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Seventy-fourth year****General and complete disarmament: nuclear disarmament****Letter dated 26 November 2019 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of
the Permanent Mission of the Russian Federation to the
United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General**

Further to our letter dated 18 April 2019 ([A/73/846-S/2019/339](#)), as well as numerous previous notes on the implementation of paragraph 3 of annex B to Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), I have the honour to once again reiterate the position of the Russian Federation on this issue due to several communications from Member States.

The Islamic Republic of Iran is a full member of the United Nations and a State party to many multilateral non-proliferation mechanisms, including the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. None of these instruments, as well as resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#), prohibit Iran to develop missile and space programmes.

Given the complete lack of evidence that Iran is developing or producing a nuclear weapon or means of its delivery or is deploying any infrastructure for the storage or servicing of nuclear weapons, the Russian Federation continues to proceed from its previous assessment that Iran is respecting in good faith the call addressed to it in paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) to refrain from activities related to ballistic missiles that are designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons. As yet no viable information to the contrary has ever been provided to the Security Council.

We continue to view with regret the ongoing attempts by certain Member States to distort the nature and scope of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), which is obviously viewed by them not as an informal political understanding between 35 States on export control issues, but as a kind of “universal legally binding instrument” that somehow prohibits all countries in the world, apart from themselves, to develop any space capabilities at all. Moreover, by making such flawed logic, these Member States are accusing by extension all other non-nuclear weapons States that are developing their own missile and space programmes of effectively designing delivery systems capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

In this context we would like to reiterate that the category I parameters of the MTCR annex are nothing but a reference tool for exporting States and were never intended to be used in the context of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) to ascertain whether or



not certain ballistic missiles are designed to be capable of carrying nuclear weapons. It is well known that such types of missiles should include certain specific features and, up until now, no evidence of their existence on Iranian ballistic missiles or space launch vehicles has ever been presented in any of the communications to the Security Council in connection with paragraph 3 of annex B to resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

It is all the more surprising when such accusations are made by a Member State that has “withdrawn” itself from the full implementation of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) in violation of Article 25 of the United Nations Charter, forfeited its legally binding obligations under the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and is actively undermining efforts by Member States to preserve the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and efforts by regional States to establish a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction.

I should be grateful for the circulation of the present letter as a document of the General Assembly under item 98 (b) of its agenda, and of the Security Council, and its reflection in the upcoming report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#).

(Signed) Dmitry Polyanskiy
Chargé d'affaires a.i.
