700) for 19 international positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 D-1, 2 P-5, 6 P-4, 1 P-3 and 7 Field Service) and 63 national positions (5 National Professional Officer and 58 Local level), as well as operational costs (\$1,369,900), comprising the costs for consultants and consulting services (\$13,300), official travel (\$194,200), facilities and infrastructure (\$763,000), ground transportation (\$64,100), communications and information technology (\$218,400), medical (\$12,200) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$104,700).

173. In 2022, it is proposed that the number and level of positions for UNSCOL remain unchanged. Taking into account the actual average vacancy rates in 2020 and the projected vacancy rate at the end of 2021, a vacancy rate of 5 per cent has been applied to the estimates for international positions. Estimates for National Professional Officer positions are based on the assumption of full incumbency, while a 3 per cent vacancy rate has been applied to estimates for Local level positions.

174. The decrease in requirements for 2022 compared with the appropriation for 2021 is attributable to reduced requirements under: (a) civilian personnel costs, resulting from the application of a lower percentage of common staff costs for international positions, based on recent expenditure patterns; and (b) operational costs, mainly related to ground transportation, owing to the exclusion of a provision for the acquisition of vehicles.

#### Extrabudgetary resources

175. In 2021, no extrabudgetary resources were available or are projected for 2022 for UNSCOL.

## 6. United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa

(\$8,611,700)

### Foreword

Over the course of 2022, the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) will reinforce its cooperation with the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) to prevent conflicts and sustain peace in Central Africa, with a focus on countries organizing elections and/or facing political violence and crises. Indeed, elections are scheduled in several countries under the purview of UNOCA, including Angola, the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Rwanda and Sao Tome and Principe. In order to preserve regional peace and stability, it is imperative that these elections are peaceful and inclusive, and that their outcome is accepted by all stakeholders, who should resolve their grievances through legal avenues and/or political dialogue. To achieve this, UNOCA and the Economic Community of Central African States Commission will take joint good offices initiatives, which will be informed by joint early warning analyses.

The groundwork for the above has been laid with the Malabo Declaration on democratic and peaceful elections as a means of reinforcing stability and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals in Central Africa, adopted on 4 December 2020 at the fiftieth ministerial meeting of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa. In 2021, UNOCA will work with ECCAS and its member States on the implementation of the Declaration, which will serve as the reference document for the election-related early warning and good offices initiatives envisioned for 2022. UNOCA will also continue to support the Committee, which will remain a key platform for the discussion of major regional peace and security threats and challenges among the States of the subregion. UNOCA will work with Member States towards repositioning the Committee to support the ECCAS peace and security institutions and mechanisms as they become gradually operational following the successful completion of the institutional reform of the regional body in 2020.

2020 was a crucial year for Central Africa. The subregion demonstrated an incredible resilience to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic by keeping the levels of infections and deaths low, but at very high socioeconomic costs. The pandemic did not prevent ECCAS from concluding a much-awaited institutional reform which, among other important innovations, changed the executive organ of the organization from a secretariat to a commission with a clearer and stronger peace and security mandate. I have established very good working relations with the President of the ECCAS Commission, while the Commission and UNOCA have also held a joint retreat to agree on their joint priorities and workplan for conflict prevention and sustaining peace, giving due consideration to the above-mentioned election-related early warning and good offices initiatives. UNOCA is also working with other subregional organizations, including the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region and the Central African Economic and Monetary Community, and is coordinating its actions, as appropriate, with United Nations presences in Central Africa.

In pursuing its objective for 2022, UNOCA will leverage the additional human resources that were approved in its 2021 budget, which will, among other things, enable the mission to reinforce its analytical capacities. The early deployment of these additional resources, as well as the renewal of the mandate of UNOCA, also due in 2021, will put the mission in a good position to attain its objective for 2022. For that, UNOCA will also draw lessons from its resilience in 2020, despite the COVID-19 pandemic, when the mission managed to successfully deliver on key priorities of its mandate.

It is therefore with commitment and confidence that I look forward to 2022 when, working closely with ECCAS, UNOCA will again make an important contribution to regional peace and security in Central Africa.

*(Signed)* François Louncény Fall  
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Central Africa  
Head of the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa

## **A. Proposed programme plan for 2022 and programme performance for 2020**

### **Overall orientation**

#### **Mandates and background**

176. The United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) is responsible for the prevention of conflicts and the consolidation of peace and security in Central Africa. The mandate was established through an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2009/697 and S/2010/457). Through another exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council (S/2018/789 and S/2018/790), the mandate was extended until 31 August 2021.
177. Following the conclusion of a strategic review of UNOCA, conducted in May and June 2019 (S/2019/625), the Security Council issued a presidential statement (S/PRST/2019/10) on 12 September 2019, defining the key priorities of the mission for the period through August 2021 as follows: (a) early warning and analysis, with a gender perspective; (b) good offices in non-mission settings, in particular in the lead-up to the upcoming electoral cycle in the region; (c) support for and strengthening of the capacity of ECCAS; and (d) building partnerships with civil society and supporting subregional civil society networks. UNOCA will pursue the same key priorities in 2022. The Office will also continue to host the secretariat of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa, coordinate the implementation of the United Nations regional strategy to address the threat and impact of the Lord's Resistance Army and support the implementation of the regional strategy and plan of action on counter-terrorism and the non-proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Central Africa.

### **Programme of work**

#### **Objective**

178. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to prevent conflict and consolidate peace and security in Central Africa.

#### **Strategy**

179. To contribute to the objective, the mission will engage in good offices activities to help address conflicts or risks to sustained peace, with a particular focus on helping countries prevent election-related violence and peacefully resolve conflicts and crises stemming from electoral processes. Such activities will be undertaken early in the electoral cycle and will involve engagement with electoral stakeholders to promote inclusive and peaceful elections, in line with relevant international and regional standards, including the Malabo Declaration on democratic and peaceful elections as a means of reinforcing stability and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals in Central Africa, adopted by the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa on 4 December 2020, at its fiftieth meeting.
180. The mission will also build regional and national capacities for preventing conflict and sustaining peace, including by providing gender-inclusive support to national institutions and platforms for political dialogue. Where such institutions and platforms are lacking, UNOCA will advocate for their establishment and support their operationalization. The mission will facilitate experience sharing and cooperation between national institutions and platforms for political dialogue in Central Africa.
181. The mission will carry out regular early warning analysis to inform the preventive diplomacy and good offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. At the regional level, such

analysis will be done in collaboration with ECCAS and relevant United Nations regional presences. At the country level, especially in non-mission settings, UNOCA will carry out a regular analysis of internal conflicts and political crises, jointly with United Nations country teams, to ensure that the programmes and activities of the latter are conflict sensitive and establish clear linkages with regional peace and security dynamics and priorities, taking into account a gender perspective.

182. The mission will enhance the coherence of the work of the United Nations on peace and security issues in Central Africa by convening regular meetings of existing coordination mechanisms, including the annual meeting of the heads of United Nations presences in the region and the annual meeting of the Political Affairs Section of UNOCA with counterparts in peacekeeping operations and special political missions and peace and development advisers in the offices of resident coordinators.
183. UNOCA will ensure the regular holding of the ministerial meetings of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa as a platform for confidence-building between Member States. It will also initiate reflection and consultation on how to reposition the Committee to better support and ensure complementarity with the new ECCAS peace and security institutional dispensation.
184. The mission will continue to keep the crisis in the Lake Chad basin on the international and regional agenda and advocate for a regional approach to addressing it, within the framework of the Regional Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience Strategy for Areas Affected by Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin Region. Jointly with UNOWAS, and in coordination with other relevant United Nations entities, as well as international and regional partners, UNOCA will maintain regular engagement with the affected countries, with a view to encouraging greater synergies between their respective responses to the crisis.
185. The mission will work closely with UNOWAS to improve coordination between Central and West African States and regional organizations and mechanisms on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea, including by reinforcing the capacity of the Interregional Coordination Centre for Maritime Safety and Security in the Gulf of Guinea and mobilizing international support for the Centre.
186. UNOCA plans to support ECCAS and its member States on issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic by mobilizing international support for the regional strategy to address the impact of the pandemic in Central Africa. The mission will support the region in drawing lessons from the pandemic to build regional capacities to anticipate and respond to the impact of pandemics and disasters, especially on peace and security. The support will target specifically the continuation of institutions and platforms for conflict prevention and sustaining peace in the event of a pandemic or disaster.
187. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
  - (a) The holding in five countries of the region of inclusive and peaceful electoral processes, the outcome of which will be accepted by all stakeholders, who will resolve their grievances through legal avenues and/or political dialogue;
  - (b) The conduct of joint early warning and good offices missions by UNOCA and the ECCAS Commission in countries holding elections or facing a political crisis, contributing to the prevention or mitigation of election-related violence and the initiation of key governance and electoral reforms;
  - (c) The successful holding of regular ministerial meetings of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa to address key peace and security challenges and priorities among United Nations entities in Central Africa;
  - (d) Enhanced coordination of United Nations efforts in support of regional and subregional initiatives on peace and security and gender-inclusive governance, including the peace process in the Central African Republic and the Regional Stabilization, Recovery and Resilience Strategy for Areas Affected by Boko Haram in the Lake Chad Basin Region;

- (e) Improved interregional coordination on maritime security in the Gulf of Guinea.
188. The planned support on issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic is expected to result in improved coordination among Member States on the cross-border and regional impacts of the pandemic on regional integration, peace and security, as well as the development of regional capacities to continue to prevent conflict and sustain peace in the context of a pandemic or a disaster, including the regular functioning of relevant institutions and mechanisms.

### **External factors for 2022**

189. The overall plan for 2022 is based on the following planning assumptions:
- (a) The ECCAS institutional reform becomes fully operational, with key peace and security institutions and mechanisms established. UNOCA and the ECCAS Commission maintain their cooperation and regular consultations, and adopt and roll out a joint plan of action, while a memorandum of understanding is also signed between the ECCAS Commission and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs;
  - (b) Against the backdrop of increased polarization of the political landscape and persisting distrust in public institutions in several countries of the region, there is a growing demand for credible and inclusive platforms for discussion on key political, electoral and institutional reforms;
  - (c) The elections scheduled in the countries of the region are held according to the constitutional and legal timeframes and the concerned countries solicit or accept the electoral assistance of the United Nations and/or the political intervention of UNOCA to prevent and/or resolve election-related violence and crises;
  - (d) States request or accept the involvement of international and regional institutions and mechanisms in the prevention or resolution of cross-border crises;
  - (e) The leadership of the ECCAS Commission and Member States show a genuine commitment to the involvement of civil society actors, including the Coalition of Civil Society Organizations for Peace and Conflict Prevention in Central Africa and women's and youth organizations, in the activities of ECCAS in the area of peace and security, including early warning, conflict prevention and peacemaking. The Coalition becomes fully operational, with adequate human resources, and is supported by Member States and partners;
  - (f) ECCAS member States endorse the regional regulation on pastoralism and transhumance in Central Africa, developed with the support of the mission. ECCAS continues to collaborate with UNOCA to support concerned member States in adopting or updating national regulations on pastoralism and transhumance, and addressing cross-border transhumance-related security concerns through bilateral cooperation.
190. With regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, the proposed programme plan is based on the assumption that the proposed deliverables and activities for 2022 will be feasible to implement. However, if the pandemic were to continue to have an impact on the planned deliverables and activities, they would be adjusted during 2022 within the scope of the overall objectives, strategies and mandates. Any such adjustments would be reported as part of the programme performance information.
191. The mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. The regional action plan on Security Council resolution [1325 \(2000\)](#) is being implemented, while States also adopt and roll out national action plans. The mission continues its advocacy for the reinforcement of the role of women in preventing conflict and sustaining peace, as well as adequate representation of women in decision-making positions. The mission works with other relevant United Nations entities and external partners to reinforce the capacities of women in decision-making positions and in mediation. In its analysis and reporting, the mission ensures that data and information are disaggregated by gender and that analyses and recommendations give due consideration to the specific situation and needs of women. During fact-finding and good offices visits, the mission ensures adequate consultation and engagement with women and women's groups.

192. In line with the United Nations Disability Inclusion Strategy, the mission advocates for political and electoral processes in the region to be disability-sensitive by encouraging Member States to take appropriate measures to facilitate the participation of persons with disabilities. The mission also encourages and supports experience-sharing between States on disability inclusion. The mission further integrates the situation of persons with disabilities in its analysis and reporting and ensures proper consultation and engagement with organizations representing persons with disabilities during fact-finding, early warning and good offices activities.
193. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the mission will enhance its partnership with regional organizations, especially the African Union, ECCAS, the Central African Economic and Monetary Community and the Lake Chad Basin Commission, and civil society, including under the umbrella of the Coalition of Civil Society Organizations for Peace and Conflict Prevention in Central Africa, in conflict prevention, mediation and early warning, including by promoting the participation of women, youth and other actors, such as the media, in peacebuilding and sustaining peace.
194. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the mission cooperates and coordinates with UNOWAS, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, the United Nations Office to the African Union and with other relevant United Nations entities when addressing cross-border and transregional challenges to peace and security, in order to avoid duplication and ensure a coherent and streamlined approach to the activities of the United Nations in the subregion.

### **Evaluation activities**

195. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs will lead a systematic assessment with the overall purpose of improving the gender sensitivity of the political analyses developed by the Department and the special political missions.

### **Programme performance in 2020**

#### **Strengthened national and regional mechanisms for improved management of farmer-herder conflicts<sup>6</sup>**

196. In 2020, the mission started the implementation of a project to raise awareness of and build support for the draft regional regulation on pastoralism and transhumance in Central Africa. This project was premised on the assessment that the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had expressed some reservations vis-à-vis the proposed regulation, because of the hostilities of some local communities and groups in the eastern part of the country. As part of this project, UNOCA carried out a study on local farmer-herder dynamics in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, including an analysis of local, national and regional tools for conflict prevention and resolution. UNOCA started preparations for a regional awareness-raising workshop, which was postponed beyond 2020 because of the COVID-19 pandemic.
197. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic and the implementation of the ECCAS institutional reform, including the transition from a secretariat to a commission, several activities planned towards the above result, including the adoption of legislation at the ECCAS level on pastoralism and transhumance and the adoption of common policies and joint programmes ahead of a joint ECCAS-ECOWAS summit scheduled in 2020, could not take place. The joint ECCAS-ECOWAS summit itself was postponed.

<sup>6</sup> As reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020 (A/74/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.4).

*Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

198. The above-mentioned work contributed to enhanced local and regional mechanisms and tools to prevent farmer-herder conflicts and protect local populations, but did not meet the target of strengthened national and regional mechanisms for improved management of farmer-herder conflicts, as reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020. The regional ECCAS-level regulation and common policies and joint programmes between ECCAS and ECOWAS were not adopted due to restrictive measures implemented by States to contain the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic, and to the ECCAS institutional reform process. However, the preparatory work aimed at the organization of a regional awareness-raising workshop, especially the study on local farmer-herder dynamics, contributed to a better understanding by UNOCA and ECCAS of local and regional mechanisms and tools for preventing farmer-herder conflicts in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The result of that study included an analysis of these mechanisms and tools, as well as recommendations aimed at their improvement, including their alignment with the draft ECCAS-level legislation.

Table 28

**Performance measure**

<i>2018 (actual)</i>	<i>2019 (actual)</i>	<i>2020 (actual)</i>
Discussions were held between Member States on the issue of transhumance, including during meetings of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa and the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa	ECCAS and its member States were engaged in consultations on an agreed regional political framework on transhumance and took concrete steps towards the adoption of a regional regulation on pastoralism and transhumance	Progress towards the adoption by ECCAS of regional legislation on pastoralism, and by ECCAS and ECOWAS of common policies and joint programmes, was delayed due to COVID-19 restrictive measures and the ECCAS institutional reform process

**Impact of COVID-19 on programme delivery**

199. Owing to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic during 2020, which prompted States of the region to implement restrictive measures, including the closing of international borders and the banning of gatherings, UNOCA has adapted its approach, cancelling trips and, when feasible, carrying out some activities virtually. Some activities were rescheduled beyond 2021, especially those funded through extrabudgetary resources.
200. The mission also advocated for a regional approach to the pandemic, including in addressing its impact on peace and security, and has mobilized international support for such an approach, including during high-level engagements with the Peacebuilding Commission and the Security Council.

**Planned result for 2022****Election-related violence is prevented or mitigated in the majority of countries of Central Africa organizing elections**

201. The majority of electoral processes in Central Africa are characterized by some level of violence, sometimes resulting in protracted post-election crises. In 2020 and 2021, UNOCA undertook early warning and good offices missions to several countries holding elections. In December 2020, the States of the region adopted the Malabo Declaration on democratic and peaceful elections as a means of reinforcing stability and achieving the Sustainable Development Goals in Central Africa, reaffirming the importance of periodic democratic and peaceful elections and calling for the establishment of national mechanisms for political dialogue on electoral processes. In the

Declaration, ECCAS and UNOCA were requested to conduct a study on election-related violence and crises in Central Africa and to recommend appropriate regional and national measures for peaceful elections in the subregion. In application of the Declaration, in 2021 UNOCA is launching a major study on the root causes, factors and manifestations of election-related violence and crises in Central Africa, and on mechanisms for their prevention and resolution. The study will also make recommendations aimed at reinforcing election-related diplomacy, including how to use early warning and good offices activities to prevent such violence and crises and promote inclusive and peaceful electoral processes.

*Lessons learned and planned change*

202. Prior to the adoption of the Declaration, there had been no subregional instrument committing Member States to organize peaceful and inclusive elections according to international standards. This had resulted in situations in which States were sometimes reluctant to accept a good offices role for UNOCA, especially close to or during electoral periods. The lesson that the mission learned from that situation was that the groundwork for election-related good offices should be laid early enough in the electoral cycle. Another lesson for the mission is that such early warning and good offices activities are more efficient when they are grounded on commitments taken in international and regional forums by the concerned States themselves. In applying these lessons, UNOCA will engage Member States preparing for elections early enough in the electoral cycle, on the basis of the commitment that they made under the Declaration.

*Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

203. This work is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated by the conduct of early warning and good offices missions in all countries preparing for elections in 2022, as well as the endorsement and concrete steps taken by ECCAS and its member States, with the support of UNOCA, towards the implementation of the Declaration (see table 29).

Table 29

**Performance measure**

<i>2018 (actual)</i>	<i>2019 (actual)</i>	<i>2020 (actual)</i>	<i>2021 (planned)</i>	<i>2022 (planned)</i>
Discussion between Member States on the issue of transhumance, including during meetings of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa and the Council for Peace and Security in Central Africa	Increased commitment by States undergoing electoral and dialogue processes to reaching a workable consensus and to peacefully resolving any conflict	Finalization of ECCAS-wide legislation on pastoralism; progress towards the adoption of common policies and joint programmes ahead of the next ECCAS-ECOWAS summit	Reduction in election-related incidents and increase in the number of constructive and inclusive dialogue initiatives in the subregion	Early warning and good offices missions conducted by UNOCA and ECCAS to States holding elections  The majority of elections in Central Africa are generally peaceful, with no or low levels of violence

**Deliverables**

204. Table 30 below lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2020–2022 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 30  
**Deliverables for the period 2020–2022, by category and subcategory**

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2020 actual</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>
<b>A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies</b>				
<b>Parliamentary documentation</b> (number of documents)	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>
1. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council	2	2	2	2
2. Report to the General Assembly on the activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa	1	1	1	1
<b>Substantive services for meetings</b> (number of three-hour meetings)	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>
3. Meetings of the Security Council	2	2	2	2
4. Ministerial meetings of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa	4	4	4	4
<b>B. Generation and transfer of knowledge</b>				
<b>Seminars, workshops and training events</b> (number of days)	<b>50</b>	<b>50</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>70</b>
5. Workshop on conflict prevention, mediation, human rights and the empowerment of women	35	35	40	45
6. Workshop for journalists/media on their role in conflict prevention and protection of civilians	15	15	20	25
<b>C. Substantive deliverables</b>				
<b>Good offices:</b> good offices, preventive diplomacy and mediation, high-level diplomatic missions and meetings, including jointly with regional organizations (ECCAS and the African Union), regional and subregional summits, forums and high-level meetings to promote peace and stability, maritime safety and human rights.				
<b>Consultation, advice and advocacy:</b> strategic coordination meetings and round tables with regional and subregional organizations on regional integration, peace and security, human rights and counter-terrorism (including addressing security threats from Boko Haram).				
<b>Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions:</b> field visits to member States to gather information, consult stakeholders and coordinate actions on issues related to subregional peace and security, such as political and electoral crises, armed groups, illicit transfers of small arms and light weapons and human rights violations and abuses.				
<b>D. Communication deliverables</b>				
<b>Outreach programmes, special events and information materials:</b> print media (brochures, information kits, calendars, annual review and quarterly publications, and banners); broadcast media (cooperation with radio and television for the coverage and broadcasting of relevant activities of the mission); and cultural and sporting events and other awareness-raising activities related to United Nations observances, including an annual football tournament for peace.				
<b>External and media relations:</b> press conferences, press releases, statements and interviews on the activities of the mission.				
<b>Digital platforms and multimedia content:</b> website and social media platforms to disseminate information related to the mission.				

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2022

### Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 31

#### Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2020	2021	2022		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2022 vs. 2021 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	–	–	–	–	–
Civilian personnel costs	5 905.9	6 264.0	6 886.9	–	622.9
Operational costs	1 259.3	1 637.7	1 724.8	–	87.1
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>7 165.2</b>	<b>7 901.7</b>	<b>8 611.7</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>710.0</b>

Table 32

#### Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff				
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total international	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	Total
	Approved 2021	1	–	–	2	5	12	6	–	26	7	–	33	4	11	–
Proposed 2022	1	–	–	2	5	12	6	–	26	7	–	33	4	11	–	48
<b>Change</b>	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

205. The proposed resource requirements for 2022 for UNOCA amount to \$8,611,700 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs (\$6,886,900) for the continuation of 33 international positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 2 D-1, 5 P-5, 12 P-4, 6 P-3 and 7 Field Service) and 15 national positions (4 National Professional Officer and 11 Local level), as well as operational costs (\$1,724,800), comprising the costs for consultants (\$29,700), official travel (\$619,200), facilities and infrastructure (\$264,300), ground transportation (\$62,100), air operations (\$140,900), communications and information technology (\$482,600) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$126,000).
206. The increase in requirements for 2022 compared with the appropriation for 2021 is attributable to the delayed impact of the seven new positions approved in 2021 and the application of a higher percentage of common staff costs, based on recent expenditure patterns, to the estimates for international staff costs, as well as higher requirements for maintenance and support of communications and information technology equipment and security services.
207. A vacancy rate of 14 per cent has been applied to the estimates for international positions, taking into account the actual vacancy rate in 2020 and projected deployment in 2021. An assumption of full incumbency, based on the most recent actual incumbency, has been applied to the estimates for national positions.

**Extrabudgetary resources**

208. During 2021, extrabudgetary resources in the estimated amount of \$570,000 are projected for support for the reinforcement of institution-building for ECCAS following its reform, the operationalization of the regional network of civil society organizations for peace and stability in Central Africa, the prevention of election-related violence and crises, the implementation of activities related to the climate change agenda, the organization of meetings and related activities of the United Nations Standing Advisory Committee on Security Questions in Central Africa and activities related to women and peace and security.
209. For 2022, extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$600,000 are projected for supporting regional capacity to prevent, mitigate and resolve election-related crises and violence in the Central Africa subregion, including through strengthening electoral governance and supporting the adoption of regional norms and mechanisms on democratic elections; supporting the effective functioning of a regional women's platform for peace and security in the Central Africa subregion; strengthening ECCAS through the reinforcement of its conflict prevention and resolution capacities, with a view to enhancing its effectiveness in early warning; and strengthening the role of media organs as a catalyst for peace and security, as well as social cohesion, through supporting capacity for improved regulatory frameworks.

## 7. United Nations Support Mission in Libya

(\$70,494,400)

### Foreword

On 23 October 2020, following intense facilitation efforts by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the 5+5 Joint Military Commission, composed of two delegations of military officers from the former Government of National Accord and of the Libyan National Army, signed a countrywide, permanent ceasefire agreement that formalized the truce in place since June 2020, effectively putting an end to the conflict that started in April 2019.

This critical development was the result of a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned multitrack dialogue process facilitated by the United Nations on the basis of Security Council resolution [2510 \(2020\)](#), in which the Council endorsed the conclusions of the January 2020 Berlin Conference on Libya, to end the conflict, chart a course to end the transition that has torn the country apart since 2011, reunify its institutions and foster a national reconciliation process to bring the Libyan people together as one nation. The Security Council extended the mandate of UNSMIL by 12 months until 15 September 2021 in resolution [2542 \(2020\)](#).

In November 2020, UNSMIL facilitated the convening of the first in-person meeting of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum, comprising 74 Libyan representatives, including delegations elected by the House of Representatives and by the High Council of State, as well as political, social and civil society actors, which resulted in the adoption of a political road map which concludes with the holding of elections on 24 December 2021. On 10 March 2021, the House of Representatives held a unified session bringing together representatives from the east and the west, which approved the Government of National Unity of Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah. On 15 March 2021 the new Government and Prime Minister Dbeibah were sworn in by the House of Representatives, on the same day that members of the new unified executive, composed of a three-member Presidency Council, took their oath of office in front of the country's Constitutional Court. In accordance with the road map, the Government of National Unity has as its primary task to lead the country to elections on 24 December 2021, reunify Libyan institutions, restore the provision of basic services to the Libyan people and launch a process of national reconciliation.

In 2021, UNSMIL is continuing its efforts to accomplish these goals in cooperation with and in support of the Government of National Unity and Libyan institutions, and along the Libyan-led and Libyan-owned intra-Libyan dialogue tracks, coordinated by UNSMIL and supported by international partners. UNSMIL also continues to provide technical advice to the High National Elections Commission for the preparation of national elections on 24 December 2021 in accordance with the November 2020 road map.

Gross violations of human rights were committed during the conflict. The United Nations will continue to work with the Libyan authorities to promote the accountability of the perpetrators and justice for the victims and their families, while supporting the implementation of an inclusive process of national reconciliation. The United Nations will also continue to provide humanitarian assistance to those most affected by the conflict and support the national authorities in responding effectively to the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic.

Throughout years of conflict, the Libyan people have made clear their strong yearning for a shared future in a united Libya based on legitimate institutions and equitable management of the country's resources. Over the course of 2022, UNSMIL will support the new Libyan authorities that will have been elected in December 2021 to consolidate unified, resilient and democratic political, military and economic institutions, by providing assistance and technical advice to translate the progress achieved through intra-Libyan dialogue into structural institutional reforms and strengthen the resilience of Libyan governance, including through national reconciliation.

*(Signed)* Ján Kubiš

Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Libya  
Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya

## A. Proposed programme plan for 2022 and programme performance for 2020

### Overall orientation

#### Mandates and background

210. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) is an integrated special political mission established on 16 September 2011 by the Security Council in its resolution [2009 \(2011\)](#) to support the country's transitional authorities in their post-conflict efforts, including through an inclusive national dialogue and a constitution drafting process. As a result of the conflict that began in 2014, the Security Council extended the mandate of UNSMIL, stressing that its immediate priority, through mediation and good offices, was to support the Libyan political process towards the formation of a Government of National Accord and security arrangements, which led to the signing of the Libyan Political Agreement on 17 December 2015.
211. On 13 February 2020, the Security Council adopted resolution [2510 \(2020\)](#), mandating UNSMIL to facilitate a three-track intra-Libyan dialogue process and demanding the full implementation of the arms embargo. The International Follow-up Committee on Libya, comprised of all countries and international organizations that participated in the Berlin Conference, was tasked with assisting with the operationalization of the Conference conclusions under the auspices of the United Nations. Four thematic working groups of the Committee were established, on political, economic, security, and human rights and international humanitarian law issues, co-chaired by UNSMIL and Member States and regional organizations.
212. The mandate of UNSMIL was extended on 15 September 2020 until 15 September 2021 by the Security Council in its resolution [2542 \(2020\)](#). The Mission's mandate currently includes mediation and good offices to support: (a) an inclusive political process and security and economic dialogue within the framework of the Libyan Political Agreement and the United Nations Action Plan for Libya; (b) continued implementation of the Agreement; (c) consolidation of the governance, security and economic arrangements of the Government of National Accord, including support for economic reform in collaboration with international financial institutions; (d) a possible ceasefire and ceasefire monitoring support; and (e) subsequent phases of the Libyan transition process, including the constitutional process and the organization of elections. In addition, within operational and security constraints, UNSMIL provides: (a) support to key Libyan institutions; (b) support, on request, for the provision of essential services and the delivery of humanitarian assistance, including in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, in accordance with humanitarian principles; (c) human rights monitoring and reporting; (d) support for securing uncontrolled arms and related materiel and countering their proliferation; and (e) the coordination of international assistance and the provision of advice and assistance to Government-led efforts to stabilize post-conflict zones, including those liberated from Da'esh.

### Programme of work

#### Objective

213. The objective, to which this mission contributes, as per Security Council resolution [2542 \(2020\)](#) and further to the Libyan ceasefire agreement of October 2020, the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum road map of November 2020 scheduling elections in December 2021, and the transfer of power to the Government of National Unity in March 2021, is to support the new, democratically elected Government's inclusive peacebuilding and State-building efforts, including consolidation of the reunification of the country and its political, security, economic and rule of law institutions, that are responsive and accountable to all Libyans; advance gender equality, human rights and rights-based national reconciliation and transitional justice processes, securing the country's borders and upholding

respect for non-interference in Libyans' affairs; addressing the threat from terrorism; and cultivating mutually beneficial relations with its international partners while respecting the sovereignty of Libya.

## Strategy

214. To contribute to the objective, the Mission will continue to provide mediation and good offices, as well as technical assistance, to address the Libyan crisis and contribute to the full unification of the Libyan State in its political, military-security and economic-financial aspects, complemented by the efforts of the working groups of the International Follow-up Committee on Libya. UNSMIL will continue to engage with Libyan stakeholders at all levels to ensure smooth progress on the Libyan-led and Libyan-owned inclusive political process and unification of State institutions. It will facilitate and support as needed the constitutional reform process and provide technical assistance to the High National Elections Commission and the Central Committee for Municipal Council Elections. UNSMIL will work with national authorities on reforming the country's security sector, including through support for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, mine action and security sector reform. On the economic front, in close cooperation with donors and international financial institutions, UNSMIL will continue to support economic policy reform, including a decentralization policy and a reform of the subsidy system. UNSMIL will also continue to provide support and good offices in the area of rule of law to support the judiciary and prosecutorial system, including its critical role in ensuring justice as a part of a sustained peace process.
215. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in:
- (a) Formation of a unified national political institution, including a Government and Parliament;
  - (b) Maintenance of the ceasefire and implementation of the provisions of the ceasefire agreement;
  - (c) Reformed unified security institutions;
  - (d) A stabilized and unified economy;
  - (e) Development of effective and accountable institutions at all levels working for the benefit of the Libyan people;
  - (f) Promotion of the rule of law throughout the country, leading to a more resilient and responsive State.

## External factors for 2022

216. The overall plan for 2022 is based on the following planning assumptions:
- (a) The Libyan Political Agreement of December 2015, Security Council resolution [2510 \(2020\)](#) endorsing the conclusions of the Berlin Conference on Libya, and the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum Tunis road map on the preparatory phase for a comprehensive solution of November 2020 will remain the guiding frameworks for United Nations support in Libya;
  - (b) Implementation of the ceasefire agreement signed on 23 October 2020, including the withdrawal of foreign forces and mercenaries, will continue, as will agreed mechanisms to monitor and maintain the ceasefire agreement, and the security situation in Libya will continue to stabilize;
  - (c) The security situation, which is expected to remain fluid and unpredictable in 2021 while the political process progresses, is anticipated to stabilize in 2022 to a level that would allow UNSMIL to expand its presence in eastern and southern Libya;
  - (d) The political transition period will end with the holding of presidential and parliamentary elections in December 2021 and the formation of new executive and legislative authorities in early 2022;

- (e) Strategic partnerships will continue between the members of the international community, including regional organizations and the United Nations, in support of a Libyan-led and Libyan-owned political process and adherence to the United Nations sanctions regime;
  - (f) Elements of instability or stagnation will continue to affect the political and security processes, providing openings for those interested in the status quo and/or potential spoilers to hinder the processes, requiring continued good offices efforts in parallel with sustained support for local reconciliation and support for transitional justice mechanisms.
217. With regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, the proposed programme plan is based on the assumption that the proposed deliverables and activities for 2022 will be feasible to implement. However, if the pandemic were to continue to have an impact on the planned deliverables and activities, they would be adjusted during 2022 within the scope of the overall objectives, strategies and mandates. Any such adjustments would be reported as part of the programme performance information.
218. UNSMIL integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. It will continue to promote the participation of women in the political process and representation in government institutions, including to ensure effective gender mainstreaming into the constitution-making and electoral processes in order to safeguard equal rights and opportunities for women. UNSMIL and the United Nations country team, through the Office of the Assistant Secretary-General (Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator), will jointly promote equal rights and opportunities for women, including support for efforts by the Government of National Unity to protect women from all forms of violence, in line with national legislation, applicable international law and relevant Security Council resolutions, addressing and preventing violence against women and girls in vulnerable situations, including displaced persons, migrants and refugees, as well as the identification of the impacts of violent extremism on women in Libya. This will also inform work aimed at exploring ways to improve prevention and protection efforts.
219. In line with the United Nations Disability Inclusion Strategy, the Mission will review and specifically examine the strategy with an emphasis on facilitating inclusion and mitigating measures to overcome any challenges and barriers to inclusion. The strategy will cover mainstreaming disability inclusion into programming, awareness-raising among staff and ensuring respectful communication, occupational support and facilities management to assist persons with disabilities, as needed, with the latter factoring in the context of a hardship duty station and associated limitations, including security-related considerations and restrictions.
220. With regard to cooperation with other entities, UNSMIL is mandated by the Security Council pursuant to its resolution [2542 \(2020\)](#) to coordinate international assistance and to provide advice and assistance to efforts led by the Government of Libya to stabilize the country. UNSMIL will seek to maximize collective results in all contexts through partnerships with relevant local and international partners, regional organizations and civil society groups, including through conducting diplomatic briefings and coordination with the African Union, the League of Arab States and the European Union (Libya Quartet) to ensure a unified approach towards supporting the country's political and security processes and resolving the Libyan crisis. Furthermore, the United Nations-African Union-European Union tripartite task force will continue to work, in particular, on the situation of stranded migrants and refugees in Libya.
221. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, UNSMIL will work closely with the United Nations country team as an integrated Mission. Delivering support to Libya as One United Nations, the Mission and the United Nations country team will carry forward the emphasis of the Secretary-General on the nexus between the peace and security, development, human rights and humanitarian pillars, as well as efforts focused on addressing humanitarian crises, to facilitate long-term peace, security and sustainable development. In recognition that political and security interventions will have a major impact on development efforts and vice versa, an integrated approach will strengthen the ability of UNSMIL to implement its mandate and increase the ability of the country team to carry out its role and, consequently, the ability of the United Nations to serve the Libyan people. UNSMIL will work jointly with the United Nations country team on providing electoral support to the Libyan

authorities, security and justice reform and increased support for basic services, economic development and security in southern Libya.

### **Evaluation activities**

222. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs will lead a systematic assessment with the overall purpose of improving the gender sensitivity of the political analyses developed by the Department and the special political missions.

### **Programme performance in 2020**

#### **Transition to State-led security and a State monopoly on the use of force<sup>7</sup>**

223. The violent conflict that began in 2019 with the Libyan National Army offensive against Tripoli and ensuing fighting between Government of National Accord forces and those of the Libyan National Army, with many of the combatants coming from non-State armed groups, continued into 2020 and required UNSMIL to prioritize and focus its efforts on bringing an end to the conflict. Throughout the conflict, the Mission continued its liaison, technical advice and some capacity-building work with Libyan security practitioners. These efforts provided the basis, within the framework of the Berlin Conference conclusions and with the support of the International Follow-up Committee on Libya, for the Mission's intensive mediation between the parties for a solution to the conflict and the parties' agreement to the establishment of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission, comprising five senior military officers from the Government of National Accord and from the Libyan National Army. The Commission functions as the mechanism for UNSMIL to conduct mediation and facilitation efforts on security aspects between the two sides in a sustained way. Following UNSMIL shuttle diplomacy between the conflicting parties, the Commission met for the first time in February 2020. Several months of dedicated and sustained mediation by the Mission via virtual meetings (due to the COVID-19 pandemic) followed, culminating in the signing of the ceasefire agreement on 23 October 2020, under the auspices of the United Nations. The Commission held its first self-organized meeting in Libya shortly thereafter, at which it unanimously agreed to the Libyan-led and Libyan-owned ceasefire monitoring mechanism, for which it requested support from UNSMIL.
224. With the support of a dedicated Libya planning team established by the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs in November 2020 at United Nations Headquarters, the Mission moved quickly to provide dedicated support to implement the Libyan-led and Libyan-owned ceasefire monitoring mechanism. This included the development of joint security arrangements in the area of the ceasefire and planning for the establishment and deployment of a joint security force of Libyan police to the area. During this period, some capacity-building and empowerment projects were realized via the development and opening of a model police station in Tripoli and the start of a similar initiative in Benghazi; however, the focus remained on reaching a ceasefire agreement. Additionally, in response to the increased threat from explosive ordnance, UNSMIL provided expertise and support to national entities to survey, remove and destroy explosive ordnance, including through coordination with the international community regarding the increased threat and assistance requirements. UNSMIL conducted awareness-raising with regard to explosive ordnance via social media and contributed to risk education in targeted languages for migrants and refugees.

#### *Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

225. The above-mentioned work contributed to the restoration of the State's monopoly over the use of force and a Libyan-led transition to greater human security, rule of law and fairer distribution of wealth and opportunities to the benefit of all Libyans. This also supported the target of full unification of the army, disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and security sector reform activities, a national security framework and capacity-building efforts, as reflected in the proposed

<sup>7</sup> As reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020 (A/74/6 (Sect. 3)/Add.4).

programme budget for 2020. The challenge to effective UNSMIL support was the continued and expanding conflict in the first half of 2020, which required the Mission to adjust its approach and focus its efforts on ending the conflict and to pursue a political solution. UNSMIL was able to achieve this goal with intense and sustained mediation efforts across interlinked political, security and economic tracks. Progress on the security track facilitated progress on the political and economic tracks. Following a truce declared in June 2020, the armed conflict abated, with the signing of the ceasefire agreement on 23 October 2020. The 5+5 Joint Military Commission, its subsidiary committees, the Libyan-led and Libyan-owned ceasefire monitoring mechanism and the proposed joint security arrangements guided by UNSMIL laid the foundation for reconciliation, consensus building, wider unification of the army and addressing the role of armed groups. The overall process is firmly rooted in national ownership, which contributed directly and positively to this substantial progress made on the ground.

Table 33  
Performance measure

<i>2018 (actual)</i>	<i>2019 (actual)</i>	<i>2020 (actual)</i>
<p>Tripoli ceasefire and other emergency measures adopted to address violence in the capital</p> <p>Partial handover of vital infrastructure, including Matiga airport, from armed groups to State forces completed</p>	<p>Due to the outbreak of conflict, UNSMIL shifted its focus to intensive mediation and conflict mitigation, resulting in the establishment of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission. With direct assistance from UNSMIL, this joint Government of National Accord-Libyan National Army body contributed to the reduction of hostilities and formed the nucleus for the full ceasefire agreement in 2020</p> <p>UNSMIL successfully championed the expansion of police capacity in both Benghazi and other regions. This included a project start-up for the model police station in Tripoli and, separately, the garnering of international financial support for the joint UNSMIL-UNDP Policing and Security Joint Programme</p> <p>Through its monthly security sector working group for defence and police attachés to Libya, UNSMIL built international understanding of and consensus on the conflict, in direct support of the Mission's political objectives</p>	<p>Libya-wide ceasefire agreement signed on 23 October 2020 under the auspices of UNSMIL</p> <p>On 3 November 2020, the 5+5 Joint Military Commission agreed to the Libyan-led and Libyan-owned ceasefire monitoring mechanism, for which it requested support from UNSMIL</p> <p>UNSMIL drafted a concept of operations, including logistical and security plans, for United Nations support for ceasefire monitoring</p> <p>UNSMIL facilitated the development of joint security arrangements in central Libya and planning for the establishment and deployment of a joint security force, in line with the ceasefire agreement</p> <p>Model police station completed in Hey Andalus, Tripoli. Planning for a model police station in Benghazi started</p> <p>Policing and security joint programme delivered training on and standard operating procedures for policing in a COVID-19 environment</p>

#### Ending arbitrary detention and improving detention conditions<sup>7</sup>

226. In 2020, UNSMIL continued to provide policy advice, technical assistance and capacity-building to the Libyan justice system, including capacity-building for its personnel on the treatment of persons

deprived of their liberty, judicial screening of detainees and legal, institutional and prison reform. Through the International Follow-up Committee on Libya, UNSMIL worked together with the members of the International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Working Group to focus on support for accountability and transitional justice. Moreover, UNSMIL organized and facilitated virtual and in-person meetings and consultations on the role of judicial leadership within the ongoing peace process. UNSMIL also assisted the Supreme Judicial Council in ensuring justice for conflict-related detainees as a part of a sustainable peace process. The Mission further contributed to advancing the rights of women and children in Libya through the establishment of two specialized courts on violence against women and the appointment of five women judges, in addition to launching a project to revise the Libyan draft law on combating violence against women and girls that includes law enforcement bodies. As a result, 12 Libyan legal experts, including 10 women, agreed on a plan of action.


227. To address the spread of COVID-19, in cooperation with the Ministry of Justice and the Judicial Police, UNSMIL advocated for the provision of basic health care for prisoners and provided technical assistance to the Ministry of Justice and the Supreme Judicial Council to screen and release detainees. In the context of the UNDP police and security joint project, technical support was provided to the Judicial Police to increase its capacities and adopt standard operating procedures to enhance the management and the organization of correctional facilities. The Mission supported the Ministry of Justice in ensuring respect for detainees' rights in correctional facilities under the Ministry's remit and in advocating with armed groups for the release of all illegally detained persons or for them to be handed over to judicial authorities for investigation and prosecution. Following quiet diplomacy and advocacy with Libyan officials, UNSMIL helped with obtaining the release of dozens of arbitrarily detained persons.

*Progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

228. The above-mentioned work contributed to enhancing the human rights and rule of law situation in accordance with international instruments and Libyan national legislation, with 1,296 inmates screened and 4,260 arbitrarily detained persons released, including migrants and asylum seekers. While the number of detainees screened did not meet the target of 1,800 due to restrictions imposed in relation to the COVID-19 pandemic, the number of detainees that were released exceeded the target of 1,200 persons, as reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020 (see figure IV).
229. As for detentions of migrants and asylum seekers, UNSMIL advocacy assisted in the release of 355 migrants and asylum seekers at Zuwarah Detention Centre, including 62 women, of whom four were pregnant, and 48 children. It also led to the subsequent closure of the detention centres in Zuwarah and Dahman. UNSMIL monitored and followed up on their safe return home.

Figure IV

**Performance measure: number of detainees screened and released**



**Impact of COVID-19 on programme delivery**

230. During 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic had an impact on the planned deliverables and activities of the Mission, and directly impacted the Mission's mediation activities aimed at bringing an end to the armed conflict between the two sides. Following the onset of the pandemic, the Mission initially maintained virtual contact with each side, conducting "virtual shuttle diplomacy" to prepare the ground for bringing the conflict to an end. In-person meetings were conducted in the latter part of the year when this became possible again, with the application of strict COVID-19 preventive measures. The change of focus on mediating an end to the conflict and the postponement of planned deliverables and activities had an impact on the expected results for 2020, as described under programme performance for 2020. While the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on the Mission's mediation work was tangible, the violent conflict itself had a more direct impact on the achievement of the planned results.

**Planned results for 2022****Empowering unified national institutions and fostering reconciliation**

231. The multipronged mediation efforts of UNSMIL launched in 2020 through the complementary intra-Libyan dialogue resulted in the 23 October 2020 ceasefire agreement. The November 2020 Tunis road map of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum charted the course for the restoration of democratic legitimacy by setting a clear date for national elections and for the establishment of a unified, interim executive authority, which included long overdue economic-financial reforms. The Berlin Conference in January 2020 provided a supportive international umbrella for the United Nations to work directly with Libyan parties, military officers, political forces and civil society leaders to seek a Libyan-Libyan resolution of the political conflict in the country.
232. As a result, the United Nations-supported process to end the prolonged transition in Libya, which was interrupted by the conflict in 2019 and 2020, could resume with the aim of ushering Libya into a new period of stability and security through elections and unified State institutions. On 10 March 2021, the House of Representatives endorsed the Government of National Unity, which will move forward on preparations for parliamentary and presidential elections on 24 December 2021. On 5 April, the Presidential Council announced the establishment of a High National Reconciliation Commission, which will be operative in various cities in Libya, with a focus on those most affected during the recent conflict. A subcommittee of the Commission will be dedicated to the needs of internally displaced persons. UNSMIL facilitated the efforts of the constitutional committee formed by the House of Representatives and the High State Council to determine a constitutional basis for elections, while in parallel assisting the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum's Legal Committee, which is mandated to follow up on the work of the Constitutional Committee. Prime Minister Abdul Hamid Dbeibah highlighted the need to address the COVID-19 pandemic, improve basic services and support reconciliation as key priorities for the new Government.
233. In 2022, UNSMIL will offer its support and technical expertise to translate the progress achieved through the intra-Libyan dialogue process to anchor reforms and strengthen the resilience of Libyan governance, security and economic and financial institutions. It will support the implementation of policies to rationalize spending and improve the unification and functionality of State institutions and procedures. This includes continuing with efforts to unify national institutions such as the Central Bank of Libya and the Ministry of Finance, as well as their budget formulation and expenditure processes. Increased capacity at the centre will be complemented by working towards further fiscal and political decentralization for local government authorities. Enhanced governance will facilitate support towards improving vital services, including in the electricity and water sectors. Follow-up support will be provided, as necessary, to conduct electoral processes and to finalize the country's constitution-making process. To overcome the cyclical pattern of conflict, UNSMIL will foster bottom-up reconciliation and enhanced respect for human rights, accountability and justice under the rule of law.

*Lessons learned and planned change*

234. The lesson for the Mission was the necessity to establish a follow-up mechanism (the International Follow-up Committee on Libya) that fully integrates the international community in pursuing the commitments made during the Berlin Conference and the benefits of interlinked thematic processes through dedicated working groups, both of which together facilitated a more holistic international response to addressing the Libyan conflict. Through the International Follow-up Committee on Libya and its working groups, the Mission was able to directly enlist key stakeholders in the process to support the negotiations and engagement with the Libyan parties. The process also served to highlight the interconnectedness of the work on the different tracks, which led to better integration and cross-communication on actions. In applying the lesson, the Mission will seek to strengthen its external mobilization for support and its internal coordination and communication to strengthen its application of the humanitarian-development-peace nexus approach.

*Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

235. This work is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated by the country-wide acceptance of national elections and the orderly formation of a Government and increased public trust in State institutions (see table 34).

Table 34  
Performance measure

2018 (actual)	2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (planned)	2022 (planned)
The UNSMIL-sponsored consultative phase of the national conference process involved some 7,000 Libyans in 77 public consultation meetings in more than 40 locations all over Libya, as well as diaspora groups resident abroad. The report issued in November outlined key areas of consensus, including regarding governance principles, critical economic and financial reforms and the centrality of elections to ending the transitional phase. UNSMIL supported economic talks ahead of the introduction of a foreign exchange rate fee in September 2018 to reduce space	Three-part road map proposed by UNSMIL to cease hostilities, enforce the implementation of the arms embargo and resume political dialogue  Integration of additional revenue matching that from oil into the regular budgetary process ensured  Meetings of the Central Bank of Libya Governors convened with the support of international financial institutions to agree on terms of reference; procurement process launched with UNOPS  Libyan Economic Dialogue established by	Intra-Libyan economic-financial, military-security and political dialogue tracks launched and supported by respective working groups under the framework of the International Follow-up Committee on the Libya Berlin process  Ceasefire agreement signed in October 2020 and political road map adopted in November for the transitional period until national elections are held  In December, assisted in reactivation of the Board of Directors of the Central Bank	A new temporary executive authority is selected by the UNSMIL-facilitated Libyan Political Dialogue Forum and endorsed by the House of Representatives to govern Libya for the period leading up to national elections set for 24 December 2021  Agreement to be reached via the Constitutional Committee of the House of Representatives and the High State Council or the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum on a constitutional basis for the elections	There is a peaceful transfer of power following national elections  Elected Government takes office with effective authority across the country  Support provided for a multifaceted national approach to reconciliation while simultaneously addressing accountability  Process to adopt a constitution that is in line with minimum internationally recognized standards finalized  Support provided for unification of the Central Bank of Libya, management of national deficits and access to foreign exchange in a

2018 (actual)	2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (planned)	2022 (planned)
<p>for currency smuggling, incentivize deposits to address liquidity and create an additional source of public revenue</p> <p>The Secretary-General called on the Security Council to make full use of the necessary measures to ensure that the audit of the two branches of the Central Bank of Libya that had been requested by the Prime Minister was initiated</p> <p>Expert studies of the Libya political economy conducted and workshops on economic sectors held</p>	<p>soliciting the participation of Libyan economic experts to consolidate and develop economic policy reform</p>	<p>of Libya, enabling the harmonization of monetary policies</p> <p>Concluded contractual arrangements with an auditing company and launched discrete parallel audits of both Central Bank of Libya branches; facilitated requests for information by the audit company</p> <p>Formalized the formation of the Libyan Expert Economic Commission as an interim consultative body to harmonize economic policy and create the conditions for institutional unification</p>	<p>In January, the Central Bank of Libya Board of Directors unified exchange rates through devaluation of the dinar, strengthening the real value of the currency and expunging market distortions created by the foreign exchange rate fee</p> <p>Conclude and publish report on the audit, following consultation with both branches; and utilize the report to launch processes to restore the national accountability process and move forward with unification of the two branches</p> <p>Economic experts support the process of transition to a new unified national Government by supporting the unification of the national budget and other economic processes</p>	<p>manner that maintains currency value and steadies the price of vital commodities</p> <p>Unification of the Central Bank of Libya consolidated, including the harmonization of its accounts and its supervisory processes with regard to commercial banks; national accountability process strengthened</p> <p>Economic reform efforts continued to make the Libyan economy more productive, efficient and transparent</p>

#### Unification of security sector and State monopoly on the use of force

236. Since 2012, the provision of security in Libya has increasingly been in the hands of non-State armed groups. External actors have used the situation to promote political, financial and ideological agendas via proxy. This has eroded not only the State's monopoly on security but also the very fabric of the State's security institutions and management culture to the point where non-State security is the de facto framework. Libya needs to establish a unified security framework that serves the interests of the people and is responsive to a civilian Government and compliant with international human rights norms to end the vicious cycle of conflict between non-State actors and opportunities for interference by foreign actors.
237. In 2019 and 2020, UNSMIL led the mediation efforts that brought an end to the armed conflict and convened the two sides together to sign a countrywide ceasefire on 23 October 2020. These efforts and

the ceasefire have laid the foundation for the unification of, and transition to, State-led security and a State monopoly on the use of force in 2022. The establishment of the 5+5 Joint Military Commission represents a key element in the unification process. Other elements include the development of joint security arrangements in the area of the ceasefire; the establishment of 5+5 Joint Military Commission subcommittees, including the classification and future demobilization of armed groups; and the planned establishment and deployment of joint Libyan security and military forces to the area.

*Lessons learned and planned change*


238. The lesson for the Mission was the deep interconnectedness between the security and political tracks, along with the impact of the economic track, with all aspects underpinned by international humanitarian law and human rights, and the need to address the State's monopoly on security at the beginning of any political rapprochement. This also includes the critical importance of maintaining a strong relationship between Libyan authorities and the United Nations. In applying the lesson, the Mission will support the development of a security sector strategic framework of governance and reforms, the professionalization and empowerment of unified State security institutions and coordination of international assistance to the security sector to achieve these reforms and support capacity-building. This will include significant support in the areas of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, security sector reform and addressing the substantial threat of explosive remnants of war and mine action.

*Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

239. This work is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated by a shift from conflict reduction and ceasefire negotiations to United Nations support for security and rule of law processes, including security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, under the auspices of the legitimate State authorities. For disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, efforts are under way to elevate this vital programme to the national level and encompass the Government as a whole, in order to map and understand the enablers for demobilizing the hundreds of thousands of "men at arms" that undermine the State's monopoly on security and the use of force. For security sector reform, efforts will be focussed on the reunification of the military under civilian authority and preparation for United Nations and international support for developing the requisite security sector frameworks and capacity needed as part of integrated security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes (see figure V).

Figure V

**Performance measure: shifting from United Nations-led conflict reduction and ceasefire negotiations to United Nations-facilitated security sector reform and development**



**Deliverables**

240. Table 35 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2020–2022 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 35  
**Deliverables for the period 2020–2022, by category and subcategory**

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2020 actual</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>
<b>A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies</b>				
<b>Parliamentary documentation</b> (number of documents)	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>
1. Report to the Security Council	3	3	3	3
<b>Substantive services for meetings</b> (number of three-hour meetings)	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>	<b>6</b>
2. Meeting of the Security Council	6	6	6	6
<b>B. Generation and transfer of knowledge</b>				
<b>Field and technical cooperation projects</b> (number of projects)	<b>57</b>	<b>4</b>	<b>22</b>	<b>16</b>
3. Projects on policing and security joint programme	55	1	20	15
4. Projects related to arms, ammunition management, counter-proliferation and humanitarian mine action	2	3	2	1
<b>Seminars, workshops and training events</b> (number of days)	<b>158</b>	<b>101</b>	<b>140</b>	<b>138</b>
5. Seminars and workshops on the political process, confidence-building, constitution-making, legislative and economic reform, electoral management and campaigning, mediation and conflict resolution, prevention of and response to incitement to violence and hatred, media, female social media youth activists, digital Libyan dialogue, unification of the army, demobilization of armed groups, and unexploded ordnance awareness training and capacity development	158	101	140	138
<b>C. Substantive deliverables</b>				
<b>Good offices:</b> provision of good offices to further an inclusive political process, security and economic dialogue; establishment of unified and functioning State institutions, and consolidation of governance, security and economic arrangements; good offices on ceasefire and cessations of hostilities, including local conflicts; transition to a State monopoly on the use of force and unification of the military to address the problem of non-State armed groups and strategic security policy and frameworks; support for accountability and transitional justice and strengthening of national capacities with regard to judicial leadership; provision of good offices to support the judiciary and prosecutorial system.				
<b>Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions:</b> monitoring missions for the Libyan ceasefire monitoring mechanism; monitoring missions of the human rights situation with visits to prisons and detention centres.				
<b>Consultation, advice and advocacy:</b> support for subsequent phases of the Libyan transition process, including the constitutional process and the organization of elections to rebuild the country's national polity by addressing the roots of grievances through a national reconciliation process and transitional justice mechanisms; restoration of public trust in rationalized State institutions and facilitate decentralization; planning and implementing of ceasefire monitoring activities; security policy and frameworks; security sector governance, reform and development; reintegration of non-State armed groups; advice and mentoring on the planning and implementing of security arrangements, security frameworks, sectoral reform and development, and demobilization of non-State armed groups; control of heavy weapons, arms and ammunition management, including advice on the clearance of explosive remnants of war, booby traps, improvised explosive devices and mines; confidence-building sessions with national and local authorities, and civil society organizations, for reconciliation dialogue initiatives; advancement of the constitution-making process with a view to ending the political transition period; advice to the High National Elections Commission and the Central Committee for Municipal Council Elections on electoral matters; assistance with strengthening the technical capacities of electoral management bodies; coordination of international electoral assistance; support for electoral security planning, support for the Central Committee for Municipal Council Elections with municipal elections through work with local electoral stakeholders; advocacy and implementation of the human rights due diligence policy framework, including the monitoring, reporting and communication strategy; advocacy for the release of individuals detained without a legal basis; and advocacy for the rights of women and children and advice on women's empowerment.				
<b>D. Communication deliverables</b>				
<b>Outreach programmes, special events and information materials:</b> media and communications campaigns through traditional and social media outlets promoting the peace process in its three tracks and intra-Libyan dialogue, as well as the promotion of reconciliation, social cohesion and respect for humanitarian and human rights law; targeted meetings and events to motivate young people and women activists and to promote their key role in peacebuilding and the peace process in Libya, including through the efforts of the youth track dialogue and by promoting the efforts of the women and municipalities track dialogues as part of the Libyan political dialogue forums; production of identity logos, branding and multimedia products; visibility materials, including banners, roll-up stands, hygiene kits, stationaries and face masks.				

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2020 actual</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>
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**External and media relations:** strategic media interviews and interactions with top-tier international and regional media outlets in Arabic, English and French; frequent engagement with local media from all parts of Libya, promoting conflict-sensitive reporting; troubleshooting and crisis management pertaining to polarized media campaigns aimed at undermining the implementation of the Mission's mandate; establishment of partnerships with social media platforms to strengthen efforts in countering hate speech, fake news and misinformation; strengthening of the partnership with the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs-Department of Peace Operations Northern Africa Division and the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Innovation Cell to enhance traditional and social media monitoring and analysis; production of daily traditional and social media monitoring reports; fostering of professional ties with local, regional and international media outlets; reporting on the human rights situation and acting as a public resource; press releases relating to the progress of the best offices process; regular briefing of the Special Envoy to the international community; inhouse production of short films that are distributed through social media.

**Digital platforms and multimedia content:** daily update of the Mission's website and daily feed on the Mission's official social media platforms in Arabic and English highlighting activities, meetings, events, public messaging and the implementation of projects and programmes of UNSMIL and the United Nations country team; with the help of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs Innovation Cell, conduct of artificial intelligence-powered digital media dialogues with the Libyan public and thematic dialogues with social groups (including youth and women) to seek their views and their recommendations.

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2022

241. In its resolution [2542 \(2020\)](#), the Security Council decided that UNSMIL should be led by a Special Envoy of the Secretary-General, who should exercise overall leadership of UNSMIL with a particular focus on good offices and mediation with Libyan and international actors to end the conflict and that, under the authority of the Special Envoy, an UNSMIL Coordinator should be in charge of the Mission's day-to-day operations and management.
242. The Council also requested the Mission, inter alia, to further the implementation of the Libyan Political Agreement, help to achieve a ceasefire and, once it was agreed by the Libyan parties, provide appropriate support for its implementation, and provide support to Libya, upon request, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

### Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 36

#### Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Category of expenditure</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>	<i>Variance</i>	
	<i>Expenditure</i>	<i>Appropriation</i>	<i>Total requirements</i>	<i>Non-recurrent requirements</i>	<i>2022 vs. 2021 Increase/(decrease)</i>
	<i>(1)</i>	<i>(2)</i>	<i>(3)</i>	<i>(4)</i>	<i>(5)=(3)-(2)</i>
Military and police personnel costs	6 881.3	6 296.8	6 676.5	–	379.7
Civilian personnel costs	31 512.3	32 322.5	34 164.8	–	1 842.3
Operational costs	33 186.1	30 624.8	29 653.1	–	(971.7)
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>71 579.7</b>	<b>69 244.1</b>	<b>70 494.4</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>1 250.3</b>

Table 37  
Positions

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>									<i>General Service and related categories</i>			<i>National staff</i>			<i>Total</i>
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security Services</i>	<i>General Service<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National Professional Officer</i>	<i>Local level</i>	<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>	
Approved 2021	1	2	–	7	13	35	29	2	89	120	1	210	14	84	6	314
Proposed 2022	1	2	–	7	14	34	30	2	90	119	3	212	14	84	6	316
<b>Change</b>	–	–	–	–	<b>1</b>	<b>(1)</b>	<b>1</b>	–	<b>1</b>	<b>(1)</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>	–	–	–	<b>2</b>

<sup>a</sup> Other level, unless otherwise specified.

243. The proposed resource requirements for 2022 for UNSMIL amount to \$70,494,400 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the deployment of 230 United Nations Guard Unit personnel (\$6,676,500); salaries and related costs (\$34,164,800) for the deployment of 212 international positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 2 Assistant Secretaries-General, 7 D-1, 14 P-5, 34 P-4, 30 P-3, 2 P-2, 119 Field Service and 3 General Service), 98 national positions (14 National Professional Officer and 84 Local level), 6 United Nations Volunteers, and 7 Government-provided personnel, including the proposed establishment of 2 international positions; and operational costs (\$29,653,100), comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$198,800), official travel (\$940,600), facilities and infrastructure (\$18,388,500), ground transportation (\$237,900), air operations (\$4,292,200), communications and information technology (\$2,162,200), medical (\$416,400) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$3,016,500).
244. The following organizational changes are proposed for 2022:
- Establishment of a new duty station in Geneva;
  - Renaming of the Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General as the Office of the Special Envoy;
  - Renaming of the Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Political) as the Office of Mission Coordinator;
  - Renaming of the Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator) as the Office of the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator.
245. With a view of ensuring effective delivery of its mandate, a number of changes to the staffing structure are proposed for 2022: the establishment of 2 positions, reassignment of 7 positions, reclassification of 2 positions and redeployment of 13 positions, as detailed below:

*Office of the Special Envoy*

- Reassignment of the position of Special Representative of Secretary-General (USG) from Tripoli as Special Envoy of the Secretary-General (USG) in Geneva, pursuant to Security Council resolution [2542 \(2020\)](#);
- Establishment of one position of Administrative Assistant (General Service) in Geneva, to be responsible for the effective and efficient management of all administrative matters in the Office, as well as provide general administrative support to the Special Envoy;
- Reassignment of the existing position of Military Adviser (D-1) as Principal Political Affairs Officer (D-1), and further redeployment from Tripoli to the Office of the Special Envoy in Geneva, based on an identified need to strengthen the capacity for providing strategic advice

and support to the Special Envoy with respect to all aspects of the implementation of the mandate, particularly with a focus on political good offices and mediation;

- (d) Reclassification of one position of Administrative Assistant (Field Service) as Administrative Assistant (General Service), and further redeployment from Tripoli to Geneva, to provide ongoing adequate administrative support to the Special Envoy in the day-to-day functioning of the Office;
- (e) Redeployment of the existing position of Special Assistant, Political Affairs (P-4) from Tripoli to the Office of the Special Envoy in Geneva to provide ongoing dedicated support for all aspects of the work of the Special Envoy in carrying out mandated responsibilities;
- (f) Redeployment of one position of Senior Political Affairs Officer (P-5) from the Political Affairs Service in Tripoli to the Office of the Special Envoy in Geneva to enhance the substantive capacity of the Office with respect to political good offices and mediation work;
- (g) Redeployment of one position of Translator, Arabic (P-3) from the Translation and Interpretation Unit to the Office of the Special Envoy in Geneva based on the identified need to provide direct, in-person support to the Special Envoy with respect to the translation of correspondence, and interpretation during engagements with Libyan interlocutors;
- (h) Redeployment of one position of Special Assistant, Political Affairs (P-5) from Tripoli to Tunis to ensure more effective management and coordination of engagements of the Special Envoy with the international community based in Tunis;

*Office of Mission Coordinator*

- (i) Reassignment of one position of Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General Political (ASG) as Mission Coordinator (ASG) pursuant to Security Council resolution [2542 \(2020\)](#);
- (j) Establishment of one position of Chief of Section, Programme Management (P-5), to lead the mine action component in UNSMIL. This is not a new function; the chief of the mine action component has to date been contracted by UNOPS as an implementing partner for UNMAS, funded from the Mission's budget. The proposed establishment of this position in the Mission's staffing table is to ensure Secretariat leadership of the mine action programme and increase the accountability, effectiveness and efficiency of the services provided by UNMAS to the Mission. This is in alignment with the recommendations of OIOS and the Board of Auditors, which called on UNMAS to reduce dependency on UNOPS and increase efforts to directly implement aspects of the mine action programmes;
- (k) Reclassification and redeployment of one position of Political Affairs Officer (P-4) from the Office of the Resident Coordinator as a Special Assistant (P-3) in the Office of Mission Coordinator, to provide the Mission Coordinator with sufficient support;

*Office of the Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator*

- (l) Reassignment of one position of Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (ASG) as Resident Coordinator (ASG), in line with Security Council resolution [2542 \(2020\)](#);

*Office of the Chief of Staff*

- (m) Reassignment of one position of Administrative Assistant (Field Service) from the Office of the Special Envoy as a Protocol Assistant (Field Service) in the Office of the Chief of Staff, to address the need to have a dedicated focal point for managing engagements with the mission area Host Governments (Libya and Tunisia), as well as provide protocol assistance to the Special Envoy, the Mission Coordinator and United Nations senior officials during visits to the mission area and assist in organizing high-level official meetings with the local authorities or official functions as required;

- (n) Redeployment of one position of Translator, Arabic (P-3) from Tunis to Tripoli to strengthen the capacity of the Translation and Interpretation Unit, taking into account the anticipated increase in engagements with Libyan interlocutors, with a view to reaching a political solution to the conflict in the country and an end to the political transition process, along with the need to fill the capacity gap resulting from the proposed redeployment of one position of Translator, Arabic (P-3) from Tripoli to Geneva to provide translation support for the Special Envoy;

*Joint Analysis and Reporting Unit*

- (o) Redeployment of one position of Information Analyst, Political (P-3) from Tunis to Benghazi to enhance the Unit's capability to expand its network of engagement in the region and support more regular monitoring and in-depth analysis of the political, socioeconomic and security situation, with a view to enhancing the Mission's situational awareness of developments in the eastern parts of the country;

*Political Affairs Service*

- (p) Redeployment of three positions: one Senior Political Affairs Officer (P-5), one Political Affairs Officer (P-3) and one Assistant Political Affairs Officer (National Professional Officer) from Tripoli to Benghazi, to ensure more effective and expanded engagement with interlocutors and enhance situational awareness of developments in the eastern region, taking into account the ongoing political and security developments on the ground, as well as anticipated increases in programmatic and operational activities in the eastern region, in line with mandate implementation;

*Human Rights, Rule of Law and Transitional Justice Division*

- (q) Redeployment of one position of Senior Rule of Law Officer (P-5) from Tunis to Tripoli, to enhance engagement with Libyan authorities and interlocutors, owing to closer proximity, as well as to ensure more effective central coordination, oversight, support, and capacity-building initiatives of the Division;

*Security Institutions Service*

- (r) Reassignment of one Border Monitor (P-3) from Tripoli as a Security Sector Reform Officer to Benghazi to address security imperatives that have arisen following ongoing developments in the security track, in particular the agreement for a complete and permanent ceasefire in Libya of October 2020, in direct support of mandate implementation;

*Security Information and Operations Centre*

- (s) Redeployment of one Associate Field Security Coordination Officer (P-2) from Tripoli to Tunis, to provide security coordination and oversight support in Tunis, taking into account the increase in workload and coordination activities between the Mission, the Department of Safety and Security in Tunisia and host authority security interlocutors, as well as achieving compliance with United Nations security management system accountability, mandatory reporting processes and managerial oversight on behalf of the Chief Security Adviser of the Integrated Security Workforce for Libya;

*Office of the Chief of Mission Support*

- (t) Redeployment of one Aviation Security Assistant (Field Service) from Tripoli to Tunis to address the identified need to have the oversight capacity located in the host country of the Unit. Given that the Mission's Aviation Unit is currently located in Tunis, the redeployment would ensure that the incumbent carries out his or her oversight duties in real time, allowing for effective and timely Mission response to issues that may arise, with a view to ensuring full

compliance with applicable policies and standards and ensuring the smooth functioning of the day-to-day aviation safety activities of the Unit;

- (u) Redeployment of one Administrative Assistant (Local Level) from Tunis to Tripoli, to strengthen the support capacity of the Office with respect to the administrative activities of mission support;

*Centralized Warehouse and Requisition Unit*

- (v) Reassignment of one position of Property Management Assistant (Field Service) as Receiving and Inspection Assistant (Field Service), based on an identified need to strengthen supply chain management and service delivery efforts.

246. A vacancy rate of 24.3 per cent has been applied to the estimates for international positions based on the actual average vacancy rate in 2020, while a vacancy rate of 50 per cent has been applied to the estimates for the two positions proposed to be established in 2022. Vacancy rates of 60 per cent and 27 per cent have been applied for National Professional Officer and Local Level staff, respectively. Vacancy rates of 16.7 and 28.6 per cent have been applied to the estimates for United Nations Volunteers and government-provided personnel, respectively. The estimates for United Nations Guard Unit personnel are based on the assumption of full deployment.
247. The increase in requirements for 2022 compared with the appropriation for 2021 is attributable to the increase under: (a) civilian personnel costs related resulting mainly from: (i) the application of a higher percentage of common staff costs to international positions, based on recent expenditure patterns; (ii) additional requirements related to the proposed redeployment of six existing positions from Libya to Geneva; (iii) the proposed establishment of two new international positions; and (iv) national positions, resulting from the application of lower vacancy rates, based on recent incumbency levels, and the revision of the average salary costs used as a basis for the estimates; and (b) military and police personnel costs, resulting mainly from higher costs for emplacement, repatriation and rotation from the country of origin of the United Nations Guard Unit to Libya, based on recent expenditure patterns. The increase in requirements was offset in part by reduced requirements for operational costs, mainly in (a) facilities and infrastructure, owing to a lower volume of acquisitions for equipment and supplies due to stock availability; (b) communications and information technology, owing to a lower volume of acquisition of equipment and spare parts, as well as reduced requirements for public information and publication services; and (c) other supplies, services and equipment, owing to lower requirements for (i) mine detection and mine clearing services in connection with the proposal to establish the mine action programme manager position on the Mission's staffing table; (ii) rations, due to projected availability of stock; and (iii) freight and related costs, owing to an overall lower volume of acquisitions planned for 2022.
248. In its resolution [2570 \(2021\)](#), the Security Council expanded the Mission's mandate to new areas of work. Due to the timing of the resolution, which was adopted on 16 April 2021, the Secretariat is still assessing the resource implications of implementing the additional mandated activities, and will present proposals in that regard at a later stage, through the established procedures, as necessary.

**Extrabudgetary resources**

249. In 2021, no extrabudgetary resources were available or are projected for 2022 for the United Nations Support Mission in Libya.



## 8. United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia

(\$60,669,700)

### Foreword

Colombia has gone through year 5 of the 15-year time frame envisioned for the implementation of the entirety of the landmark Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace, signed between the Government and the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP). The implementation of the Agreement has thus far produced noteworthy results in several key sections, all of which are deeply intertwined, owing to the commitment of the parties, as well as to the active participation of Colombian actors and the decisive support of the United Nations and the international community at large.

Examples of the significant progress we have witnessed so far include a nationwide decrease in conflict-related crimes, such as homicide and kidnapping; an increasingly robust reintegration process whereby over 13,000 men and women former combatants are building a new life alongside local communities; an innovative transitional justice system that is setting the groundwork for reconciliation through work to uphold victims’ rights to truth, justice and reparation; the steady implementation of development programmes aimed at bringing opportunities to communities affected by poverty and violence; and the broadening of spaces for political participation for civil society and political parties, including the People’s Alternative Revolutionary Force (FARC) political party, which emanated from the Final Agreement and was renamed Comunes<sup>8</sup> in early 2021.

Besides the many reasons to remain hopeful, nonetheless, peace implementation still faces significant challenges. The most prominent of them is the incessant violence perpetrated by illegal armed groups against communities, their leaders and former FARC-EP combatants in conflict-affected areas. This and other obstacles were compounded by the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, the effects of which have been felt in all spheres of peace implementation, including the two areas of the mandate of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia: sections 3.2 and 3.4 of the Final Agreement related to reintegration and security guarantees. As Colombians will certainly continue to feel the economic and social effects of the pandemic, it is of the utmost importance that the parties and all actors view the comprehensive implementation of the Final Agreement as instrumental not only to peace consolidation, but also to the ambitious pandemic recovery efforts.

Under these exceptional conditions, the Verification Mission is focusing on five priority areas, namely, ensuring the protection and security for former combatants, conflict-affected communities, social leaders and human rights defenders; ensuring the sustainability of the reintegration process; consolidating State presence; strengthening constructive dialogue between the parties; and promoting reconciliation. Decisive work on those priorities and constant commitment by all parties will be even more important to protect and build upon the gains attained and to ensure a continued and strengthened implementation of the Agreement in the midst of the electoral cycle leading up to the 2022 presidential and congressional elections.

Even under these circumstances, I am confident that the commitment of the parties, Colombian society, State entities and local authorities, and the resilience of communities, will help overcome the challenges inherent to the complex task of building lasting peace, as well as those brought on by the pandemic. In this formidable task, the support of the United Nations will remain as strong as ever.

*(Signed)* Carlos **Ruiz Massieu**  
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Colombia and  
Head of the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia

<sup>8</sup> Throughout the present document, the political party that emanated from the Final Agreement will be referred to as FARC for the 2020 period and as Comunes for 2022, reflecting the recent name change.

## **A. Proposed programme plan for 2022 and programme performance for 2020**

### **Overall orientation**

#### **Mandates and background**

250. The United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia was mandated by the Security Council, at the request of the Government of Colombia and the former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People’s Army (FARC-EP) guerrilla organization, to verify the following two key aspects of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace, adopted in 2016 by the Government of Colombia and FARC-EP: (a) the reintegration of FARC-EP members into political, economic and social life (section 3.2 of the Agreement); and (b) the implementation of personal and collective security and protection measures for ex-combatants and comprehensive security and protection programmes for the communities and organizations in the territories (section 3.4 of the Agreement). The mandate is defined in Security Council resolution [2366 \(2017\)](#) and was subsequently renewed by the Council in its resolutions [2435 \(2018\)](#), [2487 \(2019\)](#), [2545 \(2020\)](#) and [2574 \(2021\)](#), with the latter expanding the mandate of the Verification Mission to verifying compliance with the sentences to be issued by the Special Jurisdiction for Peace.
251. The Verification Mission works closely with the two parties, including in the framework of the relevant verification bodies established by the Final Agreement, in particular, the Commission for the Follow-up, Promotion and Verification of the Implementation of the Final Agreement, the National Reintegration Council and the National Commission on Security Guarantees, as well as with members of the United Nations country team, local and departmental authorities and civil society. The work of the Verification Mission will remain of vital significance in 2022 to support the parties in the implementation of the reintegration process and of measures to extend security and protection to vulnerable communities, social leaders, human rights defenders and former combatants, and in the comprehensive implementation of the mechanisms and sections of the Final Agreement that are deeply interconnected and mutually reinforcing to the ones under the mandate of the Verification Mission.

### **Programme of work**

#### **Objective**

252. The objective, to which this Mission contributes, is to advance the effective implementation of the provisions of the Final Agreement for Ending the Conflict and Building a Stable and Lasting Peace concerning reintegration and security guarantees.

#### **Strategy**

253. To contribute to the objective, the Mission will continue to apply a proactive approach to verification, which includes advocacy, good offices and close engagement with the parties to the Final Agreement, relevant institutions and authorities at the national, regional and local levels. That approach includes the Mission’s participation, jointly with the parties, in key forums and institutions created for the implementation of the Final Agreement, the promotion of constructive dialogue and trust-building between the Government and Comunes. These tripartite mechanisms address pending issues related to peace implementation and maintain constant coordination and dialogue with key interlocutors, including actors across the political spectrum, civil society, the private sector and the international community, to foster support to the implementation of the Final Agreement.

254. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in the following outcomes:
- (a) Increased trust between the parties to the Final Agreement; intensified efforts to ensure the sustainability of the reintegration process; sustained progress regarding concrete issues impeding successful reintegration, including access to land for the consolidation of former territorial areas for training and reintegration, as well as for former combatants' productive projects and for housing solutions; the promotion of gender-sensitive reintegration and the active participation of women former combatants; and the provision by the Government of more sustainable solutions for former combatants residing inside and outside of former territorial areas for training and reintegration;
  - (b) Enhanced State capacity and responsiveness to better prevent and investigate attacks against former combatants, social leaders and human rights defenders, as well as increased trust and understanding between the parties regarding security and protection mechanisms, taking into consideration the particular needs of women, children and former combatants of ethnic origin, as well as the needs of indigenous peoples and other communities at risk.

### **External factors for 2022**

255. The overall programme plan for 2022 is based on the following assumptions:
- (a) Continued international support for the close engagement of the United Nations and the Mission in the peace process;
  - (b) The Government's focus on implementation of the Final Agreement will continue after the 2022 presidential and congressional elections;
  - (c) Increased violence caused by illegal armed groups during the electoral year, requiring the further strengthening of engagement with local authorities and security institutions, as well as with the Office of the Attorney-General.
256. With regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, the programme plan is based on the assumption that the proposed deliverables and activities for 2022 will be feasible to implement. However, if the pandemic were to continue to have an impact on the planned deliverables and activities, these would be adjusted during 2022 within the scope of the overall objectives, strategies and mandates. Any such adjustments would be reported as part of the programme performance information.
257. The Mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. For example, the Mission's gender team will work closely with all the Mission's components, both at headquarters and in the field, to ensure an adequate implementation of the Mission's gender directive and gender parity strategy. The gender team will provide guidance and support to the verification teams to ensure that the specific needs of female former FARC-EP members are fully incorporated into programme design, implementation and monitoring with a focus on the security guarantees for women social leaders.
258. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the Mission will continue to undertake extensive engagement and liaison with international, national and subnational actors supporting the implementation of the Final Agreement. At the international level, the Mission will continue to engage closely with the diplomatic community and regional organizations to identify synergies and areas of mutual interest and support to peace implementation. At the national and subnational levels, the Mission will maintain its extensive engagement with a broad range of political, civil society and private sector actors, including community, religious, youth, women's, ethnic and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex organizations, and the transitional justice institutions. In Colombia, where civil society is extremely developed and highly engaged in the peace process, this engagement and cooperation with other entities remains an essential and invaluable aspect of the Mission's work. The Mission will also continue to bolster its relationships with departmental and local authorities, as they play an increasingly active role in the peace process, particularly as they gain more responsibilities in the reintegration process and security guarantees for communities.

259. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Mission will continue to work closely with the United Nations country team and the Resident Coordinator's Office. The work of the country team is guided by the United Nations Sustainable Development Cooperation Framework, signed at the beginning of 2020. Through coordination in joint mechanisms at different levels, the Mission is able to share conflict analysis and encourage coherent action and engagement across the peace and security and development pillars. This close working relationship is not only undertaken at the national level, where the Mission participates in the regular meetings of the country team, but also at the local level, where staff work closely with the teams deployed by different agencies, funds and programmes. Moreover, in the spirit of sustaining peace and contributing to long-term stability, the Mission and the country team have used synergies in the implementation of productive projects for former FARC-EP members and have worked together on efforts related to security guarantees, as well as on the implementation of projects carried out by the Peacebuilding Fund and the Multi-Partner Trust Fund.

### **Evaluation activities**

260. The Mission initiated a comprehensive staffing review that is expected to add significant value to its continuous process of self-reflection and its efforts to align its staffing resources and structures as best as possible to its mandate priorities, in a constantly evolving context.
261. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs will lead a systematic assessment with an overall purpose of improving the gender-sensitivity of the analyses developed.

### **Programme performance in 2020**

#### **Fostering shared local ownership of security guarantees for former FARC-EP members and communities<sup>9</sup>**

262. The Mission continued its active participation in and advocacy for the security guarantees mechanisms created by the Final Agreement at the national and local levels. It also continued to work with and support closely the Government and State institutions in charge of the prevention, protection and investigation of the security guarantees of former FARC-EP combatants, and to support the relationship between former combatants and those institutions. Furthermore, the Mission advocated for the participation of former combatants as analysts and liaison officers in tripartite mechanisms at the regional and local levels, dedicated to promoting a comprehensive vision of security matters.

#### *Progress towards the attainment of the objective and performance measure*

263. The Mission closely supported former FARC-EP combatants in improving their relationship with the Ministry of Defence and the Armed Forces and advocated for the implementation of their security guarantees, including a collective approach. Also, the Mission worked closely with the Office of the Attorney-General and its Special Investigations Unit to advocate for the investigation of cases of violence against former combatants. The above-mentioned work contributed to keeping the tripartite security guarantees mechanisms functioning despite the pandemic, when the security risks were increasing. The tripartite mechanism served as a standing forum to analyse those risks and take appropriate measures. They played a critical role in coordinating, for example, the evacuations of former combatants under threat while a national lockdown was in place. As a result of the pandemic and related movement restrictions, access to rural communities and local authorities, as well as other interlocutors relevant to the verification of security guarantees, became increasingly difficult, which diminished the Mission's capacity to collect and analyse information crucial to advocate for the implementation of security guarantees for former combatants, social leaders, human rights defenders

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<sup>9</sup> As reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020 (A/74/6 (Sect.3)/Add.4).

and communities, as well as for investigations into crimes against them. However, amid the pandemic, the Mission continued to participate in and helped create virtual spaces for coordination and information exchange among all relevant actors, which contributed to the continuation of the mechanism and processes established and the mitigation of security risks for former combatants, social leaders and communities. The achievements met the planned target of increasing the coverage of the subnational security guarantees mechanisms and the communication between FARC former combatants and the State institutions, as reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020.

Table 38  
Performance measure

2018 (actual)	2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)
Security guarantee mechanisms and institutions established at the national level contribute to increased coordination and communication between the parties	Expansion of subnational security guarantee mechanisms across the country and the resulting increased coordination and communication with local actors contribute to raised awareness of the need to shift from an individual protection approach to a collective security guarantees perspective with a community focus	Increased coverage of subnational security guarantee mechanisms attracts wide and informed participation from local actors, allowing for fluid communication and coordination between them and the State and enhancing the shift from individual to individual and collective security approaches
The establishment of such mechanisms in selected regions sets the ground for similar improvements in engagement with stakeholders in prioritized areas		

#### **Expanding political and geographic engagement in socioeconomic reintegration<sup>10</sup>**

264. The Mission developed a joint strategy with the National Reintegration Agency to engage with newly elected local governments so they would include socioeconomic reincorporation issues into their development plans, promoting the expansion of the political and geographical engagement in socioeconomic reintegration. The Mission also visited the most relevant local authorities to create commitment to the comprehensive implementation of the Final Agreement.

#### *Progress towards the attainment of the objective and performance measure*

265. The above-mentioned work contributed to 198 municipalities, hosting 84 per cent of the former combatant population, having included relevant elements of socioeconomic reintegration into their development plans. The inclusion of these elements demonstrates the result of the advocacy of the Mission to expand the political and geographic engagement in socioeconomic reintegration. Moreover, three new local working groups on reintegration were established in Risaralda and Tolima departments, and one in the capital district of Bogotá, where 800 former combatants are undergoing their socioeconomic reintegration. The existing 15 regional and municipal coordination mechanisms play a critical role in the reintegration process by supporting socioeconomic initiatives at the local level and, in some cases, supporting relocation due to security threats, as was the case in Antioquia, Meta and Caquetá. Amid the COVID-19 related restrictions, the Mission maintained a permanent engagement with the members of the National Reintegration Council, regional reintegration committees and local and regional administrations to continue its advocacy, and created virtual spaces for remote exchange and cooperation that helped advance socioeconomic reintegration. These achievements met the planned target of including reintegration components into development plans around the country and demonstrated the political will of key local authorities to support the socioeconomic reintegration process.

<sup>10</sup> As reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020 (A/74/6 (Sect.3)/Add.4).

Table 39  
Performance measure

2018 (actual)	2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)
Initiation of regional committees for reintegration and the sharing of best practices and lessons learned among them	Growth in number and scope of regional reintegration committees, with full support of the national Government and the engagement of new diverse regional actors in reintegration and rural development	Regional reintegration committees are functioning, with high levels of local engagement and support, and appropriate and differentiated projects are initiated in most areas where significant numbers of former FARC-EP members are living. New local and regional development plans include reintegration aspects

### Impact of COVID-19 on programme delivery

266. Owing to the impact of COVID-19 during 2020, the Mission temporarily adapted its political and verification activities to virtual and remote modus operandi that facilitated continuous engagement with the different stakeholders during the first part of the year, but also posed challenges in terms of verification and trust-building, particularly in remote rural areas. In the second part of the year, the Mission gradually reinitiated visits to the former territorial areas for training and reintegration and other reintegration areas, as well as local-level activities promoting reconciliation and dialogue, while strictly respecting COVID-19-related norms and protocols.
267. At the same time, the Mission identified activities to support the Government, the United Nations country team and communities on issues related to COVID-19, within the overall scope of its objectives. Within the framework of the inter-agency working group on reintegration, the country team and the Verification Mission coordinated a joint effort to support former combatants in the context of the pandemic in three key areas: health (led by the Pan American Health Organization and the World Health Organization (WHO)), socioeconomic reintegration and food security. Following the outbreak of the pandemic, the Verification Mission, along with the country team, provided support to the Agency for Reintegration and Normalization, the Ministry of Health and former FARC-EP combatants in their efforts to coordinate the response to COVID-19 cases among former combatants, raise awareness about preventive measures and coordinate actions to reinforce former combatants' access to health services. These included holding coordination meetings between the national and local levels, both in response to new cases and to prevent contagion in the former territorial areas for training and reintegration, where former combatants continue to advance their reintegration efforts. In the context of the pandemic, the Mission also facilitated the delivery of humanitarian aid and biosafety kits to vulnerable communities, including populations of former combatants, upon request from the Government, such as in Mandé (Antioquia), Vista Hermosa (Meta), and Acandí, Nuquí and Bahía Solano (Chocó). In coordination with UNDP, the Mission provided support in tailoring projects of former combatants to produce face masks for communities.

### Planned results for 2022

#### Strengthened investigations into attacks against former Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – People's Army combatants, social leaders and communities

268. Since the signing of the Final Agreement, the Mission has verified 262 killings of former FARC-EP members (including of 7 women), 73 of which occurred in 2020. In addition, the Mission has verified 59 attempted homicides (including of 3 women) and 20 disappearances (all men) during the same period. Most of those killings were concentrated outside the former territorial areas for training and reintegration, in rural areas, where there is a convergence of weak State presence, illegal economies and poverty. Since the laying down of arms process concluded in 2017, those areas have also been

progressively occupied by illegal armed groups and criminal organizations, causing increased insecurity and affecting communities, including former combatants and their families.

269. The Mission will continue to work closely with State authorities (including the Attorney-General's Office, the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence) and Comunes, both at the national and regional levels, to strengthen State measures aimed at preventing such crimes and to strengthen investigations into the criminal organizations behind the attacks against former combatants. One important element is the strengthening of the Tripartite Protection and Security Mechanism at the national and local levels (comprising the subdirectorate of the National Protection Unit specialized in protecting former FARC-EP combatants, the Mission and national security forces) before, during and after the 2022 elections. Another element continues to be the tripartite working group on investigations into attacks against former combatants, co-led by the Mission, Comunes and the Special Investigations Unit of the Office of the Attorney-General, to reinforce trust-building among the parties. The working group considers measures to strengthen access to justice for former combatants and improve risk analysis in response to the above challenges. Likewise, through advocacy and outreach activities with key stakeholders, the Mission will continue to encourage the National Commission on Security Guarantees to meet more regularly and develop a policy to dismantle criminal organizations and enhance the security of former FARC-EP combatants, social leaders and human rights defenders, indigenous peoples and rural communities. Furthermore, the Mission will continue to advocate for the adequate participation of women in the Commission.

*Lessons learned and planned change*

270. The lesson for the Verification Mission was that security guarantees-related coordination mechanisms addressing reported cases of violence against former combatants – in order to identify threats and violent patterns that affect reintegration and overall peace implementation – work best when they are set up in a tripartite manner including the Government, Comunes and the Mission. In applying the lesson, the Mission will continue to support the tripartite working groups at the regional level to strengthen investigations into and analysis of the criminal organizations carrying out attacks, increase former combatants' access to justice through specific programmes and capacity-building workshops in prioritized areas, improve information management for follow-up and develop a holistic analysis of the threats and patterns behind the attacks.

*Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective, and performance measure*

271. This work is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated by the prioritization of preventive measures at the local level, an expansion of investigations into the attacks, and progress in the dismantling of criminal organizations affecting the reintegration process and peace implementation, through the implementation of public policies.

Table 40  
Performance measure

2018 (actual)	2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (planned)	2022 (planned)
–	Strengthened tripartite mechanisms and prioritization of investigations into the attacks against former FARC-EP combatants	Expansion of investigations into and increased rates of successful judicial prosecutions of the criminal organizations behind the attacks,	Progress in dismantling criminal organizations affecting the reintegration process and peace implementation, through the	Strengthened tripartite mechanisms and prioritization of preventive measures at the local level to prevent the attacks against former combatants

<i>2018 (actual)</i>	<i>2019 (actual)</i>	<i>2020 (actual)</i>	<i>2021 (planned)</i>	<i>2022 (planned)</i>
	Establishment of a regional peace promoters programme to encourage in-depth analysis and investigations regarding the attacks against former combatants	including both material and intellectual authors	implementation of public policies	Expansion of investigations into and increased rates of successful judicial prosecutions of the criminal organizations behind the attacks, including both material and intellectual authors  Progress in dismantling criminal organizations affecting the reintegration process and peace implementation, through the implementation of public policies

#### **Accelerating efforts towards a sustainable reintegration**

272. As the reintegration process enters a consolidation phase, the focus is turning towards ensuring its sustainability. More than three years after the laying down of weapons was completed, over 13,000 men and women continue to strive to reintegrate civilian life, notwithstanding the challenges faced in the process. Almost 2,600 persons pursue their collective reintegration process in former territorial areas for training and reintegration, and the remaining 9,600 (approximately 70 per cent of accredited former combatants) do so outside of those areas, including in urban settings. The latter still have limited access to some reintegration benefits, especially those who pursue collective reintegration in remote rural areas. Insecurity in former conflict areas has had an increasing impact on the reintegration process, in one case forcing the relocation of a former territorial area for training and reintegration and of a successful productive project in 2020. It is more important than ever to continue to support those who remain committed to the process by offering them sustainable economic opportunities, land and housing, and by setting the foundations of reconciliation in the more than 500 municipalities where they are currently pursuing their reintegration. Engagement with communities and local authorities, which have proved to be key actors to advance reintegration, remains central in that regard.
273. The Mission will continue to work closely with both the Agency for Reintegration and Normalization and Comunes, as well as with regional and local-level actors, to promote efforts towards the sustainability of the reintegration process, including by ensuring that all former combatants – regardless of their locations – continue to have access to reintegration benefits, including land, housing, health care, basic services, viable income-generating opportunities, programmes and services adapted to the specific needs of women and those with special needs, and security and protection. The Mission’s engagement and advocacy have contributed to ensuring the allocation of resources for the purchase of land for former territorial areas for training and reintegration, to an increase in productive initiatives benefitting former combatants pursuing collective reintegration outside of the former territorial area for training and reintegration, and to a meaningful engagement of local authorities and communities in supporting the reintegration process.

*Lessons learned and planned change*

274. The lesson learned for the Mission was that it required flexibility to adjust to the new realities of the pandemic, which posed challenges and brought to the fore the vulnerability of productive projects and the limited access to health care of former combatants who reside in the most remote rural areas. In applying the lesson, the Mission will continue to step up its advocacy to bring attention to these areas within the framework of the tripartite mechanisms, including by working with the Agency for Reintegration and Normalization, the Ministry of Health and Comunes to prevent and respond to the COVID-19 contagion among former combatants, and to align those efforts with those led by United Nations agencies, funds and programmes in rural areas. Similarly, the Mission advocated for mitigation measures, including improving former combatants' connectivity, to ensure the continuity of technical assistance. The Mission will continue to ensure close coordination with the United Nations system in that regard with a view to optimizing resources. In addition, the Mission will increase its efforts to analyse the impact of limited access to health care on the overall reintegration process. It will further undertake all efforts to return to in-person verification to overcome the challenges faced when performing its functions remotely, in particular concerning the verification of socioeconomic reintegration in remote rural areas.

*Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective and performance measure*

275. This work is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated by a significant increase in the number of former combatants residing in and outside the former territorial areas for training and reintegration benefitting from State-sponsored measures to guarantee sustainable reintegration solutions for them and for their host communities.

Table 41  
Performance measure

2018 (actual)	2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (planned)	2022 (planned)
–	Increase in the number of State-sponsored collective reintegration projects for former combatants reflecting progress in the socioeconomic reintegration of former combatants inside and outside of former territorial areas of training and reintegration	Significant increase in the number of State-sponsored collective reintegration projects for former combatants, fostering the consolidation of socioeconomic integration of former combatants throughout Colombia	All State-sponsored collective reintegration projects take into consideration elements to ensure their sustainability, including access to markets, land and credit, technical assistance, strengthening of former combatants' productive associations and ensuring the active participation of women	Significant increase in the number of former combatants and their families benefiting from State-sponsored measures to guarantee sustainable reintegration solutions in and outside former territorial areas for training and reintegration

**Deliverables**

276. Table 42 below lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2020–2022 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 42  
**Deliverables for the period 2020–2022, by category and subcategory**

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2020 actual</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>
<b>A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies</b>				
<b>Parliamentary documentation</b> (number of documents)				
1. Report of the Secretary-General for the Security Council	4	4	4	4
<b>B. Generation and transfer of knowledge</b>				
<b>Publications</b> (number of publications)				
2. Thematic reports on security guarantees	–	–	2	2
<b>Technical materials</b> (number of materials)				
3. Verification manual, including a gender-sensitive verification guide	1	1	1	1
<b>C. Substantive deliverables</b>				
<b>Good offices:</b> provision of good offices to implement provisions in sections 3.2 and 3.4 of the Final Agreement; good offices to promote problem-solving, confidence-building and unity of effort in response to implementation challenges in the field; good offices and advocacy on the establishment and continuity of spaces and forums that bring together relevant counterparts and stakeholders for productive dialogue and decision-making; good offices and advocacy on visits from key stakeholders to reincorporation areas and other relevant locations where former combatants are developing productive projects as part of their reintegration process; contributions from a substantive angle to support dialogue in seven decentralized sessions of the National Reintegration Council.				
<b>Consultation, advice and advocacy:</b> consultations and advice to identify, prevent or resolve difficulties and challenges in the conditions for increased political participation by the Comunes political party, reintegration of former combatants, improving security and protection measures and conditions, and increased participation in the implementation of the Final Agreement.				
<b>Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions:</b> fact-finding missions to verify the reintegration process and security conditions in field locations, as well as to follow up on particular cases related to sections 3.2 and 3.4 of the Final Agreement.				
<b>Databases and substantive digital materials:</b> tripartite database of transit to legality (OACP, Comunes, Mission); verification reporting system at local, regional and national level (phase 1: repository, phase 2: forms automation, phase 3: text-mining tools); advance of implementation of Final Agreement follow-up tool at the local, regional and national levels; databases and information system for indicators related with verification context; database of cases against former FARC-EP combatants, relatives, political party members, social leaders, and ex-combatants detentions; tripartite productive projects database (Agency for Reintegration and Normalization, Comunes, Mission).				
<b>D. Communication deliverables</b>				
<b>Outreach programmes, special events and information materials:</b> information materials for former FARC-EP combatants and communities explaining the progress of the Mission’s mandate and the implementation of the Final Agreement; commemoration of five years of peace implementation in Colombia and results of the Verification Mission engagement; outreach programme to increase the visibility of the reintegration process and security guarantees measures; workshops with local communities and former combatants on reintegration process and security guarantees progress; outreach programmes during high-level visits to Colombia (Secretary-General and Security Council); production and dissemination/broadcasting of thematic videos in support of Mission engagement areas; events to promote reconciliation between ex-combatants and local communities; brochures, flyers, flipcharts, infographics, inserts, profiles and promotional material on the Mission’s mandate and developments; outreach programme in eight regions through radio and television broadcasting to ensure that relevant information from the Mission is shared widely through local, regional and national media; partnership with the United Nations country team and United Nations information centre to share relevant information on the progress of the Mission’s mandate and the implementation of the Final Agreement.				
<b>External and media relations:</b> conferences with key media partners directors and editors at the local, regional and national levels; press conferences, press briefings and written summaries to share with external partners, as relevant; journalists, community media and private sector visits to reintegration areas and former combatants’ productive projects; and quarterly high-level briefings on the Secretary-General’s reports with journalists, civil society, local authorities and key stakeholders at Mission headquarters in Bogotá and in the Regional Offices.				
<b>Digital platforms and multimedia content:</b> on a daily basis, create, develop and disseminate information related to the Mission’s mandate and developments to local, national and international media, as well as through the social media channels available and United Nations information platforms; animated podcast series showcasing the Mission’s mandated activities, special reports and analysis on big data from our social media channels (Twitter, Facebook and Instagram) to help improve dissemination of Mission activities; specific campaigns and products for particular social media platforms to show the impact of the Mission’s work.				

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2022

### Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 43

#### Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2020	2021	2022		Variance
	Expenditure (1)	Appropriation (2)	Total requirements (3)	Non-recurrent requirements (4)	2022 vs. 2021 Increase/(decrease) (5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	3 717.7	4 125.1	4 140.4	–	15.3
Civilian personnel costs	31 618.7	33 227.5	33 398.1	–	170.6
Operational costs	23 965.3	25 589.9	23 131.2	–	(2 458.7)
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>59 301.7</b>	<b>62 942.5</b>	<b>60 669.7</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>(2 272.8)</b>

Table 44

#### Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff				
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter- national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	Total
Approved 2021	1	1	1	6	22	38	46	1	116	45	1	162	78	80	131	451
Proposed 2022	1	1	1	6	22	37	46	1	115	44	1	160	80	82	131	453
<b>Change</b>	–	–	–	–	–	(1)	–	–	(1)	(1)	–	(2)	2	2	–	2

277. The proposed resource requirements for 2022 for the Verification Mission amount to \$60,669,700 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the deployment of 120 military observers (\$4,140,400); salaries and common staff costs (\$33,398,100) for 160 international positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 6 D-1, 22 P-5, 37 P-4, 46 P-3, 1 P-2, 44 Field Service and 1 General Service), 162 national positions (80 National Professional Officer and 82 Local level) and 131 United Nations Volunteers, as well as operational costs (\$23,131,200), comprising the costs for consultants and consulting services (\$296,900), official travel (\$1,591,300), facilities and infrastructure (\$5,909,100), ground transportation (\$2,947,200), air operations (\$5,252,300), marine operations (\$321,600), communications and information technology (\$4,826,300), medical (\$511,100), and other supplies, services and equipment (\$1,475,400).

278. In 2022, the following changes are proposed to the staffing complement: the establishment of three positions, the abolishment of one position, and the conversion of one position:

#### *Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General*

- (a) Establishment of one position of Gender Affairs Officer (National Professional Officer), to perform activities related to the verification of security guarantees, security and protection of women, girls and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex persons, and in the implementation of the actions of the Mission's gender directive, particularly on gender-sensitive analysis and reporting and capacity-building;

*Logistics Operations Unit*

- (b) Abolishment of one position of Chief of Unit, Logistics (P-4), following the closure of several camps and changes in the mission's footprint;

*Regional Office in Cali*

- (c) Establishment of one position of Administrative Officer (National Professional Officer), to provide primary advice and guidance to the Head of Office of Cali Region on all logistics and administrative matters, and to monitor and coordinate day-to-day operational support;

*Medical Team*

- (d) Establishment of one position of Medical Assistant (Local level), to coordinate the authorizations of health services, receive and validate the collection of accounts for clinics, hospitals, medical evacuation, ambulance services and other services contracted by the Mission and undertake administrative activities;

*Procurement Unit*

- (e) Conversion of one position of Procurement Assistant (Field Service) to Procurement Assistant (Local level), to benefit from the knowledge of market conditions, industry practices and language to be brought by the incumbent of the nationalized position.

- 279. A vacancy rate of 17 per cent has been applied to the estimates for continuing international positions, taking into account the average vacancy rates in 2020. A vacancy rate of 12 per cent has been applied to the estimates for continuing national positions, while vacancy rates of 50 per cent and 35 per cent have been applied, respectively, to the two National Professional Officer and one Local level positions proposed for establishment in 2022. A vacancy rate of 1 per cent has been applied to the estimates for international United Nations Volunteers. A vacancy rate of 3 per cent has been applied to the estimates for military observers.
- 280. The decrease in requirements for 2022 compared with the appropriation for 2021 is attributable mainly to the following: (a) air operations, owing to the establishment of a new contractual agreement resulting in a reduction in the contract amount for the rental and operation of the aircraft services; (b) facilities and infrastructure, owing to revised contractual agreement of lease-hold properties to include maintenance and utilities charges within the rental amount and no additional acquisition of generators and electrical equipment; (c) international staff costs, owing to the application of lower percentage of common staff costs to estimates for international staff costs, based on 2020 expenditure patterns; offset by (d) national staff costs, owing to the application of a new salary scale level for both National Professional Officers and Local level staff; and the proposed establishment of 2 National Professional Officer and 1 Local level positions.
- 281. In its resolution [2574 \(2021\)](#), the Security Council expanded the Verification Mission's mandate to new areas of work. Due to the timing of the resolution, which was adopted on 11 May 2021, the Secretariat is still assessing the resource implications of implementing the additional mandated activities and will present proposals in that respect at a later stage, through the established procedures, as necessary.

**Extrabudgetary resources**

- 282. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2021 or are projected for the Verification Mission for 2022.

## 9. United Nations Mission to Support the Hudaydah Agreement

(*\$45,559,100*)

### Foreword

The United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) brings together a variety of personnel, including military, police and civilians, to support the Yemeni parties in implementing the Stockholm Agreement, in particular the Agreement on the City of Hudaydah and the Ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa (Hudaydah Agreement), reached in Sweden on 13 December 2018. Since its establishment, the Mission has focused on supporting the parties in the implementation of the Agreement and has aimed to establish an appropriate footprint in a highly challenging operational environment to ensure the effective discharge of its mandate.

Despite enormous challenges confronted in 2020, UNMHA continued to adjust its approach and explore different ways to maintain momentum towards the full implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement. UNMHA focused its efforts on supporting the parties in their advancement of the redeployment of forces and strengthening the de-escalation and ceasefire monitoring mechanism and facilitating dialogue on the reopening of humanitarian access routes. Following the suspension by the Government of Yemen of its participation in the Redeployment Coordination Committee and related modalities in April 2020, which coincided with the increasing impact of modalities required to mitigate the threat of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, UNMHA has worked towards a sustained resumption of Agreement mechanisms and support to uphold the ceasefire. The Hudaydah Agreement continues to frame an overall reduction of violence, the protection of the Red Sea ports and increased economic activity within Hudaydah City.

UNMHA remains closely engaged with United Nations entities and international non-governmental organizations operating in Hudaydah Governorate, leveraging its position to facilitate and increase operational space for humanitarian actors. In addition, the Mission collaborates with other partners that are instrumental to the implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement, namely the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, UNDP and the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism.

UNMHA leadership is grateful for the support that it continues to receive from the Security Council, the wide range of partners across the United Nations system and the international community. The Mission's work would not be possible without the high level of dedication and professionalism of its staff, who continue to perform their work in a challenging operational environment.

*(Signed)* Lieutenant General (retired) Abhijit **Guha**  
Head of the United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement and  
Chair of the Redeployment Coordination Committee

## A. Proposed programme plan for 2022 and programme performance for 2020

### Overall orientation

#### Mandates and background

283. The United Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) is responsible for supporting the parties to the Stockholm Agreement (S/2018/1134, annex) in implementing the provisions of the Agreement on the City of Hudaydah and the Ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa (Hudaydah Agreement) and their commitments in accordance with the Hudaydah Agreement. The mandate was defined in Security Council resolution 2452 (2019) for an initial period of six months and extended in resolutions 2481 (2019), 2505 (2020) and, most recently, in resolution 2534 (2020) until 15 July 2021.
284. The mandate of the Mission, as set out in resolution 2534 (2020), is as follows: (a) to lead, and support the functioning of, the Redeployment Coordination Committee, assisted by a secretariat staffed with United Nations personnel, to oversee the governorate-wide ceasefire, redeployment of forces and mine action operations; (b) to monitor the compliance of the parties to the ceasefire in Hudaydah Governorate and the mutual redeployment of forces from the City of Hudaydah and the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa; (c) to work with the parties so that local security forces assure the security of the City of Hudaydah and the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa under Yemeni law; and (d) to facilitate and coordinate United Nations support to assist the parties to fully implement the Hudaydah Agreement.
285. Against a backdrop of sustained conflict causing a devastating humanitarian and security impact, continued efforts to enhance the ceasefire, build confidence between the parties and maintain dialogue to advance the implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement remain a vital foundation to advance peace efforts in Hudaydah and, more broadly, in Yemen. To discharge its mandate, UNMHA will continue to play a lead role in enabling the sustained functioning of the work of the Redeployment Coordination Committee and to support the parties in upholding their commitments to the full implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement, including but not limited to compliance with the ceasefire, redeployment of their forces and fulfilment of the responsibility for the security of Hudaydah and the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa to be undertaken by local security forces, in accordance with the Agreement.
286. The Mission's equal access to and dialogue across both parties through established bases within respective territories on either side of the Hudaydah frontlines and an agreed headquarters location, to strengthen monitoring capacity and enhance ceasefire compliance and oversight of the redeployment of forces, will continue to be central to the work of UNMHA in 2022. To that end, the Mission will focus its efforts on the co-location of international monitors with the joint de-escalation mechanism, joint observation posts and patrolling within the territory of both parties across the Hudaydah Governorate, to include the frontlines, ports and southern districts. Simultaneously, UNMHA will continue in its role as the Chair and facilitator of formal and informal meetings of the Redeployment Coordination Committee, in order to enhance ceasefire compliance and de-escalation, build trust-based dialogue and work towards the full redeployment of forces. The Mission will also focus on strengthened engagement with community-based networks, ensuring an inclusive implementation process and enhanced coordination for humanitarian assistance delivery. Wherever possible, this will include through engagement with diverse representatives of women and young people.

## Programme of work

### Objective

287. The objective, to which this Mission contributes, is to support the parties in the implementation of the Agreement on the City of Hudaydah and the Ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa, and their commitments in accordance with the Hudaydah Agreement.

### Strategy

288. To contribute to the objective, the mission will continue to adapt to the evolving environment across the Hudaydah Governorate to ensure it is best positioned and structured to advance its mandate. To that end, the Mission will establish and/or operate bases to ensure its physical presence and activities in the territories of both parties on either side of the Hudaydah frontlines. The Mission will also advance the incremental operationalization of its headquarters in an agreed location deemed equally accessible to both parties and strategically located so as to best undertake its mandated tasks in the Hudaydah Governorate in furtherance of the Agreement.
289. Noting that the initial Mission design was undertaken in early 2019, the Mission will implement key areas of budget-neutral restructuring to adjust to the existing and evolving operational environment and thus strengthen mandate implementation by adapting a coherent, coordinated and fit-for-purpose approach. This will focus on the Mission having a balanced representation and sustainable capacity in respective territories controlled by each side. It will also enable the fulfilment by the Mission of its good offices role to facilitate sustained dialogue with and between the parties in Aden and Sana'a and leverage the support of regional and international actors to advance the Agreement implementation. Enhanced community-level engagement through tribal leaders, women, young people and civil society groups will further seek to ensure the local population's participation in that same pursuit. UNMHA will also implement a reviewed and cost-neutral adjustment to the Mission support structure to enhance its ability to support the Mission's diverse needs and infrastructural demands effectively.
290. On the Agreement mechanisms, the Mission will lead and support the sustained operation of the Redeployment Coordination Committee as the key oversight body of the Hudaydah Agreement. To that end, the Head of Mission, acting as Chair, will lead regular Committee meetings between the parties at UNMHA headquarters in a location accessible by both parties, or other agreed locations, to oversee and ensure implementation of the following: (a) the full redeployment of forces from Hudaydah City and its ports; (b) the Governorate-wide ceasefire through trust-building dialogue and collaboration; and (c) the provision of security by local security forces within Hudaydah City and its ports in accordance with Yemeni law.
291. The Mission will also continue to strengthen the joint structures previously agreed as part of the framework of the Redeployment Coordination Committee, including the de-escalation mechanism. This will be achieved in part through the 24/7 co-location of UNMHA monitors and appointed liaison officers from both parties at joint observation posts in Hudaydah. UNMHA will also undertake patrols and on-the-ground monitoring in the territories held by the parties on either side of the frontlines and will visit military hotspots across the Governorate. In conjunction with those efforts, the Mission will continue to provide technical expertise to advance demining efforts in Hudaydah City, its ports and minefields in the Governorate.
292. The Mission plans to continue its efforts to ensure the health and safety of all Mission personnel with respect to COVID-19 by working with United Nations Headquarters and the United Nations system in Yemen in taking all possible measures to mitigate risks presented by the disease and related implications for the Mission and local population. During its engagements to advance implementation of the Agreement, the Mission will continue to fully comply with COVID-19 awareness measures and with COVID-19 protocols prescribed by WHO.

293. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in the following outcomes: (a) enhanced mutual trust, confidence and dialogue between the parties to strengthen implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement as a core foundation of the broader peace process; (b) the Mission's equal and sustained access and dialogue across both sides in their respective territories in Hudaydah; (c) strengthened ceasefire implementation across the Governorate and improved security of the local population, including a reduction in casualties resulting from ceasefire violations; (d) enhanced security conditions in Hudaydah City and its ports following the redeployment of forces and undertaking of security responsibilities by local security forces; (e) reduced violence in Hudaydah Governorate due to de-escalation of tensions between the parties on the ground; (f) advanced demining in Hudaydah City, its ports and other priority locations, reducing the risk of casualties due to improvised explosive devices or other explosive remnants of war; and (g) an enhanced and inclusive process to ensure implementation of the Agreement on the basis of strengthened community participation.
294. The planned support on issues related to COVID-19 is expected to result in enhanced awareness and sensitization of COVID-19 protocols; the safety and security of UNMHA personnel in the delivery of mandated activities; and prevention measures ensuring the safety of the local population during the Mission's engagements.

### **External factors for 2022**

295. The overall programme plan for 2022 is based on the following assumptions:
- (a) There is sufficient political will and engagement from domestic, regional and international stakeholders to enable the implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement;
  - (b) Major combat operations between the parties will not recommence in Hudaydah Governorate, nor will there be sustained military impediments that would preclude the use of the main supply routes to and from the Mission area;
  - (c) The parties resume their full participation in the activities of the Redeployment Coordination Committee and subsidiary joint mechanisms to monitor the ceasefire and foster de-escalation;
  - (d) The parties reach an agreement on the location of the Mission's headquarters, with equal access to the territory of both parties, and enable the full deployment and ongoing unimpeded functioning of the Mission;
  - (e) A suitably safe, secure and permissive operating environment exists, and sufficient confidence is established between the parties and with other partners to generate sustained support for and participation in the activities of the Mission;
  - (f) A political environment exists that does not obstruct the work of the Redeployment Coordination Committee and its subsidiary joint mechanisms, enabling the parties to sequence redeployment and activate the local security forces;
  - (g) Continued operational cooperation exists with effective command and control structures within both parties to enable compliance at all levels;
  - (h) The parties enable the Mission's access and freedom of movement to all areas required for effective observation and monitoring on both sides of the Hudaydah City frontlines and all districts of the Governorate;
  - (i) The parties provide needed access and cooperation to advance demining in Hudaydah City, the ports and areas of priority in other districts.
296. With regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, the programme plan is based on the assumption that the proposed deliverables and activities for 2022 will be feasible to implement. However, if the pandemic were to continue to have an impact on the planned deliverables and activities, these would be adjusted during 2022 within the scope of the overall objectives, strategies and mandates. Any such adjustments would be reported as part of the programme performance information.

297. UNMHA integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables, and results, as appropriate. To contribute to the advancement of the women and peace and security agenda, UNMHA will promote women's participation in the work of the Redeployment Coordination Committee and related activities and mechanisms as best possible. This will be undertaken to increase women's participation and perspectives in the planning and conduct of redeployment and local security activities, ceasefire implementation and other aspects of Agreement implementation. In addition, UNMHA will promote equal rights and opportunities for women and the full and active consideration of gender perspectives in planning and implementing mission activities and those undertaken by the parties during the implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement.
298. With regard to cooperation with other entities, UNMHA will continue to liaise and coordinate with the parties to ensure the safety and security of UNMHA personnel, movements and premises, and the unhindered and expeditious movement of mission personnel and equipment, provisions and essential supplies into and within Yemen. This requires a continued dedicated civilian capacity to maintain direct contact with the de facto authorities at all levels. Furthermore, UNMHA will engage, where possible, with local stakeholders, partners and other bodies within the Hudaydah Governorate, to leverage maximum influence and ensure a unified understanding approach in supporting the Hudaydah Agreement and its implementation.
299. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, UNMHA will continue to facilitate the support of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and other partners to assist the parties in fully implementing the Hudaydah Agreement. Specifically, UNMHA will maintain close working relationships with the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator and United Nations country team engaged in providing support for the implementation of the Stockholm Agreement, particularly the World Food Programme, UNDP and the United Nations Verification and Inspection Mechanism, as well as other development and humanitarian actors operating in Hudaydah Governorate. In pursuit of full implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement, the Mission will enhance monitoring at Hudaydah City, its port, the ports of Ra's Isa and Salif, and southern and other districts. It will also enhance port rehabilitation, support to the redeployment of forces and the establishment of local security forces, as well as demining activities. UNMHA will also consult and coordinate, as necessary, with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women) to strengthen ceasefire implementation and access to areas of need.

### **Evaluation activities**

300. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs will lead a systematic assessment with an overall purpose of improving the gender-sensitivity of the analyses developed.

### **Programme performance in 2020**

#### **Continued monitoring of a sustained ceasefire and the redeployment of forces<sup>11</sup>**

301. Despite enormous challenges in 2020, the Hudaydah Agreement remained largely intact, notwithstanding the suspension by the Government of Yemen of its participation in the Redeployment Coordination Committee and subsidiary joint mechanisms. While ongoing incidents of fighting and intermittent escalations of violence occurred across frontlines, there were no major shifts of positions along the frontlines. The operational, security and political environment continued to remain highly complex, and the lack of a functioning Committee further frustrated efforts toward a sustained engagement with the parties within the Hudaydah Agreement framework. In turn, this significantly weakened the Mission's ability to support overall mitigation and prevention of violence in the Governorate.

<sup>11</sup> As reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020 (A/74/6 (Sect.3)/Add.7).

302. During the first quarter of 2020, before the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic in Yemen, the Mission continued to support the Redeployment Coordination Committee and the functioning of its de-escalation and ceasefire mechanism. This included the running of a Joint Operations Centre comprising two appointed members of each party co-located along with UNMHA personnel on the United Nations-flagged vessel. The Centre facilitated 24/7 immediate communication between the parties and direct contact in support of monitoring and de-escalation efforts on the ground. This was achieved through continuous communication and coordination with joint observation posts manned by both parties around the clock in five strategic locations along the frontlines. Those posts were visited by mission leadership during several trips to the frontlines as part of de-escalation efforts. UNMHA personnel worked directly with the parties to improve the functioning and operations of the posts, agreeing modalities for deploying UNMHA observers on the ground at each location where they work up to 24-hours in co-location with the parties.
303. In parallel, in January and February 2020, UNMHA continued to engage with the parties on executing the overall redeployment of forces, including the opening of humanitarian access routes to support the delivery of aid to beneficiaries in need of assistance. On 11 March, a shooting incident occurred in the vicinity of one of the joint observation posts, causing the serious injury and subsequent death of one of the Government of Yemen liaison officers. In response, on 12 March, the Government of Yemen suspended its participation in the Redeployment Coordination Committee, a position it maintained for the duration of 2020. As a result, no Committee meetings were held during 2020, while the Government of Yemen withdrew its liaison officers from the United Nations-flagged vessel as well as the joint observation posts, effectively rendering the subsidiary bodies of the Redeployment Coordination Committee (Joint Operations Centre, de-escalation mechanism and observation posts) defunct and ultimately inhibiting the Mission's ability to monitor and report on the ceasefire in an equitable and informed way while also seriously setting back the capacity for real-time de-escalation.
304. This significant setback in the implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement coincided with the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, in response to which the Mission had to significantly adjust its posture and operational approach. As noted above, severe pandemic-related movement restrictions saw the Mission leadership decide to relocate the vessel with 40 Mission personnel to Oman, leaving behind a skeleton staff of 12 people in Hudaydah and four in Sana'a. During that period, civilian staff outside of Hudaydah worked remotely to support efforts in Yemen, while monitors provided by Member States were repatriated to their home countries as the pandemic unfolded. As the Mission went into lockdown in Hudaydah from mid-May until early September, direct outreach to the parties proved difficult, in particular with respect to the Government of Yemen. Subsequent to the death of their liaison officer as a result of the March shooting incident at the observation post, the Government of Yemen further conditioned its return to the joint mechanisms on the relocation of UNMHA headquarters to "neutral" territory (deemed an area that is equally accessible to both parties), a restart of the Mission's patrolling programme to the port areas and conduct of an investigation into the killing of the liaison officer. With respect to the latter issue, and in the light of the prevalent operational restrictions, a desk-review inquiry was conducted by the Mission, based on the submission of documents related to the incident by both parties. A draft project proposal for the relocation of Mission headquarters to the airport area was submitted to the parties on 17 October, that location being considered most likely to meet the requirements for equal access to both parties.
305. In early September, the United Nations in Yemen eased COVID-related restrictions, which enabled the Mission to resume its operations at a modest level. With regard to the Redeployment Coordination Committee, several bilateral meetings were held with both parties to address the situation on the ground and steps to reactivate the Committee and its modalities. To that end, the Mission undertook increasing mediation efforts to de-escalate tensions, particularly as in early October violence in the Governorate spiked to levels unseen since the commencement of the Hudaydah Agreement. At the same time, the Mission worked to advance agreement on measures to secure the Government's return to full participation in the Committee and its related mechanisms, including through online and face-to-face engagements with both parties and the conduct of visits to the frontlines south of Hudaydah. Efforts focused on the following: (a) the holding of a Committee meeting in the immediate future; (b) ceasefire implementation; and (c) establishment of a UNMHA

presence in areas under the control of the Government of Yemen. UNMHA further increased dialogue with regional and international stakeholders to encourage support for United Nations efforts to restart the Redeployment Coordination Committee process and maintain the ceasefire.

*Progress towards the attainment of the objective and performance measure*

306. These efforts contributed to the implementation of the ceasefire as set out in the Hudaydah Agreement, as demonstrated by the further reduction of violence and civilian casualties across the Governorate over the course of the reporting period. In addition, the ongoing partial functioning of the ports in receiving and offloading vessels, continued growth in economic activity within Hudaydah city and increased humanitarian access to areas of need further demonstrated sustained progress by the Mission. The ongoing engagement of the Head of Mission and the Chair of the Redeployment Coordination Committee with both parties through direct and remote means culminated in 12 bilateral meetings with the Houthi Co-Chair of the Redeployment Coordination Committee and 1 with the Government of Yemen Co-Chair, as well as 11 engagements with political leadership in Sana'a and 4 with the Government of Yemen. In addition, in 2020, the Deputy Head of Mission held 4 informal bilateral meetings with the Government of Yemen Redeployment Coordination Committee, 8 meetings with the Redeployment Coordination Committee Chair in Sana'a and Hudaydah and a total of 11 meetings with political leaders (3 with the Government of Yemen and 8 with authorities in Hudaydah and Sana'a), as well as 3 at the regional level.
307. The full implementation of the Agreement with regard to the parties' redeployment of forces was, however, not achieved. In addition to the evolving and complex local, national and regional dynamics, the reasons for that were centred on two enduring challenges that hamper agreement implementation: (a) the intransigence of both parties with respect to politically authorizing and physically executing the redeployment of forces, as agreed in the concept of operations of December 2019 – an issue linked to the lack of progress on the overall peace process; (b) the suspension by the Government of Yemen of its participation in the Redeployment Coordination Committee and its de-escalation mechanisms, including the deployment of officers to the observation posts; and (c) the outbreak of COVID-19, which resulted in the Mission's decision to reduce its capacity on the ground in the interests of ensuring the safety of its personnel and that of the local population – owing to the assessed major limitations of local medical capacity and the challenge of COVID-19-related medical evacuations in Hudaydah.

Table 45  
Performance measure

2018 (actual)	2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)
–	Agreement by the parties on all the technical aspects of the redeployment, as called for in the Hudaydah Agreement	Implementation of the concepts of operations agreed by the Redeployment Coordination Committee for phased redeployments from the ports and Hudaydah City

**Impact of COVID-19 on programme delivery**

308. During 2020, COVID-19 significantly impeded the Mission's areas of operations in the following ways: (a) by severely curtailing the Mission's ability to undertake its good offices role through sustained face-to-face engagement with the parties and stakeholders at the local, national and regional levels to reactivate the Redeployment Coordination Committee; (b) through the cessation of Mission patrols and on-the-ground monitoring for five months; (c) through the limited ability to coordinate Agreement implementation with key partners, including joint monitoring efforts and port rehabilitation; and (d) through the inability to advance community-level engagement with its focus on women's participation in agreement implementation.

309. At the same time, however, the Mission identified activities to support Member States on issues related to COVID-19, within the overall scope of its objectives. As outlined above, the impact of COVID-19 on Mission operations evolved over three phases, requiring the Mission to adjust its approach to address the rapidly evolving situation and context on the ground. In the first phase, in the light of the extreme risks in the Hudaydah context, compounded by a volatile environment following the Government's suspension of its participation in the Redeployment Coordination Committee, steps were taken to put in place immediately COVID-19 contingency and business continuity plans. This ensured the continuation of the core Mission mandate while reducing the Mission's footprint with a remaining team in Hudaydah supported by personnel in Sana'a and those telecommuting from inside and outside of Yemen. In the second phase, the Mission operated in a state of complete lockdown, with significant operational limitations due to the political and security situation and COVID-19 environment. While the monitoring of the ceasefire was sustained through engagement with the parties, patrolling and reporting were severely curtailed. Information was limited to the reports of only one party, along with those received from other sources and assessments. Efforts, however, were undertaken to advance Agreement implementation through remote means, specifically to reach an agreement on a revised concept of operations to govern the phases of redeployment. In October 2020, following the period of complete lockdown, UNMHA took steps to resume incrementally its ground operations and on-the-ground presence. This included patrols to the ports and visits to the southern districts to undertake on-the-ground monitoring, while resuming face-to-face bilateral meetings with the parties and other stakeholders at the regional level on reactivation of the Redeployment Coordination Committee. Those activities were all undertaken while observing strict COVID-19 prevention, mitigation and quarantine measures in partial lockdown conditions.

## **Planned result for 2022**

### **Redeployment of forces, local security forces take on responsibility for security and effective monitoring of the ceasefire**

310. The redeployment of forces and local security forces taking on responsibility for security in accordance with Yemeni law are overarching objectives of the Hudaydah Agreement. For the reasons mentioned above, there was no further progress in 2020 on the redeployment of forces and the local security forces taking on responsibility for security. The sustained functioning of the Redeployment Coordination Committee and its de-escalation modalities are crucial requirements for achieving redeployment and effective de-escalation along with enhanced compliance with the ceasefire. To that end, the Mission has developed and commenced implementing a political engagement strategy and "living" internal action plan that focuses on the needed steps for the sustainable reactivation of the Committee and its de-escalation modalities. To advance those initiatives, the Mission has been engaging with both parties through the Co-Chairs of the Committee and political leadership on both sides, as well as regional and international stakeholders, in order to implement key steps across two phases, namely: (a) the immediate reactivation of the Committee and adjustment of the Mission posture to enable balanced and equal positioning between the parties; and (b) the operationalization of the de-escalation mechanism through the Mission's co-location with the parties on the joint observation posts on the frontlines and its conduct of patrolling across areas of heightened military activity.

### *Lessons learned and planned change*

311. The initial Mission design and location was based on the expectation that the parties would adhere to their obligations under the Hudaydah Agreement and implement the redeployment, resulting in the Mission executing its monitoring process from within an area anticipated to be demilitarized. The lack of redeployment over the course of the Mission life thus far has however led to its headquarters being located within an area under the control of one party only. The lesson for the Mission from this situation was the critical need to adjust its posture to have a sustained physical presence in the territory of both parties along the frontlines of Hudaydah, to enable its equal and impartial access and dialogue across both sides. This serves as the immediate objective while advancing the establishment of a Mission headquarters in an agreed area deemed neutral and demilitarized by both parties. In realizing that

objective, the Mission will advance its efforts to ensure its balanced repositioning through the immediate establishment of a location in the territory of the Government of Yemen in Hudaydah, while undertaking a budget-neutral restructuring process to ensure adequate and commensurate staffing capacity in locations of both parties and the establishment of a headquarters accessible to both sides. This will significantly strengthen the Mission monitoring capacity and enable equal and sustained support to both parties with respect to their compliance with the ceasefire and agreement implementation. This will also enhance the Mission's political presence in Aden and Sana'a in support of on-the-ground implementation of the Hudaydah Agreement.

*Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective and performance measure*

312. This work is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated by a steady and measurable decline in the number of ceasefire incidents and the continued functioning of the ports through the receiving and offloading of vessels. The sustained operation of the Redeployment Coordination Committee and its subsidiary bodies would provide an environment for the commencement of the implementation of the concepts of operations for the redeployment of forces and the deployment of monitors from UNMHA and the parties in the territory of both sides in areas of heightened military activity on a systematic basis. UNMHA will also conduct patrols throughout Hudaydah City, the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa, southern and other districts, and key locations related to redeployment of forces.

Table 46

**Performance measure**

<i>2018 (actual)</i>	<i>2019 (actual)</i>	<i>2020 (actual)</i>	<i>2021 (planned)</i>	<i>2022 (planned)</i>
–	Agreement by the parties on all aspects of the redeployment, as called for in the Hudaydah Agreement	Implementation of the concepts of operations agreed by the Redeployment Coordination Committee for phased redeployments from the ports and city of Hudaydah	Sustained resumption of the Redeployment Coordination Committee and Implementation of the first phase of redeployment in accordance with the concepts of operations agreed to by the Committee	Finalization of the redeployment of forces, and local security forces take up their responsibilities in accordance with Yemeni Law

**Deliverables**

313. Table 47 below lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2020–2022 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 47

**Deliverables for the period 2020–2022, by category and subcategory**

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2020 actual</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>
<b>A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies</b>				
<b>Parliamentary documentation</b> (number of documents)	–	1	1	1
1. Letters of the Secretary-General to the Security Council	–	1	1	1
<b>Substantive services for meetings</b> (number of three-hour meetings)	18	12	25	39

Category and subcategory	2020 planned	2020 actual	2021 planned	2022 planned
2. Meetings of the Security Council, Security Council Informal Expert Group meeting on Women and Peace and Security	8	4	13	12
3. Redeployment Coordination Committee meetings	10	–	9	12
4. Bilateral meetings with regional political stakeholders	–	2	10	15
<b>B. Generation and transfer of knowledge</b>				
<b>Seminars, workshops and training events</b> (number of days)	–	–	<b>8</b>	<b>16</b>
5. Workshop with local community representatives on Hudaydah Agreement implementation	–	–	4	8
6. Workshop with political/civil stakeholders on Hudaydah Agreement implementation	–	–	4	8
<b>C. Substantive deliverables</b>				
<b>Good offices:</b> provision of good offices in the context of the efforts of the parties to fully implement the Hudaydah Agreement, including, as appropriate, jointly with the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen.				
<b>Consultation, advice and advocacy:</b> consultations with the relevant Yemeni, regional and international stakeholders, with a view to comprehensively understanding the challenges at hand and to providing the best advice possible to the parties in their efforts to implement the Hudaydah Agreement; and advocacy among Yemeni, regional and international stakeholders in support of the implementation of the Agreement and enhancement of the ceasefire in the Governorate.				
<b>Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions:</b> situation and context-driven monitoring missions to oversee the parties' implementation of the ceasefire, the redeployment of forces and the removal of military manifestations in the ports of Hudaydah, Salif and Ra's Isa; and fact-finding with respect to establishing information pertaining to the various incidents related to the maintenance of the ceasefire, in support of the parties' efforts to maintain and enhance the ceasefire.				
<b>D. Communication deliverables</b>				
<b>Outreach programmes, special events and information materials:</b> development and maintenance of strategic relationships with Mission's partners, including the United Nations Communications Group and United Nations Headquarters, to ensure alignment in UN common messaging and cooperation across different levels; development and regular updating of Mission's key messages to be transmitted publicly and in response to developments on the ground.				
<b>External and media relations:</b> press releases, messages and audiovisual material on the Mission's activities and key messages generated and published; relationships developed with media partners to ensure more fair and accurate coverage of the Mission's messaging and activities; answers drafted and cleared in a timely manner in response to media inquiries.				
<b>Digital platforms and multimedia content:</b> website establishment and frequent updates given on the Mission's activities and public statements; regular updates given through social media channels on the Mission's activities and public statements, and amplification of United Nations country team/Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen messaging; photographs and videos shared promoting the Mission's activities and key messages on all digital platforms.				

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2022

314. During 2022, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen and UNMHA will continue to deploy an integrated mission support structure, which enables both entities to achieve economies of scale and minimize duplication. This integrated structure has been reviewed to enhance its ability to effectively support the diverse needs and infrastructural demands of the Office of the Special Envoy and UNMHA. The proposed staffing for 2022 includes some rebalancing of positions to focus on operations in Hudaydah, Sana'a and Aden, in order to adjust to the changed and changing environment and thus strengthen mandate implementation by adopting a coherent, coordinated fit-for-purpose approach. The structure will also ensure the Mission's balanced representation and capacity in the respective territories controlled by each side, and support the Mission's good offices to facilitate sustained dialogue with and between the parties at the respective national levels in Sana'a and Aden and leverage the support of regional and international actors to advance Agreement implementation.
315. Currently, the Mission's land-based facilities in Hudaydah are limited to the Four Villas compound, which it has occupied since 7 May 2020. The Mission is planning to establish its headquarters at

Hudaydah airport in 2021 with an additional operating base in the area under the control of the Government of Yemen. It is expected that those additional land-based facilities will be established in 2021 and will be available for use in 2022, provided that local authorities allow the Mission to rent and establish the new proposed facilities in a timely manner.

316. UNMHA has reviewed the available options for essential medical services, as well as security and operational issues in gaining access to local medical facilities and services in Hudaydah, and is proposing to continue with the current set-up of a forward surgical team based in Hudaydah with a slightly reduced number of medical personnel and an aero-medical evacuation team based in Djibouti, where the helicopter is stationed, to support any emergency medical and casualty evacuation requirements.

### Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 48

#### Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2020	2021	2022		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2022 vs. 2021 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	649.6	2 648.6	2 343.1	–	(305.5)
Civilian personnel costs	8 936.7	12 470.6	13 435.8	–	965.2
Operational costs	37 124.6	33 450.0	29 780.2	–	(3 669.8)
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>46 710.9</b>	<b>48 569.2</b>	<b>45 559.1</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>(3 010.1)</b>

Table 49

#### Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff				United Nations Volunteers	Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/Security Services	General Service	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level			
Approved 2021	–	1	1	1	6	10	20	1	40	33	–	73	5	80	–	158	
Proposed 2022	–	1	1	1	6	11	19	1	40	36	–	76	8	80	–	164	
<b>Regular positions, change</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>(1)</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>6</b>	
Approved general temporary assistance 2021	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	–	1	–	–	–	1	
Proposed general temporary assistance 2022	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	–	1	–	–	–	1	

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>									<i>General Service and related categories</i>		<i>National staff</i>			<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>	<i>Total</i>
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/</i>	<i>General Service</i>	<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National</i>	<i>Local level</i>		
										<i>Security Services</i>			<i>Professional Officer</i>			
<b>General temporary assistance positions, change</b>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total approved 2021</b>	-	1	1	1	6	10	21	1	41	33	-	74	5	80	-	159
<b>Total proposed 2022</b>	-	1	1	1	6	11	20	1	41	36	-	77	8	80	-	165
<b>Total change</b>	-	-	-	-	-	1	(1)	-	-	3	-	3	3	-	-	6

317. The proposed resource requirements for 2022 for UNMHA amount to \$45,559,100 (net of staff assessment) and will provide for the deployment of 75 United Nations monitors (\$2,343,100); salaries, common staff costs and other related costs (\$13,435,800) for 165 positions (1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 1 D-1, 6 P-5, 11 P-4, 20 P-3, 1 P-2, 36 Field Service, 8 National Professional Officers and 80 Local level positions), including proposed establishment of 3 international Professional (1 P-4 and 2 P-3) positions and 3 Field Service positions, proposed conversion of 3 international Professional (P-3) positions to National Professional Officer positions; and 1 general temporary assistance (P-3) position; 5 government-provided personnel; as well as operational costs (\$29,780,200), comprising the costs for consultants and consulting services (\$37,500), official travel (\$775,600), facilities and infrastructure (\$10,793,200), ground transportation (\$865,700), air operations (\$8,896,100), communications and information technology (\$1,836,500), medical (\$5,163,700) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$1,411,900).

318. The following organizational changes are proposed for 2022:

- (a) Establishment of the Office of the Deputy Head of Mission, consisting of the existing positions of Deputy Head of Mission (D-2), Coordination Officer (P-4), Political Affairs Officer (P-3) and Administrative Assistant (Field Service);
- (b) Establishment of the Office of the Chief of Staff, consisting of the existing positions of Chief of Staff (P-5), Legal Officer (P-4) and Mission Planning Officer (P-3);
- (c) Establishment of the Political Affairs Section, consisting of 10 existing positions redeployed from the Liaison and Coordination Section, the Office of the Head of Mission and from the Office of the Deputy Head of Mission;
- (d) Establishment of the Police Advisory Unit, consisting of four existing positions redeployed from the Liaison and Coordination Section and the Office of the Head of Mission.

319. With a view of ensuring effective delivery of its mandate, a number of changes to the staffing structure are proposed for 2022: the establishment of 6 positions, the conversion of 3 positions, the reassignment of 10 positions and the redeployment of 28 positions, as detailed below:

*Office of the Head of Mission/Chair of the Redeployment Coordination Committee in Hudaydah*

- (a) Conversion and reassignment of one position of Civil Affairs Officer (P-3) from the Liaison and Coordination Team southern hub as Associate Public Information Officer (National Professional Officer) in Hudaydah, to develop and strengthen relationships with local and national media, to ensure more balanced and appropriate coverage of the Mission's work and positions, to enhance the presence and visibility of the Mission online and to improve Mission-wide understanding of the media landscape and situation on the ground in Hudaydah;

*Office of the Deputy Head of Mission in Hudaydah*

- (b) Establishment of one position of Programme Management Officer (P-4) in the Office of the Deputy Head of Mission, to provide demining expertise in Hudaydah City, the ports and wider Governorate. This function will lead the mine action programme embedded in the mission. This is not a new function – the chief of the mine action component has to date been contracted through UNOPS, funded from the Mission’s budget. The proposed establishment of this position on the Mission’s staffing table is to ensure Secretariat leadership of the mine action programme and increase accountability, effectiveness and efficiency of the services provided by UNMAS to the Mission. This is in alignment with the recommendations of OIOS and the Board of Auditors, which called on UNMAS to reduce its dependency on UNOPS and increase its efforts to directly implement aspects of the mine action programmes;
- (c) Redeployment of one position of Field Interpreter (Field Service) from the Office of the Head of Mission/Chair of the Redeployment Coordination Committee, to ensure critical service and handling of sensitive information;

*Office of the Chief of Staff in Hudaydah*

- (d) Reassignment of one position of Associate Administrative Officer (National Professional Officer) as Associate Protocol Officer (National Professional Officer) to assist with protocol matters in liaising with the Government of Yemen in Aden, the authorities in Sana’a and the diplomatic representative assigned to Yemen; and one Field Interpreter (Local level) in the Liaison and Coordination Team southern hub as Staff Assistant (Local level), to provide effective and efficient handling of administrative and support requirements;

*Political Affairs Section (Hudaydah, Sana’a, Aden)*

- (e) Redeployment of one position of Senior Political Affairs Officer (P-5) from the Office of the Head of Mission/Chair of the Redeployment Coordination Committee in Hudaydah, to lead the new section; two Political Affairs Officers (P-4) from the Office of the Deputy Head of Mission, to oversee the activities in Sana’a and Aden; two Civil Affairs Officers (P-3) from the Liaison and Coordination Team southern hub and Liaison and Coordination Team northern hub to Hudaydah, to establish localized networks to build the needed confidence and trust with local stakeholders; and two Associate Political Affairs Officers (National Professional Officer) from the Office of the Deputy Head of Mission and the Liaison and Coordination Mechanism Section to Sana’a and Aden, to engage in in-depth discussions and interact directly with interlocutors in the two capitals;
- (f) Conversion and redeployment of two positions of Civil Affairs Officer (P-3) from the Liaison and Coordination Team central hub to Associate Civil Affairs Officer (National Professional Officer), to work with the parties to advance local-level engagement with a high level of localized expertise to address cultural, tribal and conflict sensitivities;
- (g) Reassignment of one position of Civil Affairs Officer (P-3) in the Liaison and Coordination Team central hub as Political Affairs Officer (P-3) in Hudaydah, to support the Section in the implementation of the Agreement, ensuring a coherent approach in all locations where the Mission operates;

*Police Advisory Unit in Hudaydah*

- (h) Redeployment of one position of Senior Police Adviser (P-5) from the Office of the Head of Mission/Chair of the Redeployment Coordination and one Police Adviser (P-4) from the Liaison and Coordination Mechanism Section, to provide strategic specialized and operational advisory support to Mission senior management and coaching support to national authorities in various areas of policing and law enforcement, including developing frameworks for development, reforming local police and the management of international police;

- (i) Redeployment of one position of Field Interpreter (Local level) from the Liaison and Coordination Team northern hub, to provide dedicated language support in daily operations and specialized interpreting services;
- (j) Reassignment of one position of Field Interpreter (Local level) from the Liaison and Coordination Team southern hub as Staff Assistant (Local level), to provide effective and efficient handling of administrative and support requirements;

*Liaison and Coordination Mechanism Section in Hudaydah*

- (k) Reassignment of one position of Civil Affairs Officer (P-3) from the Liaison and Coordination Team northern hub as Coordination Officer (P-3), to ensure that the activities of the Section are aligned with the overall objectives of the mission; and one Field Interpreter (Local level) from the Liaison and Coordination Team northern hub as Administrative Assistant (Local level), to provide dedicated administrative support to the activities of the Section;
- (l) Redeployment of one position of Field Interpreter (Local level) from the Liaison and Coordination Team central hub, to provide dedicated language support in the daily operations of the Section;

*Joint Coordination and Communication Centre in Hudaydah*

- (m) Redeployment of one position of Field Interpreter (Local level) from the Liaison and Coordination Team central hub, to provide dedicated and specialized language support in the daily operations of the Centre;

*Joint Operations Centre in Hudaydah*

- (n) Redeployment of one position of Field Interpreter (Local level) from the Liaison and Coordination Team central hub, to provide dedicated and specialized language support in the daily operations of the Centre;

*Safety and Security Section (Hudaydah, Sana'a, Aden)*

- (o) Redeployment of two positions of Security Liaison Officer (Field Service) from Hudaydah to Sana'a and Aden, to support the presence of the Mission's personnel in all locations;

*Office of the Chief of Mission Support (Amman, Sana'a, Hudaydah, Djibouti, Riyadh)*

- (p) Establishment of two positions of Coordination Officer (P-3) in Djibouti and Riyadh, to coordinate with authorities regarding the clearance of flights and road movements to ensure the safety and security of United Nations personnel in Djibouti and Yemen, including for medical and casualty evacuations;

*Human Resources Unit (Amman, Sana'a, Hudaydah)*

- (q) Establishment of one position of Human Resource Officer (Field Service) in Sana'a, to ensure human resources expertise and advice is available to staff in Yemen of UNMHA and the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen;

*Finance and Budget Unit (Amman, Hudaydah)*

- (r) Establishment of one position of Finance and Budget Officer (Field Service) in Amman, to perform mission-wide resource management and financial monitoring functions;

*Procurement Unit (Amman, Sana'a)*

- (s) Redeployment of one position of Chief Procurement Officer (P-4) and one Procurement Assistant (Field Service) from Sana'a to Amman, to enhance procurement capacity for the

Office of the Special Envoy and UNMHA to provide support to all sections and units of the Mission in each location;

- (t) Establishment of one position of Procurement Assistant (Field Service) in Amman, to enhance procurement capacity for the Office of the Special Envoy and UNMHA to provide support to all sections and units of the Mission in each location;

*Field Technology Unit (Hudaydah, Aden)*

- (u) Redeployment of one position of Geographic Information Systems Assistant (Local level) from Hudaydah to Aden, as Information Systems Assistant (Local level), to provide day-to-day technical and customer support for data, voice, video and web applications and services to staff based in Aden;

*Office of the Chief of Supply Chain Management and Service Delivery (Amman, Hudaydah)*

- (v) Reassignment of one position of Administrative Officer (P-3) from the Office of the Chief of Mission Support in Sana'a as Logistics Officer (P-3) in Hudaydah, to ensure optimal acquisition planning and use of Mission resources in line with the planned increase in construction and facilities management, as well as planned increases in the level of patrolling, and observation activity;

*Ground Transport Unit (Hudaydah, Aden, Sana'a)*

- (w) Redeployment of six positions of Driver (Local level) from Hudaydah to Sana'a, to support the presence of the Mission's personnel and to provide transportation services for the movement of personnel;

*Movement Control Unit (Sana'a)*

- (x) Reassignment of three positions of Driver (Local level) from the Ground Transport Unit in Hudaydah to the Movement Control Unit in Sana'a, as Movement Control Assistants (Local level), to ensure proper planning, coordination, organization, execution and control of the movement of United Nations personnel and cargo from Amman airport to their final destinations inside Yemen;

*Engineering and Facilities Management Unit (Sana'a, Hudaydah)*

- (y) A redeployment swap of one position of Engineering Technician (Field Service) from Sana'a to Hudaydah, and one Associate Engineer (National Professional Officer) from Hudaydah to Sana'a, in view of the envisaged concentration of construction activities in Hudaydah for 2022;

*Central Warehousing and Supply Unit (Sana'a, Hudaydah)*

- (z) Redeployment of one position of Supply Officer (P-3) from Amman to Hudaydah, to strengthen the Service Delivery/Supply Chain pillar in Hudaydah.

320. Furthermore, it is proposed that one general temporary assistance position of Finance and Budget Officer (P-3) in the Field Operations Finance Division, Department of Management Strategy, Policy and Compliance, be continued in 2022. The Finance and Budget Officer performs backstopping support and continues to be essential in ensuring sufficient capacity at Headquarters for the management of financial resources, preparation of budgets and provision of services to legislative bodies during their review of the proposed budgets for special political missions.

321. For United Nations monitors, a vacancy rate of 25 per cent has been applied to the estimates, increased from 15 per cent approved for 2021. For civilian staff, a vacancy rate of 25 per cent has been applied to the estimates, taking into account the projected deployment. For Government-provided personnel, a vacancy rate of 25 per cent has been applied to the estimates.

322. The decrease in requirements for 2022 compared with the appropriation for 2021 is attributable mainly to the following: (a) a reduced requirement of rotary-wing rentals and operations due to lower contract cost; (b) a reduced requirement of medical services due to reduced contract cost; (c) the nationalization of three International (P-3) positions to National Professional Officer; and (d) no requirement for mine action services due to the establishment of 1 Programme Management Officer (P-4) position. The reduced requirements are offset by: (a) the proposed establishment of six new international positions (1 P-4, 2 P-3 and 3 Field Service); (b) national staff, due to an increase in the rate of non-pensionable remuneration for national staff based in Yemen, and higher salary rates used in estimates based on actual average salary scales of existing staff; and (c) operational and security services for new land-based premises for Mission headquarters at Hudaydah airport and one additional operational base.

**Extrabudgetary resources**

323. In 2021, no extrabudgetary resources were available or are any projected for 2022 for UNMHA.

## 10. United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti

(\$21,936,200)

### Foreword

Since its establishment in October 2019, the United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) has worked to promote political stability and ensure progress towards the achievement of the 2030 Agenda in Haiti. The mission has strived to provide good offices to foster dialogue and encourage a peaceful resolution to the protracted political crisis that has plagued the country for several years. It has also contributed to the continued efforts of the United Nations to accompany the development of justice, police and corrections systems capacities, while supporting State institutions to reduce community violence and assisting national authorities in promoting the respect for and upholding of human rights norms.

Several major milestones are anticipated for Haiti in 2021, including the democratic renewal of its governance institutions through the holding of overdue local, municipal, legislative and presidential elections. An increasingly embattled Executive has also indicated its intention to organize a controversial constitutional referendum during the year. If approved by the Haitian people, the new constitutional project could lay the foundation for further reforms aimed at addressing political and governance issues that have long prevented durable stability and impeded progress towards development. However, there persists a lack of clarity as to whether any of those processes will indeed take place as scheduled. Moreover, the potential for deadly violence and chaos looms large should they be delayed or have their outcomes contested.

The campaigning related to the referendum and elections is expected to have a negative impact on an already fragile security context in Haiti. Curbing gang-related activities, including killings, kidnappings and the targeting of local communities in populous neighbourhoods for economic gain, will also likely continue to be a major challenge for national authorities.

Given the precarious context in which Haiti is currently ensconced, characterized by a protracted political crisis and a deteriorating security situation, the support to its institutions provided by BINUH, the broader United Nations system and the international community at large will be more critical than ever going into 2022, in the light of the expected formation of a Government by a newly elected President. Should the Haitian polity and society resolve to undertake constitutional and governance reforms, the implementation of those reforms will require sustained support and advice throughout 2022, as will the curbing of gang violence, the further development of the Haitian National Police, the scaling-up of the fight against impunity and the continued promotion of human rights.

If properly resourced, the activities described herein will contribute to fostering an appeased environment in which Haitian leaders, from the political, civil society, religious and private sector realms, can collaborate effectively to address – through well-capacitated national institutions enjoying the continued support of the United Nations – the social, economic and political root causes of the chronic instability in Haiti and to fulfil the aspirations of all Haitians for peace, security and sustainable development.

*(Signed)* Helen La Lime  
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Haiti and  
Head of Office, United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti

## **A. Proposed programme plan for 2022 and programme performance for 2020**

### **Overall orientation**

#### **Mandates and background**

324. The United Nations Integrated Office in Haiti (BINUH) was mandated by the Security Council and is responsible for advising the Government of Haiti on promoting and strengthening political stability and good governance, including the rule of law; advancing a peaceful and stable environment, including through supporting an inclusive inter-Haitian national dialogue; and protecting and promoting human rights. Its mandate derives from the priorities established in relevant Security Council resolutions and decisions, in particular resolution [2476 \(2019\)](#). On 15 October 2020, the Council extended that mandate until 15 October 2021 in its resolution [2547 \(2020\)](#).
325. The mission continues to provide good offices, contribute to capacity-building, monitor human rights and engage stakeholders to reduce community violence. In 2021, the Government of Haiti intends to hold a constitutional referendum and is scheduled to hold legislative and presidential elections, amid political, security and logistics challenges. In the light of this, the strategic priorities for BINUH in 2022 are to encourage inclusive dialogue among political and social actors; to promote democratic stability and continue to support constitutional and governance reform efforts; to enhance the capacity of the Haitian National Police to ensure public safety; and to strengthen the justice sector to guarantee the rule of law and the protection of human rights.

### **Programme of work**

#### **Objective**

326. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to strengthen political stability and good governance, including accountability and the rule of law; advance a peaceful and stable environment; protect and promote human rights and strengthen gender equality.

#### **Strategy**

327. To contribute to the objective, the mission will continue to facilitate dialogue and engagement among national stakeholders to build consensus in the pursuit of a peaceful and sustainable solution to the current political crisis. The mission will maintain its provision of strategic advice and technical assistance to the police, justice and corrections systems and to the national human rights institution in Haiti to promote international norms, human rights and gender parity. The mission will also contribute to the reduction of community violence, in partnership with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, in addressing socioeconomic root causes. These activities will help Haiti to make progress towards achieving the Sustainable Development Goals, and in particular Goal 16, to promote peaceful and inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels. In Haiti, the incidence of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic continues to be low. While the Government discontinued the multi-disciplinary COVID-19 response committee it had established in March 2020, the office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator will continue to support the implementation of the COVAX initiative.
328. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in the following outcomes: (a) enhanced consensus-building and cooperation among State institutions to address the causes of instability and inequality

in Haiti; (b) effective, inclusive and accountable institutions that contribute to consolidating stability and enabling a protective environment; (c) the enhanced protection of women, communities and livelihoods by reversing the surge in gang violence; and (d) the roll out of the COVAX COVID-19 vaccination plan, with a target coverage of 20 per cent of the estimated 11.2 million population.

### **External factors for 2022**

329. The overall plan for 2022 is based on the following planning assumptions:
- (a) Political polarization is likely to continue, endangering the political consensus required to advance concrete initiatives to implement political, legal and economic reforms;
  - (b) The security situation remains fragile, although most incidents in the country, in particular in the Port-au-Prince metropolitan area, are addressed in due time by national public safety institutions;
  - (c) The Government of Haiti continues to sustain and further develop the capacities of the Haitian National Police and its Directorate of Prison Administration, including through the ongoing provision of a sufficient budget allocation;
  - (d) The impact of natural hazards on Haiti, including hurricanes and earthquakes, remains limited;
  - (e) The international donor community and the national authorities agree on and properly resource key development priorities linked to structural development issues and on stronger coordination arrangements to advance the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.
330. With regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, the programme plan is based on the assumption that the proposed deliverables and activities for 2022 will be feasible to implement. However, if the pandemic were to have an impact on the planned deliverables and activities, they would be adjusted during 2022 within the scope of the overall objectives, strategies and mandates. Any such adjustments would be reported as part of the programme performance information.
331. The mission integrates a gender perspective in its operational activities, deliverables and results, as appropriate. The mission continues to encourage the meaningful participation of women in political processes, dialogues and negotiations, as well as their representation in decision-making positions in Haitian institutions, in line with the Constitution's mandated 30 per cent quota for women's participation at all levels. The mission's reporting includes disaggregated data on the impact of human rights violations and abuses on women, as well as on accountability and justice for crimes of violence against women and girls, in coordination with UN-Women. In addition, the mission works with civil society actors focusing on gender and human rights in the context of the implementation of recommendations issued by the Committee on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women in 2016 and the second universal periodic review cycle for Haiti in 2016 on the human rights situation.
332. With regard to cooperation with other entities at the global, regional, national and local levels, the mission will continue to collaborate with regional organizations, including the Organization of American States and the Caribbean Community, to leverage its technical advice and political efforts in Haiti. The mission will also engage closely with the diplomatic community to support coordinated approaches to encouraging political consensus and tackling stalemates, when appropriate.
333. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, BINUH will continue to work in an integrated manner with the United Nations country team in mandated areas, as directed by the Security Council in its resolution [2476 \(2019\)](#). The mission and the country team are working together to implement the integrated strategic framework developed in 2020, which lays out a streamlined set of priorities for implementation aligned with the six benchmarks for Haiti.

## Evaluation activities

334. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs will lead a systematic assessment with an overall purpose of improving the gender-sensitivity of the analyses developed.

## Programme performance in 2020

### **Enhanced consensus-building and cooperation among State institutions to address causes of instability and inequality in Haiti<sup>12</sup>**

335. BINUH has continued its efforts to create a conducive environment for consensus-building. A key example is efforts to resume dialogue among various stakeholders in February 2020, following the expiration of the mandates of all members of the Lower House of Parliament, all but one-third of the members of the Senate and all elected municipal officials, which created an institutional vacuum in early 2020. While a political agreement was not achieved owing to growing political polarization, BINUH used its good offices to encourage consensus by engaging regularly with representatives of the presidency, the ruling coalition, non-aligned actors and the opposition, as well as civil society, economic actors and faith-based organizations. BINUH also coordinated engagement from international actors through the core group and an election-related donor forum.
336. Furthermore, BINUH, together with the United Nations country team, also advised on national governance reform efforts in the areas of constitutional reform and in support of overdue local, municipal, legislative and presidential elections in 2021. In that regard, BINUH advocated for strengthening women's political participation by encouraging the Provisional Electoral Council to explore measures to increase women's representation in the next legislature. In response to the formal request made by the Government on 11 November 2020 for electoral assistance, BINUH, in cooperation with other partners, provided technical advice to the Provisional Electoral Council and assisted national authorities in mobilizing resources for electoral processes. In addition, and in the light of controversy over the President's approach to initiating the constitutional reform effort, BINUH strongly advocated for the need to ensure an independent, inclusive and transparent process. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, BINUH also encouraged relevant national stakeholders to work together to address the public health emergency.

### *Progress towards the attainment of the objective and performance measure*

337. The above-mentioned work contributed to the following outcomes: (a) an adoption of the legal framework for a constitutional referendum; (b) the development of a draft new constitution that, if adopted, will contribute to rationalized electoral processes; (c) the operationalization of the regional offices of the Provisional Electoral Council; and (d) increased awareness about the importance of women's political participation. However, it did not meet the target of responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making, as reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020. However, the country's political polarization and its lack of a functioning legislature hampered participatory and inclusive consultations.

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<sup>12</sup> As reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020 (A/74/6 (Sect.3)/Add.8).

Table 50  
Performance measure

2018 (actual)	2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)
–	Disruptions in governance due to a political crisis and a lack of responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making	The legal framework for a constitutional referendum was adopted and a new constitution consulted. Separately, regional offices of the Provisional Electoral Council were operationalized. Awareness was increased about the importance of women’s political participation

**Effective, inclusive and accountable institutions contribute to consolidating stability and enabling a protective environment<sup>13</sup>**

338. The mission strategically supported national authorities to devise effective and accountable solutions to support the functioning of the justice system and enhance access to justice for all, in particular by advocating the acceleration of prisoner and detainee releases from the overcrowded prison system. To advance releases, the United Nations, together with international partners, assisted in establishing a steering committee on detention, composed of Ministry of Justice officials, in particular members of its Department of Legal Affairs, justice sector actors, the Office of the Ombudsperson (the national human rights institution of Haiti) and human rights advocates. BINUH successfully advocated for the reactivation of the *Comité de suivi de la chaîne pénale* of the Port-au-Prince jurisdiction – a coordination and information-sharing forum of key justice sector actors created to decongest prisons by fast-tracking cases – which reconvened on 11 December 2020 with an agreement to hold accelerated hearings in the capital’s courts and prisons. The President’s issuance by decree of a new Penal Code and Criminal Procedural Code, which provide for alternatives to detention, including pretrial detention, could also contribute to the reduction of pretrial detention and prison overcrowding once the laws come into force in 2022, assuming their ratification by a future Parliament. In addition, BINUH and UNDP led extensive work to prepare the establishment of 11 decentralized legal aid offices, which will contribute to reducing pretrial detention. Despite a challenging operational environment due to the COVID-19 pandemic, BINUH advisors continued to provide the Directorate of Prison Administration with advice and technical support, including in the development and implementation of a contingency plan for the prevention, mitigation and control of the COVID-19 pandemic.
339. BINUH, along with international partners and the United Nations country team, supported the development and professionalization of the Haitian National Police. BINUH police and corrections advisors provided technical assistance to national counterparts focused on addressing institutional and procedural challenges in law enforcement, notably in crowd control reform, addressing labour issues within the Haitian National Police and improving internal oversight capacity. Other efforts included advocacy for government and international support to strengthen the police’s corporate governance, organizational gender mainstreaming and operational capacities.
340. On the human rights front, BINUH continued to call for the endorsement of the national action plan on human rights by the Council of Ministers, which was validated by civil society and the national human rights institution in December 2019. In response to the pandemic, BINUH and the United Nations country team engaged in advocacy with the Government to protect the vulnerable by reducing stigma and addressing the dynamics of incitement to violence owing to the fear of COVID-19. Furthermore, the Office monitored human rights violations and abuses and provided technical

<sup>13</sup> As reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020 (A/74/6 (Sect.3)/Add.8).

assistance to enhance civil society contributions to United Nations human rights mechanisms, despite the challenges posed by the COVID-19 pandemic and limited staffing due to liquidity issues.

341. Owing to the pandemic, BINUH had to limit the number of in-person workshops, seminars and training during 2020. However, these events were able to be mostly delivered through virtual forums.

*Progress towards the attainment of the objective and performance measure*

342. The above-mentioned work contributed to building the capacity of key national institutions and the appointment of female leaders for the Bar Association of Port-au-Prince and the Ministry of Human Rights, which met the planned target of improved satisfaction among the population with their experience of public services as well as increased access of women to decision-making positions in key institutions, as reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020. A new Penal Code and Criminal Procedural Code were also adopted, providing for alternatives to detention and aligning Haitian legislation with international criminal justice and human rights norms and standards.

Table 51

**Performance measure**

2018 (actual)	2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)
–	Low satisfaction among the population with public services offered by national institutions	Improved satisfaction among the population through the alignment of the Penal Code and Criminal Procedural Code with international criminal justice and human rights norms and standards and the adoption by presidential decree; the appointment of female leaders for the Bar Association of Port-au-Prince and the Ministry of Human Rights and Fight against Extreme Poverty

**Enhanced protection of women, communities and livelihoods through reversing the surge in gang violence<sup>14</sup>**

343. The mission, with the support of the United Nations country team, has continued providing secretariat support to the re-established National Commission for Disarmament, Dismantlement and Reintegration. BINUH and the National Commission, in cooperation with the United Nations country team, contributed to enabling children in gang-affected areas to return to school during 2020 and assisted with a gang mapping in December 2020. Furthermore, BINUH contributed to the establishment in December 2020 of the Commission's coordination platform, consisting of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, non-governmental organizations and other community organizations, and provides secretariat support to the platform. In addition, the Prime Minister established an interministerial task force on community violence in October 2020, for which BINUH prepared terms of reference and provided strategic support to develop the task force's \$6.4 million six-month action plan. Moreover, BINUH and UNDP supported the national authorities in developing a comprehensive national strategy on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and community violence reduction that was submitted to the Prime Minister on 4 May 2020. Through those activities, BINUH contributed to enhancing national ownership and building the capacity of national institutions to manage substantive components of the community violence reduction programme.
344. Amid the COVID-19 pandemic, BINUH, in cooperation with the National Commission for Disarmament, Dismantlement and Reintegration and the United Nations country team, facilitated the installation of 97 water, sanitation and hygiene facilities in gang-controlled areas of Port-au-Prince as

<sup>14</sup> As reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020 (A/74/6 (Sect.3)/Add.8).

part of a project implemented by UNDP, the International Organization for Migration and the Direction nationale de l'eau potable et de l'assainissement, the public utility company. BINUH and the Commission also assisted the Ministry of Health in April and May 2020 to translate public information materials to raise awareness on the prevention of COVID-19. Furthermore, BINUH successfully advocated for the involvement of the Commission in the risk-assessment exercise for a social relief project funded by the Inter-American Development Bank and delivered by the Ministry of Social Affairs in gang-controlled areas in Port-au-Prince.

345. Within the framework of the Peacebuilding Fund's disarmament, demobilization and reintegration project in Haiti, BINUH, the United Nations country team and the United Nations Regional Centre for Peace, Disarmament and Development in Latin America and the Caribbean completed, in September 2020, a review of the draft law on firearms adopted by the Haitian Senate in July 2019, as well as a comparative legal study of the existing national arms control framework. Within the framework of the same project, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security formed an interministerial taskforce in December to implement the findings of the review of the draft law, including redrafting the text to conform with regional and international arms control instruments.
346. Despite a challenging security context that included multiple protests and increased gang-related violence, as well as liquidity challenges that prevented the hiring of key personnel, BINUH police and corrections advisers continued to provide strategic advice in 2020. In co-location with Haitian National Police senior leadership, as well as the General Inspectorate and the Directorate of Prison Administration, BINUH advisers supported the implementation of the Haitian National Police strategic development plan for the period 2017–2021. The assistance helped to strengthen the institutional capacity of the national police to address effectively security challenges, including gang-related activities and kidnappings, through a human-rights based approach, to reduce violations and increase accountability.

*Progress towards the attainment of the objective and performance measure*

347. The above-mentioned work contributed to establishing a foundation for the necessary weapons management legislation, a strengthened Commission and more effective Haitian National Police, but did not meet the target of the promulgation of a comprehensive law on arms control and the adoption of a national strategy to address gang violence, as reflected in the proposed programme budget for 2020. Those setbacks can be attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic, a delayed approval process by national authorities and a deterioration in the political context.

Table 52  
Performance measure

2018 (actual)	2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)
–	The National Commission is reactivated by the Government	A task force to review the framework on arms control was established. The Prime Minister established an interministerial task force headed by the National Commission, to which \$6.4 million has been allocated for community violence reduction activities. With support of the United Nations country team, the national strategy on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and community violence reduction was submitted to the Prime Minister's Office

### **Impact of COVID-19 on programme delivery**

348. During 2020, despite the low incidence of reported COVID-19 cases in Haiti, mitigation measures had a negative impact on the planned deliverables and activities of the Office owing to restrictions on large gatherings, reduced physical presence of staff members at BINUH headquarters and the introduction of more virtual outreach, as well as telecommuting from various locations at times, during the year. The mission's planned move to a new headquarters in early 2020 was delayed partly owing to the pandemic, and the ongoing effects of the pandemic mean that the mission has not yet been able to benefit fully from the increased proximity to interlocutors and partners. Many planned in-person meetings, workshops or trainings were converted to a virtual format. One particular impact was the reduced ability of the Office to monitor human rights violations and abuses, which resulted in the Office adopting an ex situ approach to data collection and verification through the human rights network in Haiti.
349. At the same time, however, some new activities were identified during 2020 within the overall scope of the objectives of the Office, in order to support the Government and civil society partners on issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic. Those new activities included advocacy and awareness-raising efforts to prevent COVID-19-related discrimination and stigma conducted with civil society partners, penitentiary authorities, the police and local populations.

### **Planned results for 2022**

#### **Enhanced consensus-building and cooperation among State institutions to address causes of instability and inequality in Haiti**

350. The political impasse in Haiti further deepened following the onset of the constitutional crisis in January 2020, which saw the Parliament cease functioning owing to the expiration of the terms of all Lower Chamber members and two-thirds of Senators. Without a functioning legislative branch, President Moïse continues to rule by decree, which has drawn frequent criticism, including for the executive's perceived excessive use of decrees and the promulgation of controversial decrees, such as the creation of a National Intelligence Agency answerable only to the executive. In addition, some political and civil society groups argue that his mandate ended on 7 February 2021 and that he is now in power unconstitutionally. However, the institutions that are meant to arbitrate those disputes, such as the Constitutional Court, do not currently exist, given the absence of a Parliament to help convene them. In the current situation, intensified political tensions and polarization pose serious challenges to the stability of the country.
351. By 2022, the Government of Haiti aims to have adopted a new constitution. Haiti is also expected to have formed a new Government by holding local, municipal, legislative and presidential elections in 2021. Despite support for the need to reform the constitution, there is considerable controversy regarding the executive's approach to the process that could taint a positive outcome. Moreover, there is the possibility that the lead-up to and the outcomes of the elections could result in a further heightening of political polarization and a political stalemate or in increased violence.
352. As a new elected President is expected to form a Government in February 2022, BINUH will continue to leverage the convening power of the United Nations to promote dialogue among all stakeholders by providing good offices and strategic advice, especially related to ensuring a peaceful transfer of power to the new Government and implementation of reforms. BINUH will also promote the meaningful participation of young people and women in dialogue through the creation of an exchange platform for civil society to facilitate networking and enhance their technical expertise. Furthermore, BINUH will maintain its advocacy to increase the number of women in executive positions. Given that the legislature will be also reconstituted with newly elected parliamentarians in 2022, BINUH will also support inter-institutional dialogue to facilitate coordination between the executive, legislative and judicial branches and among key institutions involved in the democratic governance, justice and security sectors.

*Lessons learned and planned change*

353. The lesson from 2020 for the mission was that its engagement, while broad-based, focused on a limited number of key decision-makers and political actors, as there was no functioning parliament and a fragmented opposition. In applying the lesson, the mission will ensure its outreach consistently includes a network of stakeholders, including in the regions, that is as wide as possible to garner commitment to working towards consensus. The mission will also advocate with the new Government to ensure the uninterrupted delivery of critical social services to demonstrate tangible results following the election and to uphold fundamental human rights.

*Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective and performance measure*

354. This work is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated by the installation of a new Government and a functional legislature and the provision of assistance to advance priorities and reforms, as well as increased representation of women in the legislative and executive branches.

Table 53

**Performance measure**

<i>2018 (actual)</i>	<i>2019 (actual)</i>	<i>2020 (actual)</i>	<i>2021 (planned)</i>	<i>2022 (planned)</i>
–	Disruptions in governance due to a political crisis and a lack of responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making	The legal framework for a constitutional referendum was adopted and a new constitution consulted despite it being challenged by the opposition. Separately, regional offices of the Provisional Electoral Council were operationalized. Awareness was increased about the importance of women's political participation	Good governance practices are adopted and a constructive and cooperative relationship between the executive, legislative and judiciary powers is restored, while the participation of women in governance institutions, including in Parliament, is increased	New Government in place, with a functioning legislature; increased representation of women in the legislative and executive branches

**Effective, inclusive and accountable institutions contribute to consolidating stability and enabling a protective environment**

355. Persistent risks associated with civil unrest, gang violence, organized crime and widespread corruption have had a significant impact on institutional development, have impeded access to basic services and human rights and have caused deterioration in the security situation in Haiti, particularly in the most marginalized and densely populated areas of the capital. The justice system in Haiti has faced many challenges owing to the continued discontent of judicial actors, limited police development and a burgeoning prison population, resulting in a prison occupancy rate in Haiti of 315 per cent, among the highest in the world, with almost 80 per cent of the prison population still in pretrial detention. Moreover, impunity and lack of accountability continue to tarnish the reputation of the judiciary, and challenges regarding independence and coordination within the

judiciary have led to very limited judicial progress in addressing human rights violations and abuses resulting from violence committed by gangs and State actors.

356. In response, the Office maintains its advocacy with the national authorities regarding the fight against impunity. In addition, BINUH, along with international partners and the United Nations country team, works to further professionalize the national police force, strengthening its institutional capacities, including regionalizing its oversight capacity. Similarly, BINUH works to professionalize the justice sector by supporting the implementation of the Ministry of Justice's plan of action on the reduction of prolonged pretrial detention, by strengthening the High Council of the Judiciary's institutional and inspection capacities and by bringing all justice sector actors to work together in the *Comités de suivi de la chaîne pénale*. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the rate of pretrial detention has stubbornly remained at 75 per cent of the prison population for the past several years, despite continuous assistance from partners, indicating the deep roots of the problem of pretrial detention.
357. For 2022, BINUH will continue to implement its mandate through strategic advice to national authorities to encourage the development of effective, accountable and transparent institutions that lead to enhanced access to justice for all and the improved promotion and protection of human rights. BINUH will work with UNDP to advocate for the effective implementation of the Penal Code and Criminal Procedural Code – which, assuming ratification by a future elected Parliament, will come into force in 2022 – especially with respect to alternatives to detention, reduced inflow of pretrial detainees and prison overcrowding. BINUH will use its good offices with the High Council of the Judiciary and the Ministry of Justice to strengthen judicial performance and independence. BINUH will keep working with the Haitian National Police and its prison administration to reinforce strategic planning capacities for police and prison management; bolster the recruitment and retention of women police officers; strengthen efforts to prevent human rights violations by police and prison officers through support from co-located United Nations police and correction advisers, in coordination with international partners; enhance efforts to address electoral violence, in particular against women; increase police oversight capacity; and strengthen women-led early warning mechanisms with the national police. At the same time, BINUH, with the United Nations country team, will support efforts to improve detention conditions, both through medium- and long-term solutions, such as the certification of prisons and the implementation of the action plan on prolonged pretrial detention, as well as efforts to support the Haitian authorities in addressing chronic shortages of food and supplies and poor detention conditions. BINUH will also continue to support national efforts to fight pretrial detention and will also work, in close consultation with the United Nations country team and international partners, to support the dissemination of the new Penal Code and Criminal Procedural Code among national stakeholders and judicial actors.

*Lessons learned and planned change*

358. The lesson for the mission was that justice-related technical and programmatic work, such as support for the organization of a national workshop or the establishment of legal aid offices, requires consistent strategic political engagement to achieve significant results. In applying the lesson, the mission will strengthen its strategic engagement with national authorities in close coordination with the United Nations country team and partners involved in justice-related programmatic work. Continued efforts with international partners will be needed to maintain their bilateral support to those institutions going forward.

*Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective and performance measure*

359. This work is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated by the validation of the national strategy to reduce pretrial detention, the promulgation of new Penal Code and Criminal Procedural Code that articulate a more progressive and humane approach to enforcing the law, and the enhanced ability of the Haitian National Police to manage public safety in Haiti. It will also result in increased public trust in the justice, police and correction systems.

Table 54  
Performance measure

2018 (actual)	2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (planned)	2022 (planned)
–	Low satisfaction among the population with public services offered by national institutions	Improved satisfaction among the population through the alignment of the Penal Code and Criminal Procedural Code with international criminal justice and human rights norms and standards, and adoption by presidential decree; the appointment of female leaders for the Bar Association of Port-au-Prince and the Ministry of Human Rights and Fight against Extreme Poverty	Key reforms to Haitian judicial, police, corrections and anticorruption institutions are adopted, laying the foundation for enhanced effectiveness, accountability and transparency	Effective implementation of the Penal Code and Criminal Procedural Code, leading to a reduction in prolonged pretrial detention and prison overcrowding; improved access to justice for all

**Enhanced protection of women, communities and livelihoods through reversing the surge in gang violence**

360. The year 2020 saw mounting insecurity and internal tensions, including an increase in violence during protests by the political opposition and civil society, as well as by a small group of radical police officers. An expansion and reorganization of gangs also resulted in an upward trend in kidnappings and homicides; the alleged collusion of certain politicians, business elites and police officers with gang leaders; and the continued deterioration of socioeconomic conditions amid the COVID-19 pandemic. Notably in 2020, kidnappings increased by 200 per cent over the previous year, with a total of 234 cases reported, including 59 women and 37 minors, compared with 78 in 2019. The significant increase in gang-related crime prompted the Government to invest more in law enforcement by allocating additional resources to the police and judicial institutions. At the same time, the Government also sought to adopt a more responsive approach to security issues, including additional funding for the police and announcing new police leadership. However, despite BINUH efforts to streamline governmental and non-governmental organization responses to community violence, many activities remain uncoordinated and fragmented.
361. In response to the context, BINUH has maintained its support to the police's anti-gang capacities, including by advising on the implementation of a comprehensive human rights-based approach to reducing violations and increasing accountability. BINUH also continues to provide strategic advice to the National Commission on Disarmament, Dismantlement and Reintegration, as well as the Prime Minister's task force on community violence. Furthermore, BINUH assisted the Commission in drafting its action plan and establishing a coordination platform with the participation of non-governmental organization partners and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes.
362. In 2022, BINUH will continue to work with strategic partners to strengthen national ownership of a comprehensive approach to curbing violence at the community level. In line with the transition of substantive disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and community violence reduction activities to the United Nations country team, the role of BINUH will shift to strategic support through good offices, strategic advice and advocacy. BINUH, with the United Nations country team, will increasingly focus on a holistic approach to community violence reduction while favouring

sustainable national institutional efforts to implementing programmes on community violence reduction and weapons and ammunition management, in accordance with the national strategy on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and community violence reduction. As a key part of that approach, BINUH and the United Nations country team will assist national authorities in developing a resource mobilization strategy to ensure the long-term sustainability of the Government's implementation of community violence reduction programming. Additional assistance will be directed towards more effective community policing, dialogue and outreach, including by reinforcing the capacity of the Haitian National Police to maintain public order and respond to gang violence and sexual and gender-based violence. Furthermore, BINUH will continue to support the Office of the Ombudsperson in the implementation of its national strategy for human rights, which, if supported with adequate resources, will help the Government to improve accountability, including regarding its efforts to address gang violence.

*Lessons learned and planned change*

363. The lesson for the mission was that, in order to reduce community violence, a holistic approach to developing and implementing the Peacebuilding Fund's disarmament, demobilization and reintegration project in Haiti was required to ensure that socioeconomic root causes could be addressed. A holistic effort was particularly vital given the handover of programmatic activities formerly implemented by peacekeeping missions to United Nations agencies, funds and programmes in the country. In applying the lesson, the mission will ensure that disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and community violence reduction activities are linked to humanitarian and development efforts and aimed at tackling root causes, as well as symptoms of violence.

*Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective and performance measure*

364. This work is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated by the implementation and funding of the national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and community violence reduction programme. This will also result in the further reduction in the number of people affected by gang violence, including sexual and gender-based violence, as well as reduce the circulation of arms and weapons.

Table 55  
Performance measure

2018 (actual)	2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (planned)	2022 (planned)
–	The National Commission is reactivated by the Government	A task force to review the framework on arms control was established. The Prime Minister established an interministerial task force headed by the National Commission, to which \$6.4 million has been allocated for community violence reduction activities. With the support of the United Nations country team, the national	The national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and community violence reduction programme is designed and funded; the number of people affected by gang violence in hotspot communities is reduced; the national weapons and ammunition management commission is	The national disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and community violence reduction programme is implemented. The National Commission for Disarmament, Dismantlement and Reintegration increases its legitimacy through the engagement of a wider spectrum of stakeholders; the

2018 (actual)	2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (planned)	2022 (planned)
		disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and community violence reduction strategy was submitted to the Prime Minister's Office	established, and a national strategy and programme are developed	Commission takes steps to move from an ad hoc body to a sustainable structure that can implement the national programme

## Deliverables

365. Table 56 lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2020–2022 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 56

### Deliverables for the period 2020–2022, by category and subcategory

Category and subcategory	2020 planned	2020 actual	2021 planned	2022 planned
<b>A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies</b>				
<b>Parliamentary documentation</b> (number of documents)	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>
1. Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council	3	3	3	3
<b>Substantive services for meetings</b> (number of three-hour meetings)	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>	<b>3</b>
2. Meetings of the Security Council	3	3	3	3
<b>B. Generation and transfer of knowledge</b>				
<b>Seminars, workshops and training events</b> (number of days)	<b>32</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>55</b>
3. Seminars, workshops and training events on four main areas of work: (a) implementation of and resource mobilization for the strategic plan to further develop and equip the Haitian National Police, sustain police service capable of maintaining public security, reduce gang violence and protect human rights; (b) implementation by national authorities and the United Nations country team of programmes on disarmament, dismantlement, reintegration, community violence reduction and weapons and ammunition management; (c) management and oversight of prisons and detention centres according to international standards; and (d) promotion of human rights and participation of women as decision-makers in State institutions, political parties and initiatives of dialogue and consensus-building	32	68	32	55
<b>Publications</b> (number of publications)	<b>2</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>2</b>
4. Joint thematic public human rights reports	2	1	2	2
<b>Technical materials</b> (number of materials)	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>11</b>
5. Materials conveying advisory support to national interlocutors in key areas of the mandate	11	11	11	11
<b>C. Substantive deliverables</b>				
<b>Good offices:</b> good offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to (a) foster cooperation and dialogue among the main political and social actors, build consensus and strengthen political stability and good governance; (b) support the efforts of national authorities and international partners to further develop and equip the Haitian National Police, as well as to facilitate local peace initiatives, to reduce gang and community violence and preserve a peaceful and stable environment; (c) raise awareness about human rights abuses and violations, sexual and gender-based violence and gender discrimination, and strengthen institutional accountability to address them and end impunity for the perpetrators.				
<b>Consultation, advice and advocacy:</b> advise on the provision of support for inclusive initiatives of dialogue and consensus-building; advise on the development of effective, accountable and transparent institutions and responsive, inclusive, participatory and representative decision-making at all levels; advance political, legal and economic reforms allowing for clearer national responsibility and accountability and policy implementation; support government efforts to undertake				

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2020 actual</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>
constitutional reforms aimed at, inter alia, clarifying and simplifying the institutional framework and the alignment of the electoral calendar and the terms of office for elected State officials, and promote judicial reform and access to justice and basic services; advise the Haitian National Police and the Directorate of Prison Administration to strengthen the capacity and oversight of the police and corrections services and procure equipment required to reduce gang violence and improve security conditions; advise State institutions and agencies to consolidate and implement action plans to promote and protect human rights and gender equality; advise on the development of a regulatory arms control framework, including effective implementation of a holistic weapons and ammunition interinstitutional mechanism.				
<b>Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions:</b> performance of missions to assess human rights and allegations of violations; implementation of the human rights due diligence policy; and joint monitoring missions to assess gang violence.				
<b>D. Communication deliverables</b>				
<b>Outreach programmes, special events and information materials:</b> information materials (brochures, flyers, flipcharts, infographics, promotional material) explaining the mission's mandate and developments; outreach events on key priorities of the mission in close collaboration with the United Nations Communications Group; activities to support joint United Nations work in elections; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration and community violence reduction; police; corrections; justice; and human rights. Campaigns will combine the use of traditional and digital media and radio networks.				
<b>External and media relations:</b> strategic plan to ensure coverage of key activities of the mission, press conferences, press briefings, press releases, targeted interviews and publications with media, in close coordination with the United Nations Communications Group and with target audiences and networks; daily media monitoring and strategic analysis of media trends, risks and opportunities and crisis communication management.				
<b>Digital platforms and multimedia content:</b> create and maintain digital platforms for the mission (web and social media); produce and disseminate content for different multimedia products and campaigns (with a focus on digital radio) that promote transparency and accountability and engage key actors on the priorities of the mission; and develop campaigns and products for social media platforms to show the impact of the mission's work and to engage key actors in priority areas, in close collaboration with the United Nations Communications Group, the United Nations country team and United Nations Headquarters.				

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2022

### Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 57

#### Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Category of expenditure</i>	<i>2020</i>	<i>2021</i>	<i>2022</i>	<i>Variance</i>	
	<i>Expenditure</i>	<i>Appropriation</i>	<i>Total requirements</i>	<i>Non-recurrent requirements</i>	<i>2022 vs. 2021 Increase/(decrease)</i>
<i>Category of expenditure</i>	<i>(1)</i>	<i>(2)</i>	<i>(3)</i>	<i>(4)</i>	<i>(5)=(3)-(2)</i>
Military and police personnel costs	641.6	826.4	826.4	–	–
Civilian personnel costs	13 696.5	13 728.6	16 241.2	–	2 512.6
Operational costs	5 595.7	4 716.6	4 868.6	–	152.0
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>19 933.8</b>	<b>19 271.6</b>	<b>21 936.2</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>2 664.6</b>

Table 58  
Positions

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>									<i>General Service and related categories</i>		<i>National staff</i>				
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security Services</i>	<i>General Service<sup>b</sup></i>	<i>Total inter- national</i>	<i>National Professional Officer</i>	<i>Local level</i>	<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>	<i>Total</i>
Approved 2021	-	1	1	4	7	18	11	1	43	17	-	60	21	28	-	109
Proposed 2022	-	1	1	4	7	18	11	1	43	17	-	60	17	28	-	105
<b>Regular positions, change</b>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	<b>(4)</b>	-	-	<b>(4)</b>
Approved general temporary assistance 2021	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	3	-	2	5	-	-	-	5
Proposed general temporary assistance 2022	-	-	-	1	1	1	-	-	3	-	2	5	-	-	-	5
<b>General temporary assistance, change</b>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
<b>Total approved 2021</b>	-	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>28</b>	-	<b>114</b>
<b>Total proposed 2022</b>	-	<b>1</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>5</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>19</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>46</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>65</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>28</b>	-	<b>110</b>
<b>Total, change</b>	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	<b>(4)</b>	-	-	<b>(4)</b>

<sup>a</sup> Position is funded at 50 per cent and cost-shared with the Development Coordination Office.

<sup>b</sup> Other level, unless otherwise stated.

366. The proposed resources requirement for 2022 for BINUH amounts to \$21,936,200 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for 13 United Nations Police Personnel (\$826,400); salaries and common staff costs (\$16,241,200) for 60 international positions (1 ASG, 1 D-2, 4 D-1, 7 P-5, 18 P-4, 11 P-3, 1 P-2 and 17 Field Service), 45 national positions (17 National Professional Officers and 28 Local level), 5 general temporary assistance positions (1 D-1, 1 P-5, 1 P-4 and 2 General Service), and 2 government provided personnel; as well as operational costs (\$4,868,600), comprising the costs for consultants and consulting services (\$187,500), official travel (\$201,500), facilities and infrastructure (\$2,370,100), ground transportation (\$244,900), communications and information technology (\$1,381,000), medical (\$197,600), and other supplies, services and equipment (\$286,000).
367. In 2022, the following changes are proposed to the staffing complement:

*Political and Good Governance Service, and Disarmament, Demobilization and Rehabilitation/Community Violence Reduction Section:*

Abolishment of four positions of Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration Officer (National Professional Officer). Since the establishment of BINUH in 2019, significant progress has been made in Haiti with respect to the weapons and ammunition management regulatory framework, as well as in gang monitoring and analysis. Consequently, it is proposed that two positions of Associate Disarmament and Demobilization Officers (National Professional Officers), which worked on the drafting, consultation and dissemination of the weapons and ammunition management legislation and on project monitoring and evaluation, be abolished. In addition, one Associate Disarmament and Demobilization Officer (National Professional Officer) and one Assistant Disarmament and Demobilization Officer (National Professional Officer) positions in the reporting cell are proposed for abolishment. Their functions are expected to be taken over by the national institutions, while any residual tasks in the area will be distributed within the Section.

368. In addition, it is proposed that five general temporary assistance positions (1 D-1, 1 P-5, 1 P-4, 2 General Service) be continued in 2022:
- (a) Principal Human Rights Officer (D-1): As the human rights situation remains of concern, the Principal Human Rights Officer will continue to assist the Government to improve compliance with human rights standards as the implementation of the human rights action plan is pending the Council of Ministers' endorsement;
  - (b) Senior Political Affairs (P-5): The Senior Political Affairs Officer, as team leader of Haiti team in the Americas Division of the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, will continue to oversee the coordination process at Headquarters, bringing together Haiti focal points from numerous Secretariat departments, services and offices, as well as from 19 agencies funds and programmes;
  - (c) Political Affairs Officer (P-4): The Political Affairs Officer assists the Senior Political Affairs Officer (team leader) in all matters described above. The position will continue to strengthen the integration of activities of BINUH and the United Nations country team and support the implementation of their integrated strategic framework;
  - (d) Team Assistant (General Service): This backstopping position, in the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs/Department of Peace Operations Haiti team, will continue to provide needed administrative support to the Haiti team in the Americas Division;
  - (e) Finance and Budget Assistant (General Service): This position remains essential in 2022, with the requirements remaining high for administrative and clerical support to Finance and Budget Officers for the cost estimates, budget proposals, budget administration and performance monitoring of all 38 special political missions.
369. A vacancy rate of 20 per cent has been applied to the estimates for international positions, taking into account the most recent actual vacancy rates. Vacancy rates of 1 and 6 per cent have been applied to the estimates for National Professional Officer and Local level positions, respectively, taking into account the most recent actual vacancy rates. The cost estimates for United Nations police and government-provided personnel for 2022 are based on the assumption of full deployment.
370. The increase in requirements for 2022 compared with the appropriation for 2021 is attributable mainly to the following: (a) increased requirements for civilian personnel costs, resulting from the application of the revised salary scales for international and national positions and the application of lower vacancy rates for National Professional Officer and Local level positions compared with the rates applied in the approved 2021 budget, offset in part by lower requirements owing to the abolishment of four National Professional Officer positions; (b) new requirements for consultants and consulting services to provide short-term services related to developing strategy for political reform and facilitating national dialogue; (c) higher requirements for public information and publication services with respect to the broadcasting and dissemination of information; and (d) higher requirements for bank charges, freight and other services to provide transportation and accommodation services for the victims of sexual exploitation and abuse. The overall increased requirements are offset in part by reduced requirements for facilities and infrastructure, attributable mainly to the move from the United Nations Logistics Base to the smaller-footprint BINUH headquarters, and the use of cost-effective turnkey contracts for engineering works, supplies and utilities.

#### **Extrabudgetary resources**

371. In 2021, no extrabudgetary resources were available or are projected for 2022 for BINUH.

## 11. United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan

(\$45,596,700)

### Foreword

Following an extended period of start-up, mainly due to the challenges posed by the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS) has reached initial operational capacity and effectively started delivering against its comprehensive mandate, including its four strategic objectives.

In 2022, UNITAMS is expected to operate at full capacity and focus on the delivery of its strategic priorities in support of the Government and people of the Sudan, building on recent major advances, including transitional institutional arrangements, legal and institutional reforms, the signing of peace agreements with some armed groups and an ambitious economic reform agenda to address significant political, security and socioeconomic challenges.

Although the Juba Agreement for Peace in the Sudan is not yet fully inclusive and comprehensive, implementation of existing arrangements is ongoing with tangible benefits to the population. UNITAMS will continue to support efforts to achieve and implement a comprehensive peace, especially with outstanding armed groups. While the security situation in some parts of the country remains volatile and unpredictable, a major escalation of violence is not anticipated. At the same time, the challenging economic situation risks threatening the political transition at a time when the trust of the population in institutions, in particular those responsible for civilian protection, justice and rule of law, is low.

In coordination with United Nations country team partners, UNITAMS will continue:

- (a) To provide good offices and technical assistance in support of political transition and stability in the Sudan and Sudanese efforts towards a comprehensive and sustainable peace;
- (b) To support the strengthening of institutions and capacity-building with regards to civilian protection and respect for human rights and the rule of law to deliver justice and accountability and coordinate the civilian protection and peacebuilding activities of the United Nations;
- (c) To support international resource mobilization and national socioeconomic reforms.

We will seek to strengthen our partnership with the transitional Government as it seeks to meet the immense challenges of delivering a durable peace and the conditions necessary for sustainable development and socioeconomic transformation, further compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic and its impact on economic activity, health and livelihoods.

I cannot help but be galvanized by the engagement, enthusiasm and fortitude of Sudanese women, young people and civil society to ensure that their inalienable rights to participate fully in the transition are realized. UNITAMS will continue to support their meaningful participation in the transition.

The transition is not the end of the journey; it marks the beginning of the country's long road towards sustainable peace and inclusive development that will benefit all of the diverse and vibrant society of the Sudan. UNITAMS will accompany the Sudan in achieving that transformation, in close collaboration with all of its partners.

*(Signed)* Volker **Perthes**  
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and  
Head of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan

## A. Proposed programme plan for 2022 and programme performance for 2020

### Overall orientation

#### Mandates and background

372. The mandate of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS) is defined in paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution [2524 \(2020\)](#) and includes the following strategic objectives: (a) to assist in the political transition, progress towards democratic governance, the protection and promotion of human rights, and sustainable peace; (b) to support peace processes and the implementation of future peace agreements; (c) to assist in peacebuilding, civilian protection and the rule of law, in particular in Darfur and the Two Areas (Blue Nile and South Kordofan); and (d) to support the mobilization of economic and development assistance and the coordination of humanitarian assistance.
373. The Sudan has made major advances over the past two years to address significant political, security and socioeconomic challenges. The transitional institutional arrangements have held firm and grown more inclusive as a result of the Juba Peace Agreement, and efforts are ongoing, with the support of UNITAMS, to reform laws and State institutions, to deliver justice and address corruption. The transitional Government is implementing an ambitious agenda to tackle inflation, reform energy subsidies, clear arrears to international financial institutions and adopt policies to facilitate entrepreneurship and attract foreign direct investment. While the implementation of the Agreement is lagging behind, the transitional Government and all armed groups have largely abided by a ceasefire, including the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North Abdelaziz al-Hilu faction, which operates in the Two Areas (and which signed a declaration of principles with the transitional Government on 28 March affirming the parties' commitment to engage in negotiations), and the Sudan Liberation Army Abdul Wahid al-Nur faction, which retains a force in Darfur, and which has yet to commit to the peace process.
374. As a result of the delays in implementing the Juba Peace Agreement, important milestones of the Constitutional Declaration were delayed, including the formation of the Transitional Legislative Council. Women and young people remain underrepresented in decision-making despite vigilant efforts by civil society, including women's groups. The slow pace of economic recovery and of progress in political reforms could further erode public support for the transitional authorities. Delays in the implementation of the national plan of the Sudan for protecting civilians (see [S/2020/429](#), annex) also increase challenges for the protection of civilians and human rights, in particular in Darfur and the Two Areas. Regional dynamics, including those related to tensions with Ethiopia, the conflicts in the Central African Republic, Libya and South Sudan and cross-border challenges caused by terrorism, violent extremism and trafficking in arms and in persons also continue to have important political and security implications for the ongoing transition and stability of the country.
375. Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic has further exacerbated the dire socioeconomic situation in the Sudan, in addition to jeopardizing the health and safety of millions of Sudanese. A total of 13.4 million people were projected to need humanitarian assistance in 2021 – an increase of 4.1 million from 2020 and the highest number in the past decade. The humanitarian response plan launched in February 2021 prioritizes life-saving multi-sectoral assistance in areas with the highest convergence of needs and includes response readiness for recurring flooding, conflict and disease outbreak.
376. Alongside the country's own efforts at putting in place key economic reforms and mobilizing domestic resources, increased international financial assistance remains paramount to support the most vulnerable populations of the Sudan and to sustain the transition. In that context, the Friends of Sudan group, convened by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for the Sudan, has been essential in mobilizing international political support and an economic package to support the priorities of the transitional Government. An investment conference organized by the Government of France in Paris in May 2021 has helped to mobilize foreign investment and create the conditions for a more conducive business environment for Sudanese and foreign investors.

## Programme of work

### Objective

377. The objective, to which this mission contributes, is to achieve a political transition towards democratic governance that enables inclusive and sustainable peace and development and ensures civilians are protected, human rights are respected and the rule of law is upheld.

### Strategy

378. To contribute to the objective, the Mission will continue to provide good offices and technical assistance in support of political transition and stability in the Sudan and of Sudanese efforts towards inclusive and sustainable peace. This entails, based on requests from the parties, support to peace talks between the transitional Government and outstanding armed groups, and continued support towards the implementation of the provisions of the Juba Peace Agreement. Those efforts will entail engagement with transitional institutions and relevant stakeholders, such as Government officials, political parties, armed groups, civil society and women's groups, as well as relevant mechanisms and commissions established by the transition, including among others the Peace Commission, the Gender Commission, the Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism, ceasefire and security-related mechanisms. Furthermore, to support the constitution drafting and electoral processes, which will serve as key milestones in the country's political transition, UNITAMS will continue to provide technical assistance and support to relevant bodies and actors. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and the various mission components will also continue to engage with civil society, women, young people, refugees, internally displaced persons and members of marginalized groups to ensure meaningful participation in the political transition and in the implementation of the peace agreements. In doing so, the Mission will also leverage the support of international and regional entities, including the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), so that efforts are fully complementary.
379. The Mission will continue its support to strengthen institutions and build their capacity to deliver justice and accountability and coordinate the civilian protection and peacebuilding activities of the United Nations, such as local-level conflict prevention, mitigation and reconciliation, and community violence reduction, particularly for women, children and vulnerable groups. The Mission will also, in particular, continue its support for the full implementation by the Sudanese authorities of the national plan of the Sudan for protecting civilians.
380. The Mission will continue to support international resource mobilization, national socioeconomic reforms and the establishment of a national architecture for development planning and aid effectiveness.
381. The above-mentioned work is expected to result in the following outcomes: (a) an inclusive and sustainable peace agreement; (b) strengthened and accountable human rights and rule of law institutions; (c) an enhanced protective environment and reinforcing peaceful coexistence and reconciliation between communities; and (d) coherent support by the United Nations and the international community to address socioeconomic challenges.

### External factors for 2022

382. The overall programme plan for 2022 is based on the following assumptions:
- (a) The peace agreement is not yet fully inclusive and comprehensive, and the implementation of existing agreements is ongoing, with the population slowly seeing tangible benefits;
  - (b) The security situation in some parts of the country remains volatile and unpredictable but does not lead to a major escalation of violence;

- (c) The economic situation remains dire, with the risk of threatening the political transition;
  - (d) Trust of the population in institutions, in particular those responsible for civilian protection, justice and rule of law, is low.
383. With regard to the COVID-19 pandemic, the programme plan is based on the assumption that the proposed deliverables and activities for 2022 will be feasible to implement. However, if the pandemic were to have an impact on the planned deliverables and activities, these would be adjusted during 2022 within the scope of the overall objectives, strategies and mandates. Any such adjustments would be reported as part of the programme performance information.
384. The Mission will continue to integrate a gender perspective in its activities, deliverables and results. UNITAMS has prioritized gender equality and the promotion of the women and peace and security agenda through all areas of its mandate, with a view to supporting the full and effective participation, representation and protection of women in the implementation of peace and political processes and all social and economic aspects of life. This will include addressing and overcoming all forms of disparities and discrimination and promoting an inclusive and gender equitable transition by keeping the women and peace and security agenda, as well as youth engagement, at the centre of its efforts, in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions on women and peace and security and on youth and peace and security.
385. With regard to cooperation with other entities, the Mission will continue to rely significantly on partnerships with international actors to support the priorities of the Sudanese authorities. The Mission will work with partners in support of the transition so as to maximize collective impact and avoid a duplication of efforts, on the basis of comparative advantages and a clear division of labour. In that regard, a continued political partnership between the African Union and the United Nations will remain critical. The Mission will also continue to coordinate closely with other regional organizations, including IGAD, as well as Member States represented by their embassies in Khartoum and by envoys in their respective capitals, and international financial institutions.
386. With regard to inter-agency coordination and liaison, the Mission and the United Nations country team will continue to operate in a complementary and integrated manner, ensuring coordination and aligning the sequencing and implementation of priority programmes during the transitional period, in accordance with Security Council resolution [2524 \(2020\)](#). They will draw on the strengths and demonstrated value added and comparative advantages of the different entities present in the Sudan to provide comprehensive and coherent support that enables the achievement of the strategic objectives of the Mission. That approach, enshrined in an integrated strategic framework or equivalent, will ensure that the Mission takes into account the work of the United Nations country team. It will also ensure that the United Nations country team is strongly positioned after the exit of UNITAMS to carry forward the work of the United Nations, consolidate the gains achieved through the work of the Mission and support the Sudan in its efforts to attain the Sustainable Development Goals. With regard to the protection of civilians, human rights, justice and accountability, UNITAMS, in close cooperation and coordination with the country office of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights and other members of the United Nations country team, will continue to support the implementation of the human rights, equality, accountability and rule of law provisions of the Constitutional Declaration and peace agreements, in particular those provisions that guarantee justice and women's rights. Liaison with the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), the United Nations Mission in South Sudan, UNSMIL, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa will ensure continued effective inter-mission cooperation on regional issues through the coordination and liaison mechanisms that were established in 2021.

## **Evaluation activities**

387. The Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs will lead a systematic assessment with an overall purpose of improving the gender-sensitivity of the analyses developed.

## **Programme performance in 2020**

388. The Mission's activities during the start-up phase in 2020 focused on the establishment of effective working arrangements with senior government officials, most notably the National Committee for Coordination with UNITAMS, representatives of armed groups and other political interlocutors, civil society representatives, and the diplomatic community.
389. The Mission was instrumental in supporting the transfer of some activities undertaken by the State liaison functions from the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) to the United Nations country team. Coordinating closely with the United Nations country team and UNAMID, UNITAMS led programme development and fundraising efforts for crucial protection-related activities, with a specific focus on Darfur in the light of the drawdown and closure of UNAMID. This led to the development of an initial set of project proposals as part of a larger peacebuilding programme addressing stabilization, peacebuilding and protection challenges in the most volatile areas of the Sudan through programmatic interventions. In December 2020, the peacebuilding and stabilization window of the multi-partner trust fund, the Sudan financing platform, was established to support peacebuilding and stabilization efforts. In addition, UNITAMS and UNAMID developed an operational framework that supported the responsible and orderly drawdown of State liaison functions activities by April 2021. UNITAMS worked to ensure that programmatic funding from UNAMID could be used until then to reduce the funding gap until the peacebuilding and stabilization window became operational. To ensure that UNITAMS is able to build on the results and lessons learned from the rule of law work of UNAMID, the Missions also jointly undertook planning and scoping activities.
390. UNITAMS also established a common data and information hub. This initiative of the Resident Coordinator's Office, with support from the Peacebuilding Support Office's Humanitarian Development Peacebuilding Partnership Facility, established an information management platform that supports joint analysis and assessments of humanitarian, development and peace priorities, together with the World Bank, by ensuring (a) information sharing protocols and systems; (b) support to aid coordination; and (c) monitoring of conflict risk and resilience capacities.
391. UNITAMS participated in the planning of joint missions to assess the protection needs and perceptions of populations in Darfur in the wake of the withdrawal of UNAMID. Together with the protection cluster of the United Nations country team and UNAMID, UNITAMS jointly planned the assessments that were undertaken by the United Nations country team and UNAMID in camps for internally displaced persons in Darfur. This involved discussions with key stakeholders to better understand protection concerns and needs and outline practical recommendations. The findings and recommendations from the assessment continue to inform UNITAMS and the United Nations country team's engagement with the transitional Government on the protection of civilians. The United Nations country team and humanitarian actors are also implementing recommendations from the assessment.

## **Impact of COVID-19 on programme delivery**

392. COVID-19 had an impact on the establishment of the Mission on the ground, as most staff initially had to work remotely and, when onboarding began, staff had to be quarantined for limited periods. Such restrictions had a great impact on planning, including the ability to undertake field visits and to meet with key partners on the ground to initiate mandate delivery.

## **Planned results for 2022**

### **Progress in the political transition and towards democratic governance and an inclusive and comprehensive peace in the Sudan**

393. In order to support Sudanese efforts to implement key milestones of the country's political transition, the Mission will provide technical assistance and support constitution drafting and electoral processes, including through broad-based consultations with inclusive participation, as well as through support to relevant commissions, as stipulated in the Constitutional Declaration, which is expected to result in progress towards greater democratic governance and the promotion and protection of human rights.
394. Since the signing of the Juba Peace Agreement and the inclusion of its signatories in the transitional institutions, the priority has been the implementation of the agreement and the conclusion of potential negotiations with the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North under Abdelaziz al-Hilu and the Sudan Liberation Army Abdul Wahid al-Nur faction. The Mission will continue to provide good offices and technical assistance, as requested by the parties, towards the full and timely implementation of the Juba Peace Agreement, including by supporting the Peace Commission and supporting the negotiation and mediation processes, to reach an inclusive and comprehensive peace agreement.
395. The Mission will leverage the comparative advantage of its good offices, mediation and political expertise, combined with technical and programmatic support from the United Nations country team and with funding from the peacebuilding and stabilization window of the multi-partner trust fund, the Sudan financing platform. The Mission will also coordinate with the African Union, IGAD and other partners to benefit from their comparative advantages.

#### *Lessons learned and planned change*

396. A key lesson for the Mission is the critical importance of effective needs-based planning, adequate resource mobilization, and coordination with key partners, including the United Nations country team, national counterparts, regional partners and members of the international community, in support of ongoing peace processes and implementation of peace agreements. In applying the lesson, the Mission will utilize mechanisms, including the peacebuilding and stabilization window of the multi-partner trust fund, the Sudan financing platform, to enhance in-depth needs-based planning, resource mobilization, as well as joint planning and delivery with key partners.

#### *Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective and performance measure*

397. This work is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated by a peace agreement, including the current non-signatories to the Juba Peace Agreement, improved security for the Sudanese people, inclusive constitutional and electoral processes with the increased, broad-based, meaningful participation of stakeholders, including women and young people, and throughout all of the Sudan. In addition, an inclusive and comprehensive peace will provide an incentive for international and regional actors to support the transition and long-term stability of the Sudan.

Table 59  
Performance measure

2018 (actual)	2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (planned)	2022 (planned)
–	–	–	Significant progress made on political transition and a more comprehensive peace agreement is signed, with increased participation of women and young people in the peace process	Acceleration of ongoing transition processes, a meaningful implementation of peace agreements and conclusion of necessary further negotiations

### Improved protective environment for the Sudanese population

398. As part of its peacebuilding and protection mandate, UNITAMS will support the Government of the Sudan in strengthening the protective environment, in particular in Darfur and the Two Areas. To that end, it will provide normative and policy advice on human rights and justice reform processes in support of the implementation of the national plan of the Sudan for protecting civilians, and will work with the Ministry of Justice, the Supreme Court and the Attorney General's Office, as well as relevant reform commissions, on strengthening judicial independence and compliance with international human rights standards and norms and on boosting the integrity and accountability of the justice sector, with a view to rebuilding the Sudanese population's trust in the judiciary. In close collaboration with the United Nations country team, UNITAMS will support inclusive consultations on reform measures to foster broad popular support and work with key rule of law stakeholders on coordination for justice reforms. In providing support to the criminal justice system, UNITAMS will help to enable it to deliver on the population's call for accountability, including in emblematic political and human rights cases. UNITAMS will provide legislative advice on reforms of substantive criminal laws and criminal procedure law and support further alignment with international standards and norms, including on women's inclusion, human rights standards and victim-centred justice.
399. The core tasks for 2022 will include the following: (a) supporting the implementation of human rights and rule of law provisions of the national plan of the Sudan for protecting civilians and the Constitutional Declaration, including on transitional justice and accountability; and (b) engaging with and building the capacity of local institutions, the Sudan Police Force, civil society and communities to prevent and address conflict, including through improved weapons and ammunition management. In close coordination with the protection cluster of the United Nations country team, UNITAMS will provide technical advice, capacity-building, advocacy and support resource mobilization, with a view to strengthening protection systems, attention to conflict-related sexual violence, accountability mechanisms and the criminal justice chain to ensure improved compliance with international human rights and humanitarian law, as well as accountability for the perpetrators of violations. This critical work will support early-warning mechanisms, build confidence in the transitional authorities and facilitate peacebuilding over the medium and longer terms. The implementation of the human rights due diligence policy on United Nations support to non-United Nations security forces will be an essential safeguard for the Mission's support to non-United Nations forces and a catalyst to encourage government compliance with international humanitarian and human rights law and accountability with respect to addressing violations by defence and security forces.

*Lessons learned and planned change*

400. The lesson for the Mission was the importance of coordination and focused initiatives to address concerns relating to the protection of civilians and human rights, including conflict-related sexual violence, during the drawdown of UNAMID and deployment of UNITAMS, as gaps emerged in the transfer of State liaison function projects. In applying the lesson, the Mission will ensure that sufficient staff are deployed to regional offices and have enough capacity to ensure continued and effective delivery of priority programmes, projects and initiatives.

*Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective and performance measure*

401. This work is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated by a reduction in the frequency and intensity of violent conflict, including intercommunal violence and human rights violations; an increase in accountability initiatives, including for security forces, a professional and accountable Sudan Police Force and high-level criminal investigations; the ratification of core treaties and the repealing of laws that discriminate against women; the initiation of transitional justice processes; and an increased presence and effectiveness of human rights and rule of law institutions at both the national and state levels. Together with progress in the peace process, this should lead to an overall improvement in the protective environment for the Sudanese population and pave the way for longer-term peacebuilding in post-conflict areas.

Table 60  
Performance measure

2018 (actual)	2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (planned)	2022 (planned)
–	–	–	National capacity for civilian protection is enhanced, and key reforms for the protection of human rights and the upholding of the rule of law are adopted	National capacity for civilian protection is enhanced, and reforms for the protection of human rights, accountability and upholding of the rule of law are accelerated

**Increased mobilization of economic and development assistance and coordination of humanitarian assistance**

402. The Sudan is undergoing a national political transition while attempting to resolve its long-standing internal conflicts, with both processes having profound implications for peacebuilding and sustaining peace. The root causes of conflict, including issues of accountability, reconciliation, devolution, land rights and durable solutions, need to be addressed. Effectively assisting the transitional authorities in meeting those challenges requires coherence and coordination across the United Nations system.
403. In the Sudan, the current peacebuilding context requires a mix of long-term programmatic support and flexible funding in order to capitalize on political opportunities to sustain peace. A multi-partner trust fund has been made operational and is now the financial solution of choice to promote medium- and longer-term coherent United Nations system-wide and integrated support in the Sudan and to support priority programming areas related to peacemaking, peacebuilding and stabilization. In establishing an appropriate mechanism for joint and coordinated peacebuilding support, UNITAMS is supporting strengthened integration within the United Nations and providing an advisory and coordination function through its peacebuilding component under the Deputy Special Representative of the

Secretary-General, Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator, and its planned subnational presence. It will draw on lessons learned from the innovative approach of the State liaison functions and the Peacebuilding Fund programming in Darfur and catalyse peacebuilding programming in the Two Areas.

404. The Mission will also coordinate international efforts to assist Sudanese stakeholders in identifying and articulating their priorities and mobilizing donor support on an ongoing basis through the transitional period, including through the Friends of Sudan group and the Khartoum-based Sudan International Partners Forum. Equally, the Mission will support the establishment of the Government-led Sudan National Development Forum, which brings together the transitional Government and international partners in coordinating the implementation of the national development priorities. While humanitarian assistance will continue to be necessary in some areas, the balance of assistance programmes is expected to begin to shift discernibly towards longer-term development work.
405. In addition, the Mission will continue to enable humanitarian access and contribute to the safety of United Nations staff and the local population through survey and clearance of areas and roads contaminated with landmines and explosive remnants of war, with a particular focus on roads connecting Government-controlled and opposition-controlled territory, where possible. The Mission's effectiveness in this regard will be enhanced by the continued engagement of donor funding in support of these goals.

*Lessons learned and planned change*

406. The lesson learned for the Mission is the need for strong coordination of peacemaking, peacebuilding and stabilization efforts, both by national stakeholders and donors, in a holistic manner that is fully aligned with the national development priorities and efforts of the Government of the Sudan. In applying the lessons, the Mission will prioritize continued support to resource mobilization of economic and development assistance and coordination among donors in the Sudan, to include planning and delivery, especially on humanitarian assistance, in support to the humanitarian support plan.

*Expected progress towards the attainment of the objective and performance measure*

407. This work is expected to contribute to the objective, as demonstrated by enhanced service delivery and support for inclusive governance that will strengthen the State-society relationship, and relationships among and between communities, in particular in conflict-affected areas.

Table 61  
Performance measure

2018 (actual)	2019 (actual)	2020 (actual)	2021 (planned)	2022 (planned)
–	–	–	Increased satisfaction of the Sudanese population with service delivery and governance by public administrations in conflict-affected areas	Significant progress in mobilizing resources and a strengthened business and investment climate to support economic development in the Sudan

## Deliverables

408. Table 62 below lists all deliverables, by category and subcategory, for the period 2020–2022 that contributed and are expected to contribute to the attainment of the objective stated above.

Table 62

### Deliverables for the period 2022, by category and subcategory

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2020 actual</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>
<b>A. Facilitation of the intergovernmental process and expert bodies</b>				
<b>Parliamentary documentation</b> (number of documents)	–	2	4	4
1. Reports of the Secretary-General for the Security Council	–	2	4	4
<b>Substantive services for meetings</b> (number of three-hour meetings)	–	2	4	4
2. Meetings of the Security Council		2	4	4
<b>B. Generation and transfer of knowledge</b>				
<b>Field and technical cooperation projects</b> (number of projects)	–	–	1	–
3. United Nations joint peacebuilding programme launched	–	–	1	–
<b>Seminars, workshops and training events</b> (number of days)	–	–	112	137
4. Workshops and civic consultations on subjects relating to peace negotiations and peace agreements, as well as the political transition, including constitution drafting and population census		–	30	30
5. Seminars and consultations on electoral matters	–	–	15	30
6. Workshops and consultations on disarmament, demobilization and reintegration	–	–	9	15
7. Workshops on community violence reduction	–	–	6	10
8. Workshops and trainings on human rights and protection	–	–	20	20
9. Workshops on rule of law	–	–	12	12
10. Seminars for Sudan Police Force officers on civilian protection, community policing and sexual and gender-based violence	–	–	20	20
<b>Publications</b> (number of publications)	–	–	6	10
11. Newsletters featuring news and human-interest stories on United Nations engagement, achievements and work throughout the Sudan	–	–	4	4
12. Promotional and educational materials, including graphic posters and/or brochures, on thematic issues of sustainable peace and development	–	–	2	6
<b>Technical materials</b> (number of materials)	–	–	2	5
13. Manual on civilian protection for the Sudan Police Force and pocket booklets for commanders on the protection of civilians, based on competent laws	–	–	1	1
14. Manual on community-oriented policing for the Sudan Police Force	–	–	–	1
15. Manual on conflict-related sexual violence and sexual and gender-based violence for the Sudan Police Force	–	–	–	1
16. Material on peacebuilding financing in the Sudan	–	–	1	1
<b>C. Substantive deliverables</b>				

**Good offices:** good offices of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General to engage with all concerned parties to support the Sudanese peace negotiations and the implementation of peace agreements, as well as assistance to the country's political transition; technical assistance for national efforts for an inclusive, participatory and transparent constitution drafting process that provides the basis for consensus-building and dialogue on social cohesion, good governance, protection of civilians, human rights and the rule of law; support the efforts of national authorities to implement the human rights, equality, accountability and rule of law provisions of the Constitutional Declaration, including the strengthening of independent and representative rule of law institutions; support the efforts of national and local authorities to provide and ensure security, justice

<i>Category and subcategory</i>	<i>2020 planned</i>	<i>2020 actual</i>	<i>2021 planned</i>	<i>2022 planned</i>
and protection, including to raise awareness about human rights abuses and violations, sexual and gender-based violence and gender discrimination, to strengthen trust and national accountability and to address those abuses and violations and end impunity for the perpetrators.				
<b>Consultation, advice and advocacy:</b> consultations, advice and advocacy on the political transition and peace processes with a broad range of Sudanese stakeholders, including civil society, women, young people, refugees and internally displaced persons and members of marginalized groups; meetings and consultations with international, regional and subregional organizations, as well as with concerned Member States, on the political and security situation in the Sudan; advise on and advocate the establishment and formulation of institutions, legislative and policy frameworks required to implement the human rights, equality, accountability and rule of law provisions of the Constitutional Declaration, including the strengthening of accountable and representative rule of law institutions in conflict-affected areas that foster a protective environment and advance the peace process, in strong partnership with civil society; advocacy for progress towards the effective re-establishment of the criminal justice chain throughout the Sudan; advocacy for resource mobilization, including for the multi-partner trust fund on peacebuilding. Provision of technical support and advice to the Sudan National Mine Action Centre pertaining to mine action and compliance with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention; provision of advocacy and advice in support of development of local mine action initiatives in areas controlled by non-State armed groups.				
<b>Fact-finding, monitoring and investigation missions:</b> joint missions in support of national authorities to assess security incidents, including intercommunal violence and other conflict-related incidents; monitoring and advising on redressal of human rights violations, reporting on impunity.				
<b>D. Communication deliverables</b>				
<b>Outreach programmes, special events and information materials:</b> information materials (brochures, flyers, flipcharts, infographics, promotional material, frequently asked questions, messaging) explaining the Mission's mandate and developments; outreach events on key priorities of the Mission in close collaboration with partners and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes in the mission area and awareness-raising events with national stakeholders, including civil society and local communities, to support joint United Nations work in the areas of the rule of law, criminal justice and accountability; activities and campaigns to support United Nations work in support of the political transition, the peace process, peacebuilding, civilian protection, gender equality, economic development and the achievement of the Sustainable Development Goals; production of content for dissemination through national and local media; outreach activities targeted at hard-to-reach audiences through partners, using alternate means such as telecommunications, theatre and other traditional communication methods; trainings to build capacity, improve relationships and support media relations and improved reporting on the work of the United Nations.				
<b>External and media relations:</b> strategic plan to cover key activities of the Mission; press conferences, press briefings, press releases; targeted interviews and publications with media in close coordination with the United Nations Communications Group and with target audiences and networks; videos of Mission activities; weekly media monitoring and analysis of media trends, risks and opportunities and crisis communications management; opinion poll survey to get an accurate idea of public perception, with subsequent surveys throughout the Mission duration.				
<b>Digital platforms and multimedia content:</b> create and maintain digital platforms for the Mission (web and social media); produce and disseminate content for different multimedia products and campaigns that promote transparency and accountability and engage key actors on the priorities of the Mission; develop campaigns and products for social media platforms to show the impact of the Mission's work and to engage key actors in priority areas in close collaboration with the United Nations Communications Group, the United Nations country team and United Nations Headquarters.				

## B. Proposed post and non-post resource requirements for 2022

### Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 63

#### Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2020	2021	2022		Variance
	Expenditure	Appropriation	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2022 vs. 2021 Increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)=(3)-(2)
Military and police personnel costs	–	546.1	858.7	–	312.6
Civilian personnel costs	651.1	17 618.6	21 909.1	–	4 290.5
Operational costs	768.9	15 905.7	22 828.9	417.5	6 923.2
<b>Total (net of staff assessment)</b>	<b>1 420.0</b>	<b>34 070.4</b>	<b>45 596.7</b>	<b>417.5</b>	<b>11 526.3</b>

Table 64

#### Positions

	Professional and higher categories								General Service and related categories		National staff				Total	
	USG	ASG <sup>a</sup>	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Subtotal	Field/ Security Services	General Service <sup>a</sup>	Total international	National Professional Officer	Local level		United Nations Volunteers
Approved 2021	1	1	2	4	18	31	29	3	89	51	1	141	48	69	11	269
Proposed 2022	1	1	2	4	18	32	29	2	89	46	1	136	50	73	11	270
<b>Change</b>	–	–	–	–	–	<b>1</b>	–	<b>(1)</b>	–	<b>(5)</b>	–	<b>(5)</b>	<b>2</b>	<b>4</b>	–	<b>1</b>

<sup>a</sup> Other level, unless otherwise stated.

409. The proposed resource requirements for 2022 for UNITAMS amount to \$45,596,700 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the deployment of 30 United Nations police officers (\$858,700), salaries and common staff costs (\$21,909,100) for 136 international positions (1 USG, 1 ASG, 2 D-2, 4 D-1, 18 P-5, 32 P-4, 29 P-3, 2 P-2, 46 Field Service, 1 General Service), 123 national positions (50 National Professional Officer and 73 Local level) and 11 United Nations Volunteers, inclusive of the proposed establishment of 1 new international position at the P-4 level and the proposed conversion of 6 positions from international to national positions; as well as operational costs (\$22,828,900), comprising costs for consultants and consulting services (\$98,700) official travel (438,800), facilities and infrastructure (\$3,149,000), ground transportation (\$429,800), air operations (\$11,455,400), communications and information technology (\$2,776,800), medical (\$525,800) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$3,954,600).

410. It is proposed to establish one civilian staff position and convert six international positions to national positions as follows:

#### *Integrated Office of the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General*

- (a) Establishment of one position of Programme Management Officer (P-4) in Khartoum, to lead the UNITAMS mine action programme. This is not a new function; the chief of the mine action component has to date been contracted by UNOPS as an implementing partner for UNMAS, funded from the Mission's budget. The proposed establishment of this position on the Mission's

staffing table is to ensure Secretariat leadership of the mine action programme and increase accountability, effectiveness and efficiency of the services provided by UNMAS to the Mission. This is in alignment with the recommendations of OIOS and the BOA which called on UNMAS to reduce dependency on UNOPS and increase efforts to directly implement aspects of the mine action programmes;

*Office of Supply Chain and Service Delivery*

- (b) Reassignment of one position of Human Resources Assistant (Local level) as Fuel Assistant (Local level) in Khartoum, to ensure uninterrupted operations of the fuel distribution point in Khartoum;

*Office of the Chief of Staff*

- (c) Conversion of one position of Translator (P-2) to Assistant Translator (National Professional Officer) and one Archives Officer (Field Service) to Senior Archives Assistant (Local level) in Khartoum;

*Aviation and Movement Control Unit*

- (d) Conversion of one position of Air Operations Assistant (Field Service) to Air Operations Officer (National Professional Officer) in Khartoum;

*Property Management Unit*

- (e) Conversion of one position of Property Management Assistant (Field Service) to Property Management Assistant (Local level) in Khartoum;

*Surface Transportation Unit*

- (f) Conversion of one position of Transport Assistant (Field Service) to Transport Assistant (Local level) in Khartoum;

*Service Delivery Unit*

- (g) Conversion of one position of Supply Assistant (Field Service) to Supply Assistant (Local level) in El Fasher.

411. The conversions are proposed in line with the requests of the General Assembly to promote the nationalization of positions, whenever appropriate, as well as to build national capacity and transfer knowledge and skills for the continued operations of the Mission.
412. In addition to civilian personnel proposed above, 30 individual police officers would be deployed to the Mission area in line with paragraph 2 (iii) of Security Council resolution [2524 \(2020\)](#) to assist, advise and support the Government's capacity to extend State presence and inclusive civilian governance, in particular by strengthening accountable rule of law and security sector institutions and building trust between State authorities and local communities. The deployment of 30 individual police officers represents an increase from 21 officers authorized for the 2021 period and is in response to the request from the host Government for additional policing support in the areas of Kadugli, Kassala and El Damazin.
413. Based on the anticipated pace of deployment of UNITAMS uniformed and civilian personnel, a vacancy rate of 45 per cent has been applied to the estimates for international and national positions, United Nations Volunteers and United Nations police officers. A vacancy rate of 50 per cent has been applied to the new position proposed for establishment.
414. The Mission coordinated with UNAMID and members of the United Nations country team for the provision of administrative services during the deployment phase on a cost-recovery basis. During the 2021–2022 period, it is envisaged that the World Food Programme would provide office space

in Kassala and transportation services throughout the Sudan. UNISFA will accommodate UNITAMS in Kadugli and provide related support services. UNAMID will host UNITAMS in El Fasher during its deployment while arrangements are made for a regional office in El Fasher. UNITAMS is co-located with UNDP and other agencies in Nyala and Zalingei. Efforts are under way to establish co-location in Port Sudan, Kauda and El Damazin. Cooperation in procurement is being considered with UNDP and the United Nations Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda, also on a cost recovery basis.

415. By 1 July 2021, UNITAMS will be deploying one medium fixed-wing aircraft, and two medium utility rotary-wing aircraft, which will be used throughout the Mission area. The operating area will include, but not be limited to, Abeyi, the Sudan, South Sudan, as well as bordering countries, Botswana, Ethiopia, Kenya, South Africa, Uganda and Zimbabwe. The fixed-wing aircraft will be based in Khartoum, and the two rotary-wing aircraft will be based in El Fasher, Darfur, as their main operations base. Regular flight schedules will be established to cover all Mission deployment locations.
416. The increase in requirements for 2022 compared with the appropriation for 2021 is attributable mainly to the following: (a) higher requirements for United Nations police, resulting from the proposed increase of nine police officers in 2022 and the application of a lower vacancy rate compared with 2021; (b) increased requirements for civilian personnel costs, owing to the application of a lower vacancy rate compared with 2021 and the proposed establishment of one international position. The increase is offset in part by the conversion of six international positions to national positions; (c) new requirements for the rental of premises, security services, engineering supplies and generator fuel, following the taking over of facilities and equipment from UNAMID; (d) increased requirements for ground transportation related to vehicle repair and maintenance services and petrol, oil and lubricants for the vehicles transferred from UNAMID; (e) the full year provision for the rental and operational costs of one fixed-wing and two rotary-wing aircrafts, for which only a 6-month provision was included in the 2021 budget; and (f) higher requirements for communication and information technology to maintain the information and communications technology infrastructure inherited from UNAMID. The overall increased requirements are offset in part by decreased requirements for consultants and consulting services due to reliance on in-house capacity provided by the deployed staff, as well as the discontinuation of the funding for programmatic activities provided in the budget for 2021 during the start-up phase of the mission.

**Extrabudgetary resources**

417. Extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$775,700 were made available in 2021.

## Annex

### Summary of follow-up action taken to implement decisions and requests of the General Assembly, including the requests and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions endorsed by the Assembly

*Brief description of the recommendation*

*Action taken to implement the recommendation*

#### Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/75/7/Add.5)

Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the higher than expected implementation rate of expenditure was due to the continued requirement for individual contractors for an additional 6 months to maintain the Log Base and liquidate assets prior to the relocation of the mission headquarters from the Log Base to the new location. The Advisory Committee trusts that updated information will be provided in the context of the next budget submission. (para. 35)

Regarding cost-sharing arrangements under thematic cluster III, the Advisory Committee recalls that it was informed, upon enquiry, that a number of cost-sharing arrangements with peacekeeping missions, service centres and United Nations offices for special political missions are in place (see A/74/7/Add.4, paras. 39–42). The Committee also recalls that it was provided with information regarding the services provided between AMISOM and UNSOM and that it was informed that AMISOM was an enabler and strategic partner for the implementation of the UNSOM mandate. The Advisory Committee recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary General to present updated information on cost-sharing arrangements and related resources between UNSOM, AMISOM and UNSOS in his next report on special political missions (cluster III). (para. 37)

The mission completed the move from the Log Base to the new mission headquarters in 2020. The resources for individual contractors as contained in the approved budget for 2021, as well as those proposed for 2022, are both in the amount of \$46,400, representing a reduction of 32 per cent compared with the approved budget for 2020, attributable to the reduced requirements for individual contractors after the move to the new mission headquarters.

Information on the cost-sharing arrangements in special political missions is provided centrally in annex VI to the main report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions (A/76/6 (Sect.3)/Add.1).

#### Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (A/75/7/Add.8)

The Advisory Committee recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to include systematically in the context of future proposed programme budgets, a detailed breakdown, with the status of incumbency, of all positions at the D-1 and higher levels funded through extrabudgetary resources, including those authorized by the Committee and those established by the Secretary-General. (para. 15)

There are currently no positions at the D-1 and higher levels funded through extrabudgetary resources in the special political missions.

The Advisory Committee notes that Arabic is a language for UNITAMS and emphasizes the importance of recruiting staff with the requisite language skills for the effective performance of their functions, which will reduce the expenses related to translation and interpretation. (para. 16)

The Advisory Committee recalls that, further to General Assembly resolutions 61/276 and 66/264, the Assembly, in its resolution 74/263, requested the Secretary-General to continue his efforts to promote the nationalization of positions, whenever appropriate, as well as to build local capacity within the special political missions and to report thereon in the context of future budget submissions (see also A/75/7/Add.2, para. 53). (para. 17)

The Advisory Committee trusts that lessons learned and best practices will be taken into account during the transition period and that the next budget submission will provide detailed information regarding the implementation of programmatic activities, including on the implementing partners and utilization of resources. (para. 29)

The Advisory Committee trusts that a detailed demining plan will be provided in the context of the next budget submission for UNITAMS. (para. 30)

The successful implementation of the UNITAMS recruitment process is dependent on the availability of adequate pool of Arabic speaking candidates for international positions requiring direct contact with the Government and civil society, in both substantive and mission support components.

At the time of recruiting, due consideration will be given to knowledge of at least two official languages, in particular for positions at the professional level and above, especially Arabic. For positions requiring knowledge of or fluency in Arabic, the level of the language proficiency will be specified, for example, fluency in Arabic and working knowledge of English, or fluency in both English and Arabic.

UNITAMS has placed great emphasis in selecting the right profile of national staff, which will enable the promotion of gender equality and avail the mission to a geographically diverse pool of talented national staff at all levels, including senior positions, for a constructive mandate delivery. This is done with the view of optimizing, strengthening and contributing directly to national capacity-building. The transfer of responsibility, skills and knowledge required for continued operation from international to national positions is taken into consideration during the stabilization phase of the mission and will follow a nationalization strategy of identifying and defining the demand required at various operational levels.

Proposals are made in the proposed budget for 2022 for the nationalization of six international positions.

Detailed information regarding the implementation of programmatic activities, including on the implementing partners and utilization of resources, is provided in performance reports as part of proposed programme budget reports.

The Mission's mine action activities during start-up in 2020 focused on surveying and identifying the scope of explosive ordnance contamination in the areas that have become accessible as a result of the Juba Peace Agreement.

In 2022, with funds from the budget for UNITAMS, UNMAS will conduct survey and clearance activities in areas identified to be contaminated, primarily in the Ullu area of Blue Nile state and its vicinity. Those activities aim to ensure the safety of humanitarian actors and local populations and create conditions for the safe return of refugees and internally displaced

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*Brief description of the recommendation**Action taken to implement the recommendation*

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persons. Since those areas are covered by the recent Juba Peace Agreement, mine action will also support confidence-building and peacebuilding.

Depending on the evolution of the peace negotiation with the al-Hilu group, and contingent on access, priority areas in south Kordofan may be prioritized for survey and clearance.

In addition, UNITAMS will continue to provide strategic and technical advice to the Sudan National Mine Action Centre pertaining to mine action and compliance with the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, and provide advocacy and advice in support of the development of local mine action initiatives in areas controlled by non-State armed groups.

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