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Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2018-2019

Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council

Thematic cluster I: Special and personal envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General

Report of the Secretary-General

Addendum

Summary

The present report contains the proposed resources for 2018 for 10 special political missions grouped under the thematic cluster of special and personal envoys, advisers and representatives of the Secretary-General.

The proposed resources for 2018 for special political missions grouped under this cluster amount to \$49,984,200 (net of staff assessment).



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I. Financial overview

1. The proposed resources for 2018 for special political missions grouped under this cluster amount to \$49,984,200 (net of staff assessment). Table 1 below allows for a comparison between the proposed resources for 2018 and the resources for 2017 as approved by the General Assembly in its resolution [71/272](#).

Table 1
Resource requirements
(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	1 January 2016-31 December 2017			Requirements for 1 January-31 December 2018		Variance analysis 2017-2018	
	Appropriation	Estimated expenditures	Estimated variance	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Approved budget 2017	Variance increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)-(1)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)=(4)-(6)
Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus	5 511.6	5 782.2	270.6	2 858.5	5.8	2 810.5	48.0
Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the prevention of Genocide	4 375.0	4 321.1	(53.9)	2 143.7	—	2 201.0	(57.3)
Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara	1 083.2	904.6	(178.6)	462.8	—	545.3	(82.5)
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)	909.1	729.8	(179.3)	403.0	—	489.2	(86.2)
United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions	3 913.7	3 698.2	(215.5)	1 772.6	—	1 976.0	(203.4)
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria	31 252.3	31 252.3	—	16 706.2	128.4	16 351.8	354.4
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan	2 837.5	3 165.3	327.8	1 418.0	2.3	1 387.3	30.7
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region	8 715.2	8 509.9	(205.3)	3 742.6	10.3	4 332.5	(589.9)
Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen	21 159.9	21 202.8	42.9	13 777.2	54.5	13 243.5	533.7
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General (Burundi)	15 312.4	14 353.3	(959.1)	6 699.6	45.0	7 763.7	(1 064.1)
Total	95 069.9	93 919.5	(1 150.4)	49 984.2	246.3	51 100.8	(1 116.6)

II. Special political missions

A. Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus

(\$2,858,500)

Background, mandate and objective

2. The Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus, also known as the good offices mission, supports the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus, whose mandate is to assist the parties in the conduct of negotiations aimed at reaching a comprehensive settlement.

3. On 10 July 2008, in a letter to the President of the Security Council (S/2008/456), the Secretary-General announced the appointment of his Special Adviser on Cyprus as of 14 July 2008, to assist the parties in the conduct of full-fledged negotiations aimed at reaching a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue. On 3 September 2008, the leaders began full-fledged negotiations under the auspices of the United Nations on chapters related to the issues of governance and power-sharing, property, European Union matters, economic matters, security and guarantees and territory. Since 22 August 2014, Espen Barth Eide (Norway) has been the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus.

4. Since the start of the full-fledged negotiations, the Secretary-General has provided progress reports to the Security Council on the activities of the Office of the Special Adviser (S/2009/610, S/2010/238, S/2010/603, S/2011/112, S/2011/498, S/2012/149, S/2016/15 and S/2016/599). The Special Adviser has briefed the Security Council 13 times (on 10 June and 30 November 2010, 15 March and 7 September 2011, 29 March and 10 July 2012, 30 May 2013, 22 January 2014, 26 January and 29 July 2015, 28 January and 25 July 2016 and 26 January 2017). The Council, in its resolution 2338 (2017), welcomed the good progress in the negotiations, including the convening of the Conference on Cyprus in January 2017. In addition, both the Secretary-General and his Special Adviser have maintained a steady pace of meetings to brief international stakeholders and key regional Governments.

5. From May 2016 to May 2017, the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders and their negotiators continued to engage in a sustained manner on the substantive chapters of the negotiations. The pace of the negotiations increased further in late 2016 and early 2017, when the two sides travelled to Switzerland (7-11 November 2016, 19-21 November 2016 and 9-11 January 2017) for intensive negotiations, including on the chapter on territory. On 12 January 2017, the Secretary-General convened the Conference on Cyprus, facilitated by the Office of the Special Adviser, to address the sixth chapter on security and guarantees. The Conference reconvened at deputies' and experts' level in Switzerland from 18 to 20 January 2017. In late February 2017, the talks were paused for about seven weeks. The leaders and negotiators resumed regular meetings on 11 April 2017.

6. Meanwhile, the Office of the Special Adviser continued to facilitate the work of expert working groups and committees established by the sides to prepare for a settlement in areas such as the economy, matter related to the European Union, property, the federal judiciary, international treaties and federal laws.

7. The 13 technical committees established by the parties on: crime and criminal matters; European Union preparations; economic and commercial matters; cultural heritage; crisis management; humanitarian matters; health; the environment; broadcasting; crossings; culture; education; and gender equality continued to meet under the facilitation of the Office of the Special Adviser and the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).

Cooperation with other entities

8. In line with the integrated approach of the United Nations in Cyprus, the Office of the Special Adviser, UNFICYP and other United Nations entities operate in a way that maximizes synergies and ensures coherent and effective support to the peace effort. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Cyprus and Head of UNFICYP acts as Deputy Special Adviser to the Secretary-General with regard to the negotiations, ensuring and coordinating the provision of support to the Office of the Special Adviser by both UNFICYP (on a non-reimbursable basis) and the United Nations country team.

9. Since late 2015, the Office of the Special Adviser has coordinated and provided political oversight for the engagement of international financial institutions, currently the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the European Central Bank, and the European Commission in support of the process. This includes the provision of political guidance and input, monthly coordination videoconferences and the preparation, facilitation and coordination of regular expert missions to Cyprus and workshops with the sides.

10. The outcome of the detailed review of coordination arrangements between the Office of the Special Adviser and UNFICYP conducted in June 2010 remains valid (see [A/65/706](#), annex III). A formal agreement on administrative and logistical support was concluded between the two missions in 2013. It was revised and signed in August 2016.

Performance information

11. Since the resumption of full-fledged negotiations in May 2015, the process has continued at a sustained pace, with negotiations between the leaders and negotiators in Cyprus as well as off-island. Notably, the sides engaged in intensive off-island negotiations in November 2016 (7-11 and 19-21 November) and January 2017 (9-12 and 18-20 January) on all chapters of the negotiations. In particular, for the first time in this process, the sides entered into negotiations on the chapters on territory and security and guarantees. This resulted in a first exchange of maps on 11 January 2017, followed on 12 January by the convening of an international Conference for Cyprus under the auspices of the Secretary-General to address the sixth and last chapter of the negotiations, security and guarantees.

12. The Office of the Special Adviser continues to facilitate regular meetings of expert working groups, subgroups and committees established by the sides, as well as workshops and technical missions involving the European Commission and international financial institutions under United Nations auspices.

13. With a stated commitment by the leaders to finding a solution in the best interest of all Cypriots, the Office of the Special Adviser expects a continuation of the current pace of negotiations and technical work-streams for the remainder of 2017. As reflected in the indicators set out below, the pace of meetings of leaders, negotiators and experts, the numbers of papers produced by the sides and the numbers of confidence-building measures are expected to remain steady.

14. During 2017, increased convergence between the parties on core and substantive issues is expected to be realized. As the sides progressed in their negotiations and worked to reach convergence on the core issues, direct engagement at the level of the leaders increased, starting in the second half of 2016. Between January and May 2017, the leaders held a total of 30 meetings in the presence of United Nations representatives. It is estimated that by the end of 2017, 70 meetings between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot leaders will have been held. While the negotiators continued to meet frequently, the increased engagement

between the leaders aimed at closing the core outstanding issues in the negotiations resulted in fewer meetings at the negotiators' level. Between January and May 2017, a total of 23 meetings of the negotiators in the presence of United Nations representatives were held. It is estimated that by the end of 2017 at least 100 meetings between the negotiators will have been held. Between January and May 2017, 58 meetings of working groups and technical committees to discuss specific areas of expertise and identify areas of convergence had been held. It is estimated that by the end of 2017, 350 of such meetings will have been held. By the end of 2017, it is estimated that 200 papers, indicating movement towards convergence, reflecting a continued intensity of the negotiations and efforts at achieving convergence on the chapters of the negotiations, will have been produced. With respect to implementation of confidence-building measures formulated by the technical committees and approved by the leaders, aimed at easing the daily life of Cypriots throughout the island, three new confidence-building measures were completed between January and May 2017. Another seven such measures are expected to be completed before the end of 2017, for a total of 96.

Planning assumptions for 2018

15. Should the current pace of progress continue for the remainder of 2017, the process could proceed further towards the final stages during the remainder of 2017 and 2018, including the drafting of the settlement agreement and its annexes and preparations for implementation. The Office of the Special Adviser will therefore be called upon to continue to facilitate regular meetings between the leaders, negotiators and experts and to “shuttle” between the sides separately until a comprehensive settlement is reached. The requirement to coordinate technical work in preparation for settlement implementation will also continue, or may even increase. While the staff and facilitators of the Office of the Special Adviser assume overall responsibility for each chapter of the negotiations, consultants provide specialized technical expertise, when needed, to contribute to the resolution of areas of disagreement and the devising of implementation strategies.

16. During 2017, unforeseen off-site meetings, including two sessions of the Conference on Cyprus with the participation of the guarantor powers (Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), were held in Switzerland. Provision for further such meetings has not been included in the 2018 budget proposal, given the uncertainty of the timing of such sessions at the same time as the finalization of the budget proposal.

17. As the process progresses towards a successful conclusion, the Office of the Special Adviser will continue to engage with a variety of interlocutors, including representatives of political parties, civil society and women's groups, as well as with regional and international stakeholders, in order to galvanize support for the negotiations and help the leaders prepare their communities for a settlement.

18. The Office will also continue to facilitate technical committees, including any new committees that may be established, and support confidence-building measures.

19. The Special Adviser is expected to continue to undertake frequent travel to Cyprus, countries in the region and New York to hold meetings with the sides, facilitate the negotiations and galvanize support for the process in the final phase.

20. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures for the mission are set out below.

Table 2

Objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures*Objective:* To achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement		Performance measures			
			2018	2017	2016	2015
(a) Progress in the full-fledged negotiations towards a comprehensive settlement	(i) Increased convergence among parties on core and substantive issues [number of meetings between the leaders]	Target	70	70	54	60
		Estimate		70	66	38
		Actual			77	45
	[number of meetings between the representatives/negotiators of the leaders to identify areas of convergence]	Target	100	160	146	100
		Estimate		100	160	100
		Actual			103	102
	[number of meetings of the working groups and technical committees to discuss specific areas of expertise and identify areas of convergence]	Target	350	350	250	229
		Estimate		350	350	250
		Actual			345	254
	[number of papers indicating movement towards convergence between the parties within the full-fledged negotiation process]	Target	200	200	150	150
		Estimate		200	200	150
		Actual			305	231
	(ii) Implementation of confidence-building measures formulated by the technical committees and approved by the leaders aimed at easing the daily life of Cypriots across the island [number of confidence-building measures implemented]	Target	105	80	60	40
		Estimate		96	75	53
		Actual			86	65

Outputs

- Bilateral meetings with Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot leaders, or their representatives or advisers, related to all chapters of the negotiations (170)
- Advice to the sides on issues related to all chapters of the negotiations (200)
- Briefings and bilateral meetings with the international community (170)
- Facilitation of meetings of working groups and technical committees on procedural, legal, technical and substantive issues related to all chapters of the negotiations and confidence-building measures (350)
- Meetings with leaders of political parties and other influential individuals and groups, the media, academics and civil society from the two communities, and participation in events contributing to an enabling environment for the negotiation process (80)
- Contact with the Cypriot and international media (50 interviews and 30 press releases) in cooperation with UNFICYP
- Reports and/or briefings to the Security Council (4)

External factors

21. The objective is expected to be achieved, provided that the political will of the leaders and of their respective communities overcome current political and economic challenges and that there is continuing support from the international community.

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 3

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	1 January 2016-31 December 2017			Requirements for 1 January-31 December 2018		Variance analysis 2017-2018	
	Appropriation	Estimated expenditures	Estimated variance over/(under)	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Approved budget 2017	Variance increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)-(1)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)=(4)-(6)
Civilian personnel costs	3 978.4	4 087.8	109.4	2 209.4	–	2 034.6	174.8
Operational costs	1 533.2	1 694.4	161.2	649.1	5.8	775.9	(126.8)
Total (net of staff assessment)	5 511.6	5 782.2	270.6	2 858.5	5.8	2 810.5	48.0

Table 4
Positions

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories		National staff				Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Sub-total	Field/Security Services	General Service	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	
Approved 2017	1 ^a	–	–	1	3	5	1	–	11	4	1	16	–	5	–	21
Proposed 2018	1 ^a	–	–	1	3	5	1	–	11	4	1	16	–	5	–	21
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

^a The Under-Secretary-General is on a when-actually-employed contract.

22. The projected overexpenditure in the biennium 2016-2017 is attributable to the higher civilian personnel costs, reflecting the higher actual ratio of common staff costs to net salaries, as well as unbudgeted operational costs related to the two conferences on Cyprus held in January and June 2017, funded from the Secretary-General's commitment authority for unforeseen and extraordinary expenses under the terms of General Assembly resolution 70/250. Appropriation for the amount used against the commitment authority will be sought in the context of the second performance report for the biennium 2016-2017.

23. Resource requirements for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2018, which amount to \$2,858,500 (net of staff assessment), would provide for the salaries and common staff costs (\$2,209,400) for the continuation of 21 positions (1 Under-Secretary-General (on a when-actually-employed contract), 1 D-1, 3 P-5, 5 P-4, 1 P-3, 4 Field Service, 1 General Service (Other level) and 5 national staff positions (Local level)), as well as operational requirements (\$649,100) comprising costs of consultants (\$58,500), official travel (\$195,300), facilities and infrastructure (\$93,300), ground transportation (\$49,500), communications (\$53,100), information technology (\$35,800) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$163,600).

24. In 2018, there will be no change to the proposed number or to the levels of positions for the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus.

25. The variance (increase) between the proposed resources for 2018 and the approved budget for 2017 reflects the provision at the actual average step in grade

of current incumbents, and the ratio of actual common staff costs expenditures to actual salaries, based on expenditure trends, partly offset by a higher proposed vacancy rate of 9 per cent for national staff (Local level) in 2018 compared with a zero per cent vacancy rate in 2017, as well as reductions in operational costs related mainly to requirements for consultants, interpretation services during leaders' meetings and public information services for community outreach activities.

Extrabudgetary resources

26. Thus far in 2017, an amount of approximately \$33,500 has been utilized to temporarily fund positions needed to support the intensification of the Cyprus talks. Depending on the evolution of the talks, additional extrabudgetary resources may be mobilized to continue to support the Office of the Special Adviser in 2018.

B. Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide

(\$2,143,700)

Background, mandate and objective

27. Pursuant to the invitation of the Security Council to the Secretary-General in its resolution [1366 \(2001\)](#) to refer to the Council information and analysis from within the United Nations system on cases of serious violations of international law, including international humanitarian law and human rights law, the Secretary-General, in a letter dated 12 July 2004 ([S/2004/567](#)), informed the President of the Council of his decision to appoint a Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide. In his reply dated 13 July 2004 ([S/2004/568](#)), the President of the Council informed the Secretary-General that the Council had taken note of his intention.

28. The Secretary-General listed the responsibilities of the Special Adviser as follows:

(a) To collect existing information, in particular from within the United Nations system, on massive and serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law of ethnic and racial origin that, if not prevented or halted, might lead to genocide;

(b) To act as a mechanism of early warning to the Secretary-General, and through him to the Security Council, by bringing to their attention situations that could potentially result in genocide;

(c) To make recommendations to the Security Council, through the Secretary-General, on actions to prevent or halt genocide;

(d) To liaise with the United Nations system on activities for the prevention of genocide and work to enhance the United Nations capacity to analyse and manage information regarding genocide or related crimes.

29. The normative reference of the work of the Special Adviser is drawn, in addition to the exchange of letters, from the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide; the wider body of international human rights law, international humanitarian law and international criminal law and from resolutions of the General Assembly, the Security Council and the Human Rights Council, including the 2005 World Summit Outcome.

30. As regards the responsibility to protect, it will be recalled that in paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome, the assembled Heads of State and Government addressed the responsibility of Member States and the international

community to protect populations by preventing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and their incitement and pledged, among other things, to support the United Nations in establishing early warning capability in this regard. They also called on the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect. The Assembly adopted the World Summit Outcome in its resolution [60/1](#), while the Security Council reaffirmed the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 in paragraph 4 of its resolution [1674 \(2006\)](#) and recalled its reaffirmation in the second preambular paragraph of resolution [1706 \(2006\)](#). In paragraph 140 of the outcome document, in the section on the responsibility to protect, the Heads of State and Government expressed their full support for the mission of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide, thus underscoring the close relationship between the two mandates.

31. On 31 August 2007, in a letter to the President of the Security Council ([S/2007/721](#)), the Secretary-General expressed his intention to appoint a Special Adviser to focus on the responsibility to protect. In his reply dated 7 December 2007 ([S/2007/722](#)), the President of the Council informed the Secretary-General that the Council had taken note of the Secretary-General's intention. The Special Adviser is charged with the conceptual, institutional and operational development of the principle and with continuing a political dialogue with Member States on its implementation.

32. To contribute to dialogue with and among Member States and to outline a strategy for addressing the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome, in January 2009 the Secretary-General issued a report entitled "Implementing the responsibility to protect" ([A/63/677](#)). In the annex to that report, the Secretary-General indicated his intention to establish a joint office for the Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and on the Responsibility to Protect, given the close and complementary nature of their work. The report of the Secretary-General was debated in the General Assembly in July 2009 leading to the adoption, by consensus, of the first resolution on the responsibility to protect (resolution [63/308](#)), in which the Assembly reaffirmed its intention to continue its consideration of the concept. In his report to the Assembly of 14 July 2010 on early warning, assessment and the responsibility to protect ([A/64/864](#)), the Secretary-General reiterated his proposal to institutionalize the collaboration between the two Special Advisers. The Security Council, in its resolutions [2150 \(2014\)](#) on the maintenance of international peace and security and the prevention of genocide and [2171 \(2014\)](#) on the maintenance of international peace and security: conflict prevention, reaffirmed paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 2005 World Summit Outcome and recalled the important role of the Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and on the Responsibility to Protect, "whose functions include acting as an early warning mechanism to prevent potential situations that could result in genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and ethnic cleansing".

Cooperation with other entities

33. The Special Advisers work in close collaboration with other United Nations entities, in particular in relation to the collection of information for early warning purposes, policy development and activities aimed at the prevention of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The Special Advisers cooperate, inter alia, with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), including the Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, the Office of Legal Affairs, the Office of the Special Representative on Sexual Violence in Conflict, the Office of the Special Representative on Violence against Children, the Office of the Special

Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, the United Nations Children's Fund, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization and the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

34. The Office is supported by the Department of Political Affairs for personnel, financial and budgetary management, processing travel requests and other administrative activities.

Performance information

35. The Office has continued to refine its early warning methodology in order to alert the Secretary-General and, through him, the Security Council, as well as the broader United Nations system to situations where there is a risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (see [S/2004/567](#), annex, para. (b)). In 2014, the Office published a framework of analysis to guide assessment of the risk of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, based on applicable international law and jurisprudence. In its resolution [28/34](#), the Human Rights Council took note of the framework of analysis and encouraged Member States and regional and subregional organizations to use relevant frameworks, as appropriate, for guidance in their prevention work. In January 2016, the Secretary-General presented the Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes to the Presidents of the General Assembly and the Security Council (see [A/70/741-S/2016/71](#)) and recommended its widest possible use by United Nations entities and the membership of the United Nations to support prevention strategies at the national, regional and international levels.

36. During the first six months of 2017, the Special Advisers submitted four advisory notes to the Secretary-General on country or regional developments relevant to the prevention of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, with recommendations for preventive action. When requested, the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide briefed the Security Council and Human Rights Council on matters relevant to his mandate.

37. The Special Advisers continued to develop initiatives in response to specific global risks. In July 2017, the Secretary-General launched a plan of action for religious leaders and actors to prevent incitement to violence that could lead to genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. The recommendations contained in the plan of action were developed by religious leaders and actors during consultations organized by the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide in all regions between April 2015 and December 2016.

38. The Special Advisers have continued to organize specialized training to develop capacity to: (a) identify and manage information on risk factors for genocide and related crimes; (b) develop early warning and prevention capacity to strengthen resilience to these crimes; and (c) develop structures, tools and policies to respond when these crimes are ongoing. Requests by the Member States and civil society for this training remain high. In the first five months of 2017, the Office organized training or facilitated technical assistance in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kenya, Tunisia and Uganda. Further training activities are planned in Africa, Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Middle East. These activities have been organized in cooperation with Member States, United Nations partners and civil society.

39. Emphasizing the importance of a regional approach, the Special Advisers have continued to develop operational partnerships with regional and subregional arrangements for the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. They have also provided support through training and technical assistance, aimed at developing or strengthening regional frameworks and

mechanisms for the prevention of such crimes. Engagement with those organizations has led to: (a) increased cooperation on matters relevant to the mandates of the two Special Advisers; (b) greater awareness of the causes and dynamics of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and of the measures that can be taken to prevent them; and, as a consequence, (c) strengthened prevention, protection and response capacities.

40. With regard to cooperation with regional and subregional arrangements in Africa, the Special Advisers have continued to engage with the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the Southern African Development Community and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development on preventive action, including in relation to situations in the region.

41. The Office has continued to provide particular support to the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region on implementation of the Protocol for the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity and all forms of Discrimination. Under the Protocol, Member States of the International Conference are required to domesticate and enforce its provisions by putting in place laws that will prevent and punish atrocity crimes, adopt measures that will eliminate discrimination and teach and encourage tolerance among national, racial and ethnic groups. In May 2011, the Member States of the International Conference sought the technical support of the Special Advisers in the development of regional and national early warning capacity and committed themselves to the establishment of national committees on the prevention and punishment of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and all forms of discrimination. The Office has since provided training and technical assistance to the Regional Committee on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity and all forms of Discrimination and to the national committees of the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Kenya, South Sudan, Uganda and the United Republic of Tanzania, as well as to the national coordination mechanism of Zambia. In 2017, the Office supported the national committees of Kenya and Uganda in developing a domestic legal framework for the prevention of mass atrocities. Additional support was provided to Kenya to facilitate inter- and intra-community dialogue and to strengthen national capacity to prevent the risk of atrocity crimes in the context of the 2017 elections.

42. In the Asia-Pacific region, the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide has continued to engage with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and some of its Member States. The Office of the Special Adviser has also been consulting with parliamentarians from States members of the Association on their role in the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity in South-East Asia.

43. In Europe, the Special Advisers have continued working with regional organizations to integrate atrocity prevention in policy and operational frameworks, in particular with the European Union. The Special Advisers have also provided regular briefings to the European Union Peace and Security Council and the Working Group of the European Council on United Nations Affairs. In addition, the Special Advisers have also held high-level policy discussions with the European External Action Service on institutional arrangements for early warning and early response and on improving responses to the threat to populations posed by non-State armed groups. The Office has built on existing cooperation with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and held consultations with the Office of the OSCE High Commissioner for National Minorities, the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the OSCE Conflict Prevention Centre.

44. In the Americas region, the Special Advisers have continued their collaboration with the Organization of American States, in particular with its Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. In parallel, the Special Advisers have continued to support the initiatives of the Latin American Network for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention, which includes 18 member States. Staff of the Office have contributed as instructors to training activities of the Network.

45. Cooperation with the League of Arab States in the Middle East and North Africa region has included the contribution of the League to the capacity-building activities of the Office in the region.

46. The Special Advisers have continued to encourage the appointment by Member States of national focal points on genocide prevention and on the responsibility to protect and have provided substantive input to the activities of the different networks of focal points.

47. The political, institutional and operational development of the responsibility to protect principle has continued, in line with the decision of the General Assembly to continue consideration of the principle in 2009. The two Special Advisers have consulted with Member States in New York and in national capitals and with regional organizations, civil society and the United Nations system on the implementation of the principle and ways to fulfil the commitment made by all Heads of State and Government in 2005 to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, as well as their incitement. In 2017, the Special Adviser on the Responsibility to Protect oversaw the preparation of the ninth annual report of the Secretary-General on the matter, entitled “Implementing the responsibility to protect: accountability for prevention” ([A/71/1016-S/2017/556](#)). The report, which was informed by consultations with Member States, regional organizations and civil society, reflects on key elements of legal, political and moral accountability for implementation in relation to each of the three pillars of the responsibility to protect. The eighth informal General Assembly dialogue on the responsibility to protect will be held on 6 September 2017.

Planning assumptions for 2018

48. The Special Advisers will continue to advise the Secretary-General on situations where there is a risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing or crimes against humanity and will recommend preventive action to be taken by the United Nations system. The Special Advisers will also continue to engage with Member States and regional organizations to promote cooperation, dialogue and capacity-building, with a view to preventing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and identifying best practices from countries and regions that have averted them, including through curbing their incitement. To that end, the Special Advisers will continue to focus on four areas of work: (a) raising awareness; (b) collecting information and identifying concerns; (c) communicating concerns and recommendations; and (d) developing capacities for the prevention of and response to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

Raising awareness

49. In order to prevent genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, the Office will continue to support the efforts of the United Nations system, Member States, regional and subregional organizations and civil society to work collectively towards that goal. Promoting greater understanding of the causes and dynamics of genocide and related crimes and of the measures that can be taken to prevent them is a preventive measure in itself. In that regard, the Office will assist the General Assembly in its continued consideration of the responsibility to

protect principle, including through the preparation of the annual reports of the Secretary-General on different dimensions of its application and the preparation of annual, informal, interactive dialogues on the responsibility to protect. In addition, the Office will organize, in partnership with the United Nations, Member States, regional organizations and civil society, specific activities to increase knowledge of and engagement on various dimensions of the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and the responsibility to protect principle.

50. The Office will also disseminate the research and the publications it has developed on different aspects of the prevention of genocide and the responsibility to protect principle, in collaboration with the United Nations system and academic and research institutions, including through its website.

Collecting information and identifying concerns

51. The Special Advisers will continue to collect information and identify developments of concern worldwide from the perspective of the prevention of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, in consultation with United Nations departments, offices, funds and programmes and the Member States concerned. They will draw upon relevant human rights, political, development and humanitarian information, gathered primarily from United Nations sources, and will assess situations based on the Framework of Analysis for Atrocity Crimes developed by the Office ([A/70/741-S/2016/71](#)). When appropriate, and in consultation with relevant State and regional authorities, the Special Advisers will conduct country visits.

Communicating concerns and recommendations

52. In accordance with past practice and the procedures outlined by the Secretary-General (see [A/64/864](#)), the Office will alert the Secretary-General, and through him the Security Council, to situations of concern, and will recommend possible courses of action to prevent or halt genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity. The Special Advisers can advocate measures under the Charter of the United Nations that may be implemented by States in the exercise of their responsibilities, by international organizations and by the international community, more generally.

53. Noting that prevention and protection have been most successful where a State agrees to take prompt action and where the international community reaches a consensus on the problems and the response, the Special Advisers will use advocacy to encourage a political environment that supports prevention and protection through constructive engagement. Advocacy may be bilateral or multilateral, confidential or public.

Developing capacities to prevent and respond to genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, as well as their incitement

54. The Office will continue to provide or to facilitate training and technical assistance and to contribute, when requested, to the development of State-led initiatives, including those of international focal point networks aimed at protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, as well as their incitement. In collaboration with relevant United Nations entities, the Special Advisers will also provide advice and assistance to strengthen resilience to these crimes.

55. The Special Advisers will continue to consult widely to identify concerns and fill gaps in existing policy and guidance on the prevention of genocide and on the implementation of the responsibility to protect.

56. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures for the mission are set out below.

Table 5

Objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures

Objective: To advance national, regional and international efforts to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and their incitement

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement		Performance measures			
			2018	2017	2016	2015
(a) Increased capacity of the United Nations system, Member States and regional and subregional organizations to identify and prevent or mitigate the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity as a result of training and technical assistance provided by the Special Advisers	(i) Number of officials from the United Nations, Member States, regional and subregional organizations and civil society trained by the Office on the identification, analysis and management of information regarding genocide and related crimes and on measures to prevent and mitigate the risk of these crimes	Target	300	350	350	350
		Estimate		350	350	350
		Actual			428	346
	(ii) Number of Member States/regional or subregional organizations that have received technical assistance from the Office and taken steps to establish national and regional initiatives or mechanisms for the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, including early warning mechanisms	Target	6	6	6	8
		Estimate		6	6	6
		Actual			7	9
(b) Greater awareness of the causes and dynamics of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and the measures that could be taken to prevent or mitigate the risk of these crimes occurring, including within the framework of the responsibility to protect principle	Number of Member States and regional organizations that have requested or facilitated a visit by the Special Advisers on matters related to the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, including their incitement, and implementation of the responsibility to protect principle	Target	10	11	15	15
		Estimate		10	12	15
		Actual			12	11
(c) Increased capacity of the United Nations system as a whole to prevent or mitigate the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity as a result of timely and relevant advice and analysis of the risk of genocide and related crimes in a given situation provided by the Office, with recommendations for preventive measures	Number of advisory notes, briefings, statements and policy documents that, based on consistent and reliable information received primarily from within the United Nations system, alert the Secretary-General and, through him, the Security Council, to situations where there is a potential risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and that recommend courses of action to prevent such crimes	Target	50	50	50	225
		Estimate		50	50	50
		Actual			50	50

Outputs

- Early warning mechanism based on the systematic collection, management and analysis of information, primarily from within the United Nations system, on developments worldwide relevant to the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (1)
- Reports, briefings and advisory notes to the Secretary-General that include recommendations on strategies and policy options for action by the United Nations system to address situations where there is a risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (10)
- Training workshops, seminars and technical assistance to enhance the capacity of the United Nations, Member States and civil society to analyse the risk of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and to take preventive measures; development of training materials and establishment of a pool of expert trainers (10)
- Publications, research papers, guidance or policy tools on different aspects of the prevention of genocide and the responsibility to protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity to fill existing gaps (6)
- Annual report of the Secretary-General to the General Assembly on the responsibility to protect (1)
- Informal interactive dialogue during the seventy-second session of the General Assembly, in line with the decision of the Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect (1)
- Engagement with Member States, regional and subregional arrangements to advance the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and their incitement through advisory missions, consultations and high-level meetings (25)
- Advocacy missions to countries or regions where the involvement of the Special Advisers is considered of particular value with respect to the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity (5)

External factors

57. The objective is expected to be achieved, provided that there is continued commitment on the part of Member States, including the Security Council, to engage with the Special Advisers to advance activities for the prevention of genocide and implement the responsibility to protect principle; that Member States where critical events take place are willing to engage with the Special Advisers; and that there is active engagement of Member States, regional and other organizations to develop preventive capacity and take appropriate action for the prevention of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 6

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	1 January 2016-31 December 2017			Requirements for 1 January-31 December 2018		Variance analysis 2017-2018	
	Appropriation	Estimated expenditures	Estimated variance over/(under)	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Approved budget 2017	Variance increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)-(1)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)=(4)-(6)
Civilian personnel costs	2 976.6	2 976.6	—	1 470.8	—	1 501.8	(31.0)
Operational costs	1 398.4	1 344.5	(53.9)	672.9	—	699.2	(26.3)
Total (net of staff assessment)	4 375.0	4 321.1	(53.9)	2 143.7	—	2 201.0	(57.3)

Table 7
Positions

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>									<i>General Service and related categories</i>		<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National staff</i>			<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>	<i>Total</i>
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Subtotal</i>	<i>Field/ Security Services</i>	<i>General Service</i>		<i>National Professional Officer</i>	<i>Local level</i>			
Approved 2017	1	1 ^a	–	–	1	3	2	–	8	–	2	10	–	–	–	–	10
Proposed 2018	1	1 ^a	–	–	1	3	2	–	8	–	2	10	–	–	–	–	10
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

^a The Assistant Secretary-General is on a \$1-per-year contract.

58. The projected underexpenditure in 2016-2017 is attributable mainly to the lower requirements for consultants due to reduced travel of consultants, as well as lower actual requirements for commercial communications, stationery and office supplies and other services.

59. The proposed resources for 2018 for the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide amount to \$2,143,700 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the salaries and common staff costs for the continuation of the 10 positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 Assistant Secretary-General (on a \$1-per-year contract), 1 P-5, 3 P-4, 2 P-3 and 2 General Service (Other level)) (\$1,470,800), as well as operational costs (\$672,900) comprising of: consultants (\$51,000), official travel (\$388,600), facilities and infrastructure (\$160,300), ground transportation (\$3,600), communications (\$19,900), information technology (\$21,000) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$28,500).

60. In 2018, the proposed number and levels of positions for the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide will remain unchanged.

61. The variance (decrease) between the 2018 requirements and the 2017 approved budget is mainly attributable to the higher proposed vacancy rate of 3 per cent for international staff in 2018 compared with zero per cent in 2017, as well as lower operational requirements, chiefly related to consultants, commercial communications and other services, taking into account actual expenditure trends, partly offset by increased costs for information technology services based on the current rates.

Extrabudgetary resources

62. In 2017, extrabudgetary resources amounting to approximately \$283,000 are committed, mainly to provide for two Professional positions (1 P-3 and 1 P-2), the capacity-building programme and the preparation of the report of the Secretary-General for 2017 on the responsibility to protect.

63. In 2018, extrabudgetary resources amounting to \$435,000 are anticipated. These funds will be used primarily to support the continuation of the above-mentioned two Professional positions and the capacity-building programme.

C. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara

(\$462,800)

Background, mandate and objective

64. On 16 August 2017, the Secretary-General appointed Horst Köhler as his Personal Envoy for Western Sahara (S/2017/462). Mr. Köhler replaced Christopher Ross, who concluded his tenure on 30 April 2017. The Secretary-General intends to relaunch the political process in a new spirit and new dynamic, while signalling to the Security Council that the Personal Envoy will work with the parties and the neighbouring States on the basis of guidance contained in the Security Council resolutions adopted since 2007, the latest of which is 2351 (2017), in order to achieve a just, durable and mutually acceptable political solution, which would provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.

65. As in previous resolutions, in its resolution 2351 (2017) the Security Council called upon the parties and the neighbouring states to cooperate more fully with the United Nations and with each other in order to strengthen their involvement to end the current impasse and to achieve progress towards a political solution. The Security Council further affirmed its full support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy towards a solution to the question of Western Sahara.

Cooperation with other entities

66. The Personal Envoy reports on his findings and recommendations to the Secretary-General through the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs. The Departments of Political Affairs and Peacekeeping Operations, both at Headquarters and through the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO), provide support to the Personal Envoy. MINURSO shares with the Personal Envoy media reports and code cables on the latest developments in the Western Saharan territory and in the refugee camps near Tindouf. MINURSO also facilitates the trips of the Personal Envoy, on a non-reimbursable basis, within the MINURSO area of operation, covering Western Sahara and the refugee camps.

Performance information

67. In 2017, the Personal Envoy continued to engage with parties to the conflict and the neighbouring countries, Algeria and Mauritania, in New York. Owing to political circumstances beyond the control of the Secretariat, the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General was unable to travel to the region.

68. The Personal Envoy also continued his consultations with members of the Group of Friends of Western Sahara, both in their capitals and in New York, to ensure the support of his interlocutors for the achievement of results during the year. Progress from efforts in 2016 only became visible in 2017, when both parties to the conflict withdrew their military presence from the buffer strip deployed in August 2016, thus averting an outbreak of violence following the most dangerous challenge to the ceasefire in more than two decades.

Planning assumptions for 2018

69. In 2018, the newly appointed Personal Envoy intends to implement the vision expressed by the Secretary-General to relaunch the political process in a new spirit and dynamic, which will include building on his intensified efforts to make progress in the negotiating process through consultations between the Government of Morocco and the Polisario Front, with the support of the neighbouring countries. The objective is to visit the region and meet key interlocutors in order to reach a

lasting, just and mutually acceptable political solution that will provide for the self-determination of Western Sahara.

70. The Personal Envoy will also continue to hold consultations with interested Member States in their capitals and, through the Department of Political Affairs, with the Permanent Missions of the Member States in New York. He will hold face-to-face negotiating sessions once the parties have demonstrated sufficient willingness to engage in serious discussions. The Personal Envoy also intends to visit Geneva to discuss different aspects related to the conflict with the relevant United Nations agencies.

71. The work of the Personal Envoy will be concluded once the parties have reached a mutually acceptable political solution that will provide for the self-determination of the people of Western Sahara.

72. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures for the mission are set out below.

Table 8

Objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures

Objective: To achieve a comprehensive settlement of the question of Western Sahara

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement		Performance measures			
			2018	2017	2016	2015
(a) Progress towards the comprehensive settlement of the question of Western Sahara	(i) Increased convergence among the parties on core and substantive issues. [Number of consultations between the Personal Envoy and the parties and neighbouring States in the region (shuttle diplomacy)]	Target	5	5	5	3
		Estimate		5	5	5
		Actual		—	5	5
	(ii) Enhanced involvement of the international community [number of consultations with, and briefings for, the Group of Friends on Western Sahara]	Target	12	12	12	10
		Estimate		12	12	10
		Actual		—	12	12
	(iii) Enhanced implementation of confidence-building measures [review meetings for the plan of action on confidence-building measures]	Target	2	2	2	2
		Estimate		2	2	2
		Actual		—	2	1

Outputs

- Continued high-level dialogue between the parties and neighbouring States
- Informal negotiations between the parties (2)
- Political consultations with the parties and neighbouring States in the region (5)
- Political consultations with the parties and neighbouring States at Headquarters (18)
- Reports and briefings to the Security Council (2)
- Briefings and consultations with the Group of Friends on Western Sahara and with the international community (12)
- Tour of the capitals of the members of the Group of Friends of Western Sahara (2)
- Meetings with UNHCR to review and support confidence-building measures (2)
- Inter-Sahrawi seminars operated by UNHCR (3)

External factors

73. The objective of the good offices role of the Secretary-General, carried out largely through his Personal Envoy, is expected to be achieved, provided that the parties are willing and committed to reaching a political solution and that the neighbouring states and the international community provide support for the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy.

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 9

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category	2016-2017			Requirements for 2018		Total requirements for 2017	Variance 2017-2018
	Appropriation	Estimated expenditure	Variance	Total	Non-recurrent		
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)-(1)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)=(4)-(6)
Civilian personnel costs	606.4	514.3	(92.1)	236.0	–	306.9	(70.9)
Operational costs	476.8	390.3	(86.5)	226.8	–	238.4	(11.6)
Total (net of staff assessment)	1 083.2	904.6	(178.6)	462.8	–	545.3	(82.5)

Table 10

Positions

	Professional and higher categories								General Service and related categories			National staff				United Nations Volunteers	Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Sub-total	Field/ Security Services	General Service	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level			
Approved 2017	1 ^a	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	2	–	–	2	–	–	–	–	2
Proposed 2018	1 ^a	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	2	–	–	2	–	–	–	–	2
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

^a The Under-Secretary-General is on a when-actually-employed contract.

74. The projected unencumbered balance in 2016-2017 is attributable mainly to: (a) lower requirements for consultants, other services and travel owing to the limited progress in negotiations and cancellation of related meetings; and (b) lower costs of entitlements due to the vacancy of the Personal Envoy (Under-Secretary-General) and Political Affairs Officer (P-3) positions for four and three months, respectively, in 2017, and to the reduced projected number of work-days for the new Personal Envoy.

75. The proposed resource requirements for 2018 for the Personal Envoy, which amount to \$462,800 (net of staff assessment), would provide for the salaries and common staff costs for the continuation of the two positions of the Office (1 Under-Secretary-General, on a when-actually-employed contract, and 1 P-3) (\$236,000), as well as operational costs (\$226,800) comprising consultancy services (\$39,900), official travel (\$120,900), facilities and infrastructure (\$26,900), ground transportation (\$1,000), communications (\$3,100), information technology (\$4,000) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$31,000).

76. In 2018, the proposed number and levels of the positions for the Office of the Personal Envoy will remain unchanged. With the appointment of the new Personal Envoy, who is on a when-actually-employed contract, it is proposed that the Under-Secretary-General and the P-3 Political Affairs Officer positions be relocated to Berlin. These positions were previously located in Washington, D.C. and New York, respectively.

77. The variance (decrease) between the proposed resources for 2018 and the 2017 approved budget is mainly attributable to the lower requirements for staff costs due to the reduced number of projected work-days for the new Personal Envoy for 2018, the lower post adjustment factor for Berlin and the application of a 5 per cent vacancy rate for 2018 compared to a zero per cent vacancy rate in 2017.

Extrabudgetary resources

78. No extrabudgetary resources were available for 2017 nor are any projected for 2018 for the special political mission for Western Sahara.

D. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)

(\$403,000)

Background, mandate and objective

79. On 14 December 2004, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he had appointed a Special Envoy for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004), who would report to the Council every six months on the implementation of the resolution, as requested by the Council in its presidential statement of 19 October 2004 (S/PRST/2004/36). In carrying out this mandate, the Special Envoy consults with the Government of Lebanon, the Security Council and other interested Member States to assist the Secretary-General in the preparation of semi-annual reports to the Council on the implementation of the resolution. The Secretary-General tasked the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs with taking on, ad interim, the responsibility of reporting on resolution 1559 (2004), an arrangement that has been maintained to date.

80. On 17 May 2006, in response to the third semi-annual report of the Secretary-General (S/2006/248), the Security Council adopted resolution 1680 (2006), in which it reiterated its call for the full implementation of the provisions of resolution 1559 (2004), strongly encouraged the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to respond positively to the request made by the Government of Lebanon, in line with the agreements of the Lebanese national dialogue, to delineate their common border, especially in those areas where the border was uncertain or disputed, and to establish full diplomatic relations and representation, noting that such measures would constitute a significant step towards asserting the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Lebanon.

81. On 11 August 2006, the Security Council adopted resolution 1701 (2006), in which it emphasized the importance of the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all Lebanese territory in accordance with the provisions of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006) and the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords. The Council requested the Secretary-General to develop, in liaison with relevant international actors and the concerned parties, proposals to implement the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords and Council resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), including with respect to disarmament and the delineation of the international

borders of Lebanon; and requested the Secretary-General to report to the Council on a regular basis on the implementation of resolution [1701 \(2006\)](#).

82. The full implementation of resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#) is a long and demanding process. However, since the adoption of the resolution on 2 September 2004, as set out in the reports of the Secretary-General, many of its provisions have been implemented.

83. On 22 July 2016, the Security Council issued a presidential statement ([S/PRST/2016/10](#)) underscoring, in the strongest possible terms, its deep concern over the two-year-long vacancy in the Presidency of Lebanon, further stressing that the vacancy and the resulting political paralysis seriously impaired the country's ability to address the growing security, economic, social and humanitarian challenges it is facing. The Council reaffirmed its call on all Lebanese leaders to act with leadership and flexibility to convene urgently a parliamentary session and proceed to the election of a President.

84. On 31 October 2016, after two and a half years of paralysis, the Parliament elected Michel Aoun as President of Lebanon. Designated as Prime Minister on 3 November 2016, the leader of the Future Movement, Saad Hariri, formed his cabinet on 18 December 2016. The cabinet agreed on its ministerial statement on 27 December 2016, which was approved by Parliament, along with the composition of the cabinet, a day later.

85. On 1 November 2016, the Security Council issued a presidential statement ([S/PRST/2016/15](#)) welcoming the election of the President of Lebanon in accordance with the Lebanese constitution as a long-awaited and critical step to overcoming Lebanon's political and institutional crisis. The Council further stressed that the election of a parliament by May 2017, in accordance with the constitution, was critical to the stability of the country and to its resilience to withstand regional challenges.

86. After some delay, an agreement was found on a new electoral law, which was approved by Parliament on 16 June 2017. On the same day, the International Support Group for Lebanon issued a statement from Beirut welcoming the agreement as a "further step towards the reactivation of Lebanon's institutions of state and the normalization of Lebanese political life". Legislative elections are scheduled to take place in May 2018.

87. The provision calling for the disbanding and disarming of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias has not yet been implemented. From September 2008 to November 2010, Lebanese leaders engaged in a national dialogue, the main mandate of which has been the development of a national defence strategy that would address the issue of weapons outside the control of the State. Following the resumption of the national dialogue in June 2012 and the adoption of Lebanon's policy of disassociation, pursuant to the Baabda Declaration, the then President introduced a draft vision of the national defence strategy for the consideration of participants in the national dialogue. The President convened the last national dialogue under his mandate on 5 May 2014. No such meetings have been held since. The Secretary-General in his reports on the implementation of resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#) and [1701 \(2006\)](#) (the latest of which are [S/2017/374](#) and [S/2017/201](#)) has called on the new President, under whose chairmanship the national dialogue is convened, to restart the process. He also has called on Lebanon to implement those decisions that had previously been agreed upon through the national dialogue.

88. The delineation and demarcation of the boundaries of Lebanon are an essential element for guaranteeing the country's territorial integrity, as called for by resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#). Over the reporting period, there have been no discussions or

contacts between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic on the delineation of their common border pursuant to resolution 1680 (2006). At the same time, the pattern of cross-border incidents between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic has been ongoing since the beginning of the conflict in the latter country. While acknowledging the bilateral nature of border delineation and Lebanon's policy of disassociation with respect to the Syrian conflict, the evolving situation on the ground underscores the need for progress on this matter under resolution 1680 (2006), as derived from resolution 1559 (2004).

Cooperation with other entities

89. The Special Envoy coordinates and works closely with the United Nations Office of the Special Coordinator for Lebanon, which, along with the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia, UNDP and the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, provides logistical support for visits to the Middle East.

Performance information

90. There has been no further progress towards the implementation of the remaining provisions of resolution 1559 (2004), in particular in the context of regional instability, and given the recent end of political paralysis in Lebanon. Stagnation in the implementation process could lead to the erosion of the provisions already implemented and challenge the implementation of outstanding provisions. The Secretary-General will continue to deploy every effort to encourage further progress, in the interest of regional peace and security.

Planning assumptions for 2018

91. The remaining provisions of resolution 1599 (2004) are the most difficult and sensitive to implement, namely: the disbanding and disarming of Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias; the extension of the control of the Government of Lebanon over all its territory; and strict respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon. In 2018, against the backdrop of the continued turmoil in the region, the Secretary-General intends to continue his efforts to encourage the relevant parties to make further progress towards the full implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004), in the interest of stability in the region.

92. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures for the mission are set out below.

Table 11

Objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures

Objective: To implement fully Security Council resolution 1559 (2004) and all subsequent related decisions of the Council

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement	Performance measures			
		2018	2017	2016	2015
(a) Respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity and political independence of Lebanon under the sole and exclusive authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout its territory	(i) Absence of land, air and sea violations	Target	Absence of violations	Absence of violations	Absence of violations
		Estimate		Violations occurred	Violations occurred
		Actual		Violations occurred	Violations occurred

	(ii) Number of interactions with relevant parties to reduce violations and ultimately bring them down to zero	Target	36	35	35	34
		Estimate		35	34	34
		Actual			34	34
	(iii) Number of interactions with relevant parties to ensure progress in the extension of the authority of the Government of Lebanon throughout Lebanese territory, in particular along its borders	Target	36	35	35	34
		Estimate		35	34	34
		Actual			34	34
	(iv) Withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon	Target	Complete	Complete	Complete	Complete
		Estimate		Incomplete	Incomplete	Incomplete
		Actual			Incomplete	Incomplete
(b) Disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias	Progress in disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias	Target	Yes			
		Estimate		No		
		Actual			No	No
(c) A strengthened response by all Member States for the implementation of the remaining provisions of Security Council resolution 1680 (2006)	Number of interactions by the Special Envoy with the Government of Lebanon and other interested Governments for increased efforts to implement the remaining provisions of Security Council resolution 1680 (2006), taking into account significant progress made in this respect	Target	36	35	35	34
		Estimate		35	34	34
		Actual			34	34

Outputs

- Regular interactions of the Special Envoy with representatives of the Government of Lebanon and other interested Governments to advance the implementation of the resolution (36)
- Regular interactions with the Government of Lebanon in support of a resumption of the Lebanese national dialogue related to the disbanding and disarmament of Lebanese militias (36)
- Regular interactions with the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO)/Palestinian Authority and good offices between PLO and the Government of Lebanon to facilitate dialogue between the PLO/Palestinian Authority and the Government of Lebanon on the disbanding and disarmament of Palestinian militias (10)
- The provision of good offices and consultations with all foreign Governments that might have influence on the Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias in Lebanon to assist in implementing the requirements of relevant Security Council resolutions in a peaceful manner (32)
- Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council (2)

External factors

93. The objective of the Special Envoy would be achieved on the assumption that: (a) there is political stability and security in Lebanon; (b) hostilities in the region do not further impact Lebanon; (c) there is political goodwill on the part of the parties concerned; (d) the political goodwill of Member States has a positive influence on the parties concerned; and (e) there are no tensions between Lebanon and other States in the region.

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 12

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	1 January 2016-31 December 2017			Requirements for 1 January-31 December 2018		Variance analysis 2017-2018	
	Appropriation	Estimated expenditures	Estimated variance over/(under)	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Approved budget 2017	Variance increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)-(1)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)=(4)-(6)
Civilian personnel costs	494.5	494.5	–	250.4	–	257.6	(7.2)
Operational costs	414.6	235.3	(179.3)	152.6	–	231.6	(79.0)
Total (net of staff assessment)	909.1	729.8	(179.3)	403.0	–	489.2	(86.2)

Table 13

Positions

	Professional and higher categories								General Service and related categories			National staff				Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Sub-total	Field/Security Services	General Service	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	
Approved 2017	1 ^a	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	2	–	1	3	–	–	–	3
Proposed 2018	1 ^a	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	2	–	1	3	–	–	–	3
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

^a The Under-Secretary-General is on a \$1-per-year contract.

94. The projected unencumbered balance for the biennium 2016-2017 reflects a reduction in requirements: the function of the Special Envoy is being carried out by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, who, owing to other high-level priorities to which he had to attend, has carried out limited travel with regard to the implementation of issues related to Security Council resolution 1559 (2004).

95. The proposed resources for the Office of the Special Envoy for 2018, amounting to \$403,000 (net of staff assessment), would provide for the salaries and common staff costs for the continuation of the three positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 P-4, 1 General Service (Other level)) (\$250,400), and operational costs (\$152,600) comprising official travel (\$76,300), facilities and infrastructure (\$50,900), ground transportation (\$3,000), communications (\$13,600), information technology (\$4,800) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$4,000).

96. In 2018, the proposed number and levels of positions for the Office of the Special Envoy will remain unchanged.

97. The variance (decrease) between the 2018 requirements and the 2017 approved budget reflects the reduced requirements for travel, taking into account the uncertainty regarding the appointment of a new Special Envoy and the application of a vacancy rate of 5 per cent for 2018 compared to a zero per cent vacancy rate in 2017.

Extrabudgetary resources

98. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2017 nor are any projected in 2018 for the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution [1559 \(2004\)](#).

E. United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions

(\$1,772,600)

Background, mandate and objective

99. Following the non-extension of the mandate of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia in June 2009, the United Nations has continued to support the Geneva international discussions on security and stability and the return of internally displaced persons and refugees, which commenced on 15 October 2008 in Geneva in accordance with the six-point agreement of 12 August 2008 and implementing measures of 8 September 2008, following the hostilities of August 2008 (see [S/2009/254](#), para. 5). In resolution [1866 \(2009\)](#), the Security Council welcomed the beginning of the discussions and requested the Secretary-General, through his Special Representative, to continue to fully support the process. The discussions, of which 40 rounds have been held to date, most recently on 21 June 2017, are co-chaired by the European Union, OSCE and the United Nations.

100. Against the background of the “Proposals for joint incident prevention and response mechanisms” agreed to in Geneva on 18 February 2009, the Secretary-General, on 28 September 2009, addressed a letter to the President of the Security Council in which he updated the members of the Council on the progress in the Geneva international discussions and the convening of the Joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism (IPRM) under the United Nations auspices in Gali (see [S/2009/254](#), paras. 5 and 6). The Secretary-General also stated that, following consultations with the relevant stakeholders, the United Nations would continue to support the Geneva international discussions and the IPRM through a limited number of personnel, with the task of facilitating the United Nations participation in the international discussions in Geneva and in the IPRM, and liaising and coordinating with the relevant actors. He stated that those personnel would be based in Geneva and would spend as much time as required on the ground in order to perform those functions. The Secretary-General addressed a letter on this matter to the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Georgia on 29 September 2009, to which the Minister for Foreign Affairs replied on 28 October 2009. Contacts and communications on this matter were conducted without prejudice to the respective positions of the participants in the ongoing Geneva discussions.

101. In a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 28 December 2009, the Secretary-General noted that, given the important role of the Geneva international discussions and the IPRM in stabilizing the situation and building confidence, and in the light of the broad support, including from the main stakeholders, for a continued and effective United Nations engagement beyond 31 December 2009, the United Nations would continue to provide support to the Geneva international discussions and the work of the IPRM. In a letter dated 25 February 2010 ([S/2010/103](#)), the Secretary-General informed the President of the Council that, following consultations, it was his intention to appoint Antti Turunen of Finland as the United Nations representative responsible for United Nations support to the Geneva international discussions and the IPRM. In a letter dated 2 May 2011 ([S/2011/279](#)), the President of the Security Council informed the

Secretary-General that the members of the Council had taken note of his intention and of the information contained in his letter of 25 February 2010.

102. The United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions and his team are responsible for preparing, in consultation with the co-Chairs, the sessions of the Geneva international discussions. They are also responsible for preparing, convening and facilitating the periodic IPRM meetings. With regard to the latter, the team maintains a hotline to facilitate timely communication and exchange of information among the parties on any issues of mutual concern.

103. The United Nations Representative and the team will continue to maintain an office in Geneva on the premises of the United Nations Office at Geneva on a reimbursable basis. The team members would regularly travel to the field to liaise with the relevant actors in preparation for and follow-up to the discussions in the IPRM. The team will continue to be co-located and logistically backstopped by UNDP and UNHCR.

Future outlook

104. The role of the United Nations Representative is expected to continue for the duration of the United Nations involvement in the Geneva international discussions and the Gali IPRM. There continues to be support among the principal stakeholders for the discussions in Geneva and in the IPRMs, as well as for the continued engagement of the United Nations. The role of the United Nations will be reviewed depending on future developments with regard to the Geneva discussions and/or IPRMs and the views of the key stakeholders.

Cooperation with other entities

105. The United Nations Representative and his staff will liaise with United Nations agencies, programmes and funds, such as the office of the Resident Coordinator, UNHCR, UNDP and other actors, in particular with respect to coordinating the role and contribution of the United Nations in the framework of the Geneva discussions and the Gali IPRM. The United Nations Representative and his staff will also maintain close contacts with the officials of the European Union and its monitoring mission in Georgia and officials of OSCE.

106. The mission is supported by the United Nations Office at Geneva and the Department of Field Support for personnel, financial and budgetary management, processing travel requests and other administrative activities.

Performance information

107. On 21 June 2017, the United Nations Representative co-chaired the 40th round of the Geneva international discussions. Despite the complex issues under deliberation, the United Nations and the other co-Chairs managed to keep all the participants actively engaged in the discussions. In order to encourage more informed debates, special “information sessions” were conducted in conjunction with the formal Geneva sessions, and on one occasion in the context of the Gali IPRM. Those sessions, co-facilitated by the United Nations, have helped to enrich the formal meetings of the Geneva international discussions. Two more rounds of the Geneva discussions are foreseen to be held in 2017.

108. On 28 June 2017, the 47th Gali IPRM meeting took place under the United Nations chairmanship. All participants took an active part in the meetings in business-like atmosphere and used the platform for additional sideline bilateral talks. All participants have underlined the importance of the mechanism and

reconfirmed their commitment to continue engagement in the future. Six more Gali IPRM meetings are foreseen for 2017.

Planning assumptions for 2018

109. It is expected that the Geneva discussions and the Gali IPRM will continue to convene regularly, requiring the substantive and technical support of the United Nations. Both continue to remain the essential platforms for dealing with the issues of concern for all stakeholders involved. The situation on the ground is likely to continue to warrant international involvement and support in preventing instability and facilitating regular contact and exchange of information among the parties. The mission's strategy is to continue promoting mutual understanding and to facilitate dialogue among the key stakeholders of the Geneva process.

110. It is expected that the Geneva discussions will continue to be convened with approximately the same frequency in 2018: on average, once every two and a half or three months. In preparation for these meetings, the United Nations Representative will be expected to take part in preparatory visits by the co-Chairs of the Geneva discussions. The Gali IPRM is also expected to maintain the established regularity of meetings — once per month, on average — with possible emergency meetings to be convened at short notice by the United Nations Representative. The Representative remains ready to contribute to the prevention of any incident of concern in the area of responsibility through the good services offered to the participants of the Gali IPRM.

111. The United Nations Representative is responsible for the coordination of the role of the Organization within the framework of the Geneva international discussions and the Gali IPRM. The mission will continue to carry out the task assigned to it through close cooperation with the United Nations partners engaged in the Geneva process.

112. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures for the mission are set out below.

Table 14

Objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures

Objective: To promote mutual understanding and dialogue among the key stakeholders of the Geneva international discussions and the Joint Incident Prevention and Response Mechanism

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement		Performance measures			
			2018	2017	2016	2015
(a) Progress on the key agenda issues in Working Group I (on security and stability) and Working Group II (on humanitarian matters) of the Geneva international discussions	Continued engagement of participants in the Geneva discussions in Working Groups I and II [number of sessions of the Geneva discussions]	Target	4	4	4	4
		Estimate		4	4	4
		Actual			4	4

Outputs

- Consultations by the United Nations Representative with the participants in the Geneva discussions (10)
- Joint visits by the co-Chairs of the Geneva discussions in preparation for the sessions of the Geneva discussions (5)
- Thematic non-papers by the co-Chairs (2)
- Information sessions on specific issues on the agenda for the participants in the Geneva discussions (4)

- Press communiqué of the co-Chairs after each round of the Geneva discussions (4)
- Reports on the consultations of the co-Chairs and progress in the Geneva discussions (4)
- Periodic spot reports (4)

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement		Performance measures			
			2018	2017	2016	2015
(b) Improved cooperation between the IPRM participants to prevent and respond to incidents on the ground	(i) Number of IPRM meetings conducted	Target	12	12	12	12
		Estimate		12	12	4
		Actual			6	0
	(ii) Number of incidents addressed through IPRM or good offices of the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions	Target	25	20	20	20
		Estimate		20	20	20
		Actual			23	20

Outputs

- Agendas for the IPRM meetings prepared on the basis of the suggestions of IPRM participants (12)
- Press releases (12) and summary conclusions (12) of the Chair issued following each IPRM meeting
- Notes for the file on each IPRM meeting (12)
- Briefings to international and diplomatic community representatives on the ground (12)
- Use of the hotline (at least 5 phone calls per week to exchange information)
- Weekly security situation reports (52)
- Weekly humanitarian situation reports (52)
- Weekly political situation reports (52)

External factors

113. The objective would be achieved on the assumption that: (a) the participants in the Geneva discussions and the Gali IPRM continue to engage in their respective processes; and (b) the expected submissions from the participants in the sessions of the Geneva discussions and the Gali IPRM meetings are received in full and on time.

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 15

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	1 January 2016-31 December 2017			Requirements for 1 January-31 December 2018		Variance analysis 2017-2018	
	Appropriation	Estimated expenditures	Estimated variance over/(under)	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Approved budget 2017	Variance increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)-(1)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)=(4)-(6)
Civilian personnel costs	2 722.1	2 647.6	(74.5)	1 238.9	—	1 380.2	(141.3)
Operational costs	1 191.6	1 050.6	(141.0)	533.7	—	595.8	(62.1)
Total (net of staff assessment)	3 913.7	3 698.2	(215.5)	1 772.6	—	1 976.0	(203.4)

Table 16
Positions

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>								<i>General Service and related categories</i>		<i>National staff</i>				<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>	<i>Total</i>
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Sub-total</i>	<i>Field/ Security Services</i>	<i>General Service</i>	<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National Professional Officer</i>	<i>Local level</i>		
Approved 2017	–	1	–	–	1	2	2	–	6	–	1	7	–	–	–	7
Proposed 2018	–	1	–	–	1	2	2	–	6	–	1	7	–	–	–	7
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

114. The anticipated unencumbered balance in 2016-2017 is attributable to: (a) reduced international staff costs mainly due to lower actual percentage of common staff costs to salaries based on expenditure trends; (b) reduced operational costs related mainly to commercial communications due to a new telephone service provider and reduced requirements for security services during the high-level meetings since the events were held at the premises of the United Nations Office at Geneva, with the consent of the parties.

115. Resource requirements for 2018 amount to \$1,772,600 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for salaries and common staff costs for the continuation of seven positions based in Geneva (1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 P-5, 2 P-4, 2 P-3 and 1 General Service (Other level)) (\$1,238,900), as well as for operational costs (\$533,700), including official travel (\$333,900), facilities and infrastructure (\$98,100), ground transportation (\$35,500), communications (\$16,700), information technology (\$16,700) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$32,800).

116. In 2018, the number and levels of positions for the Office of the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions will remain unchanged.

117. The variance (decrease) between the proposed resources for 2018 and the approved budget for 2017 is attributable mainly to: (a) reduced civilian personnel costs reflecting higher proposed vacancy rate for international staff of 14 per cent compared with 5 per cent in 2017 and the actual average step in grade of current incumbents, and the ratio of actual common staff costs expenditures to actual salaries based on expenditure trends; and (b) reduced operational requirements mainly for official travel, security services, commercial communications and hospitality.

Extrabudgetary resources

118. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2017 nor are any projected for 2018 for the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions.

F. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria

(\$16,706,200)

Background, mandate and objective

119. On 16 February 2012, the General Assembly, in its resolution [66/253 A](#), requested the Secretary-General and all relevant United Nations bodies to support the efforts of the League of Arab States aimed at promoting a peaceful solution to

the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, including through the appointment of a special envoy. On 23 February 2012, the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the League of Arab States appointed Kofi Annan as their Joint Special Envoy.

120. On 21 March 2012, the Security Council, in a presidential statement (S/PRST/2012/6), endorsed a six-point plan. Pursuant to the plan, the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the armed opposition forces broadly adhered to a cessation of violence by 12 April 2012, diminishing violence significantly for approximately five weeks. In its resolution 2043 (2012) of 21 April 2012, the Council decided to establish, for an initial period of 90 days, a United Nations Supervision Mission in the Syrian Arab Republic (UNSMIS) to monitor a cessation of armed violence and to monitor and support the full implementation of the six-point plan.

121. Meeting in Geneva under the auspices of the Joint Special Envoy, the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the members of the Action Group for Syria (China, France, the Russian Federation, Turkey and the United States, as well as Iraq, Kuwait and Qatar, representing organs of the League of Arab States), adopted the Geneva communiqué on 30 June 2012 (S/2012/523).

122. Following a resurgence of violence in the Syrian Arab Republic, the mandate of UNSMIS was not renewed, leading to the liquidation of the mission on 19 August 2012.

123. On 27 September 2013, the Security Council, in its resolution 2118 (2013), called for the convening of an international conference on the Syrian Arab Republic, to include the Syrian Government and the opposition, with a view to reaching agreement on the full implementation of the Geneva communiqué. The Joint Special Representative of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, Lakhdar Brahimi, convened the conference on 22 January 2014 in Montreux, Switzerland. The conference was followed by two rounds of negotiations between the two parties in Geneva.

124. On 10 July 2014, the Secretary-General appointed Staffan de Mistura as his Special Envoy for Syria, to assume his functions on 1 September 2014. On 30 October 2014, the Special Envoy proposed the establishment of “freeze zones”, the first of which was to be in Aleppo. The freeze was not announced, however, owing to a lack of agreement by the parties. On 5 May 2015, the Special Envoy launched the Geneva Consultations, aimed at opening consultations with a broad spectrum of Syrian interlocutors, along with countries from the region and beyond, to help identify points of convergence that could allow for the launch of a political process.

125. In October 2015, new political momentum at the international and regional levels to achieve a political settlement of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic resulted in the establishment of the International Syria Support Group, co-chaired by the Russian Federation and the United States of America, the adoption of four political statements (on 30 October and 14 November 2015 and 11 February and 17 May 2016) and two Security Council resolutions (2254 (2015) and 2268 (2016)).

126. Through this process, the Security Council, by its resolutions 2254 (2015) and 2268 (2016), tasked the Special Envoy with: (a) convening formal negotiations between the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the opposition on a political transition; (b) supporting the monitoring of the cessation of hostilities by the co-Chairs of the International Syria Support Group; (c) supporting the Support Group’s task forces on humanitarian access and ceasefire; and (d) supporting the Secretary-General’s reporting obligations before the Council. The resolutions further called upon Member States to prevent and suppress terrorist acts committed

specifically by the listed ISIL and Al-Nusra Front and further noted that the cessation of hostilities would not apply to these groups.

127. In the light of this mandate, the Special Envoy convened three rounds of intra-Syrian talks in Geneva, in a proximity format, between January and April 2016.

128. With respect to the cessation of hostilities, the International Syria Support Group established a ceasefire task force. Pursuant to Security Council resolution [2268 \(2016\)](#), the Office of the Special Envoy serves as secretariat of the task force, and supports the monitoring of the cessation of hostilities through an operations centre in Geneva. As of the fall of 2016, and by delegation of the co-chairs of the International Syria Support Group, the Office of the Special Envoy assumed the chairmanship of the task force ad interim.

129. In addition, the Office of the Special Envoy convenes and coordinates the task force of the International Syria Support Group on humanitarian access, which addresses urgent priorities related to the implementation of paragraphs 12 and 13 of resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#), including: the lifting of all sieges in the Syrian Arab Republic; obtaining unhindered and sustainable humanitarian access to besieged and hard-to-reach areas; and protecting civilians. In coordination with the United Nations country team in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Office of the Special Envoy chairs the task force and serves as its secretariat.

130. During the remainder of 2016 the Office of the Special Envoy supported efforts by the Co-Chairs of the International Syria Support Group to restore the cessation of hostilities and, on 6 October 2016, launched a political initiative to reduce the violence engulfing the city of Aleppo. The Office further advocated for increased humanitarian access to besieged and hard-to-reach areas in the country.

131. On 29 December 2016, the Governments of the Russian Federation and Turkey announced a nationwide ceasefire in the Syrian Arab Republic, to take effect on 30 December 2016. The Security Council welcomed these efforts and took note of the ceasefire in its resolution [2336 \(2016\)](#). The ceasefire is supported by regular meetings between the three guarantor States (the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Russian Federation and Turkey) as well as the Syrian Government and a number of armed opposition groups in Astana, Kazakhstan. The Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria provides technical support to the Astana meetings.

132. The Special Envoy reconvened three rounds of intra-Syrian talks in Geneva between February and May 2017. On 19 May 2017, the Special Envoy announced the establishment of a technical consultative process on constitutional and legal issues raised within formal sessions of the talks. Technical consultations were conducted separately with experts from the Government and from the opposition in the first part of 2017.

133. Through the Civil Society Support Room and the Women's Advisory Board, two consultative platforms to maintain sustained, regular consultations with civil society and women in order to ensure an inclusive political process, the Special Envoy also engaged with more than 300 Syrian civil society organizations, including women's groups, representing a range of political viewpoints.

Cooperation with other entities

134. Substantive and administrative support for the Office of the Special Envoy is provided by the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Field Support. In the implementation of the good offices mandate, the Special Envoy and his Office will continue to consult and coordinate closely with the Department of Political Affairs, the relevant peacekeeping and special political missions in the

region and, when appropriate, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OHCHR, UNHCR and the United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN-Women). Cooperation will continue with the agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations operating in the Syrian Arab Republic and the region and with the United Nations country team in the Syrian Arab Republic through the Office of the Special Envoy in Damascus. In addition, agencies working in the Syrian Arab Republic are represented within the headquarters of the Inter-Agency Task Force for the Syrian Crisis, which ensures the coordination and coherence of United Nations political, humanitarian, human rights and other efforts in the country. Furthermore, the Office partners with Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the European Union, and the Norwegian Centre for Conflict Resolution and Swisspeace in the implementation of the Civil Society Support Room and the Women's Advisory Board.

135. In incorporating the principles of the global field support strategy, the Office of the Special Envoy will continue to leverage the existing logistical and administrative capacity of the Global Service Centre in Brindisi, Italy, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force. The Office has also established a memorandum of understanding with the United Nations Office at Geneva for the provision of support and coordination in Geneva on a cost-reimbursable basis.

Performance information

136. Accomplishments achieved during the period from January to June 2017 reflect steps towards ending the violence and reaching a peaceful resolution of the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic. This included ongoing intra-Syrian talks and technical consultations with the Syrian Government and the Syrian opposition, as well as the provision of technical support to the guarantors of the ceasefire established on 30 December 2016, engagement with the International Syria Support Group and the members of the Security Council to reduce the level of violence, increase access to humanitarian assistance and serve as an incremental building block for an overarching political solution. In addition, the Special Envoy continued to hold technical meetings and to consult widely with other relevant Member States, civil society organizations and women's representatives.

Planning assumptions for 2018

137. The broad activities of the Special Envoy in 2018 are expected to be as follows:

(a) Applying the good offices of the Secretary-General through his Special Envoy for Syria to achieve a peaceful political solution to the conflict. To that end, the Special Envoy will continue to: hold intra-Syrian talks in line with resolution [2254 \(2015\)](#) and to convene related processes; and consult broadly with domestic and international stakeholders, including neighbouring States and other Governments with interest in or having influence over the Syrian parties, the Syrian authorities, opposition groups, armed groups and women's representatives and civil society organizations. In consultation with the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, the Special Envoy will advise the Secretary-General on the political process;

(b) Working with the member States of the International Syria Support Group, participants in the Astana meetings, all relevant Syrian parties and civil society organizations and entities of the United Nations, as well as international non-governmental organizations and other organizations, to end the violence and to support the sustained and unimpeded delivery of humanitarian assistance. As appropriate, the Special Envoy will maintain close contact with the United Nations

High Commissioner for Human Rights, the Emergency Relief Coordinator and other relevant United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, as well as the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Syrian Red Crescent Society, to support their efforts, mainly through its office in Damascus;

(c) Briefing the Security Council and/or the General Assembly, as appropriate.

138. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures for the mission are set out below.

Table 17

Objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures

Objective: To achieve through peaceful and inclusive means a Syrian-led political solution to the Syrian conflict, which will meet the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people to dignity, freedom and justice, based on the principles of equality and non-discrimination

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement		Performance measures			
			2018	2017	2016	2015
(a) Progress towards the cessation of violence	Absence of politically motivated violence in the Syrian Arab Republic	Target	Yes	Yes	Not achieved	Not achieved
		Estimate		Not achieved	Not achieved	Not achieved
		Actual			Not achieved	Not achieved

Outputs

- Provision of technical expertise to meetings of the Guarantors of the Ceasefire established on 29 December 2016 (10)
- Meetings of the ceasefire task force and related meetings that support the Syrian parties and members of the International Syria Support Group in the negotiation and implementation of a nationwide ceasefire (100)
- Updates and briefings to the Security Council, the General Assembly and other relevant United Nations bodies, as well as the League of Arab States and other regional organizations and the diplomatic community, on the political and security situation in the Syrian Arab Republic and the efforts of the Special Envoy (25)
- Press statements stressing the importance of political dialogue, an end to violence and human rights violations and humanitarian access (24)
- Background briefings, including to media outlets, stressing the importance of political dialogue, an end to violence and human rights violations, and humanitarian access (104)
- Interviews with major media outlets, stressing the importance of political dialogue, an end to violence and human rights violations, and humanitarian access (24)

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement		Performance measures			
			2018	2017	2016	2015
(b) Progress towards an inclusive Syrian-led political process in a safe environment that provides for a political transition and aims to address effectively the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the Syrian people	(i) Number of meetings between representatives of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and the whole spectrum of Syrian opposition groups in a credible and comprehensive political process	Target	500	500	100	60
		Estimate		150	350	150
		Actual			275	275
	(ii) Road map or agreement is reached on a solution that meets the legitimate will and aspiration of the Syrian people and ensures full respect for their fundamental rights	Target	1	1	1	1
		Estimate		1	1	1
		Actual			—	—

(iii) Number of meetings relating to the political process that include representatives of civil society organizations	Target	200	200		
	Estimate		180	100	
	Actual			–	–
(iv) Number of meetings relating to the political process that include women's representatives and organizations	Target	100	80		
	Estimate		80	35	
	Actual			41	–

Outputs

- Provision of good offices and organization of talks, consultations and negotiations with all concerned internal, regional and international parties and actors aimed at finding a political solution to the Syrian conflict (350)
- Meetings and workshops for all Syrian stakeholders on topics relating to the peace talks, such as human rights and humanitarian access (8)
- Regular visits to the Syrian Arab Republic and other countries to promote a political solution to the Syrian conflict (30)
- Facilitation of direct and indirect meetings between representatives of the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic and a broad spectrum of the Syrian opposition to reach an agreement to end the conflict and put forward a political solution acceptable to all concerned (85)

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement		Performance measures			
			2018	2017	2016	2015
(c) Progress towards improvement of the human rights situation	Number of meetings with the Syrian parties and other relevant stakeholders to facilitate the release of detainees and prisoners related to events since March 2011	Target	60	50	50	50
		Estimate		70	50	50
		Actual			30	40

Outputs

- Mechanism to coordinate the release of detainees (1)

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement		Performance measures			
			2018	2017	2016	2015
(d) Improved access for humanitarian assistance to people in need	Percentage of people in need reached by international humanitarian assistance	Target	100	100	100	100
		Estimate		80	80	74
		Actual			83	80

Outputs

- Meetings of the humanitarian task force with all members of the International Syria Support Group and related meetings to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance, in particular to besieged and hard-to-reach areas (104)

External factors

139. The objective will be achieved on the assumption that all domestic, regional and international stakeholders cooperate with the Special Envoy.

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 18

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	1 January 2016-31 December 2017			Requirements for 1 January-31 December 2018		Variance analysis 2017-2018	
	Appropriation	Estimated expenditures	Estimated variance over/(under)	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Approved budget 2017	Variance increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)-(1)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)=(4)-(6)
Military and police personnel costs	–	9.6	9.6	–	–	–	–
Civilian personnel costs	15 841.7	15 253.4	(588.3)	7 534.4	–	7 188.1	346.3
Operational costs	15 410.6	15 989.3	578.7	9 171.8	128.4	9 163.7	8.1
Total (net of staff assessment)	31 252.3	31 252.3	–	16 706.2	128.4	16 351.8	354.4

Table 19

Positions

	Professional and higher categories								General Service and related categories			National staff				Total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Sub-total	Field/Security Services	General Service	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	
Approved 2017	1	1	1	3	8	16	12	1	43	10	9	62	–	32	–	94
Proposed 2018	1	1	1	3	8	16	12	1	43	10	9	62	–	32	–	94
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

140. In 2016-2017, while the full amount approved for the mission is expected to be utilized, the projected underexpenditure under civilian personnel reflects the delayed recruitment related to visa approval for international staff and the lower than actual average step in grade of current national staff incumbents. The projected overexpenditure under operational costs reflects the increased requirement for consultants and for other supplies, services and equipment related to support services for conference, meetings and peace talks as a result of the increased frequency and duration of Geneva talks based on 2017 developments, partly offset by the lower than foreseen costs for rental of premises in Damascus in 2016.

141. The estimated requirements for the Office of the Special Envoy for 2018 amount to \$16,706,200 (net of staff assessment) and provide for civilian personnel costs (\$7,534,400) for 94 positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 Assistant Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 3 D-1, 8 P-5, 16 P-4, 12 P-3, 1 P-2, 10 Field Service, 9 General Service (Other Level), and 32 Local level) as well as for operational costs (\$9,171,800), comprising costs for consultants (\$200,000), official travel (\$1,956,600), facilities and infrastructure (\$4,486,800), ground transportation (\$375,700), communications (\$293,700), information technology (\$255,100) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$1,603,900).

142. In 2018 the number and levels of positions for the Office will remain unchanged. The proposed number of positions for the substantive component of the mission is 52, 33 of which will be based in Geneva (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 Assistant Secretary-General, 3 D-1, 4 P-5, 10 P-4, 6 P-3, 1 P-2 and 7 General Service

(Other level)) 16 in Damascus (1 D-2, 2 P-5, 3 P-4, 5 P-3, 1 Field Service, and 4 Local level) and 3 in New York (1 P-5, 1 P-4 and 1 General Service (Other level)).

143. The proposed number of positions for the security component is 22, all based in Damascus (1 P-4, 5 Field Service and 16 Local level).

144. The proposed number of positions for the support component is 20, 3 of which will be based in Geneva (1 P-5, 1 P-3 and 1 General Service (Other level)) and 17 in Damascus (1 P-4, 4 Field Service and 12 Local level).

145. The variance (increase) between the proposed resources for 2018 and the approved budget for 2017 reflects mainly the increase in requirements for civilian personnel costs. The increase under civilian personnel resources is mainly due to the provision at the actual average step in grade of current incumbents and ratio of actual common staff costs expenditures to actual salaries based on expenditures trends for international staff.

Extrabudgetary resources

146. In 2017, extrabudgetary resources estimated at \$500,000 have been utilized to support the Office of the Special Envoy, including direct costs of the intra-Syrian talks in Geneva undertaken by the Special Envoy. Extrabudgetary resources have also been used to cover post-agreement planning activities and backstopping requirements at Headquarters in New York. In 2018, the work of the Office will be supported through the trust fund in support of the Department of Political Affairs, which will provide additional funds to cover unforeseen or expanded activities during the course of the year. In particular, the trust fund will provide support for intra-Syrian talks, technical support to the Astana process, meetings between international and regional stakeholders, meetings of domestic Syrian representatives (including the Civil Society Support Room), and the work of consultants. Extrabudgetary resources in the amount of \$750,000 are expected for 2018. In 2017, four positions of Political Affairs Officer (3 P-4 and 1 P-3) are being funded from extrabudgetary resources. It is expected that those positions will be continued in 2018.

G. Office of the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan

(\$1,418,000)

Background, mandate and objective

147. The Office of the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan was established in July 2011 through an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council ([S/2011/474](#) and [S/2011/475](#)). Subsequent exchanges of letters in 2016 ([S/2016/258](#) and [S/2016/259](#)) further reaffirmed the establishment and mandate of Office of the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan. The Office supports the establishment and maintenance of good and peaceful neighbourly relations between the Sudan and South Sudan through a good offices role on behalf of the Secretary-General. This includes cooperating with the African Union High-level Implementation Panel in efforts to implement Security Council resolution [2046 \(2012\)](#), which calls on the Sudan and South Sudan to reach agreement on critical issues, including: (a) modalities for implementing provisions under the Comprehensive Peace Agreement that remain outstanding, including a political settlement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) of the conflict in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States; and (b) key post-separation arrangements critical for the establishment of good neighbourly relations between the parties.

148. On 27 September 2012, the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan signed nine agreements in Addis Ababa brokered by the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, and closely supported by the Office of the Special Envoy. In the overall Cooperation Agreement, the parties recommitted to the overriding principle of establishing the Sudan and South Sudan as two viable neighbouring states cooperating with each other. The eight additional agreements covered arrangements on oil, trade, banking, certain economic matters, pensions, border issues, the status of nationals in each other's countries and security arrangements. While the joint mechanisms envisaged in the agreements have been activated, little progress has been made in utilizing them to address outstanding issues. Furthermore, despite continued engagement and shuttling between both Governments, no progress has been achieved on the temporary arrangements in Abyei Area and its final status.

149. Slow progress in improving the relations between the two countries is attributed to the internal conflicts that preoccupy both countries and have diverted attention from the resolution of outstanding bilateral issues, with South Sudan particularly consumed in an ongoing crisis after the resumption of fighting in July 2016. The Office of the Special Envoy has supported regional efforts by the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development to seek political solutions to the internal conflicts in each country.

150. While the support of the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan for the efforts of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel in the Sudan has been longstanding, with regard to South Sudan, United Nations support to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the African Union was reconfirmed at a joint consultative meeting of the leadership of the three organizations in January 2017 on the margins of the African Union Summit. The African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the United Nations agreed to work jointly on finding a lasting and inclusive political solution to the conflict, within the framework of the 2015 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan, encouraging the High Representative of the African Union for South Sudan, former President Alpha Oumar Konaré of Mali, in particular, to undertake active shuttle diplomacy, in close consultation with the United Nations and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, supported, notably, by the Office of the Special Envoy. The Security Council reaffirmed the call for trilateral collaboration at its 7906th meeting, on 23 March 2017, while considering the report of Secretary-General on South Sudan. The Office of the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan has actively engaged, in cooperation with other entities, in the quest to find a regionally supported political solution to the collapse of the Peace Agreement of 2015. Benefiting from its co-location with the African Union and the office of the Chair of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, and its access to the member States of the Authority, opposition parties and the envoys of the Troika (the United States, the United Kingdom and Norway), the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan has been required or requested to engage with or to convene meetings of these stakeholders in Addis Ababa, Brussels, New York, Juba and Khartoum.

Cooperation with other entities

151. The Office of the Special Envoy will continue to extend full support to, and to coordinate efforts with, the African Union — both towards the efforts of the African Union High-level Implementation Panel in the Sudan and to the work of the High Representative of the African Union for South Sudan — as well as to the Intergovernmental Authority on Development. The Office of the Special Envoy will also continue to work in close collaboration and coordination with the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), the United Nations-African Union Mission in

Darfur (UNAMID), and the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei, and to carry out consultations with international and regional partners, including neighbouring States, donor countries and members of the Security Council. Coordination with other United Nations entities and international organizations also remains a priority, which is reflected, for example, in the close cooperation with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs of the Secretariat and UNDP on the issue of humanitarian access to Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States. The Office of the Special Envoy will continue to be administratively supported by the United Nations Office to the African Union in Addis Ababa, as well as by UNAMID and UNMISS in Khartoum and Juba, respectively.

Performance information

152. The Office of the Special Envoy continued to actively engage key officials in both countries and other stakeholders to promote the resolution of outstanding issues arising from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, to pursue arrangements to strengthen bilateral relations and to address related internal conflicts in both countries that are an impediment to the normalization of bilateral relations. The Office also cooperated with and supported the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, including by providing analysis and input for resolving obstacles to the peace processes in the Sudan and South Sudan.

153. There was minimal progress in regard to the two main outstanding issues from the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. On the Abyei Area, the Governments of the Sudan and South Sudan have made no progress in the implementation of the agreement of 20 June 2011 or on the resolution of the final status of the territory, and the Abyei Joint Oversight Committee has not met since March 2015. With the expectation that addressing the Abyei final-status issue will be deferred for the time being, the Special Envoy engaged the officials in Juba and Khartoum to encourage both sides to establish the relevant institutions that would facilitate support to the communities in the area in the meantime.

154. The conflict in the Two Areas of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile is also yet to be resolved. In August 2016, the African Union High-level Implementation Panel, closely supported by the Office of the Special Envoy, convened the parties to discuss the subject of humanitarian aid delivery and a road map agreement that envisages the next steps in the peace process, including the talks on cessation of hostilities, the political negotiations on a settlement of the conflicts in the Two Areas and Darfur and the options to ensure the participation of the opposition in an inclusive national dialogue. The parties were unable, however, to agree on the humanitarian aid delivery, and the conclusion of the national dialogue in October 2016 without the participation of the major opposition organizations and armed movements has stalled the process. The stand-off between the Government and the SPLM-N with regard to delivery by the United States of medicine to the two areas by air, has delayed humanitarian services and blocked progress on a joint cessation of hostilities agreement. The internal crisis within the SPLM-N leadership that erupted in March 2017 poses another risk, possibly further delaying the negotiations. The African Union High-level Implementation Panel and the Office of the Special Envoy have continued to engage with the Government and the opposition groups in search of a more inclusive political process, and have sought support from key international partners to finding agreement on the humanitarian aid question as well as an expedited path to an agreed cessation of hostilities. The latter would allow for a substantive engagement by all parties on the negotiation of a new social contract and a sustainable peace.

155. As regards the cooperation agreements between the two countries, the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone is yet to be operationalized, notwithstanding the

previous agreement on the part of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism — the key mechanism to addressing issues related to border security between the Sudan and South Sudan — on the coordinates of the centre line and the completion of the redeployment of forces from the area of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone. Limited progress has been made on the implementation of some of the outcomes of the June 2016 Joint Political and Security Mechanism, in particular: the commitment of the two countries to open 10 border crossing corridors, starting with four in the short term (three opened for humanitarian purposes, one more is being discussed); the restoration of direct communication hotlines between the chiefs of military intelligence; and the strengthening of relations between the intelligence services of the two countries through information-sharing. However, no progress has been made in the agreed reactivation of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism and meetings of the Joint Security Committee, which has not met since September 2016, nor in activating the mechanisms responsible for transnational border crimes and terrorism. The parties also periodically continued to accuse each other of providing support or harbouring rebels from the other side. The parties found common ground in the oil sector, however, on which the two countries reportedly reached an agreement in February 2017, adopting a flexible arrangement on fees paid to the Sudan for the transportation, transit and processing of oil.

156. While the parties agreed to resume regular meetings of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism, the meetings have been repeatedly postponed at the request of South Sudan as a result of continuing domestic challenges. Against the background of concerns expressed in the Security Council over the slow implementation of previous decisions, particularly as regards continued funding for the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism if not fully operationalized, the parties finally met again in an extraordinary session on 14 and 15 May 2017. They resolved to take urgent practical steps in activating the Verification and Monitoring Mechanism and facilitating its work, and recommitted themselves to the implementation of previous decisions of the Joint Political and Security Mechanism, and also agreed to resume meetings of the Joint Security Committee. The Office of the Special Envoy supported the African Union High-level Implementation Panel in convening the meetings of the Political and Security Mechanism and in engaging the parties on the matter, and will continue to encourage the implementation of all cooperation agreements.

157. The internal crisis in South Sudan took a new turn in July 2016, when fighting again broke out in Juba and Vice-President Riek Machar, together with other SPLM-in-opposition forces fled the country. Since then, the Office of the Special Envoy, in close collaboration with the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for South Sudan and UNMISS, has renewed its support for the efforts of the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development by engaging the parties both in Juba and outside South Sudan, as well as engaging the countries of the region and the international community in seeking a political solution to the crisis. The African Union High Representative, the Chair of the Joint Monitoring and Evaluation Commission, former President Festus Mogae of Botswana, and the United Nations Special Envoy all conducted shuttle diplomacy with the aim of launching a political process that each party could engage in. The Office of the Special Envoy also sought to establish close working relationships and a shared strategy between the three organizations. However, the Government of South Sudan has continued to reject meeting the former First Vice-President, Riek Machar. Through defections from both sides, new opposition forces have been established and are positioning themselves politically and/or militarily. Meanwhile, the national dialogue initiative proposed by President Salva Kiir in December 2016 has not evolved into a concrete process and, lacking inclusivity, continues to be rejected by the opposition in its current form.

Planning assumptions for 2018

158. The Office of the Special Envoy will continue to assist the parties in resolving the two main outstanding issues in the implementation of resolution 2046 (2012), namely, the conflict in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile States of the Sudan, and the establishment of temporary arrangements for, and agreement on, the process to determine the final status of Abyei. The Office will also continue to support efforts to reach an agreement on a timeline for border demarcation and a dispute resolution mechanism for disputed border areas. The sustained engagement of stakeholders in both countries by the Special Envoy will remain important for the stabilization of the security situation and, eventually, finding a lasting solution to these issues.

159. The Special Envoy will also continue to work towards the achievement and consolidation of peace and stability between, and within, the Sudan and South Sudan. The Special Envoy will shuttle regularly between the two countries, travel to countries of the region and to other suitable locations for necessary consultations.

160. The Office of the Special Envoy will continue to support efforts, including those of the African Union, notably the shuttle diplomacy of the High Representative, and of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, to end the internal conflicts in the Sudan and South Sudan through holistic and inclusive processes. The Special Envoy will participate in all rounds of negotiations conducted under the auspices of the High Representative in the Sudan, and in the negotiations conducted by the African Union, the office of its High Representative and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development with respect to South Sudan. The Special Envoy will further continue to exercise the good offices of the Secretary-General within the eight member States of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development in support of these efforts, and as requested by the Security Council with regard to the Sudan and South Sudan.

161. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures for the mission are set out below.

Table 20

Objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures

Objective: To support the process of negotiations to achieve consolidation of peace and stability within and between the Sudan and South Sudan through political engagement

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement		Performance measures			
			2018	2017	2016	2015
(a) Implementation of bilateral agreements	(i) Establishment of the Abyei Area Administration	Target	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		Estimate		No	No	No
		Actual			No	No
	(ii) Full withdrawal of armed forces and police from the Abyei Area	Target	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		Estimate		No	No	No
		Actual			No	No
	(iii) Full operationalization of the Joint Border Verification and Monitoring Mechanism and full establishment of the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone	Target	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		Estimate		No	No	No
		Actual			No	No
	(iv) Cessation of hostilities and an agreement on security and political arrangements in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States	Target	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		Estimate		No	No	No
		Actual			No	No

	(v) Humanitarian access for vulnerable populations in Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan States	Target	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		Estimate		No	No	No
		Actual			No	No
(b) Completion of negotiations on the outstanding issues between the Sudan and South Sudan	(i) Agreement between the Sudan and South Sudan on a timeline for border demarcation and a dispute resolution mechanism for disputed areas	Target	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		Estimate		No	No	No
		Actual			No	No
	(ii) Agreement between the Sudan and South Sudan on the process leading to the determination of the final status of the Abyei Area	Target	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
		Estimate		No	No	No
		Actual			No	No
(c) Consolidation of peace and stability within the Sudan and South Sudan	(i) Effective and timely implementation of the agreement on the resolution of the conflict in South Sudan	Target	Yes	Yes	No	
		Estimate		Yes	Yes	No
		Actual			Yes	No
	(ii) Inclusive and credible implementation of the outcomes of the national dialogue in the Sudan	Target	Yes			
		Estimate		Yes		
		Actual			No	

Outputs

- Regular engagement and consultations with the authorities of the Sudan and South Sudan and other relevant parties and stakeholders on all issues related to the peace consolidation process, regarding: (a) the implementation of bilateral agreements, (b) the completion of negotiations on the outstanding issues between the Sudan and South Sudan, and (c) the consolidation of peace and stability within the Sudan and South Sudan (6 visits each to the Sudan and South Sudan).
- Provision of advice or technical assistance through regular meetings and consultations with the African Union and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development on: (a) the implementation of bilateral agreements; (b) the completion of negotiations on the outstanding issues between the Sudan and South Sudan, (c) consolidation of peace and stability within the Sudan and South Sudan (50 meetings/consultations).
- Regular engagement and consultations with key Member States, including countries of the region and neighbouring States to develop and foster common approaches (12 meetings/consultations).
- Biannual briefings by the Special Envoy to the Security Council and to the General Assembly on various related issues (2 briefings).

External factors

162. The objective is expected to be achieved provided that the political will of the leaders and their respective communities prevails, particularly in view of the internal crises in both countries, and that there is continuing support from the international community.

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 21

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	1 January 2016-31 December 2017			Requirements for 1 January-31 December 2018		Variance analysis 2017-2018	
	Appropriation	Estimated expenditures	Estimated variance over/(under)	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Approved budget 2017	Variance increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)-(1)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)=(4)-(6)
Civilian personnel costs	2 288.4	2 637.2	348.8	1 155.9	—	1 110.4	45.5
Operational costs	549.1	528.1	(21.0)	262.1	2.3	276.9	(14.8)
Total (net of staff assessment)	2 837.5	3 165.3	327.8	1 418.0	2.3	1 387.3	30.7

Table 22
Positions

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>								<i>General Service and related categories</i>			<i>National staff</i>			<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>	<i>Total</i>
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Sub-total</i>	<i>Field/ Security Services</i>	<i>General Service</i>	<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National Professional Officer</i>	<i>Local level</i>		
Approved 2017	1	—	—	1	—	2	1	—	5	—	—	5	2	2	—	9
Proposed 2018	1	—	—	1	—	2	1	—	5	—	—	5	2	2	—	9
Change	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—

163. The projected overexpenditure for 2016-2017 is mainly attributable to: (a) a high turnover of international staff resulting in higher common staff costs than budgeted; (b) lower actual vacancy rates than budgeted for national staff; and (c) higher than budgeted costs for international and national staff based on actual step in grade and ratio of actual common staff costs expenditures to actual salaries of current incumbents. This is partially offset by lower operational requirements, in particular for official travel, due to increased utilization of various teleconferencing options, and for medical services, due to actual lower rate of the Office's contribution to the United Nations Health Centre Clinic than budgeted.

164. The proposed resources for 2018 for the Office of the Special Envoy, which amount to \$1,418,000 (net of staff assessment), would provide for salaries and common staff costs for the continuation of nine positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 D-1, 2 P-4, 1 P-3, 2 National Professional Officers, 2 Local level) (\$1,155,900), as well as the operational costs (\$262,100), comprising of official travel (\$171,900), facilities and infrastructure (\$12,300), ground transportation (\$8,300), communication (\$36,000), information technology (\$16,100), medical (\$4,600), and other supplies, services and equipment (\$12,900).

165. In 2018, there will be no change to the number and levels of positions for the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan.

166. The variance (increase) between 2018 requirements and the 2017 approved budget is mainly due to the increased requirements for international and national staff as a result of: (a) the application of a lower vacancy rate for national staff in 2018 compared to 2017, taking into account actual vacancy rates in 2017; (b) the introduction of revised national staff salary scale for Khartoum, effective September 2016; and (c) provision being made at the actual average step in grade of current incumbents, and ratio of common staff costs expenditures to actual salaries, based on expenditure trends. These increased requirements are partially offset by reduced operational costs, mainly for official travel owing to the utilization of various teleconferencing options.

Extrabudgetary resources

167. In 2017, the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan benefited from extrabudgetary resources in an estimated amount of \$188,100 for consultancy services and to provide temporary administrative support. No extrabudgetary resources are projected in 2018 for the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan.

H. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region

(\$3,742,600)

Background, mandate and objective

168. On 24 February 2013, Angola, Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania and Zambia signed the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region. The Framework outlines key national, regional and international actions required to end the cycle of conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. Kenya and the Sudan joined the Framework in January 2014. The Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region was established in 2013 with the mandate to support the implementation of the Framework. Furthermore, in continuation of its previous related resolutions, the Security Council, in its resolution [2348 \(2017\)](#), called on the Special Envoy to continue his engagement in furtherance of peace and stability in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the region, including through the promotion of timely, credible and inclusive national elections and regional dialogue.

169. In March 2016, the Security Council took note of the Special Envoy's road map aimed at supporting the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework ([S/PRST/2016/2](#)). The road map identifies nine priority areas for the effective discharge of the Special Envoy's mandate. Furthermore, the Security Council took note of the Great Lakes Regional Strategic Framework, which harmonizes and aligns United Nations programmatic interventions in support of the political objectives of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework.

Cooperation with other entities

170. The Office of the Special Envoy collaborates closely with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), especially on the implementation of national and regional commitments, as outlined in the Framework and relevant Security Council resolutions. It will also cooperate with the United Nations Mission in South Sudan and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic, as well as the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA) and the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan, to maximize synergies in mandate implementation and avoid overlap.

171. The Office of the Special Envoy collaborates with United Nations country teams in the region to ensure the effective implementation of the Great Lakes Regional Strategic Framework.

172. The Office of the Special Envoy collaborates with the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe on non-locational administrative support elements, and with the United Nations Office at Nairobi on locational administrative support elements to ensure timely support and efficient service delivery to the Office. Support provided by both the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe and the United Nations Office at Nairobi is on a cost-reimbursable basis.

Performance information

173. The Office of the Special Envoy continued to support the signatory countries in the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework. In concert with the guarantor institutions, the Office also continued its efforts to

achieve the reform of the governing structures of the Framework to achieve strengthened regional ownership and engagement in the implementation process. The Office of the Special Envoy also supported resource mobilization for and the overall implementation of the Great Lakes Regional Strategic Framework.

174. Furthermore, the accomplishments of the Office of the Special Envoy for 2017 are as follows: (a) the provision of good offices to stakeholders in support of the neutralization of negative forces, in coordination with MONUSCO, to encourage the resumption of joint evaluation meetings between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and ex-M23 combatants, initiated in 2016, regarding the implementation of the Nairobi Declarations (2013) and the repatriation of ex-M23 combatants from Rwanda and Uganda to the Democratic Republic of the Congo; (b) provision of good offices, in coordination with MONUSCO, in support of a regional solution for the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army in Opposition members currently in the Democratic Republic of the Congo; (c) support for the dialogue process in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in coordination with MONUSCO, to engage national dialogue stakeholders, as well as regional and international partners, in support of the implementation of the political agreement of 31 December 2016; (d) support for the dialogue process led by the East African Community in Burundi to provide coherent international support to the East African Community facilitator; and (e) support for the implementation of the Framework commitments, including through (i) facilitation of the proceedings of the 16th and 17th meetings of the Technical Support Committee, held on 9 and 10 February 2017, and 4 May 2017, respectively, and that Committee's retreat held on 4 and 5 May, which resulted in an updated list of priority activities and recommendations to strengthen the effectiveness of the Committee; (ii) coordination among the guarantor institutions through the holding of their third coordination meeting in Addis Ababa on 28 January 2017; and (iii) the holding of a regional stakeholders' meeting in Nairobi on 16 and 17 February 2017, during which the views of participants were sought, including the views of civil society organizations, women, youth and the private sector, on solutions to ongoing political crises in the region.

175. Accomplishments of the Office also include the following: (a) organization of a coordination meeting on ongoing and planned joint activities with the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, held on 8 and 9 May 2017 in Bujumbura; (b) coordination with the Conference and other partners on a joint initiative to address illegal exploitation and trade in natural resources; (c) engagement with national and regional stakeholders in support of durable solutions for displacement and facilitation of the inter-agency working group on displacement; (d) ongoing collaboration with the United Nations country teams in the region, including one coordination meeting with resident coordinators, held on 20 January 2017; (e) engagement with the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the Government of Rwanda and the Rwanda Development Board on convening the second Private Sector Investment Conference for the Great Lakes Region; (f) organization of global open days on Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) on women, peace and security in Goma, Democratic Republic of the Congo, held from 31 January to 2 February 2017, followed by a high-level dialogue between regional women leaders and decision makers, held on 2 February 2017; (g) technical support for the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region for the development of a regional action plan on Security Council resolution 1325 (2000); (h) co-organization with the International Conference and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime of one side event for fundraising for the Great Lakes judicial cooperation network (26 May 2017); and (i) substantive support for the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region regional committee for the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and all forms of discrimination.

Planning assumptions for 2018

176. Based on the mandate of the Special Envoy, the overarching planning assumptions for the 2018 budget focus on the following priorities and programmatic activities:

- (a) Conduct good offices to support efforts to neutralize armed groups;
- (b) Support the implementation of existing accords and mechanisms that promote regional cooperation and confidence-building;
- (c) Provide good offices to support the conduct of timely, credible and inclusive elections in countries of the region;
- (d) Support governance structures of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, including the effective functioning of the Technical Support Committee and the Regional Oversight Mechanism;
- (e) Collaborate with Governments and regional organizations on durable solutions for refugees and internally displaced persons;
- (f) Consolidate efforts to ensure that gender perspectives, as well as women, peace and security perspectives, are mainstreamed in the peace and development processes. Encourage greater participation of women in peace processes;
- (g) Initiate and support efforts to engage civil society and youth in the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework;
- (h) Promote initiatives on socioeconomic cooperation in the region, including follow-up processes to the Private Sector Investment Conference for the Great Lakes Region;
- (i) Support efforts to strengthen judicial cooperation in the Great Lakes region;
- (j) Provide support for the effective implementation of the Great Lakes Regional Strategic Framework in support of the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework;
- (k) Continue to work closely with the diplomatic community and international partners to ensure concerted political, technical and financial support towards implementation of the mandate of the Office of the Special Envoy.

177. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures for the mission are set out below.

Table 23

Objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures

Objective: To advance the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region, and promote durable solutions to prevent and resolve recurring conflicts in the Great Lakes region, including by carrying out tasks mandated by Security Council resolution [2348 \(2017\)](#)

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement	Performance measures			
		2018	2017	2016	2015
(a) Progress in the implementation of the commitments under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework according to the established benchmarks and the Special Envoy's road map	(i) Support increased efforts to neutralize negative forces in line with relevant Security Council resolutions (with a focus on the Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda (FDLR) and the Allied Democratic Forces)	Target	7		
		Estimate	6		
		Actual		6	5

[Increased number of advocacy meetings at the political and technical level, both diplomatic and military]				
(ii) Progress in the implementation of the Nairobi Declarations (2013), including repatriation of ex-M23 combatants from Rwanda and Uganda to the Democratic Republic of the Congo	Target	4		
	Estimate		2	
	Actual			–
[Number of pending issues resolved by the Democratic Republic of the Congo and ex-M23 combatants]				
(iii) Progress on the voluntary repatriation of former FDLR combatants and dependants	Target	3		
	Estimate		2	
	Actual			1
[Number of initiatives aiming at facilitating the repatriation of FDLR elements in camps for voluntarily disarmed persons]				
(iv) Increase in confidence-building initiatives facilitated for enhanced cooperation between the Governments of the region	Target	5		
	Estimate		5	
	Actual			4 2
[Number of high-level meetings and summits, including sectorial meetings, aimed at enhancing cooperation]				
(v) Increased efforts towards promoting peaceful, inclusive and transparent elections in the region	Target	20		
	Estimate		15	
	Actual			15
[(a) Number of high-level engagements in support of the political dialogues in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Burundi]				
[(b) Number of high-level engagements with international partners in support of a coherent international engagement with political dialogue processes in the region (International Contact Group, e-Team etc.)]	Target	6		
	Estimate		6	
	Actual			6
[(a) Number of Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Regional Oversight Mechanism, Ministerial and Technical Support Committee meetings held]				
(vi) Strengthening of the effectiveness of the governance structure of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, including meetings of the Regional Oversight Mechanism, ministers for foreign affairs, the Technical Support Committee and witnesses/guarantors	Target	6		
	Estimate		6	
	Actual			5 4
[(a) Number of Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework Regional Oversight Mechanism, Ministerial and Technical Support Committee meetings held]				
[(b) Percentage of the updated (2017) priority activities implemented by countries of the region]	Target	30		
	Estimate		20	
	Actual			30
[(c) Number of meetings of Guarantors on joint initiatives in support of the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework]				
	Target	4		
	Estimate		2	
	Actual			–

Outputs

- Regular consultations at the senior and working levels with the Governments of the 13 signatory countries of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework

- Meetings and/or missions conducted/undertaken to promote confidence-building among regional leaders (5)
- Reports of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (2)
- Briefings to the Security Council on the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (2)
- Meetings of the Technical Support Committee convened jointly with the African Union Commission (2)
- Meeting of the Regional Oversight Mechanism jointly convened and co-chaired by the United Nations Secretary-General and the Chair of the African Union Commission (1)
- Meeting of the guarantors of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (1)
- Facilitation missions to help ensure free, fair and peaceful presidential elections in the region and a politically stable post-electoral environment (9)
- Development of a strategy paper to accelerate the implementation of the Nairobi Declarations (1)
- Missions undertaken, in liaison with the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region and the Governments of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda and Uganda, to advance the implementation of the Nairobi Declarations (3)
- Consultations facilitated, in liaison with the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region and the Southern African Development Community, to accelerate the neutralization of negative forces operating in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (4)

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement		Performance measures			
			2018	2017	2016	2015
(b) Progress in facilitating a political process that involves Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework signatory countries, the international community, civil society, women, youth and other stakeholders to address the underlying root causes of the conflict in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo	(i) Implementation of durable solutions to address issues of refugees and internally displaced persons in the region [Number of initiatives and projects facilitated]	Target	5	5	5	
		Estimate		8	5	5
		Actual			5	5
	(ii) Improved socioeconomic development and enhanced regional economic integration [Number of initiatives and projects implemented to promote regional economic cooperation, including in the context of the Great Lakes Regional Strategic Framework]	Target	7	5	4	
		Estimate		5	4	4
		Actual			4	4
	(iii) Increased mobilization and engagement of <i>forces vives</i> (women, youth and civil society) in the region, to build knowledge and constituencies under the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework and promote a shared vision for peace and prosperity in the region [Number of initiatives and projects implemented to promote mobilization and engagement of <i>forces vives</i>]	Target	6	5	4	
		Estimate		5	4	4
		Actual			5	2
	(iv) Progress in fighting impunity, improving accountability and advancing regional judicial cooperation to strengthen the rule of law in the region [Number of extraditions and prosecutions of high-profile perpetrators and masterminds of serious human rights violations]	Target	5	5	4	2
		Estimate		5	4	2
		Actual			4	2
	(v) Improved coordination of the international community's support to the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework, including through the mobilization of resources, and strengthened strategic partnership with donors [Increase in resources mobilized]	Target	\$4 million	\$3 million	\$4 million	
		Estimate		\$3 million	\$2.6 million	\$4 million
		Actual			\$1.4 million	\$0.6 million

[Number of initiatives taken]	Target	12		
	Estimate		12	
	Actual		8	10

Outputs

- Thematic papers and/or related projects developed jointly with partners, which propose concrete regional actions to widen and deepen regional integration (5)
- Conference, facilitated together with partners, on substantive matters to make recommendations for action, with participation of government representatives, civil society groups, human right defenders and women's groups from the Great Lakes region (1)
- Tours in the region to engage the political leadership on the full implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework (8)
- Weekly consultations with the African Union, the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region and the Southern African Development Community (52)
- Initiatives in resource mobilization for the cross-border trust fund in support of the Great Lakes Regional Strategic Framework (12)
- Weekly consultations with the International Conference of the Great Lakes Region and other partners on technical and advisory support on regional judicial cooperation (52)
- Facilitation of an international conference on strengthening the economic sector in the Great Lakes region (1)

External factors

178. The Office of the Special Envoy is expected to achieve its mandate, provided that there is political will among signatory countries of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework to implement national and regional commitments for the stabilization of eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo and the overall implementation of the Framework; the situation in the region allows for continued political dialogue between countries in that region; and there is continued support and focus on the Great Lakes region by Member States to ensure success in the implementation process, including coordinated actions and coherent messaging to signatory countries.

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 24

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	1 January 2016-31 December 2017			Requirements for 1 January-31 December 2018		Variance analysis 2017-2018	
	<i>Appropriation</i>	<i>Estimated expenditures</i>	<i>Estimated variance over/(under)</i>	<i>Total requirements</i>	<i>Non-recurrent requirements</i>	<i>Approved budget 2017</i>	<i>Variance increase/(decrease)</i>
<i>Category of expenditure</i>	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)-(1)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)=(4)-(6)
Civilian personnel costs	5 634.4	5 725.3	90.9	2 577.6	—	2 833.5	(255.9)
Operational costs	3 080.8	2 784.6	(296.2)	1 165.0	10.3	1 499.0	(334.0)
Total (net of staff assessment)	8 715.2	8 509.9	(205.3)	3 742.6	10.3	4 332.5	(589.9)

Table 25
Positions

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>								<i>General Service and related categories</i>			<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National staff</i>		<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>	<i>Total</i>
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Sub-total</i>	<i>Field/ Security Services</i>	<i>General Service</i>		<i>National Professional Officer</i>	<i>Local level</i>		
Approved 2017	1	–	1	1	4	6	4	–	17	1	1	19	1	7	–	27
Proposed 2018	1	–	1	1	4	6	4	–	17	1	1	19	1	7	–	27
Change	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

179. The projected underexpenditure in 2016-2017 is attributable mainly to lower projected requirements for (a) communications and information technology services, as a result of the change in support arrangements for the Office from being provided by the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS) and the United Nations Global Service Centre, to being provided by the United Nations Office at Nairobi; (b) air transportation, owing to the use of more economical aircraft; and (c) consultants, owing to the reduced period of engagement of consultants. The projected underexpenditures are partly offset by overexpenditures for international staff due to the delayed receipt of billing for the costs of one staff member seconded from another organization for the period 2014-2015.

180. The proposed resources for 2018 for the Office of the Special Envoy amount to \$3,742,600 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the salaries and common staff costs for the continuation of the 27 positions (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 1 D-1, 4 P-5, 6 P-4, 4 P-3, 1 Field Service, 1 General Service (Other level), 1 National Professional Officer and 7 Local level) (\$2,577,600), as well as operational costs (\$1,165,000), comprising consultants (\$19,900), official travel (\$509,300), facilities and infrastructure (\$127,300), ground transportation (\$65,000), air transportation (\$72,800), communications (\$110,500), information technology (\$83,400), medical (\$17,600) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$159,200).

181. In 2018, the number and levels of positions for the Office of the Special Envoy are proposed to remain unchanged.

182. The variance (decrease) between the 2018 requirements and the 2017 approved budget reflects reduced requirements for international staff, reflecting provision at the actual average step in grade of the current incumbents and the ratio of actual common staff cost expenditures to actual salaries, based on expenditure trends, and a higher vacancy rate for international staff in 2018 compared with 2017, taking into account the actual vacancy rate during 2017. The variance is also a result of reduced requirements for operational costs, mainly under official travel and consultants, owing to more reliance on videoconferencing and use of in-house expertise instead of consultancies; reduced requirements under communications and information technology as a result of the change in support arrangements for the Office from being provided by UNSOS and the United Nations Global Service Centre, to being provided by the United Nations Office at Nairobi; and reduced requirements under air transportation owing to a reduced number of trips and the use of more economical aircraft.

Extrabudgetary resources

183. The Office of the Special Envoy estimates that it will mobilize \$2.5 million in extrabudgetary resources in 2017. Extrabudgetary resources have been utilized to

support activities related to economic, youth and women's affairs, such as organization of the second private sector investment conference, the regional women's forum, the minister's meeting on youth, and the conference on youth unemployment. In 2018, the Office is projecting that \$1.3 million in extrabudgetary resources will be mobilized, to be utilized to follow up on various thematic areas of economic affairs, gender issues (women and youth) and regional judicial cooperation.

I. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Yemen

(\$13,777,200)

Background, mandate and objective

184. Since the beginning of the uprising in Yemen in early 2011, the Secretary-General has used his good offices to promote peace and stability through dialogue and negotiations. In its resolutions [2014 \(2011\)](#), [2051 \(2012\)](#), [2140 \(2014\)](#), [2201 \(2015\)](#), [2204 \(2015\)](#) and [2216 \(2015\)](#), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to continue or to intensify his good offices role. The Council receives regular briefings on Yemen in accordance with the current 60-day reporting cycle.

185. To ensure the full and effective implementation of Security Council resolutions [2014 \(2011\)](#) and [2051 \(2012\)](#), together with the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism, the Secretary-General established the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen (see also [S/2015/283](#) and [S/2015/284](#)) in accordance with an exchange of letters with the President of the Security Council in June 2012 ([S/2012/469](#) and [S/2012/470](#)). As requested by the Yemeni parties, that Office supported the implementation of the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism through political mediation and facilitation efforts and by promoting the inclusive participation of all constituencies in the political transition.

186. Since the establishment of the Office of the Special Envoy in 2012, the United Nations has provided support for the Yemeni-led political transition process and has promoted inclusive participation, including of previously marginalized groups, such as youth movements, women's groups, the Hiraak Southern movement and the Houthi movement. With the support and facilitation provided by the United Nations, Yemenis concluded a national dialogue conference in January 2014. The outcome document of that conference provided a blueprint for the creation of a new federal State underpinned by a commitment to democracy, good governance, the rule of law, national reconciliation and respect for the human rights and fundamental freedoms of all the people of Yemen. A commission was created to draft a new constitution based on the outcomes of the conference.

187. Despite important progress in the political transition, conflicts between government forces, the Houthis and other armed groups over the draft constitution and power-sharing arrangements led to an escalation of military violence, with the Houthis and allied units of the armed forces eventually seizing control of Sana'a and other parts of the country in September 2014 and during the ensuing months.

188. The United Nations facilitated numerous rounds of negotiations in an attempt to resolve the political impasse, but these efforts were insufficient to halt the escalation of military confrontations. At the request of President Abdrabuh Mansour Hadi Mansour, a coalition of countries led by Saudi Arabia intervened militarily on 26 March 2015 in order to secure the return of the Government. Ground fighting between Houthi and allied forces against Government of Yemen forces and allied militias intensified and spread, triggering a humanitarian emergency.

189. Since then, the Special Envoy has facilitated successive rounds of consultations aimed at obtaining a negotiated settlement to end the conflict and resume the political transition process, including direct talks held in Switzerland in June and December 2015, and in Kuwait from April to August 2016.

190. Despite these efforts by the United Nations, fighting continues between various parties throughout the country, including along the border between Saudi Arabia and Yemen. Concurrently, attacks claimed by Al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula and the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant, as well as counter-insurgency operations against those groups, continue in many parts of Yemen, and the overall security situation remains highly volatile.

191. To alleviate the humanitarian situation and create an environment conducive to the talks, a cessation of hostilities facilitated by the Special Envoy came into effect on 10 April 2016 and lasted until 7 August 2016. The Special Envoy has repeatedly sought agreements to restore the cessation of hostilities. In addition, the Special Envoy assisted the parties in establishing the De-escalation and Coordination Committee, a United Nations-supported body composed of military representatives from the parties directly involved in the military conflict. It is aimed at promoting communication between the parties and strengthening adherence to the cessation of hostilities. To complement the work of the Committee, local de-escalation committees were established in the six most conflict-affected governorates.

192. In the statement of 25 April 2016 by the President of the Security Council ([S/PRST/2016/5](#)), the Council called upon all Yemeni parties to develop a road map for the implementation of interim security measures, especially at the local level, withdrawals, the handover of heavy weapons, the restoration of State institutions and the resumption of political dialogue in line with relevant Security Council decisions, the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism, and the outcomes of the comprehensive national dialogue conference. The Council requested the Secretary-General to present a plan outlining how the Office of the Special Envoy could support the next phase of its work with the parties, in particular to support the elements set out above.

193. The response of the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council dated 24 May 2016 ([S/2016/488](#)), of which the Council took note in its letter dated 26 May 2016 ([S/2016/489](#)), set out a proposal to strengthen the Office of the Special Envoy to provide expanded support to the Yemeni-Yemeni talks and to the implementation of the resultant agreements. The Office would undertake the following main functions:

(a) Lead United Nations assistance in the peace talks in the provision of facilitation and technical advice on the negotiation and design of:

(i) Interim security arrangements, including the formation of security committees, the negotiated withdrawal of militias and armed groups and the orderly handover of heavy weapons to the State;

(ii) The restoration of State institutions, including respect for the legally established lines of authority and the removal of any obstructions to the proper functioning of State institutions;

(iii) Preparations for the resumption of political dialogue, including agreements for finalizing and adopting the draft constitution, undertaking electoral reform and holding general elections;

(b) Lead United Nations assistance with regard to expanded facilitation and the provision of technical advice to the Yemeni parties with the aim of ensuring greater respect for and compliance with the cessation of hostilities, including

through support for the De-escalation and Coordination Committee, local committees and additional local mechanisms;

(c) Lead United Nations assistance for the implementation of initial stages of agreements concluded through negotiations, and plan and prepare for United Nations support for the implementation of more comprehensive agreements.

194. The overall aim of the Office is to provide support to the Yemen peace process, the cessation of hostilities (through the de-escalation and coordination mechanisms) and the implementation of any eventual agreements so as to enable the resumption of a peaceful, inclusive, orderly and Yemeni-led transition.

Cooperation with other entities

195. The Department of Political Affairs is responsible for providing strategic guidance and substantive backstopping support to the Office of the Special Envoy.

196. The Department of Field Support will continue to provide strategic guidance on field support issues relating to the Office in Yemen and Jordan. The Kuwait Joint Support Office will continue to provide transactional support in the areas of finance, human resources and travel. In the implementation of the good offices mandate, the Special Envoy and his Office will continue to consult and coordinate closely with the Department of Political Affairs, the relevant missions in the region and, when appropriate, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OHCHR and UN-Women. Cooperation will continue with the Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator and the agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations operating in Yemen. In addition, agencies working in Yemen are represented in the Inter-agency Task Force on Yemen at Headquarters, which ensures the coordination and coherence of United Nations political, humanitarian, human rights and other efforts in Yemen. Furthermore, the Office will continue to pursue joint efforts with international financial institutions, especially the World Bank, to develop and facilitate joint response strategies on pre-recovery and peacebuilding activities, including in the area of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration.

197. In fulfilling its tasks, the Special Envoy and his Office engage closely with Member States and the Security Council, as well as international and regional organizations, including the League of Arab States the Gulf Cooperation Council and other international partners.

198. Work on the draft constitution, electoral reform and other transition tasks are to be conducted in close coordination with the Electoral Assistance Division of the Department of Political Affairs, the Resident Coordinator and the United Nations country team.

Performance information

199. Accomplishments achieved during the period from January to June 2017 reflected ongoing efforts to end the violence and facilitate a negotiated political settlement in Yemen based on the framework developed during the talks in Kuwait City held from April to August 2016. The framework addresses political and security arrangements, to be implemented in parallel, which would help Yemen to return to an inclusive, peaceful and orderly Yemeni-led transition. The framework has been accepted as the basis of future negotiations by the parties, in principle, with strong support from the international community. The Special Envoy and his Office continued their close collaboration with international partners to design and organize consultative meetings with Yemeni interlocutors intended to gather input on and build broad understanding, consensus and acceptance of the Special Envoy's

proposed framework for a comprehensive agreement. The consultation meetings considered a range of issues, including peace negotiations and the current challenges; the restoration of State institutions; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; the constitution-making process; elections and electoral reform; the southern question; and women, peace and security. The Office also prepared for a comprehensive preparatory workshop for a cessation of hostilities in January 2017, intended to strengthen the coordination and de-escalation mechanisms originally deployed as part of the 10 April 2016 cessation of hostilities agreement.

200. The Office formalized a working relationship with the World Bank as part of the Yemen Humanitarian-Development-Peace Initiative, which also includes the United Nations Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen, the European Union delegation to Yemen and the Islamic Development Bank. The partnership supports a platform aimed at ensuring coordination, common understanding and shared planning for joint advocacy and action in a transition period, which is informed by and supportive of the political process.

201. For the period from July to December 2017, the Special Envoy and his Office will continue efforts to promote a negotiated settlement to end the conflict. In this regard, mediation efforts will focus on finalizing the details and sequencing of the security and political elements of a comprehensive peace agreement, as well as the development of a road map towards finalizing the constitution-making process and holding general elections. The Office will also expand efforts to promote inclusive participation in the peace process, with an emphasis on women, youth and civil society. With a view to securing a renewed cessation of hostilities, the Office will continue to generate options papers and other forms of technical advice on mechanisms to support a cessation of hostilities and the design of longer-term security arrangements that would form part of a comprehensive agreement. The development of these papers and strategies will entail intensive dialogue and discussions with the parties and representatives of the international community. The Office will continue its partnership with the entities of the Yemen Humanitarian-Development-Peace Initiative.

Planning assumptions for 2018

202. The broad activities of the Office of the Special Envoy in 2018 are expected to be as follows:

(a) Applying the good offices of the Secretary-General through his Special Envoy for Yemen to achieve a comprehensive negotiated political settlement to end the conflict, consistent with the Gulf Cooperation Council Initiative and its Implementation Mechanism, the outcomes of the comprehensive national dialogue conference and relevant Security Council resolutions. To that end, the Special Envoy will continue to mediate between the principal parties to the conflict in an effort to facilitate a comprehensive agreement based on the framework presented previously; to provide support in the negotiations regarding the design of mechanisms and processes that would form part of an agreement to end the conflict, including with regard to ceasefire monitoring, the withdrawal of forces and the handover of heavy weapons, the establishment of other interim security arrangements, the restoration of State institutions and the resumption of the political transition process (finalizing and adopting a draft constitution, undertaking electoral reform, holding general elections and promoting transitional justice and accountability); to consult broadly with domestic and international stakeholders, including the Government of Yemen, representatives of the Houthis, the Hiraak Southern movement, all relevant Yemeni parties, women's and youth representatives, civil society organizations, members of the Gulf Cooperation Council and other Member States with influence over the Yemeni parties. In

consultation with the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, the Special Envoy will advise the Secretary-General on the political process;

(b) Working with the principal parties to the conflict, other Yemeni constituencies and stakeholders in the region and beyond to achieve a renewed cessation of hostilities, including through support of the De-escalation and Coordination Committee and, at the governorate level, the local de-escalation committees. They will need substantial technical and facilitation support to prepare for and ensure effective functioning of these bodies in order for the committees to contribute to a de-escalation of fighting and the strengthening of a cessation of hostilities.

203. It is expected that the engagement of the Security Council will remain active and high, including through regular reporting requirements to the Council (every 60 days). The reports are presented to the Council by the Special Envoy, and, given the expected challenges to the peace process, frequent and ad hoc briefings can be anticipated.

204. The security conditions in Yemen are expected to remain very challenging for United Nations staff, such that the Office of the Special Envoy and most of its staff will continue to be based outside of Yemen with periodic travel to the country, as and when required and as security and operational conditions permit. The office in Amman will continue to serve as the hub for the provision of support to Yemeni parties and operations in Yemen. The size of the office in Sana'a will continue to remain limited, but would increase over time as security and operational conditions permit. The Government of Yemen has declared Aden the temporary capital. This requires commensurate staff presence to enable the exercise of the good offices of the Secretary-General through the Special Envoy. Given access and movement challenges, the deployment of staff to Aden will facilitate enhanced engagement with Yemeni interlocutors, including with those representing government (national and local), political parties, the Hiraak Southern movement, civil society and others. Given the security situation and the operationally challenged environment in Aden, staff presence in Aden is expected to increase gradually, as security and operational conditions permit.

205. The Office will continue to collaborate with the World Bank and other partners in the implementation of the Yemen Humanitarian-Development-Peace Initiative, which is aimed at supporting critical Yemeni state institutions, preserving basic macroeconomic stability and the functioning of critical poverty alleviation programmes, guiding development planning in support of the political process and ensuring close linkages between development actors and the technical advice that the Office will provide to the parties.

206. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures for the mission are set out below.

Table 26

Objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures

Objective: Inclusive peace process in Yemen is advanced, while levels of violence are reduced

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement	Performance measures			
		2018	2017	2016	2015
(a) A negotiated solution is agreed that meets the legitimate will of the Yemeni people	(i) Agreement on the road map signed by both parties to the conflict	Target	Yes	Yes	
		Estimate		Yes	No
		Actual			No

(ii) Number of meetings of representatives of parties to the conflict in an inclusive and comprehensive process (bilateral meetings, facilitated talks)	Target	60	50		
	Estimate		60	50	
	Actual			150	10
(iii) Number of instances of technical advice provided on the negotiation and design of elements for the road map or initial agreement (capacity-building, options papers)	Target	50	50		
	Estimate		70	50	
	Actual			110	10
(iv) Number of cases in which women, youth and civil society organizations are meaningfully included in the political process (memberships in political bodies, capacity-building)	Target	100	80		
	Estimate		30	30	
	Actual			16	5

Outputs

- Regular engagement and consultations and provision of technical advice on the negotiation and design of interim security arrangements, including the formation of security committees, the negotiated withdrawal of militias and armed groups and the orderly handover of heavy weapons to the State (100)
- Consultations and provision of technical advice on the restoration of State institutions, including respect for the legally established lines of authority and the removal of any obstructions to the proper functioning of State institutions (40)
- Consultations and technical advice on the resumption of the political dialogue, including agreements for finalizing and adopting the draft constitution, undertaking electoral reform and holding general elections (60)

Expected accomplishments	Indicators of achievement		Performance measures			
			2018	2017	2016	2015
(b) Strengthened cessation of hostilities	(i) Number of technical support initiatives provided to relevant security committees and local mechanisms (capacity-building, advisory products)	Target	100	100		
		Estimate		150	100	
		Actual			125	5
	(ii) Number of activities in which local community members, women and youth engaged in cessation-of-hostilities initiatives (facilitation and participation in advocacy, capacity-building)	Target	80			
		Estimate		45		
		Actual			20	

Outputs

- Assistance with regard to expanded facilitation and technical advice to the Yemeni parties with the aim of ensuring greater respect for and compliance with the cessation of hostilities, including through support for security committees and additional local mechanisms (50)

External factors

207. The objective will be achieved on the assumption that there is sufficient political will and engagement from domestic, regional and international stakeholders and there is continued support from the international community for the Special Envoy.

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 27

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	1 January 2016-31 December 2017			Requirements for 1 January-31 December 2018		Variance analysis 2017-2018	
	Appropriation	Estimated expenditures	Estimated variance over/(under)	Total requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Approved budget 2017	Variance increase/(decrease)
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)-(1)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)=(4)-(6)
Civilian personnel costs	11 457.5	13 320.1	1 862.6	8 966.4	—	6 977.1	1 989.3
Operational costs	9 702.4	7 882.7	(1 819.7)	4 810.8	54.5	6 266.4	(1 455.6)
Total (net of staff assessment)	21 159.9	21 202.8	42.9	13 777.2	54.5	13 243.5	533.7

Table 28

Positions

	Professional and higher categories								General Service and related categories			National staff				
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Sub-total	Field/Security Services	General Service	Total inter-national	National Professional Officer	Local level	United Nations Volunteers	Total
Approved 2017	1	—	1	1	7	14	12	—	36	24	1	61	8	26	—	95
Proposed 2018	1	—	1	2	7	15	11	—	37	25	1	63	8	26	—	97
Change	—	—	—	1	—	1	(1)	—	1	1	—	2	—	—	—	2

208. The projected overexpenditure in 2016-2017 is mainly the result of the increased requirements for international staff, which reflects the actual lower vacancy rate, the provision at the actual average step in grade of the current incumbents and the ratio of actual common staff cost expenditures to actual salaries, based on expenditure trends. These overexpenditures are partly offset by the decrease under operational costs, which is mainly the result of reduced requirements for freight and related costs for the one-time acquisition of vehicles and equipment; and under facilities and infrastructure, including reduced requirements for alteration and renovation of the office premises, security services, rental of premises, and utilities, petrol, and maintenance services owing to the delays in locating office premises based on the security situation in Sana'a. The Office is temporarily utilizing the premises of the diplomatic transit facility while it secures a location that would meet the minimum operating security standards required by the Department of Safety and Security. This is partially offset by increased air charter services in Sana'a and Aden, as well as other countries in the region, as the political process in Yemen calls for increased negotiations between all parties involved in the conflict.

209. The estimated requirements for the Office of the Special Envoy for 2018 amount to \$13,777,200 (net of staff assessment) and provide for 97 civilian personnel (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 2 D-1, 7 P-5, 15 P-4, 11 P-3, 25 Field Service, 1 General Service (Other level), 8 National Professional Officers and 26 Local level) (\$8,966,400); and operational costs (\$4,810,800), including official travel (\$847,800), facilities and infrastructure (\$2,339,700), ground transportation

(\$466,800), air transportation (\$276,900), communications (\$178,300), information technology (\$289,600), medical (\$122,500) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$289,200).

210. The proposed staffing complement for the Office of the Special Envoy for 2018 includes a total of 97 positions, as shown in the table above. In 2018, the Office of the Special Envoy proposes the following changes:

(a) Proposed establishment of two new positions, including one Principal Security Sector Reform Officer in Sana'a (1 D-1), and one backstopping Political Affairs Officer in New York (1 P-4);

(i) The Principal Security Sector Reform Officer (D-1) will oversee the Security Sector Reform Section, as well as provide a timely and efficient response in supporting the return to a cessation of hostilities, including various forms of support to the De-escalation and Coordination Committee. The Principal Security Sector Reform Officer will also provide strategic advice to the Special Envoy on interim security measures that would be part of an eventual negotiated political settlement to end the war, as well as on longer-term measures, such as security sector reform and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration efforts;

(ii) The Political Affairs Officer (P-4) will be located in the Department of Political Affairs in New York to ensure appropriate Headquarters-level backstopping support to the Office of the Special Envoy in fulfilment of its strengthened and expanded role in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions and presidential statements, including through engagement with the Security Council, Member States and other stakeholders in New York, as well as the effective coordination between the Office of the Special Envoy, the Department of Political Affairs and other United Nations system partners;

(b) Proposed reclassification of one position, a Movement Control Officer (P-3) to a Movement Control Assistant (Field Service), since the functions related to movement control, including passenger booking and facilitation, and cargo handling can be performed at the Field Service level;

(c) Proposed redeployment of positions, including three Political Affairs Officers and one Security Officer (1 P-4, 2 P-3 and 1 National Professional Officer) from Sana'a to Aden, since the Government of Yemen has declared Aden the temporary capital, and one Driver (1 LL) from Sana'a to Amman to provide dedicated support to staff in this location.

211. The variance (increase) between the resources proposed for 2018 and the 2017 approved budget is mainly a result of (a) the proposed establishment of the two positions mentioned above; (b) increased requirements for international staff, which reflects the lower budgeted vacancy rate and the provision at the actual average step in grade of the current incumbents and the ratio of actual common staff cost expenditures to actual salaries, based on expenditure trends; which is partly offset by (c) the removal of the provisions for the acquisition of vehicles; (d) the removal of the provisions for the acquisition of prefabricated facilities, generators, water treatment equipment, office furniture and equipment; and (e) reduction for freight and related costs for the acquisition of vehicles and equipment.

Extrabudgetary resources

212. In 2017, extrabudgetary resources estimated at \$1,800,000 have been utilized to support the Office of the Special Envoy to assist the De-escalation and Coordination Committee and the negotiations on security arrangements, including support from the Principal Security Sector Reform Officer (D-1) funded from

extrabudgetary resources. In 2018, funding amounting to \$544,000 has been secured to increase the capacity of the Office to provide continued support to the completion of the constitution-making process.

J. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General (Burundi)

(\$6,699,600)

Background, mandate and objective

213. The situation in Burundi remains volatile, and a political and peaceful settlement that addresses its root causes has yet to be found, despite the continuing efforts of the East African Community to promote an inclusive and genuine inter-Burundian dialogue.

214. The Security Council has remained seized of the situation in Burundi. In its resolution [2248 \(2015\)](#), the Council invited the Secretary-General to deploy a team in Burundi to coordinate and work with the Government of Burundi, the African Union and other partners to assess the situation and develop options to address political and security concerns. The Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General (Burundi) (previously the Office for the Special Adviser for Conflict Prevention, including in Burundi) has been operational in Bujumbura since January 2016.

215. In its subsequent resolutions [2279 \(2016\)](#) and [2303 \(2016\)](#), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General, through his good offices, to continue to support the inter-Burundian dialogue and to coordinate and provide all necessary technical and substantive support to the mediation process led by the East African Community, and to work with the Government of Burundi and other concerned stakeholders in the areas of security and rule of law. The Council also requested the Secretary-General to report on the situation in Burundi every three months and to provide written reports immediately to the Council on grave security incidents, violations of international humanitarian law and violations or abuses of human rights.

216. On 5 May 2017, after an exchange of letters with the Security Council ([S/2017/396](#) and [S/2017/397](#)), the Secretary-General appointed Michel Kafando of Burkina Faso as his new Special Envoy, to lead United Nations political efforts in Burundi under the mandate extended by the Security Council. Since the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General will assume the responsibilities previously under the purview of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Conflict Prevention, including in Burundi, the Office has been renamed to reflect the title of the new appointee.

Cooperation with other entities

217. The Office of the Special Envoy liaises and coordinates closely with United Nations regional political offices in the region, including UNOCA, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region and the United Nations Office to the African Union, to ensure the provision of adequate support to regional and subregional initiatives on Burundi. The Office also closely cooperates with the Peacebuilding Commission configuration on Burundi, OHCHR and the Office of the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide to promote coherence on Burundian political issues.

218. The Office of the Special Envoy collaborates closely with the office of the United Nations Resident Coordinator and the United Nations country team in Burundi. Where appropriate, synergies have been found with ongoing programmes

and projects that are relevant to the implementation of its mandate. In particular, the Special Envoy continues to rely on technical advice and support from the OHCHR country office to ensure that respect for human rights is mainstreamed into all activities.

219. At the Headquarters level, the Department of Political Affairs chairs the inter-agency task force on Burundi, which includes representatives of all relevant Secretariat departments and United Nations agencies, funds and programmes. The Special Envoy also represents the United Nations in coordination meetings with the numerous international envoys to Burundi.

220. In order to promote efficiency and maximize the use of cost-sharing initiatives, the staff of the Office of the Special Envoy deployed in Burundi is serviced by the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe for financial and human resources requirements. The office support team deployed in Bujumbura supports the day-to-day administrative and logistical needs of the team, undertaking those functions which cannot be performed remotely and providing an administrative link with the Centre.

Performance information

221. One dialogue session has been convened in 2017 so far, with only partial representation of key stakeholders, and further sessions are expected to be held during the remainder of the year. As projected, a joint working group consisting of the African Union, the East African Community and the United Nations has been established and is fully operational in providing support to the political process led by the East African Community; it is expected to be strengthened further in the remainder of 2017. The Secretariat briefed the Security Council in June 2017 on developments in Burundi, following the appointment of Michel Kafando as the Special Envoy in May 2017. The Special Envoy travelled to the region from May to June 2017 and briefed the Security Council in July 2017. The Special Envoy's office in Bujumbura continued to work closely with the office of the East African Community facilitator and his team.

Planning assumptions for 2018

222. As a result of the appointment of a new Special Envoy, who will be based in Ouagadougou, relocation of a number of existing, Headquarters-based positions is proposed. These adjustments seek both to provide the adequate substantive and administrative support needed by the Special Envoy and to bolster the capacity of the Office to support the dialogue process led by the East African Community in the United Republic of Tanzania. The office is planning to strengthen its ability to support the dialogue, as well as its collaboration and synergy with the facilitator's team. This would be achieved by the proposed redeployment of staff to Dar-es-Salaam, United Republic of Tanzania. The Office will continue to work closely with the African Union presence in Bujumbura.

223. The Office will continue to rely on regional synergies to support its requirements with regard to issues relating to the supply chain, as well as compound and facilities, currently provided by the United Nations Office for Project Services. Office space at UNDP in Ouagadougou will be provided to the Special Envoy and his immediate team, on a cost-reimbursable basis.

224. The objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures for the mission are set out below.

Table 29

Objective, expected accomplishments, indicators of achievement and performance measures

Objective: To support the Government of Burundi and other stakeholders in establishing a credible and inclusive political dialogue process that is nationally owned, while security and rule of law institutions are strengthened

<i>Expected accomplishments</i>	<i>Indicators of achievement</i>
(a) An inclusive inter-Burundian dialogue process that is nationally owned and internationally accepted	<p>(i) Agreement on process, structure and timeline for a political dialogue process</p> <p><i>Performance measures</i></p> <p>Target 2018: Full agreement on process, structure and timeline</p> <p>Expected 2017: Consultations have taken place to agree on process, structure and timeline</p> <p>Actual 2016: Several preparatory meetings and consultations by the facilitator held with stakeholders, the United Nations and the African Union</p> <p>(ii) Dialogue sessions are convened with the participation of key stakeholders</p> <p><i>Performance measures</i></p> <p>Target 2018: 4 dialogue sessions with full representation of key stakeholders</p> <p>Expected 2017: 4 dialogue sessions with partial representation of key stakeholders</p> <p>Actual 2016: 3 dialogue session with partial representation of key stakeholder</p> <p>(iii) Key international and regional partners jointly support the process</p> <p><i>Performance measures</i></p> <p>Target 2018: The joint support coordination mechanism of the African Union, the East African Community and the United Nations holds at least 8 regular sessions</p> <p>Expected 2017: The joint support coordination mechanism of the African Union, the East African Community and the United Nations holds at least 6 regular sessions</p> <p>Actual 2016: Preparatory meetings held in late 2016 to reach agreement on the joint support coordination mechanism, involving the African Union, the East African Community and the United Nations</p>

Outputs

- Promotion of a political solution to the Burundian crisis with key stakeholders through visits of the Special Envoy to Burundi and countries in the region (6)
- Meetings of the East African Community-African Union-United Nations joint technical working group to provide advice to the facilitation led by the East African Community (5)

- Deployment of technical United Nations mediation experts on three occasions to support the design, structure and timeline of the dialogue process led by the East African Community
- Quarterly report or briefing to the Security Council

<i>Expected accomplishments</i>	<i>Indicators of achievement</i>
(b) Governance and civilian oversight of the security sector and rule of law institutions in Burundi	<p>(i) Improved respect for human rights by the security and rule of law sector and associated personnel</p> <p><i>Performance measures</i></p> <p>Target 2018: Implementation of two initiatives to make the security sector rightsized, well managed and respectful of human rights</p> <p>Expected 2017: Consultation and planning for one joint initiative with Burundian authorities to strengthen governance and civilian oversight of the security sector and rule of law in Burundi</p> <p>Actual 2016: Regular consultations with national authorities, emphasizing respect for human rights by the security sector</p>

Outputs

- Consultations with national authorities to raise concerns relating to the security and rule of law situation (10)
- Meetings with political parties and civil society organizations, including representatives of women, youth and the media, to ensure that their security concerns are taken into consideration (6)
- Coordination meetings with bilateral and multilateral partners that are undertaking security sector programming to ensure coherence in approaches (12)

External factors

225. The objective is expected to be achieved, provided that there is political will, support and engagement from the various stakeholders and there is continuing support from the international community.

Resource requirements (regular budget)

Table 30

Financial resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Category of expenditure</i>	<i>1 January 2016-31 December 2017</i>			<i>Requirements for 1 January-31 December 2018</i>		<i>Variance analysis 2017-2018</i>	
	<i>Appropriation</i>	<i>Estimated expenditures</i>	<i>Estimated variance over/(under)</i>	<i>Total requirements</i>	<i>Non-recurrent requirements</i>	<i>Approved budget 2017</i>	<i>Variance increase/(decrease)</i>
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(2)-(1)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)=(4)-(6)
Civilian personnel costs	6 492.6	7 777.7	1 285.1	3 110.8	—	3 202.8	(92.0)
Operational costs	8 819.8	6 575.6	(2 244.2)	3 588.8	45.0	4 560.9	(972.1)
Total (net of staff assessment)	15 312.4	14 353.3	(959.1)	6 699.6	45.0	7 763.7	(1 064.1)

Table 31
Positions

	<i>Professional and higher categories</i>								<i>General Service and related categories</i>			<i>National staff</i>				<i>Total</i>
	<i>USG</i>	<i>ASG</i>	<i>D-2</i>	<i>D-1</i>	<i>P-5</i>	<i>P-4</i>	<i>P-3</i>	<i>P-2</i>	<i>Sub-total</i>	<i>Field/ Security Services</i>	<i>General Service</i>	<i>Total inter-national</i>	<i>National Professional Officer</i>	<i>Local level</i>	<i>United Nations Volunteers</i>	
Approved 2017	1	–	1	2	6	6	2	–	18	7	1	26	2	5	–	33
Proposed 2018	1	–	1	2	5	6	2	–	17	8	1	26	2	5	–	33
Change	–	–	–	–	(1)	–	–	–	(1)	1	–	–	–	–	–	–

226. The estimated unencumbered balance for 2016-2017 mainly reflects (a) a reduction in official travel owing to a slower tempo of political discussions; (b) a reduction in the costs for communications and information technology services owing to a lower than anticipated cost for a contract for communications services and maintenance; (c) reduced costs for medical services owing to the use of a United Nations common service for medical services; and (d) lower freight costs owing to the availability of equipment from regional United Nations missions, which are partially offset by an increase under civilian personnel as a result of (i) personnel costs related to the previous United Nations mission in Burundi; and (ii) lower actual vacancy rates for national staff than budgeted.

227. The proposed resources for 2018 for the Office of the Special Envoy amount to \$6,699,600 (net of staff assessment) and would provide for the salaries and common staff costs for the continuation of 31 positions, the proposed establishment of one new position and the downward reclassification of one position (1 Under-Secretary-General, 1 D-2, 2 D-1, 5 P-5, 6 P-4, 2 P-3, 8 Field Service, 1 General Service, 2 National Professional Officer, 5 Local level) (\$3,110,800), as well as for operational costs (\$3,588,800), comprising consultants (\$120,300), official travel (\$925,500), facilities and infrastructure (\$1,343,200), ground transportation (\$143,500), communications (\$357,000), information technology (\$350,100), medical (\$102,000) and other supplies, services and equipment (\$247,200).

228. The Special Envoy will be employed on a when-actually-employed basis and is proposed to be based in Ouagadougou. The office proposes to relocate a number of its personnel to align the staffing resources with the locations where they can be most effective and efficient in the implementation of the mandate.

229. It is proposed to relocate the immediate Office of the Special Envoy to Ouagadougou by redeploying the position of the Special Assistant (P-5) to Ouagadougou from New York and reclassifying the position at the P-4 level to provide substantive support for the Special Envoy. The office also proposes to establish a new position of Administrative Assistant at the Field Service level to provide administrative support to the Special Envoy in Ouagadougou.

230. In New York, the office proposes to reduce its capacity at Headquarters and strengthen its presence in Burundi through the redeployment of two positions (1 P-5 and 1 P-4) to the Dialogue Support Unit in Bujumbura. To ensure effective Headquarters support in New York for the activities of the Special Envoy, one Political Affairs Officer (P-3) is proposed to be redeployed to the Africa I Division of the Department of Political Affairs and relocated to New York from Bujumbura. The remaining staff assistant (General Service (OL)) in New York is proposed to be redeployed to the Africa I Division of the Department of Political Affairs.

231. In Bujumbura, the proposed strengthening of the Dialogue Support Unit with the redeployments from New York would provide sufficient support for the mediation support team. Consequently, the office proposes the abolishment of one Political Affairs Officer (P-4) position and the redeployment of one Senior Information Analyst (P-5) position to the Office of the Head of Office in Bujumbura.

232. In Nairobi, it is proposed to relocate the existing staff of the Dialogue Support Unit (1 P-5 and 1 P-4) to Dar-es-Salaam as a dialogue support liaison team to provide closer technical support to the facilitator, the former President of the United Republic of Tanzania, Benjamin William Mkapa, who is based in Dar-es-Salaam.

233. The variance (decrease) between the proposed resources for 2018 and the approved budget for 2017 is primarily a result of the application of a higher vacancy rate for international staff in 2018, reduced requirements for official travel and acquisition of equipment, and reduced costs of facilities resulting from a proposed move to smaller premises.

Extrabudgetary resources

234. No extrabudgetary resources were available in 2017, nor are any projected for the Office for 2018.
