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United Nations

Report of the Committee on Contributions

Eighty-first session (7 June–2 July 2021)

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Official Records
Seventy-sixth Session
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Note

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Summary

At its eighty-first session, with regard to the methodology for the scale of assessments for the period 2022–2024, the Committee on Contributions:

(a) Decided to review the scale for the period 2022–2024 pursuant to rule 160 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly and Assembly resolutions 58/1 B and 73/271;

(b) Recalled and reaffirmed its recommendation that the scale of assessments for the period 2022–2024 be based on the most current, comprehensive and comparable data available for gross national income (GNI);

(c) Recommended that the General Assembly encourage the Member States to submit gross national disposable income data to the Statistics Division, which the Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Working Group on the Implementation of the Principle of Capacity to Pay agreed was theoretically the most appropriate measure of capacity to pay;

(d) Welcomed the increasing number of Member States implementing the 2008 System of National Accounts (SNA), and expressed support for the ongoing efforts by the Statistics Division to enhance coordination, advocacy and implementation of SNA and supporting statistics at the national level, with a view to enabling Member States to submit national accounts data on a timely basis with the required scope, detail and quality;

(e) Recommended that the General Assembly call upon Member States to submit the required national accounts questionnaires under the 2008 SNA on a timely basis;

(f) Decided to request a joint briefing from representatives of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development at its eighty-second session to discuss efforts to resolve inconsistencies and verify data on remittances;

(g) Recommended that conversion rates based on market exchange rates be used for the scale of assessments for the period 2022–2024, except where that would cause excessive fluctuations and distortions in the GNI of some Member States expressed in United States dollars, in which case United Nations operational rates or other appropriate conversion rates should be applied, if so determined, on a case-by-case basis;

(h) Decided to use a market exchange rate (except in the case of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, where the Committee will use modified conversion rates (2014–2016) and United Nations operational rates of exchange (2017–2019));

(i) Agreed that, once chosen, there were advantages in using the same base period for as long as possible;

(j) Agreed that a low per capita income adjustment (LPCIA) continued to be an essential element in the scale methodology, which should be based on reliable, verifiable and comparable data;

(k) Noted that an alternative approach for establishing the LPCIA threshold could be the world average per capita debt-adjusted GNI;

(l) Noted that another alternative approach for establishing the LPCIA threshold could be an inflation-adjusted threshold;

(m) Considered the application of the new data to the methodology used in preparing the current scale and included the results for information;

(n) Decided to further consider all elements of the scale methodology at its eighty-second session in the light of any guidance from the General Assembly.

With regard to other suggestions and other possible elements for the scale methodology, the Committee on Contributions:

(a) Decided that the concept of a neutral zone above and below the LPCIA threshold, whereby Member States falling into that neutral zone would neither benefit from nor absorb relief arising from the application of the LPCIA, was not a reasonable option because it did not resolve the problem of the discontinuity, but merely shifted the thresholds at which the discontinuity would apply to Member States;

(b) Agreed that any scheme of limits should not be an element of the scale methodology;

(c) Decided to study further the questions of large scale-to-scale changes in rates of assessment and annual recalculation on the basis of any guidance thereon by the General Assembly.

The Committee recalled the past successful implementation of multi-year payment plans by several Member States and reiterated its recommendation that the General Assembly encourage all Member States in arrears under Article 19 of the Charter to consult with the Secretariat to develop and submit practical multi-year payment plans.

The Committee encouraged all Member States in arrears requesting exemption under Article 19 to provide the fullest possible supporting information in support of their claim, including economic, social, political and financial indicators.

With regard to exemptions from the application of Article 19 of the Charter, the Committee recommended that the following Member States be permitted to vote in the General Assembly until the end of the seventy-sixth session of the Assembly: Central African Republic, Comoros, Sao Tome and Principe and Somalia.

Under other matters, the Committee:

(a) Recommended a flat annual fee of 50 per cent to be applied to notional rates of assessment of 0.001 per cent for the Holy See and 0.011 per cent for the State of Palestine, as non-member States, for the period 2022–2024;

(b) Decided to hold its eighty-second session from 6 to 24 June 2022.

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Annexes

I. Attendance

1. The Committee on Contributions held its eighty-first session, using a hybrid modality of virtual and in-person meetings, at United Nations Headquarters from 7 June to 2 July 2021. At the beginning of the session, the Committee expressed solidarity with all those who continued to suffer as a result of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic.

2. The following members joined the session in person: Syed Yawar Ali, Jakub Chmielewski, Mohamed Mahmoud Ould El Ghaouth, Bernardo Greiver del Hoyo, Michael Holtsch, Ji-sun Jun, Vadim Laputin, Robert Ngei Mule, Toshiro Ozawa, Tõnis Saar, Henrique da Silveira Sardinha Pinto, Brett Schaefer, Ugo Sessi and Alejandro Torres Lépori. The following members joined the session virtually: Cheikh Tidiane Deme, Gordon Eckersley, Shan Lin and Steven Townley.

3. The Committee elected Mr. Greiver del Hoyo as Chair and Mr. Eckersley as Vice-Chair.

4. The Committee appreciates the efforts of the Secretariat to support the hybrid meeting.

II. Terms of reference

5. The Committee on Contributions carried out its work on the basis of its general mandate, as contained in rule 160 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly; the original terms of reference of the Committee contained in chapter IX, section 2, paragraphs 13 and 14, of the report of the Preparatory Commission (PC/20) and in the report of the Fifth Committee (A/44), adopted during the first part of the first session of the Assembly on 13 February 1946 (resolution 14 (I) A, para. 3); and the mandates contained in Assembly resolutions 46/221 B, 48/223 C, 53/36 D, 54/237 C and D, 55/5 B and D, 57/4 B, 58/1 A and B, 59/1 A and B, 60/237, 61/2, 61/237, 64/248, 67/238, 70/245 and 73/271.

6. The Committee had before it the summary record of the Fifth Committee at the seventy-fifth session of the General Assembly relating to agenda item 145, entitled "Scale of assessments for the apportionment of the expenses of the United Nations" (A/C.5/75/SR.2), and the verbatim records of the 16th and 18th plenary meetings of the Assembly at its seventy-fifth session (A/75/PV.16 and A/75/PV.18), and had available the relevant report of the Fifth Committee to the Assembly (A/75/382).

III. Scale of assessments for the period 2022–2024

7. At its eighty-first session, the Committee on Contributions recalled that, in its resolution 55/5 B, the General Assembly had established the elements of the methodology used in preparing the scale of assessments for the period 2001–2003, which had also been used since then in preparing the scale of assessments for the subsequent six periods. The Committee also recalled that, in its resolution 58/1 B, as reaffirmed in its resolution 61/237 and subsequent resolutions, the Assembly had requested the Committee, in accordance with its mandate and the rules of procedure of the Assembly, to review the methodology of future scales of assessments based on the principle that the expenses of the Organization should be apportioned broadly according to capacity to pay. By its resolution 73/271, the Assembly reaffirmed that

the Committee, as a technical advisory body, was required to prepare the scale of assessments strictly on the basis of reliable, verifiable and comparable data.

8. The Committee recalled that, in adopting the latest scale of assessments in its resolution 73/271, the General Assembly had recognized that the current methodology could be enhanced, bearing in mind the principle of capacity to pay. The Assembly had noted that there were limitations in the data set available for the preparation of the scale of assessments and had requested the Committee, in accordance with rule 160 of the rules of procedure of the Assembly, to consider all relevant data in appeals submitted by Member States that might affect their capacity to pay. The Assembly had also requested the Committee, in accordance with its mandate and the rules of procedure of the Assembly, to review and make recommendations on the elements of the methodology of the scale of assessments in order to reflect the capacity of Member States to pay, and to report thereon to the Assembly by the main part of its seventy-sixth session.

9. On the basis of the above-mentioned mandates, the Committee on Contributions had reviewed the elements of the scale methodology at its seventy-ninth session, and the results of those reviews were reflected in report A/74/11. Having considered the summary records of the Fifth Committee at the seventy-fifth session of the General Assembly relating to agenda item 145, the Committee noted that the Assembly had not provided it with any recent guidance on the methodology for the preparation of the scale of assessments for the period 2022–2024.

10. **On that basis, the Committee reviewed the scale of assessments for the period 2022–2024.**

A. Methodology for the preparation of the scale of assessments

11. The Committee recalled that the methodology used for the preparation of the scale of assessments had changed over time (see annex I). The Committee also recalled that the same methodology used to prepare the scale of assessments for the period 2001–2003 was used to prepare the scale of assessments for the period 2019–2021. An overview of the methodology used in preparing the current scale is presented in the figure below. A detailed description of that methodology is contained in annex II. In the absence of any specific guidance from the General Assembly, the Committee reviewed the elements of the current methodology further. It also considered alternative approaches suggested by members of the Committee and other possible elements for the scale methodology.

Overview of the methodology for preparing the scale of assessments



Abbreviations: GNI, gross national income; LDC, least developed country; LPCIA, low per capita income adjustment.

12. On the basis of the general mandate given to it under rule 160 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, as well as the requests contained in Assembly resolutions 58/1 B and 73/271, the Committee carried out a review of the elements of the current methodology.

1. Elements for making comparative estimates of national income

(a) Income measure

13. The income measure is a first approximation of capacity to pay. The Committee recalled that the Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Working Group on the Implementation of the Principle of Capacity to Pay had examined measures of income and agreed in 1995 that gross national disposable income (GNDI) was theoretically the most appropriate measure of capacity to pay because it represented the total income available to residents of a country, namely, national income plus net current transfers (see A/49/897). The Working Group, however, had considered that its use in the scale of assessments would be impracticable at that time owing to the lower reliability and availability of that income measure.

14. The Committee reviewed the status of the availability of the GNDI data as submitted by countries through the national accounts questionnaire, as shown below.

Availability of gross national disposable income data as at June 2021

	2014	*2015*	*2016*	*2017*	*2018*	*2019*
Number of Member States providing GNDI data	132	131	127	120	110	90
Percentage contribution of those Member States to the scale of assessments for 2019–2021	97.5	97.4	97.3	96.2	95.0	84.2

15. The Committee noted the importance of remittances, including personal transfers, in measuring a country's capacity to pay. Based on its review of the latest data, the Committee noted that there were still considerable gaps in GNDI data owing to the fact

that approximately one third of Members States had not provided such data for the period 2014–2019. Although the availability of GNDI data had improved over the years, they were still not being provided by the majority of Member States in a timely manner. By June 2021, data were available for the year 2014 for 132 Member States; however, for the year 2019, data were available for only 90 Member States. Given the lower availability of GNDI data, the Committee considered that it was still not feasible to use the data for the preparation of the scale of assessments. The Committee requested the Statistics Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the Secretariat to continue to review the availability and possible sources of GNDI data.

16. At the Committee's request, the Statistics Division presented GNDI figures using data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and compared it with data provided by Member States. Some members were concerned that data on debt and remittances presented were inconsistent depending on the source, raising questions about comparability and accuracy. For more than two decades, the Committee has been seeking to incorporate GNDI into the scales as recommended by the Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Working Group on the Implementation of the Principle of Capacity to Pay, which requires improved data. In the interests of the completeness and comparability of data, the Committee encouraged IMF, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank and the Statistics Division to make every effort to harmonize data and called upon Member States to submit consistent data to each organization. **The Committee decided to request a joint briefing from representatives of those institutions at its eighty-second session to discuss efforts to resolve inconsistencies and verify data.**

17. At its eighty-first session, the Committee reaffirmed that the scale of assessments should be based on the most current, comprehensive and comparable data available for gross national income (GNI).

18. The Committee recalled that, in 2008, the Statistical Commission had adopted the 2008 System of National Accounts (SNA) as the international statistical standard for compiling national accounts statistics and had encouraged Member States to implement the standard. However, the Committee had raised concerns in the past about the comparability of national accounts data between those Member States reporting according to the more recent standards (the 2008 SNA or the 1993 SNA) and those still reporting under the 1968 SNA. The Committee noted that an increasing number of Member States had adopted the 1993 SNA or the 2008 SNA, as shown in the table below, thereby diminishing the potential impact on the comparability of the data. The Committee noted that GNI data reported under the 1993 SNA and the 2008 SNA constituted a more accurate reflection of the full productive capacity of an economy than those reported under the 1968 SNA. The Committee welcomed the continued increase in the number of Member States reporting under the more recent standards and emphasized the importance of the remaining five Member States adopting and reporting on a timely basis under the 2008 SNA. The share of Member States still reporting under the 1968 SNA is 0.154 scale points in the 2021 update to the scale.

Member States reporting national accounts statistics under the 1993 or 2008 System of National Accounts

Year	*Number of Member States*	*Percentage of total GNI of Member States in 2019*	*Percentage of total population of Member States in 2019*
2012	156	98.0	92.6
2013	163	98.1	93.9
2014	167	98.9	94.8
2015	172	99.1	95.7

Year	*Number of Member States*	*Percentage of total GNI of Member States in 2019*	*Percentage of total population of Member States in 2019*
2016	176	99.2	96.0
2017	183	99.4	97.2
2018	183	99.4	97.2
2019	188	99.6	97.9
2020	188	99.6	97.9

19. The Committee was given a presentation by the Statistics Division on the SNA expected to be adopted in 2025.

20. The Committee reviewed the statistical data available with a two-year time lag and noted that they were the most timely data available[1] for calculating the scale of assessments. There were still considerable delays in the timely submission of data by some Member States, and consequently the data submitted officially by Member States had to be supplemented by other official sources, including from the regional commissions of the United Nations, IMF, the World Bank and the publications of Member States. In some cases, it was also necessary to include estimates prepared by the Statistics Division. The Committee noted that, in June 2021, the Statistics Division was required to make estimates of GNI for 38 Member States for the year 2019, compared with 13 for 2018 and only 4 for 2014. However, in most of those cases, official gross domestic product (GDP) data were available and had been used as the underlying basis for estimation.

Sources of information for gross national income data, June 2021

Year	*National accounts questionnaires submitted directly*	*International Monetary Fund/ World Bank*	*Other[a]*	*Estimated*	*Total*
2014	149	34	6	4	193
2015	147	36	5	5	193
2016	145	38	5	5	193
2017	134	46	5	8	193
2018	127	49	4	13	193
2019	105	46	4	38	193

[a] Statistical offices, United Nations regional commissions and central/regional banks.

21. At its previous sessions, the Committee had reviewed the reliability of statistical data available, including the impact of the revisions made over time to the data initially submitted by Member States. The Committee noted that the use of the data as later revised by Member States generated significantly different results in some cases compared with the already approved scale of assessments. The Committee also noted that most national statistical organizations provided provisional estimates, followed by revised estimates and then final estimates. Some Member States were able to publish only provisional estimates of national accounts statistics. Provisional estimates of national accounts aggregates were often substantially revised in subsequent years. The Committee considered the extent to which revision to the most recent data could be significant.

[1] In accordance with statistical standards for the timeliness of data, it is expected that data for a particular reference period be available before the end of the next period (e.g., data for 2019 are reported before the end of 2020).

22. Following its review of the data available for the preparation of the scale of assessments, the Committee had noted that, given the limitations of the data set, there were trade-offs in achieving a balance among timeliness, reliability, verifiability and comparability. The Committee had noted that those limitations were attributable to several factors, including the delay in the submission of national accounts data by some Member States, the significant revisions that were later submitted, the volume of estimates that had to be included and the fact that five Member States still reported under the 1968 SNA. In adopting the scale of assessments in its resolution 73/271, the General Assembly had noted the limitations in the data set available for the preparation of the scale of assessments. In the same resolution, the Assembly had reaffirmed that, as a technical body, the Committee was required to prepare the scale of assessments strictly on the basis of reliable, verifiable and comparable data. The Assembly had also supported the efforts of the Statistics Division in supporting statistics at the national level and in providing support to countries and regional organizations to enhance coordination, advocacy and resources for the implementation of the 1993 SNA and the 2008 SNA.

23. **On the basis of its review, the Committee:**

(a) **Recalled and reaffirmed its recommendation that the scale of assessments for the period 2022–2024 be based on the most current, comprehensive and comparable data available for GNI;**

(b) **Recommended that the General Assembly encourage the Member States to submit GNDI data to the Statistics Division, which the Ad Hoc Intergovernmental Working Group on the Implementation of the Principle of Capacity to Pay agreed was theoretically the most appropriate measure of capacity to pay;**

(c) **Welcomed the increasing number of Member States implementing the 2008 SNA, and expressed support for the ongoing efforts by the Statistics Division to enhance coordination, advocacy and implementation of SNA and supporting statistics at the national level, with a view to enabling Member States to submit national accounts data on a timely basis with the required scope, detail and quality;**

(d) **Recommended that the General Assembly call upon Member States to submit the required national accounts questionnaires under the 2008 SNA on a timely basis;**

(e) **Decided to request a joint briefing from representatives of IMF, the World Bank and OECD at its eighty-second session to discuss efforts to resolve inconsistencies and verify data on remittances.**

(b) Conversion rates

24. A conversion factor is needed to convert the GNI data received from Member States in their national currencies to a common monetary unit. In accordance with General Assembly resolutions, a United States dollar conversion factor based on market exchange rates (MERs) is used for the scale methodology except where that would cause excessive fluctuations and distortions in the income of some Member States, when average annual United Nations operational rates of exchange or other appropriate conversion rates should be employed.

25. The Committee noted that the exchange rates (conversion rates) used by the Statistics Division to convert GNI data in national currencies to United States dollars are the annual averages of market exchange rates provided to IMF by the monetary authority of each Member State, which are set out in the IMF publication entitled *International Financial Statistics*. As used by IMF, the term "market exchange rate" could refer to any one of the three types of annual average rates: (a) market rates,

determined largely by market forces; (b) official rates, determined by government authorities; and (c) principal rates, in cases in which countries maintain multiple exchange rate regimes. For the purpose of the scale of assessments, rates of all three types obtained from the publication are considered to be MERs.

26. The Committee also noted that, when MERs are not available from the publication or from the IMF economic information system, the Statistics Division uses average annual United Nations operational rates of exchange. Those rates are established primarily for accounting purposes and are applied to all official transactions of the United Nations with respect to a country's currency. The rates may take the form of official, commercial or tourist rates of exchange.

27. The Committee recalled that, for previous scales, MERs had been used (see annex III), except where that would have caused excessive fluctuations and distortions in the income of some Member States, in which case other appropriate conversion rates had been used. For the 2019–2021 scale of assessment, the Committee had used systematic criteria to identify MERs that had caused excessive fluctuations and distortions in GNI for possible replacement with other appropriate conversion rates. The stepwise application of the systematic criteria is shown in annex IV to the present report.

28. The Committee recalled that both elements of the criteria, namely, the growth factor of the per capita GNI and the MER valuation index (MVI) of Member States, were considered relative to their respective values based on the entire membership of the United Nations. In that way, the systematic criteria took into account the relative movement of the currencies of all Member States relative to the United States dollar. At previous sessions, the Committee had concluded that no single criterion would automatically solve all problems satisfactorily and that any criteria would be used solely as a point of reference to guide the Committee in identifying the Member States for which the MERs should be reviewed.

29. At its present session, the Committee used the systematic criteria to identify MERs for review for possible replacement in preparing the scale of assessments for 2022–2024. The Committee also revisited ways to refine the systematic criteria by changing the range of the variations of the thresholds of its two parameters, namely, the per capita GNI growth factor and MVI. It also used a statistical measure, a moving average, to reduce the impact of exchange rate fluctuations in the cross-country comparison of GNI. The Committee considered a number of variations, including using three-year averages, six-year averages or inflation-adjusted averages of exchange rates. The Committee noted that, apart from the inflation-adjusted averages of exchange rates, changing the range of the variations of the thresholds of its two parameters and applying three-year and six-year averages of exchange rates to the current data did not improve the reliability of the results, and the systematic criteria as currently formulated remained a generally effective instrument to assist in identifying Member States with MERs that needed additional review. The Committee decided to continue to study the systematic criteria at its future sessions.

30. **The Committee recommended that conversion rates based on MERs be used for the scale of assessments for the period 2022–2024, except where that would cause excessive fluctuations and distortions in the GNI of some Member States expressed in United States dollars, in which case United Nations operational rates or other appropriate conversion rates should be applied, if so determined on a case-by-case basis.**

(c) Base period

31. For the scale methodology, income data expressed in United States dollars are averaged over a designated base period. The Committee recalled that, in the past, the

base period used in preparing the scale of assessments had varied from 1 to 10 years. For the 2001–2003 scale, the General Assembly, in its resolution 55/5 B, had adopted a hybrid approach based on average statistical base periods of six and three years, reflecting a compromise between those arguing for shorter base periods and those arguing for longer ones. In implementing that decision, two scales had been separately calculated for each of the six-year and three-year base periods and had then been averaged to form a final scale of assessments. Since then, subsequent scales of assessments had been calculated using that approach.

32. The Committee recalled that at previous sessions it had discussed extensively the alternative approach of first averaging the GNI data for three-year and six-year periods and then running a single machine scale on the average, instead of running two separate machine scales for each period and averaging their results. The Committee had concluded that a single machine run was technically feasible, as reflected by the statistical information provided by the Statistics Division, but the information showed some differences in the distribution of points compared with the current approach. Some members expressed the view that it would be a simpler technical approach to reflect the average of the three-year and six-year periods, and would not constitute a change to the current methodology. Other members expressed the view that two scales should continue to be calculated and the results averaged, consistent with the approach that had been used since the adoption by the General Assembly of its resolution 55/5 B.

33. The Committee also recalled that at its previous sessions it had discussed the advantages and disadvantages of both shorter and longer base periods. Some members had favoured longer base periods as a way of ensuring stability and smoothing out sharp year-to-year fluctuations in the income measure of Member States, while others had favoured shorter base periods to better reflect the current capacity of Member States to pay.

34. The Committee noted that the choice of base period had a material impact on the outcome of the scale methodology. However, once chosen, comparability and stability were achieved over time by maintaining the same base period. Since the current approach had been used for a relatively long time, those objectives had been achieved for the methodology.

35. **The Committee agreed that, once chosen, there were advantages to using the same base period for as long as possible.**

2. Relief measures

36. The relief measures in the scale of assessments methodology consist of the debt-burden and low per capita income adjustments. An overview of those two adjustments is presented below.

Overview of the debt-burden and low per capita income adjustments by scale period (average of three- and six-year base periods)

Scale period	*DBA*	*LPCIA*	*Sum of redistribution of DBA and LPCIA*	*Number of LPCIA beneficiaries*	*Share of LPCIA beneficiaries at DBA stage[a]*	*Share of LPCIA beneficiaries at LPCIA stage[b]*	*Average per capita GNI of LPCIA beneficiaries*	*Average per capita GNI of LPCIA absorbers*	*World average per capita GNI*
2001–2003	0.786	8.457	9.243	132	18.577	10.120	1 112	23 418	4 851
2004–2006	0.796	8.627	9.423	130	16.449	7.822	1 064	23 328	5 097
2007–2009	0.711	9.287	9.998	132	17.713	8.426	1 252	26 237	5 630
2010–2012	0.598	9.564	10.163	134	20.553	10.989	1 778	30 634	6 988
2013–2015	0.545	9.598	10.143	130	19.839	10.241	2 319	28 059	8 647

Scale period	DBA	LPCIA	Sum of redistribution of DBA and LPCIA	Number of LPCIA beneficiaries	Share of LPCIA beneficiaries at DBA stage[a]	Share of LPCIA beneficiaries at LPCIA stage[b]	Average per capita GNI of LPCIA beneficiaries	Average per capita GNI of LPCIA absorbers	World average per capita GNI
2016–2018	0.588	10.132	10.720	131	26.240	16.107	3 497	33 804	10 186
2019–2021	0.720	9.647	10.367	130	28.589	18.942	3 920	32 862	10 440
2021 update[c,d]	0.755	9.433	10.188	131	35.739	26.306	4 770	42 582	10 944
Growth since 2001–2003[e]	-3.9	11.5	10.2	-0.8	92.4	159.9	329.0	81.8	125.6

Abbreviations: DBA, debt-burden adjustment; LPCIA, low per capita income adjustment.

[a] The sum of the shares of those Member States that benefit from the LPCIA at the DBA stage of the scale methodology.

[b] The sum of the shares of those Member States that benefit from the LPCIA at the LPCIA stage of the scale methodology.

[c] 2021 update refers to the update of the 2019–2021 scale using data for the 2014–2019 base period, available in June 2021.

[d] Market exchange rate (except modified conversion rates (2014–2016) and United Nations operational rates of exchange (2017–2019) for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela).

[e] Percentage change between the 2001–2003 scale and the 2021 update scale.

37. In the course of the discussion, some members wondered whether the existing scale methodology might be better recast in some way to focus relief on the Member States that were the least able to contribute, with the full burden of that relief and any other adjustments required then to be met by the Member States with the highest capacity to contribute. While some basic possibilities for implementing that proposal were briefly examined, those members considered that further consideration of this concept would best be taken up in a non-scale year in the light of guidance from the General Assembly. Some members expressed reservations, pointing out that Member States whose per capita income was below the average per capita income of the Member States had limited capacity to pay and should not be excluded from the above-mentioned proposal.

(a) Debt-burden adjustment

38. The Committee recalled that the debt-burden adjustment had been part of the scale methodology since 1986. It had been introduced in response to a debt crisis at that time, in which a number of developing countries had been unable to refinance sovereign debt. As a consequence, some countries had been confronted by crises of solvency that had had a severe impact on their capacity to pay. The debt-burden adjustment had therefore been introduced to provide relief to such Member States by reflecting the impact of the repayment of their external debt on their capacity to pay. Given the fact that interest on external debt was already accounted for as part of GNI, the debt-burden adjustment in the current methodology was calculated by deducting the nominal principal payments on external debt from GNI in United States dollars. Percentage shares were recalculated on the basis of debt-adjusted GNI, and therefore the impact of the debt-burden adjustment was indirectly distributed to all Member States. The Committee noted that the total redistribution of points at the debt-burden adjustment stage using updated statistical data for the 2014–2019 period would be 0.755 percentage points. A total of 122 members would benefit from the debt-burden adjustment.

39. Some members noted that the debt-burden adjustment had been introduced to provide relief to Member States that were identified as "especially badly affected by external debt" (see A/42/11, para. 21) but was currently applied to all debt for countries not classified as high-income economies by the World Bank. Furthermore, the same members noted that most of the relief provided by the debt-burden adjustment in recent scales of assessment went to upper-middle-income countries, including those that provided large external loans.

Overview of the debt-burden adjustment by scale period (average of three- and six-year base periods)

Scale period	*Debt-burden adjustment (percentage points)*	*Number of debt-burden adjustment beneficiaries*	*World Bank thresholds (United States dollars)*
2001–2003	0.786	112	9 412
2004–2006	0.796	109	9 322
2007–2009	0.711	103	9 443
2010–2012	0.598	133	10 701
2013–2015	0.545	129	11 868
2016–2018	0.588	122	12 490
2019–2021	0.720	122	12 514
2021 update[a,b]	0.755	122	12 362

[a] "2021 update" refers to the update of the 2019–2021 scale using data available in June 2021 for the period 2014–2019.

[b] Market exchange rate (except modified conversion rates (2014–2016) and United Nations operational rates of exchange (2017–2019) for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela).

40. The Committee noted that, for several periods, the total redistribution of points at the debt-burden adjustment stage had varied over the years.

41. The Committee recalled that, when the debt-burden adjustment had been introduced, public external debt had been preferred over total external debt for two main reasons. First, not all private external debt was included in total external debt. Second, private debt did not constitute the same burden as public debt. However, total external debt had been used rather than public debt because of greater availability of data and the lack of distinction between public and private debt in data then available. The Committee's consideration of this matter was summarized in its report on its forty-eighth session (see A/43/11, paras. 11–21). In recent years, the availability of data from the World Bank on public external debt and publicly guaranteed debt had improved substantially. In 1985, such data had been available for 37 Member States, while they were now available for 121 Member States.

42. The Committee noted that, in addition to the 121 Member States covered in the World Bank database, 12 other Member States qualified for the debt-burden adjustment under the current methodology. Five of those Member States had provided debt data in response to requests that were transmitted through their permanent missions to the United Nations. Of the 126 Member States subject to the debt-burden adjustment, four Member States did not benefit as the share of their debt-adjusted GNI in world debt-adjusted GNI was more than the share of their GNI in world GNI. In those cases in which there was no response, estimates were made by the Statistics Division for those countries for which debt data for at least one year of the base period had previously been provided. For the remaining Member States, several were subject to the floor adjustment, and the lack of a debt-burden adjustment would have had no impact on their rate of adjustment. The Committee noted that gaps in data from some Member States that qualified for the debt-burden adjustment had an impact on the ability to prepare the scale of assessments strictly on the basis of reliable, verifiable and comparable data.

43. The Committee recalled that limitations in the availability of data on principal payments on debt at the time when the adjustment had been introduced had led it to base the adjustment on a proportion of the total external debt stock of the Member States concerned. For that purpose, it had been assumed that external debt was repaid over a period of eight years, so that the adjustment to the GNI data was 12.5 per cent of total external debt stock per year. That became known as the debt-stock approach.

Alternatively, the adjustment could be based on data on actual repayments of debt principal, which became known as the debt-flow approach. Debt-flow data were used for one year in the preparation of the scale for 1998–2000 (see annex I). In its report on its fifty-sixth session, it was noted that, notwithstanding the view of some members that the overall level of debt itself constituted a significant burden, the Committee had agreed that the adjustment should be based on data on actual principal repayments, rather than on a proportion of debt stocks (see A/50/11/Add.2, para. 41).

44. With regard to the availability of information required for the application of the debt-stock and debt-flow approaches, the Committee noted that, for the 2014–2019 period, the World Bank International Debt Statistics database covered the debt stock and debt flow of 121 Member States. The countries covered were developing countries that were members of and borrowers from the World Bank and had per capita GNI below the World Bank per capita GNI threshold for high-income economies, which had been $12,536 in 2019. On the basis of the information reviewed at its present session, the Committee noted that the actual average repayment period of external debt for 2014–2019 was approximately 10.1 years, compared with the 8-year period assumed for the debt-stock approach.

45. Consequently, two issues that had been raised in relation to the current methodology of the debt-burden adjustment could be addressed using the currently available data, namely: (a) whether to use total external debt data or only public and publicly guaranteed external debt data; and (b) whether to base the adjustment on the debt-stock or the debt-flow approach. The figure below summarizes the size and number of beneficiaries of the debt-burden adjustment, taking into account the different possible options.

Comparison of different debt-burden adjustment approaches, with a six-year base period (updated with June 2021 data)



46. The Committee considered the coverage of the debt-burden adjustment. In that context, some members pointed out that the economic situation had changed significantly since the introduction of the adjustment in 1986. There was a discussion on the purpose of the debt-burden adjustment. Some members suggested that if the adjustment was intended to provide relief it should apply to the Member States facing significant debt burdens or substantial challenges in terms of capacity to pay. If, however, the debt-burden adjustment was intended to more accurately reflect the capacity to pay, those members argued that the debt-burden adjustment should be applied to all Member States. The Statistics Division noted that external debt statistics for all Member States were still not readily available from one data source and that the available data were not comparable.

47. Other members stated that the adjustment was still an essential part of the methodology in determining the capacity of many Member States to pay and that it should therefore be retained in its present form. These members pointed out that the debt-burden adjustment concept was based on developmental concerns and therefore should continue to be limited to countries below the World Bank threshold for high-income per capita GNI. They noted that the latest statistical data showed that the size of the adjustment was increasing. They argued that the debt-burden adjustment was necessary for measuring the real capacity of Member States to pay, bearing in mind that there were still a number of heavily indebted Member States.

48. With regard to the question of whether to use total external debt or public debt, those members noted that, since the GNI calculation took into account both private and public sources of income, total external debt should logically be retained in the debt-burden adjustment calculation. They also expressed the view that the use of total debt stock was necessary, as total external debt reflected capacity to pay, and that private debt represented an important component of the total debt stock, impacting the balance of payments and influencing the overall capacity of Member States to pay.

49. With regard to the question of whether to use debt stock or debt flow, those members noted that an adjustment based on debt stock was of better service to Member States most in need of relief: those which over time had not been able to make repayments and therefore had not been able to reduce their external debt. Those members emphasized that the recent international financial crisis had had a negative impact on the development prospects of many developing countries, therefore further affecting their capacity to pay and worsening their debt situation. They considered that the adjustment should continue to be part of the methodology, as it reflected an important factor in the capacity of Member States to pay.

50. Other members expressed support for refinements to the debt-burden adjustment on the basis of technical merit and the improved availability of data. They noted that data availability constraints were no longer a technical obstacle to using public rather than total external debt data, nor to switching from the debt-stock to the debt-flow approach. They viewed such changes as technical enhancements to the current methodology. In their view, the debt-flow approach took into account actual transactions of debt repayment and was therefore a better representation of the economic reality. If debt repayment was to be considered a burden, then that would support taking actual repayment into account. Those members also expressed the view that, if the debt stock approach was maintained, it could be significantly improved by updating the repayment period, which was based on the assumption of repayment occurring over a period of eight years at the time of introduction of the debt-burden adjustment in 1986. That would bring the debt stock closer to the current economic reality.

51. Those members also raised a number of conceptual issues. They disputed the view that all debt was a burden, as assumed by the current methodology. Those members argued that the impact that debt had on a Member State's capacity to pay

was more accurately reflected by the market interest rate on debt refinance, which was already taken into account in GNI measures.

52. The Committee noted that unavailability of data was no longer a factor in determining whether to base the debt-burden adjustment on (a) total external debt or public external debt; and (b) the debt-stock approach or the debt-flow approach. Data were now available on public external debt and on the actual repayments.

53. Some members expressed the view that the debt-burden adjustment no longer served its original purpose as it did not focus relief on those Member States that most needed relief. The Member States that benefited the most from the debt-burden adjustment were generally middle-income countries, as defined by the World Bank. From a technical standpoint, they considered that the current methodology was seriously flawed and no longer in line with economic reality, which meant that the debt-burden adjustment relief was inaccurate and distorted the overall scale of assessment, as well as the level of the debt-burden adjustment due to individual Member States. Those members expressed the view that, if the debt-burden adjustment could not be brought into line with economic reality, then it was preferable to eliminate it from the methodology altogether. Also, some members pointed out that some upper-middle-income countries with a large debt stock also extended large external loans, and that for those countries the debt-burden adjustment should be calculated on a net basis. Nevertheless, according to information provided by the Statistics Division, there were insufficient data available to determine in a comparable way the net debt of the Member States that benefited from the debt-burden adjustment in the current methodology. It was suggested that efforts to resolve inconsistencies and verify data on debt should also be discussed in the scope of the joint briefing with representatives of IMF, the World Bank and OECD at its eighty-second session (see para. 23 (e) above).

54. **The Committee decided to consider further the question of the debt-burden adjustment at future sessions in the light of guidance from the General Assembly.**

(b) Low per capita income adjustment

55. The Committee noted that the low per capita income adjustment had been an important element of the scale methodology since the earliest days of the United Nations and that it had been used in the preparation of the first scale of assessments. The Committee recalled that its terms of reference, inter alia, called for comparative income per head of population to be taken into account to prevent anomalous assessments resulting from the use of comparative estimates of national income. **The Committee agreed that a low per capita income adjustment continued to be an essential element of the scale methodology, which should be based on reliable, verifiable and comparable data.**

56. The adjustment has two parameters to set the size of the adjustment: a threshold level of per capita GNI to determine which countries would benefit, and a gradient. Prior to 1979, the amount of the adjustment was distributed pro rata to all Member States; however, from that year onward the adjustment was changed to be redistributed only to Member States above the low per capita income threshold. Since the adoption of the 1995–1997 scale, the threshold, which had previously been a fixed dollar amount, has been the average per capita GNI for the membership. The gradient had grown over the years, from 40 per cent in 1948 to 85 per cent in 1983. As detailed in annex I, since the calculation of the scale for the 1998–2000 period, the gradient has been fixed at 80 per cent.

57. The total redistribution of points at the low per capita income adjustment stage using updated statistical data for 2014–2019 would be 9.433 percentage points.

Overview of the low per capita income adjustment by scale period (average of three- and six-year base periods)

Scale period	*LPCIA*	*Number of LPCIA beneficiaries*	*World average per capita GNI*
2001–2003	8.457	132	4 851
2004–2006	8.627	130	5 097
2007–2009	9.287	132	5 630
2010–2012	9.564	134	6 988
2013–2015	9.598	130	8 647
2016–2018	10.132	131	10 186
2019–2021	9.647	130	10 440
2021 update[a,b]	9.433	131	10 944

Abbreviation: LPCIA, low per capita income adjustment.

[a] "2021 update" refers to the update of the 2019–2021 scale using data available in June 2021 for the period 2014–2019.

[b] Market exchange rate (except modified conversion rates (2014–2016) and United Nations operational rates of exchange (2017–2019) for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela).

58. The Committee reviewed information showing the distribution of the overall low per capita income adjustment for individual beneficiaries of that adjustment. The information showed that most beneficiaries receive an adjustment of less than one tenth of one percentage point.

Analysis of the low per capita income adjustment redistribution of points by scale period for the average of three- and six-year base periods

		Number of LPCIA beneficiaries			
			Top beneficiaries (>0.1 LPCIA reduction)		
Scale period	*LPCIA*	*Total*	*>2.5*	*between 0.1 and 2.5*	*<0.1*
2001–2003	8.457	132	1	15	116
2004–2006	8.627	130	1	14	115
2007–2009	9.287	132	1	14	117
2010–2012	9.564	134	1	16	117
2013–2015	9.598	130	1	14	115
2016–2018	10.132	131	1	15	115
2019–2021	9.647	130	1	14	115
2021 update	9.433	131	0	17	114

59. At its present session, the Committee reviewed the low per capita income adjustment as currently formulated, using updated statistics. The figure below presents the low per capita income adjustment as a percentage of the debt-adjusted GNI share, shown in relation to the per capita debt-adjusted GNI. With a gradient of 80 per cent, for those Member States below the threshold, the low per capita income adjustment ranges from 80 per cent to zero, with the relative size of the adjustment decreasing as the per capita debt-adjusted GNI approaches the threshold. For all Member States above the threshold, the low per capita income adjustment results in a uniform increase of 15.0 per cent of their debt-adjusted GNI, as shown in the figure below. The size of this discontinuity is increasing, having a marked impact on Member States that cross the per capita income threshold.

Low per capita income adjustment as a percentage of debt-burden adjusted gross national income share, in relation to per capita debt-adjusted gross national income (for illustrative purposes, with a six-year base period that results in a threshold of $10,783)



Abbreviation: DBA, debt-burden adjustment; LPCIA, low per capita income adjustment.

60. Some members of the Committee expressed the view that, according to the review of the latest statistical data, the low per capita income adjustment continued to work well as part of the overall methodology and should be retained as currently formulated. Those members noted that the per capita GNI of many countries had increased over time and that such countries received lower adjustments. Furthermore, the number of beneficiary countries had varied over time, as some countries had crossed the threshold and no longer received any adjustment and now paid for the benefits of those below the threshold. They also noted that the latest statistical data reflected a decrease in the size of the redistribution. They expressed their support for the continued use of average per capita GNI for the membership in establishing the threshold and pointed out that the threshold based on the world average per capita GNI reflected the economic reality and was a sound basis for determining low per capita income. They also pointed to the significant changes in recent scales of assessment, which included increases for many developing countries. They emphasized that changes to the low per capita income adjustment would need to be based on reliable data and should be a technical enhancement to the methodology as a whole, not a change designed solely to lessen the absorption of the burden on those above the threshold.

61. Other members argued that the adjustment had been intended to provide targeted relief for countries with low per capita income, but that, through the current design of the threshold as the average per capita GNI for the membership, it was instead providing very generalized and significant relief to a much larger number of Member States, including Member States that the World Bank classified as upper-middle-income countries. While the current threshold was $10,783 (six-year base period), the World Bank classification for low-income countries was $1,020. They noted that 106 out of the 133 countries currently receiving low per capita income adjustment relief were middle-income countries. They further noted that over two thirds of the low per capita income adjustment relief in terms of total scale points redistributed went to 49 upper-middle-income countries. Those members therefore supported using a more appropriate, alternative definition of the low per capita income adjustment threshold to focus relief on low-income and lower-middle-income countries.

Evolution of the World Bank low income threshold, the debt-burden adjustment threshold and the low per capita income adjustment threshold



Abbreviation: DBA, debt-burden adjustment.

62. The Committee recalled the various options for revising the low per capita income adjustment, with different views expressed. Those options are summarized as follows:

(a) The low per capita income adjustment threshold could be based on the world average per capita debt-adjusted GNI instead of the unadjusted per capita GNI used in the current methodology. Given the lack of comparable external debt data for all countries, an alternative approach would be to use unadjusted per capita GNI for both Member States and the threshold calculation. This would address the asymmetry of comparing the debt-adjusted GNI of Member States against an adjustment threshold based on the unadjusted GNI;

(b) The threshold could be redefined on the basis of the World Bank definition of low-income, lower-middle-income or upper-middle-income countries. This could address the inconsistency with the classification used for the debt-burden adjustment, which was based on the World Bank Debtor Reporting System;

(c) The threshold could be adjusted in line with the average GNI per capita of the absorbers (those above the threshold) only, rather than the world average. This would address inconsistency in the current methodology, which could arise when, as the situation of low-income countries improved, they would push up the threshold, delaying the point at which they graduated above it;

(d) The threshold could be fixed in real terms at an initial fixed amount, such as $10,000, similar to the $1,000 fixed threshold used from 1948 to 1973. The $10,000 could then be adjusted for inflation in future years;

(e) The discontinuity caused when crossing the threshold could be addressed by changing the manner of distribution of the adjustment (which was currently absorbed only by those countries above the threshold). The proposals are further discussed in section B.1 (b) below;

(f) Taking into account the inconsistency with the classification used for the debt-burden adjustment, the Committee also discussed a novel proposal to apply a lower low per capita income adjustment threshold but to apply the redistribution only to countries classified by the World Bank as high-income. This would create a group of middle-income countries that neither benefited from relief measures nor absorbed the scale points resulting from the relief measures. The proposals are further discussed in section B.1 (b) below.

Comparison of different thresholds for the low per capita income adjustment (six-year base period)





63. **In the past, the Committee had agreed that an alternative approach for establishing the threshold could be the world average per capita debt-adjusted GNI** (instead of the unadjusted per capita GNI used in the current methodology). The Committee noted that this would address the asymmetry of comparing the debt-adjusted GNI of Member States against an adjustment threshold based on the unadjusted GNI. Under that alternative approach, using the updated statistical data for 2012–2017, the size of the points redistributed would change, but the number of beneficiaries and number of absorbers would remain the same.

64. **The Committee had also agreed that another alternative approach for establishing the threshold could be an inflation-adjusted threshold.** The low per capita income adjustment threshold would be fixed in real terms instead of being set at the current average world per capita income for the scale base period. For example, the average per capita GNI of a specific reference year could be used, but it could be updated according to the world inflation rate in order to keep its real value constant over time. Under that approach, a country's individual position with respect to the low per capita income adjustment threshold would be rendered independent of the

performance of other countries. Under that alternative approach, using the updated statistical data for 2012–2017 and the 2019–2021 threshold adjusted for inflation, the size of the points redistributed would change, but the number of beneficiaries and number of absorbers would remain the same.

65. **The Committee decided to consider further the low per capita income adjustment in the light of guidance from the General Assembly.**

3. Limits to the scale

(a) Floor

66. The Committee recalled that the minimum assessment rate, or floor, had been an element of the scale methodology from the outset. The setting of the floor was a decision to be taken by the General Assembly. Since 1998, the floor had been reduced from 0.01 to 0.001 per cent. In the scale of assessments for the 2019–2021 period, 16 Member States, of which 9 were included in the list of the least developed countries, had been raised to the floor. On the basis of its analysis of the updated statistical data for 2014–2019, the Committee noted that 16 Member States, of which 8 were included in the list of the least developed countries, had been raised to the floor.

67. Member States at the floor (0.001 per cent) were each assessed $28,926 for the regular budget for 2021. The Committee considered the floor of 0.001 per cent to be the practical minimum contribution that Member States should be expected to make to the Organization.

68. **The Committee decided to consider further the question of the floor at future sessions in the light of guidance from the General Assembly.**

(b) Ceilings

69. The Committee recalled that the current methodology included a maximum assessment rate, or ceiling, of 22 per cent and a maximum assessment rate for the least developed countries, or least developed countries ceiling, of 0.010 per cent. The setting of both ceilings was a decision to be taken by the General Assembly.

70. Since 1992, the least developed countries ceiling had been 0.010 per cent. That ceiling had applied to 7 of the 46 least developed countries for the scale of assessments for 2019–2021. The total redistribution using the updated data for 2014–2019 was 0.190 points. It should be noted that Equatorial Guinea graduated from the least developed country category in June 2017 and Vanuatu graduated from the least developed country category in December 2020.

71. As detailed in annex I, the maximum ceiling has been part of the scale methodology from the outset. Since 2001, the maximum ceiling rate has been reduced from 25 to 22 per cent. The total redistribution of points using updated statistical data was 6.565. Only one country has benefited from those points.

Overview of the total change in scale at the maximum 22 per cent ceiling step by scale period (average of three- and six-year base periods)

Scale period	*Points redistributed at the maximum ceiling step*
2001–2003	8.166
2004–2006	12.329
2007–2009	11.907
2010–2012	8.965
2013–2015	5.622

Scale period	*Points redistributed at the maximum ceiling step*
2016–2018	3.938
2019–2021	5.260
2021 update[a,b]	6.565

[a] "2021 update" refers to the update of the 2019–2021 scale using data available in June 2021 for the period 2014–2019.

[b] Market exchange rate (except modified conversion rates (2014–2016) and United Nations operational rates of exchange (2017–2019) for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela).

72. **The Committee decided to consider further the question of the ceilings at future sessions in the light of guidance from the General Assembly.**

B. Other suggestions and other possible elements for the scale methodology

1. Large scale-to-scale changes in rates of assessment and discontinuity

(a) Large scale-to-scale changes in rates of assessment

73. The Committee recalled that over the years it had considered the question of large scale-to-scale changes in the rates of assessment of Member States. It also recalled that the scale methodology for the 1986–1998 scales had included a scheme of limits, which had restricted large scale-to-scale increases and decreases faced by Member States. Nevertheless, owing to the complexities related to the operation of the scheme of limits, which itself created distortions, the General Assembly had subsequently decided to phase out the scheme of limits over two scale periods. Since the calculation of the 2001-2003 scale, its effects had been fully eliminated. Additional details on the rationale for that decision are provided in the report of the Committee on its seventy-eighth session (A/73/11) and previous reports of the Committee.

74. **The Committee agreed that any scheme of limits should not be an element of the scale methodology.**

75. Under the current methodology, any Member State that moved up from the floor would inevitably experience a minimum increase of 100 per cent. The Committee considered the approach of implementing a scale carried out to four decimal places, which would have the impact of allowing smaller movements in rates between two different scales for those moving up from the floor. After discussion, the Committee recalled that, in a dynamic world, changes to the rates of assessment were inevitable. Since the scale was a 100 per cent scale, as the shares of some Member States went up or down, the shares of others would decrease or increase in inverse proportion, regardless of whether their GNI had increased or decreased in absolute terms. Moreover, the Committee noted that even a four decimal place scale would result in an increased assessment for Member States facing the prospect of moving up from the floor and observed that the amounts involved at the floor were small and should be within the capacity to pay of all Member States.

76. The Committee studied the cases of Member States with large changes in their rates of assessment, using the updated statistical data for the 2014–2019 period. The rates of assessment based on the updated data and the application of the methodology approved for the scale for 2019–2021 are contained in section III.D of the present report. In addition, annex V provides summary information on the scale-to-scale changes using updated statistical data compared with the approved scale for 2019-2021, including information on the underlying factors. The Committee noted that, as had been the case in the past, many changes were related to relative growth

of GNI in comparison with the world average, crossing of the LPCIA threshold, revisions to past official data over time, proximity to the LPCIA threshold and implementation of the new SNA standard.

77. Some members of the Committee noted that the inclusion of the six-year base period in the present methodology served as a built-in mitigation strategy, offsetting the impact of a sudden sharp increase in GNI share in more recent years.

78. Some members noted that annual recalculation of the scale would offer a degree of mitigation through gradual annual changes over the scale period.

(b) Discontinuity

79. In discussing the issue of discontinuity at its present session, the Committee focused on dealing with the discontinuity caused when a Member State crossed the LPCIA threshold. The Committee noted that Member States crossing the threshold would no longer receive a reduction and would instead be subject to an increase at the LPCIA stage. Therefore, the size of the discontinuity for a Member State crossing the threshold would be the reduction that the Member State received as a beneficiary under the old scale, plus the increase borne as an absorber under the new scale (15 per cent). Prior to 1979, the amount of the adjustment had been distributed pro rata to all Member States, including those below the LPCIA threshold. As a result, all Member States, except those affected by the ceilings or the floor, had shared the burden of the adjustment. That approach had mitigated the effect of the adjustment on those moving up through the threshold. It could also result, however, in countries slightly below the threshold becoming net absorbers. Owing to concern about that effect, the adjustment had been redistributed since 1979 to only Member States that were above the threshold.

80. The options for addressing the problem of discontinuity included: distributing the percentage points arising from the LPCIA to all Member States; and allowing "indirect redistribution" similar to the debt-burden adjustment, whereby the GNI of countries below the threshold would be reduced to the extent of the LPCIA, while countries above the threshold would not have to explicitly absorb the relief given to the countries below the threshold. **The Committee decided that the concept of a neutral zone above and below the LPCIA threshold, whereby Member States falling into that neutral zone would neither benefit from nor absorb relief arising from the application of the LPCIA, was not a reasonable option because it did not resolve the problem of the discontinuity, but merely shifted the thresholds at which the discontinuity would apply to Member States.** The effect of these options to address discontinuity is reflected in the chart below.

81. Some members expressed reservations about introducing such proposals into the scale methodology. They pointed out that, in many cases, changes in rates of assessment were the result of real growth and changes in the capacity to pay. Those members noted that the inclusion of the six-year base period in the current methodology provided some built-in mitigation to address discontinuity. Other members noted the ongoing issue with regard to Member States crossing the threshold in different scales and the resulting dramatic swings in their assessments as they either received LCPIA relief or absorbed the cost of LCPIA relief and that the options above would address that problem.

Effect of different methodologies to address discontinuity at the low per capita income adjustment threshold (six-year base period)



Abbreviation: DBA, debt-burden adjustment.

82. **The Committee decided to further study measures to deal with large scale-to-scale changes and discontinuity in the light of guidance from the General Assembly.**

2. Annual recalculation

83. Annual recalculation is the updating of relative income shares before the second and third years of each scale period, involving the replacement of data for the first year of the base period(s) with newly available data for the year following the initial base period(s). In the case of the scale for the 2016–2018 period, for example, for which the base periods were 2008–2013 and 2011–2013, data for 2014 would replace both data for 2008 in the six-year base period and data for 2011 in the three-year base period. On the basis of those recalculated income shares and the established scale methodology, the scale for 2017 would be adjusted accordingly. Similarly, for 2018, the scale would be adjusted by replacing data for 2009 in the six-year base period and data for 2012 in the three-year base period with data for 2015.

84. The Committee recalled that it had first considered the proposal for automatic annual recalculation of the scale in 1997.

85. At its present session, the Committee spent considerable time discussing the impact of the current global pandemic upon the economic performance of Member States and the extent to which that would be reflected in the updated scale of assessments. Members noted that the base period for the 2022–2024 updated scale of assessments did not include the years 2020 or 2021 and that it did not therefore take any account of the impact of the pandemic. It was suggested that one way to reflect the impact of the pandemic was to introduce a regular annual recalculation of the

scale of assessments. That would ensure that the most up-to-date economic data were used to update the scale. Nevertheless, as in the past, members had different views, mainly about its practical implementation and whether its benefits outweighed its potential drawbacks.

86. While it was technically feasible to recalculate the scale of assessment annually, many members considered that that was not an optimal solution. Those members recalled that the Committee had considered the merits of annual recalculation many times in the past but had found that the practical drawbacks of annual recalculation were considerable. They therefore supported the maintenance of current arrangements, which were reflected in rule 160 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, to the effect that the scale of assessments, once fixed by the Assembly, should not be subject to a general revision for at least three years unless it was clear that there had been substantial changes in relative capacity to pay.

87. Those members expressed the view that the current scale methodology contained relief measures designed to mitigate the worst effects of economic crises, including those arising from the current global pandemic. It was clear that the pandemic had affected all Member States to a significant degree, and it was therefore unlikely that recalculating the scale annually would result in major changes to the scale because it was a Member State’s relative share of world GNI, rather than its absolute level of GNI, that was the largest determinant of its scale assessment.

88. Annual recalculation would also require annual General Assembly approval of the scale of assessments, as well as potential changes to the timing and frequency of peacekeeping assessments, potentially impacting the liquidity position of individual peacekeeping operations. Those members also considered that it would make the annual assessments of Member States less stable and predictable and could have a negative impact on the formulation of the national budgets of some Member States. They noted that additional costs might arise, depending on the length of the Committee’s annual session and the required arrangements for servicing the Committee and the Assembly.

89. Some members supported annual recalculation, on the basis of the view that it would reflect a better measure of capacity to pay, since the scale would be recalculated annually on the basis of the most up-to-date data available. They considered that this would also be better aligned with the proposed annual budget of the United Nations. Those members referred to the problems encountered in the provision of data, the volume of estimates and the significant revisions made by some Member States to previously submitted data. They noted that annual recalculation would allow for newly available statistical data to be taken into account in the scale of assessments, including data from more recent years, revisions to data from past years and the extra information submitted by individual Member States. Annual recalculation would also help to address discontinuity and smooth out large scale-to-scale increases. Those members also noted that annual recalculation would be based on approved scale methodology fixed for three years, with scale rates to be recalculated annually on the basis of updated statistical data.

90. The main potential benefits and drawbacks of annual recalculation are outlined below.

Benefits	*Drawbacks*
Better reflects the current capacity of Member States to pay, as each year the scale would be based on the most up-to-date data available	Annual assessments of Member States could be less stable and predictable, and the formulation of national budgets more complicated

Benefits	*Drawbacks*
Ensures that assessments always use data from two years earlier and revisions to GNI estimates are fully incorporated	Peacekeeping assessments would be issued at least twice a year (in January and July, for a maximum of six months); consequential impact on the Organization's short-term cash flow; and administrative consequences (such as additional assessments and reports)
May help in some cases to address the issue of large scale-to-scale increases by smoothing out adjustments annually over the three-year period	May pose problems for some international organizations that follow the United Nations scale of assessments
The updated scale of assessments could take into account any newly available statistical information that was not available when the scale was reviewed	Implications would depend, in part, upon such decisions as the length of the Committee's annual session, the degree of delegation to the Committee and other work modalities, in addition to the possible need to amend rule 160 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly

91. **The Committee decided to study further the question of annual recalculation at future sessions in the light of guidance from the General Assembly.**

3. Inclusion of the indicators of 2020 and 2021 in the scale methodology as soon as possible

92. Owing to the effects of the coronavirus disease (COVID-19) pandemic, which affected the capacity of Member States to pay, a view was put forward that the economic indicators of 2020 and 2021 be included in the methodology as soon as possible. In this regard supporting the retention of the current system of three-year scale of assessment, some members suggested that the extraordinary circumstances arising from the COVID-19 pandemic might merit the recalculation of the scale of assessment in 2023 as a one-time extraordinary measure. That would mean the adoption of a two-year scale of assessment followed by a three-year scale thereafter. Another view was put forward that retaining the current system of a three-year scale of assessment would incorporate the economic indicators of 2020 and 2021 in the next scale period, and a one-time extraordinary measure should be avoided.

C. Statistical information

93. The Committee had before it detailed information from a comprehensive database for the period 2014–2019 for all Member States and participating non-Member States on various measures of income in local currencies, population, exchange rates and total external debt stocks, repayments of principal and total and per capita income measures in United States dollars. The primary source of income data in local currencies was the national accounts questionnaire completed for the United Nations by the countries concerned. Those countries for which full replies to the questionnaire had not been received were contacted directly and, if necessary, data had been collected or estimates prepared by the Statistics Division based on information from other national and international sources, notably the regional commissions, IMF and the World Bank.

94. The Committee noted that the use of relevant data was important to avoid distortions in the preparation of the scale. The Committee reviewed the data for all countries, paying particular attention to those results which, in United States dollars, suggested that there might be anomalies or distortions in the data. In all cases, the Committee was guided by the mandate given in General Assembly resolution 48/223 C and subsequent resolutions to base the scale on reliable, verifiable and comparable data and to use the most recent figures available.

1. Population

95. Midyear population estimates for the period 2014–2019 are generally drawn from *World Population Prospects: The 2019 Revision*, prepared by the Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, and are supplemented, as required, by national estimates for countries and areas not included in that publication.

2. External debt

96. Information on total external debt and repayments of principal were extracted in most cases from the World Bank International Debt Statistics database. The Member States covered are developing countries that are members of and borrowers from the World Bank and have per capita GNI below the World Bank threshold for high-income economies, which was $12,536 in 2019. Those Member States falling below this threshold and for which debt data were not available, or which were not covered in the World Bank database, were contacted directly and requested to provide the necessary data. Of those which did not do so, the Committee noted that the rates of several were at the floor, so that the lack of debt data made no practical difference. For Member States that did not provide the additional information, the Committee used, if available, debt data for earlier years that had been used in the preparation of the scale of assessments for the period 2016–2018.

97. Total debt stocks include public and publicly guaranteed long-term debt, private non-guaranteed long-term debt, the use of IMF credit and estimated public and private short-term debt. Principal repayments are part of total debt flows, which also include disbursements, net flows and transfers on debt and interest payments, and consist of the amounts of principal repaid in foreign currency in the year specified. Interest payments/receipts on debt are already included as part of primary income, a component added to GDP to obtain GNI.

3. Gross national income

98. The Committee reviewed the principal national accounts aggregates and related statistics for individual Member States for each of the years from 2014 to 2019. The GNI data are obtained principally from individual country submissions sent in response to the Statistics Division national accounts questionnaire sent annually to the respective national statistical offices and/or institutions responsible for the dissemination of statistics on national accounts.

99. The Committee noted that, compared with the data used for the 2019–2021 scale of assessments, the data that it had reviewed included not only information for the period 2017–2019 but, in a number of cases, revised information for the period 2011-2013. Included were revisions of official statistics received earlier, as well as the substitution of newly available official data for estimates used in preparing the 2019–2021 scale of assessments.

4. Conversion rates

100. The Committee recalled that previous scales had used MERs, except when that would cause excessive fluctuations and distortions in the income of some Member States, in which case price adjusted rates of exchange (PAREs) or other appropriate conversion rates were used. As a general rule, the exchange rates used for the conversion of national currencies to United States dollars are annual averages of market exchange rates as communicated to IMF by the monetary authority of each Member State. The rates are published in the IMF publication *International Financial Statistics*. The Committee recalled that the IMF publication contained three types of rates used by the Fund, referred to as MERs for the purposes of the scale: (a) market rates, determined largely by market forces; (b) official rates, determined by government authorities; and (c) principal rates, when countries maintained multiple exchange rate regimes. For the purpose of the scale of assessments, any of the three types of rates obtained from the publication were deemed to be MERs. When MERs were not available from *International Financial Statistics* or from the IMF economic information system, United Nations operational rates of exchange or other information were used in the initial database computations (see annex III).

101. The Committee used systematic criteria, which had also been used for the scale for 2019–2021, to identify MERs that had caused excessive fluctuations and distortions in GNI for possible replacement with PAREs or other appropriate conversion rates. The systematic criteria are described in annex IV. The Committee carried out an extensive review of all cases identified by the criteria on the basis of a detailed evaluation of each country's data. Following an assessment of whether the per capita GNI growth factor of Member States is between 0.67 and 1.5 times the world per capita GNI growth factor, and whether the MVI is between 0.80 and 1.20 times the average MVI, across all Member States, the Committee identified Angola, South Sudan, the Sudan, Uzbekistan and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela for possible replacement of their MERs with PAREs or other appropriate conversion rates.

102. In reviewing the situation of countries for which per capita GNI levels in United States dollars using the MER did not appear to reflect the economic reality in the country, owing possibly to a fixed exchange rate, the Committee recalled that, for the 2019–2021 scale, it had decided to use United Nations operational rates of exchange for Myanmar for the years 2011 and 2012, and to use the MER for the years 2013–2016 and the United Nations operational rates of exchange for the Syrian Arab Republic. The Committee examined the impact of the MERs on the income of those two countries for each year of the period 2011–2016.

103. For the scale period 2022–2024, the Committee considered alternative conversion rates in the cases of South Sudan, the Sudan, Suriname, Uzbekistan and Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of). Those Member States were identified using the current systematic criteria for the possible review of their MERs for replacement with PAREs or other appropriate conversion rates.

104. The outcome of the analysis showed that:

(a) When using the MER with a three-year moving average, the MVIs of all five Member States remain outside the limits of the MVI;

(b) When using the modified conversion factor, the MVI of the Sudan is adjusted to within the MVI limits;

(c) When using the MER with a six-year moving average, the MVI of South Sudan and Suriname is adjusted to within the MVI limits;

(d) When using the United Nations operational rates of exchange, the MVI of only Suriname is adjusted to within the MVI limits;

(e) When using the PARE conversion factor, the MVIs of South Sudan, Sudan, Suriname and Uzbekistan are adjusted to within the MVI limits, but not in the case of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela;

(f) When using the annual PARE conversion factor, the MVIs of all five Member States are adjusted to within the MVI limits.

105. The Committee was informed by the Statistics Division that, in the cases of South Sudan, the Sudan, Suriname and Uzbekistan, the United Nations operational rates of exchange were the only possible alternative. No countries with fixed exchange rates were identified.

106. The Committee also considered various conversion rate options for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Given the distortion in income converted to United States dollars when applying the MER (as reported by the IMF), the Committee agreed that an alternative conversion rate should be utilized. The Committee considered the use of the United Nations operational rate of exchange. The Committee also considered the use of a modified conversion rate. A modified conversion rate is an improved PARE, allowing the adjustment of a MER for any year of the base period, and is based on the MER, adjusted for the difference in inflation between the rates of inflation in the country and in the world economy based on the membership of the United Nations (international inflation). The chart below shows the impact of the application of different exchange rates to convert the GNI of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela to United States dollars.

Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela: impact of different exchange rates



Abbreviation: UNOP, United Nations operational rate of exchange.

107. **After review of all available options, the Committee concluded that using the modified conversion rate for the years 2014–2016 and the United Nations operational rate for the years 2017–2019 was the most appropriate option for the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.**

D. Scale of assessments for the period 2022–2024

108. In order to be able to identify the impact of the inclusion of new GNI data in calculations for the 2022–2024 scale, including the decisions on data and conversion rates outlined above, the Committee considered the application of the new data to the methodology used in preparing the current scale of assessments. The results are shown below for information.

Step-by-step adjustments for the scale of assessments for the period 2022–2024 based on the methodology used in the scale of assessments for the period 2019–2021

Parameters

Statistical base period	2017–2019 (three-year base period) and 2014–2019 (six-year base period)
Income measure	Gross national income
Conversion rate	Market exchange rate (exceptions: modified conversion rates (2014–2016) and United Nations operational rates of exchange (2017–2019) used for Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of))
Debt-burden adjustment	
Debt measure	Total external debt stock
Low per capita income adjustment	
Gradient	Single gradient (80 per cent)
Threshold	$11,105 (three-year base period) and $10,783 (six-year base period)
Eligibility	Countries below threshold
Redistribution	Countries above threshold
Floor rate	0.001 per cent
Maximum rate, least developed country	0.01 per cent
Ceiling rate	22 per cent

	Member State	Adopted scale for 2019–2021	Share in world GNI	Debt adjustment	Low per capita income adjustment	Floor	Least developed country ceiling	Ceiling	Difference from 2019–2021 scale	Percentage difference from 2019–2021 scale
1	Afghanistan[a]	0.007	0.023	0.023	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.006	-0.001	-14.3
2	Albania	0.008	0.017	0.016	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.000	0.0
3	Algeria	0.138	0.207	0.209	0.104	0.104	0.105	0.109	-0.029	-21.0
4	Andorra	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.000	0.0
5	Angola[a]	0.010	0.122	0.115	0.050	0.050	0.010	0.010	0.000	0.0
6	Antigua and Barbuda	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.0
7	Argentina	0.915	0.645	0.616	0.661	0.661	0.662	0.719	-0.196	-21.4
8	Armenia	0.007	0.015	0.014	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.007	0.000	0.0
9	Australia	2.210	1.614	1.634	1.875	1.875	1.879	2.111	-0.099	-4.5
10	Austria	0.677	0.519	0.525	0.603	0.603	0.604	0.679	0.002	0.3
11	Azerbaijan	0.049	0.056	0.054	0.028	0.028	0.029	0.030	-0.019	-38.8
12	Bahamas	0.018	0.015	0.015	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.019	0.001	5.6
13	Bahrain	0.050	0.041	0.042	0.048	0.048	0.048	0.054	0.004	8.0
14	Bangladesh[a]	0.010	0.340	0.337	0.110	0.110	0.010	0.010	0.000	0.0
15	Barbados	0.007	0.006	0.006	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.008	0.001	14.3
16	Belarus	0.049	0.070	0.065	0.040	0.040	0.040	0.041	-0.008	-16.3
17	Belgium	0.821	0.633	0.641	0.736	0.736	0.737	0.828	0.007	0.9
18	Belize	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0
19	Benin[a]	0.003	0.016	0.016	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.002	66.7
20	Bhutan[a]	0.001	0.003	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0
21	Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	0.016	0.045	0.043	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.003	18.8
22	Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.012	0.023	0.021	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.000	0.0
23	Botswana	0.014	0.020	0.020	0.014	0.014	0.014	0.015	0.001	7.1
24	Brazil	2.948	2.328	2.271	1.935	1.935	1.938	2.013	-0.935	-31.7
25	Brunei Darussalam	0.025	0.016	0.016	0.019	0.019	0.019	0.021	-0.004	-16.0
26	Bulgaria	0.046	0.075	0.069	0.054	0.054	0.054	0.056	0.010	21.7
27	Burkina Faso[a]	0.003	0.017	0.017	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.001	33.3
28	Burundi[a]	0.001	0.004	0.004	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0
29	Cabo Verde	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0
30	Cambodia[a]	0.006	0.026	0.024	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.001	16.7
31	Cameroon	0.013	0.043	0.042	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.013	0.000	0.0

	Member State	Adopted scale for 2019–2021	Share in world GNI	Debt adjustment	Low per capita income adjustment	Floor	Least developed country ceiling	Ceiling	Difference from 2019–2021 scale	Percentage difference from 2019–2021 scale
32	Canada	2.734	2.010	2.034	2.334	2.334	2.339	2.628	-0.106	-3.9
33	Central African Republic[a]	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0
34	Chad[a]	0.004	0.013	0.013	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	-0.001	-25.0
35	Chile	0.407	0.321	0.325	0.373	0.373	0.374	0.420	0.013	3.2
36	China	12.005	16.687	16.606	14.662	14.660	14.688	15.254	3.249	27.1
37	Colombia	0.288	0.381	0.366	0.237	0.237	0.237	0.246	-0.042	-14.6
38	Comoros[a]	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0
39	Congo	0.006	0.014	0.013	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	-0.001	-16.7
40	Costa Rica	0.062	0.070	0.066	0.066	0.066	0.066	0.069	0.007	11.3
41	Côte d’Ivoire	0.013	0.063	0.061	0.021	0.021	0.022	0.022	0.009	69.2
42	Croatia	0.077	0.069	0.070	0.080	0.080	0.081	0.091	0.014	18.2
43	Cuba	0.080	0.115	0.114	0.091	0.091	0.091	0.095	0.015	18.8
44	Cyprus	0.036	0.027	0.028	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.036	0.000	0.0
45	Czechia	0.311	0.260	0.263	0.302	0.302	0.303	0.340	0.029	9.3
46	Democratic People’s Republic of Korea	0.006	0.021	0.021	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	-0.001	-16.7
47	Democratic Republic of the Congo[a]	0.010	0.050	0.050	0.012	0.012	0.010	0.010	0.000	0.0
48	Denmark	0.554	0.423	0.428	0.491	0.491	0.492	0.553	-0.001	-0.2
49	Djibouti[a]	0.001	0.004	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0
50	Dominica	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0
51	Dominican Republic	0.053	0.094	0.090	0.064	0.064	0.064	0.067	0.014	26.4
52	Ecuador	0.080	0.124	0.119	0.074	0.074	0.074	0.077	-0.003	-3.8
53	Egypt	0.186	0.340	0.330	0.134	0.134	0.134	0.139	-0.047	-25.3
54	El Salvador	0.012	0.029	0.027	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.013	0.001	8.3
55	Equatorial Guinea	0.016	0.014	0.014	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.012	-0.004	-25.0
56	Eritrea[a]	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0
57	Estonia	0.039	0.034	0.034	0.039	0.039	0.039	0.044	0.005	12.8
58	Eswatini	0.002	0.005	0.005	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.0
59	Ethiopia[a]	0.010	0.104	0.102	0.026	0.026	0.010	0.010	0.000	0.0
60	Fiji	0.003	0.006	0.006	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.001	33.3
61	Finland	0.421	0.319	0.323	0.371	0.371	0.371	0.417	-0.004	-1.0
62	France	4.427	3.302	3.341	3.836	3.835	3.842	4.318	-0.109	-2.5

	Member State	Adopted scale for 2019–2021	Share in world GNI	Debt adjustment	Low per capita income adjustment	Floor	Least developed country ceiling	Ceiling	Difference from 2019–2021 scale	Percentage difference from 2019–2021 scale
63	Gabon	0.015	0.018	0.017	0.012	0.012	0.012	0.013	-0.002	-13.3
64	Gambia[a]	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0
65	Georgia	0.008	0.020	0.017	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.000	0.0
66	Germany	6.090	4.674	4.730	5.429	5.428	5.439	6.111	0.021	0.3
67	Ghana	0.015	0.072	0.069	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.009	60.0
68	Greece	0.366	0.248	0.251	0.288	0.288	0.289	0.325	-0.041	-11.2
69	Grenada	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0
70	Guatemala	0.036	0.084	0.081	0.040	0.040	0.040	0.041	0.005	13.9
71	Guinea[a]	0.003	0.013	0.012	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.000	0.0
72	Guinea-Bissau[a]	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0
73	Guyana	0.002	0.006	0.006	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.002	100.0
74	Haiti[a]	0.003	0.018	0.018	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.006	0.003	100.0
75	Honduras	0.009	0.026	0.025	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.000	0.0
76	Hungary	0.206	0.175	0.177	0.203	0.203	0.203	0.228	0.022	10.7
77	Iceland	0.028	0.028	0.028	0.032	0.032	0.032	0.036	0.008	28.6
78	India	0.834	3.048	3.005	1.004	1.004	1.005	1.044	0.210	25.2
79	Indonesia	0.543	1.190	1.149	0.527	0.527	0.528	0.549	0.006	1.1
80	Iran (Islamic Republic of)	0.398	0.567	0.573	0.357	0.357	0.357	0.371	-0.027	-6.8
81	Iraq	0.129	0.232	0.222	0.123	0.123	0.123	0.128	-0.001	-0.8
82	Ireland	0.371	0.336	0.340	0.390	0.390	0.391	0.439	0.068	18.3
83	Israel	0.490	0.429	0.434	0.499	0.499	0.500	0.561	0.071	14.5
84	Italy	3.307	2.439	2.468	2.833	2.833	2.838	3.189	-0.118	-3.6
85	Jamaica	0.008	0.018	0.015	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.000	0.0
86	Japan	8.564	6.144	6.217	7.136	7.135	7.149	8.033	-0.531	-6.2
87	Jordan	0.021	0.049	0.045	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.022	0.001	4.8
88	Kazakhstan	0.178	0.191	0.169	0.128	0.128	0.128	0.133	-0.045	-25.3
89	Kenya	0.024	0.097	0.094	0.029	0.029	0.029	0.030	0.006	25.0
90	Kiribati[a]	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0
91	Kuwait	0.252	0.179	0.181	0.208	0.208	0.208	0.234	-0.018	-7.1
92	Kyrgyzstan	0.002	0.009	0.008	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.0
93	Lao People’s Democratic Republic[a]	0.005	0.020	0.018	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.007	0.002	40.0

	Member State	Adopted scale for 2019–2021	Share in world GNI	Debt adjustment	Low per capita income adjustment	Floor	Least developed country ceiling	Ceiling	Difference from 2019–2021 scale	Percentage difference from 2019–2021 scale
94	Latvia	0.047	0.038	0.039	0.044	0.044	0.045	0.050	0.003	6.4
95	Lebanon	0.047	0.063	0.053	0.035	0.035	0.035	0.036	-0.011	-23.4
96	Lesotho[a]	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0
97	Liberia[a]	0.001	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0
98	Libya	0.030	0.033	0.034	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.018	-0.012	-40.0
99	Liechtenstein	0.009	0.008	0.008	0.009	0.009	0.009	0.010	0.001	11.1
100	Lithuania	0.071	0.059	0.059	0.068	0.068	0.068	0.077	0.006	8.5
101	Luxembourg	0.067	0.052	0.053	0.060	0.060	0.061	0.068	0.001	1.5
102	Madagascar[a]	0.004	0.016	0.015	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.000	0.0
103	Malawi[a]	0.002	0.008	0.008	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.0
104	Malaysia	0.341	0.398	0.369	0.335	0.335	0.335	0.348	0.007	2.1
105	Maldives	0.004	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.000	0.0
106	Mali[a]	0.004	0.019	0.018	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.001	25.0
107	Malta	0.017	0.015	0.015	0.017	0.017	0.017	0.019	0.002	11.8
108	Marshall Islands	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0
109	Mauritania[a]	0.002	0.008	0.008	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.0
110	Mauritius	0.011	0.016	0.017	0.018	0.018	0.018	0.019	0.008	72.7
111	Mexico	1.292	1.424	1.372	1.174	1.174	1.176	1.221	-0.071	-5.5
112	Micronesia (Federated States of)	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0
113	Monaco	0.011	0.008	0.008	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.011	0.000	0.0
114	Mongolia	0.005	0.014	0.009	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	-0.001	-20.0
115	Montenegro	0.004	0.006	0.005	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.000	0.0
116	Morocco	0.055	0.134	0.128	0.053	0.053	0.053	0.055	0.000	0.0
117	Mozambique[a]	0.004	0.017	0.015	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.004	0.000	0.0
118	Myanmar[a]	0.010	0.079	0.078	0.022	0.022	0.010	0.010	0.000	0.0
119	Namibia	0.009	0.015	0.015	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.009	0.000	0.0
120	Nauru	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0
121	Nepal[a]	0.007	0.038	0.037	0.011	0.011	0.010	0.010	0.003	42.9
122	Netherlands	1.356	1.053	1.066	1.224	1.223	1.226	1.377	0.021	1.5
123	New Zealand	0.291	0.237	0.239	0.275	0.275	0.275	0.309	0.018	6.2
124	Nicaragua	0.005	0.015	0.013	0.004	0.004	0.004	0.005	0.000	0.0

	Member State	Adopted scale for 2019–2021	Share in world GNI	Debt adjustment	Low per capita income adjustment	Floor	Least developed country ceiling	Ceiling	Difference from 2019–2021 scale	Percentage difference from 2019–2021 scale
125	Niger[a]	0.002	0.014	0.014	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.001	50.0
126	Nigeria	0.250	0.494	0.493	0.175	0.175	0.175	0.182	-0.068	-27.2
127	North Macedonia	0.007	0.014	0.013	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.000	0.0
128	Norway	0.754	0.519	0.526	0.603	0.603	0.604	0.679	-0.075	-9.9
129	Oman	0.115	0.085	0.086	0.099	0.099	0.099	0.111	-0.004	-3.5
130	Pakistan	0.115	0.370	0.361	0.110	0.110	0.110	0.114	-0.001	-0.9
131	Palau	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0
132	Panama	0.045	0.069	0.070	0.080	0.080	0.080	0.090	0.045	100.0
133	Papua New Guinea	0.010	0.028	0.025	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.000	0.0
134	Paraguay	0.016	0.045	0.043	0.025	0.025	0.025	0.026	0.010	62.5
135	Peru	0.152	0.247	0.240	0.157	0.157	0.157	0.163	0.011	7.2
136	Philippines	0.205	0.455	0.449	0.204	0.204	0.204	0.212	0.007	3.4
137	Poland	0.802	0.640	0.648	0.744	0.744	0.745	0.837	0.035	4.4
138	Portugal	0.350	0.270	0.273	0.314	0.313	0.314	0.353	0.003	0.9
139	Qatar	0.282	0.206	0.208	0.239	0.239	0.239	0.269	-0.013	-4.6
140	Republic of Korea	2.267	1.968	1.992	2.286	2.286	2.290	2.574	0.307	13.5
141	Republic of Moldova	0.003	0.013	0.012	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.005	0.002	66.7
142	Romania	0.198	0.265	0.269	0.287	0.287	0.287	0.312	0.114	57.6
143	Russian Federation	2.405	1.914	1.861	1.794	1.794	1.797	1.866	-0.539	-22.4
144	Rwanda[a]	0.003	0.011	0.010	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.000	0.0
145	Saint Kitts and Nevis	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	0.001	100.0
146	Saint Lucia	0.001	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.001	100.0
147	Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0
148	Samoa	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0
149	San Marino	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.0
150	Sao Tome and Principe[a]	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0
151	Saudi Arabia	1.172	0.905	0.916	1.052	1.051	1.053	1.184	0.012	1.0
152	Senegal[a]	0.007	0.025	0.024	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.000	0.0
153	Serbia	0.028	0.054	0.049	0.031	0.031	0.031	0.032	0.004	14.3
154	Seychelles	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.0
155	Sierra Leone[a]	0.001	0.005	0.005	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0

	Member State	Adopted scale for 2019–2021	Share in world GNI	Debt adjustment	Low per capita income adjustment	Floor	Least developed country ceiling	Ceiling	Difference from 2019–2021 scale	Percentage difference from 2019–2021 scale
156	Singapore	0.485	0.386	0.390	0.448	0.448	0.449	0.504	0.019	3.9
157	Slovakia	0.153	0.119	0.120	0.138	0.138	0.138	0.155	0.002	1.3
158	Slovenia	0.076	0.060	0.061	0.070	0.070	0.070	0.079	0.003	3.9
159	Solomon Islands[a]	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0
160	Somalia[a]	0.001	0.002	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0
161	South Africa	0.272	0.408	0.387	0.234	0.234	0.235	0.244	-0.028	-10.3
162	South Sudan[a]	0.006	0.006	0.006	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002	-0.004	-66.7
163	Spain	2.146	1.632	1.652	1.896	1.896	1.899	2.134	-0.012	-0.6
164	Sri Lanka	0.044	0.100	0.093	0.043	0.043	0.043	0.045	0.001	2.3
165	Sudan[a]	0.010	0.074	0.072	0.022	0.022	0.010	0.010	0.000	0.0
166	Suriname	0.005	0.005	0.004	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	-0.002	-40.0
167	Sweden	0.906	0.666	0.674	0.774	0.774	0.775	0.871	-0.035	-3.9
168	Switzerland	1.151	0.867	0.877	1.007	1.007	1.009	1.134	-0.017	-1.5
169	Syrian Arab Republic	0.011	0.028	0.028	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.009	-0.002	-18.2
170	Tajikistan	0.004	0.011	0.011	0.003	0.003	0.003	0.003	-0.001	-25.0
171	Thailand	0.307	0.553	0.534	0.353	0.353	0.354	0.368	0.061	19.9
172	Timor-Leste[a]	0.002	0.003	0.003	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	-0.001	-50.0
173	Togo[a]	0.002	0.008	0.008	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.002	0.000	0.0
174	Tonga	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0
175	Trinidad and Tobago	0.040	0.028	0.028	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.037	-0.003	-7.5
176	Tunisia	0.025	0.048	0.043	0.018	0.018	0.018	0.019	-0.006	-24.0
177	Turkey	1.371	0.978	0.923	0.812	0.812	0.813	0.845	-0.526	-38.4
178	Turkmenistan	0.033	0.047	0.047	0.033	0.033	0.033	0.034	0.001	3.0
179	Tuvalu[a]	0.001	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0
180	Uganda[a]	0.008	0.039	0.038	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.010	0.002	25.0
181	Ukraine	0.057	0.155	0.138	0.053	0.053	0.054	0.056	-0.001	-1.8
182	United Arab Emirates	0.616	0.485	0.491	0.564	0.564	0.565	0.635	0.019	3.1
183	United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	4.567	3.346	3.386	3.887	3.886	3.894	4.375	-0.192	-4.2
184	United Republic of Tanzania[a]	0.010	0.067	0.065	0.018	0.018	0.010	0.010	0.000	0.0
185	United States of America	22.000	24.550	24.841	28.514	28.510	28.565	22.000	0.000	0.0
186	Uruguay	0.087	0.071	0.071	0.082	0.082	0.082	0.092	0.005	5.7

	Member State	Adopted scale for 2019–2021	Share in world GNI	Debt adjustment	Low per capita income adjustment	Floor	Least developed country ceiling	Ceiling	Difference from 2019–2021 scale	Percentage difference from 2019–2021 scale
187	Uzbekistan	0.032	0.077	0.075	0.026	0.026	0.026	0.027	-0.005	-15.6
188	Vanuatu	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.000	0.0
189	Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	0.728	0.230	0.207	0.168	0.168	0.169	0.175	-0.553	-76.0
190	Viet Nam	0.077	0.263	0.251	0.090	0.090	0.090	0.093	0.016	20.8
191	Yemen[a]	0.010	0.029	0.028	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.008	-0.002	-20.02
192	Zambia[a]	0.009	0.029	0.027	0.008	0.008	0.008	0.008	-0.001	-11.1
193	Zimbabwe	0.005	0.024	0.023	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.002	40.0
		100.000	**100.000**	**100.000**	**100.000**	**100.000**	**100.000**	**100.000**		

[a] Least developed country.

IV. Multi-year payment plans

109. A multi-year payment plan is a schedule of future payments designed to eliminate arrears in the payment of assessed contributions within an identified time frame.

110. In paragraph 1 of its resolution 57/4 B, the General Assembly endorsed the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee concerning multi-year payment plans (see also A/57/11, paras. 17–23), and in its resolution 74/1, the Assembly reaffirmed that endorsement.

111. In considering the matter, the Committee had before it the report of the Secretary-General on multi-year payment plans (A/76/70), prepared pursuant to the recommendations of the Committee. The Committee noted that the only multi-year payment plan referenced in the report of the Secretary-General had expired in 2009 and had not been updated. As at 18 June 2021, none of the Member States in arrears under Article 19 of the Charter of the United Nations to the Organization had a current multi-year payment plan in place.

112. **The Committee recalled the past successful implementation of multi-year payment plans by several Member States and reiterated its recommendation that the General Assembly encourage all Member States in arrears under Article 19 of the Charter to consult with the Secretariat to develop and submit practical multi-year payment plans.**

V. Application of Article 19 of the Charter

113. The Committee recalled its general mandate, under rule 160 of the rules of procedure of the General Assembly, to advise the Assembly on the action to be taken with regard to the application of Article 19 of the Charter. It also recalled Assembly resolution 54/237 C concerning procedures for the consideration of requests for exemption under Article 19.

114. The Committee recalled that the General Assembly, in its resolution 54/237 C, had decided that requests for exemption under Article 19 must be submitted by Member States to the President of the Assembly at least two weeks before the session of the Committee so as to ensure a complete review of the requests. In addition, the Assembly had urged all Member States in arrears requesting exemption under Article 19 to provide the fullest possible supporting information, including information on economic aggregates, government revenues and expenditure, foreign exchange resources, indebtedness, difficulties in meeting domestic or international financial obligations and any other information that might support the claim that failure to make necessary payments had been attributable to conditions beyond the control of the Member State concerned. Most recently, the Assembly, in its resolution 75/2, had once again urged all Member States requesting exemption to submit as much information as possible, and to consider submitting such information in advance of the deadline specified in resolution 54/237 C, so as to enable the collation of any additional detailed information that might be necessary.

115. The Committee noted that all the requests for exemption considered at its present session had been received by the President of the General Assembly in advance of the deadline. **The Committee encouraged all Member States in arrears requesting exemption under Article 19 to provide the fullest possible supporting information in support of their claim, including economic, social, political and financial indicators. The Committee also urged those Member States to submit their requests as early as possible in advance of the deadline specified in resolution 54/237 C.**

116. At its present session, the Committee noted that five requests for exemption under Article 19 had been received. However, during the session, a payment was received from the Islamic Republic of Iran, which reduced the arrears payable by the country. The Committee noted that no further action was required as the Islamic Republic of Iran had made the minimum payment necessary to no longer fall under Article 19 (see sect. V.A below).

A. Requests for exemption

117. The four requests for exemption under Article 19 that had been received by the Committee are summarized below.

Requests for exemption under Article 19 of the Charter

Member State	*Number of years consecutively falling under Article 19*	*Number of years consecutively requesting an exemption under Article 19*	*Total payments received while falling under Article 19 (in United States dollars)*	*Contributions due as at 29 June 2021 (in United States dollars)*
Central African Republic	2	–	31 076	138 409
Comoros	29	27	539 691	980 646
Sao Tome and Principe	34	20	999 423	938 902
Somalia	29	20	77 653	1 517 630

118. In reviewing the four requests, the Committee recognized the difficult situations of the Member States concerned. It acknowledged the great efforts that had been made in some cases to make some payment of contributions over the years. The Committee recalled that, by its resolution 52/215, the General Assembly had decided to reduce the floor rate from 0.01 per cent to 0.001 per cent, starting with the 1998–2000 scale of assessment period. As a result, in most cases, the bulk of the accumulated contributions still due from those Member States stemmed from the period prior to 1998. Some members noted, however, that other Member States in similar situations had paid their assessments and not fallen under Article 19.

119. Many Member States make extraordinary efforts to meet their financial obligations to the United Nations despite facing enormous challenges. Some Committee members noted that a small number of Member States had been considered for exemption under Article 19 continuously for many years. The Committee noted that the methodology was designed to take into account changes in capacity to pay and to smooth abrupt changes in national income by using the three-year and six-year base periods. As such, exemptions to Article 19 are intended to be granted in exceptional circumstances. The Committee expressed its concern that three of the four Member States had been granted exemption every year for the past 20 years, but also noted that in the last few years they have been paying amounts above their annual assessments. Some members of the Committee emphasized the value of a multi-year payment plan, currently entered into voluntarily, as a useful tool for Member States to reduce their arrears and to avoid further accumulation of the arrears. To encourage Member States to resolve their arrears, some Committee members expressed the view that a systemic approach could be taken to use multi-year payment plan as a critical factor in the process of making recommendations on the application of Article 19 of the Charter, should the General Assembly so decide. Other members expressed the view that the General Assembly could require Member States requesting exemption under Article 19 of the Charter to develop and submit practical

multi-year payment plans in consultation with the Secretariat. **The Committee encouraged Member States applying for exemption under Article 19 to make annual payments exceeding current assessments in order to avoid further accumulation of arrears and to work with the Secretariat to develop and submit a multi-year payment plan to resolve their arrears in a reasonable timeframe.**

1. Central African Republic

120. The Committee had before it a letter dated 21 May 2021 from the President of the General Assembly addressed to the Chair of the Committee on Contributions, transmitting a letter dated 19 May 2021 from Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Central African Republic to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly. It also heard an oral presentation by the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Central African Republic to the United Nations.

121. In its written presentations, the Central African Republic indicated that the occupation of a large portion of the country by armed groups and the attacks by such groups on the capital and other major cities in the country following the elections have hurt the national economy. The COVID-19 pandemic has also been a contributing factor.

122. In its oral presentations, the Central African Republic reminded the Committee of its ongoing crisis since 2012 and pointed to the presence of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) as evidence. The Central African Republic indicated that two unsuccessful attempts were made to transfer the funds to the United Nations in the last quarter of 2020 and provided documentation to corroborate this statement. The Central African Republic stated that the electoral tensions and the attack by the armed groups of the Coalition des patriotes pour le changement in January 2021, compounded by the impact of the coronavirus pandemic, which resulted in a national shutdown, have delayed the resumption of national banking operations.

123. The Secretariat provided the Committee with information concerning the situation in the Central African Republic. The Committee noted that the accumulated contributions due from the Central African Republic amounted to $138,409 and that a minimum payment of $29,395 was required under Article 19. The most recent payment, of $30,744, from the Central African Republic had been received in June 2020. The Committee recalled that the Central African Republic had previously made considerable efforts and had successfully addressed its arrears in the past, despite the difficult situation of the country.

124. The Committee noted with appreciation that the Chargé d’affaires a.i. of the Central African Republic stated that his Government would again try to transfer the funds necessary to avoid the application of Article 19.

125. **The Committee concluded that the failure of the Central African Republic to pay the amount necessary to avoid the application of Article 19 was a result of conditions beyond its control. It therefore recommended that the Central African Republic be permitted to vote until the end of the seventy-sixth session of the General Assembly.**

2. Comoros

126. The Committee had before it a letter dated 30 April 2021 from the President of the General Assembly addressed to the Chair of the Committee on Contributions, transmitting a letter dated 28 April 2021 from the Permanent Representative of the Permanent Mission of the Comoros to the United Nations addressed to the President

of the General Assembly. It also heard an oral presentation by the Permanent Representative of the Comoros to the United Nations.

127. In its written and oral presentations, the Comoros indicated that the second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic on the archipelago reached a peak at the end of January 2021. This further exacerbated an economy that was still recovering from Cyclone Kenneth which devastated the Comoros in April 2019. The national response to the COVID-19 pandemic and its measures to mitigate its effects such as social distancing measures, curfews, border lockdowns and restricted international travel resulted in the contraction of the economy to -0.9 per cent. The consequences on exports and the service and tourism sectors have been significant and have led to a decline in the investment rate, which went from 10.5 per cent in 2019 to 1.8 per cent in 2020. The Government has also increased public spending linked to the COVID-19 crisis, resulting in an increase in the budget deficit from 2.1 per cent of GDP in 2019 to 3.6 per cent in 2020. The Comoros indicated its Government's commitment to the issue of a multi-year payment plan, and to regularly reducing its arrears by paying $33,000 annually.

128. The Secretariat provided the Committee with information concerning the situation in the Comoros. Owing to its location and topography, the Comoros is among the most climate-vulnerable countries in the world and more than half of its population lives in at-risk areas. The political situation in the Comoros continues to be a challenge and affects humanitarian and other activities. Government ministries are underfunded and poorly staffed. On account of the COVID-19 pandemic, the need to prioritize funding for the Ministry of Health is a source of great concern, as access to acceptable medical facilities and vaccine coverage is in many cases almost impossible and the level of access is lower than acceptable levels. The in-country presence of various United Nations entities is limited, with support provided from offices in other locations.

129. The Committee noted that the accumulated contributions due from the Comoros amounted to $980,646 and that a minimum payment of $871,632 was required under Article 19. The most recent payment, of $40,000, from the Comoros had been received in August 2020. Payments had also been received annually since 2012. The Committee welcomed those annual payments, which demonstrated the commitment of the Comoros to reducing its arrears. Some members of the Committee noted that the country had been granted exemption under Article 19 for a number of years but had not submitted a multi-year payment plan to resolve its arrears in a reasonable time frame. **The Committee strongly urged the Comoros to submit a multi-year payment plan.**

130. **The Committee concluded that the failure of the Comoros to pay the amount necessary to avoid the application of Article 19 was a result of conditions beyond its control. It therefore recommended that the Comoros be permitted to vote until the end of the seventy-sixth session of the General Assembly.**

3. Sao Tome and Principe

131. The Committee had before it a letter dated 4 May 2021 from the President of the General Assembly addressed to the Chair of the Committee on Contributions, transmitting a letter dated 2 May 2021 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Sao Tome and Principe to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly. It also heard an oral presentation by the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Sao Tome and Principe to the United Nations.

132. In its written and oral presentations, Sao Tome and Principe emphasized the small size of the country, its insularity and its strong dependence on external aid,

which have contributed to creating an economy that is highly vulnerable to different types of hazards.

133. The already vulnerable situation in Sao Tome and Principe with 67 per cent of the population living in poverty, with an economy highly dependent on external aid and basic food imports, has been further exacerbated by the global COVID-19 pandemic. The rising debt of Sao Tome and Principe coupled with contraction in global aggregate demand, in particular external tourism demand, has also negatively affected the country's international tourism revenue. The effect has been a reduction in internal consumption by non-residents which in turn has affected other sectors of the economy. The negative effects are visible on income, unemployment, inflation and public finance. Sao Tome and Principe has long-standing external arrears and it is working bilaterally with its creditor countries to settle its external debt. Sao Tome and Principe is prone to natural disasters, including floods, storm surges and landslides. These natural hazards have a deep impact on agriculture, which is the country's strongest economic sector, with exports of cocoa, coffee and palm oil. Tourism accounts for 20 per cent of the economy of Sao Tome and Principe, but it has proved insufficient to support growth on an economy-wide basis, and with the continuing impact of the pandemic ongoing, the future looks bleak.

134. The Committee noted that the accumulated contributions due from Sao Tome and Principe amounted to $938,902 and that a minimum payment of $829,888 was required under Article 19. The most recent payment, of $31,582, from Sao Tome and Principe had been received in July 2020. Some members of the Committee noted that the country had been granted exemption under Article 19 for a number of years but had not updated its multi-year payment plan to resolve their arrears in a reasonable time frame. **The Committee strongly urged Sao Tome and Principe to update its multi-year payment plan and revise the terms.**

135. **The Committee concluded that the failure of Sao Tome and Principe to pay the amount necessary to avoid the application of Article 19 was a result of conditions beyond its control. It therefore recommended that Sao Tome and Principe be permitted to vote until the end of the seventy-sixth session of the General Assembly.**

4. Somalia

136. The Committee had before it a letter dated 10 May 2021 from the President of the General Assembly addressed to the Chair of the Committee on Contributions, transmitting a letter dated 7 May 2021 from the Permanent Representative of Somalia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the General Assembly. It also heard an oral presentation by the Deputy Permanent Representative of Somalia to the United Nations.

137. In its written and oral presentations, Somalia indicated that it was experiencing an economic crisis which has been worsened by the COVID-19 pandemic. The impact has also been felt by its nationals living overseas, which has translated into a reduction of transfers to Somalia from abroad. There also continues to be political instability which further compounds an already dire situation. The Committee also heard that Somalia would make all necessary payments as soon as possible, and the submission of a multi-year payment plan would be seriously considered in the next year.

138. The Secretariat provided the Committee with information concerning the situation in Somalia. The Committee heard that the country has laid out a path for parliamentary elections to be held in 2021. Somalia has achieved commendable progress on economic and fiscal reforms in the past years resulting in reaching its decision point under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative March 2020. In

2020 and 2021, the combination of several factors led to a partial reversal of gains. The COVID-19 pandemic, a protracted political crisis and, more recently, drought and locust infestations have resulted in concurrent drops in remittances, domestic fiscal revenue and foreign budgetary support. As a result, the federal Government has been running a six to seven million United States dollars cash flow deficit since February 2021. Somalia also still faced significant development, humanitarian and security challenges. The humanitarian crisis in the country is among the most complex and long-standing emergencies in the world. More than 20 per cent of the population is expected to experience increased food insecurity. The levels of malnutrition in Somalia were among the highest in the world, and malnutrition was one of the leading underlying causes of child mortality in the country. Internally displaced persons constituted a significant source of acute humanitarian needs. Somalia is severely affected by climate change, with stronger and more frequent weather shocks destroying lives and livelihoods. Since 1990, Somalia has experienced more than 30 climate-related hazards, triple the number of climate-related hazards experienced between 1970 and 1990.

139. The Committee noted that the accumulated contributions due from Somalia amounted to $1,517,630 and that a minimum payment of $1,408,616 was required under Article 19. The Committee noted that a payment, of $35,024, had been received from Somalia in May 2021. Some members of the Committee noted that the country had been granted exemption under Article 19 for a number of years but had not submitted a multi-year payment plan to resolve their arrears in a reasonable time frame. **The Committee strongly urged Somalia to submit a multi-year payment plan.**

140. **The Committee concluded that the failure of Somalia to pay the amount necessary to avoid the application of Article 19 was a result of conditions beyond its control. It therefore recommended that Somalia be permitted to vote until the end of the seventy-sixth session of the General Assembly.**

VI. Other matters

A. Assessment of non-member States

141. The Committee recalled that, in its resolution 44/197 B, the General Assembly had endorsed the proposal by the Committee on Contributions concerning revised assessment procedures for non-member States that were full participants in some of the activities financed by the United Nations. Those procedures involved periodic reviews of levels of participation by non-member States in United Nations activities in order to fix a flat annual fee percentage that was applied to a notional assessment rate, based on national income data, and to the net assessment base for the regular budget.

142. After the admission of Switzerland to membership in the United Nations, only one non-member State, the Holy See, remained subject to the procedure. After consultations with the Holy See, the Committee had recommended that the General Assembly fix the flat annual fee percentage at 50 per cent of its notional assessment rate and that further periodic reviews of the flat annual fee percentage rate be suspended. In its resolution 58/1 B, the General Assembly had endorsed that recommendation. Following the adoption of resolution 67/19, the Committee decided that the same procedure applied to the Holy See should also be applied to the State of Palestine.

143. For the 2019–2021 period, both the Holy See and the State of Palestine were assessed at a flat annual fee of 50 per cent of their notional rates of assessment as

adopted in General Assembly resolution 73/271. For that period, the notional rate of assessment of the Holy See had been fixed at 0.001 per cent, and for the State of Palestine at 0.008 per cent.

144. Some members noted that, under current procedures, the contributions payable by non-member States were calculated using the regular budget assessment base and that no provision was made for other funds (peacekeeping operations, international tribunals, Working Capital Fund). The Committee further noted that the reason for applying these contributions payable to non-member States was that, while they were not Member States of the United Nations, their participation in the activities of the Organization resulted in costs and they should bear some financial responsibility. Some members of the Committee noted that this reasoning applies not just to the regular budget, however, and that non-member States could be charged contributions payable for other funds as has been done historically for the regular budget.

145. Other members emphasized however that there is a clear distinction between Member and non-member States and that such distinction need be maintained, inter alia with respect to assessed financial contributions to the Organization. They reminded the Committee that non-member States could not serve on the Security Council and other bodies, including the Committee on Contributions, and had no constitutional role under the Charter in establishing, directing or setting the budgets for peacekeeping operations, international tribunals or the Working Capital Fund. Those members expressed the view that current long-standing arrangements for making formal extrabudgetary assessments for non-member States has proved to be an acceptable, practical, administratively efficient and visible means of assessing appropriate additional contributions commensurate with the limited additional cost of conference and other Secretariat resources involved in servicing their participation.

146. On the basis of the available statistical data, the Committee noted that a notional rate of assessment for the period 2022–2024 of 0.001 per cent would apply to the Holy See, and 0.011 per cent to the State of Palestine.

147. **The Committee recommended that non-member States be called upon to contribute for the period 2022–2024 based on a flat annual fee fixed at 50 per cent, which would be applied to notional rates of assessment fixed at 0.001 per cent for the Holy See and 0.011 per cent for the State of Palestine.**

B. Appeals from Member States for a change of assessment

Cuba

148. The Committee had before it the text of a letter dated 1 June 2021 from the Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the Republic of Cuba to the United Nations in which he requested a reduction of his country’s rate of assessment for the 2022–2024 period. The Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations also addressed the Committee and gave more details on the conditions in the country.

149. The Ambassador provided supplementary information on the performance of the Cuban economy between 2014 and 2019, highlighting challenging conditions based on a combination of domestic variables, an international environment marked by a persistent global economic crisis and the economic, commercial and financial restrictive measures imposed against Cuba by another Member State. In addition, the Ambassador stressed the very negative impact of COVID-19 on Cuba and the estimated decrease of 11 per cent of the country’s GDP at constant prices as a result of the effects of the global pandemic. The Committee’s attention was also drawn to a number of climate-related events which have caused significant damage to the country and the Cuban economy.

150. Some members stated that the Committee has a methodology approved by the General Assembly that it follows and the methodology is the same for all Member States.

151. **The Committee took note of the information. While Cuba emphasized its marked economic slowdown in 2019, the Committee noted that the scale for all Member States is drawn up on a six-year base period precisely to account for such annual fluctuations. Moreover, the Committee noted that 2020 is not included in the data for the 2022–2024 scale period for any Member States.**

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

152. The Committee had before it the text of a letter dated 12 May 2021 requesting a review of the exchange rate used in exchanging the Iranian rial to the United States dollar.

153. **The Committee took note of the request and concluded that the exchange rate applicable for the base period under consideration did not reflect a change in the national income from the general criteria applied to other Member States. The market exchange rate would continue to be used for the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Committee also noted that the scale for the Islamic Republic of Iran for the period 2022–2024 will decrease by 6.8 per cent compared with the period 2019–2021.**

C. Process of decision-making on the scale of assessment

154. The Committee took note of resolution 73/272, in which the General Assembly recognized the need to reform the current methodology for apportioning the expenses of peacekeeping operations, and its desire to address the issue in an effective and expeditious manner. Some members expressed the view that the Committee could provide its experience and advice on the peacekeeping scale of assessments, should the Assembly so request. Other members expressed the view that it was superfluous and not feasible to offer its assistance again as the offer had already been included in previous reports of the Committee and the Assembly had not requested such assistance.

D. Collection of contributions

155. The Committee, at the conclusion of its present session, noted that only one Member State, the Central African Republic, was in arrears in the payment of its assessed contribution to the United Nations under the terms of Article 19 of the Charter and had no vote in the General Assembly. In addition, the following three Member States were in arrears in the payment of their assessed contributions under the terms of Article 19 but had been permitted to vote in the Assembly until the end of the seventy-fifth session, pursuant to General Assembly resolution 75/2: Comoros, Sao Tome and Principe and Somalia. **The Committee decided to authorize its Chair to issue an addendum to the present report, if necessary.**

156. The Committee also noted that, as at 31 May 2021, a total of $4.0 billion was owed to the Organization for the regular budget, peacekeeping operations and the international tribunals. That amount reflected an increase compared with the amount of $3.8 billion outstanding as at 31 May 2020.

E. Payment of contributions in currencies other than the United States dollar

157. Under the provisions of paragraph 17 (a) of its resolution 73/271, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to accept, at his discretion and after consultation with the Chair of the Committee on Contributions, a portion of the

contributions of Member States for the calendar years 2019, 2020 and 2021 in currencies other than the United States dollar.

158. The Committee noted that, in 2020, the Secretary-General did not receive any contributions to the regular budget in currencies other than the United States dollar.

F. Organization of the Committee's work

159. The Committee wished to record its appreciation for the substantive support for its work performed by the secretariat of the Committee and the Statistics Division, especially during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Committee was briefed by its secretariat and by the Statistics Division on the consideration of its report on its eighty-first session by the Fifth Committee in 2021. In particular, the Committee appreciated the provision of documents and materials in an electronic format during the session and urged the continuation of this practice. The Committee emphasized the importance of ensuring that its secretariat and the Statistics Division were maintained at the capacities required to support the Committee in carrying out its mandates. The Committee also expressed its appreciation for the substantive support provided by the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and the United Nations Development Programme in its consideration of requests for exemptions under Article 19, but noted that it would appreciate more information relating to the financial circumstances relating to capacity to pay, particularly government expenditure, government revenues, debt payments, remittances and foreign currency reserves.

G. Working methods of the Committee

160. The Committee carried out a review of its working methods, during which members expressed general satisfaction with the working methods and procedures currently in place. The Committee decided to continue to explore ways in which to improve access to information and documentation, including the online availability of information for Member States on the outcome of its work. Information on the work of the Committee is available at www.un.org/en/ga/contributions.

161. For its eighty-first session, the Committee met in a hybrid modality with a majority of its members travelling to New York for a mix of in-person and virtual sessions. For future sessions, the Committee appreciates the continuing support and assistance from the Secretariat in facilitating the participation of all the members.

162. In the preparation for the scale of assessment, the Committee recalled General Assembly resolution 73/271 which requires the Committee, as a technical advisory body, to prepare the scale of assessments strictly on the basis of reliable, verifiable and comparable data. The Committee recalled that requests submitted to it for consideration should be made formally, in writing, addressed to the Chair of the Committee. Such requests should be made through the Secretariat at least two weeks in advance of the Committee meeting so that members had sufficient time to consider all the relevant facts.

H. Date of the next session

163. **The Committee decided to hold its eighty-second session in New York from 6 to 24 June 2022.**

Annex I

Summary of the evolution of the elements in the methodology used for the preparation of the United Nations scale of assessments

		Low per capita income allowance						
Scale of assessments	*Statistical base period*	*Per capita income limit (United States dollars)*	*Gradient (percentage)*	*Ceiling (percentage)*	*Floor (percentage)*	*No increase for the least developed countries*	*Debt relief*	*Scheme of limits*
1946–1947	1938–1940	Individual allowances made on the basis of per capita income levels		39.89	0.04			
1948	1945, 1946 or 1947 single year statistics	1 000	40	39.89	0.04			
1949	1945, 1946 or 1947 single year statistics	1 000	40	39.89	0.04			
1950 (same as 1949 except for minor adjustment)	1945, 1946 or 1947 single year statistics	1 000	40	39.79	0.04			
1951	1945, 1946 or 1947 single year statistics	1 000	40	38.92	0.04			
1952	1945, 1946 or 1947 single year statistics	1 000	40	36.90	0.04			
1953	Average of 1950–1951	1 000	50	35.12	0.04			
1954	Average of 1950–1952	1 000	50	33.33	0.04			
1955	Average of 1951–1953	1 000	50	33.33	0.04			
1956–1957[a]	Average of 1952–1954	1 000	50	33.33	0.04			
1958	Average of 1952–1954	1 000	50	32.51	0.04			
1959–1961	Average of 1955–1957	1 000	50	32.51	0.04			
1962–1964	Average of 1957–1959	1 000	50	32.02	0.04			
1965–1967	Average of 1960–1962	1 000	50	31.91	0.04			
1968–1970	Average of 1963–1965	1 000	50	31.57	0.04			
1971–1973	Average of 1966–1968	1 000	50	31.52	0.04			
1974–1976	Average of 1969–1971	1 500	60	25.00	0.02			
1977[a]	Average of 1972–1974	1 800	70	25.00	0.02			
1978–1979	Average of 1969–1975	1 800	70	25.00	0.01			
1980–1982	Average of 1971–1977	1 800	75	25.00	0.01			
1983–1985	Average of 1971–1980	2 100	85	25.00	0.01	X		

		Low per capita income allowance						
Scale of assessments	*Statistical base period*	*Per capita income limit (United States dollars)*	*Gradient (percentage)*	*Ceiling (percentage)*	*Floor (percentage)*	*No increase for the least developed countries*	*Debt relief*	*Scheme of limits*
1986–1988	Average of 1974–1983	2 200	85	25.00	0.01	X	X	X
1989–1991	Average of 1977–1986	2 200	85	25.00	0.01	X	X	X
1992–1994	Average of 1980–1989	2 600	85	25.00	0.01	X	X	X
1995–1997	Average of results of machine scales using base periods 1985–1992 and 1986–1992	World average (3 055 and 3 198)	85	25.00	0.01	X	X	50 per cent phase-out
1998–2000[b]	Average of 1990–1995	World average (4 318)	80	25.000	0.001	[c]	X[d]	Full phase-out[e]
2001–2003	Average of results of machine scales using base periods 1996–1998 and 1993–1998	World average (4 957 and 4 797)	80	22.000	0.001	[c]	X[f]	
2004–2006	Average of results of machine scales using base periods 1999–2001 and 1996–2001	World average (5 094 and 5 099)	80	22.000	0.001	[c]	X[f]	
2007–2009	Average of results of machine scales using base periods 2002–2004 and 1999–2004	World average (5 849 and 5 518)	80	22.000	0.001	[c]	X[f]	
2010–2012	Average of results of machine scales using base periods 2005–2007 and 2002–2007	World average (7 530 and 6 708)	80	22.000	0.001	[c]	X[f]	
2013–2015	Average of results of machine scales using base periods 2008–2010 and 2005–2010	World average (8 956 and 8 338)	80	22.000	0.001	[c]	X[f]	
2016–2018	Average of results of machine scales using base periods 2011–2013 and 2008–2013	World average (10 511 and 9 861)	80	22.000	0.001	[c]	X[f]	
2019–2021	Average of results of machine scales using base periods 2014–2016 and 2011–2016	World average (10 403 and 10 476)	80	22.000	0.001	[c]	X[f]	

(Footnotes on following page)

(Footnotes to table)

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[a] A ceiling on per capita assessments, set at the level of the per capita assessment of the Member State with the highest assessment, was applied to scales of assessment between 1956 and 1976. On the recommendation of the Committee on Contributions, the ceiling was abolished by the General Assembly in its resolution 3228 (XXIX) of 12 November 1974.

[b] Income measure changed from national income to gross national product.

[c] Not a specific part of the methodology, but since the least developed countries reduction of the floor to 0.001 per cent, there may be some increases in the rates of assessment of the least developed countries, but subject to the least developed countries ceiling of 0.010 per cent.

[d] Calculated using debt-flow data for 1998 and debt-stock data for 1999–2000.

[e] Subject to a limitation of 15 per cent on the allocation of additional points to developing countries benefiting from the application of the scheme of limits.

[f] Calculated using the debt-stock method.

Annex II

Outline of the methodology used for the preparation of the United Nations scale of assessments for the period 2019–2021

1. The current scale of assessments was based on the arithmetic average of results obtained using national income data for base periods of three and six years for the periods 2014–2016 and 2011–2016. The methodology used in the preparation of each set of results took as its starting point the gross national income (GNI) of the States Members of the United Nations during the corresponding base periods as a first approximation of the capacity to pay, and applied conversion factors, relief measures and limits to the scale in order to arrive at the final scale.

2. Information on GNI was provided by the Statistics Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs and was based on data provided in national currencies by Member States in response to the annual national accounts questionnaire. Since figures had to be provided for all Member States for all years of the possible statistical periods, when data were not available from the Member States, the Statistics Division prepared estimates using national and other available sources, including the regional commissions of the United Nations, other regional organizations, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

3. The GNI data for each year of the base periods were then converted to a common currency, the United States dollar, in most cases using market exchange rates. For this purpose, market exchange rates were taken to be the annual average exchange rates between the national currencies and the United States dollar as published in the IMF *International Financial Statistics*. As used by IMF, exchange rates are classified into three broad categories, reflecting the role of the authorities in determining the rates and/or the multiplicity of the exchange rates of the Member States, and include the following:

(a) Market rates, determined largely by market forces;

(b) Official rates, determined by government authorities;

(c) Principal rates, for countries maintaining multiple exchange rate regimes.

For the purposes of preparing the scale of assessments, the above-mentioned three categories were referred to as market exchange rates (MERs). For States that were not members of IMF, where MERs were not available, United Nations operational rates of exchange were used.

4. As part of its review process, the Committee on Contributions used systematic criteria to consider whether MERs resulted in excessive fluctuations or distortions in the income of particular Member States, for possible replacement with the United Nations operational rate of exchange, price-adjusted rates of exchange (PAREs) or other appropriate conversion rates. The PARE methodology was developed as a means of adjusting the conversion rates into United States dollars taking into account the relative price changes in the economies of the respective Member States and the United States of America, which is reflected in the MER valuation index (MVI). The MVIs of the Member States are considered relative to the respective value of the entire membership of the United Nations and in that way take into account the movement of the currencies of all Member States relative to the United States dollar. PAREs are derived by adjusting the MER with the ratio of the MVI of the entire membership of the Organization divided by the MVI of the Member State, limited to a range of 20 per cent above or below the MVI of the entire membership.

5. An average of the annual GNI figures in United States dollars for each base period was then aggregated with the corresponding figures for all Member States as the first step in the machine scales used for the scale of assessments for the period 2019–2021.

Summary of step 1

Annual GNI figures in national currency were converted to United States dollars using the annual average conversion rate (MER or other rate selected by the Committee). The average of these figures was calculated for each base period (three and six years). Thus, where the length of the base period is six years, the average GNI is:

$$\frac{1}{6}\left(\frac{\mathrm{GNI}_{year_1}}{\text{Conversion rate}_{year_1}}+\cdots+\frac{\mathrm{GNI}_{year_6}}{\text{Conversion rate}_{year_6}}\right)$$

These average GNI figures were summed and used to calculate the shares of GNI of Member States in the average GNI of the entire membership.

A similar exercise was carried out for the three-year base period.

6. The next step in the scale methodology was the application of the debt-burden adjustment in each machine scale. In its resolution 55/5 B, the General Assembly decided to base this adjustment on the approach employed in the scale of assessments for the period 1995–1997. Under this approach, the debt-burden adjustment is the average of 12.5 per cent of total external debt for each year of the period (what has become known as the debt-stock method), based on an assumed repayment of external debt within eight years. Data for this adjustment came from the World Bank International Debt Statistics database, which included statistics for Member States that are members of and borrowers from the World Bank and have per capita GNI below a given threshold. In 2016, the threshold set by the World Bank was $12,236 (using the World Bank Atlas conversion rates). The amount of the debt-burden adjustment was deducted from the GNI of the countries affected. The debt-burden adjustment was distributed to all Member States through the indirect redistribution of points; that is, new shares of debt-adjusted GNI were calculated.

Summary of step 2

The debt-burden adjustment (DBA) for each base period was deducted from GNI to derive debt-adjusted GNI (GNI_{da}). This involved deducting an average of 12.5 per cent of the total debt stock for each year of the base period. Thus:

Average GNI - DBA = GNI_{da}

Total GNI_{da} = total GNI - total DBA

These figures were used to calculate new shares of GNI_{da}.

7. The next step was the application of the low per capita income adjustment in each machine scale. This involved the calculation of the average per capita GNI during each of the base periods for the membership as a whole and the average per capita GNI_{da} for each Member State for each base period. The overall average figures for the current scale were $10,403 for the three-year base period and $10,476 for the six-year base period, and these were fixed as the starting points, or thresholds, for the corresponding adjustments. The share in GNI_{da} of each Member State whose average per capita GNI_{da} was below the threshold was reduced by 80 per cent of the percentage by which its average per capita GNI_{da} was below the threshold.

8. For each machine scale, the total low per capita income adjustment was reallocated to all Member States above the threshold, except the Member State affected by the maximum assessment rate or ceiling, in proportion to their relative shares of the total GNI_{da} of that group. For illustrative purposes, a track 2 calculation was undertaken in which the ceiling Member State was not excluded from the allocation of the adjustment. This permitted the machine scales considered by the Committee to indicate what the relative assessment rates of Member States would be if the ceiling were not applied.

Summary of step 3

The average per capita GNI for the entire membership for each base period was calculated. This was used as the threshold for application of the low per capita income adjustment. Thus the average per capita GNI for the six-year base period is:

$$\frac{\left(\text{Total GNI}_{year_1} + \cdots + \text{Total GNI}_{year_6}\right)}{\left(\text{Total population}_{year_1} + \cdots + \text{Total population}_{year_6}\right)}$$

A similar exercise was carried out for the three-year base period.

Summary of step 4

The average per capita GNI_{da} for each Member State for each base period was calculated in the same manner as in step 3, using GNI_{da}. Thus the average per capita GNI_{da} for the six-year base period is:

$$\frac{\left(\text{GNI}_{da,\, year_1} + \cdots + \text{GNI}_{da,\, year_6}\right)}{\left(\text{population}_{year_1} + \cdots + \text{population}_{year_6}\right)}$$

A similar exercise was carried out for the three-year base period.

Summary of step 5

In each machine scale, the low per capita income adjustment was applied to the Member States whose average per capita GNI_{da} was lower than the average per capita GNI (threshold). This adjustment reduced the affected Member State’s share of GNI_{da} by the percentage by which its average per capita GNI_{da} was below the threshold multiplied by the gradient (80 per cent).

> Example: If the average per capita GNI is $5,000 and a Member State’s per capita GNI_{da} is $1,000, and the gradient is 80 per cent, then the percentage by which the GNI_{da} share would be reduced is:
>
> [1 - (1000/5000)] x 0.80 = 64 per cent.

Summary of step 6

In each machine scale, the total low per capita income adjustment was reallocated pro rata to Member States whose average per capita GNI_{da} was above the threshold. In order to illustrate the outcomes with and without a ceiling scale rate, the following two alternative tracks were applied to this and subsequent steps:

Track 1

The total of the low per capita income adjustments was proportionately reallocated to all Member States whose average per capita GNI_{da} was above the threshold, except the ceiling Member State. Since the ceiling Member State would not ultimately share in the reallocation of points arising from the low per capita income adjustment, including it in the reallocation would cause the beneficiaries of the adjustment to share a part of its cost. This would occur when the points added for the ceiling Member State were reallocated pro rata to all other Member States as part of the reallocation of points arising from the application of the ceiling.

Track 2

The total of the low per capita income adjustments was proportionately reallocated to all Member States whose average per capita GNI_{da} was above the threshold, including the ceiling Member State. This yielded, for illustrative purposes, scale figures that would have applied if there had not been a ceiling rate of assessment. In machine scales, the results of track 2 calculations appear in the "low per capita income", "floor" and "least developed countries adjustment" steps.

9. Following those adjustments, three sets of limits were applied to each machine scale. The Member States whose adjusted share was less than the minimum level, or floor, of 0.001 per cent were brought up to that level. Corresponding reductions were applied pro rata to the shares of all other Member States except, under track 1, the ceiling Member State.

Summary of step 7

The minimum assessment rate, or floor (currently 0.001 per cent), was applied to the Member States that had a rate at this stage that was below the floor. Corresponding reductions were then applied pro rata to all other Member States except, under track 1, the ceiling Member State.

10. A maximum assessment rate of 0.01 per cent was then applied for each machine scale to those Member States on the list of the least developed countries. Increases corresponding to this least developed countries ceiling were then applied pro rata to all other Member States except those affected by the floor and, under track 1, the ceiling Member State.

Summary of step 8

The least developed countries that had a rate that at this point exceeded the least developed countries ceiling (0.01 per cent) had their rate reduced to 0.01 per cent. Corresponding increases were applied pro rata to other Member States, except those affected by the floor and, under track 1, the ceiling Member State.

11. A maximum assessment rate, or ceiling, of 22 per cent was then applied to each machine scale. Increases corresponding to the resulting reduction for the ceiling Member State were then applied pro rata to other Member States. As indicated above, those increases were calculated in accordance with track 1; that is, they reflected a distribution of points from the ceiling Member State that did not include any points arising from the application of the low per capita income adjustment, the floor adjustment and the adjustment for the least developed countries ceiling.

Summary of step 9

The maximum assessment rate, or ceiling, of 22 per cent was then applied. Corresponding increases were then applied pro rata to all other Member States except those affected by the floor and the least developed countries ceiling, using the track 1 approach from step 6 above.

12. An arithmetical average of the final scale figures was then calculated for each Member State, using base periods of three and six years.

Summary of step 10

The results of the two machine scales, using base periods of three and six years (2014–2016 and 2011–2016), were added together and divided by two.

Annex III

Explanation of exchange rates used in the scale methodology

1. As a general rule, the exchange rates used for the conversion of national currencies to United States dollars are annual averages of exchange rates as communicated to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) by the monetary authority of each Member State. These rates are published in the IMF publication *International Financial Statistics*. Exchange rates in *International Financial Statistics* are classified into three broad categories, reflecting the role of the authorities in determining the rates themselves and/or the multiplicity of the rates in a given country. The three categories are the market rate, describing an exchange rate determined largely by market forces; the official rate, describing an exchange rate determined by the authorities – sometimes in a flexible manner; and the principal, secondary or tertiary rate, for countries maintaining multiple exchange arrangements.

2. Official exchange rates include not only rates that have been officially determined and/or enforced, but also any reference or indicative exchange rate that is computed and/or published by the central bank. The calculation of such exchange rates is often based on market exchange rates, such as those used in interbank market transactions or in a combination of interbank and bank-client transactions in a specified observation period. The published exchange rate is used as a guideline for market participants or for accounting and customs valuation purposes, in exchange transactions with the government, and sometimes mandatorily in specific exchange transactions.[1]

3. As used by IMF, the term "market exchange rate" in the scale methodology could refer to one of the three types of annual average rates:

(a) Market rates, determined largely by market forces;

(b) Official rates, determined by government authorities;

(c) Principal rates, for countries maintaining multiple exchange rate regimes.

4. For non-members of IMF, there are no market exchange rates available and the rates used are average annual United Nations operational rates of exchange. These rates are established primarily for accounting purposes and applied to all official United Nations transactions with respect to those currencies. The rates may take the form of official, commercial or tourist rates of exchange.

[1] International Monetary Fund, *Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 2016* (Washington, D.C., October 2016), p. 13.

Annex IV

Systematic criteria for identifying Member States for which market exchange rates may be reviewed for possible replacement



Abbreviations: GNI, gross national income; MER, market exchange rate.

Annex V

Review of the scale-to-scale changes between the adopted 2019–2021 scale and the June 2021 machine scale

								Average annual percentage change, 2014–2019				
								GDP		*Implicit price deflator*[a]		
Member State	*2019–2021 adopted scale*	*June 2021 machine scale*	*Change (percentage)*	*2019–2021 scale GNI share*	*June 2021 machine scale GNI share*	*Change (percentage)*	*Per capita GNI (United States dollars)*	*Nominal (United States dollars)*	*Real*	*United States dollars*	*National currency*	*Comments on the 2014–2019 period*[b,c]
	(1)	*(2)*	*(3)*	*(4)*	*(5)*	*(6)*	*(7)*	*(8)*	*(9)*	*(10)*	*(11)*	*(12)*
World							**10 944**	**2.1**	**3.0**	**-0.9**		
Afghanistan	0.007	0.006	-14.3	0.027	0.023	-15.2	520	-0.6	1.8	-2.4	3.3	Assessment is close to the floor. Implemented 2008 SNA.
Albania	0.008	0.008	0.0	0.016	0.017	3.4	4 827	3.2	2.9	0.3	0.9	
Algeria	0.138	0.109	-21.0	0.240	0.207	-13.8	4 115	-3.3	2.3	-5.5	1.1	GDP growth is lower than world GDP growth.
Andorra	0.005	0.005	0.0	0.004	0.004	-7.6	39 961	-0.2	1.9	-2.1	0.7	Implemented 2008 SNA.
Angola	0.010	0.010	0.0	0.151	0.122	-19.1	3 352	-7.6	-0.1	-7.5	15.4	
Antigua and Barbuda	0.002	0.002	0.0	0.002	0.002	6.4	15 435	5.9	4.4	1.4	1.4	
Argentina	0.915	0.719	-21.4	0.751	0.645	-14.1	12 104	-5.2	-0.6	-4.6	37.2	Member State moved below the LPCIA threshold in the 3-year base period. GDP growth is lower than world GDP growth.
Armenia	0.007	0.007	0.0	0.015	0.015	0.6	4 225	3.4	4.5	-1.1	1.6	
Australia	2.210	2.111	-4.5	1.751	1.614	-7.8	54 139	-1.7	2.2	-3.8	1.6	
Austria	0.677	0.679	0.3	0.537	0.519	-3.2	48 581	0.6	1.7	-1.1	1.8	
Azerbaijan	0.049	0.030	-38.8	0.074	0.056	-25.4	4 649	-7.0	0.8	-7.7	5.0	GDP growth is lower than world GDP growth.
Bahamas	0.018	0.019	5.6	0.014	0.015	5.1	31 623	4.3	1.7	2.5	2.5	Implemented 2008 SNA. Large revision to national accounts data.
Bahrain	0.050	0.054	8.0	0.040	0.041	3.8	22 320	2.8	3.1	-0.2	-0.2	
Bangladesh	0.010	0.010	0.0	0.269	0.340	26.6	1 759	11.7	7.1	4.3	5.7	

Member State	2019–2021 adopted scale	June 2021 machine scale	Change (percentage)	2019–2021 scale GNI share	June 2021 machine scale GNI share	Change (percentage)	Per capita GNI (United States dollars)	Average annual percentage change, 2014–2019: GDP: Nominal (United States dollars)	GDP: Real	Implicit price deflator[a]: United States dollars	Implicit price deflator[a]: National currency	Comments on the 2014–2019 period[b,c]
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Barbados	0.007	0.008	14.3	0.006	0.006	4.1	16 857	2.1	0.8	1.3	1.3	
Belarus	0.049	0.041	-16.3	0.079	0.070	-11.5	6 130	-2.6	0.4	-3.0	11.9	Decreased share in world GNI. Unusual price changes.
Belgium	0.821	0.828	0.9	0.650	0.633	-2.6	45 806	0.4	1.7	-1.3	1.6	
Belize	0.001	0.001	0.0	0.002	0.002	-0.9	4 561	3.9	2.2	1.6	1.6	
Benin	0.003	0.005	66.7	0.012	0.016	38.1	1 167	4.8	8.0	-3.1	-0.2	GDP growth is higher than world GDP growth. Assessment is close to the floor. Implemented 2008 SNA. Large revision to national accounts data.
Bhutan	0.001	0.001	0.0	0.002	0.003	7.3	2 886	6.3	5.6	0.6	3.8	
Bolivia (Plurinational State of)	0.016	0.019	18.8	0.040	0.045	11.9	3 292	4.9	4.2	0.7	0.7	
Bosnia and Herzegovina	0.012	0.012	0.0	0.023	0.023	-0.6	5 639	1.7	2.8	-1.1	1.8	Implemented 2008 SNA.
Botswana	0.014	0.015	7.1	0.020	0.020	-0.8	7 290	3.5	2.8	0.7	4.9	
Brazil	2.948	2.013	-31.7	2.752	2.328	-15.4	9 240	-4.5	-0.3	-4.2	6.0	Member State moved below the LPCIA threshold in the 6-year base period. GDP growth is lower than world GDP growth.
Brunei Darussalam	0.025	0.021	-16.0	0.020	0.016	-18.9	31 528	-4.8	0.0	-4.8	-3.4	GDP growth is lower than world GDP growth.
Bulgaria	0.046	0.056	21.7	0.070	0.075	6.8	8 702	3.5	3.3	0.2	3.1	
Burkina Faso	0.003	0.004	33.3	0.014	0.017	20.6	731	2.9	5.5	-2.4	0.4	GDP growth is higher than world GDP growth. Assessment is close to the floor. Implemented 2008 SNA. Large revision to national accounts data.
Burundi	0.001	0.001	0.0	0.004	0.004	0.9	299	5.4	3.4	2.0	4.9	

Member State	2019–2021 adopted scale	June 2021 machine scale	Change (percentage)	2019–2021 scale GNI share	June 2021 machine scale GNI share	Change (percentage)	Per capita GNI (United States dollars)	Average annual percentage change, 2014–2019: GDP: Nominal (United States dollars)	GDP: Real	Implicit price deflator[a]: United States dollars	Implicit price deflator[a]: National currency	Comments on the 2014–2019 period[b,c]
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Cabo Verde	0.001	0.001	0.0	0.002	0.002	0.5	3 341	1.1	3.4	-2.1	0.7	
Cambodia	0.006	0.007	16.7	0.021	0.026	22.5	1 340	10.0	7.1	2.8	2.9	
Cameroon	0.013	0.013	0.0	0.042	0.043	4.1	1 445	3.2	4.6	-1.4	1.5	Implemented 2008 SNA.
Canada	2.734	2.628	-3.9	2.166	2.010	-7.2	45 138	-1.0	2.0	-2.9	1.3	
Central African Republic	0.001	0.001	0.0	0.002	0.003	10.4	469	4.6	3.4	1.2	4.1	Implemented 1993 SNA.
Chad	0.004	0.003	-25.0	0.016	0.013	-15.8	734	-3.3	0.8	-4.1	-1.3	Assessment is close to the floor.
Chile	0.407	0.420	3.2	0.323	0.321	-0.5	14 326	0.1	1.9	-1.8	4.1	
China	12.005	15.254	27.1	14.730	16.687	13.3	9 495	6.6	6.5	0.1	0.1	GDP growth is higher than world GDP growth.
Colombia	0.288	0.246	-14.6	0.419	0.381	-8.9	6 419	-2.7	2.8	-5.4	3.9	Implemented 2008 SNA.
Comoros	0.001	0.001	0.0	0.002	0.001	-13.1	1 370	0.7	3.5	-2.7	0.1	
Congo	0.006	0.005	-16.7	0.016	0.014	-14.2	2 231	-6.0	-3.3	-2.8	0.1	Implemented 1993 SNA. Large revision to national accounts data.
Costa Rica	0.062	0.069	11.3	0.065	0.070	6.4	11 588	3.9	3.3	0.5	3.3	
Côte d’Ivoire	0.013	0.022	69.2	0.042	0.063	49.9	2 117	7.1	9.5	-2.2	0.6	GDP growth is higher than world GDP growth. Implemented 2008 SNA.
Croatia	0.077	0.091	18.2	0.069	0.069	-0.2	13 714	0.7	2.4	-1.7	0.8	Member State was reclassified as a high-income economy by the World Bank and no longer benefits from DBA.
Cuba	0.080	0.095	18.8	0.107	0.115	7.2	8 406	5.0	1.6	3.3	3.3	
Cyprus	0.036	0.036	0.0	0.029	0.027	-4.2	26 327	0.5	3.3	-2.7	0.1	
Czechia	0.311	0.340	9.3	0.246	0.260	5.6	20 203	2.9	3.5	-0.6	2.1	
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea	0.006	0.005	-16.7	0.022	0.021	-5.8	673	-0.2	-0.6	0.4	1.8	1968 SNA. GDP growth is lower than world GDP

Member State	2019–2021 adopted scale (1)	June 2021 machine scale (2)	Change (percentage) (3)	2019–2021 scale GNI share (4)	June 2021 machine scale GNI share (5)	Change (percentage) (6)	Per capita GNI (United States dollars) (7)	Average annual percentage change, 2014–2019: GDP: Nominal (United States dollars) (8)	Average annual percentage change, 2014–2019: GDP: Real (9)	Average annual percentage change, 2014–2019: Implicit price deflator[a]: United States dollars (10)	Average annual percentage change, 2014–2019: Implicit price deflator[a]: National currency (11)	Comments on the 2014–2019 period[b,c] (12)
												growth. Assessment is close to the floor.
Democratic Republic of the Congo	0.010	0.010	0.0	0.046	0.050	10.4	508	6.4	5.4	0.9	11.2	
Denmark	0.554	0.553	-0.2	0.439	0.423	-3.5	60 992	0.3	2.5	-2.1	0.7	
Djibouti	0.001	0.001	0.0	0.002	0.004	66.6	3 102	7.6	7.2	0.4	0.4	Implemented 2008 SNA.
Dominica	0.001	0.001	0.0	0.001	0.001	0.4	7 529	2.6	0.5	2.1	2.1	
Dominican Republic	0.053	0.067	26.4	0.084	0.094	12.3	7 369	6.0	6.2	-0.2	3.3	GDP growth is higher than world GDP growth.
Ecuador	0.080	0.077	-3.8	0.125	0.124	-0.6	6 077	2.2	1.0	1.1	1.1	
Egypt	0.186	0.139	-25.3	0.405	0.340	-16.0	2 898	2.3	4.5	-2.1	13.6	Decreased share in world GNI. Unusual price changes.
El Salvador	0.012	0.013	8.3	0.028	0.029	2.1	3 751	3.4	2.2	1.2	1.2	Implemented 2008 SNA.
Equatorial Guinea	0.016	0.012	-25.0	0.015	0.014	-8.4	8 802	-10.8	-5.9	-5.3	-2.5	Member State moved below the LPCIA threshold in the 6-year base period. GDP growth is lower than world GDP growth.
Eritrea	0.001	0.001	0.0	0.005	0.002	-54.4	588	0.2	2.8	-2.5	-2.8	1968 SNA.
Estonia	0.039	0.044	12.8	0.031	0.034	9.8	21 045	3.7	3.8	-0.1	2.8	
Eswatini	0.002	0.002	0.0	0.005	0.005	7.2	3 631	-0.5	1.8	-2.2	4.6	
Ethiopia	0.010	0.010	0.0	0.082	0.104	28.1	806	12.4	8.5	3.6	11.6	
Fiji	0.003	0.004	33.3	0.005	0.006	8.9	5 613	4.6	3.5	1.1	3.8	GDP growth is higher than world GDP growth. Assessment is close to the floor.
Finland	0.421	0.417	-1.0	0.334	0.319	-4.4	47 863	-0.1	1.5	-1.6	1.3	
France	4.427	4.318	-2.5	3.507	3.302	-5.8	40 724	-0.6	1.5	-2.0	0.8	
Gabon	0.015	0.013	-13.3	0.019	0.018	-5.5	7 176	-0.7	2.6	-3.2	-0.4	

								Average annual percentage change, 2014–2019				
								GDP		Implicit price deflator[a]		
Member State	2019–2021 adopted scale	June 2021 machine scale	Change (percentage)	2019–2021 scale GNI share	June 2021 machine scale GNI share	Change (percentage)	Per capita GNI (United States dollars)	Nominal (United States dollars)	Real	United States dollars	National currency	Comments on the 2014–2019 period[b,c]
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Gambia	0.001	0.001	0.0	0.001	0.002	61.7	702	5.1	3.7	1.3	7.0	Implemented 2008 SNA. Large revision to national accounts data.
Georgia	0.008	0.008	0.0	0.019	0.020	1.8	4 047	0.5	4.2	-3.5	5.3	Implemented 2008 SNA.
Germany	6.090	6.111	0.3	4.823	4.674	-3.1	46 688	0.6	1.7	-1.1	1.7	
Ghana	0.015	0.024	60.0	0.051	0.072	39.7	2 024	1.1	4.8	-3.5	13.4	GDP growth is higher than world GDP growth. Implemented 2008 SNA. Large revision to national accounts data.
Greece	0.366	0.325	-11.2	0.290	0.248	-14.4	19 431	-2.5	0.7	-3.2	-0.4	
Grenada	0.001	0.001	0.0	0.001	0.001	4.6	9 161	6.2	4.7	1.5	1.5	
Guatemala	0.036	0.041	13.9	0.077	0.084	8.8	4 087	6.4	3.6	2.8	2.4	Implemented 2008 SNA.
Guinea	0.003	0.003	0.0	0.011	0.013	17.6	855	6.8	6.7	0.0	4.9	
Guinea-Bissau	0.001	0.001	0.0	0.001	0.002	15.7	716	4.0	4.5	-0.5	2.4	
Guyana	0.002	0.004	100.0	0.004	0.006	50.0	6 579	3.7	3.3	0.4	0.6	GDP growth is higher than world GDP growth. Assessment is close to the floor. Implemented 2008 SNA. Large revision to national accounts data.
Haiti	0.003	0.006	100.0	0.011	0.018	63.3	1 352	-0.4	1.2	-1.6	10.8	Assessment is close to the floor. Implemented 2008 SNA. Large revision to national accounts data.
Honduras	0.009	0.009	0.0	0.025	0.026	6.3	2 280	5.2	3.7	1.5	4.7	
Hungary	0.206	0.228	10.7	0.163	0.175	7.1	14 849	3.2	4.1	-0.9	3.6	
Iceland	0.028	0.036	28.6	0.022	0.028	25.7	68 074	7.5	4.0	3.4	3.4	GDP growth is higher than world GDP growth.
India	0.834	1.044	25.2	2.624	3.048	16.1	1 879	7.3	6.9	0.3	3.4	GDP growth is higher than world GDP growth.

Member State	2019–2021 adopted scale	June 2021 machine scale	Change (percentage)	2019–2021 scale GNI share	June 2021 machine scale GNI share	Change (percentage)	Per capita GNI (United States dollars)	Average annual percentage change, 2014–2019: GDP: Nominal (United States dollars)	GDP: Real	Implicit price deflator[a]: United States dollars	Implicit price deflator[a]: National currency	Comments on the 2014–2019 period[b,c]
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Indonesia	0.543	0.549	1.1	1.185	1.190	0.4	3 710	3.5	5.0	-1.5	3.6	
Iran (Islamic Republic of)	0.398	0.371	-6.8	0.596	0.567	-4.9	5 791	1.9	1.4	0.5	15.3	Decreased share in world GNI. Unusual price changes.
Iraq	0.129	0.128	-0.8	0.230	0.232	1.0	5 094	0.8	4.1	-3.2	-3.0	1968 SNA.
Ireland	0.371	0.439	18.3	0.294	0.336	14.4	58 145	8.9	9.6	-0.6	2.3	
Israel	0.490	0.561	14.5	0.387	0.429	10.8	42 881	5.1	3.4	1.6	1.4	
Italy	3.307	3.189	-3.6	2.620	2.439	-6.9	33 275	-1.1	0.8	-1.9	0.9	
Jamaica	0.008	0.008	0.0	0.018	0.018	-2.0	4 974	1.8	1.1	0.6	5.5	
Japan	8.564	8.033	-6.2	6.789	6.144	-9.5	39 878	-0.3	0.8	-1.1	0.7	
Jordan	0.021	0.022	4.8	0.046	0.049	6.3	4 176	4.4	2.3	2.0	2.0	Implemented 1993 SNA.
Kazakhstan	0.178	0.133	-25.3	0.224	0.191	-14.8	8 687	-4.3	4.0	-8.0	7.3	GDP growth is lower than world GDP growth.
Kenya	0.024	0.030	25.0	0.079	0.097	22.2	1 589	9.6	5.6	3.8	6.8	GDP growth is higher than world GDP growth.
Kiribati	0.001	0.001	0.0	0.000	0.000	2.3	3 146	0.9	3.3	-2.4	3.1	
Kuwait	0.252	0.234	-7.1	0.200	0.179	-10.2	36 511	-4.2	0.1	-4.3	-3.2	Implemented 1993 SNA.
Kyrgyzstan	0.002	0.002	0.0	0.009	0.009	5.0	1 212	3.2	4.2	-1.0	5.3	
Lao People's Democratic Republic	0.005	0.007	40.0	0.017	0.020	18.4	2 353	7.8	6.6	1.1	2.9	GDP growth is higher than world GDP growth. Assessment is close to the floor.
Latvia	0.047	0.050	6.4	0.038	0.038	2.0	16 284	1.9	2.8	-0.9	2.0	
Lebanon	0.047	0.036	-23.4	0.062	0.063	2.4	7 734	2.2	-0.5	2.6	2.6	GDP growth is lower than world GDP growth.
Lesotho	0.001	0.001	0.0	0.004	0.003	-12.5	1 284	0.0	0.6	-0.6	6.3	
Liberia	0.001	0.001	0.0	0.003	0.003	9.6	496	4.9	2.5	2.4	2.4	
Libya	0.030	0.018	-40.0	0.044	0.033	-23.3	4 177	-11.1	-10.9	-0.1	1.5	GDP growth is lower than world GDP growth.
Liechtenstein	0.009	0.010	11.1	0.007	0.008	18.6	175 387	1.0	2.2	-1.1	0.0	
Lithuania	0.071	0.077	8.5	0.056	0.059	4.1	17 119	2.7	3.4	-0.7	2.2	

Member State	2019–2021 adopted scale	June 2021 machine scale	Change (percentage)	2019–2021 scale GNI share	June 2021 machine scale GNI share	Change (percentage)	Per capita GNI (United States dollars)	Average annual percentage change, 2014–2019: GDP: Nominal (United States dollars)	GDP: Real	Implicit price deflator[a]: United States dollars	Implicit price deflator[a]: National currency	Comments on the 2014–2019 period[b,c]
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Luxembourg	0.067	0.068	1.5	0.053	0.052	-1.9	72 351	2.4	3.4	-1.0	1.9	
Madagascar	0.004	0.004	0.0	0.015	0.016	4.1	498	2.1	3.7	-1.5	7.0	
Malawi	0.002	0.002	0.0	0.008	0.008	6.9	379	7.2	4.4	2.6	15.7	
Malaysia	0.341	0.348	2.1	0.395	0.398	0.7	10 546	2.0	5.1	-2.9	1.6	
Maldives	0.004	0.004	0.0	0.005	0.005	9.2	8 993	9.4	6.5	2.7	2.8	Implemented 2008 SNA.
Mali	0.004	0.005	25.0	0.017	0.019	8.2	827	4.5	7.3	-2.6	0.2	GDP growth is higher than world GDP growth. Assessment is close to the floor.
Malta	0.017	0.019	11.8	0.013	0.015	13.1	28 154	6.3	6.7	-0.4	2.5	
Marshall Islands	0.001	0.001	0.0	0.000	0.000	6.4	4 745	3.5	4.7	-1.1	-1.1	
Mauritania	0.002	0.002	0.0	0.006	0.008	30.1	1 586	0.8	3.7	-2.8	0.5	Implemented 2008 SNA.
Mauritius	0.011	0.019	72.7	0.016	0.016	4.5	10 756	2.6	3.7	-1.0	1.4	Member State was reclassified as a high-income economy by the World Bank and no longer benefits from DBA. Member State moved above the LPCIA threshold in the 3-year base period. GDP growth is higher than world GDP growth.
Mexico	1.292	1.221	-5.5	1.497	1.424	-4.9	9 410	-0.1	2.2	-2.2	4.7	
Micronesia (Federated States of)	0.001	0.001	0.0	0.000	0.001	7.6	3 790	4.7	1.3	3.3	3.3	
Monaco	0.011	0.011	0.0	0.008	0.008	-1.6	179 842	2.1	4.2	-2.0	0.8	
Mongolia	0.005	0.004	-20.0	0.014	0.014	-4.7	3 579	1.8	4.8	-2.9	6.6	
Montenegro	0.004	0.004	0.0	0.006	0.006	7.2	8 186	3.7	3.7	0.0	2.9	
Morocco	0.055	0.055	0.0	0.134	0.134	0.0	3 106	1.9	4.2	-2.2	0.0	
Mozambique	0.004	0.004	0.0	0.019	0.017	-6.6	497	-1.7	4.6	-6.0	6.2	Implemented 2008 SNA.
Myanmar	0.010	0.010	0.0	0.081	0.079	-2.4	1 217	2.6	6.6	-3.7	4.4	1968 SNA.
Namibia	0.009	0.009	0.0	0.016	0.015	-4.0	5 131	0.7	1.6	-0.9	5.8	Implemented 2008 SNA.

Member State	2019–2021 adopted scale	June 2021 machine scale	Change (percentage)	2019–2021 scale GNI share	June 2021 machine scale GNI share	Change (percentage)	Per capita GNI (United States dollars)	Average annual percentage change, 2014–2019: GDP: Nominal (United States dollars)	GDP: Real	Implicit price deflator[a]: United States dollars	Implicit price deflator[a]: National currency	Comments on the 2014–2019 period[b,c]
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Nauru	0.001	0.001	0.0	0.000	0.000	28.7	14 640	0.6	3.7	-3.0	2.4	Member State was reclassified as a high-income economy by the World Bank and no longer benefits from DBA. Member State moved above the LPCIA threshold in both the 3- and 6-year base periods.
Nepal	0.007	0.010	42.9	0.028	0.038	36.2	1 124	7.5	4.9	2.5	5.8	GDP growth is higher than world GDP growth. Implemented 2008 SNA. Large revision to national accounts data.
Netherlands	1.356	1.377	1.5	1.074	1.053	-1.9	51 157	0.6	2.1	-1.5	1.4	
New Zealand	0.291	0.309	6.2	0.230	0.237	2.7	41 540	1.9	3.7	-1.8	1.8	
Nicaragua	0.005	0.005	0.0	0.015	0.015	-2.2	1 934	2.3	1.9	0.4	5.5	
Niger	0.002	0.003	50.0	0.010	0.014	45.4	532	4.0	5.9	-1.8	1.0	Assessment is close to the floor. Implemented 2008 SNA. Large revision to national accounts data.
Nigeria	0.250	0.182	-27.2	0.609	0.494	-18.8	2 126	-1.5	2.0	-3.5	7.9	GDP growth is lower than world GDP growth.
North Macedonia	0.007	0.007	0.0	0.014	0.014	1.5	5 464	2.7	2.9	-0.2	2.6	
Norway	0.754	0.679	-9.9	0.597	0.519	-13.1	80 972	-4.1	1.5	-5.6	1.0	
Oman	0.115	0.111	-3.5	0.091	0.085	-6.8	15 021	-0.5	1.9	-2.4	-2.4	
Pakistan	0.115	0.114	-0.9	0.365	0.370	1.3	1 464	2.1	4.2	-2.0	4.6	
Palau	0.001	0.001	0.0	0.000	0.000	6.6	16 550	3.0	1.4	1.7	1.7	

								Average annual percentage change, 2014–2019				
								GDP		Implicit price deflator[a]		
	2019–2021 adopted scale	June 2021 machine scale	Change (percentage)	2019–2021 scale GNI share	June 2021 machine scale GNI share	Change (percentage)	Per capita GNI (United States dollars)	Nominal (United States dollars)	Real	United States dollars	National currency	Comments on the 2014–2019 period[b,c]
Member State	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Panama	0.045	0.090	100.0	0.060	0.069	13.7	13 784	6.6	4.7	1.8	1.8	Member State was reclassified as a high-income economy by the World Bank and no longer benefits from DBA. Member State moved above the LPCIA threshold in both the 3- and 6-year base periods. GDP growth is higher than world GDP growth.
Papua New Guinea	0.010	0.010	0.0	0.028	0.028	-0.8	2 704	2.7	5.8	-2.9	4.0	
Paraguay	0.016	0.026	62.5	0.035	0.045	29.1	5 423	-0.3	3.3	-3.5	2.6	Implemented 2008 SNA. Large revision to national accounts data.
Peru	0.152	0.163	7.2	0.241	0.247	2.5	6 466	2.1	3.0	-0.9	2.7	
Philippines	0.205	0.212	3.4	0.448	0.455	1.6	3 566	4.8	6.5	-1.6	1.7	
Poland	0.802	0.837	4.4	0.635	0.640	0.8	13 959	2.3	4.2	-1.9	1.3	
Portugal	0.350	0.353	0.9	0.277	0.270	-2.5	21 705	0.9	2.2	-1.3	1.6	
Qatar	0.282	0.269	-4.6	0.224	0.206	-8.0	62 442	-2.0	2.2	-4.2	-4.2	
Republic of Korea	2.267	2.574	13.5	1.794	1.968	9.7	31 875	3.1	2.8	0.3	1.3	
Republic of Moldova	0.003	0.005	66.7	0.010	0.013	29.5	2 706	3.9	3.6	0.3	6.1	GDP growth is higher than world GDP growth. Assessment is close to the floor. Implemented 2008 SNA. Large revision to national accounts data.

Member State	2019–2021 adopted scale	June 2021 machine scale	Change (percentage)	2019–2021 scale GNI share	June 2021 machine scale GNI share	Change (percentage)	Per capita GNI (United States dollars)	Average annual percentage change, 2014–2019: GDP: Nominal (United States dollars)	GDP: Real	Implicit price deflator[a]: United States dollars	Implicit price deflator[a]: National currency	Comments on the 2014–2019 period[b,c]
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Romania	0.198	0.312	57.6	0.241	0.265	10.2	11 205	4.6	4.5	0.1	4.2	Member State was reclassified as a high-income economy by the World Bank and no longer benefits from DBA. Member State moved above the LPCIA threshold in the 3-year base period. GDP growth is higher than world GDP growth.
Russian Federation	2.405	1.866	-22.4	2.194	1.914	-12.7	10 875	-5.0	0.8	-5.7	6.2	Member State moved below the LPCIA threshold in the 6-year base period. Implemented 2008 SNA. GDP growth is lower than world GDP growth.
Rwanda	0.003	0.003	0.0	0.010	0.011	8.0	757	4.8	7.2	-2.2	3.3	Implemented 2008 SNA.
Saint Kitts and Nevis	0.001	0.002	100.0	0.001	0.001	6.8	18 225	3.7	2.2	1.5	1.5	Assessment is close to the floor.
Saint Lucia	0.001	0.002	100.0	0.002	0.002	27.3	9 554	4.1	2.1	2.0	2.0	Assessment is close to the floor. Implemented 2008 SNA.
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines	0.001	0.001	0.0	0.001	0.001	1.6	7 281	2.3	1.3	0.9	0.9	
Samoa	0.001	0.001	0.0	0.001	0.001	-5.7	4 076	1.7	2.6	-0.8	1.5	Implemented 2008 SNA.
San Marino	0.002	0.002	0.0	0.002	0.002	-14.4	40 454	-2.4	-0.2	-2.2	0.6	
Sao Tome and Principe	0.001	0.001	0.0	0.000	0.000	11.2	1 864	5.7	3.8	1.8	4.8	
Saudi Arabia	1.172	1.184	1.0	0.928	0.905	-2.5	22 554	1.0	1.9	-0.9	-0.9	
Senegal	0.007	0.007	0.0	0.024	0.025	6.4	1 349	3.3	5.8	-2.4	0.4	Implemented 2008 SNA. Large revision to national accounts data.
Serbia	0.028	0.032	14.3	0.051	0.054	5.3	6 343	1.0	2.4	-1.3	2.2	
Seychelles	0.002	0.002	0.0	0.002	0.002	5.0	14 622	3.0	3.7	-0.7	1.9	
Sierra Leone	0.001	0.001	0.0	0.005	0.005	-9.2	535	-2.9	0.0	-2.9	9.7	

Member State	2019–2021 adopted scale	June 2021 machine scale	Change (percentage)	2019–2021 scale GNI share	June 2021 machine scale GNI share	Change (percentage)	Per capita GNI (United States dollars)	Average annual percentage change, 2014–2019: GDP: Nominal (United States dollars)	GDP: Real	Implicit price deflator[a]: United States dollars	Implicit price deflator[a]: National currency	Comments on the 2014–2019 period[b,c]
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Singapore	0.485	0.504	3.9	0.384	0.386	0.5	55 800	3.3	3.3	0.1	1.5	
Slovakia	0.153	0.155	1.3	0.121	0.119	-1.9	18 001	1.0	3.1	-2.0	0.8	
Slovenia	0.076	0.079	3.9	0.060	0.060	0.6	24 000	1.9	3.4	-1.5	1.4	
Solomon Islands	0.001	0.001	0.0	0.001	0.001	7.7	1 830	3.6	3.1	0.5	2.4	
Somalia	0.001	0.001	0.0	0.002	0.002	13.2	106	-1.3	2.7	-4.0	-0.2	Implemented 1993 SNA.
South Africa	0.272	0.244	-10.3	0.433	0.408	-5.8	5 901	-0.7	1.0	-1.7	5.2	
South Sudan	0.006	0.002	-66.7	0.019	0.006	-66.9	481	-14.5	4.7	-18.3	58.5	GDP growth is lower than world GDP growth. Unusual price changes. Assessment is close to the floor.
Spain	2.146	2.134	-0.6	1.700	1.632	-4.0	28 908	0.5	2.6	-2.1	0.8	
Sri Lanka	0.044	0.045	2.3	0.099	0.100	0.7	3 913	2.1	3.9	-1.8	3.7	
Sudan	0.010	0.010	0.0	0.081	0.074	-8.5	1 486	-9.5	4.3	-13.3	26.5	1968 SNA. Decreased share in world GNI. Unusual price changes. Scale at least developed countries ceiling.
Suriname	0.005	0.003	-40.0	0.006	0.005	-21.6	6 598	-4.1	0.2	-4.2	9.7	GDP growth is lower than world GDP growth. Unusual price changes. Assessment is close to the floor. Implemented 2008 SNA.
Sweden	0.906	0.871	-3.9	0.718	0.666	-7.1	55 543	-1.6	2.5	-4.1	2.1	
Switzerland	1.151	1.134	-1.5	0.912	0.867	-4.9	84 643	0.4	2.0	-1.5	-0.4	
Syrian Arab Republic	0.011	0.009	-18.2	0.034	0.028	-17.5	1 341	3.0	-2.6	5.7	29.6	GDP growth is lower than world GDP growth. Implemented 2008 SNA.
Tajikistan	0.004	0.003	-25.0	0.013	0.011	-13.7	1 054	-0.3	7.8	-7.6	3.8	Assessment is close to the floor.
Thailand	0.307	0.368	19.9	0.504	0.553	9.6	6 603	4.4	3.0	1.3	1.5	
Timor-Leste	0.002	0.001	-50.0	0.004	0.003	-28.0	2 001	6.3	3.8	2.4	2.4	Assessment is close to the floor.

Member State	2019–2021 adopted scale	June 2021 machine scale	Change (percentage)	2019–2021 scale GNI share	June 2021 machine scale GNI share	Change (percentage)	Per capita GNI (United States dollars)	Average annual percentage change, 2014–2019: GDP: Nominal (United States dollars)	GDP: Real	Implicit price deflator[a]: United States dollars	Implicit price deflator[a]: National currency	Comments on the 2014–2019 period[b,c]
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Togo	0.002	0.002	0.0	0.006	0.008	26.1	842	5.5	7.5	-1.9	0.9	Implemented 2008 SNA. Large revision to national accounts data.
Tonga	0.001	0.001	0.0	0.001	0.001	7.6	5 001	3.0	2.2	0.7	5.1	Implemented 2008 SNA.
Trinidad and Tobago	0.040	0.037	-7.5	0.031	0.028	-10.9	16 715	-2.7	-1.6	-1.1	-0.3	
Tunisia	0.025	0.019	-24.0	0.056	0.048	-15.2	3 429	-2.9	1.8	-4.6	5.3	GDP growth is lower than world GDP growth.
Turkey	1.371	0.845	-38.4	1.149	0.978	-14.9	9 935	-3.8	4.3	-7.7	10.7	Member State moved below the LPCIA threshold in both the 3- and 6-year base periods. Decreased share in world GNI.
Turkmenistan	0.033	0.034	3.0	0.046	0.047	1.9	6 704	2.4	7.0	-4.3	-0.9	
Tuvalu	0.001	0.001	0.0	0.000	0.000	22.8	6 506	4.0	5.9	-1.8	3.8	Implemented 1993 SNA.
Uganda	0.008	0.010	25.0	0.033	0.039	19.4	783	3.1	5.0	-1.7	4.3	GDP growth is higher than world GDP growth. Large revision to national accounts data.
Ukraine	0.057	0.056	-1.8	0.162	0.155	-4.4	2 892	-2.9	-0.9	-1.9	19.2	
United Arab Emirates	0.616	0.635	3.1	0.487	0.485	-0.4	42 061	1.1	3.2	-2.0	-2.0	Implemented 2008 SNA.
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	4.567	4.375	-4.2	3.616	3.346	-7.5	41 388	0.3	1.9	-1.6	1.8	
United Republic of Tanzania	0.010	0.010	0.0	0.060	0.067	13.2	1 011	5.0	6.7	-1.6	4.5	Implemented 2008 SNA.
United States of America	22.000	22.000	0.0	23.575	24.550	4.1	62 368	4.2	2.5	1.7	1.7	
Uruguay	0.087	0.092	5.7	0.069	0.071	3.1	16 984	0.3	2.0	-1.6	7.7	Implemented 2008 SNA.
Uzbekistan	0.032	0.027	-15.6	0.086	0.077	-11.3	1 972	-2.9	6.1	-8.5	16.3	Decreased share in world GNI. Unusual price changes.
Vanuatu	0.001	0.001	0.0	0.001	0.001	3.1	3 061	2.5	2.7	-0.2	3.0	

Member State	2019–2021 adopted scale	June 2021 machine scale	Change (percentage)	2019–2021 scale GNI share	June 2021 machine scale GNI share	Change (percentage)	Per capita GNI (United States dollars)	Average annual percentage change, 2014–2019: GDP: Nominal (United States dollars)	GDP: Real	Implicit price deflator[a]: United States dollars	Implicit price deflator[a]: National currency	Comments on the 2014–2019 period[b,c]
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)	0.728	0.175	-76.0	0.596	0.230	-61.5	6 382	-23.7	-15.4	-9.8	1 824.9	Member State moved below the LPCIA threshold in both the 3- and 6-year base periods. Nominal and real GDP growth lower than world GDP growth. Unusual price changes.
Viet Nam	0.077	0.093	20.8	0.230	0.263	14.1	2 294	7.3	6.6	0.7	2.3	
Yemen	0.010	0.008	-20.0	0.037	0.029	-22.9	849	-5.4	-11.5	6.9	9.6	
Zambia	0.009	0.008	-11.1	0.030	0.029	-3.0	1 422	-2.3	3.4	-5.5	9.2	
Zimbabwe	0.005	0.007	40.0	0.020	0.024	24.6	1 413	2.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	Assessment is close to the floor. Large revision to national accounts data.

Abbreviations: DBA, debt-burden adjustment; GDP, gross domestic product; GNI, gross national income; LPCIA, low per capita income adjustment; SNA, System of National Accounts.

[a] The implicit price deflator is calculated as GDP at current prices divided by GDP at constant prices.

[b] No comment is given when a Member State provides data in accordance with the 1993 or 2008 SNA.

[c] Member States with per capita GNI below $12,153 benefit from DBA.