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Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council

Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

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Special political missions

Thematic cluster I

Special and personal envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General

Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus

Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide

Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#)

United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa***

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi

Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar*

Thematic cluster II

Sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels, and other entities and mechanisms

Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea**

Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Panel of Experts on the Sudan

Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Panel of Experts on Libya

Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic

Panel of Experts on Yemen

Panel of Experts on South Sudan

Panel of Experts on Somalia*

Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolutions [1526 \(2004\)](#) and [2253 \(2015\)](#) concerning ISIL (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities

Office of the Ombudsperson established pursuant to resolution [1904 \(2009\)](#)****

Implementation of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#)

Panel of Experts on Mali

* Missions established during 2018 (see paras. 5 (a)–(c) below).

** Missions discontinued during 2018 (see paras. 4 and 5 (d) below).

*** Name changed from the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan (see [S/2018/955](#); see para. 5 (e) below).

**** A separate budget for 2019 for the Office has been submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution [72/262 A](#) (see [A/73/352](#) and [A/73/352/Corr.1](#), para. 3).

Support to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution [1540 \(2004\)](#) on the non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction

Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate

United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (UNITAD)*

Thematic cluster III

Regional offices, offices in support of political processes and other missions

United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel (UNOWAS)

United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS)

United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)

United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia

United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission

Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon

United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA)

United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)

United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)

United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)

I. Introduction

1. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has considered the main report of the Secretary-General on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council ([A/73/352](#) and [A/73/352/Corr.1](#)). During its consideration of the report, the Advisory Committee met with representatives of the Secretary-General, who provided additional information and clarification, concluding with written responses received on 5 December 2018.

2. The main report of the Secretary-General provides an overview of the proposed resource requirements for 2019 for special political missions and related cross-cutting issues. As in previous years, five addenda to the main report cover the specific requirements for thematic clusters I to III and the two largest missions, UNAMA and UNAMI.¹ In addition to the budget proposals presented under cluster II ([A/73/352/Add.2](#) and [A/73/352/Add.2/Corr.1](#)), the Secretary-General submits a separate proposal for the recently established mission, UNITAD ([A/73/352/Add.6](#), [A/73/352/Add.6/Corr.1](#) and [A/73/352/Add.6/Corr.2](#)).

3. In the present report, the Advisory Committee addresses issues of a cross-cutting nature pertaining to special political missions, while its specific comments and recommendations relating to the budget proposals for thematic clusters I to III, UNAMA, UNAMI and UNITAD are presented in separate related reports.²

Status of mission mandates and missions established and discontinued since the previous report of the Secretary-General

4. Of the 37 missions for which budgetary requirements are requested by the Secretary-General for 2019, the status of their mandates are as follows: (a) 14 missions have open-ended mandates; (b) 22 missions have mandates expiring in 2019 or later; and (c) the mandate of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea expires in December 2018 (see [A/73/352](#) and [A/73/352/Corr.1](#), para. 7). During its consideration of the resource requirements for 2019 for the missions under thematic cluster II, the Advisory Committee was informed that the Security Council, in its resolution [2444 \(2018\)](#), had decided to terminate the mandate of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, with effect from 16 December 2018 and that the overall requirements under cluster II for 2019 had been adjusted to reflect the change (see [A/73/498/Add.2](#), table 1). Consequently, the proposed resources for 2019 under consideration now include requirements for 36 missions (see para. 5 (c) below). The overall resource requirements for 2019 are discussed in section II.C below.

5. Since the issuance of the previous report of the Secretary-General ([A/72/371](#)), a number of missions have been established, discontinued or expanded (see [A/73/352](#) and [A/73/352/Corr.1](#), paras. 8 and 9, and para. 4 above), as follows:

(a) The Secretary-General appointed a Special Envoy on Myanmar on 26 April 2018 pursuant to General Assembly resolution [72/248](#);

(b) The Secretary-General appointed a Special Adviser to head UNITAD on 31 May pursuant to Security Council resolution [2379 \(2017\)](#);

¹ [A/73/352/Add.1](#), [A/73/352/Add.2](#) and [A/73/352/Add.2/Corr.1](#), [A/73/352/Add.3](#), [A/73/352/Add.4](#) and [A/73/352/Add.5](#).

² [A/73/498/Add.1](#), [A/73/498/Add.2](#), [A/73/498/Add.3](#), [A/73/498/Add.4](#), [A/73/498/Add.5](#) and [A/73/498/Add.6](#).

(c) The Panel of Experts on Somalia was established on 14 November 2018 pursuant to Security Council resolution [2444 \(2018\)](#);³

(d) The mandate of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea will terminate, with effect from 16 December 2018, pursuant to Security Council resolution [2444 \(2018\)](#);

(e) In a letter dated 31 October 2018 ([S/2018/979](#)), the Security Council took note of the decision of the Secretary-General, in his letter of 24 October ([S/2018/955](#)), to expand the remit of the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan to cover the Horn of Africa region. The staffing and other requirements for the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Horn of Africa will be met through existing resources. The Advisory Committee was informed that any changes to the results-based framework would be reflected in the next budget.

II. Overview of resource requirements for 2018–2019

A. Biennial provision for 2018–2019

6. The Advisory Committee recalls that the Secretary-General included a biennial provision of \$1,109.6 million for special political missions under section 3, Political affairs, of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019 (see paras. 7–9 below). A summary of the charges against the biennial provision is set out in annex I to the main report of the Secretary-General. That summary, which has been revised to reflect the change noted in paragraph 4 above (see annex I to the present report), shows the following:

(a) A total charge of \$633.5 million, approved by the General Assembly in its resolutions [72/262 A](#) and [C](#), for special political missions for 2018 against the biennial provision of \$1,109.6 million under section 3, Political affairs, of the programme budget for 2018–2019, meaning that the undistributed balance of the biennial provision amounts to \$476.1 million;

(b) Total requirements relating to the financing of 36 special political missions for 2019 are estimated by the Secretary-General at \$663.3 million net (see para. 4 above), exceeding the undistributed balance of \$476.1 million in the biennial provision by \$187.2 million;

(c) An additional amount of \$194 million net, which the General Assembly is requested to appropriate under section 3, Political affairs, of the programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019, after taking into account a projected overexpenditure of \$6.8 million for 2018 (see para. 11 below).

7. The Advisory Committee recalls that the biennial provision of \$1,109.6 million for special political missions, which was included in section 3, Political affairs, of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019, represented a reduction of \$14.8 million compared with the amount of \$1,124.4 million provided for in the proposed programme budget outline for the biennium 2018–2019 (see General Assembly resolution [71/274](#)). The Secretary-General attributed the reduction of \$14.8 million to planned Umoja-related efficiency gains across all special political missions for 2018–2019. The Committee pointed out at the time of its consideration of the proposed programme budget for 2018–2019 that the reduction of \$14.8 million had not yet been identified, and that it would not be possible to verify details pertaining to the promised efficiencies before budget proposals for the missions for

³ The Advisory Committee was informed that a budget proposal for the Panel of Experts will be submitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly at the resumed seventy-third session.

2018 and 2019 until late 2017 and 2018, respectively (A/72/7, paras. 55 and 63). In the context of the proposed budgets for special political missions for 2018, the missions did not identify reductions related to Umoja or other efficiencies, except for UNAMA, for which a reduction of \$698,900 was attributed to planned efficiencies (A/72/7/Add.10, para. 13). For 2019, the Advisory Committee notes that no such efficiencies are reported in the proposed budgets for special political missions by the Secretary-General.

8. The Advisory Committee further recalls that, in its review of the proposed biennial provision for special political missions for 2016–2017, it discussed the successive reductions proposed by the Secretary-General to biennial provisions for the missions, under presumed efficiencies, for the bienniums 2012–2013, 2014–2015 and 2016–2017, for which reductions in the amounts of \$35 million, \$32 million and \$6 million, respectively, were proposed without details to support such reductions in the related proposed programme budgets (A/70/7/Add.10, paras. 7–10).

9. The Secretary-General indicates that since the provision of \$1,109.6 million for the biennium 2018–2019 does not take into account four new missions,⁴ nor the expansion of the mandates of four existing missions,⁵ resources for those additional mandates are considered as an addition to the provision for the special political missions (A/73/352 and A/73/352/Corr.1, para. 79). The Advisory Committee pointed out at the time of its consideration of the proposed programme budget for 2018–2019 that the level of resources approved for special political missions for recent bienniums was between 7 and 10 per cent higher than the amount of \$1,109.6 million set aside in the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019 (A/72/7, para. 57). **The Committee has recognized that funding for special political missions during a biennium is dependent on decisions of the General Assembly and/or the Security Council with respect to establishment or renewal of mandates. As such, a biennial provision approved prior to the start of a biennium is subject to change during that biennium. The Committee has nonetheless considered that past experience indicates an inability to make accurate predictions about ongoing resource requirements of the special political missions (see A/70/7/Add.10, para. 11, and A/66/7, para. 27). The Committee therefore recommends that the Assembly request the Secretary-General to make further efforts to present more accurate budget estimates of the special political missions with the introduction of the annual programme budget for 2020.**

B. Budget performance for 2018

10. The projected expenditures for 2018 amount to \$642.2 million, compared with the appropriation of \$635.4 million, resulting in an estimated overexpenditure of \$6.8 million (1.1 per cent). Table 5 of the main report of the Secretary-General provides a summary of the estimated budget performance for 2018 by cluster. Table 6 of the report provides a summary of the main factors contributing to the significant variances between the 2018 appropriation and projected expenditures by mission.

11. The Secretary-General indicates that the projected overexpenditure for 2018 reflects the estimated overexpenditures under civilian personnel costs, offset in part

⁴ The Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar, the Panel of Experts on Mali, the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia and the United Nations Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant.

⁵ The Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM).

by projected underexpenditure under operational costs (A/73/352 and A/73/352/Corr.1, para. 73). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the projected overexpenditures under civilian personnel costs were due to a combination of lower actual vacancy rates and higher-than-budgeted actual expenditures for salaries and common staff costs, mainly related to the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, UNSOM, UNSMIL, UNAMI, UNIOGBIS and the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen. Those projected overexpenditures are partly offset by projected underexpenditures under operational costs, primarily under facilities and infrastructure in UNSOM, UNSMIL and the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia; under communications and information technology in the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, UNAMA and UNSMIL; and under air operations in UNOWAS, the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia and UNSOM.

C. Resource requirements for 2019

12. The main report of the Secretary-General provides an overview of the proposed resource requirements of \$665.5 million net for 2019 for 37 special political missions. The Advisory Committee requested that table 7 of the report, be updated to show the requirements for 36 missions for 2019 in view of the change under thematic cluster II (see table 1 below). Upon request, the Committee was also provided with an updated version of table 11 of the report showing adjusted requirements by major category of expenditure for 2019 (see annex II).

Table 1
Summary of estimated requirements for 2019 (by cluster)

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	Total requirements for 2018 ^a	Total requirements for 2019	Variance amount	Variance percentage
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)-(1)	(4)=(3)/(1)
Cluster I	49 294.5	55 900.9	6 606.4	13.4
Cluster II	33 324.6	57 200.5	23 875.9	71.6
Cluster III	292 557.0	302 315.0	9 758.0	3.3
UNAMA	148 705.3	141 499.3	(7 206.0)	(4.8)
UNAMI	108 630.0	105 775.7	(2 854.3)	(2.6)
Subtotal (net)	632 511.4	662 691.4	30 180.0	4.8
Discontinued missions ^b	2 185.8	–	(2 185.8)	(100.0)
Provision for the share of special political missions for the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda	686.9	595.5	(91.4)	(13.3)
Total (net)	635 384.1	663 286.9	27 902.8	4.4

^a The appropriation for 2018 of \$635,384,100 includes: (a) an amount of \$633,521,600 approved in the context of special political missions under General Assembly resolutions 72/262 A and C; and (b) an amount of \$1,862,500 approved in the context of administrative and financial implications of the decisions and recommendations contained in the report of the International Civil Service Commission for the year 2017 (see General Assembly resolution 72/262 A, sect. VII).

^b Missions that had approved resources in 2018 and that are discontinued in 2019 include the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea.

13. The overall resource level proposed for 2019 amounts to \$663.3 million, representing an increase of \$27.9 million (4.4 per cent) compared with the overall resources approved for 2018. The Advisory Committee notes that, excluding proposed resources in the amount of \$21.5 million for UNITAD (A/73/352/Add.6, A/73/352/Add.6/Corr.1 and A/73/352/Add.6/Corr.2, table 2), the resource requirements for the continuing missions would amount to \$641.8 million, an increase of \$6.4 million (1 per cent). Information with respect to the resource changes for 2019 by cluster is discussed in paragraphs 75 to 79 of the main report of the Secretary-General.

14. A summary of the variances between the approved resources for 2018 and the proposed resources for 2019 by mission is provided in table 8 of the main report of the Secretary-General, and mission-by-mission estimates are presented in table 10 of the report. The Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that the increase in resource requirements in 2019 is mainly the result of: (a) the application of lower vacancy rates in 2019 than budgeted in 2018, taking into account actual average vacancy rates in 2018; (b) higher civilian personnel costs based on the actual salaries and entitlements of incumbents; and (c) the proposed establishment of new positions, mainly under UNITAD, UNSOM, UNSMIL and the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia. These increases are partly offset by reductions under military and police personnel, mainly under UNAMI, UNIOGBIS and UNSOM; and operational costs, primarily under the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia and UNSMIL. The comments and recommendations of the Committee on the proposed resource requirements for individual missions are contained in its related reports.²

Staffing requirements for 2019

15. In view of the change under cluster II (see para. 4 above), the Advisory Committee also requested a revised table 9 of the main report of the Secretary-General, which provides information on the total number of civilian positions by cluster, excluding the mission discontinued in 2018 (see table 2 below). The number, category and level of civilian positions for each mission are provided in table 12 of the main report.

Table 2
Summary of proposed civilian staffing, by cluster

	<i>Approved 2018</i>	<i>Proposed 2019</i>	<i>Variance</i>	<i>Variance (percentage)</i>
	<i>(1)</i>	<i>(2)</i>	<i>(3)=(2)-(1)</i>	<i>(4)=(3)/(1)</i>
Cluster I	302	307	5	1.7
Cluster II	111	244	133	119.8
Cluster III	1 316	1 426	110	8.4
UNAMA	1 237	1 206	(31)	(2.5)
UNAMI	852	800	(52)	(6.1)
Subtotal	3 818	3 983	165	4.3
Discontinued missions ^a	7	–	(7)	(100.0)
Total	3 825	3 983	158	4.1

^a Missions that had approved resources in 2018 and that are discontinued in 2019 include the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea.

16. The Secretary-General proposes that the number of civilian personnel be increased from 3,825 to 3,983, reflecting an overall increase of 158 positions (4.1 per

cent). The Advisory Committee notes that, excluding the proposed 135 positions for UNITAD (see [A/73/352/Add.6](#), [A/73/352/Add.6/Corr.1](#) and [A/73/352/Add.6/Corr.2](#), table 3), there is an increase of 23 positions for the continuing missions (0.6 per cent). The changes under civilian personnel reflect: (a) net increases under UNITAD (135), UNSOM (48), the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia (37), UNSMIL (34), the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen (3) and the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria (2); and (b) net decreases under UNAMI (52), UNAMA (31), UNIOGBIS (7), the implementation of Security Council resolution [2231 \(2015\)](#) (2), UNOWAS (1) and the United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission (1) (see [A/73/352](#) and [A/73/352/Corr.1](#), para. 81). A summary of the proposed changes in the number and level of civilian positions for 2019 is provided in annex XII to the main report of the Secretary-General. The comments and recommendations of the Committee on the proposed staffing requirements for individual missions are contained in its related reports.²

17. With respect to the contract status of the heads of office, the Advisory Committee notes from the information it received upon request that all the heads of office work full-time, except four who work under when-actually-employed contracts⁶ and one who works under a one-dollar-a-year contract.⁷ The Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that the positions under the when-actually-employed contracts were budgeted for 9 months for 2019 and that a one-dollar-a-year contract is granted only under exceptional circumstances for high-level appointments.

Vacancy rates and vacant positions

18. The Advisory Committee notes that, in response to its previous requests (see [A/71/595](#), paras. 17 and 46), which were endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution [71/272 A](#), annex X to the main report of the Secretary-General contains (a) information on the vacancy rates approved for and experienced in 2018, and (b) the proposed vacancy rates for 2019, and that annex XI contains information on positions that had been vacant for two years or longer as at 30 April 2018 (see [A/73/352](#) and [A/73/352/Corr.1](#), paras. 83 and 84).

19. The comments and recommendations of the Advisory Committee on the vacancy rates and vacant positions of individual missions are contained in its related reports.² **The Committee reiterates that: (a) budgeted vacancy rates should be based, as much as possible, on actual vacancy rates: in cases where the proposed budgeted rates differ from the actual rates at the time of the budget preparation, clear justification should be provided in related budget documents for the rates applied; (b) vacant posts should be filled expeditiously, as requested by the General Assembly; and (c) as a matter of overall policy, the continuing requirement for posts that have been vacant for two years or longer should be reviewed and justifications provided for their retention: otherwise, they should be proposed for abolishment ([A/72/7/Add.10](#), para. 26).**

20. The Advisory Committee also requested and received information on temporary assignments of staff to higher-level vacant positions, involving special post

⁶ The Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus, the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara, the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi and the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar.

⁷ The Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#). The position is currently vacant as the functions of the Special Envoy are being performed by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs.

allowances.⁸ As at 30 September 2018, a total of 38 such assignments had been granted at special political missions as follows: the Office of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Cyprus (1); the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria (3); the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan (1); the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen (4); the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi (5); the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Myanmar (1); the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (4); the Panel of Experts on South Sudan (1); UNIOGBIS (2); UNSOM (2); the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (2); UNSMIL (3); and UNAMA (9). The Committee has made comments and recommendations in this regard in its related reports.⁹ The Committee recalls that the Board of Auditors, in its report on the United Nations for the year ended 2017, observed that the granting of a special post allowance to staff had not been limited to exceptional cases during the biennium 2016–2017 and that the United Nations had stated that the overuse of temporary job openings was one of the main factors preventing stronger workforce planning in the Organization (see [A/73/5 \(Vol. I\)](#), paras. 93–99, and [A/73/430](#), paras. 34 and 35). **The Committee trusts that all vacant positions will be filled expeditiously and recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to complete the recruitment process for those posts presently encumbered by the use of special post allowances promptly. Furthermore, the Committee recommends that the Assembly request the Secretary-General to include information on temporary assignments with special post allowances and recruitment status in the context of all budget proposals in 2019, including peacekeeping budgets and the programme budget.**

Budgeting for the positions of resident coordinators and related support capacity in special political missions

Background

21. The Advisory Committee recalls that, until 2018, in the case of special political missions that have Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General who also serve as resident coordinators, resident representatives and/or humanitarian coordinators, the salaries and common staff costs related to those positions were budgeted at 50 per cent of the total cost for the respective missions and the other half of the costs were billed to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (see [A/72/7/Add.10](#), para. 24, and [A/70/7/Add.48](#), para. 17). In addition to staff costs, the General Assembly, in its resolution [71/272 B](#), endorsed the recommendation of the Committee that the cost-sharing arrangement should also include operational support costs, including official travel (see [A/70/7/Add.48](#), para. 17).

22. The Advisory Committee further recalls that the General Assembly, in its resolution [72/279](#), decided to create a dedicated, independent, impartial, empowered and sustainable development-focused coordination function for the United Nations development system by separating the functions of the resident coordinator from those of the resident representative of UNDP and to provide sufficient funding for the

⁸ The provisions governing special post allowance are contained in rule 3.10 of the Staff Rules ([ST/SGB/2018/1](#)) and administrative instructions [ST/AI/1999/17](#), [ST/AI/1999/17/Amend.1](#) and [ST/AI/2003/3](#).

⁹ See [A/73/498/Add.1](#), para. 9, [A/73/498/Add.2](#), para. 9, [A/73/498/Add.3](#), para. 9, and [A/73/498/Add.4](#), para. 12.

system, as prescribed in paragraph 10 of the resolution,¹⁰ starting from 1 January 2019. Pursuant to that resolution, a total of 129 resident coordinator posts need to be transitioned to the United Nations Secretariat from UNDP effective 1 January 2019. In that context, the Controller, in a letter dated 30 August 2018, requested the Committee's concurrence with the establishment of 129 resident coordinator posts in the Secretariat, to be funded from extrabudgetary resources. The letter indicated that, of the 129 posts, 12 posts (10 Assistant Secretary-General and 2 D-2) were part of the staffing table of peacekeeping operations or special political missions. The Committee considered, at that time, that those posts should continue to be reviewed by the Assembly in the context of the budgets of the relevant peacekeeping operations or special political missions until the Assembly decided otherwise (see [A/73/579](#), para. 12).

23. The report of the Secretary-General on revised estimates relating to the resident coordinator system under section I, Overall policy making, direction and coordination ([A/73/424](#))¹¹ and the related report of the Advisory Committee ([A/73/579](#)) are currently before the General Assembly. The Committee was informed that, in fact, rather than the 12 posts indicated in the above-mentioned letter of the Controller (see para. 22 above), 11 posts were part of the staffing table of peacekeeping operations and special political missions, as one Assistant Secretary-General-level post is in the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process under section 3, Political affairs, of the programme budget (see [A/73/579](#), para. 13). **The Committee notes the inconsistent information provided on the number of double- or triple-hatted posts in peacekeeping and special political missions.** During its consideration of the proposed budgets for special political missions for 2019, which contain provisions for six missions that have resident coordinators (see [A/73/352/Add.3](#), [A/73/352/Add.4](#) and [A/73/352/Add.5](#)), the Committee notes that there is a need to clarify certain areas, such as the separation of functions, support capacity and administrative arrangements, which are discussed in paragraphs 24 to 28 below.

Budgeting for the positions of resident coordinators and related support capacity costs

24. In his report before the General Assembly on revised estimates relating to the resident coordinator system, the Secretary-General indicates that, wherever applicable, resident coordinators will continue to be double-hatted as humanitarian coordinators and triple-hatted as deputy special representatives of the Secretary-General, in relevant contexts. For such posts in peacekeeping missions or special political missions, 50 per cent of the salaries and common staff costs will be paid by the newly established resident coordinator system, while the other 50 per cent will continue to be paid by the respective missions (see [A/73/424](#), para. 20). The Secretary-General indicates that the salaries and common staff costs related to those positions are budgeted at 50 per cent of the total cost for 2019 in six special political missions (UNIOGBIS, UNSOM, the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator

¹⁰ The system would be funded, on an annual basis starting from 1 January 2019, through: (a) a 1 per cent coordination levy on tightly earmarked third-party non-core contributions to United Nations development-related activities, to be paid at source; (b) doubling the current United Nations Development Group cost-sharing arrangement among United Nations development system entities; and (c) voluntary, predictable, multi-year contributions to a dedicated trust fund to support the inception period.

¹¹ See [A/73/424](#), para. 30, in which the Secretary-General requests the General Assembly to appropriate the amount of \$13,571,800 in the form of a grant under section 1, Overall policymaking, direction and coordination, of the programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019. That amount represents the United Nations share of the United Nations Sustainable Development Group cost-sharing arrangement for the year 2019, in accordance with paragraph 10 (b) of Assembly resolution [72/279](#).

for Lebanon, UNSMIL, UNAMA and UNAMI) (see [A/73/352](#) and [A/73/352/Corr.1](#), para. 82). Upon request, the Advisory Committee was provided with information on the functional titles of the double- and triple-hatted positions for 2018 and 2019 in the six missions (see table 3 below).

Table 3

Functional titles of Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General who continue to serve as resident coordinators and/or humanitarian coordinators in 2019

Mission	Approved for 2018		Proposed for 2019	
	Grade	Functional title	Grade	Functional title
UNIOGBIS	D-2	DSRSG/RC/RR	D-2	DSRSG/RC
UNSOM	ASG	DSRSG/RC/HC/RR	ASG	DSRSG/RC/HC
UNSCOL	ASG	DSC/RC/HC/RR	ASG	DSC/RC/HC
UNSMIL	ASG	DSRSG/RC/HC/RR	ASG	DSRSG/RC/HC
UNAMA	ASG	DSRSG/RC/HC/RR	ASG	DSRSG/RC/HC
UNAMI	ASG	DSRSG/RC/HC/RR	ASG	DSRSG/RC/HC

Abbreviations: ASG, Assistant Secretary-General; DSC, Deputy Special Coordinator; DSRSG, Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General; RC, resident coordinator; HC, humanitarian coordinator; RR, resident representative.

25. The Advisory Committee notes from table 3 above that, while the Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General will no longer perform the functions of resident representative of UNDP from 2019, the functions of the resident coordinator will not be separated from those of the Deputy Special Representatives and/or humanitarian coordinators in the missions.

26. With respect to the core support capacity for the new resident coordinators at the country level, the Secretary-General proposes a minimum capacity of five substantive staff members in each resident coordinator office to cover the core functions for effective coordination.¹² The budget of the resident coordinator system special purpose trust fund is set out in annex II to the related report of the Secretary-General ([A/73/424](#)). However, in the proposed budget for UNAMI for 2019, the Secretary-General indicates that the Development Coordination Office of the mission is responsible for supporting the Deputy Special Representative/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator in carrying out the functions of the Resident Coordinator ([A/73/352/Add.5](#), para. 56 (b)). Upon request, the Advisory Committee was provided with information on support capacities being used to carry out mandated development work in the context of the respective missions (see table 4 below). **The Committee notes that the resources proposed for support capacity for the resident coordinators of UNAMA, UNAMI and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon appear to be duplicative of the core support capacity to be provided under the new resident coordinator system from the special purpose trust fund.**

¹² This will include experts in coordination and strategic planning (P-5), economics (P-4 or National Professional Officer), monitoring and evaluation, communications and strategic partnerships (3 National Professional Officers) (see [A/73/424](#), paras. 12, 92–96).

Table 4
Support capacities related to development work in missions

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Unit</i>	<i>Positions</i>
UNAMA	Resident Coordinator/ United Nations Country Team Unit	1 P-5, 1 P-4, 1 P-3, 2 NPO, 1 LL
UNAMI	Development Coordination Office	1 P-5, 2 P-4, 4 P-3, 1 P-2, 10 NPO, 2 LL
UNSCOL	Coordination Unit	1 P-5, 1 P-4, 1 NPO

Abbreviations: LL, Local level; NPO, National Professional Officer.

27. **Taking into account that the reinvigorated resident coordinator system is newly established, with operation to start only from 2019, the Advisory Committee does not object to the proposed resources for the six missions for 2019. However, the Committee recommends that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to undertake a review, in the context of the next budget submissions, to ensure that the arrangements proposed for the double- or triple-hatted Deputy Special Representatives of the Secretary-General and the related support capacity in the six missions are consistent with the provisions of Assembly resolution 72/279. In addition, the Committee considers that there is a need to further determine how the related operational costs should be budgeted for those positions in the special political missions (see para. 21 above). Furthermore, the Committee expects that a consistent approach will also be adopted for those positions in the peacekeeping operations concerned, as well as those relating to the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process in the proposed programme budget for 2020 (see para. 23 above).**

28. Concerning administrative arrangements to support the offices of the resident coordinator, the Secretary-General indicates that UNDP will provide administrative and operational support services for premises and facilities management, general administration, finance and procurement, legal affairs and information, communication and technology to the regional and country offices on a service fee basis (A/73/424, para. 21). **The Advisory Committee notes that no related information is provided in the proposed budgets for 2019 for the six special political missions concerned. The Committee trusts that information in this regard will be provided to the General Assembly at the time of its consideration of the present report.**

Operational costs for 2019

29. The resource requirements under operational costs for 2019 contained in annex II to the present report relate to costs for 36 missions (see para. 12 above). The Advisory Committee discusses cross-cutting issues in the present section, and its comments and recommendations on proposed requirements under operational costs for 2019 for individual missions are provided in its related reports.² The Committee has made specific comments and recommendations in those reports relating to consultants, official travel, facilities and infrastructure and ground transportation (see A/73/498/Add.1, paras. 20 and 27; A/73/498/Add.3, paras. 32, 34, 36 and 39; A/73/498/Add.4, paras. 18 and 20; A/73/498/Add.5, paras. 22 and 23; and A/73/498/Add.6, para. 21).

Air operations

30. The resources proposed for air operations amount to \$37.4 million for 2019, compared with the approved budget of \$42.6 million for 2018 and the expenditure of \$37 million for 2017. The proposal for 2019 represents a decrease of \$5.1 million, or 12.1 per cent, compared with the appropriation for 2018. Annex IV to the main report of the Secretary-General provides, for each mission, information on the approved and proposed budgets and actual and proposed flying hours for 2017, 2018 and 2019. The Secretary-General indicates that, of the total resources proposed for 12 special political missions for 2019, those under air operations for four missions (UNSOM, UNAMA, the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia and UNSMIL) represent 77.3 per cent of such resources. He also indicates that, compared with 2018, eight missions reflect reduced financial resources under air operations in 2019, two missions are with essentially unchanged financial resources, while two missions (the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen and the newly established UNITAD) reflect increased financial resources in 2019 (see [A/73/352](#) and [A/73/352/Corr.1](#), para. 61 and annex IV).

31. The Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that the overall reduction of \$5.1 million under air operations for 2019 for special political missions was the result of the negotiation of less expensive contracts through a competitive procurement process and reviews of aviation requirements conducted by the missions under the Secretary-General's initiative, and that the reductions were mainly reflected under the resources proposed for UNOWAS/UNIOGBIS/United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission (shared aircraft), UNSOM, the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia, UNAMA and UNAMI. The Committee was also informed that the proposed reductions would not have a negative impact on the operations of the missions concerned. Upon request, the Committee was provided with information on the cost-sharing of aircraft among special political missions, including types of aircraft, the percentages for shared use and seat capacity (see table 5 below).

Table 5
Cost-shared aircraft among special political missions and peacekeeping operations

<i>Aircraft type</i>	<i>Seat capacity</i>	<i>Mission</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Learjet 60	7 passengers (VIP)	UNOWAS	75
		UNIOGBIS	20
		United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission	5
DHC-8-100	37 passengers	UNSOM	30
DHC-7	48 passengers		70
2 MI-8MTV	22 passengers		
HS-125	14 passengers	UNAMI	55
		Yemen	45

Compliance with the advance air ticket purchase policy

32. The Advisory Committee has discussed the persistent low rates of compliance with the 16-day advance booking policy for the purchase of air tickets by special political missions (see [A/72/7/Add.10](#), para. 37; [A/71/595](#), para. 32, and [A/70/7/Add.10](#), para. 37). Annex VII to the main report of the Secretary-General provides information on the annual rates of compliance with the advance booking policy, as requested by the Committee. The Committee notes from the information contained

therein that the overall compliance rates continue to be persistently low for most of the missions under thematic clusters I and III, and for UNAMA and UNAMI. Furthermore, the compliance rates for over a dozen missions were lower in 2018 than in 2017, with more than half of those under thematic cluster II. Of all the missions, only one mission under thematic cluster I has exceeded the Secretariat target rate of 70 per cent compliance since 2016 (United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions).

33. The Advisory Committee further notes that the main report of the Secretary-General provides the same explanation as in his previous report (see [A/73/352](#) and [A/73/352/Corr.1](#), para. 67, and [A/72/371](#), para. 97), which attributes full compliance to external factors only. The Committee continues to believe that such an explanation is insufficient (see [A/72/7/Add.10](#), para. 36). **While recognizing that, for some missions, the nature of the work involved and the related travel requirements can vary, as can the predictability of certain types of trips, the Committee reiterates its dissatisfaction with the overall low rates of compliance with the 16-day advance booking policy. The Committee reiterates its expectation that the reasons for the low compliance rates will be analysed and the necessary measures taken to improve compliance with the advance purchase policy, thus leading to savings arising from the advance booking of predictable trips, in particular that related to official training (see [A/72/7/Add.10](#), para. 37; [A/71/595](#), para. 32, and [A/70/7/Add.10](#), para. 37). Furthermore, recognizing that some trips can, and should, be planned and that some cannot, the Committee is of the view that the related annex to the main report of the Secretary-General could be expanded to include an explanation for the low compliance rates, by mission, indicating the number of planned trips and those that were unexpected, within and outside mission areas.**

34. Furthermore, the Advisory Committee continues to be of the view that, given the ever-expanding and improved means of communication offered by available technology, larger reductions in resource requirements for official travel should have been possible (see [A/71/595](#), para. 30). The Committee reiterates its views relating to the judicious use of travel resources, in particular its view that the primary consideration in authorizing official travel should be whether direct face-to-face contact is necessary for mandate implementation (see [A/72/7](#), para. 107). In addition, the Committee reiterates that missions should, wherever feasible, balance the increased requirements for travel in certain work areas by seeking alternative means of communication in others (see [A/72/7/Add.10](#), para. 39).

Holdings of vehicles and information technology equipment

35. Tables 3 and 4 in the main report of the Secretary-General provide information on the proposed allocation, for 2019, of vehicles and computing devices for personnel in field-based special political missions that are supported by the Department of Field Support. The tables show that the overall holdings of vehicles and information technology equipment proposed for 2019 are 16.4 per cent and 4.9 per cent higher, respectively, than the standard allocations.

36. The Advisory Committee has observed a trend of increasingly higher allocation percentages than those specified by the Standard Cost and Ratio Manual in recent years¹³ (see [A/72/7/Add.10](#), para. 42). The Committee recalls that the vehicle

¹³ For vehicles, the proposed holdings increased from 8.2 per cent above the standard ratio for 2016 to 16 per cent for 2017 and to 20 per cent for 2018. For information technology equipment, including spare equipment, the proposed holdings also increased from 1 per cent over the standard ratio for 2016 to 5 per cent for 2017 and to 8.6 per cent for 2018.

entitlement ratios set out in the Manual were updated following the reduction of excess holdings of vehicles during the 2016/17 period (see [A/72/789](#), para. 44 and annex II). The Committee notes that, although the ratios of the proposed holdings for 2019 are lower than those proposed for 2018, they remain at the increased levels of 2017, which are still higher than those of 2016. While justification is provided for the proposed higher information technology equipment holdings, such as the need for training facilities, Internet cafés, CarLog systems and time required to repair equipment (see [A/73/352](#) and [A/73/352/Corr.1](#), para. 60), no specific justification is provided for the proposed higher holdings of vehicles, except that the Department has noted that the vehicle holdings of some missions are higher than the standard allocation and that there are also operating conditions to which some missions, more than others, need to adapt (*ibid.*, para. 59). **The Committee reiterates that the trend of higher-than-standard allocations of vehicles, information technology equipment and spare equipment should be reviewed and reversed (see [A/72/7/Add.10](#), para. 42). The Committee trusts that information on the review and adjustment to be made to align with the standard will be reflected in the next budget of the Secretary-General.**

37. The Advisory Committee has repeatedly stressed the need to have a coherent policy regarding the vehicle holdings of special political missions at family duty stations and has requested, but not received, detailed information in the past (see [A/72/7/Add.10](#), para. 46; [A/71/595](#), para. 35; and [A/70/7/Add.10](#), para. 24). The Committee notes the lack of detailed information on the matter in the proposed budget for 2019, except what is stated in paragraph 57 of the main report of the Secretary-General that, since 2016, measures for the holding and use of vehicles have been formulated with a view to allowing missions to rationalize the need for vehicle usage in family duty stations. **The Committee reiterates that a coherent policy regarding the vehicle holdings of special political missions at family duty stations should be formulated and that detailed information by mission should be provided in the proposed budgets for 2020.**

38. With regard to the writing-off and acquisition of vehicles, it is indicated in the report of the Secretary-General that, in order to reinforce the oversight and monitoring of inventory holdings, including the tracking of write-offs towards the replacement of vehicles, a central approach to vehicle acquisitions is also in place, in which acquisitions of light passenger vehicles are reviewed by the Department of Field Support ([A/73/352](#) and [A/73/352/Corr.1](#), para. 56). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that, according to the rules set out in the Standard Cost and Ratio Manual since 2016, the criteria for the write-off of vehicles has been revised to a combined seven years of service with 180,000 miles, compared with the previous criteria by which either seven years of service or 180,000 miles would have qualified a vehicle for write-off.

39. The Advisory Committee was also informed upon enquiry that a provision of \$1.2 million for the acquisition of vehicles have been requested for 2019 for four missions (see table 6 below). During its review of the proposed budget for UNITAD, the Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that UNAMI had identified 14 armoured vehicles as surplus and 6 had been transferred to UNITAD (see [A/73/498/Add.6](#), para. 19). **The Committee therefore requests that more information be provided to the General Assembly as to whether the remaining surplus armoured vehicles could be transferred to other missions in need of them, including the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen and UNSOM at the time of its consideration of the present report.**

Table 6
Resources proposed for the acquisition of vehicles for 2019

	<i>Proposed acquisition of vehicles in 2019</i>	<i>Costs</i>
Cluster I		
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen	2 armoured vehicles	242 000
Cluster III		
UNSONM	6 armoured vehicles	729 000
United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia	1 sedan light	17 200
UNAMI	11 4x4 General purpose, medium vehicles (station wagon)	211 800
Total		1 200 000

40. With respect to the fleet transformation programme mentioned in paragraph 59 of the main report of the Secretary-General, the Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that, in line with United Nations environmental goals for 2020, the Department of Field Support had adopted new measures to minimize the environmental footprint impact of transportation assets while looking at a strategy that eventually might transform the overall composition of the vehicle fleet. That review of the light passenger vehicle component is aiming to right-size the current missions' active fleets where the Department, along with stakeholders, are exploring more cost-effective and fuel-efficient alternative means of transportation in lieu of light passenger vehicles (4x4 vehicles). A review that is being carried out for the special political missions may result in additional reductions.

41. The Advisory Committee recalls that it has been a few years since the Department has discussed such efforts. For example, the Committee was informed in 2015, regarding efforts to replace part of the light passenger vehicle holdings (4x4 vehicles) with sedan and multipurpose vehicles (4x2 vehicles) and the entry into effect of a new global systems contract for the supply of such vehicles in May 2015.¹⁴ More recently, it had also been informed that several new such systems contracts had been put in place to enable the future replacement of vehicles by missions. In addition, with respect to an online fleet management and vehicle tracking system that would soon be established, the Committee was informed that the Department was in the final stage of establishing a contract for the tracking system (see [A/72/789](#), para. 44). **The Committee has welcomed the measures taken towards improving the management of vehicle fleets in peacekeeping missions (ibid., para. 45). The Committee trusts that future reports of the Secretary-General will contain detailed information on the impact of the reviews being undertaken, as well as the benefits and efficiencies attributed to those efforts, including the implications of adjusting the standard ratios.**

¹⁴ The report of the Secretary-General indicated that a study undertaken by the Department had shown that it would be possible to replace up to 18 per cent of the fleet with 4x2 sedan-type vehicles. Subsequently, following the development of a new scope of requirements and an evaluation of procurement proposals, a new global systems contract would come into effect in May 2015 and be implemented in a phased manner on a mission-by-mission basis (see [A/69/839](#), para. 158, and [A/70/742](#), paras. 159 and 160).

III. General observations and recommendations

Format and presentation of the budget

42. The Advisory Committee welcomes the continued efforts made to improve the format and presentation of the proposed budgets for special political missions, including the streamlining of the main report of the Secretary-General, as well as the improved presentation of annex VIII thereto (see para. 45 below) and tables 7, 8, 10 and 11 therein by presenting the financial resources in a chronological order, in response to its previous comments and recommendations (see [A/72/7/Add.10](#), para. 51). **The Committee trusts that the Secretary-General will continue to make efforts to improve the presentation of information in his future reports.**

43. In addition, the Advisory Committee is of the view that comprehensive financial and human resources requirements under information and communication technology should also be provided as supplementary information under thematic clusters, where applicable (see annex IV below).

44. Concerning budget classification, the Advisory Committee notes that the proposed budgets for special political missions for 2019 follows the same budgetary presentation with respect to object class and subclasses as those of the peacekeeping budgets for 2018/19 (see [A/72/7/Add.48](#), annex I, and supplementary information to the 2019 budget). The Committee recalls that, in its consideration of the peacekeeping budget for 2017/18, the Secretary-General indicated that the implementation of Umoja had provided the Secretariat with an opportunity to review the presentation of budgetary reports and data, make refinements to nomenclature and update the grouping of expenditures. The Committee noted, at that time, that further clarifications might be necessary in terms of expenditures charged to certain subclasses, such as the case of “architectural and demolition services” under the facilities and infrastructure object class ([A/71/836](#), para. 49). The Committee is of the view that a breakdown should continue to be presented under the newly combined construction, alteration, renovation and major maintenance subclass in the supplementary information.

Backstopping support to special political missions at Headquarters

45. The Advisory Committee notes that annex VIII to the main report of the Secretary-General ([A/73/352](#) and [A/73/352/Corr.1](#)) has been improved to include consolidated information on backstopping support positions at Headquarters funded from special political mission budgets approved for 2018 and proposed for 2019, with functional titles of the positions approved for the Headquarters offices under the relevant missions concerned and the proposed changes for 2019, as requested by the Committee in its previous reports (see [A/72/7/Add.10](#), para. 53, and [A/71/595](#), para. 51). A total of 39 such positions are proposed for 2019, compared with the 36 positions approved for 2018. The proposed increase by three positions for 2019 is as follows: (a) Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen (one P-4 position of Political Affairs Officer in the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs); (b) UNITAD (one P-4 position of Political Affairs Officer in the Department of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs; and one P-3 position of Programme and Planning Officer in the Department of Operational Support) ([A/73/352](#) and [A/73/352/Corr.1](#), para. 68).

46. **The Advisory Committee expects that consolidated information on backstopping positions at Headquarters will continue to be provided in future budget submissions. The Committee continues to believe that the existing backstopping positions at Headquarters should be reviewed annually in order to**

realign the capacities when changes in the mandates of the missions occur (see [A/72/7/Add.10](#), para. 53).

47. Annex II to the main report of the Secretary-General contains information on the lead departments that would provide support to the special political missions in 2019. Information is provided in paragraphs 69 and 70 of the report concerning the substantive and administrative support provided to the missions in 2018, as well as the respective roles of the relevant departments at Headquarters in 2019 following reforms in the peace and security and management structures. The Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that with the establishment of the new Departments as a result of the reforms, the structures at Headquarters would be aligned to better support the special political missions in a more effective and responsive manner, eliminating duplication of efforts and overlapping functions.

48. The Advisory Committee recalls that, in its review of the proposed reform in the peace and security structure, it noted the lack of information on potential effectiveness and efficiency gains arising from the proposed reform (see [A/72/859](#), paras. 8 and 41). The Committee therefore trusts that the Secretary-General will provide detailed information on improvements to the support provided by Headquarters to the special political missions in future budget submissions.

Support services provided by the Kuwait Joint Support Office and the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda

Background and development

49. The Advisory Committee recalls that Kuwait has been used as an administrative and logistical hub for UNAMI since its establishment in 2003 and that, in 2010, the Secretary-General decided to relocate some international mission support staff of UNAMA to the UNAMI office in Kuwait (co-location). He indicated at the time that the incremental cost to UNAMI would be minimal because the office premises in Kuwait were provided gratis by the Government of Kuwait (see [A/65/328/Add.5](#), para. 8, and [A/72/371](#), para. 71). In its resolution [65/291](#), the General Assembly noted the intention of the Secretary-General to establish a support office in Kuwait for UNAMA and requested him to explore possibilities for cost-sharing between UNAMA and UNAMI. The Committee further recalls that, with the establishment of the Kuwait Joint Support Office for UNAMI and UNAMA to cover certain support functions in December 2012, the two missions maintained, in parallel, separate support offices in Kuwait. The Secretary-General indicates that, for 2019, UNAMI continues to maintain stand-alone support functions in Kuwait, while UNAMA is now in the process of limiting its presence in Kuwait to shared functions. Outside the framework of the Joint Support Office, other functions located in Kuwait that are shared between UNAMI and UNAMA include auditing and conduct and discipline (see [A/73/352](#) and [A/73/352/Corr.1](#), para. 45). The Committee has made comments and recommendations on the staffing requirements for 2019 of the Integrated Conduct and Discipline Unit in its related report (see [A/73/498/Add.5](#), para. 14).

50. The services and related cost-sharing arrangements currently in place in Kuwait are as follows:

(a) Separate from the shared services, UNAMI provides host entity support to all staff located in Kuwait because of its history and wider capacities (see [A/73/352](#) and [A/73/352/Corr.1](#), para. 45). Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that UNAMI and UNAMA had a memorandum of understanding for cost-sharing services provided by UNAMI in Kuwait, which is based on the costs incurred by UNAMI (including for utilities, maintenance services, transportation, communications

and information technology and contractual security) and shared on a proportionate basis, depending on the number of staff each entity has at the duty station;

(b) With respect to the Kuwait Joint Support Office, the Advisory Committee was informed, upon enquiry, that for the staff in the Support Office, UNAMA and UNAMI share attributable costs on a 50:50 per cent basis. The Committee was previously informed that the Support Office would not be a separately funded office but would remain a joint and integral component of both UNAMA and UNAMI, funded through the assessed funding for both missions and scalable to the requirements of the two missions (see [A/66/7/Add.12](#), para. 205, and [A/68/7/Add.10](#) and [A/68/7/Add.10/Corr.1](#), para. 37). The support services provided to two other missions, the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia and the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen, since 2012 and 2013, respectively, have been provided within the existing resources of the Support Office (see [A/69/628](#), paras. 54 and 55).

51. The Advisory Committee recalls that, on 1 November 2016, as an interim arrangement, pending the consideration by the General Assembly of the global service delivery model for the Secretariat, the Secretary-General moved payroll processing into two centres and that, since that time: (a) payroll for national staff and individual uniformed personnel in missions based in Africa has been processed by the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe; and (b) payroll for those staff in all other missions has been processed by the Kuwait Joint Support Office (see [A/72/7/Add.10](#), paras. 57 and 58, and [A/71/595](#), paras. 53 and 54). The Committee did not object to the interim arrangements for the two centres pending the consideration by the Assembly of the global service delivery model for the Secretariat and recalled that, in accordance with Assembly resolution [70/248](#), any changes to the existing and future service delivery model must be approved by the Assembly (see [A/72/7/Add.10](#), para. 58, and [A/71/595](#), para. 55).

New proposals relating to the Kuwait Joint Support Office and the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe

52. In the budget proposals for special political missions for 2019, the Secretary-General makes two new proposals concerning service provision by and funding arrangements for the Kuwait Joint Support Office and the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe for 2019 (see also para. 51 above), as follows:

(a) To redistribute positions currently funded by UNAMA and UNAMI by reducing a total of 11 positions in UNAMA (5) and UNAMI (6), while adding a total of 9 positions in three other missions for which services are provided by the Support Office (the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen and UNITAD; excluding the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia) (see para. 50 (b) above): this redistribution would result in a net reduction of two positions for the Support Office ([A/73/352](#) and [A/73/352/Corr.1](#), paras. 41 and 43 and tables 1 and 2);

(b) Pending the approval and implementation of a global service delivery model, to expand the full-service coverage provided by the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe to all special political missions based in Africa, which would include UNIOGBIS, UNSMIL, UNOWAS and United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission, in addition to its current clientele of six special political

missions¹⁵ and all eight peacekeeping operations in Africa, as well as the United Nations Office to the African Union. Consequently, a total of eight positions are proposed for abolishment in four missions, effective 1 July 2019, while a total of seven positions would be established in the proposed budget for the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe for 2019/20 (see [A/73/352](#) and [A/73/352/Corr. 1](#), paras. 46–48; see details in [A/73/498/Add.3](#), paras. 10–13 and the table under para. 12).

53. Upon enquiry, the Advisory Committee was informed that the proposals relating to the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe are not intended to pre-empt the proposed establishment of global shared service centres in the context of the potential proposals of the Secretary-General relating to the global service delivery model. The Committee was provided, upon request, with a summary table showing services currently provided in 2018 to special political missions and peacekeeping operations by the Kuwait Joint Support Office, the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe and the Global Service Centre, in Brindisi, Italy (see annex III).

54. The Advisory Committee has discussed, over the years, the status of the Kuwait Joint Support Office and the lack of a business case study, with an independently validated full cost-benefit analysis, for approval by the General Assembly (see [A/72/7/Add.10](#), para. 55; [A/70/7/Add.10](#), para. 58, [A/69/628](#), para. 56, and [A/68/7/Add.10](#) and [A/68/7/Add.10/Corr.1](#), para. 38). The Committee has expressed the expectation that the proposal of the Secretary-General on the global service delivery model would also respond to its previous request, endorsed by the Assembly in its resolution [68/247 A](#), to provide such an analysis, both qualitative and quantitative, of the Support Office (see [A/72/7/Add.10](#), para. 55, and [A/71/595](#), para. 55). Moreover, the Committee has pointed out that the Support Office was established by the Department of Field Support in response to the security situations in Iraq and Afghanistan and was later expanded by the Department to include other missions (see also paras. 49–51 above). **The Committee therefore continues to be of the view that the Kuwait Joint Support Office is not a shared service centre approved by the Assembly (see [A/72/7/Add.10](#), para. 56).**

55. **The Advisory Committee reiterates that, while it does not object to the proposals for 2019 (see paras. 52 (a) and (b) above), it recalls that, in accordance with General Assembly resolution [70/248](#), any changes to the existing and future service delivery model must be approved by the Assembly (see [A/72/7/Add.10](#), para. 58, and [A/71/595](#), para. 55).**

Nationalization of positions

56. The Advisory Committee has noted the trend of the decreasing number of positions nationalized in recent years by the special political missions ([A/72/7/Add.10](#), para. 59). Compared with the conversion of 12 international positions to national positions in 2016 (UNSMIL (7), UNAMI (4) and UNIOGBIS (1)), only one position was nationalized in 2017 (UNAMI) and two in 2018 (UNSMIL and UNAMI), as well as the establishment of one new national professional position in UNAMA. The Committee notes from the report of the Secretary-General that a total of five positions are proposed for nationalization for 2019 in three missions (UNSMIL (1), the United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia (1) and UNAMI (3)) (see [A/73/352](#) and [A/73/352/Corr.1](#), para. 51). Upon enquiry, the Committee was informed that one of the biggest challenges is finding personnel with the right skill sets, which

¹⁵ The Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi, the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, UNSOM and the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa.

may not be available in the host country or in specific regions of the country, in particular during conflict and post-conflict phases.

57. While recognizing that circumstances on the ground may limit the possibility of nationalizing some positions, the Advisory Committee notes with concern the lack of progress in the implementation of General Assembly resolutions [61/276](#) and [66/264](#) and reiterates its call to the Secretary-General to take all measures necessary to ensure that the resolutions are properly implemented (see [A/72/7/Add.10](#), para. 59, and [A/71/595](#), para. 43).

Other matters

Key performance indicators

58. With respect to the formulation of indicators of achievement for individual missions, the Advisory Committee has made comments in its reports on a few missions (see [A/73/498/Add.1](#), para. 33, [A/73/498/Add.3](#), para. 42, and [A/73/498/Add.5](#), para. 8). The Committee reiterates its view that certain indicators of achievement can be improved in order to better reflect what could be achieved by United Nations entities and the activities for which they can be held accountable.

IV. Recommendation on action requested of the General Assembly

59. The budgetary proposals of the Secretary-General for 37 special political missions for 2019, which require action to be taken by the General Assembly, are set out in paragraph 85 (a) to (d) of his main report on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the Assembly and/or the Security Council ([A/73/352](#) and [A/73/352/Corr.1](#)).

60. The Advisory Committee notes that, in view of the conclusion of the mandate of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea (see para. 4 above), the proposed resources for 2019 presented for the consideration of the General Assembly now include requirements for 36 of the special political missions listed in table 10 of the main report of the Secretary-General. With respect to resource requirements of the 36 special political missions for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2019 and the share of special political missions in the budget of the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe for the 2018/19 period, the Committee recommends that the General Assembly approve the proposals of the Secretary-General, subject to its comments and recommendations in the present report, as well as in its related reports.² The Committee requests that the adjusted amount be provided to the Assembly at the time of its consideration of the proposals of the Secretary-General.

Annex I*

Summary of charges against the provision for special political missions, 2018–2019

(Thousands of United States dollars)

a.	Amount included under section 3, Political affairs, of the programme budget for the biennium 2018–2019	1 109 612.9
	Charges approved by the General Assembly for 2018:	
	Resolution 72/262 A	510 030.7
	Resolution 72/262 C	123 490.9
b.	Total charges	633 521.6^a
c.	Undistributed balance in the provision for special political missions	476 091.3
	Charges proposed for approval by the General Assembly for 2019:	
	Cluster I: special and personal envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General (A/73/352/Add.1)	55 900.9
	Cluster II: sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels, and other entities and mechanisms (A/73/352/Add.2 and A/73/352/Add.2/Corr.1 , and A/73/352/Add.6 , A/73/352/Add.6/Corr.1 and A/73/352/Add.6/Corr.2) ^b	57 200.5
	Cluster III: regional offices, offices in support of political processes and other missions (A/73/352/Add.3)	302 315.0
	United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (A/73/352/Add.4)	141 499.3
	United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (A/73/352/Add.5)	105 775.7
	Provision for the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda (General Assembly resolution 72/286 , para. 10 (c))	595.5
d.	Total	663 286.9
e.	Shortfall to be sought in additional appropriation (e=d-c)	187 195.6
f.	Estimated overexpenditure for 2018	6 810.0
g.	Shortfall to be sought in additional appropriation, taking into account estimated overexpenditure for 2018 (net of staff assessment) (g=e+f)	194 005.6

^a The appropriation for 2018 of \$635,384,100 includes: (a) an amount of \$633,521,600 approved in the context of special political missions under General Assembly resolutions [72/262 A](#) and [C](#); and (b) an amount of \$1,862,500 approved in the context of administrative and financial implications of the decisions and recommendations contained in the report of the International Civil Service Commission for the year 2017 (see resolution [72/262 A](#), sect. VII).

^b The figure for cluster II exclude the resources for Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea.

* Revised annex I to the main report of the Secretary-General ([A/73/352](#) and [A/73/352/Corr.1](#)).

Annex II*

Summary of requirements by major component

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	2018			2019		Variance	
	Appropriation ^a	Estimated expenditure	Estimated variance	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2019 vs. 2018 Increase/ (decrease)	Net requirements for 2019
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)-(1)	(4)	(5)	(6)=(4)-(1)	(7)=(4)+(3)
I. Military and police personnel							
1. Military observers	4 449.1	4 477.9	28.8	4 353.6	–	(95.5)	4 382.4
2. Military contingents	28 094.4	27 747.6	(346.8)	25 376.9	–	(2 717.5)	25 030.1
3. United Nations police	1 109.6	1 076.1	(33.5)	509.4	–	(600.2)	475.9
Subtotal	33 653.1	33 301.6	(351.5)	30 239.9	–	(3 413.2)	29 888.4
II. Civilian personnel							
1. International staff	253 420.7	275 139.3	21 718.6	291 537.1	–	38 116.4	313 255.7
2. National staff	80 810.0	89 291.5	8 481.5	77 423.6	–	(3 386.4)	85 905.1
3. United Nations Volunteers	7 164.5	8 076.0	911.5	8 204.2	–	1 039.7	9 115.7
4. General temporary assistance	1 480.7	1 869.0	388.3	–	–	(1 480.7)	388.3
5. Government-provided personnel	1 019.4	1 105.6	86.2	1 664.2	–	644.8	1 750.4
Subtotal	343 895.3	375 481.4	31 586.1	378 829.1	–	34 933.8	410 415.2
III. Operational costs							
1. Experts	11 975.9	11 798.5	(177.4)	12 609.1	–	633.2	12 431.7
2. Consultants and consulting services	3 746.0	4 553.6	807.6	4 400.4	–	654.4	5 208.0
3. Official travel	19 257.9	21 662.4	2 404.5	19 087.2	–	(170.7)	21 491.7
4. Facilities and infrastructure	106 320.1	93 503.2	(12 816.9)	107 969.5	10 845.0	1 649.4	95 152.6
5. Ground transportation	9 837.7	9 530.7	(307.0)	9 056.5	1 143.0	(781.2)	8 749.5
6. Air operations	42 546.2	37 451.1	(5 095.1)	37 413.6	92.8	(5 132.6)	32 318.5
7. Marine operations	415.9	408.3	(7.6)	567.4	–	151.5	559.8
8. Communications and information technology	39 691.6	32 400.0	(7 291.6)	39 118.1	4 906.7	(573.5)	31 826.5

* Revised table 11 in the main report of the Secretary-General (A/73/352 and A/73/352/Add.1).

Category of expenditure	2018			2019		Variance	
	Appropriation ^a	Estimated expenditure	Estimated variance	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	2019 vs. 2018 Increase/ (decrease)	Net requirements for 2019
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)-(1)	(4)	(5)	(6)=(4)-(1)	(7)=(4)+(3)
9. Medical	4 469.5	3 618.9	(850.6)	3 840.9	120.7	(628.6)	2 990.3
10. Other supplies, services and equipment	16 702.2	15 530.5	(1 171.7)	19 559.7	895.6	2 857.5	18 388.0
Subtotal	254 963.0	230 457.2	(24 505.8)	253 622.4	18 003.8	(1 340.6)	229 116.6
Net requirements	632 511.4	639 240.2	6 728.8	662 691.4	18 003.8	30 180.0	669 420.2
Discontinued missions^b	2 185.8	2 267.0	81.2	–	–	(2 185.8)	81.2
Provision for the share of special political missions for the Regional Service Centre	686.9	686.9	–	595.5	–	(91.4)	595.5
Total	635 384.1	642 194.1	6 810.0	663 286.9	18 003.8	27 902.8	670 096.9

^a The appropriation for 2018 of \$635,384,100 includes: (a) an amount of \$633,521,600 approved in the context of special political missions under General Assembly resolutions 72/262 A and C; and (b) an amount of \$1,862,500 approved in the context of administrative and financial implications of the decisions and recommendations contained in the report of the International Civil Service Commission for the year 2017 (see resolution 72/262 A, sect. VII).

^b Missions that had approved resources in 2018 and that are discontinued in 2019 include the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea.

Annex III

Summary of support services provided by the Kuwait Joint Support Office, the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda, and the United Nations Logistics Base in Brindisi, Italy to special political missions and peacekeeping operations in 2018

<i>Entity</i>	<i>Finance</i>	<i>Human resources</i>	<i>Client entities 2018</i>
Regional Service Centre in Entebbe	Vendor payments	Check-in/check-out	SESG-Burundi, UNSOM, SESG-GL, UNOCA, OSESSS, UNOAU, MONUSCO, UNMISS, MINUSCA, MINUSMA, UNAMID, UNISFA, UNSOS, MINURSO
	Travel claims and expense reports	Benefits and entitlements administration	
	Cash management	Administration of consultants/individual contractors	
	Accounting and financial reporting	Travel-related services	
	Umoja role mapping	Shipment of personal effects (for all staff categories)	
	Payroll and allowances		
Regional Service Centre in Entebbe	Payroll and allowances	Education grant claims and advances	UNIOGBIS, UNSMIL, UNOWAS, CNMC
Kuwait Joint Support Office	Vendor payments	Check-in/check-out	UNAMA, UNAMI, UNRCCA, OSESG-Yemen, OSESG-Syria
	Travel claims and expense reports	Benefits and entitlements administration	
	Cash management	Administration of consultants/individual contractors	
	Accounting and financial reporting	Travel-related services	
	Umoja role mapping	Shipment of personal effects (for all staff categories)	
	Payroll and allowances		
Kuwait Joint Support Office	Payroll and allowances	Education grant claims and advances	UNSCOL, UNVMC, SASG-Cyprus, UNMOGIP, UNSCO, UNTSO, UNIFIL, UNDOF, UNFICYP, UNMIK, MINUJUSTH, United Nations Logistics Base
United Nations Logistics Base	All finance and human resources related services		Provided to UNSMIL (special political mission) through UNSMIL staff embedment in UNGSC

<i>Entity</i>	<i>Finance</i>	<i>Human resources</i>	<i>Client entities 2018</i>
United Nations Logistics Base	Procurement through the comprehensive operational mission procurement and acquisition support service		UNOWAS and UNOCA

Abbreviations: CNMC: United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission; MINUJUSTH: United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti; MINUSCA: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic; MINUSMA: United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali; MINURSO: United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara; MONUSCO: United Nations Organization Mission to the Democratic Republic of the Congo; OSESG-Syria: Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria; OSESG-Yemen: Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen; OSESSS: Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Sudan and South Sudan; SASG-Cyprus: Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus; SESG-Burundi: Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi; SESG-GL: Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region; UNAMA: United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan; UNAMI: United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq; UNAMID: African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur; UNDOF: United Nations Disengagement Observer Force; UNFICYP: United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus; UNGSC: United Nations Global Service Centre; UNIFIL: United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon; UNIOGBIS: United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau; UNISFA: United Nations Interim Security Force in Abyei; UNMIK: United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo; UNMISS: United Nations Mission in South Sudan; UNMOGIP: United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan; UNOAU: United Nations Office to the African Union; UNOCA: United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa; UNOWAS: United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel; UNRCCA: United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia; UNSCO: United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process; UNSCOL: Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon; UNSMIL: United Nations Support Mission in Libya; UNSOM: United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia; UNSOS: United Nations Support Office in Somalia; UNTSO: United Nations Truce Supervision Organization; UNVMC: United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia.

Annex IV

Summary of resources approved for 2018 and proposed for 2019 under information and communications technology

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	<i>Number of ICT-related positions</i>		<i>ICT resources</i>	
	<i>Approved 2018</i>	<i>Proposed 2019</i>	<i>Approved resources 2018</i>	<i>Proposed 2019</i>
Thematic cluster I				
Special and personal envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General				
Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus	–	–	88.9	97.0
Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide	–	–	40.7	37.2
Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara	–	–	7.1	10.1
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)	–	–	15.3	10.4
United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions	–	–	33.4	33.4
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria	2 LL	2 LL	540.8	490.1
Office of the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan	–	–	51.8	51.1
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region	–	–	192.2	208.6
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen	5 positions: 1 P-4, 2 FS and 2 LL	5 positions: 1 P-4, 2 FS and 2 LL	467.9	518.2
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Burundi	1 FS	1 FS	669.7	604.7
Office of the Special Envoy to the Secretary-General on Myanmar	–	–	45.6	18.0
Thematic cluster II				
Sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels, and other entities and mechanisms				
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea	–	–	68.2	58.2
Panel of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo	–	–	32.9	37.8
Panel of Experts on the Sudan	–	–	33.8	37.3
Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea	–	–	295.1	152.7
Panel of Experts on the Libya	–	–	45.6	45.9
Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic	–	–	39.3	38.8
Panel of Experts on Yemen	–	–	40.9	53.0
Panel of Experts on South Sudan	–	–	34.9	38.4
Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team pursuant to resolution 1526 (2004) and 2253 (2015) concerning Isil (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and the Taliban	–	–	219.8	219.8

	Number of ICT-related positions		ICT resources	
	Approved 2018	Proposed 2019	Approved resources 2018	Proposed 2019
Office of the Ombudsperson established pursuant to resolution 1904 (2009)	–	–	22.4	23.1
Implementation of Security Council resolution 2231 (2015)	–	–	55.8	43.5
Panel of Experts on Mali	–	–	37.7	41.6
Support to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction	–	–	89.1	89.1
Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate	–	–	229.2	223.7
Investigative Team to Promote Accountability for Crimes Committed by Da'esh/ Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant	–	2 FS and 1 UNV		4 231.3
Thematic cluster III				
Regional offices, offices in support of political processes and other missions				
United Nations Office for West Africa and the Sahel	1 FS, 2 LL	1 FS, 2 LL	675.9	694.7
United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau	3 FS, 1 LL	3 FS, 1 LL	1 215.2	1 253.2
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia	–	–	7 744.6	7 747.6
United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia	1FS, 2 LL	1FS, 2 LL	362.7	332.6
United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission	–	–	335.9	322.5
Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon	2 LL	2 LL	276.5	276.5
United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa	1 FS, 2 LL	1 FS, 2 LL	458.6	472.4
United Nations Support Mission in Libya	9 positions: 5 FS, 4 LL	9 positions: 5 FS, 4 LL	4 120.2	2 910.2
United Nations Verification Mission in Colombia	–	14 positions: 1 P-4, 4 FS, 1 NPO, 8 LL	10 350.5	5 609.2
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan	61 positions: 1 P-4, 14 FS, 11 NPO, 29 LL, 6 UNV	60 positions: 1 P-4, 14 FS, 11 NPO, 28 LL, 6 UNV	5 751.8	7 116.8
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq	45 positions: 1 P-4, 2 P-3, 11 FS, 3 NPO, 28 LL	45 positions: 1 P-4, 2 P-3, 11 FS, 2 NPO, 29 LL	5 072.8	5 078.6

Abbreviations: FS, Field Service; LL, Local level; NPO, National Professional Officer; UNV, United Nations Volunteer.