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Lessons learned exercise on the coordination activities of the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response

Report of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions

I. Introduction

1. The Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions has considered the report of the Secretary-General on the lessons learned exercise on the coordination activities of the United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response (UNMEER) ([A/70/737](#) and Corr.1). During its consideration of the report, on 31 March 2016, the Committee met with representatives of the Secretary-General, including the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Ebola, who provided additional information and clarification, concluding with written responses received on 10 February 2017.

2. The report of the Secretary-General was submitted in response to General Assembly resolution [69/274](#) B, in which the Assembly requested the Secretary-General to provide, at the first part of its resumed seventieth session, detailed information in the context of his lessons learned exercise, on, inter alia: (a) the coordination activities of the Mission and the Office of the Special Envoy with the wider United Nations system, the Governments of the most affected countries and other actors; (b) the results of his in-depth review of the organizational, administrative and planning aspects, and operations on the ground; and (c) the final performance, including the liquidation and the disposal of the assets of the Mission and the Office of the Special Envoy. The Assembly also requested the Secretary-General to ensure that the disposal of all assets upon the liquidation of the Mission was in accordance with the United Nations regulations and rules.

3. In the same resolution, the General Assembly also welcomed the establishment, on 2 April 2015, of the High-level Panel on the Global Response to Health Crises, which would take into account, inter alia, the recent experience in dealing with the Ebola outbreak, and encouraged the Secretary-General to ensure that the lessons learned exercises were complementary.

4. The Advisory Committee also recalls that, at its request, the Board of Auditors included in its report on the financial statements of the United Nations for 2015 a commentary on the financial and asset management of UNMEER based on a



preliminary analysis ([A/71/5 \(Vol. I\)](#), chap. II, paras. 58-68). The Board will provide a more detailed analysis in the context of its report on the financial statements of the United Nations for 2016 (see para. 37 below).

II. Background

5. Information on the events leading up to the establishment of the Mission and on its mandate and role is provided in paragraphs 1 to 10 of the report of the Secretary-General. The Mission was established on 19 September 2014 following the adoption of General Assembly resolution [69/1](#), and closed on 31 July 2015, following a transition period of 5 months initiated in February 2015. The liquidation of UNMEER was completed on 31 August 2015.

6. The Advisory Committee recalls that the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General on Ebola was mandated to represent the United Nations system and to provide overarching strategic leadership, coordination and guidance, including through consultations with the Member States and other stakeholders, as well as to lead international efforts to mobilize and sustain the necessary political will and strategic resources.

7. UNMEER was mandated to build and maintain a regional operational platform, ensuring the rapid delivery of international assistance against the needs identified in the affected States, lead the Ebola emergency response at the operational level and provide operational strategic direction to the United Nations system, the United Nations country teams and other implementing partners on the ground. The Mission, which was headquartered in Accra, was headed by a Special Representative of the Secretary-General at the Under-Secretary-General level, with an in-country crisis response team headed by an Ebola crisis manager at the Assistant Secretary-General level in each of the three affected countries — Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone.

III. Lessons learned exercise

8. The report of the Secretary-General indicates that the lessons learned exercise constituted a critical assessment of which aspects of the Mission's experience should be considered for replication in future emergencies and which should not. The report further indicates that it was underscored to the respondents that the objective of the lessons learned exercise was not to validate the experience of UNMEER, but to provide candid feedback and broader insight into how the United Nations collectively manages crisis response.

9. As stated in the report of the Secretary-General, the lessons learned exercise was carried out from September to December 2015 in partnership with the International Peace Institute, an external research and policy analysis institution. The exercise included: (a) a comprehensive desk review of internal documentation and independent analyses of UNMEER; (b) the conduct of 175 individual interviews with key United Nations, non-governmental, national, regional and bilateral response partners; (c) field visits to Guinea, Liberia, Senegal and Sierra Leone; and (d) the organization of three consultative round-table discussions moderated by the International Peace Institute with Member States and with United Nations principals in New York and with key operational partners in Dakar.

10. The report of the Secretary-General presented the findings and lessons learned from the exercise under three main themes: (a) the critical role of leadership; (b) the

value of coordination and partnership; and (c) operational impact and delivery. The paragraphs below summarize the key findings and lessons learned, by theme.

11. With regard to the first theme, the critical role of leadership, the main findings and lessons learned presented in the report of the Secretary-General included the following: (a) the establishment of UNMEER played a catalytic role in mobilizing the necessary financial and human resources to scale up the response; (b) the technical leadership of the World Health Organization (WHO) was integral to the Mission's effectiveness in providing operational direction to response partners; (c) the Special Envoy on Ebola played an important role in supporting the exchange of information among responders from the global to the field level; (d) the Multi-Partner Trust Fund, which was managed by the Special Envoy on Ebola, provided a rapid influx of programme funds to meet identified critical gaps in the response; (e) the United Nations could have played a more effective role in aligning messaging early in the response and avoiding confusion between the expectations of the Mission and its resourced capacities; (f) the role of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General was viewed as critical in elaborating the operational framework; (g) the Ebola Crisis Managers were regarded as highly effective in providing a cross-sectoral interface at a senior level with the Governments of the affected countries; and (h) the more operational, emergency-focused United Nations entities were more nimble in making the necessary adjustments to adapt their country presence to exigencies on the ground, as and when required ([A/70/737](#) and Corr.1, paras. 15-32).

12. Under the second theme, the value of coordination and partnership, the main findings and lessons learned presented in the report of the Secretary-General included the following: (a) the UNMEER structure should have been tailored to the exigencies and local needs of each country, ensuring optimum use and greater complementarity with existing United Nations presences and capacities; (b) there are inefficiencies in the use of new mechanisms in terms of time lost through the familiarization process required; (c) the use of existing coordination mechanisms ensures greater integration with actors already on the ground and facilitates greater continuity; (d) UNMEER could have played a greater role in donor coordination and real-time financial tracking at the country level and should have leveraged the coordination tools and capacities of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; (e) while UNMEER was quickly established and deployed, it took time to become operational and fully staffed; and (f) UNMEER should have leveraged the comparative advantages of United Nations entities better equipped to carry out certain tasks, and to use the best-placed actors to get critical enablers in place, such as vehicles, fuel and phones, in the most cost-effective and swift manner ([A/70/737](#) and Corr.1, paras. 33-52).

13. With regard to the third theme, operational impact and delivery, the main findings and lessons learned presented in the report of the Secretary-General include the following: (a) UNMEER was considerably more effective in a facilitating rather than in an implementing capacity; (b) UNMEER was viewed as being less effective in providing the coordination that was required at the field level; and (c) that the principle of comparative advantage should guide the designation of roles and responsibilities in the establishment of a new entity ([A/70/737](#) and Corr.1, paras. 53-63).

IV. Comments and observations

14. **In the view of the Advisory Committee, the common threads emerging from the findings and lessons learned presented in the report of the Secretary-General relate mostly to the organizational aspects of UNMEER. The feedback**

from the lessons learned exercise highlights the need for: using and building upon existing mechanisms rather than creating new mechanisms, entities or structures; supporting local actors on the ground rather than assuming responsibility for their tasks; a country-level presence and mission structures that are tailored to the exigencies and local needs of each country; strengthened capacity at the district level; and greater coordination and collaboration among different entities. In addition, in several cases, the feedback indicates a lack of active engagement between UNMEER and implementing partners. The Committee comments on the above issues in further detail in the paragraphs below.

15. The Advisory Committee is of the view that the findings presented in the report of the Secretary-General are indicative of a silo mentality mindset, which results in resistance to leveraging existing mechanisms, enhancing collaboration in the use of financial and human resources and the sharing of knowledge, as well as a tendency to develop new, stand-alone, duplicative solutions and structures. The Committee believes that one of the key lessons learned from the experience of UNMEER is that in order to address crises in a more effective manner, the leadership of the Organization must promote and instil an organizational culture that encourages and supports collaboration and cooperation among departments and entities, working towards achieving results around a shared common purpose.

A. Role of the Mission

16. The Advisory Committee recalls that it had discussed the role of the Mission at the time of its consideration of the first report of the Secretary-General on UNMEER¹ and his initial proposals for the requirements of the Mission.² In its related reports, the Committee emphasized the need for clarification of the specific coordination role of UNMEER and how it fit into the United Nations system-wide Ebola response effort and the activities of other key players such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Food Programme (WFP) and the United Nations country teams. In view of the involvement of multiple senior officials in leadership roles, the Committee further stressed the need to ensure overall coherence in the execution of the mandate of the Mission and had emphasized the need for close coordination and cooperation among all partners in order to ensure its effective and efficient operation. The Committee also noted that the report of the Secretary-General did not provide information on the activities of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. In this regard, the Committee questioned why the existing institutional arrangements established by the General Assembly in its resolution 46/182 to strengthen the United Nations response to complex emergencies, which had been applied to address numerous crises since the adoption of the resolution in 1991, had not been applied in this case.

17. The Advisory Committee is of the view that, during the lifespan of the Mission, the General Assembly was not provided with clear information on the specific functions and tasks of UNMEER, in particular with regard to the operational activities of the Mission and the means of collaboration with other entities of the United Nations system, which would have reflected a holistic vision of the response of the United Nations system to the Ebola outbreak. The Committee believes that such clarity is essential for planning purposes and determining the optimum organizational arrangements and level of resource

¹ See A/69/404 and the related report of the Advisory Committee (A/69/408, para. 9).

² See A/69/590 and Corr.1 and the related report of the Advisory Committee (A/69/660, paras. 36, 63 and 64).

requirements (see para. 23 below). The Committee emphasizes the importance of establishing, at the outset of any major initiative, a clear understanding among all partners of their respective roles and responsibilities, building on the mandates and comparative advantages of other United Nations system entities.

18. In this connection, the Advisory Committee notes that the report of the Secretary-General indicates that a severe disconnect arose between the expectations for the Mission and its resourced capacities. Initial confusion was created between UNMEER and other United Nations entities over whether the Mission's sphere of responsibility would extend beyond stopping the outbreak and treating the infected to the operationalization of the broader strategic priorities, including providing essential services, preserving stability and preventing outbreaks in non-affected countries (see [A/70/737](#) and Corr.1, para. 27).

B. Organizational, administrative and planning aspects

19. The Advisory Committee recalls that UNMEER was proposed as a regional mission with a total of 376 positions, with its headquarters in Accra, with 137 positions; a country office with 72 positions in each of the affected countries (Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone); and a New York liaison office with 6 positions (see [A/69/590](#) and Corr.1 and [A/69/842](#)). In its related reports ([A/69/660](#) and [A/69/903](#)), the Committee questioned the approach taken to establish such a large structure for UNMEER, given the singular strategic objective and purpose of the Mission to work with others to stop the Ebola outbreak, after which it was to be disbanded. The Committee also questioned the approach taken given the short-term nature of the operational targets of UNMEER, which were framed in terms of goals to be achieved over 30-day, 60-day and 90-day periods. The Committee expressed its view that the proposed structure of the mission was unrealistic and appeared to be modelled on the requirements of a more typical field operation with a long-term perspective. At that time the Committee recommended that the structure of the Mission be further streamlined to be more closely aligned with its specific role, and include only the organizational units and positions that were to be effectively deployed to implement its workplan, and that it be adjusted to reflect changing needs as the outbreak status and related response activities in each country evolved ([A/69/660](#), para. 40).

20. With regard to the location of UNMEER, the Advisory Committee questioned the rationale for proposing a large number of positions at its headquarters in Accra rather than in the affected countries. The Committee also noted that the identical, template-based staffing structure that was proposed for the three country offices did not appear to take into account the specific circumstances and requirements of each of the three affected countries, nor the presence of the United Nations entities already engaged in those countries.

21. With regard to staffing, the Advisory Committee considered the proposed structure of UNMEER to be top-heavy, taking the view that, in general, the grade levels of many of the proposed positions appeared to be high in comparison with the related duties and responsibilities, which were mostly of a logistical and support nature. The Committee also questioned the need for two positions at the Under-Secretary-General level, in particular the reason why the functions of the Head of UNMEER could not have been performed by an incumbent at the Assistant Secretary-General level, under the strategic guidance of the Special Envoy, and why the functions of the three Ebola Crisis Managers heading the country offices could not be performed by incumbents at the D-2 level, rather than at the Assistant Secretary-General level.

22. In its resolution 69/262, the General Assembly also encouraged greater emphasis on reallocating resources and activities from UNMEER headquarters to the front line in order to achieve maximum impact on the ground, and requested the Secretary-General to ensure that the staffing structures of both UNMEER and the Office of the Special Envoy were commensurate with their mandates and that the financial resources were concentrated on operational activities.

23. With regard to planning aspects, the Advisory Committee recalls that the Secretary-General initially presented a request for some \$189.6 million for the requirements of the Mission on 17 November 2014 (A/69/590 and Corr.1). In its related report, the Committee had noted that the request was not supported by sufficient justification, and furthermore, based on its consideration of the proposed resources and the additional information provided to it, the Committee was of the view that the requirement appeared to be significantly overstated. Subsequently, on 27 March 2015, the Secretary-General proposed an updated request in the amount of \$88.1 million (A/69/842), representing less than half of the initial requirements presented. The General Assembly appropriated \$80.2 million for the Mission and the actual expenditures recorded amounted to \$79.8 million, comprising \$75.7 million for UNMEER and \$2.3 million for the Office of the Special Envoy. Upon repeated enquiry, the Committee was finally provided, on 10 February 2017, with a table showing the evolution of the budgetary proposals for UNMEER and the backstopping functions, as well as the final appropriation and actual expenditures by category of expenditure (see annex). **While recognizing the evolving nature of the activities of the Mission and the uncertainty as to the depth of the health crisis, the Advisory Committee is of the view that the initial analysis of the budgetary requirements of UNMEER reflects poor planning and budgetary practice, and thus resulted in a significant overestimation of the proposed requirements.**

24. The Advisory Committee notes that many of the problems related to the findings of the lessons learned exercise had been identified by the General Assembly at the time of the consideration of the budgetary proposals for UNMEER. The Committee is of the view that the approach taken to establish a large mission with a heavy footprint at its headquarters, far from the affected countries, as well as to assume responsibility for certain tasks, such as the creation of an integrated air operations centre for UNMEER, was not thoroughly analysed or fully justified, and resulted in resources being expended to build administrative structures and layers rather than on operational activities.

25. In view of the compressed timeline for addressing the Ebola health crisis, the Advisory Committee is of the view that a more efficient approach would have been to establish a mechanism reflecting the important coordination role of the Special Envoy, designed to maximize leveraging of the comparative advantages of each partner and to support the entities that were already on the ground, such as WHO and the United Nations country team, which had the required technical expertise. Furthermore, existing institutional arrangements, such as the framework for emergency humanitarian assistance adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 46/182, could have been used, including the resources of the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. While recognizing the unknown nature and possible impact of the health crisis at the time, the Committee is nevertheless of the view that the Secretariat did not adequately react to the concerns of the Assembly and make adjustments accordingly.

C. Operational activities

26. The report of the Secretary-General indicates that the lessons learned exercise found that logistics support from UNMEER, WFP and the United Nations Mission

in Liberia was a critical multiplier in the response to facilitate field operations, with assessed funding making possible the rapid provision of logistics assets and enablers (A/70/737 and Corr.1, para. 60).

27. In its previous reports, the Advisory Committee emphasized the need for full information on the operational role of UNMEER, including details on the provision of air transportation, information and communications technology (ICT) services, vehicles, and medical services. The Committee also recommended that the Secretary-General be requested to maintain a detailed accounting of expenditures incurred for operational activities to be undertaken by UNMEER in support of the United Nations system Ebola response effort and to provide comprehensive and transparent information on the services delivered and their related costs in the performance report (A/69/660, para. 46). The Committee expressed its expectation that quantitative information on the performance targets and outputs to be delivered would be included in the results-based-budgeting framework and the list of outputs in the performance report of the Mission, as well as detailed performance information on air operations, ICT and vehicles (see A/69/903 paras. 12, 49, 51 and 52; see also paras. 29, 30, 32 and 33 below). The report of the Secretary-General indicates that the performance report of the Mission is contained in the second performance report on the programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015 (see A/70/557; see also para. 33 below). **The Advisory Committee notes, however, that the detailed performance information requested was not included in that report, which provided only data at budget-section level. The Committee will revert to this matter in the context of its consideration of the forthcoming report of the Board of Auditors on the financial statements of the United Nations (see para. 4 above and para. 37 below).**

Air operations

28. With regard to air operations, the report of the Secretary-General indicates that due to the ability to immediately activate standby contracts under existing Secretariat arrangements and to temporarily redeploy aircraft from peacekeeping missions in the region, as well as the fact that the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service would have required additional extrabudgetary funding at the time of the Mission's operations in order to provide additional services, the establishment of an air operation for UNMEER was deemed prudent. The air service expanded existing United Nations Humanitarian Air Service operations in the region, with full coordination between the Humanitarian Air Service and the air service facilitated by UNMEER through the de-confliction of routes and the co-location of organizational aviation heads. However, the adoption of a unified booking process through the Humanitarian Air Service proved not to be accessible to the specialized agencies of the United Nations, including WHO, which increased the complexity of making flight bookings for those entities (see A/70/737 and Corr.1, paras. 60-62).

29. **In this connection, the Advisory Committee recalls that it had been informed that an UNMEER integrated air operations centre had been established at Accra to support the international response effort. The Committee had expressed the view that greater consideration should have been given to strengthening the existing inter-agency air coordination capacities of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), WFP and the United Nations Humanitarian Air Service before deciding to create an integrated air operations centre at UNMEER, including the provision of services on a cost-reimbursement basis (A/69/660, paras. 43 and 54). Subsequently the Committee recommended that the Secretary-General examine the organizational and operational aspects of UNMEER air services in the context of the lessons learned exercise, with a view to assessing whether the services were delivered in**

the most effective and efficient manner possible (A/69/903, para. 49; see also paras. 34 and 37 below).

Information and communications technology

30. The Advisory Committee recalls that the Secretary-General had indicated that UNMEER would provide ICT services, including: (a) the backbone infrastructure for the entire United Nations system response, including a wide area network, through a combination of satellite and terrestrial links and commercial Internet service providers, radio and mobile communications, messaging systems, videoconferencing services and geospatial services; and (b) ICT services to the Mission and to other agencies, funds and programmes of the United Nations system at UNMEER headquarters, three country offices and four logistics hubs and all forward logistics bases (A/69/903, para. 50). The Committee had also been informed that a total of 604 computers and printers had been acquired, including almost 540 personal computers and over 60 printers. The Committee had expressed its expectation that the performance report would include a full justification for the acquisition of such a large number of personal computers, which significantly exceeded the total number of UNMEER personnel deployed (*ibid.*, para. 51; see also paras. 34 and 37 below).

Vehicles

31. With regard to vehicles, the report of the Secretary-General indicates that the Mission worked closely with donors, Governments and contractors to set up vehicle maintenance and repair workshops to ensure maintenance of the vehicle fleet.

32. The Advisory Committee discussed the vehicles acquired and donated by UNMEER in its previous report (A/69/903, paras. 43-47). As indicated, UNMEER received a total of 530 vehicles from other missions, of which 148 were retained for internal use of UNMEER at its headquarters and three country offices, while the rest were to be donated to partners, including host Governments, United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and non-governmental organizations according to an established donation plan. The Committee had recommended that the Secretary-General provide a detailed accounting of all the vehicles transferred to UNMEER, including information on the types of vehicles, the originating missions and the asset value, transportation and freight costs, as well as comprehensive information on the donation of the vehicles and on the procedures applied for acquisition and disposal of the vehicles (A/69/903, para. 47; see also paras. 34 and 37 below).

33. The Advisory Committee recalls that the 148 vehicles retained for the internal use of UNMEER included eight armoured vehicles and two ambulances acquired from the strategic deployment stocks reserve at the United Nations Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy (UNLB), at a replenishment cost of \$1,753,200. The Committee further recalls that, at the time of its consideration of the initial budget proposals for UNMEER, it was informed that the most recent security assessment no longer called for the use of armoured vehicles in Ghana and Guinea. The Committee expressed its concern that some of the armoured vehicles may have been purchased without the supporting security assessments, resulting in additional costs for the onward transfer of the armoured vehicles to other missions (A/69/660, paras. 52 and 53). **The Advisory Committee is of the view that the lessons learned exercise should have covered the issues experienced with the acquisition of vehicles, and of procurement in general, in greater detail.**

D. Financial performance and disposal of assets

34. As indicated above, in its resolution [69/274](#) B, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to provide, in the context of his lessons learned report, information on the final performance of the Mission, including the liquidation and the disposal of the assets of the Mission and the Office of the Special Envoy. The report of the Secretary-General indicates that the performance report of the Mission was provided in the second performance report on the programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015 ([A/70/737](#) and Corr.1, para. 75; see also [A/70/557](#)), with an extract of the asset disposal breakdown being provided in the annex to the lessons learned report. **The Advisory Committee is of the view, however, that the information contained in the above-mentioned second performance report provides insufficient details on the performance and liquidation of the Mission, and does not adequately respond to the request of the General Assembly (see also para. 27 above and para. 37 below).**

35. In this connection, the Advisory Committee recalls that in its previous report ([A/69/903](#)), it had recommended that the performance report include: (a) quantitative information on the operational activities of UNMEER, in particular as regards provision of air transportation, ICT assets/services, medical services and vehicles; (b) a detailed accounting of all the vehicles transferred to UNMEER, including information on the types of vehicles, the originating missions and the asset value, transportation and freight costs, as well as comprehensive information on the donation of the vehicles; (c) justification for the acquisition of large numbers of personal computers, significantly exceeding the total number of UNMEER personnel deployed; and (d) a detailed accounting of the expenditures incurred for the acquisition of ICT assets, as well as comprehensive information on the disposal of those assets.

36. Furthermore, in its first report on UNMEER ([A/69/408](#)), the Advisory Committee had recommended that, given the large number of partners and sources of funding, the Secretary-General be requested to maintain, with immediate effect, a system of detailed and robust accounting and proper attribution of all expenditures incurred by activity, funding source and categories and objects of expenditure, noting that the use of the recently implemented enterprise resource planning system for peacekeeping and special political missions in peacekeeping (Umoja) should enable a sufficient level of detail for reporting purposes.

37. **The Advisory Committee regrets that, despite repeated requests, the Secretariat has been unable to provide full information on the financial performance of the Mission and on the liquidation and disposal of assets.** In view of the foregoing, the Committee had requested the Board of Auditors to conduct a detailed examination of the Mission's expenditures, staffing, recruitment and procurement, as well as of the acquisition of assets and the transfer of assets to and from the Mission, the disposal of assets, including the procedures applied and the recipients of the assets, the special measures put in place for UNMEER and compliance with United Nations rules and regulations. In its report on the financial statements of the United Nations for 2015 ([A/71/5 \(Vol. I\)](#), paras. 58-68), the Board presented its findings on UNMEER expenditures based on a preliminary analysis. A more detailed analysis covering the totality of the above-mentioned issues will be included in the Board's report on the financial statements of the United Nations for 2016. **Accordingly, the Advisory Committee will revert to the above issues in the context of its consideration of the Board's forthcoming report on the financial statements of the United Nations for 2016.**

V. Recommendation

38. The action to be taken by the General Assembly is set out in paragraph 87 of the report of the Secretary-General. **The Advisory Committee recommends that the General Assembly take note of the report of the Secretary-General, subject to its observations in the paragraphs above.**

Annex

United Nations Mission for Ebola Emergency Response: budget proposals, final appropriation and actual expenditure

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	<i>Object of expenditure</i>	<i>A/69/590 and Corr.1</i>	<i>Resolution 69/262</i>	<i>A/69/842</i>	<i>Resolution 69/274 B</i>	<i>Final appropriation</i>	<i>Expenditures</i>
Backstopping (DM/MSD)	Other staff costs	1 132.8	611.9	561.4	501.3	328.8	298.8
	Consultants	157.3	85.0	106.0	106.0	52.1	36.4
	Travel of staff	102.0	55.1	36.6	36.6	28.3	28.3
	Contractual services	15.7	8.5	8.9	8.4	19.4	19.4
	General operating expenses	4.6	2.5	2.9	2.8	–	5.1
	Supplies and materials	4.1	2.2	2.0	1.8	164.7	164.8
	Furniture and equipment	318.2	171.9	171.1	171.1	0.2	0.1
Total		1 734.7	937.1	888.9	828.0	593.5	552.9
Backstopping (DM/OCSS)	Other staff costs	241.4	130.4	153.4	153.4	102.9	93.3
	Contractual services	3.5	1.9	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5
	General operating expenses	1 072.1	579.1	900.7	892.7	268.6	228.2
	Supplies and materials	0.8	0.4	0.4	0.4	–	–
	Furniture and equipment	199.8	107.9	195.7	195.7	1.3	–
Total		1 517.6	819.7	1 252.7	1 244.7	375.3	324.0
Backstopping UNMEER (DM/PPBD)	Other staff costs	132.0	71.3	147.4	147.4	114.8	114.9
	Contractual services	1.8	1.0	1.8	1.8	1.8	1.8
	General operating expenses	0.6	0.3	0.6	0.6	–	–
	Supplies and materials	0.4	0.2	0.4	0.4	–	–
Total		134.8	72.8	150.2	150.2	116.6	116.7
Backstopping (DPKO/DFS)	Other staff costs	910.1	491.6	699.4	680.2	543.9	533.5
	Travel of staff	148.1	80.0	148.1	148.1	81.5	79.5
	Contractual services	14.7	7.9	12.0	11.9	11.9	–
	General operating expenses	11.5	6.2	10.7	10.7	10.7	–

	<i>Object of expenditure</i>	<i>A/69/590 and Corr.1</i>	<i>Resolution 69/262</i>	<i>A/69/842</i>	<i>Resolution 69/274 B</i>	<i>Final appropriation</i>	<i>Expenditures</i>
	Supplies and materials	2.7	1.5	2.0	2.0	–	–
	Furniture and equipment	9.4	5.1	9.4	9.4	–	–
Total		1 096.5	592.3	881.6	862.3	648.0	613.0
Backstopping (DSS)	Other staff costs	264.0	142.6	229.4	98.3	102.0	102.0
	Travel of staff	37.8	20.4	25.2	12.6	1.6	1.6
	Contractual services	3.5	1.9	3.1	1.4	1.4	1.4
	General operating expenses	5.9	3.3	5.8	2.1	–	–
	Supplies and materials	0.8	0.5	0.7	0.3	–	–
	Furniture and equipment	2.0	1.1	2.0	0.5	–	–
Total		314.0	169.8	266.2	115.2	105.0	105.0
Backstopping (OLA)	Other staff costs	117.4	63.4	98.3	98.3	51.5	50.6
	Contractual services	1.6	0.9	1.2	1.2	1.2	1.2
	General operating expenses	0.5	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.5
	Supplies and materials	0.3	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2
Total		119.8	64.8	100.2	100.2	53.4	52.5
Office of the Special Envoy for Ebola	Other staff costs	1 471.2	794.6	1 954.1	1 954.1	1 838.6	1 596.0
	Travel of staff	759.7	410.3	599.0	599.0	599.0	624.1
	Contractual services	15.0	8.1	23.0	23.0	19.9	6.3
	General operating expenses	101.2	54.7	86.0	86.0	101.7	73.2
	Supplies and materials	4.0	2.2	5.5	5.5	0.7	0.3
	Furniture and equipment	14.4	7.7	20.3	20.3	12.5	10.5
	Improvement of premises	–	–	–	–	–	15.7
Total		2 365.5	1 277.6	2 687.9	2 687.9	2 572.4	2 326.1
UNMEER	Other staff costs	42 468.3	22 938.6	26 226.5	26 226.5	24 633.6	24 879.3
	Consultants	109.1	58.9	237.4	222.3	305.7	263.0
	Travel of staff	7 403.4	3 998.8	6 906.0	6 906.0	5 985.5	6 583.9
	Contractual services	9 391.1	5 072.5	1 202.0	1 202.0	2 223.6	2 164.2
	General operating expenses	72 864.1	39 356.4	32 203.0	32 203.0	30 121.0	30 431.2
	Hospitality	50.0	27.0	40.0	40.0	25.6	17.7

<i>Object of expenditure</i>	<i>A/69/590 and Corr.1</i>	<i>Resolution 69/262</i>	<i>A/69/842</i>	<i>Resolution 69/274 B</i>	<i>Final appropriation</i>	<i>Expenditures</i>
Supplies and materials	12 628.2	6 820.9	3 564.4	3 564.4	570.8	582.1
Furniture and equipment	31 396.8	16 958.4	11 328.0	11 328.0	9 013.4	7 998.3
Improvement of premises	6 000.0	3 240.8	159.0	159.0	20.3	56.2
Grants and contributions	—	—	—	—	2 808.8	2 739.2
Total	182 311.0	98 472.3	81 866.3	81 851.2	75 708.3	75 715.3
Total (net of staff assessment)	189 593.9	102 406.4	88 094.0	87 839.7	80 172.5	79 805.4

Abbreviations: DM, Department of Management; MSD, Medical Services Division; OCSS, Office of Central Support Services; PPBD, Programme Planning and Budget Division; DPKO, Department of Peacekeeping Operations; DFS, Department of Field Support; DSS, Department of Safety and Security; OLA, Office of Legal Affairs.