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### Programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015

## **Estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council**

### **Report of the Secretary-General**

#### *Summary*

The present report is submitted in the context of actions taken or expected to be taken by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council regarding special political missions, including good offices and preventive diplomacy and post-conflict peacebuilding missions, on the basis of requests from Governments and/or recommendations of the Secretary-General.

It contains the proposed resource requirements for 2015 for 35 special political missions authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council, as presented in detail in the addenda to the present report ([A/69/363/Add.1-5](#)).

The total estimated requirements of the missions in question amount to \$485,160,800 net (\$513,182,600 gross). Of this requirement, an amount of \$435,094,000 (net of staff assessment) would be charged against the balance of \$435,094,000 remaining in the provision for special political missions in the amount of \$1,081,089,900 appropriated under section 3, Political affairs, of the programme budget for 2014-2015, after taking into account the underexpenditure in 2014 amounting to \$11,966,000 (net of staff assessment).

The General Assembly is requested to approve the remaining amount of \$38,100,800, net of staff assessment (\$40,314,500 gross), in additional appropriation for the biennium 2014-2015.



## Contents

	<i>Page</i>
I. Introduction .....	3
A. Status of the extension or renewal of mandates .....	3
B. Missions established, completed or discontinued in 2014.....	5
C. Organization of the reports on the budgets of special political missions .....	6
D. Performance information for 2014 .....	6
E. Operational environment, including cooperation and synergies and the level of collaboration with and between missions, the United Nations country team and United Nations Headquarters .....	7
F. Reporting requirements related to special political missions emanating from the General Assembly or from the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions .....	20
II. Analysis of budget performance and resource requirements for special political missions ...	28
A. Estimated performance for 2014 .....	28
B. Proposed resources for 2015 .....	30
III. Action requested of the General Assembly .....	48
Annexes	
I. Summary of the utilization of the provision for special political missions, 2014-2015 .....	49
II. Special political missions 2015: lead department and administrative support arrangements ..	50
III. Extrabudgetary resources for special political missions .....	52
IV. Air operations resources, 2013-2015.....	53
V. Main factors for variances in civilian staffing requirements .....	55
VI. Vacancy rates comparison.....	56
VII. Security-related resources.....	60
VIII. National staff common staff costs .....	62
IX. Cost-sharing.....	63

## I. Introduction

1. The purpose of the present report is to seek funding for the second year of the biennium 2014-2015 for 35 special political missions, in connection with actions taken or expected to be taken by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council on the basis of requests from Member States and/or recommendations of the Secretary-General.

2. Two missions, namely, the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2127 (2013) and the Panel of Experts for Yemen established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2140 (2014), are new missions established in late 2013 and in 2014. The mandate of four missions, namely, the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA), the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL), the United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB) and the Joint Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations for the Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Programme of the Syrian Arab Republic (OPCW-United Nations Joint Mission), ended or will end in 2014.

3. The resource requirements for one special political mission, namely, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Myanmar, whose mandate emanates from the General Assembly and whose requirements are included in the present report in order to consolidate the overall resource requirements for all special political missions, will also be brought to the attention of the Assembly in accordance with rule 153 of the rules of procedure of the Assembly.

4. Pending further developments and clarity on the mandate and operations of the United Nations Assistance Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) and the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), the present report reflects six-month interim resource requirements for 2015 for those missions. The interim resource requirements are necessary to ensure that financial arrangements are in place to allow the missions to continue operations during the first half of 2015 and to determine their actual requirements as the situation on the ground becomes clearer. The interim period will also enable the missions to develop comprehensive budget proposals which will incorporate fully any decisions that the Security Council may take and will cover the full scope of operations for UNAMA and UNSMIL in 2015. Accordingly, a technical rollover of 50 per cent of the level of projected expenditures during 2014 is proposed for the period from 1 January to 30 June 2015 for UNAMA and UNSMIL. Detailed budget proposals for 2015 will be prepared for consideration during the second resumed part of the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

5. In its resolution 68/248, the General Assembly approved under section 3, Political affairs, of the programme budget for 2014-2015 a biennial provision for special political missions in the amount of \$1,081,089,900. The utilization of the provision is contained in annex I to the present report.

### A. Status of the extension or renewal of mandates

6. The mandates of the majority of the special political missions included in the present report have been renewed or extended into 2015, and requests for the

extension or renewal of the mandates of the remaining missions are before, or are anticipated to be renewed by, the General Assembly or the Security Council.

7. Information on the status of the mandates of the 35 missions whose requirements are included in the present report is provided below:

(a) Twelve missions have open-ended mandates. They are: the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus; the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide; the Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara; the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004); the United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions; the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan; the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen; the United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA); the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon; the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel; the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region; and the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria;

(b) Nineteen missions have mandates expiring in 2015 or later. They are: the Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire; the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo; the Panel of Experts on the Sudan; the Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea; the Panel of Experts on the Islamic Republic of Iran; the Panel of Experts on Libya; the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1526 (2004) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities; the Panel of Experts on Yemen; the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic; the support to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction; the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate; the United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA); UNSMIL; United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC); the United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA); the United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM); the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI); the United Nations Electoral Observer Mission in Burundi (MENUB); and UNAMA;

(c) Three missions have mandates expiring in 2014. They are: the Panel of Experts on Liberia; the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea; and the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS);

(d) The mandate for one mission, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Myanmar, is open-ended and is under consideration by the General Assembly.

8. The budget proposals for 2015 for the missions whose mandates expire in 2014, with the exception of BNUB, whose mandate will end on 31 December 2014 in accordance with Security Council resolution 2137 (2014), are included in the present report on the assumption that the General Assembly or the Security Council will extend their mandates into 2015 on the basis of reports and requests already submitted or to be submitted to them.

## **B. Missions established, completed or discontinued in 2014**

9. Two missions, namely, the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic and the Panel of Experts for Yemen, are new missions established in late 2013 and in 2014.

10. The Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic was established by the Security Council in its resolution 2127 (2013), dated 5 December 2013, and the mandate of the Panel was further expanded by the Council in its resolution 2134 (2014), dated 28 January 2014. On 9 April 2014, the General Assembly, by its resolution 68/247 B, approved the budget for the period from 1 January to 31 December 2014 for the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic.

11. The Panel of Experts for Yemen was established by the Security Council in its resolution 2140 (2014), dated 26 February 2014. The General Assembly, by its resolution 68/280, adopted on 30 June 2014, approved the budget for a nine-month period in 2014 for the Panel of Experts for Yemen.

12. Four missions have completed, or will be completing, their operations in 2014. They are UNIPSIL, BINUCA, BNUB and the OPCW-United Nations Joint Mission.

13. On 31 March 2014, UNIPSIL successfully concluded its mandate on peace and security as anticipated in Security Council resolution 2097 (2013), closing a chapter on the engagement of the Organization in Sierra Leone and signalling important progress in the transition of that country. The successful exit of UNIPSIL marks the end of 15 years of United Nations peacekeeping and political presences in the wake of the civil war in Sierra Leone. Given the significant progress made by the country in its peace consolidation and transition process, the Security Council decided that the political mission should give way to a regular United Nations country team presence, which would provide a different kind of assistance to the country going forward.

14. On 10 April 2014, in view of the deterioration of the security situation in the Central African Republic, the Security Council adopted its resolution 2149 (2014), authorizing the deployment of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in the country, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). This marked the end of the mandate of BINUCA, which was subsumed under MINUSCA. BINUCA and its predecessor, the United Nations Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African Republic, had supported peacebuilding efforts in the Central African Republic since 2000.

15. In its resolution 2137 (2014), dated 13 February 2014, the Security Council extended the mandate of the United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB) until 31 December 2014, requesting the mission to complete the transfer of appropriate responsibilities to the United Nations country team by that date. In the same resolution, the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to establish a United Nations electoral observer mission immediately following the end of the BNUB mandate. The United Nations Electoral Observer Mission in Burundi (MENUB) would be fully operational on 1 January 2015.

16. With respect to the OPCW-United Nations Joint Mission, the budget for 2014 was approved by the General Assembly for the period from 1 January to 30 June 2014 (see [A/68/327/Add.8](#) and Corr.1; [A/68/7/Add.18](#) and Corr.1; and General Assembly resolution 68/247 A). While the Joint Mission achieved progress in the

implementation of its mandate up to 30 June 2014, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council on 23 May 2014 ([S/2014/368](#)) that the Joint Mission would continue its work for a finite period of time beyond 30 June 2014 to allow sufficient time for the completion of residual activities, including the establishment of appropriate arrangements for OPCW to continue verification activities in the Syrian Arab Republic. The Joint Mission ceased operations at the end of September 2014, to be followed by a one-month administrative liquidation process. Before completion of operations, the Joint Mission ensured the return and/or disposal of assets which were no longer needed to support the remaining activities and assisted in putting in place appropriate successor arrangements to enable OPCW to continue any in-country activities beyond 30 September 2014. To provide for the continuation of the core mandated tasks in support of the remaining verification activities for the additional period, the Secretary-General sought additional funding in the amount of \$3.3 million, which was subsequently revised to \$1.7 million, as a commitment authority under the terms of General Assembly resolution 68/249, with the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions. The Committee approved a commitment authority in the amount of \$1,701,300.

### **C. Organization of the reports on the budgets of special political missions**

17. As in the past, the budget proposals for special political missions for 2015 are organized in thematic clusters, while the budgets for larger missions, namely, UNAMA and UNAMI, are presented in separate addenda to the present report:

- (a) Thematic cluster I: special and personal envoys and special advisers of the Secretary-General ([A/69/363/Add.1](#));
- (b) Thematic cluster II: sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels ([A/69/363/Add.2](#));
- (c) Thematic cluster III: political offices, peacebuilding support offices and integrated offices ([A/69/363/Add.3](#));
- (d) UNAMA ([A/69/363/Add.4](#));
- (e) UNAMI ([A/69/363/Add.5](#)).

18. In line with the comments and suggestions of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions, efforts continue to be made to adapt and follow as closely as is practical the format and presentation of budgets for peacekeeping operations.

### **D. Performance information for 2014**

19. In accordance with the recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions ([A/65/602](#), para. 14), which was endorsed by the General Assembly in resolution 65/259 (sect. XIII, para. 2), efforts continue to be made to formulate the indicators of achievement in a manner that facilitates the measurement of performance and allows for better assessment of progress in the

achievement of expected accomplishments. That includes incorporating information on the programme performance of special political missions into budget proposals.

## **E. Operational environment, including cooperation and synergies and the level of collaboration with and between missions, the United Nations country team and United Nations Headquarters**

### **1. Operational environment**

20. Special political missions continue to play a critical role in the overall efforts of the United Nations to prevent and resolve conflicts and to build a sustainable peace. The following areas cover some of the recent trends in special political missions.

#### **Complex and increasing number of mandates**

21. As of October 2014, there are 35 special political missions under way, categorized in three main “clusters”. Cluster I refers to special and personal envoys and special advisers of and to the Secretary-General mandated to carry out good offices and mediation functions. There are currently 11 such missions. Cluster II refers to sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels, of which there are currently 13. Five of them are based in New York and one in Nairobi, while seven are home-based. Cluster III refers to field-based political offices, peacebuilding support offices and integrated offices. As of October 2014, there are 11 such missions deployed around the world, with varying structures and functions. Seven of those missions are based in Africa (UNOWA, UNIOGBIS, UNSOM, CNMC, BNUB, UNOCA and UNSMIL), two in the Middle East (UNSCOL and UNAMI) and two in Asia (UNRCCA and UNAMA). Their sizes vary from small missions, such as CNMC, and regional offices, such as UNOCA, to larger assistance missions deployed to countries where international military assistance is provided/present, such as UNAMI, UNAMA and UNSOM.

22. A field-based special political mission in place as of September 2014 has an average duration of slightly less than six years. Some of the existing missions, however, were established following other special political missions, subsequent to a change in mandates. The longest-serving field-based special political mission was the United Nations Political Office for Somalia, created in 1995 and replaced on 3 June 2013 by UNSOM. Of the 35 current missions, listed in table 6, 33 are mandated by the Security Council and 2 are mandated by the General Assembly.

23. The number of special political missions has grown over the past two decades. In 1993, there were only three political missions in the field. That number increased to 12 in 2000 and reached 14 in 2014. This growth took place notwithstanding the fact that over half of the country-specific special political missions deployed since 1993 have already been liquidated. The number of special political missions in clusters I and II has increased from 2 in 2000 to 24 in 2014.

24. The increase in the overall number of special political missions is only part of the story. Individually, the mandates of those missions have become significantly more complex than at the outset, when they were entrusted primarily with reporting and monitoring tasks. Especially over the past decade, field-based special political missions have become manifestly multidimensional operations, in line with an

expanding normative agenda, combining political tasks with a broader set of mandates in areas such as human rights, rule of law and security institutions, sexual violence in conflict and child recruitment.

25. One area in which the normative agenda of special political missions has increased significantly is the role of women in peace and security, particularly since the adoption of Security Council resolution 1325 (2000). Special political missions have been particularly involved in efforts to promote women's participation in conflict resolution and peace processes and to incorporate a gender perspective into their overall peacebuilding work.

26. Whereas a field-based mission in 1995 had an average of 2 mandate areas, that number had increased to 3.5 by 2000 and to roughly 6 by 2014. Different thematic mandates have become more prevalent over time. For example, the percentage of field-based missions with mandates in the areas of security sector reform and the rule of law has increased from none in 1995 to 30 per cent in 2000 to 60 per cent at present. Human rights mandates have followed a similar trend: 28 per cent of field-based special political missions had mandates related to human rights in 1995, 38 per cent in 2000 and 60 per cent at present.

27. The emergence of new threats to the maintenance of international peace and security and their regional implications have increased the importance of regional offices, such as UNOCA, UNOWA and UNRCCA, as well as those special political missions dealing with thematic and cross-cutting issues, such as the Special Envoys for the Sahel and the Great Lakes Region and the Special Adviser on the Prevention of Genocide.

28. The escalation in terrorist activities, illicit drug trafficking, transnational organized crime and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in West Africa, as well as increasing maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea, led to significant demands by the Security Council for UNOWA to do more on these issues. The Ebola outbreak is also affecting the capacity of UNOWA to carry out its work, especially in the Mano River countries. This includes activities in support of the implementation of the strategy for cross-border security in the Mano River Union, which was adopted by the States members of the Mano River Union in October 2013, pursuant to Security Council resolutions 2000 (2011), 2062 (2012) and 2066 (2012). The Security Council has also requested more political analysis from UNOWA to better inform good offices efforts and support timely preventive action.

29. The mandate of UNOCA has been progressively expanded since its establishment in 2011, as a result of regional developments (the regional impact of the crisis in the Central African Republic, the role of UNOCA in support of the mediation of the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) on the Central African Republic, maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea and the increased activities of armed groups in Central Africa, including Boko Haram), as well as resolutions adopted and decisions taken by the Security Council regarding the Lord's Resistance Army (see, for example, [S/PRST/2013/18](#) and [S/PRST/2014/8](#)), maritime insecurity in the Gulf of Guinea (resolutions 2018 (2011) and 2039 (2012) and [S/PRST/2013/13](#)) and poaching and the illicit trafficking of wildlife ([S/PRST/2013/18](#)).

30. Since its establishment in 2007, UNRCCA has supported the countries of Central Asia in their efforts to prevent conflict and resolve long-standing tensions



through regional cooperation. In 2010, the Centre was instrumental in the response of the United Nations to the unrest and outbreak of inter-ethnic violence in the south of Kyrgyzstan, working closely with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the European Union to enable the international community to speak with a single voice. More recently, the Centre has been working more and more closely with the World Bank and other stakeholders to address tensions related to water and energy management in the region. In addition, as the drawdown of international forces from Afghanistan nears completion, the Centre is increasingly supporting the efforts of the Central Asian countries to engage with Afghanistan on shared security challenges, such as extremism, terrorism and organized crime, including drug trafficking, as well as on the development needs of Afghanistan, including through the promotion of regional trade. At the same time, the Centre continues to encourage Central Asian leaders to address deep-rooted issues at home, including human rights infringements, corruption and governance issues, so as to help make those States more resilient to any disturbances that might emanate from beyond their borders. The budget of the Centre covers mostly staff and operational costs, and a significant proportion of its programmatic activities are funded through extrabudgetary resources.

31. The complexity of the mandates of some special political missions has also increased owing to the effects of regional spillover. For instance, in 2014 the operational environment of UNSCOL continued to be affected by the regional context, primarily the ongoing impact of the spillover from the conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic and evolving political and security conditions in the mission area, and it is expected that those conditions will persist in 2015. UNSCOL was called upon to deliver its complex mandate in implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) amid increasingly challenging security, political, humanitarian and socioeconomic conditions. These include a heightened level of terrorist threat, a protracted political crisis and the humanitarian and socioeconomic challenge presented by the largest refugee population per capita in the world. The security context in Lebanon is volatile, and maintaining the mission's level of security personnel remains essential for its operational capability and security.

32. In addition, special political missions have become more complex in terms of their structure. Some of them are deployed not only to capital cities, but also to other key locations in-country to facilitate liaison with a broader spectrum of the population. A number of missions work increasingly with seconded military and police personnel providing strategic and technical advice in their areas of expertise, or in partnership with non-United Nations military actors on the ground. In Somalia, United Nations civilian police advisers support the development of the Somalia Police Force through strategic advice and training in close cooperation with the police component of the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The United Nations civilian police advisers are deployed in the capital and in some of the regional offices of UNSOM. Government-provided military officers also support the reform of the security sector and the development of the Somali National Army. Special political missions are more operational at the country level, implementing projects in support of national peacebuilding priorities, and have begun to benefit from the ability to receive support directly from the Peacebuilding Fund. Peacebuilding is essentially a political exercise. Working in tandem with special political missions and national partners, funding from the Peacebuilding Fund has played a critical role in accompanying and strengthening a number of political processes during critical

periods. In 2013, 12 countries that either had special political missions present or were covered by a special political mission (e.g., UNOWA or UNRCCA) received funding from the Peacebuilding Fund.

### **Delivering mandates in a volatile security environment**

33. In 2014, there was a deterioration in the security situation in several countries in which special political missions operate, which created greater risks for United Nations personnel and assets and posed significant obstacles for the implementation of mandates. Special political missions have been called upon to deliver complex mandates in situations of active conflicts or in contexts which are barely post-conflict. Volatile security environments hinder the ability of the Organization to interact with national stakeholders, both government and civil society, in particular in more remote areas away from urban centres. Other areas of mandate implementation, such as humanitarian assistance, disarmament and demobilization or electoral assistance, may also be affected.

34. In Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic and Yemen, political missions are operating in areas with fragile security environments. The evolving political and security situation in Iraq had an impact on UNAMI in 2014 and is likely to remain unpredictable and fluid throughout 2015. The already precarious security situation has significantly deteriorated since early June 2014, when terrorists and associated armed groups took control of large parts of the western, north-western and north-central provinces of Iraq. The security situation also led to the temporary relocation/evacuation of designated international staff from the Baghdad office of UNAMI to Erbil in northern Iraq and to Jordan and Kuwait, approved by the Department of Safety and Security with effect from 15 June 2014. Only critical staff remained in Baghdad, which, combined with movement restrictions, has had a considerable impact on operations, mandate delivery capabilities and the safety and security of staff members. A significantly increased threat of terrorism and armed conflict, along with the spillover from the continuing conflict in the Syrian Arab Republic, will continue to affect ethno-sectarian relations and security in Iraq. Continued tensions between Baghdad and Erbil have also had an impact on UNAMI operations, including a 12-day suspension of cargo flights from Baghdad into Erbil in July 2014, which affected humanitarian deliveries.

35. In Libya on 7 July 2014, UNSMIL temporarily relocated its international staff members present in the mission area. Of the 113 non-security international staff, 69 were requested to leave the mission area. Then, on 13 July 2014, prompted by fighting in and around the Janzour area where the UNSMIL premises are located and by the further deterioration of the security situation throughout Tripoli, UNSMIL, in coordination with United Nations Headquarters, took the decision to evacuate almost all remaining internationally recruited staff members from Libya. On 13 and 14 July 2014, those staff members were evacuated by road to Tunisia. The staff relocated to Tunisia or Brindisi continued to carry out their responsibilities in order to enable the Mission to continue its work to the greatest possible extent.

36. In order to cope with those environments that are less conducive to United Nations operational work, the Organization has developed a menu of security options to minimize security risks while enabling missions to implement their mandates. This may include cooperation with existing international or regionally led military operations in a country where special political missions are deployed, the

deployment of United Nations security officers to support security for mission premises and personnel, and enhanced cooperation with host Governments.

37. One of the options that has been explored in recent years is the deployment of guard units. A guard unit is a force composed of police or military personnel, or other State security forces, provided as contingents by one or more Member States and deployed with the authorization of the Security Council or the General Assembly to protect United Nations personnel, premises and assets in field missions operating in non-conductive environments. For example, UNAMI has had a guard unit since 2004. In 2013, three new guard units were authorized through an exchange of letters between the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council for BINUCA ([S/2013/636](#) and [S/2013/637](#)) on 29 October 2013, UNSMIL ([S/2013/704](#) and [S/2013/705](#)) on 27 November 2013 and UNSOM ([S/2013/764](#) and [S/2013/765](#)) on 24 December 2013. In the case of UNSMIL, the deployment of a United Nations guard unit proved to be unfeasible in the political and security circumstances in the country. The Secretary-General, by his request to the General Assembly for additional resources in 2014 ([A/68/327/Add.12](#)), therefore proposed to strengthen and restructure the Security Section of UNSMIL to increase its ability to provide security for the mission and its staff. An exercise in lessons learned will be undertaken by the Departments of Safety and Security, Political Affairs and Peacekeeping Operations with the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and relevant operational agencies by mid-2015 to review the use of guard units, including the command and control structure.

## **2. Support to special political missions on mediation, good offices, elections and counter-terrorism**

38. Given their relatively lean structure and light footprint, special political missions often have to rely on support from Headquarters in specific thematic areas, from the rule of law and constitution-making to electoral assistance. One of the key areas in which special political missions have required particular support in recent years is mediation and good offices.

39. Over the past few years, the United Nations has enhanced its operational readiness to implement and support mediation efforts. The Mediation Support Unit of the Department of Political Affairs complements expertise available elsewhere in the United Nations system and serves as the central hub for mediation support within the United Nations system, capable of assisting the peace efforts of the United Nations, Member States, regional organizations and others.

40. An important asset in the rapid response capability of the Organization is the standby team of mediation experts. These experts, who can be deployed within 72 hours, are specialists in mediation process design, constitution-making, gender and inclusion issues, the sharing of natural resources, power-sharing and security arrangements. The Department of Political Affairs has also maintained rosters of pre-vetted thematic, operational and senior mediation experts, with geographical and gender representation, who can be deployed for longer-term engagements to support mediation processes. Knowledge products, such as induction guidance, good practices and technical papers, have also been systematically prepared and shared with mediators. Finally, mediation training for both senior mediators and working-level staff, with a special focus on women mediators and a high-level

series of seminars on gender and inclusive mediation, have been important areas of work.

41. Given their role in conflict prevention and peacemaking, special political missions are one of the main beneficiaries of such structures in addition to peacekeeping missions. Special envoys supporting complex mediation processes have frequently relied on expertise from the Department of Political Affairs on a wide range of mediation activities. In Yemen, standby team experts assisted through the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General in the design and conduct of the National Dialogue Conference which was concluded successfully in January 2014. In addition to the support provided to the national dialogue process, the standby team and other United Nations experts are supporting the Office of the Special Adviser in advising the committee which is drafting the constitution and its secretariat. In other cases, special political missions facilitating constitutional processes have also benefited from such expertise. Several standby team experts have been advising UNSMIL, and through it the Libyan Constitutional Drafting Assembly, on international best practices in constitution-making. In Somalia, a standby expert has been working closely with UNSOM to provide advice to the Speaker of the parliament and officials within the Federal Government of Somalia on how to move the constitutional review process forward.

42. Given that the Organization, including through its missions in the field, is often called upon to provide electoral assistance in fragile or unstable environments, such as political transition and post-conflict settings, special political missions have placed greater focus on preventing election-related instability and violence, urging more consultative approaches that will enhance confidence in the electoral process and mitigate the risk of conflict. All United Nations electoral assistance activities are provided in an integrated manner, regardless of whether the United Nations mission on the ground is an integrated mission; this means that all United Nations entities offering electoral assistance report to one United Nations Chief Electoral Officer, who is responsible for coordinating and providing coherent United Nations electoral assistance, to avoid duplication of effort. The United Nations sees electoral processes as part of a political process and therefore tries to ensure that both the electoral assistance side and the political work of the United Nations work in tandem.

43. As most of the special political missions are regularly confronted with issues related to counter-terrorism, efforts have been made to ensure closer coordination with the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre in the Department of Political Affairs. In September 2013, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force Office and UNRCCA began jointly implementing a three-year project entitled "Towards a comprehensive implementation of the joint plan of action under the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy in Central Asia". The project aims to conduct a number of capacity-building workshops for all five Central Asian Member States to assist in the implementation of the joint plan of action, a regional counter-terrorism strategy modelled on the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy.

44. The Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force Office maintains an ongoing dialogue with the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel and UNOWA in the context of their role in the implementation of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel. The Task Force Office and

UNOWA exchange relevant information, hold consultations on the security situation in West Africa and cooperate on counter-terrorism capacity-building assistance initiatives, especially in Nigeria in the framework of the Integrated Assistance for Countering Terrorism initiative, which assists interested Member States with the integrated implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy. They also ensure effective coordination and information-sharing among United Nations entities in the region.

45. The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre is working with UNOCA and other United Nations entities, such as the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, on a project aimed at facilitating the implementation of commitments undertaken by States in Central Africa on the development and implementation of a road map for counter-terrorism and non-proliferation of arms in the region by strengthening relevant customs, police and economic and social cooperation mechanisms at the national, subregional and international levels. The project is intended to culminate in the development of an integrated counter-terrorism and small arms strategy for Central Africa, which will allow the States concerned to work towards the implementation of the road map, while also fulfilling the relevant legal and administrative obligations referred to in the Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and Security Council resolutions 1373 (2001), 1624 (2005) and 1963 (2010).

46. In addition, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1526 (2004) are core entities of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, which collaborate through the respective Task Force working groups in the provision of counter-terrorism assistance to Member States.

### **3. Knowledge management in support of special political missions**

47. As an increasing number of missions conclude their mandates or new missions are deployed, the ability of the Organization to take stock of existing experiences, create inventories of successful policies and best practices and disseminate them across the range of special political missions becomes even more important. Over the past few years, the United Nations has been undertaking concerted efforts to strengthen its knowledge management and lessons-learned capacities and apply them to the work of its special political missions. In that process, the Organization seeks to learn from its failures as well as its successes. While the experience of each special political mission is highly context-specific, awareness of existing practices, policies and successful strategies can greatly contribute to the effectiveness of a mission in implementing its mandate.

48. There are now more opportunities for the exchange of experiences and good practices among the leadership of missions and personnel from specialized areas. In March 2014, special representatives — heads of both special political missions and peacekeeping operations — met for an annual retreat, where they shared views on some key challenges they faced on the ground, from security and resourcing to mediation and conflict prevention. In the same month, the heads of the political affairs components of field-based special political missions met on an annual retreat to exchange experiences on the key substantive and operational issues faced in the discharge of the mandates of their missions. The workshop held by the joint mission analysis centres in May 2014 afforded information analyst officers and chiefs of the analysis centres from special political missions and peacekeeping missions the

opportunity to share good practices and lessons learned. A dedicated workshop for chiefs of staff of special political missions is also being planned.

49. The Organization has also focused on the preparation of guidance materials in key thematic areas, such as crisis management, integrated assessment and planning, and on mission concepts. Those system-wide and interdepartmental products have been accompanied by implementation strategies to ensure that guidance is implemented and promoted both at Headquarters and in the field. In addition, the Organization is undertaking several studies on subjects such as the benchmarks mandated by the Security Council in the context of mission transitions and an independent review of the United Nations programme criticality framework — a systematic approach to determining the criticality of all activities carried out by United Nations personnel and establishing the maximum acceptable risk for staff working on different activities.

50. Mission-specific activities relating to lessons learned and other analytical studies have been an important component of the ability of the Organization to capture successful experiences. In 2014, the Department of Political Affairs undertook a lessons-learned study on the transition from UNIPSIL to the United Nations country team at the end of the UNIPSIL mandate on 31 March 2014. In May 2013, the Departments of Political Affairs, Peacekeeping Operations and Field Support produced a joint evaluation of the start-up of UNSMIL in order to identify the challenges faced by the mission during its first months of operations and explore opportunities to better support the start-up of special political missions. A study jointly commissioned in 2013 by the Departments of Political Affairs and Peacekeeping Operations and the United Nations Development Programme on integrated electoral assistance in United Nations mission settings provided recommendations on how to improve United Nations assistance and national electoral processes in countries on the agenda of the Security Council.

#### **4. Partnerships and cooperation**

51. Partnerships have taken a number of different forms and covered various areas, reflecting the growing diversity and complexity of cooperation between the United Nations and regional actors.

52. Regionally mandated envoys, for example, have, by the nature of their mandate, a close relationship with regional actors in the areas in which they operate. In particular, given their focus on addressing cross-boundary issues and challenges, their cooperation with regional actors is critical in many cases. For example, the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region has developed a strong partnership with the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the Southern African Development Community, the African Union and other regional actors. Similarly, the Special Envoy for the Sahel works closely with a wide range of regional and subregional actors to coordinate the different regional and international initiatives for the Sahel, including the African Union, the Arab Maghreb Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), ECCAS, the African Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the European Union and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation.

53. Regional offices have also made strong efforts to work closely with regional or subregional organizations in their areas of operation. For example, UNRCCA holds regular annual or biannual consultations in the area of preventive diplomacy with

regional organizations, notably the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, OSCE and the European Union.

54. UNRCCA has intensified its cooperation with the World Bank in the context of the preparation of feasibility studies, led by the World Bank, on the Rogun hydropower station in Tajikistan. The initial drafts of the studies were released on 17 June 2014 and, following a riparian consultation meeting in Almaty, Kazakhstan, in July 2014, the final reports were published on 1 September 2014. The Centre offered political support to the World Bank throughout the preparation of the feasibility studies, and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the Centre and staff of the Centre regularly participate in meetings of partners, convened by the World Bank, which include the Russian Federation, the United States of America and the European Union. The goal of those meetings has been to share information, discuss options and forge a common position among key actors of the international community on issues related to transboundary water management in Central Asia and on the Rogun project in particular. For its part, the World Bank supports the legal framework proposed by UNRCCA for transboundary water management in the Aral Sea basin, including by contributing financially to the organization of a workshop on the proposal, held at the United Nations Office at Vienna in March 2014. UNRCCA is currently working to build support among the countries of the region for continuing riparian consultations at the level of Deputy Prime Minister in an effort to build on the results of the meeting in July 2014.

55. In some instances, cooperation with regional actors is a crucial part of the mandates of special political missions. The United Nations Office in West Africa is mandated to enhance subregional capacities for conflict prevention, conflict management, mediation and good offices, including providing support to existing subregional mechanisms, in particular the ECOWAS conflict prevention framework and its mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution, peacekeeping and security. Similarly, UNOCA is mandated to cooperate with ECCAS, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, the Economic Community of the Great Lakes Countries and other key partners in the region, providing assistance to their efforts to promote peace and stability in the broader Central Africa subregion. Both UNOWA and UNOCA have worked with regional partners, such as ECOWAS, ECCAS and the Commission of the Gulf of Guinea, to prepare a regional anti-piracy strategy for the Gulf of Guinea.

56. The Special Envoy for the Sahel co-chairs, along with the African Union Mission for Mali and the Sahel in Bamako, the technical secretariat for the ministerial coordination platform for the Sahel. The secretariat is instrumental in ensuring effective support for the fulfilment of the objectives set forth by the members of the coordination platform and the agenda of work defined by the incumbent chairmanship of the platform. In this capacity, the Office of the Special Envoy works closely with the African Union and the other members of the technical secretariat, which include the World Bank, the African Development Bank, the Islamic Development Bank, the European Union, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and all subregional organizations. The Special Envoy for the Sahel has held working meetings with the African Union, the European Union, the World Bank and ECOWAS to define the operational modalities of collaboration and to strengthen the capacity of the technical secretariat to provide effective and timely support for the coordination platform.

57. In 2014, UNOCA collaborated with ECCAS in the organization of a series of workshops and meetings related to gender, elections, mediation, border delimitation and demarcation, counter-terrorism and the proliferation of small arms. UNOCA also supported the efforts of ECCAS, the Commission of the Gulf of Guinea and ECOWAS, in collaboration with UNOWA, in the holding of a series of meetings of the interregional working group, in May and June 2014, to operationalize the Interregional Coordination Centre on maritime safety and security in the Gulf of Guinea. UNOCA has also continued to work in partnership with the African Union to address the threat posed by the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) to the implementation of the United Nations strategy on the LRA and in support of the African Union regional cooperation initiative for the elimination of the LRA. UNOCA has played a key role in coordinating the efforts of multilateral and bilateral partners, such as the European Union, the United States and non-governmental organizations, in relation to LRA. Since July 2014, UNOCA has supported the ongoing ECCAS mediation on the crisis in the Central African Republic.

58. UNOWA has continued to work in close cooperation with the African Union, ECOWAS, the Mano River Union, the States members of the West Africa Coast Initiative, the Commission of the Gulf of Guinea and, to a lesser extent, the West African Economic and Monetary Union. Cooperation with its main regional partner, ECOWAS, in the areas of peace and security, governance, mediation and good offices, civil society, human rights and gender has expanded over the years. That partnership covers multiple areas, notably with a bridge already existing between the ECOWAS network of women for peace and the regional working group on women and peace and security, where UNOWA has a leading role. Several regional conferences on elections, impunity, human rights and justice in West Africa have been organized. Moreover, UNOWA, together with the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, contributed to the ECOWAS meeting of the interministerial drug coordinating committees held in January 2014 in Cotonou, Benin, where a draft regional action plan covering the period from 2015 to 2020 was formulated. In accordance with its mandate, UNOWA has continued to support capacity-building for ECOWAS.

59. With regard to regional security, UNOWA works closely with UNOCA and ECOWAS to implement Security Council resolutions 2018 (2011) and 2039 (2012) on the threat of piracy in the Gulf of Guinea and has supported ECOWAS in finalizing its integrated maritime strategy. UNOWA has also continued to follow closely the progress towards the establishment of the ECOWAS standby force and participated in meetings of the ECOWAS Committee of Chiefs of Defence Staff. Furthermore, it regularly conducts early warning missions jointly with ECOWAS and is currently supporting the ECOWAS electoral commission network on providing support to countries through the deployment of teams during the pre- and post-electoral period. With regard to building the capacity of ECOWAS in the field of mediation, UNOWA is also engaged in providing technical support for the establishment of a mediation facilitation division at ECOWAS.

60. UNOWA support for the Mano River Union facilitated the timely adoption of, and efforts for, the operationalization of the strategy for cross-border security in December 2013. The mission continues to work closely with the African Union on counter-terrorism and the prevention of radicalization and capacity-building for national institutions. It also regularly attends the meetings of the Nouakchott Process, led by the African Union. The Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of UNOWA has continued to chair the policy committee of the West Africa



Coast Initiative on combating drug trafficking and organized crime in West Africa. Regular meetings take place with the authorities of the participating countries, and a donor meeting was organized on 22 May 2014 in New York to mobilize international support for the Initiative, in particular its transnational crime units.

61. UNOWA has continued to organize regular coordination and consultative meetings with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes based in Dakar, aimed at sharing information and strengthening cooperation, including on political developments in the region, in particular the progress made in Guinea and Guinea-Bissau, and on the implementation plan for the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel. It also organized the twenty-sixth regular meeting of heads of peace missions in West Africa in Dakar on 9 May 2014.

62. Envoys with thematic mandates have also increased their partnership with regional organizations. For example, the Special Advisers on the Prevention of Genocide and on the Responsibility to Protect work closely with Member States and a range of regional and subregional organizations to raise awareness of the causes of, and precursors to, genocide, war crimes and ethnic cleansing and the measures that can be taken to prevent or halt those crimes. The two Special Advisers also provide technical assistance and specialized training to strengthen prevention and response capacity, working in cooperation both with regional organizations, such as the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region, and with networks of Member States, such as the Latin American Network for Genocide and Mass Atrocity Prevention.

63. Furthermore, country-specific special political missions have developed strong partnerships with key regional actors. In Somalia, the United Nations has worked side by side with its regional partners, including the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development and the European Union, in addition to the logistical support provided by the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia to AMISOM. UNSOM and the United Nations Office to the African Union supported the African Union in the development of a revised concept of operations for AMISOM in January 2014, and they are working closely together on its implementation. In particular, UNSOM and AMISOM have established a joint working group on the implementation of the United Nations human rights due diligence policy.

64. In Guinea-Bissau, UNIOGBIS has enhanced its partnership with ECOWAS, which has led the regional support for the restoration of constitutional order in the country, and with the African Union, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries and the European Union. UNAMA has been closely involved in the development of the Istanbul Process on Regional Security and Cooperation for a Secure and Stable Afghanistan, which includes as one of its key elements drawing together the regional organizations operating in the 14 countries of the “heart of Asia” region to develop synergistic and coherent activities, specifically in the areas of security, economic development, trade, disaster management and counter-narcotics. UNAMA also maintains close ties with UNRCCA to coordinate efforts as required.

65. Similarly, the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Myanmar has regular engagement and consultations with interested Member States, including countries of the region and neighbouring States, to develop common approaches to addressing the continuing progress on democratization, national reconciliation and development in Myanmar.

66. In Burundi, where the mandate of BNUB ends on 31 December 2014, the mission has been engaging the African Union, the European Union, the East African Community and the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region to ensure that the facilitation of political dialogue and high-level advocacy continues after its departure.

67. A high degree of coordination exists between UNSCOL and the World Bank through various initiatives aimed at supporting Lebanese efforts to host and assist the Syrian refugee population and mitigating the impact of the refugee crisis on the host communities and infrastructure in Lebanon. That coordination has informed the establishment by the Secretary-General of the International Support Group for Lebanon, with the participation of the World Bank, and the development within that framework of the Lebanese National Stabilization Framework and the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Lebanon.

**5. Coordination and cooperation among the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Department of Field Support**

68. As recommended by the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in paragraph 34 of its report on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council ([A/68/7/Add.10](#) and Corr.1) and previous reports endorsed in General Assembly resolutions, further efforts have been made to improve the cooperation and coordination among the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Field Support and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations at Headquarters and in the field.

69. As a global service provider in the United Nations system on electoral assistance, mediation, political analysis and counter-terrorism, the Department of Political Affairs has strengthened its capacity to provide those professional services in a timely manner. In 2014, the Electoral Assistance Division in the Department of Political Affairs, which supports the United Nations focal point for electoral assistance, provided support for United Nations electoral assistance activities in 60 countries, 8 of which have United Nations peacekeeping operations and 7 of which have special political missions. In 2013, a standby team of mediation experts of the Department of Political Affairs was deployed to over 50 countries, 6 of which have United Nations peacekeeping operations. In 2013, political officers of the Department of Political Affairs provided political analysis and support for technical assessments and related tasks in at least five peacekeeping operations. At the senior management level, the three Departments participate in weekly sessions organized by the Secretary-General or the Deputy Secretary-General for policy discussions on the situation in countries with special political missions and/or peacekeeping operations.

70. In the field, special political missions and peacekeeping operations have increased their cooperation. For example, the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region has worked closely with the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) towards the implementation of the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the Region. Similarly, the Special Envoy for the Sahel has collaborated with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali in the context of the United Nations integrated strategy for the Sahel.

71. The Department of Political Affairs has established 11 integrated task forces, which ensure close coordination on political issues with the Departments of Peacekeeping Operations, Field Support and Safety and Security and with United Nations agencies, funds and programmes on issues related to special political missions. Between 1 January and 31 July 2014, over 60 meetings of integrated task forces for United Nations country presences with a special political mission were held, covering Afghanistan, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the Syrian Arab Republic, the State of Palestine and the Great Lakes region.

72. The Departments of Political Affairs and Peacekeeping Operations have systematically developed joint guidance and policies applicable to both special political missions and peacekeeping operations. In 2013 and 2014, six guidance and policy notes were jointly prepared on issues such as mission concept, coordination with the European Union during the planning of missions, integrated assessment and planning and transitions. There is also close cooperation among the three departments in addressing crisis situations. For instance, in August 2014 they took part in a common crisis cell to respond to the outbreak of Ebola virus disease in West Africa. Joint cables from the three departments are regularly sent to all special political missions and peacekeeping operations on policy and administrative issues of concern to field operations. The three departments also offer joint training and lessons-learned exercises and undertake joint studies and evaluations on issues of mutual interest.

73. Special political missions continue to rely on the support provided by the Office of Rule of Law and Security Institutions of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, especially in areas in which special political missions are often mandated to work, such as the rule of law, judiciary reform and security sector reform. Special political missions also rely on the expertise of the Office of Military Affairs of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations regarding the deployment of military advisers and United Nations guard units.

74. In December 2013, the Policy Committee of the Secretary-General adopted a decision to transfer the lead responsibility for UNAMA from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to the Department of Political Affairs in 2014. The two departments agreed on a transfer date of 1 October 2014. To ensure a smooth transfer, in August 2013 the Department of Political Affairs seconded one staff member to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations on a part-time basis. The staff member was also deployed to UNAMA on several occasions in order to become familiar with its operations. As at 1 October 2014, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations has lent three staff members to the Department of Political Affairs from its now-disbanded Afghanistan integrated operational team through 30 June 2015, as part of the Afghanistan team. To ensure that the same level of support is provided to UNAMA as that provided by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, the Department of Political Affairs has recruited a Transition Team Leader at the D-1 level, funded through extrabudgetary resources, to head the team through the same period. In meetings with Member States on the sidelines of the general debate of the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly, it was emphasized that the transfer is an internal management matter with no impact on UNAMA operations. Support to UNAMA on electoral matters through a mission-funded desk officer position in the Electoral Assistance Division of the Department of Political Affairs has continued uninterrupted. Since the decision to transfer

UNAMA to the Department of Political Affairs, the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, in consultation with the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, has visited Afghanistan twice.

75. The Executive Office of the Department of Political Affairs provides administrative support to 14 of the missions under thematic clusters I and II, 17 special political missions receive administrative support from the Department of Field Support, 2 special political missions receive administrative support from both departments and the Office of Disarmament Affairs and the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate each provide administrative support to 1 special political mission. To ensure a clear understanding of the responsibilities of the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Field Support in supporting special political missions, a revised service level agreement has been signed by the heads of the two departments.

76. Over the past few years, the United Nations has faced significant challenges in its peace and security engagements. United Nations missions and envoys are dealing with rapidly evolving conflicts, fragile or non-existent political frameworks and volatile security environments. The number of United Nations missions on the ground — peacekeeping operations and special political missions — is higher than ever. Their mandates have expanded and become significantly more complex. In the current financial climate, resources are stretched further than before.

77. In view of this rapidly evolving context, the Secretary-General has decided to initiate a review of United Nations peace operations. The review will cover not only peacekeeping but also special political missions, which are grappling with some of the same challenges, while facing others that are unique to their context. The review will be an opportunity to reflect on how the United Nations can better respond to the various challenges it faces around the world and how the different mechanisms of the Organization in the area of peace and security can be strengthened. The independent panel that will be appointed to carry out the review is expected to deliver its report by April 2015.

## **F. Reporting requirements related to special political missions emanating from the General Assembly or from the recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions**

### **1. Extrabudgetary resources**

78. In accordance with the recommendation of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (see [A/65/602](#)), which was reaffirmed by the General Assembly in its resolution 65/259, that the level of extrabudgetary resources provided to special political missions be fully disclosed so as to allow for a clear and transparent analysis of the resources proposed, as compared with the capacity available from all types of funding and the needs identified, efforts continue to be made to collate the information on extrabudgetary resources made available to, or made available through, special political missions. The estimated level of extrabudgetary resources available to the missions or for those extrabudgetary activities in which the missions are involved is provided in annex III to the present report.

## 2. Other issues

79. In its report on estimates for special political missions ([A/68/7/Add.10](#) and Corr.1), the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions took note of the background information provided in the report of the Secretary-General to the sixty-eighth session of the General Assembly on estimates in respect of special political missions, good offices and other political initiatives authorized by the General Assembly and/or the Security Council ([A/68/327](#)) and requested the Secretary-General to report on a number of issues. As requested by the Advisory Committee, and endorsed by the Assembly in resolution 68/247, those issues are addressed in the following paragraphs.

### **Role of the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre**

80. In its report on estimates in respect of special political missions ([A/68/7/Add.10](#), para. 106, and Corr.1), the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions took note of the information provided to it and indicated its expectation that the Secretary-General would further clarify in the next budget for special political missions the roles of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force and the United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre and their relationship with the Department of Political Affairs and the Under-Secretary-General of the Department.

81. The Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force Office, established in 2005 and institutionalized by the General Assembly in its resolution 64/235, comprises 34 United Nations entities and international organizations, is located in the Department of Political Affairs and reports directly to the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, who is also the Chair of the Task Force. The United Nations Counter-Terrorism Centre was established in 2011 through a contribution by Saudi Arabia, which was noted with appreciation by the General Assembly in its resolution 66/10. Through the Task Force, the Centre seeks to contribute to the full implementation of all four pillars of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted by the General Assembly in its resolution 60/288. The Centre reports to the Secretary-General through the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, who is also the Executive Director of the Centre. As a result, there is engagement with the Under-Secretary-General, who is kept fully informed of the work of the Task Force Office, and who provides guidance, advice and support, as required in his capacity as Chair.

82. One of the core mandates of the Task Force Office is to strengthen the coordination and coherence of United Nations counter-terrorism efforts. In this context, the Office works actively to engage and strengthen its collaboration with all the subprogrammes of the Department of Political Affairs and special political missions. The Office engages most notably with desk officers in the Department of Political Affairs, collaborates with different divisions within the Department that are relevant to the mandate of the Task Force and whose work has aspects that relate to counter-terrorism, and works with special political missions based abroad and at Headquarters.

83. The members of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force include the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to Security Council resolution

1526 (2004) and two special political missions. As well as being core entities of the Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force, the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team collaborate with the Task Force Office on various levels, including through bilateral engagement and on joint and working group projects in the provision of counter-terrorism assistance to Member States. The General Assembly welcomed the establishment of the Counter-Terrorism Centre in 2011 in its resolution 66/10. The Centre is located within the Task Force Office and also works closely with the Executive Directorate, mainly through the implementation of projects and activities on counter-terrorism.

84. The Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, established by the Security Council in its resolution 1535 (2004), assists the work of the Counter-Terrorism Committee and coordinates the process of monitoring the implementation of Council resolutions 1373 (2001) and 1624 (2005). The Executive Directorate is the Chair of three Task Force working groups on border management, tackling the financing of terrorism and legal and criminal responses to counter-terrorism. In that capacity, the Executive Directorate leads the working groups, with the support of the Task Force Office, to implement relevant activities in those specific areas. The Task Force and the Executive Directorate also work closely on joint projects and areas of mutual interest, such as border management, asset-freezing and strengthening the criminal justice system. They also hold regular monthly meetings to ensure greater coordination and coherence on the work of the Task Force and its activities. The Task Force Office regularly participates in the activities of the Executive Directorate and those of the Counter-Terrorism Committee.

85. In the light of the need to strengthen collaboration between the Task Force and the Executive Directorate, the two most recent resolutions pertinent to each have called for greater interaction, collaboration and support for further efforts to counter terrorism. In its resolution 2129 (2013), the Security Council called for the Executive Directorate to work more closely with relevant organizations, most particularly the Task Force and its working groups. In the fourth resolution reviewing the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (68/276), the General Assembly emphasized the role of the Executive Directorate in strengthening United Nations counter-terrorism efforts, particularly in sharing relevant information with United Nations counter-terrorism entities.

### **Global field support strategy**

86. In its report on estimates in respect of special political missions ([A/68/7/Add.10](#) and Corr.1), the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions recommended that the General Assembly request the Secretary-General to provide more comprehensive information on the benefits of the global field support strategy for the special political missions in his next annual progress report on the support strategy. While such information will be provided in the next annual progress report on the support strategy, relevant information with respect to the global field support strategy is also included in this section.

87. Detailed reporting on the overall progress in the implementation of the global field support strategy has been provided in two separate reports: the fourth annual report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of the global field support strategy ([A/68/637](#) and Corr.1) and annexes I and II to the report of the Secretary-

General on the overview of the financing of United Nations peacekeeping operations ([A/68/731](#)). The fifth annual progress report on the implementation of the global field support strategy will be submitted to the General Assembly for its consideration during its sixty-ninth session and will provide a full update.

88. The peacekeeping financial year 2014/15 is the final year of implementation for the five-year time frame of the strategy, after which the principles, tools and benefits of the strategy and all activities remaining for completion will be mainstreamed into the ongoing work of the Department of Field Support, service centres and mission support components. Beyond June 2015, the Department of Field Support will continue working with its client missions and the lead departments, the Department of Political Affairs and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, to continuously improve the delivery of support services to field missions. In this regard, although the global field support strategy will end, the Department of Field Support will remain committed to continuous performance improvement and will continue to propose, deliver, oversee and report on strategic change initiatives and improvements designed to strengthen service delivery for United Nations field missions.

89. In the peacekeeping financial year 2014/15, the service centre structures established under the global field support strategy will continue to provide support to special political missions. The Global Service Centre in Brindisi provides back office administrative support and non-location-dependent finance and human resources services to UNSMIL. The Global Service Centre continues to host UNSMIL staff, providing a combination of back office and in-mission technical support. Support from the Global Service Centre to UNSMIL results in an estimated \$2.5 million in savings per year for the United Nations. As reported last year, those savings were achieved by placing staff members providing support to the Mission in the areas of budget, finance, human resources, procurement, information and communications technology, logistics and engineering in the Global Service Centre in Brindisi rather than in the Mission in Libya. The Global Service Centre has also provided operational support for the closure and liquidation of special political missions (BNUB and UNIPSIL).

90. As of October 2014, the Regional Service Centre at Entebbe will provide shared services to eight field missions in East Africa: two missions led by the Department of Political Affairs (BNUB and UNSOM); five missions led by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (MINUSCA, MONUSCO, the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan); and the United Nations Support Office for the African Union Mission in Somalia and UNSOM. In 2014, the Regional Service Centre has also been instrumental in supporting the transition of BINUCA to a new peacekeeping operation, MINUSCA. Transactional and non-location-dependent elements of human resources, finance, multimodal movement and control, and information and communications technology support are centralized at the regional level with the aim of ensuring consistent, high-quality support for staff serving in those field missions, helping to reduce mission footprints and leveraging economies of scale. In that regard, BNUB and UNSOM will be contributing a combined total of \$112,900 to the operational resources of the Regional Service Centre during the peacekeeping financial period 2014/15.



91. In the forthcoming fifth progress report on the global field support strategy, the Department of Field Support will present proposals for the broadening of the “shared services” pillar of the strategy. In that report, a proposed way forward for broadening the shared services approach will be presented within an overall integrated model for United Nations field support. In addition, a framework will be proposed that, if endorsed, would provide mechanisms for the provision of non-location-dependent functions to be rolled out progressively to all field missions, including all special political missions and peacekeeping operations.

#### **United Nations Kuwait Joint Support Office**

92. In paragraph 38 of its report on estimates in respect of special political missions ([A/68/7/Add.10](#) and Corr.1), which was endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 68/247 A, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions requested the Secretary-General to provide the full costs and benefits of the Kuwait Joint Support Office in the budget for 2015 for the special political missions.

93. Since the official launch of the Kuwait Joint Support Office in December 2012, the progressive integration of the administrative support personnel and processes of UNAMA and UNAMI into a consolidated support office serving both missions has continued. That effort has been led by the steering committee of the Kuwait Joint Support Office (comprising the chiefs of mission support of UNAMA and UNAMI and representatives of the Department of Field Support) and by the management team of the Joint Support Office. The Joint Support Office has also assumed responsibility for the delivery of support services in finance and human resources, provided within its existing resources, to UNRCCA and the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen.

94. As noted above, in the fifth progress report on the global field support strategy, the Department of Field Support will further broaden the shared service pillar strategy across the field operations it administers. Furthermore, the lack of full and considered resource requirements for UNAMA has meant that putting together the cost-benefit analysis of shared services in the Kuwait Joint Support Office would not be comprehensive at this point.

#### **Ratios for vehicles and information technology equipment**

95. The Department of Field Support has reviewed the vehicle and information technology equipment holdings in special political missions and aligned such holdings, where possible, with the standard ratios it has established and promulgated in the Standard Cost and Ratio Manual. In that context, the holdings of vehicles and information technology equipment have been proposed on the basis of the proposed personnel incumbency levels planned for 2015, rather than on the full authorized level of personnel. Information on the proposed allocation of vehicles for 2015 is provided in table 1 below.



Table 1  
Proposed allocation of vehicles for 2015

<i>Mission name</i>	<i>2015 proposed personnel<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Personnel adjusted for vacancy rate<sup>a</sup></i>	<i>Standard allocation<sup>b,c</sup></i>	<i>2015 proposed holdings (budget)<sup>b,c</sup></i>	<i>Variance (percentage)</i>
CNMC	11	10	4	7	75
UNRCCA	8	8	4	5	25
UNIOGBIS	111	100	38	47	24
UNAMI	512	433	194	211	9
UNOCA	21	20	8	9	13
MENUB	87	72	28	28	–
UNSCOL	23	23	17	17	–
UNOWA	32	30	13	8	(39)
UNSOM	284	244	83	47	(43)
<b>Total</b>	<b>1 089</b>	<b>940</b>	<b>389</b>	<b>379</b>	<b>(3)</b>

<sup>a</sup> Includes United Nations international and national professional officers, United Nations Volunteers and military and police personnel (military observers, military police and civilian police officers).

<sup>b</sup> Includes VIP and standard 4x4s and sedans; excludes troop-carrying and utility vehicles, buses and electric carts.

<sup>c</sup> Based on standard equipment as outlined in the Standard Cost and Ratio Manual.

96. A number of special political missions (UNOCA, UNRCCA, CNMC and UNIOGBIS) reflect proposed vehicle holdings above the standard allocation, both in nominal terms and as a percentage of standard allocation, owing to the relatively small inventory held. The above-average ratios, especially in the smaller missions, reflect limited retention of vehicles for general use by mission personnel. Two special political missions (UNOWA and UNSOM) reflect proposed vehicle holdings lower than the standard allocation in line with the operational conditions on the ground. In total, the proposed vehicle holdings for special political missions are 3 per cent lower than the standard allocation.

97. Information on the proposed allocation of computing devices for 2015 is provided in table 2 below.

Table 2  
Proposed allocation of computing devices for 2015

Mission name	2015 proposed personnel <sup>a</sup>	Personnel adjusted for vacancy rate <sup>a</sup>	Computing devices <sup>b</sup>			
			Standard allocation <sup>c</sup>	Standard allocation and spares	2015 proposed holdings (budget)	Variance (percentage)
UNOCA	27	26	26	36	49	36
UNAMI	903	787	780	972	1 163	20
UNSOM	284	244	244	332	364	10
MENUB	87	72	83	83	83	–
UNOWA	48	42	42	54	54	–
CNMC	23	22	22	38	38	–
UNSCOL	81	80	78	78	78	–
UNIOGBIS	151	139	150	150	145	(3)
UNRCCA	30	29	29	45	35	(22)
<b>Total</b>	<b>1 634</b>	<b>1 441</b>	<b>1 454</b>	<b>1 788</b>	<b>2 009</b>	<b>12</b>

<sup>a</sup> Includes international and national staff, United Nations Volunteers, United Nations Police, United Nations Military Observers, Government-provided personnel and military staff officers.

<sup>b</sup> Includes desktop computers, laptops and netbook computers.

<sup>c</sup> Based on standard requirements as outlined in the Standard Cost and Ratio Manual.

98. Most special political missions are holding the ideal number of computing devices in line with standard ratios. Overall, the total proposed computing device holdings for special political missions is 12 per cent higher than the standard allocation, owing mainly to the higher-than-standard holdings in UNAMI.

### Air operations

99. In its report on estimates in respect of special political missions (A/67/604), endorsed by the General Assembly in its resolution 67/246, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions requested that information on air operations be provided, including prior-year expenditure, current-year appropriation and proposed budget amounts, with a breakdown of costs by mission and type of air asset.

100. In annex IV to the present document, information is provided, by mission, on appropriations and expenditure for 2013, the approved budget for 2014 and the proposed budget for 2015 for air operations. The annex does not include information with respect to UNAMA and UNSMIL, pending the preparation of the 12-month budget for those missions in the first semester of 2015. The table also does not reflect information on the four missions that have completed, or will be completing, operations during 2014 and will be discontinued in 2015.

101. Air operations resources for UNAMI and UNSOM represent 84 per cent of the proposed budget for such resources in 2015. As reflected in annex IV, overall resources for air operations are proposed to increase from \$27.1 million in 2014 to \$34.0 million in 2015, reflecting an increase of \$6.9 million (25.6 per cent). Seven

of the eight missions reflect increases in resources for air operations in 2015 compared with 2014. Four missions reflect increases of 40 per cent or more, namely, the Offices of the Special Envoy for the Sahel and the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region, UNIOGBIS and UNSOM.

102. For UNIOGBIS and the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel the increase in resources proposed for 2015 compared with 2014 is attributable mainly to the new cost-sharing arrangements (in the proportions of 65:20:10:5 respectively) and the new contract for the rental of a fixed-wing aircraft — to be shared among UNOWA, UNIOGBIS, the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel and CNMC. The increase in resources for the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region is attributable mainly to an increase in the number of planned special flights from four in 2014 to six in 2015. The increase in resources for UNSOM is due mainly to an increase in the total number of air assets and the number of flight hours.

#### **National staff common staff costs**

103. In paragraph 21 of its report on estimates in respect of special political missions ([A/68/7/Add.10](#) and Corr.1), the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions requested that information on common staff costs for national staff for all missions be included in the budget proposals for special political missions for 2015.

104. Common staff costs are driven by the profile of staff members, for example, marital status and number of dependants, and may show variations both across missions and across time for the same mission. Accordingly, common staff costs are budgeted as a percentage of the estimated provisions for salaries, taking into account past percentages of common staff cost expenditures against salary expenditures.

105. Annex VIII provides information on the percentage of common staff costs as a proportion of salaries budgeted in 2014 and 2015.

#### **Cost-shared positions**

106. In paragraph 91 of its report ([A/68/7/Add.10](#) and Corr.1), the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions requested information on the positions that are cost-shared among the funds and programmes and relevant Secretariat departments, including on the specific share of the Department of Political Affairs in respect of any such cost-sharing arrangements.

107. Annex IX provides information on cost-shared positions reflected in the proposed budget for 2015.

#### **Security services**

108. In paragraph 180 of its report ([A/68/7/Add.10](#)), the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions requested information on the use of private security companies.

109. Accordingly, annex VII provides information on security-related resources reflected in the proposed budget for 2015.

## II. Analysis of budget performance and resource requirements for special political missions

### A. Estimated performance for 2014

110. The total approved budget for 38 special political missions amounted to \$646 million. The related estimated expenditure amounts to \$634 million, resulting in an overall unencumbered balance of \$12 million. Summarized information by cluster is reflected in table 3. Mission-by-mission budget performance and breakdown by expenditure category are contained in tables 6 and 7.

Table 3

#### Summary of financial resource performance (estimated) for 2014

(Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>1 January-31 December 2014</i>				
	<i>Appropriation</i>	<i>Estimated expenditure</i>	<i>Variance</i>	<i>Variance (percentage)</i>
	<i>(a)</i>	<i>(b)</i>	<i>(c)=(a)-(b)</i>	<i>(d)=(c)/(a)</i>
Cluster I	38 116.3	34 720.5	3 395.8	8.9
Cluster II	3 612.2	35 821.5	290.7	0.8
Cluster III <sup>a</sup>	244 096.5	232 833.3	11 263.2	4.6
UNAMA	191 364.5	189 936.0	1 428.5	0.7
UNAMI	136 306.4	140 718.6	(4 412.2)	(3.2)
<b>Subtotal (net)</b>	<b>645 995.9</b>	<b>634 029.9</b>	<b>11 966.0</b>	<b>1.9</b>

<sup>a</sup> Includes UNSMIL, BINUCA, UNIPSIL, BNUB and the Special Coordinator for the OPCW-United Nations Joint Mission.

111. Overall, special political missions are expected to utilize 98.1 per cent of approved resources in 2014. The unencumbered balance of \$12 million arises mainly in cluster I (\$3.4 million) and cluster III (\$11.3 million) missions, partly offset by estimated overexpenditure of \$4.4 million for UNAMI.

112. The unencumbered balance of \$3.4 million for cluster I missions falls primarily under civilian personnel. A summary of explanations for significant variances in cluster I missions relates to:

(a) The Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria (\$1.5 million) and the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel (\$0.5 million), owing mainly to the actual vacancy rate for international staff being higher than budgeted;

(b) The Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus (\$0.4 million), owing to the vacancy of the Special Adviser position from April to August 2014, which resulted in reduced expenditures for staff costs and official travel;

(c) The Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan (\$0.3 million), owing to the higher-than-budgeted vacancy rate for

international staff and the resumption of negotiations in Addis Ababa, which resulted in lower-than-budgeted requirements for travel.

113. The underexpenditure in cluster I missions is partly offset by overexpenditure in the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region (\$0.2 million) and relates to:

(a) Civilian personnel, as a result of a combination of (i) the approval by the General Assembly of a greater number of positions than the funding level for general temporary assistance; (ii) a lower projected average vacancy rate than budgeted for international and national staff; (iii) the engagement of a full-time Under-Secretary-General starting from 1 September 2014, compared with the provision for an Under-Secretary-General on a when-actually-employed basis; and (iv) higher expenditures for post adjustment as a result of the transfer of three positions from Dublin to Geneva as at 1 September 2014;

(b) Official travel, owing mainly to the increase in travel within the Great Lakes region to support mandated activities and the increased activities of a full-time Under-Secretary-General as at 1 September 2014, compared with the provision for an Under-Secretary-General on a when-actually-employed basis for 2014.

114. Overall, cluster III missions estimate underexpenditures of \$11.3 million. Eight of the 12 missions with operations during 2014 estimate underexpenditures, while one mission (UNRCCA) estimates full utilization of its approved resources. The underexpenditures are primarily in the following missions:

(a) UNSMIL (\$6.6 million), reflecting the inability of the mission to fully carry out the activities related to its mandate during the year, as a result of the evacuation and relocation of staff from Libya in view of the deteriorating security situation;

(b) BINUCA (\$3.3 million), as a result of the deterioration of the security situation in the Central African Republic, leading to the establishment by the Security Council of a United Nations peacekeeping operation in the country (MINUSCA) on 10 April 2014, thereby ending the mandate of BINUCA;

(c) UNIOGBIS (\$1.8 million), owing to a higher actual vacancy rate for international staff than budgeted.

115. Those underexpenditures are partly offset by overexpenditures in the following missions:

(a) UNSOM (\$0.9 million), owing mainly to higher than budgeted common staff costs associated with the placement and on-boarding of staff during the start-up phase of UNSOM in 2014;

(b) The OPCW-United Nations Joint Mission (\$1.7 million), owing to the extension of operations for the period from 1 July to 30 September 2014 to allow sufficient time for the completion of residual activities, including the establishment of appropriate mechanisms for OPCW to continue verification activities in the Syrian Arab Republic;

(c) UNOWA (\$0.1 million), owing mainly to additional costs for renovation relating to the relocation of the office to new premises and higher than budgeted flight hours for the fixed-wing aircraft.

116. The overexpenditure of \$4.4 million in UNAMI is due primarily to higher-than-budgeted expenditures for civilian personnel (\$15.9 million), which are partly offset by underexpenditure on military and police personnel (\$1.9 million) and operational costs (\$9.7 million). The overexpenditure for civilian personnel is due to higher-than-budgeted expenditure for common staff costs. The underexpenditure for military and police personnel is due mainly to the reduced cost of rations, reflecting the relocation of United Nations guard units from the Tamimi compound to the Erbil compound, effective June 2014, as a result of the deteriorating security situation in Iraq. The underexpenditure for operational costs falls mainly under:

(a) Other supplies, services and equipment (\$3.3 million), as a result of the lower cost of rations owing to the relocation of staff away from Baghdad caused by the deteriorating security situation and lower costs of training fees and supplies, owing to the provision of in-house training instead of external training, whenever possible;

(b) Facilities and infrastructure (\$2.4 million), mainly as a result of favourable actual contractual rates for maintenance services and lower generator fuel consumption as a result of the improved power supply in Iraq;

(c) Air transportation (\$2.3 million), owing mainly to lower-than-budgeted actual flight hours as a result of the deteriorating security situation.

## **B. Proposed resources for 2015**

117. The total estimated resource requirements for 2015 relating to the 35 missions covered in the present report and its addenda amount to \$485,160,800 net (\$513,182,600 gross). Pending further developments and clarity on the mandate and operations of UNAMA and UNSMIL, the present report reflects six-month interim resource requirements for 2015 for those missions. The interim resource requirements are necessary to ensure that financial arrangements are in place to allow the missions to continue operations during the first half of 2015 and to determine their requirements for 2015 as the situation on the ground becomes clearer. The interim period will also enable the missions to develop comprehensive budget proposals, which will fully incorporate any decisions taken by the Security Council and will cover the full scope of operations for UNAMA and UNSMIL during 2015. Accordingly, a technical rollover of 50 per cent of the level of projected expenditures for 2014 is proposed for the period from 1 January to 30 June 2015 for UNAMA and UNSMIL. Detailed budget proposals for 2015 for those missions will be prepared for consideration during the second resumed part of the sixty-ninth session of the General Assembly.

118. Mission-by-mission budget estimates, requirements by expenditure component and the number and level of positions are presented in tables 6, 7 and 8, respectively. Table 6 contains a complete list of the special political missions, indicating their respective appropriations for the period 2014, estimated expenditures and variances at the end of 2014, requirements for 2015, net additional appropriation, taking into account underexpenditure or overexpenditure for 2014, and the variance between 2015 requirements and the 2014 appropriation. In addition, the table provides the sources of the mandates of individual missions and their expiry dates. Summarized information by cluster is provided below.

Table 4  
**Summary of estimated requirements for 2015 (by cluster)**

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	2014			2015			
	Appropriation	Estimated expenditure	Estimated unencumbered balance	Total requirements 2015	Net requirements <sup>a</sup>	Variance (2014-2015)	Variance (percentage)
	(a)	(b)	(c)=(a)-(b)	(d)	(e)=(d)-(c)	(f)=(d)-(a)	(g)=(f)/(a)
Cluster I	38 116.3	34 720.5	3 395.8	37 312.3	33 916.5	(804.0)	(2.1)
Cluster II	36 112.2	35 821.5	290.7	35 211.0	34 920.3	(901.2)	(2.5)
Cluster III <sup>b,c</sup>	244 096.5	232 833.3	11 263.2	180 460.9	169 197.7	(63 635.6)	(26.1)
UNAMA <sup>b</sup>	191 364.5	189 936.0	1 428.5	94 968.0	93 539.5	(96 396.5)	(50.4)
UNAMI	136 306.4	140 718.6	(4 412.2)	137 208.6	141 620.8	902.2	0.7
<b>Total (net)</b>	<b>645 995.9</b>	<b>634 029.9</b>	<b>11 966.0</b>	<b>485 160.8</b>	<b>473 194.8</b>	<b>(160 835.1)</b>	<b>(24.9)</b>

<sup>a</sup> Net requirements after taking into account estimated underexpenditure or overexpenditure for 2014.

<sup>b</sup> Proposed requirements for UNSMIL (in cluster III) and UNAMA for 2015 reflect only six months of interim funding, pending the preparation of 12-month budgets.

<sup>c</sup> Cluster III includes missions which have completed, or will be completing, their operations during 2014: BINUCA, UNIPSIL, BNUB and the OPCW-United Nations Joint Mission.

119. Overall, the present report reflects a decrease in expenditure for special political missions in 2015 compared with 2014, with a reduction of \$160.8 million compared with the approved resources of \$646.0 million for 2014. It should be noted, however, that if UNAMA and UNSMIL had presented full-year budgets, that decrease would not have been achieved.

120. Analysed by cluster, resource reductions are proposed in clusters I, II, III and UNAMA. Only UNAMI reflects an increase in proposed resources for 2015 compared with 2014.

121. Special political missions under cluster I reflect an overall decrease of \$0.8 million in 2015 compared with 2014, with 9 of the 11 missions in cluster I reflecting decreases in 2015, while 2 missions (the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel and the Office of the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region) reflect increases in 2015. Overall, the reduced resources provided for in cluster I missions for 2015 compared with 2014 are due primarily to decreases under official travel, communications and consultants. Those decreases are partly offset by increases for civilian personnel and air transportation. The main reasons for increases for the Office of the Special Envoy for the Sahel are the proposed establishment of three new positions and increased provisions for air transportation, given the increased activity level of the mission. The main reason for increases for the Office of the Special Envoy for the Great Lakes Region reflects: (a) the provision being made for the full staffing complement in 2015, compared with the approval by the General Assembly of a greater number of positions than the approved funding level for general temporary assistance in 2014; (b) the projected full deployment of staff and reduced vacancy rates in 2015, compared with phased deployment and higher vacancy rates in 2014; (c) the provisions for one additional P-4 position proposed for 2015; (d) the provision for a full-time Under-Secretary-General position in 2015,

compared with the provision for an Under-Secretary-General on a when-actually-employed basis in 2014; (e) the relocation of three positions from Dublin to Geneva, with consequent higher costs for post adjustment; and (f) increased requirements for official travel.

122. Special political missions under cluster II reflect a net decrease of \$0.9 million, with 8 of the 13 missions in that cluster reflecting decreases in 2015 compared with 2014. The overall decrease for cluster II missions is due primarily to the discontinuation in 2015 of a one-time expense of \$2 million for the relocation of the office of the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate in 2014, which is partly offset by increases in five missions in this cluster, due mainly to mandate-driven changes in the Panel of Experts on Libya, the Panel of Experts on the Sudan and the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1526 (2004). The mandate-driven changes in the Panels of Experts on Libya and on the Sudan relate to an increase in the number of experts and/or an increase in the duration of the panels from 11 to 12 months. The mandate-driven change in the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team relates to a new requirement to translate consolidated lists regarding sanctions into the six official languages of the United Nations. Two missions in cluster II reflect significant increases for civilian staff: (a) the Panel of Experts on Yemen, owing to the application of a zero vacancy rate in 2015, compared with a budgeted vacancy rate of 63 per cent in 2014, when it was first established; and (b) the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate, owing to the proposed establishment of two additional positions and the upward reclassification of one position, the application of a lower vacancy rate and an increase in salary costs.

123. Overall, cluster III missions, excluding UNSMIL, for which only a budget for six months of interim funding is proposed, reflect an increase of \$25.5 million. If UNSMIL is included, however, there is a decrease of \$12.5 million. Furthermore, if the four discontinued missions (BINUCA, UNIPSIL, BNUB and the OPCW-UN Joint Mission) are taken into account, cluster III reflects an overall decrease of \$63.6 million.

124. Cluster III missions, which present full budget proposals for 2015, reflect an overall increase of \$25.5 million, due mainly to:

(a) The first-time inclusion of resources for MENUB (\$12.3 million), established by the Security Council and starting in January 2015;

(b) A net increase in resources for UNSOM (\$12.9 million), owing primarily to the full budgeting for 12 months for the United Nations guard unit, compared with the 9-month provision in 2014, and the application of a zero vacancy rate in 2015, compared with a 5 per cent vacancy rate in 2014; increases for civilian personnel related to the provision for the proposed establishment of 21 new positions and the provision of resources for 12 months for 14 international positions that were funded for only 4 months in 2014; proposed resources for 17 general temporary assistance positions to provide electoral support during 2015; and increases in facilities and infrastructure and air transportation, due mainly to an increase in the total number of air assets and the number of flight hours planned.

125. Three of the eight missions in cluster III, which present full budget requirements for 2015, reflect decreases in 2015 compared with 2014: CNMC



(\$0.7 million), UNSCOL (\$0.1 million) and UNOCA (\$27,000). The remaining three missions in the cluster reflect increases in 2015 compared with 2014:

(a) UNOWA (\$0.8 million), owing mainly to increases under international staff, reflecting the proposed establishment of two new positions and an increase in the budgeted post adjustment rate, as well as increases under air operations, reflecting the effect of a new contract for a fixed-wing aircraft effective January 2015;

(b) UNIOGBIS (\$0.4 million), owing mainly to increases under national staff, reflecting the proposed establishment of four new positions, lower budgeted vacancy rates for national staff and the change in the exchange rate, as well as increases under air operations attributable to the new cost-sharing arrangements (in the proportions of 65:20:10:5, respectively) for the rental of a fixed-wing aircraft shared among UNOWA, UNIOGBIS, the Office of Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel and CNMC, and reflecting the effect of a new contract for a fixed-wing aircraft effective January 2015;

(c) UNRCCA (\$0.1 million), owing mainly to increases under civilian personnel, reflecting the proposed upgrading of the Head of Mission position from Assistant Secretary-General to Under-Secretary-General, and increases in staff salaries for National Officers based on a revised salary scale.

126. As noted above, and in a similar manner to UNSMIL, the present report reflects the 6-month interim resource requirements for UNAMA pending the presentation of a 12-month budget proposal during the second resumed part of the sixty-ninth session.

127. The increase in proposed resources of \$0.9 million for UNAMI for 2015 compared with 2014 is due mainly to increases for civilian personnel (\$12.6 million), which are partly offset by decreases for military and police personnel (\$2.9 million) and operational costs (\$8.8 million). Increases for civilian personnel are due mainly to an increase in common staff costs for international staff, based on past expenditure trends. Those increases are partly offset by decreased resources for military and police personnel due to the discontinuation of the provision for accommodation at the United Nations Tamimi compound and reduced provision for the travel of military contingents, reflecting the change in the rotation schedule from twice to once per year, which was revised to a 12-month cycle following the adoption of General Assembly resolution 67/261. Reduced provisions under operational costs reflect mainly the following:

(a) A reduction in the contractual rates for maintenance services;

(b) Lower requirements for spare parts and supplies, as the mission holds adequate spare parts in stock;

(c) Discontinuation of the provision for free meals and accommodation for both uniformed and civilian personnel, resulting in lower requirements for rations and a lower cost of cleaning services.

### **Positions**

128. The number, category and level of positions for each mission are provided in table 5. The total number of civilian staff by cluster is summarized below.

Table 5  
Summary of proposed civilian staffing (by cluster)

	Approved 2014	Proposed 2015	Variance	Variance (percentage)
	(a)	(b)	(c)=(b)-(a)	(d)=(c)/(a)
Cluster I	208	212	4	1.9
Cluster II	88	90	2	2.3
Cluster III <sup>a,b</sup>	1 365	1 039	(326)	(23.9)
UNAMA	1 690	1 690	—	—
UNAMI	951	900	(51)	(5.4)
<b>Total</b>	<b>4 302</b>	<b>3 931</b>	<b>(371)</b>	<b>(8.6)</b>
<b>Total excluding 439 positions in 2014 for discontinued missions</b>	<b>3 863</b>	<b>3 931</b>	<b>68</b>	<b>1.8</b>

<sup>a</sup> The net reduction of 326 positions in cluster III reflects the decrease of 439 positions for the four discontinued missions (BINUCA, UNIPSIL, BNUB the OPCW-UN Joint Mission), partly offset by the proposed establishment of 113 positions for continuing and new cluster III missions.

<sup>b</sup> The figure for 2015 includes the continuation of 384 positions for UNSMIL.

129. Overall, the number of civilian personnel is proposed to decrease from 4,302 to 3,931 positions, reflecting an overall reduction of 371 positions. That reduction is due mainly to the discontinuation of four missions under cluster III in 2015 and a reduction in the number of positions for UNAMI, following the review of the civilian staffing of the mission. Those reductions are partly offset by the proposed staffing for MENUB, to be established as at 1 January 2015, and additional staffing for UNSOM.

130. The proposed staffing resources reflected in table 5 for UNSMIL (included in cluster III) and UNAMA reflect maintenance of their respective approved staffing levels for 2014 for the 6-month interim funding proposal for 2015, pending the preparation of the 12-month budget.

131. A summary of the changes proposed for the missions operating in 2015 and the main factors for variances is contained in annex V to the present report. The net increase of 68 positions in 2015 proposed for the 35 special political missions concerned is due mainly to the proposed establishment of positions for MENUB. The largest number of positions proposed for reduction is for UNAMI, as a result of the review of civilian staffing.

132. Information regarding the budgeted vacancy rates for 2014, actual average vacancy rates for the period up to 31 August 2014 and proposed vacancy rates for 2015 for special political missions is contained in annex VI to the present document. The proposed budgeted vacancy rates for 2015 take into account the actual vacancy rates experienced during 2014 and the planned deployments.

Table 6  
**Estimated costs of the activities of special political missions**

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	1 January to 31 December 2014			Requirements for 2015			Variance	Mandates and expiry dates
	Appropriations	Estimated expenditures	Variance under- (over) expenditures	Total requirements	Net requirements	Non-recurrent requirements		
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(1)-(2)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)	(6)	(7)=(4)-(1)	(8)
<b>I. Thematic cluster I: special and personal envoys and special advisers of the Secretary-General</b>								
1 Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Myanmar	1 338.6	1 155.3	183.3	1 161.0	977.7	–	(177.6)	General Assembly resolutions 62/222, 63/245, 64/238, 65/241, 66/230, 67/233, 68/242; open-ended
2 Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus	3 388.4	2 976.1	412.3	3 183.3	2 771.0	12.0	(205.1)	Series of Security Council resolutions, including 186 (1964), 367 (1975), 1250 (1999), 1475 (2003), 1758 (2007), 1818 (2008), 1873 (2009), 1930 (2010) and 1986 (2011); open-ended
3 Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the prevention of Genocide	2 435.6	2 173.8	261.8	2 171.0	1 909.2	–	(264.6)	Security Council resolution 1366 (2001); S/2004/567-S/2004/568; open-ended
4 Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara	657.6	572.5	85.1	586.8	501.7	–	(70.8)	S/2005/497-S/2005/498; Security Council resolution 1813 (2008); 2099 (2013); open-ended
5 Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)	723.6	580.0	143.6	654.3	510.7	–	(69.3)	Security Council resolution 1559 (2004); PRST/2006/3; open-ended
6 United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions	2 193.1	2 107.7	85.4	2 042.6	1 957.2	–	(150.5)	S/2010/103-S/2011/279; open-ended
7 Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria	12 644.5	11 151.0	1 493.5	11 871.1	10 377.6	54.5	(773.4)	General Assembly resolution 66/253; open-ended
8 Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan	1 672.7	1 345.3	327.4	1 319.5	992.1	19.5	(353.2)	S/2011/474-S/2011/475; open-ended

	1 January to 31 December 2014			Requirements for 2015			Variance	Mandates and expiry dates
	Appropriations	Estimated expenditures	Variance under- (over) expenditures	Total requirements	Net requirements	Non-recurrent requirements		
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(1)-(2)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)	(6)		
9 Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen	5 362.0	5 192.1	169.9	5 352.3	5 182.4	2.0	(9.7)	S/2011/474-S/2011/475; open-ended
10 Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel	3 323.4	2 855.6	467.8	3 987.7	3 519.9	23.5	664.3	S/2011/474-S/2011/475; open-ended
11 Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region	4 376.8	4 611.1	(234.3)	4 982.7	5 217.0	11.5	605.9	Security Council resolution 2098 (2013) open-ended
<b>Subtotal, I</b>	<b>38 116.3</b>	<b>34 720.5</b>	<b>3 395.8</b>	<b>37 312.3</b>	<b>33 916.5</b>	<b>123.0</b>	<b>(804.0)</b>	
<b>II Thematic cluster II: sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels</b>								
12 Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea	2 514.7	2 465.3	49.4	2 406.6	2 357.2	–	(108.1)	Security Council resolution 2111 (2013); 25 November 2014
13 Panel of Experts on Liberia	531.6	320.9	210.7	314.0	103.3	–	(217.6)	Security Council resolution 2128 (2013); 10 December 2014
14 Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire	1 307.8	1 204.9	102.9	1 282.5	1 179.6	–	(25.3)	Security Council resolution 2153 (2014); 30 May 2015
15 Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo	1 424.8	1 334.9	89.9	1 364.7	1 274.8	–	(60.1)	Security Council resolution 2136 (2014); 1 February 2015
16 Panel of Experts on the Sudan	1 322.6	1 311.0	11.6	1 468.1	1 456.5	–	145.5	Security Council resolution 2138 (2014); 13 March 2015
17 Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea	2 797.9	2 704.2	93.7	2 729.6	2 635.9	–	(68.3)	Security Council resolution 2141 (2014); 5 April 2015
18 Panel of Experts on the Islamic Republic of Iran	2 971.5	2 965.7	5.8	2 782.2	2 776.4	–	(189.3)	Security Council resolution 2159 (2014); 9 July 2015
19 Panel of Experts on Libya	1 270.7	1 502.9	(232.2)	1 593.2	1 825.4	2.1	322.5	Security Council resolution 2174 (2014); 13 April 2015
20 Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic	1 476.1	1 222.7	253.4	1 519.6	1 266.2		43.5	Security Council resolution 2127 (2013); 5 January 2015
21 Panel of Experts on Yemen	2 217.3	2 254.0	(36.7)	2 830.4	2 867.1		613.1	Security Council resolution 2140 (2014); 26 March 2015

	1 January to 31 December 2014			Requirements for 2015				
	Appropriations	Estimated expenditures	Variance under- (over) expenditures	Total requirements	Net requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Variance	Mandates and expiry dates
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(1)-(2)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(-3)	(6)	(7)=(4)-(-1)	(8)
22 Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1526 (2004)	4 447.0	4 504.0	(57.0)	4 496.1	4 553.1	–	49.1	Security Council resolution 2083 (2012); 16 June 2015
23 Support to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)	3 112.0	3 098.7	13.3	3 102.0	3 088.7	13.3	(10.0)	Security Council resolution 1810 (2008) and 1977 (2011); 25 April 2021
24 Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate	10 718.2	10 932.3	(214.1)	9 322.0	9 536.1	8.3	(1 396.2)	Security Council resolution 2129 (2013); 31 December 2017
<b>Subtotal, II</b>	<b>36 112.2</b>	<b>35 821.5</b>	<b>290.7</b>	<b>35 211.0</b>	<b>34 920.3</b>	<b>23.7</b>	<b>(901.2)</b>	
<b>III Thematic cluster III: political offices, peacebuilding support offices and integrated offices</b>								
25 United Nations Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa (UNOWA)	9 417.8	9 540.1	(122.3)	10 211.0	10 333.3	35.0	793.2	S/2013/732; 31 December 2016
26 United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS)	20 763.1	18 953.9	1 809.2	21 124.1	19 314.9	365.6	361.0	Security Council resolution 2157 (2014); 30 November 2014
27 United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)	70 148.6	71 079.4	(930.8)	83 051.6	83 982.4	8 761.2	12 903.0	Security Council resolution 2158 (2014); 2 June 2015
28 United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA)	2 881.6	2 881.6	–	2 937.5	2 937.5	13.3	55.9	S/2007/279-S/2007/280; open-ended
29 United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC)	5 771.3	5 596.2	175.1	5 112.8	4 937.7	35.0	(658.5)	S/2014/6-S/2014/7; 31 December 2014
30 United Nations Electoral Observer Mission in Burundi (MENUB)	–	–	–	12 256.7	12 256.7	–	12 256.7	S/2137 (2014); 31 December 2015
31 Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL)	8 750.6	8 308.7	441.9	8 609.0	8 167.1	–	(141.6)	Security Council resolutions 1701 (2006) and 1773 (2007); S/2007/85-S/2007/86; S/2012/34-S/2012/35; open-ended

	1 January to 31 December 2014			Requirements for 2015				Mandates and expiry dates
	Appropriations	Estimated expenditures	Variance under- (over) expenditures	Total requirements	Net requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Variance	
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(1)-(2)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)	(6)	(7)=(4)-(1)	
32 United Nations Office in Central Africa (UNOCA)	5 754.9	5 452.0	302.9	5 727.9	5 425.0	–	(27.0)	Security Council-Secretary-General exchange of letters: S/2009/697-S/2010/457-S/2012/656-S/2012/657-S/2014/103-S/2014/104-Security Council resolutions: 2018 (2011)-2039 (2012); Security Council Presidential Statements: S/PRST/2011/21-S/PRST/2013/6; General Assembly resolutions: 66/55-67/70-68/62; 31 August 2015
<b>Subtotal, III</b>	<b>123 487.9</b>	<b>121 811.9</b>	<b>1 676.0</b>	<b>149 030.6</b>	<b>147 354.6</b>	<b>9 210.1</b>	<b>25 542.7</b>	
<b>IV United Nations Assistance Mission</b>								
33 United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)	136 306.4	140 718.6	(4 412.2)	137 208.6	141 620.8	3 373.4	902.2	Security Council resolution 2169 (2014); 31 July 2015
<b>Subtotal, IV</b>	<b>136 306.4</b>	<b>140 718.6</b>	<b>(4 412.2)</b>	<b>137 208.6</b>	<b>141 620.8</b>	<b>3 373.4</b>	<b>902.2</b>	
<b>Total</b>	<b>334 022.8</b>	<b>333 072.5</b>	<b>950.3</b>	<b>358 762.5</b>	<b>357 812.2</b>	<b>12 730.2</b>	<b>24 739.7</b>	
<b>Special political missions for which 6-month interim funding is requested for 2015</b>								
34 United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)	69 430.7	62 860.5	6 570.2	31 430.3	24 860.1	–	(38 000.4)	Security Council resolution 2144 (2014); 13 March 2015
35 United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)	191 364.5	189 936.0	1 428.5	94 968.0	93 539.5	–	(96 396.5)	Security Council resolution 2145 (2014); 17 March 2015
<b>Total 6-month interim funding</b>	<b>260 795.2</b>	<b>252 796.5</b>	<b>7 998.7</b>	<b>126 398.3</b>	<b>118 399.6</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>(134 396.9)</b>	
<b>Discontinued special political missions</b>								
United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA)	20 507.2	17 244.1	3 263.1	–	(3 263.1)	–	(20 507.2)	

	1 January to 31 December 2014			Requirements for 2015				
	Appropriations	Estimated expenditures	Variance under- (over) expenditures	Total requirements	Net requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Variance	Mandates and expiry dates
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(1)-(2)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)	(6)	(7)=(4)-(1)	(8)
United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL)	4 364.1	3 308.4	1 055.7	–	(1 055.7)	–	(4 364.1)	
United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB)	14 661.2	14 261.7	399.5	–	(399.5)	–	(14 661.2)	
Special Coordinator for the Joint Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations (OPCW-UN)	11 645.4	13 346.7	(1 701.3)	–	1 701.3	–	(11 645.4)	
Discontinued special political missions, total	51 177.9	48 160.9	3 017.0	–	(3 017.0)	–	(51 177.9)	
Grand total	645 995.9	634 029.9	11 966.0	485 160.8	473 194.8	12 730.2	(160 835.1)	

Table 7  
**Summary of requirements by major component**  
 (Thousands of United States dollars)

Category of expenditure	1 January to 31 December 2014			Requirements for 2015			
	Appropriation	Estimated expenditures	Variance under- (over) expenditures	Total requirements	Net requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Variance
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(1)-(2)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)	(6)	(7)=(4)-(1)
<b>I. Military and police personnel</b>							
1. Military observers	781.7	682.7	99.0	601.0	502.0	—	(180.7)
2. Military contingent	17 387.5	15 676.1	1 711.4	17 993.1	16 281.7	—	605.6
3. Civilian police	1 189.7	1 063.1	126.6	1 008.4	881.8	—	(181.3)
<b>Total, category I</b>	<b>19 358.9</b>	<b>17 421.9</b>	<b>1 937.0</b>	<b>19 602.5</b>	<b>17 665.5</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>243.6</b>
<b>II. Civilian personnel</b>							
1. International staff	128 379.3	137 495.7	(9 116.4)	151 190.3	160 306.7	—	22 811.0
2. National staff	28 533.9	32 327.6	(3 793.7)	30 676.6	34 470.3	—	2 142.7
3. United Nations Volunteers	745.0	391.2	353.8	986.2	632.4	—	241.2
4. General temporary assistance	306.1	66.5	239.6	1 313.8	1 074.2	—	1 007.7
5. Government-provided personnel	174.8	174.8	—	235.7	235.7	—	60.9
<b>Total, category II</b>	<b>158 139.1</b>	<b>170 455.8</b>	<b>(12 316.7)</b>	<b>184 402.6</b>	<b>196 719.3</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>26 263.5</b>
<b>III. Operational costs</b>							
1. Experts	16 567.6	15 975.9	591.7	16 564.1	15 972.4	—	(3.5)
2. Consultants	4 356.2	3 335.6	1 020.6	4 484.4	3 463.8	—	128.2
3. Official travel	13 769.5	12 845.4	924.1	14 006.8	13 082.7	—	237.3
4. Facilities and infrastructure	40 606.3	39 888.0	718.3	41 048.1	40 329.8	3 317.8	441.8
5. Ground transportation	9 064.8	9 261.3	(196.5)	8 769.6	8 966.1	4 068.4	(295.2)
6. Air transportation	27 107.6	24 440.8	2 666.8	34 038.2	31 371.4	1 588.5	6 930.6
7. Naval transportation	20.5	20.5	—	30.9	30.9	—	10.4
8. Communications	14 334.7	12 576.6	1 758.1	15 718.0	13 959.9	2 396.8	1 383.3
9. Information technology	5 526.0	5 583.8	(57.8)	5 827.0	5 884.8	1 350.6	301.0
10. Medical	3 171.3	2 742.7	428.6	3 757.7	3 329.1	8.1	586.4
11. Special equipment	—	—	—	—	—	—	—



Category of expenditure	1 January to 31 December 2014			Requirements for 2015			
	Appropriation	Estimated expenditures	Variance under- (over) expenditures	Total requirements	Net requirements	Non-recurrent requirements	Variance
	(1)	(2)	(3)=(1)-(2)	(4)	(5)=(4)-(3)	(6)	(7)=(4)-(1)
12. Other supplies, services and equipment	22 000.3	18 524.2	3 476.1	10 512.6	7 036.5	–	(11 487.7)
13. Quick-impact projects	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
<b>Total, category III</b>	<b>156 524.8</b>	<b>145 194.8</b>	<b>11 330.0</b>	<b>154 757.4</b>	<b>143 427.4</b>	<b>12 730.2</b>	<b>(1 767.4)</b>
<b>Total (net requirements)</b>	<b>334 022.8</b>	<b>333 072.5</b>	<b>950.3</b>	<b>358 762.5</b>	<b>357 812.2</b>	<b>12 730.2</b>	<b>24 739.7</b>
<b>Interim funding for 6 months</b>							
United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) <sup>a</sup>	69 430.7	62 860.5	6 570.2	31 430.3	24 860.1	–	(38 000.4)
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) <sup>a</sup>	191 364.5	189 936.0	1 428.5	94 968.0	93 539.5	–	(96 396.5)
<b>Subtotal, interim funding for 6 months</b>	<b>260 795.2</b>	<b>252 796.5</b>	<b>7 998.7</b>	<b>126 398.3</b>	<b>118 399.6</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>(134 396.9)</b>
<b>Discontinued special political missions</b>							
United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA)	20 507.2	17 244.1	3 263.1	–	(3 263.1)	–	(20 507.2)
United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL)	4 364.1	3 308.4	1 055.7	–	(1 055.7)	–	(4 364.1)
United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB)	14 661.2	14 261.7	399.5	–	(399.5)	–	(14 661.2)
Special Coordinator for the Joint Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations (OPCW-UN)	11 645.4	13 346.7	(1 701.3)	–	1 701.3	–	(11 645.4)
<b>Total</b>	<b>51 177.9</b>	<b>48 160.9</b>	<b>3 017.0</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>(3 017.0)</b>	<b>–</b>	<b>(51 177.9)</b>
<b>Grand total</b>	<b>645 995.9</b>	<b>634 029.9</b>	<b>11 966.0</b>	<b>485 160.8</b>	<b>473 194.8</b>	<b>12 730.2</b>	<b>(160 835.1)</b>

<sup>a</sup> Proposed resources for 2015 for UNSMIL and UNAMA represent 6-month interim funding, pending the preparation of a 12-month budget in the first semester of 2015.

Table 8  
Staffing requirements

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories			Total inter-national	National staff			Grand total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Total	Field Service/ security	Principal level	General Service		National Officers	Local level	UNVs	
<b>I. Thematic Cluster I, special and personal envoys and special advisers of the Secretary-General</b>																	
<b>1. Special Advisor to the Secretary-General on Myanmar</b>																	
Approved 2014	1	–	–	–	–	2	1	–	4	–	–	1	5	–	–	–	5
Proposed 2015	1	–	–	–	–	2	1	–	4	–	–	1	5	–	–	–	5
<b>2. Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus</b>																	
Approved 2014	1	–	–	1	3	5	–	–	10	3	–	1	14	–	5	–	19
Proposed 2015	1	–	–	1	3	5	–	–	10	3	–	1	14	–	5	–	19
<b>3. Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide</b>																	
Approved 2014	1	1	–	–	1	3	2	–	8	–	–	2	10	–	–	–	10
Proposed 2015	1	1	–	–	1	3	2	–	8	–	–	2	10	–	–	–	10
<b>4. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara</b>																	
Approved 2014	1	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	2	–	–	–	2	–	–	–	2
Proposed 2015	1	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	2	–	–	–	2	–	–	–	2
<b>5. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)</b>																	
Approved 2014	1	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	2	–	–	1	3	–	–	–	3
Proposed 2015	1	–	–	–	–	1	–	–	2	–	–	1	3	–	–	–	3
<b>6. United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions</b>																	
Approved 2014	–	1	–	–	1	2	2	–	6	–	–	1	7	–	–	–	7
Proposed 2015	–	1	–	–	1	2	2	–	6	–	–	1	7	–	–	–	7
<b>7. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria</b>																	
Approved 2014	1	1	1	2	6	9	9	–	29	13	–	14	56	–	24	–	80
Proposed 2015	1	1	1	2	6	9	9	–	29	13	–	9	51	–	29	–	80
<b>8. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan</b>																	
Approved 2014	1	–	–	1	–	2	1	–	5	–	–	–	5	2	1	–	8
Proposed 2015	1	–	–	1	–	2	1	–	5	–	–	–	5	2	1	–	8

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories			Total inter-national	National staff			Grand total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Total	Field Service/ security	Principal level	General Service		National Officers	Local level	UNVs	
9. Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen <sup>a</sup>																	
Approved 2014	–	1	–	1	2	2	3	–	9	12	–	1	22	1	10	–	33
Proposed 2015	–	1	–	1	3	2	3	–	10	12	–	1	23	1	10	–	34
10. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel																	
Approved 2014	1	1	–	–	3	4	3	–	12	–	–	–	12	1	2	–	15
Proposed 2015	–	1	–	–	3	5	3	–	12	1	–	–	13	1	3	–	17
11. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes region																	
Approved 2014	1	1	–	1	4	5	3	–	15	1	2	–	18	1	7	–	26
Proposed 2015	1	1	–	1	4	6	3	–	16	1	2	–	19	1	7	–	27
Subtotal, cluster I																	
Approved 2014	9	6	1	6	20	35	25	–	102	29	2	21	154	5	49	–	208
Proposed 2015	8	6	1	6	21	37	25	–	104	30	2	16	152	5	55	–	212
II. Thematic cluster II: sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels																	
12. Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea																	
Approved 2014	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	–	1	2	–	5	–	7
Proposed 2015	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	–	1	2	–	5	–	7
13. Panel of Experts on Liberia																	
Approved 2014	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0
Proposed 2015	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0
14. Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire																	
Approved 2014	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	1
Proposed 2015	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	1
15. Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo																	
Approved 2014	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	1
Proposed 2015	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	1
16. Panel of Experts on the Sudan																	
Approved 2014	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	1
Proposed 2015	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	–	–	1	–	–	–	1

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories			Total inter-national	National staff			Grand total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Total	Field Service/ security	Principal level	General Service		National Officers	Local level	UNVs	
17. Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea																	
Approved 2014	–	–	–	–	–	–	2	–	2	–	–	2	4	–	–	–	4
Proposed 2015	–	–	–	–	–	–	2	–	2	–	–	2	4	–	–	–	4
18. Panel of Experts on the Islamic Republic of Iran																	
Approved 2014	–	–	–	–	–	1	1	–	2	–	–	2	4	–	–	–	4
Proposed 2015	–	–	–	–	–	1	1	–	2	–	–	2	4	–	–	–	4
19. Panel of Experts on Libya																	
Approved 2014	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	–	1	2	–	–	–	2
Proposed 2015	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	–	1	2	–	–	–	2
20. Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic																	
Approved 2014	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	–	1	2	–	–	–	2
Proposed 2015	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	–	–	1	2	–	–	–	2
21. Panel of Experts on Yemen																	
Approved 2014	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	5	–	–	6	–	2	–	8
Proposed 2015	–	–	–	–	–	–	1	–	1	5	–	–	6	–	2	–	8
22. Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1526 (2004) concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities																	
Approved 2014	–	–	–	–	1	2	3	–	6	–	–	6	12	–	–	–	12
Proposed 2015	–	–	–	–	1	2	3	–	6	–	–	6	12	–	–	–	12
23. Support for the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004) on the non-proliferation of all weapons of mass destruction																	
Approved 2014	–	–	–	–	1	–	2	–	3	–	–	2	5	–	–	–	5
Proposed 2015	–	–	–	–	1	–	2	–	3	–	–	2	5	–	–	–	5
24. Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate																	
Approved 2014	–	1	1	2	9	12	4	4	33	–	–	8	41	–	–	–	41
Proposed 2015	–	1	1	2	9	13	6	3	35	–	–	8	43	–	–	–	43
Subtotal, cluster II																	
Approved 2014	–	1	1	2	11	15	19	4	53	5	–	23	81	–	7	–	88
Proposed 2015	–	1	1	2	11	16	21	3	55	5	–	23	83	–	7	–	90

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories			Total inter-national	National staff			Grand total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Total	Field Service/ security	Principal level	General Service		National Officers	Local level	UNVs	
III. Thematic cluster III, United Nations offices, peacebuilding support offices and integrated offices																	
25. United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA)																	
Approved 2014	1	–	–	2	3	8	3	–	17	6	–	–	23	5	16	–	44
Proposed 2015	1	–	–	2	4	8	4	–	19	6	–	–	25	5	16	–	46
26. United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS)																	
Approved 2014	1	–	2	2	6	13	10	–	34	30	–	–	64	18	40	7	129
Proposed 2015	1	–	2	2	6	13	10	–	34	30	–	–	64	22	40	7	133
27. United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) <sup>a</sup>																	
Approved 2014	1	2	1	7	28	28	28	1	96	36	–	–	132	56	25	4	217
Proposed 2015	1	2	1	7	29	30	28	1	99	37	–	–	136	63	33	6	238
28. United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia (UNRCCA)																	
Approved 2014	–	1	–	–	1	2	2	–	6	2	–	–	8	4	18	–	30
Proposed 2015	1	–	–	–	1	2	2	–	6	2	–	–	8	4	18	–	30
29. United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC)																	
Approved 2014	–	–	–	–	3	6	–	–	9	1	–	–	10	–	2	–	12
Proposed 2015	–	–	–	–	3	6	–	–	9	1	–	–	10	–	2	–	12
30. United Nations Electoral Observer Mission in Burundi (MENUB)																	
Approved 2014	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	0
Proposed 2015	1	–	1	1	3	15	10	–	31	21	–	–	52	9	16	11	88
31. Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL)																	
Approved 2014	1	1	–	1	2	5	2	1	13	9	–	–	22	3	58	–	83
Proposed 2015	1	1	–	1	2	5	1	1	12	7	–	–	19	4	58	–	81
32. United Nations Regional Office in Central Africa (UNOCA)																	
Approved 2014	1	–	–	1	3	3	4	–	12	7	–	–	19	2	6	–	27
Proposed 2015	1	–	–	1	3	3	4	–	12	7	–	–	19	2	6	–	27
Subtotal, cluster III																	
Approved 2014	5	4	3	13	46	65	49	2	187	91	–	–	278	88	165	11	542
Proposed 2015	7	3	4	14	51	82	59	2	222	111	–	–	333	109	189	24	655

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories			Total inter-national	National staff			Grand total
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Total	Field Service/ security	Principal level	General Service		National Officers	Local level	UNVs	
IV. United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq																	
Approved 2014	1	2	1	7	23	63	63	10	170	224	–	–	394	91	466	–	951
Proposed 2015	1	2	1	7	20	59	61	9	160	223	–	–	383	97	420	–	900
V. Special political mission for which 6-month interim funding will be issued for 2015																	
United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)																	
Approved 2014	1	1	3	8	11	40	44	1	109	148	–	1	258	33	88	5	384
Proposed 2015	1	1	3	8	11	40	44	1	109	148	–	1	258	33	88	5	384
United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan																	
Approved 2014	1	2	3	6	28	80	80	26	226	175	–	–	401	187	1 022	80	1 690
Proposed 2015	1	2	3	6	28	80	80	26	226	175	–	–	401	187	1 022	80	1 690
Subtotal, IV and V																	
Approved 2014	3	5	7	21	62	183	187	37	505	547	–	1	1 053	311	1 576	85	3 025
Proposed 2015	3	5	7	21	59	179	185	36	495	546	–	1	1 042	317	1 530	85	2 974
Grand total																	
Approved 2014	17	16	12	42	139	298	280	43	847	672	2	45	1 566	404	1 797	96	3 863
Proposed 2015	18	15	13	43	142	314	290	41	876	692	2	40	1 610	431	1 781	109	3 931
Change	1	(1)	1	1	3	16	10	(2)	29	20	–	(5)	44	27	(16)	13	68
VI. Discontinued special political missions																	
United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in the Central African Republic (BINUCA)																	
Approved 2014	–	1	1	1	5	15	8	2	33	37	–	–	70	8	72	5	155
Proposed 2015	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL)																	
Approved 2014	–	1	–	1	4	3	2	–	11	12	–	–	23	2	11	5	41
Proposed 2015	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–
United Nations Office in Burundi (BNUB)																	
Approved 2014	–	1	1	1	3	15	9	–	30	22	–	–	52	15	51	5	123
Proposed 2015	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–	–

	Professional and higher categories									General Service and related categories			National staff			Grand total	
	USG	ASG	D-2	D-1	P-5	P-4	P-3	P-2	Total	Field Service/ security	Principal level	General Service	Total inter-national	National Officers	Local level		UNVs
Special Coordinator for the Joint Mission of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the United Nations (OPCW-UN)																	
Approved 2014	1	—	2	2	7	12	14	—	38	33	—	1	72	—	48	—	120
Proposed 2015	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Subtotal, VI																	
Approved 2014	1	3	4	5	19	45	33	2	112	104	—	1	217	25	182	15	439
Proposed 2015	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
Grand total																	
Approved 2014	18	19	16	47	158	343	313	45	959	776	2	46	1 783	429	1 979	111	4 302
Proposed 2015	18	15	13	43	142	314	290	41	876	692	2	40	1 610	431	1 781	109	3 931

<sup>a</sup> The information provided for the Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen and for UNSOM for 2014 reflects the latest approved staffing.

### **III. Action requested of the General Assembly**

**133. The General Assembly is requested:**

(a) **To approve the budgets in the total amount of \$485,160,800 (net of staff assessment) for the 35 special political missions listed in table 6 for the period up to December 2015;**

(b) **To approve a charge totalling \$435,094,000 net, corresponding to the undistributed balance in the provision for special political missions for the biennium 2014-2015;**

(c) **To appropriate, under the procedures provided for in paragraph 11 of annex I to resolution 41/213, an additional amount of \$38,100,800 under section 3, Political affairs, of the programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015, after taking into account the unencumbered balance of \$11,966,000 for 2014;**

(d) **To appropriate an amount of \$2,213,700 under section 36, Staff assessment, to be offset by a corresponding amount under income in section 1, Income from staff assessment, of the programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015.**



## Annex I

### Summary of the utilization of the provision for special political missions, 2014-2015

(Thousands of United States dollars)

#### Summary of the utilization of the provision for special political missions, 2014-2015

a. Amount included under section 3, Political affairs, of the proposed programme budget for the biennium 2014-2015	1 081 089.9
b. Charges approved by the General Assembly for 2014:	645 995.9
c. Undistributed balance in provision for special political missions (c=a-b)	435 094.0
Charges proposed for approval by the General Assembly for 2015:	
Cluster I ( <a href="#">A/69/363/Add.1</a> )	37 312.3
Cluster II ( <a href="#">A/69/363/Add.2</a> )	35 211.0
Cluster III ( <a href="#">A/69/363/Add.3</a> )	180 460.9
UNAMA ( <a href="#">A/69/363/Add.4</a> )	94 968.0
UNAMI ( <a href="#">A/69/363/Add.5</a> )	137 208.6
d. Total charges for 2015	485 160.8
e. Estimated underexpenditures for 2014	(11 966.0)
f. Net additional requirements for 2015, taking into account underexpenditure for 2014 (f=d-e)	473 194.8
g. Amount to be charged against undistributed balance in the provision for special political missions	(435 094.0)
h. Additional appropriation requested of the General Assembly (net of staff assessment) (h=f-g)	38 100.8

## Annex II

### Special political missions 2015: lead department and administrative support arrangements

	<i>Lead department</i>	<i>Administrative support</i>
<b>I. Thematic cluster: special and personal envoys and special advisers of the Secretary-General</b>		
1. Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Myanmar	DPA	DPA
2. Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus	DPA	DFS
3. Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the prevention of Genocide	DPA	DPA
4. Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara	DPA	DPA
5. Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)	DPA	DPA
6. United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions	DPA	DFS
7. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria	DPA	DFS
8. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sudan and South Sudan	DPKO/DPA	DFS
9. Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen	DPA	DPA/DFS
10. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel	DPA	DFS
11. Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region	DPA	DFS
<b>II. Thematic cluster: sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels</b>		
12. Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea	DPA	DPA
13. Panel of Experts on Liberia	DPA	DPA
14. Group of Experts on Côte d'Ivoire	DPA	DPA
15. Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo	DPA	DPA
16. Panel of Experts on the Sudan	DPA	DPA
17. Panel of Experts on the Democratic People's Republic of Korea	DPA	DPA
18. Panel of Experts on the Islamic Republic of Iran	DPA	DPA
19. Panel of Experts on Libya	DPA	DPA
20. Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic	DPA	DPA
21. Panel of Experts on Yemen	DPA	DPA/DFS

	<i>Lead department</i>	<i>Administrative support</i>
22. Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team established pursuant to Security Council resolution 1526 (2004)	DPA	DPA
23. Support to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)	ODA	ODA
24. Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED)	CTED	CTED
<b>III. Thematic cluster: political offices, peacebuilding support offices and integrated offices</b>		
25. United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA)	DPA	DFS
26. United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS)	DPA	DFS
27. United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)	DPA	DFS
28. United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia (UNRCCA)	DPA	DFS
29. United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC)	DPA	DFS
30. United Nations Electoral Observer Mission in Burundi (MENUB)	DPA	DFS
31. Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL)	DPA	DFS
32. United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA)	DPA	DFS
33. United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL)	DPA	DFS
<b>IV. United Nations assistance missions</b>		
34. United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)	DPA <sup>a</sup>	DFS
35. United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)	DPA	DFS

<sup>a</sup> The lead responsibility for UNAMA was transferred from the Department of Peacekeeping Operations to the Department of Political Affairs as at 1 October 2014.

## Annex III

### Extrabudgetary resources for special political missions

(Thousands of United States dollars)

<i>Cluster/mission</i>	<i>2014 estimates</i>	<i>2015 estimates</i>
<b>Thematic cluster I: special and personal envoys and special advisers of the Secretary-General</b>		
Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Myanmar	667.5	718.4
Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide	785.0	780.0
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria	–	–
Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen	132.8	–
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region	1 600.0	1 000.0
<b>Subtotal I</b>	<b>3 185.3</b>	<b>2 498.4</b>
<b>Thematic cluster II: sanctions monitoring teams, groups and panels</b>		
Support to the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1540 (2004)	1 100.0	1 500.0
Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate	885.0	885.0
<b>Subtotal II</b>	<b>1 985.0</b>	<b>2 385.0</b>
<b>Thematic cluster III: political offices, peacebuilding support offices and integrated offices</b>		
United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA)	182.4	139.2
United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS)	5 718.7	6 200.0
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)	8 150.5	5 000.0
United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy in Central Asia (UNRCCA)	289.0	386.0
United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC)	2 331.0	1 325.0
Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL)	–	186.9
United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA)	699.2	560.3
<b>Subtotal III</b>	<b>17 370.8</b>	<b>13 797.4</b>
<b>IV. United Nations assistance missions</b>		
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)	616.0	50 144.6
<b>Subtotal IV</b>	<b>616.0</b>	<b>50 144.6</b>
<b>Total extrabudgetary<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>23 157.1</b>	<b>68 825.4</b>

<sup>a</sup> The table does not include information on UNAMA and UNSMIL, pending the preparation of the 12-month budget for those missions in the first semester of 2015.

## Annex IV

**Air operations resources, 2013-2015**

(Thousands of United States dollars)

	<i>Appropriation 2013</i>	<i>Expenditures 2013</i>	<i>Approved budget 2014</i>	<i>Proposed budget 2015</i>
<b>Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel</b>				
FW	126.0	—	126.0	382.1
RW	—	—	—	—
POL	—	—	—	99.8
Other	—	—	—	68.6
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>126.0</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>126.0</b>	<b>550.5</b>
<b>Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region</b>				
FW	—	—	152.0	220.0
RW	—	—	—	—
POL	—	—	—	—
Other	—	—	—	—
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>—</b>	<b>152.0</b>	<b>220.0</b>
<b>United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA)</b>				
FW	2 637.5	2 640.9	2 296.1	2 489.8
RW	—	—	—	—
POL	422.9	269.6	245.8	580.6
Other	215.0	307.8	185.4	187.7
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>3 275.4</b>	<b>3 218.3</b>	<b>2 727.3</b>	<b>3 258.1</b>
<b>United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS)</b>				
FW	120.0	131.1	93.0	764.2
RW	—	—	—	—
POL	165.8	164.3	140.2	178.6
Other	160.9	152.9	116.7	116.3
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>446.7</b>	<b>448.3</b>	<b>349.9</b>	<b>1 059.1</b>
<b>United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)</b>				
FW	1 020.0	286.1	2 048.4	3 448.7
RW	—	—	1 435.5	2 920.6
POL	—	—	649.7	2 194.2
Other	—	—	1 040.3	822.4
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>1 020.0</b>	<b>286.1</b>	<b>5 173.9</b>	<b>9 385.9</b>

	<i>Appropriation 2013</i>	<i>Expenditures 2013</i>	<i>Approved budget 2014</i>	<i>Proposed budget 2015</i>
<b>United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC)</b>				
FW	853.2	922.0	341.5	192.3
RW (helicopter)	55.7	717.4	25.6	–
POL	283.2	333.0	119.7	44.7
Other	172.9	332.1	136.8	66.0
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>1 365.0</b>	<b>2 304.5</b>	<b>623.6</b>	<b>303.0</b>
<b>United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa (UNOCA)</b>				
FW	–	–	–	–
RW	–	–	–	–
POL	–	–	–	–
Other	177.5	1.9	177.5	229.0
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>177.5</b>	<b>1.9</b>	<b>177.5</b>	<b>229.0</b>
<b>United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)</b>				
FW	5 592.7	5 504.2	4 508.7	5 788.7
RW	10 090.1	10 990.6	10 827.9	11 244.4
POL	2 144.3	1 565.3	2 093.8	1 642.7
Other	621.6	299.2	347.0	356.8
<b>Subtotal</b>	<b>18 448.7</b>	<b>18 359.4</b>	<b>17 777.4</b>	<b>19 032.6</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>24 859.3</b>	<b>24 618.4</b>	<b>27 107.6</b>	<b>34 038.2</b>
FW	10 349.4	9 484.3	9 565.7	13 285.8
RW	10 145.8	11 708.0	12 289.0	14 165.0
POL	3 016.2	2 332.2	3 249.2	4 740.6
Other	1 347.9	1 093.9	2 003.7	1 846.8
<b>Total<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>24 859.3</b>	<b>24 618.4</b>	<b>27 107.6</b>	<b>34 038.2</b>

*Abbreviations:* FW, fixed-wing aircraft, including rental and operation and liability insurance; RW, rotary-wing aircraft, including rental and operation and liability insurance; POL, petrol, oil and lubricants; Other, equipment and supplies, services, landing fees and ground handling charges, and aircrew subsistence allowance.

<sup>a</sup> The table does not include information on UNAMA and UNSMIL, pending the preparation of the 12-month budget for those missions in the first semester of 2015. The table does not include information for the four special political missions that had operations in 2014 but will be discontinued in 2015.

## Annex V

### Main factors for variances in civilian staffing requirements

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Number of positions (net variance)</i>	<i>Summary of proposed changes</i>
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria	–	No net change. Proposed redeployment of 5 Field Service level positions from Geneva to Damascus, with commensurate reclassification to Local level positions.
Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen	1	Proposed establishment of 1 new Senior Political Affairs Officer (P-5) position.
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel	2	Net increase of 2 positions, reflecting the proposed establishment of 1 new Political Affairs Officer (P-4), 1 new Senior Staff Assistant/Personal Assistant (Field Service), and 1 Driver (Local level) position. These are offset by the discontinuation of 1 Under-Secretary-General position which was approved up to 31 January 2014.
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region	1	Net increase of 1 position, reflecting the proposed establishment of 1 new Political Affairs Officer (P-4) and 1 new Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Officer (P-3) position and proposed abolishment of 1 Security Coordination Officer (P-3) position.
Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate	2	Proposed establishment of 2 new Political Affairs Officer (1 P-4, 1 P-3) positions, proposed reclassification of 1 Political Affairs Officer position from P-2 to P-3 level.
United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA)	2	Proposed establishment of 1 Senior Information Analyst (P-5) and 1 Information Analyst (P-3) positions.
United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS)	4	Proposed establishment of 2 new Political Affairs Officer (2 National Officers), 1 Security Sector Reform Officer (1 National Officer) and 1 Public Information Officer (1 National Officer) positions.
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)	21	Proposed establishment of 21 positions to strengthen the capacity of UNSOM in the areas of political affairs, gender advisory, regional liaison, human resources, medical support and logistical support (1 P-5, 2 P-4, 1 FS, 7 National Officer, 8 Local level, 2 UNV).
United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA)	–	No net change. Proposed reclassification of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General position from Assistant Secretary-General to Under-Secretary-General level.
United Nations Electoral Observer Mission in Burundi (MENUM)	88	Establishment of a new special political mission, with 88 positions proposed.
Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL)	(2)	Net decrease of 2 positions, reflecting the proposed reclassification of 1 Budget Officer position from P-3 to National Officer, proposed reclassification of 2 Security Service positions from Field Service to Local level and proposed abolishment of 1 Driver (Local level) and 1 Budget Assistant (Local level) position.
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)	(51)	Net decrease of 51 positions reflecting proposed abolishment of 92 positions, 41 new positions proposed and proposed reclassification of 5 positions.
<b>Total<sup>a</sup></b>	<b>68</b>	

<sup>a</sup> The discontinuation of 439 positions for four missions which have completed, or will be completing, operations during 2014 and will be discontinued in 2015 are not reflected in the table (BINUCA: 155 positions; UNIPSIL: 41 positions; BNUB: 123 positions; OPCW-UN Joint Mission: 120 positions).

## Annex VI

## Vacancy rates comparison

## A. Cluster I and Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate

(Percentages)

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Myanmar</i>	<i>Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus</i>	<i>Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide</i>	<i>Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara</i>	<i>Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)</i>	<i>United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions</i>	<i>Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria</i>	<i>Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan</i>	<i>Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen</i>	<i>Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel</i>	<i>Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region</i>	<i>Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate</i>
<b>International staff</b>												
2014 budgeted vacancy rate	0	8	0	0	0	5	30	5	10	20	20	3
Actual average vacancy rate for the period from January to August 2014	0	9.8	1.25	0	12.5	17.9	41.7	40	63	78	21.5	2.4
Proposed vacancy rate for 2015	0	10	0	0	0	5	30	10	20	20	10	2
<b>National Professional Officers</b>												
2014 budgeted vacancy rate	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	0	5	20	—
Actual average vacancy rate for the period from January to August 2014	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	43.8	0	100	37.5	—
Proposed vacancy rate for 2015	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	20	5	5	—



<i>Mission</i>	<i>Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Myanmar</i>	<i>Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus</i>	<i>Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide</i>	<i>Personal Envoy of the Secretary-General for Western Sahara</i>	<i>Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Implementation of Security Council resolution 1559 (2004)</i>	<i>United Nations Representative to the Geneva International Discussions</i>	<i>Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria</i>	<i>Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan</i>	<i>Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen</i>	<i>Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel</i>	<i>Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region</i>	<i>Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate</i>
<b>National staff (Local level)</b>												
2014 budgeted vacancy rate	–	0	–	–	–	–	30	5	10	5	20	–
Actual average vacancy rate for the period from January to August 2014	–	7.8	–	–	–	–	17.1	0	14	69	26.8	–
Proposed vacancy rate for 2015	–	0	–	–	–	–	10	5	20	5	5	–

## B. Cluster III

(Percentages)

<i>Mission</i>	<i>UNOWA</i>	<i>UNIOGBIS</i>	<i>UNSOM</i>	<i>CNMC</i>	<i>UNRCCA</i>	<i>MENUB</i>	<i>UNSCOL</i>	<i>UNOCA</i>	<i>UNAMI</i>
<b>Military advisers</b>									
2014 budgeted vacancy rate	0	10	—	—	—	—	—	—	46
Actual average vacancy rate for the period from January to August 2014	0	0	—	—	—	—	—	—	88
Proposed vacancy rate for 2015	0	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	85
<b>Contingents</b>									
2014 budgeted vacancy rate	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	0
Actual average vacancy rate for the period from January to August 2014	—	—	19	—	—	—	—	—	1
Proposed vacancy rate for 2015	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10
<b>Police advisers</b>									
2014 budgeted vacancy rate	—	10	15	—	—	—	—	—	17
Actual average vacancy rate for the period from January to August 2014	—	1	50	—	—	—	—	—	67
Proposed vacancy rate for 2015	—	10	5	—	—	—	—	—	83
<b>International staff</b>									
2014 budgeted vacancy rate	7	10	15	5	5	—	5	12	12
Actual average vacancy rate for the period from January to August 2014	9	20	47	16	10	—	13.1	9	12
Proposed vacancy rate for 2015	7	12	15	15	5	20	5	8	12
<b>National Professional Officers</b>									
2014 budgeted vacancy rate	25	5	15	—	5	—	0	5	20
Actual average vacancy rate for the period from January to August 2014	28	1.7	76	—	0	—	—	0	17
Proposed vacancy rate for 2015	30	2	15	—	5	10	5	0	16
<b>National staff (Local level)</b>									
2014 budgeted vacancy rate	9	5	15	0	5	—	0	10	16
Actual average vacancy rate for the period from January to August 2014	14	0	76	0	0	—	—	0	14
Proposed vacancy rate for 2015	15	3	15	0	5	10	3	0	13

<i>Mission</i>	<i>UNOWA</i>	<i>UNIOGBIS</i>	<i>UNSOM</i>	<i>CNMC</i>	<i>UNRCCA</i>	<i>MENUB</i>	<i>UNSCOL</i>	<i>UNOCA</i>	<i>UNAMI</i>
<b>United Nations Volunteers</b>									
2014 budgeted vacancy rate	–	5	15	–	–	–	–	–	–
Actual average vacancy rate for the period from January to August 2014	–	8.6	75	–	–	–	–	–	–
Proposed vacancy rate for 2015	–	5	15	–	–	20	–	–	–

*Abbreviations:* UNOWA, United Nations Office for West Africa; UNIOGBIS, United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau; UNSOM, United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia; CNMC, United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission; UNRCCA, United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia; MENUB, United Nations Electoral Observer Mission in Burundi; UNSCOL, Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon; UNOCA, United Nations Regional Office for Central Africa; UNAMI, United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq.

## Annex VII

### Security-related resources

(Thousands of United States dollars)

Mission	Number of security positions		Other security-related resources		
	Approved 2014	Proposed 2015	Approved 2014	Proposed 2015	Remarks
Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus	1 FS, 1 LL	1 FS, 1 LL	–	–	–
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria	1 P-4, 2 P-3, 8 FS, 3 GS-OL, 13 LL	1 P-4, 2 P-3, 8 FS, 16 LL	30.0	30.0	Other security services: missions share of costs for private security firms providing access control to mission offices.
Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen	1 P-3, 11 FS, 1 LL	1 P-3, 11 FS, 1 LL	236.8	191.8	Other security services: provision for Yemeni armed security guards to provide security for the convoy of the Special Adviser and provision for ESCWA close protection replacement costs for 2 visits.
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel	–	–	9.6	19.2	Contractual security services (provided by private security firms) — security guards.
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea	–	–	128.0	62.1	Other security services: armed security escort provided by UNON when requested by the experts on a cost-reimbursement basis.
Panel of Experts on Yemen	5 FS	5 FS	207.9	232.1	Other security services: security services from the national Government and costs for Security Officers from other United Nations offices.
Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for West Africa/United Nations Office for West Africa (UNOWA)	1 FS	1 FS	24.5	19.2	Contractual security services (provided by private security firms).
United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS)	1 P-3, 13 FS, 21 LL	1 P-3, 13 FS, 21 LL	305.7	341.0	Contractual security services (provided by private security firms).
United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM)	1 P-4, 1 P-3, 22 FS, 4 NO, 12 LL	1 P-4, 1 P-3, 22 FS, 4 NO, 12 LL	7 083.7	1 154.0	Contractual security services (provided by private security firms): 747.9 approved for 2014 and 1,753.2 proposed for 2015; United Nations guard units (provided by Member States/troop-contributing countries): 6,335.8 approved for 2014 and 1,154 proposed for 2015.

Mission	Number of security positions		Other security-related resources		
	Approved 2014	Proposed 2015	Approved 2014	Proposed 2015	Remarks
United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA)	9 LL	9 LL	–	–	–
United Nations support for the Cameroon-Nigeria Mixed Commission (CNMC)	–	–	60.4	54.5	Contractual security services (provided by private security firms).
United Nations Electoral Observer Mission in Burundi (MENUB)	–	2 P-3, 4 FS	–	363.0	Contractual security services (provided by private security firms): 363 proposed for 2015.
Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL)	1 P-4, 6 FS, 44 LL	1 P-4, 4 FS, 46 LL	35.9	37.5	It is proposed to reclassify the two Security Officers at the Field Service level to the Local level as Security Assistants; provision for the Security Information Operation Centre (SIOC).
United Nations Office in Central Africa (UNOCA)	1 FS	1 FS	130.0	110.8	Contractual security services (provided by private security firms): 120 approved for 2014 and 98.8 proposed for 2015; other security services: 10 approved for 2014 and 12 proposed for 2015 (UNOCA share of Department of Safety and Security).
United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI)	7 P-4, 10 P-3, 5 P-2, 117 FS, 9 NO, 140 LL	7 P-4, 8 P-3, 4 P-2, 118 FS, 8 NO, 120 LL	11 593.0	9 380.2	Contractual security services (provided by private security firms): 541.3 approved for 2014 and 787.9 proposed for 2015; United Nations guard units (provided by Member States/troop-contributing countries): 11,051.7 approved for 2014 and 8,592.3 proposed for 2015.

## Annex VIII

### National staff common staff costs

	<i>Budget 2014 (percentage)</i>	<i>Budget 2015 (percentage)</i>
Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Cyprus	28.0	25.1
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for Syria	28.8	29.0
Office of the Special Envoy for the Sudan and South Sudan	32.0	31.0
Office of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Yemen	54.7	54.7
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Sahel	29.9	32.0
Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for the Great Lakes Region	15.5	15.4
Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea	53.9	53.9
UNOWA	31.1	32.0
UNIOGBIS	28.0	30.0
UNSOM	26.0	26.0
CNMC	32.1	32.0
UNRCCA	29.6	29.2
UNSCOL	30.0	30.0
UNOCA	35.3	53.2
UNAMI	23.6	23.6

## Annex IX

### Cost-sharing

<i>Mission</i>	<i>Cost-shared positions</i>	<i>Additional information</i>
Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL)	1 ASG	Costs are shared with UNDP on a 50 per cent basis
United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS)	2 LL	United Nations country team (integrated services) — 35 per cent cost-sharing with funds, agencies and programmes