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**Consideration of effective measures to enhance
the protection, security and safety of diplomatic
and consular missions and representatives**

Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives

Report of the Secretary-General*

Addendum

I. Introduction

1. During the period from 16 May to 26 September 2014, seven additional reports were received from States pursuant to paragraphs 10 and 12 of General Assembly resolution [67/94](#). Reports by States contain, inter alia, information on measures they have taken to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives, as well as missions and representatives with diplomatic status to international intergovernmental organizations in their respective territories. The relevant information concerning those reports is presented below.

II. Reports received from States pursuant to paragraph 10 of General Assembly resolution [67/94](#)

2. **Sweden** (19 June 2014) reported the following incidents and serious offences that occurred involving the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives of the following countries in Sweden from 2012 to mid-2014:

* The present addendum includes contributions received by the Secretary-General after the 15 May 2014 deadline.



Bolivia (Plurinational State of)

On 26 February 2014, the Embassy of the Plurinational State of Bolivia became the victim of fraud when an unknown offender hacked into the Embassy's central telephone function and generated costs for the Embassy (approximately 17,000 Swedish kroner).

Bulgaria

On 4 March 2014, an employee at the Embassy was threatened by a person visiting the Embassy for consular purposes.

Egypt

On 6 May 2014, the Embassy reported that a staff member at its consular section had been the victim of threats and defamation. The alleged offences had taken place in April and consisted of publishing false information about and making threats against the staff member on a Facebook page. The victim has reported the incident to the police.

Ethiopia

On 4 January 2012, the Consul General expressed security and safety concerns after the Embassy received threats by mail and by phone. Threats were also made during demonstrations outside the Consulate.

Finland

On the night of 16 to 17 June 2012, the car of a staff member of the Embassy was stolen.

In June 2012, graffiti were painted on the walls of the Mission.

On 7 July 2012, the residence building was vandalized and a window broken by an unknown perpetrator.

France

In 2012, the Embassy received incoherent letters from a man several times a week for a short period. While the letters did not contain threats, they made staff members feel uncomfortable. The Embassy has not considered that the incidents constituted grounds for pressing charges.

Hungary

On 25 February 2014, one of the Embassy vehicles was vandalized and a bag stolen from the back seat. The investigation was closed for lack of evidence.

On 26 March 2014, the Ambassador's residence was burgled. Thieves broke open the entrance door and stole small value articles. A preliminary investigation was initiated but later closed for lack of evidence.

Iran (Islamic Republic of)

On 11 February 2014, guests at a reception held at the Grand Hotel in Stockholm were harassed, insulted and photographed by demonstrators outside the hotel and in its lobby when entering the reception.

On 25 February 2014, a demonstration was held outside the Embassy premises with permission from the police. The protestors shouted slogans through loudspeakers and caused general disturbance in the neighbourhood.

On 8 March 2014, a demonstration was held outside the Embassy premises without permission from the police. The protestors behaved aggressively, climbed the Embassy fence, shouted through loudspeakers and hung banners on the gate. The police were on the scene within 10 minutes of being notified by the Embassy but by then the protestors had already departed.

Libya

On 6 February 2012, two men loitered around the Embassy, disturbing the staff by insulting them and taking photographs of the licence plates of the Embassy's vehicles.

From October 2012 to February 2014, the Embassy staff was harassed by a man who called the Embassy up to 20 times a day. The man also visited the Embassy. He displayed aggressive behaviour and was often very loud when calling or visiting the Embassy. The Embassy staff felt offended and insulted by his behaviour.

On 30 April 2014, the Chargé d'affaires of Libya was threatened at the Embassy by a visitor who was seeking assistance with a consular matter.

Rwanda

On 16 August 2012, during a demonstration that had been authorized outside the Embassy, someone tried to vandalize the premises by attempting to take the national flag down and burn it.

On 30 November 2012, a group of people tore off a sign and a mailbox belonging to the Embassy.

Sri Lanka

On the night of 18 to 19 March 2014, a diplomat at the Embassy was burgled. The front door was found open the following morning and two cell phones, a camera and alcohol were stolen.

Syrian Arab Republic

On 16 January 2012, the Ambassador received threats and insults over the phone after pressing charges in relation to an earlier incident.

On 14 February 2012, graffiti were painted on the walls of the Embassy and the Syrian national flag was torn down. Two perpetrators were apprehended by the police.

On 14 August 2012, a group of 11 people broke into the Embassy and vandalized its interior. A computer hard drive was stolen.

3. **Qatar** (6 June 2014) and **Oman** (25 June 2014) reported that there had been no violations of the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives or of missions and representatives with diplomatic status to international intergovernmental organizations in their territories during the reporting period.

4. **Serbia** (27 June 2014) reported 22 offences committed in the territory of Serbia (19 in Belgrade, 2 in Subotica and 1 in Novi Sad) against persons employed in foreign embassies and in missions of international organizations in 2013 and 2014.

The majority of the offences were crimes against property (19), while two were traffic violations (threats to public transportation) and one was a violation of public peace and order (violent behaviour). The 27 victims of these offences were persons who stated to police investigators or in filing relevant complaints that they were foreign nationals employed in foreign embassies and missions of international organizations. No data are available, however, as to whether they enjoyed diplomatic privileges and immunities.

5. **Cuba** (14 August 2014) reported on the key results achieved by its multiple response system for the security and protection of the diplomatic corps as follows:

- There have been zero occurrences of violent intrusion into diplomatic offices in Cuba. Break-ins have been isolated events committed by individuals rather than organized groups.
- The number of criminal acts has decreased. The number of reports of crime has fallen and only nine were recorded in 2013.
- There have been zero occurrences of violent acts. No cases of assaults were reported in 2013.
- The vast majority of criminal offences have been minor and have not resulted in dangerous situations.
- There has been an increase in follow-up and cases solved in the investigation of offences committed against the diplomatic corps.

6. **The Islamic Republic of Iran** (19 August 2014) referred to the incident reported by Saudi Arabia (23 January 2013) involving a member of its diplomatic service in the Islamic Republic of Iran (see [A/69/185](#), para. 11).

According to the report provided by the Permanent Mission of Saudi Arabia, the diplomatic agent, Yasser bin Mohammed Al-Qarni, former attaché with the Embassy of Saudi Arabia in Tehran was involved in a motor vehicle accident on 14 March 2013. The report simply describes part of the actual incident and does not reflect the role of Mr. Al-Qarni in the accident.

Based on the report provided by the Tehran Traffic Police, at 5.30 a.m. on 14 March 2013, Mr. Al-Qarni exceeded the speed limit, considerably endangering the lives of other motorists and pedestrians and causing the car to swerve out of control, killing an Iranian civilian and seriously injuring two others, including a police officer.

The cause of the accident was proved to be high speed and reckless driving of the motorist while under the influence of alcohol, which constitutes a serious crime under Iranian national laws.

The Embassy of Saudi Arabia had been duly informed of previous cases of alcohol-related driving offences by Mr. Al-Qarni, which were in serious violation of article 41.1 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961. Repeated recurrences of such behaviour, which finally caused the fatal accident mentioned above, proved that the Embassy of Saudi Arabia had failed to properly address the serious offences committed by its staff.

Given that Mr. Al-Qarni had committed a criminal offence with aggravating circumstances (driving over the speed limit while intoxicated), the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, within the framework of the Vienna Convention, expressed its expectation to the Embassy of Saudi Arabia that it would cooperate with the Iranian judicial authorities to complete the judicial procedures that had been initiated, including by the victim's family, and to consider the possibility of waiving the immunity of the concerned diplomat. It was also recommended, *inter alia*, that the offender remain present in the country until due investigation by law enforcement authorities was properly carried out. It seems that the Embassy of Saudi Arabia misinterpreted this request by the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

The Islamic Republic of Iran expects that, following the return of Mr. Al-Qarni to his home country without being prosecuted, owing to his diplomatic status, Saudi Arabia will pursue the case before its judicial authorities and ensure that impunity is not tolerated for the perpetrator of such a crime under any circumstances.

III. Views expressed by States pursuant to paragraph 12 of General Assembly resolution 67/94

7. **Qatar** (6 June 2014), **Mauritius** (25 June 2014), **Oman** (25 June 2014) and **Cuba** (14 August 2014) reported on the measures taken to enhance the protection, security and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives as well as missions and representatives with diplomatic status to international intergovernmental organizations on their respective territories.¹

8. **Qatar** (6 June 2014) reported that, all measures had been taken and efforts made to secure diplomatic headquarters and ensure the safety of the diplomatic corps. This was accomplished through the use of official and civilian static guards and mobile patrols. In addition, security was provided for all national events and official visits to diplomatic headquarters. Security was heightened in case of potential threats, so as to ensure the security and safety of all accredited diplomatic missions in the country. A diplomatic liaison officer ensured that security arrangements were made in ongoing coordination between the security officials of diplomatic missions and the Public Guard Department.

The Public Guard Department had sought to enhance communications with diplomatic missions, with a view to removing any obstacles, implementing

¹ For the full text of the replies, see http://www.un.org/en/ga/sixth/69/protection_of_diplomats.shtml.

suggestions and overcoming any negative aspects that might affect the security system. Accordingly, steps had been taken to hold an annual meeting with the security officials of diplomatic missions, in order to understand the security requirements of those missions and address the issues they raise in coordination with the relevant departments of the Ministry of the Interior.

9. **Mauritius** (25 June 2014) reported that it had succeeded to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations on 18 July 1969. Before its succession, and in order to give force of law to certain provisions of the Vienna Convention regarding immunity from prosecution, exemption from taxation, security of personnel and premises of foreign missions, the Government of Mauritius had enacted the Diplomatic Relations Act in 1968. Article 22 of the Schedule to the Diplomatic Relations Act stipulates that the premises of diplomatic missions in Mauritius are inviolable and no Mauritian may enter such premises without the consent of the head of mission.

It is therefore the duty of the Government to take all appropriate steps to protect the premises of the missions against any intrusion or damage and to prevent any disturbance of the peace of the missions or impairment of their dignity.

Upon request, the Mauritius police provides armed security at the premises of high commissions and embassies. Whenever there is an increased threat, heightened security is also provided.

10. **Oman** (25 June 2014) reported that it enjoyed a safe and secure atmosphere owing to the measures taken by the security authorities.

Those measures included stationing guards, verifying the identities of persons entering the locations under protection and keeping the surrounding areas under surveillance to ensure adequate security. Similar measures were taken to protect persons with diplomatic status, in accordance with customary diplomatic practices. Those measures were considered sufficient and appropriate for current circumstances, although it should be noted that security developments were monitored to determine whether an increase in the measures that were taken normally was warranted. Such measures were taken in coordination with and by agreement of the missions and those who work at them.

11. **Cuba** (14 August 2014) reported that it had a multiple response system for the security and protection of the diplomatic corps. The system was essentially preventive and its main objective was to promote a climate of safety and security to allow accredited diplomats to attend to their business unhindered.

The system is managed by the Department for the Security and Protection of the Diplomatic Corps, which is part of the Ministry of the Interior. The Department works closely with and coordinates other areas of the Ministry and entities that make up the system.

The system ensures the full protection of diplomatic branches, offices and residences as well as of diplomatic personnel as a whole, including when outside the province of the capital, Havana, which is where such personnel generally work and reside.

The key strengths of the system include:

- Being in operation 24 hours a day
- The provision of an English and French translation service 24 hours a day
- A three-digit telephone number available to accredited diplomatic personnel in the country, which they may call from anywhere to request help
- Police response within five minutes to calls from diplomatic personnel in the municipalities of Playa, Plaza and Old Havana
- A video-surveillance system in the areas where most diplomatic buildings are located, in the municipalities of Playa, Plaza and Old Havana
- A patrol system operating 24 hours a day and specialized forces prepared to handle acts and events affecting the diplomatic corps
- Specialized training for forces involved in the system
- A special protection agency for diplomatic offices, which ensures the physical protection of diplomatic buildings on the basis of reciprocal agreements or direct contracts

Cuba stated that it would continue to give special attention to the protection and security of diplomatic missions and accredited representatives in its national territory, as evidence of its commitment to existing international norms on the issue, in particular the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.
