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# **REPORT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

**16 July 1966 – 15 July 1967**

**GENERAL ASSEMBLY  
OFFICIAL RECORDS : TWENTY-SECOND SESSION  
SUPPLEMENT No. 2 (A/6702)**

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**UNITED NATIONS**

( 121 p. )

**REPORT**  
**OF**  
**THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

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**GENERAL ASSEMBLY**  
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**UNITED NATIONS**  
*New York, 1967*

## NOTE

Symbols of United Nations documents are composed of capital letters combined with figures. Mention of such a symbol indicates a reference to a United Nations document.

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## INTRODUCTION

The present report<sup>1</sup> is submitted to the General Assembly by the Security Council in accordance with Article 24, paragraph 3, and Article 15, paragraph 1, of the Charter.

Essentially a summary and guide reflecting the broad lines of the debates, the report is not intended as a substitute for the records of the Security Council, which constitute the only comprehensive and authoritative account of its deliberations.

With respect to the membership of the Security Council during the period covered, it will be recalled that the General Assembly, at its 1462nd meeting, on 11 November 1966, approved the membership of Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia and India as non-permanent members of the Security Council to fill the vacancies resulting from the expiration, on 31 December 1966, of the terms of office of Jordan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Uganda and Uruguay.

The period covered in the present report is from 16 July 1966 to 15 July 1967. The Council held eighty meetings during that period.

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<sup>1</sup> This is the twenty-second annual report of the Security Council to the General Assembly. The previous reports were submitted under the symbols A/93, A/366, A/620, A/945, A/1361, A/1873, A/2167, A/2437, A/2712, A/2935, A/3137, A/3648, A/3901, A/4190, A/4494, A/4867, A/5202, A/5802, A/6002 and A/6302.



## Part I

# QUESTIONS CONSIDERED BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL UNDER ITS RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY

## Chapter 1

### THE PALESTINE QUESTION

#### I. Complaints by Israel and Syria

##### A. COMMUNICATION TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL AND REQUESTS FOR A MEETING

1. By a letter dated 18 July 1966 (S/7412), the representative of Syria drew the attention of the President of the Security Council to a new act of aggression committed by Israel authorities against Syrian territory, population and property, when on the afternoon of 14 July 1966, a number of Israel jet fighters and bombers violated Syrian air space, shelled seven Syrian areas situated on the site of the Jordan River development scheme, hit mechanical and engineering equipment, destroyed bulldozers with napalm bombs, wounded nine civilians and killed one woman. The Israel claims that Syria was responsible for four incidents which had allegedly taken place on 13 and 14 July had been categorically denied by Syrian military spokesmen, and refuted before the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission. The representative of Syria emphasized that his Government could not be held responsible for the activities of El Fatah and El-Assefa, nor for the rise of Palestinian Arab organizations striving to liberate their conquered and occupied territory. The machinery competent to carry out an investigation was obviously the Mixed Armistice Commission, whose meetings the Israel authorities had boycotted for fear of exposure of their fallacious arguments.

2. In a further letter dated 21 July (S/7419), the representative of Syria requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the grave situation arising from the act of aggression committed by Israel against Syrian territory on the afternoon of 14 July 1966, an act that seriously threatened peace and security in the area.

3. In a letter dated 22 July (S/7423), the representative of Israel requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider repeated acts of aggression committed by Syrian armed forces and by armed saboteur groups operating from Syrian territory against citizens and territory of Israel, and declarations by official spokesmen of the Syrian Government containing threats against the people, territorial integrity and political independence of Israel, openly inciting to war against Israel, in violation of the United Nations Charter and the Israel-Syrian General Armistice Agreement.

##### B. CONSIDERATION AT THE 1288TH AND 1289TH MEETINGS (25 AND 26 JULY 1966)

4. At the 1288th meeting on 25 July, the representative of Jordan objected to the inscription of the so-called Israel complaint in the provisional agenda which, he

said, represented an effort on the part of Israel, by presenting a counter-complaint, to frustrate the work of the Council and to confuse the issue.

5. The representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Bulgaria endorsed the views expressed by the representative of Jordan. The Council should, they considered, discuss the matter as originally presented in the provisional agenda.

6. The representative of the United Kingdom said that it had been the Council's past practice to include in the agenda communications from both sides in disputes which came before it, and to deal with those communications simultaneously. To depart from the established practice would tend, in a sense, to be a prejudgement of the claim of one party against the other.

7. The representative of Jordan said that there was no such thing as a standing practice vis-à-vis the question at issue. He suggested that the Council first take up item (a) and later, if it wished, item (b).

8. The representative of New Zealand suggested that the Council follow the procedure outlined in its decision of May 1954 and subsequently recalled at a meeting in 1957, of holding a general discussion with reference to any or all of the items on the agenda.

9. The President of the Security Council said that the revised agenda had been issued as a result of his consultations prior to the convening of the Council. Noting the reservations expressed by previous speakers, he said that, as no formal proposal had been made, he would allow the agenda to stand as drafted.

10. The provisional agenda, consisting of the Syrian and Israel communications as sub-items (a) and (b) respectively, was adopted. The representatives of Iraq, Israel, and Syria were invited, at their request, to take seats at the Council table.

**Decision:** *Following a brief procedural discussion, the Council decided first to consider the Syrian complaint, and then to decide whether to consider the Israel complaint. It was also decided that the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization should be asked to investigate the incidents referred to in the Israel and Syrian communications and report on them separately.*

11. The representative of Syria stated that Israel had cited a number of incidents allegedly caused by Syrians on 13 and 14 July as having provoked the air strike. Complaints by either side, however, were supposed to be presented to the Mixed Armistice Commission on the authority of which the Council, in turn, made its decision. Israel had boycotted the Commission since 1951

because the Commission's decisions were not to its liking; it decided on the truth of its own charges and decided its own course of action. Its policy of retaliation completely disregarded the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria, which forbade military or paramilitary forces of either party to commit warlike or hostile acts against the other.

12. The Israel attack had been directed against a water development project in Syria, and was part of a calculated plan. Israel forces had attacked the same place several times before, and the Prime Minister of Israel, the Chief of Staff and other Ministers had made no secret of the fact that they intended to prevent the work by force. The charges made by Israel were but a smoke-screen for expansionist and colonialist designs on Syria and her neighbours. Regardless of the motives alleged for the aggression, Israel authorities admitted responsibility for it. It was not Syria's duty to serve as the guardian of what Israel regarded as its frontiers.

13. The air strike of 14 July was but one link in a chain of Israel attacks on neighbouring Arab countries, all in less than a year. The decisions of the Mixed Armistice Commission had made it clear that the Government of Israel had been convicted of planning and organizing military operations against neighbouring Arab States. But no Arab Government had been found guilty by the Commission of organizing a raid on Israel. The frequency of these acts of aggression by Israel, their timing and their tactics all pointed glaringly to a fundamental Israel policy which was an inherent condition of its existence and stemmed from Zionist ideology, which was based on a policy of constant aggression against neighbouring Arab States and of obstructing the development of the Arab countries. Syria could not be expected to acquiesce any longer in the imposition by Israel of this law of the jungle.

14. The representative of Israel said that the recent incidents, and Israel's reaction to them, could not be regarded in isolation from their background. For a long time, gunfire from Syrian military positions directed at civilian activities in Israel, and squads of saboteurs and terrorists crossing into Israel, had kept the border region in a state of turmoil. In this constant harassment, Israel had suffered sixteen casualties, with four dead. The action on 14 July had been taken reluctantly, after Israel had become convinced that all its efforts through the United Nations and diplomatic channels had failed to deter Syrian aggression. An air strike had been employed because it was only by taking to the air that Israel could overcome its marked topographical disadvantage and keep casualties to a minimum.

15. The Government of Israel had no wish to engage in armed clashes or military action on its borders. There could be no trouble if there were an unconditional and effective cease-fire and a complete halt to armed raiding in Israel territory. Israel was prepared to send representatives to meet with Syrian representatives at any time or place convenient to Syria.

16. Citing a number of the provisions of the Armistice Agreement, the representative of Israel said that Syria's policy and behaviour amounted to a repudiation of these in letter and in spirit. Syrian leaders openly declared that Israel must be destroyed and announced that they were engaged in what they called a "people's war of liberation". The proclaimed policy was belligerency, and the practical steps to implement that policy included arming and training five to six thousand Palestinians in

Syria as a spearhead in the coming war on Israel; attempting to disrupt normal civilian life in the border region; setting up an illicit project to curtail Israel's normal and vital water supply; and promoting sabotage through the El Fatah organization. From the beginning, it had been clear to Israel that Syria was the source, the training ground, the principal supplier and the main political patron of that organization.

17. If the Council saw fit to adopt any resolution at all, it was clearly imperative that it condemn Syria's acts of aggression and threats of war and that it demand of the Syrian Government that it halt such activities forthwith. Syria had prevented the Mixed Armistice Commission from functioning fully, by insisting on placing on its agenda matters concerning the demilitarized zone, despite the fact that, under the General Armistice Agreement, it was for the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission to deal with such matters.

18. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recalled that the Security Council had on three occasions, in January 1956, April 1962 and April 1964 condemned Israel in the most categorical fashion for taking so-called "retaliatory measures" of a military character. The Council was now confronted with open aggression by Israel, an act which was in direct contradiction with the principles of the Charter, the elementary and universally recognized rule of international law, and the Armistice Agreement between the two countries. Israel's activities were an obvious reflection of the intensification of the imperialistic policies of the Western Powers and of their reactionary agents in the Near East. The Soviet Union could not and would not watch with indifference all these attempts to disturb peace in a region which was in the immediate proximity of its frontiers. The repeated provocations against Arab countries and the overt aggression against Syria were intolerable. The Security Council must condemn Israel as an aggressor, condemn its use of military aircraft in its provocations against Syria, and take effective measures to prevent those aggressive acts by Israel in the future.

19. The representative of the United States of America regretted that the representative of the Soviet Union had once again raised the bogey-man of western imperialism. The United States sought and maintained friendly relations with all countries in the Middle East; it gave assistance to both Israel and the Arab States, and its policy was based on a desire to maintain peace in the area.

20. At the 1289th meeting, on 26 July, the representative of Iraq said that his Government considered the latest Israel aggression an aggression against the entire Arab world. The Israel attack had been provoked not by infiltration or sabotage, but by the works of peaceful and constructive reclamation undertaken by Syria. The Zionist intruders had no right to interfere with the development schemes of Syria or any other country. The Arabs, on the other hand, had every reason to be alarmed by the Israel diversion of the Jordan River for expansionist purposes. The recent aggression was but one aspect of the Zionist conspiracy against the Arab people. The Israel policy of "hit and report" must not be allowed to continue and to become another Zionist manoeuvre to block action by the Security Council.

21. The representative of Jordan said that the attack on Syria was the sixth proclaimed retaliatory action committed by the Israel regular forces in less than a year. The philosophy of retaliation was not new to Zionism; it had been part and parcel of Israel's history since



its creation. The Council could not possibly escape its responsibility. It should consider the roots of the problem it had created when it had given the right of the majority to the minority in Palestine.

22. The question before the Council was not one of retaliation for acts of sabotage, but a further link in a long and carefully studied Zionist plan for immigration and expansion. It embodied an attempt to create a vacuum which could prepare the ground for further expansion. That policy of aggression had been the rule followed by the Israelis since the signing of the Armistice Agreement, and Israel had been constantly rebuked, censured or condemned by the Council for its military attacks on Arab lands. No Arab State, the representative of Jordan continued, could be held responsible for the rise of liberation movements among the 1 million Arab expellees who had been forcibly driven from their homeland, and unless the rights of the Arabs of Palestine were restored, the peace of the area would continue to be threatened.

23. Replying to the statement made by the representative of Iraq, the representative of Israel said Iraq had no common frontier with Israel and was in no position to bring before the Council any information relating to the occurrences on the Israel-Syrian border with which the Council was now dealing. It was unclear to him what special standing Iraq claimed for itself now to intervene in matters that concerned the Israel-Syrian armistice régime and the questions arising out of it, which were now on the Council's agenda. He would enter on the record a blanket refutation of the whole of the statement made by the representative of Iraq.

24. The statement made by the representative of Jordan, he continued, constituted not a refutation of the case that Israel wished to make to the Council, but *a priori* comments on a case which had not yet even been heard by the Council. Moreover, the representative of Jordan had indulged in a series of cheap innuendoes and sneers, to which grave exception must be taken.

#### C. CONSIDERATION AT THE 1290TH TO 1295TH MEETINGS (28 JULY TO 3 AUGUST 1966)

25. At the 1290th meeting on 28 July, the President of the Council drew attention to two separate reports transmitted to the Council by the Secretary-General dated 26 July (S/7432 and Corr.1 and Add.1) and 27 July (S/7433 and Corr.1), relating respectively to items (a) and (b) of the agenda adopted by the Council on 25 July. Both were based entirely on information transmitted by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO).

26. The first report (S/7432 and Corr.1 and Add.1) stated that United Nations military observers had investigated the Syrian verbal complaint received by the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission on 15 July 1966. The incident investigated had occurred in Syria in an area 8 to 9 kilometres due east of the Armistice Demarcation Line, where work had been in progress on a public works project. The Observers had noted six caterpillar-type tractors destroyed by burning or otherwise damaged, as well as burnt metal sheets, a compressor truck damaged, a small supply dump destroyed and two power-drills slightly damaged by falling stones. One dead woman and five injured persons had been seen by the observers. The logs at the United Nations observation posts—none of which were in locations with

direct observation of the target area—had indicated that at 1400 GMT, on 14 July 1966, four to six Israel jet aircraft had attacked targets in Syria.

27. The second report (S/7433 and Corr.1) dealt with the investigation of three Israel verbal complaints received by the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission on 13 and 14 July. These complaints related to two mine explosion incidents. The observers had seen at the site of the first incident an overturned, partially destroyed, burning military vehicle and a crater 50 to 75 cm deep and 1.5 metres wide caused by an explosive charge. They had also seen a trail of marks and well-defined matching footprints leading to and from the scene of the incident and the western bank of the Jordan River mouth. At Israel hospitals, they had also seen the body of a dead man with severe burns and traumatic injuries and an injured person and had received medical certificates for the three casualties reported by witnesses (two dead, one injured).

28. Observers investigating the second incident had found a crater in a dirt road, and a badly damaged diesel tractor fifteen metres south of the crater. At Godford Hospital they had seen a patient in serious condition with multiple wounds and lacerations caused by splinters. They had also seen a trail of marks and footprints leading to and from the northern bank of Wadi She'Ayoun and the western bank of the Jordan River, and had been shown footprints and signs from the scene of the incident to the northern bank of Wadi She'Ayoun. At the scene of the third incident, the observers had seen a concrete two-roomed building badly damaged and a number of shattered windows in two nearby chicken houses. They had also been shown a deactivated charge. The observers had also seen outgoing tracks from the scene of the incident to the Lebanese border.

29. The President also drew attention to a note of 27 July by the Secretary-General (S/7434) on the efforts of UNTSO to relieve tension along the line between Israel and Syria. These efforts had included visits to the demilitarized zone and the defensive areas, as well as proposals for facilitating conversations on the long-standing dispute over the cultivation of certain areas and restoration of the unconditional cease-fire both countries had agreed to in June. The Chief of Staff expressed the hope that the relaxation of tension that had accompanied those visits would continue and would permit efforts to be made in a calmer atmosphere to solve problems, in particular the cultivation problems, which had given rise to regrettable incidents.

30. The representative of Syria said that the aerial attack of 14 July had destroyed a development project aiming at the utilization of water resources inside Syrian territory. It was not merely a reprisal action but part of the long-term effort to realize the expansionist and imperialist designs of Israel and Zionism. Those designs went as far back as 1919 and even before, when Zionism had been conceived by its founders as a great scheme directed against the Arab world.

31. The representative of Israel said that the Security Council, although it had been urged to confine its discussions strictly to sub-item (a) of the agenda, had been taken on a historical ramble, dating back to the diaries of Dr. Theodore Herzl in the 1890s. Israel had emerged from the statement just made by the Syrian representative as an ugly unrecognizable Arab caricature of a small hard-working democratic republic which



was a permanent part of the Middle East landscape, anxious to build itself and to live in peace with its neighbours.

32. At the 1291st meeting, on 29 July, the representative of the United States said that his country supported the instrumentalities of the United Nations and believed in the full utilization of the United Nations machinery in dealing with events such as those the Council was now considering. One of the principal causes of tension along the Israel-Syrian frontier, he continued, had been disagreement over areas of cultivation. In June 1966, the Chief of Staff had been successful in obtaining a cease-fire in those areas. It was regrettable that that period of quiet had been broken by a series of terrorist incidents in Israel close to the Syrian border. From the evidence submitted by the Chief of Staff, it seemed reasonably clear that individuals responsible for those acts of sabotage had come from Syria. The Syrian Government denied responsibility for those raiding parties, but it was difficult to believe that Syrian authorities could have been ignorant of the movements across their frontiers or to understand why the official Damascus radio continued to broadcast El Fatah communiqués on sabotage and raids across the border. Nor could he concur with the statement by the representative of Syria in the Council that his Government was not required to prevent raids across its borders. Under the Armistice Agreements Syria was required to maintain peace.

33. The United States considered it deplorable that Israel had chosen to reply to the raids in a manner which had not only caused further civilian casualties but increased the danger of more serious breaches of the cease-fire. His Government supported the continuing efforts of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to help maintain reasonably quiet conditions along the frontier. It also agreed that a settlement of the problem of cultivation would help relieve tension between the two countries. In conclusion, he appealed to both sides to deal with differences by peaceful means, to avoid resorts to force and to abide scrupulously by their solemn obligations under the Armistice Agreement and the Charter.

34. The representative of the United Kingdom said that reliance must be placed on the United Nations presence to guarantee peace and security in the area. The machinery for dealing with disputes existed. The means also existed for increasing the effectiveness of that machinery. In such circumstances, it was difficult to see any justification for the air attack mounted on Syrian territory by Israel on 14 July. The United Kingdom deplored the attack not only as wrong but as wholly contrary to the Armistice Agreement, Israel's obligations under the Charter and repeated resolutions of the Council; however, that did not mean that his Government had no regard for the casualties on the other side of the line.

35. There seemed no doubt that the incidents referred to in the Secretary-General's second report (S/7433) had actually taken place. While not seeking to go beyond that report, his delegation considered that it contained certain implications which made it appropriate to recall to the Government of Syria its obligations under the Armistice Agreement, specifically under paragraph 3 of article III. He urged that both parties be encouraged to co-operate with the efforts being made by the Chief of Staff to stabilize the unconditional cease-fire and to secure agreement over land cultivation in the demilitarized zone.

36. The representative of France said that his country deplored the air action against Syria because it condemned all acts of reprisal and all so-called punitive actions. The plenary meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission should be resumed. Only in that way could a true dialogue begin.

37. France also regretted the incidents which were the subject of the Secretary-General's second report and it therefore fully supported the new efforts made by the Chief of Staff to ensure an unconditional cessation of hostilities. Israel should abandon all reprisal actions and its neighbours should be vigilant in ensuring control over their frontiers.

38. At the 1292nd meeting on 29 July, the representative of Mali said the issue before the Council was whether an individual or a nation had the right to resort to unilateral actions of reprisal. In the present case, Israel and Syria, which were parties to an Armistice Agreement, had possibilities for a dialogue, and so had no right to resort to unilateral action. The complaint procedure, however slow, could not be ignored.

39. In his delegation's view, the reality in Palestine could be defined in the most simple terms: the land of Israel, which had always been inhabited by Arabs and Hebrews, should be the inalienable homeland for both of those peoples. It was vain to hope for stability in that part of the world so long as a true solution was not found to the problem of returning the Arab expatriates to the homes they had been forced to abandon. He continued to support the complete re-establishment on its homeland of the Arab people of Palestine, in all its rights, including its right to self-determination.

40. The representative of Bulgaria said that neither the report of the UNTSO Chief of Staff nor the reports of the Secretary-General had corroborated the Israel allegations. The conclusions drawn by the United States did not flow from the documents submitted but from the fact that it had a definite policy on the question. The doctrine of reprisals set forth in the documents and declarations of the Government of Israel was contrary to the provisions of the Charter and in flagrant contradiction with the General Armistice Agreement. The Security Council must condemn the Israel attack on 14 July against Syria as a flagrant violation of the Armistice Agreement and the Charter of the United Nations. It must also remind those who had encouraged the attack that they were jointly responsible for it with the country which had carried it out. Finally the Council must insist that Israel not repeat such acts.

41. At the same meeting, the President drew the attention of the Council to the following draft resolution submitted by Jordan and Mali (S/7437):

*"The Security Council,*

*"Taking note of the complaint submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic to the Security Council against the aggression committed by Israel on 14 July 1966,*

*"Noting the report of the Secretary-General (S/7432),*

*"Recalling its resolutions 111(1956) of 19 January 1956 and 171(1962) of 9 April 1962, and in particular the provisions in these two resolutions relevant to the maintenance of the Armistice and the settlement of the disputes through the intermediary of the Mixed Armistice Commission,*

*"Noting with concern that the Israel aggression took place north-west of Lake Tiberias, well within*

the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic, and that it took the grave form of an air attack where napalm bombs in particular were used,

*"Having heard the statements of the representatives of the Syrian Arab Republic and Israel,*

*"1. Condemns Israel's wanton attack on 14th July 1966, as a flagrant violation of the cease-fire provisions of Security Council resolution 54(1948) of 15 July 1948, of the terms of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria, and of Israel's obligations under the Charter of the United Nations;*

*"2. Deplores the losses, human and otherwise, caused by the Israeli air attack for which Israel must assume full responsibility;*

*"3. Reaffirms resolutions 111(1956) and 171 (1962), and deplores the resumption by Israel of aggressive acts unequivocally condemned by these resolutions;*

*"4. Reminds Israel that the Security Council has already condemned military action in breach of the General Armistice Agreement, and has called upon Israel to take effective measures to prevent such action;*

*"5. Reiterates its call on Israel to comply with its obligations under the Charter in default of which the Council will have to consider what further measures should be invoked;*

*"6. Calls upon the Governments of Israel and Syria to co-operate with the Chief of Staff in carrying out his responsibilities under the General Armistice Agreement and the pertinent resolutions of the Security Council, and urges that all steps necessary for reactivating the Mixed Armistice Commission and for making full use of the Mixed Armistice machinery be promptly taken."*

42. Introducing the draft resolution on behalf of its sponsors, the representative of Jordan said that its provisions were the least the Council could do to meet Israel's challenge to the authority of the United Nations. The draft did not depart from similar Council action in similar cases and was based on past Council resolutions in connexion with Israel's violations of the Armistice Agreement.

43. It was obvious, he continued, that there had been no provocation whatsoever for the Israel air attack; it was a case of malicious, premeditated and deliberate aggression. The Israel charges were false accusations, aimed at covering up a serious violation of the Charter and of the Armistice Agreement. Had the Israelis had a case, they should have presented it to the Mixed Armistice Commission and allowed that organization to establish the facts, with the co-operation of both parties, and to report to the Council. It would not be fruitful for the Council to assume the functions of the Armistice Commission. The Council, in order to reduce tension, should find ways of strengthening the functioning of the Armistice Agreement.

44. The representative of Japan said his Government deplored and regretted the present situation. The Council should concentrate on helping to restore peace to the border area. It should endorse the steps taken by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and encourage him to continue his efforts. Meanwhile, it was of the utmost importance that both parties refrain from any action which might further aggravate the existing situation and that they co-operate fully with the Chief of Staff.

45. The representative of New Zealand said that the Council had a twofold task: to determine if possible where the responsibility for the disturbance lay and to consider what measures might be taken to forestall the recurrence of further incidents. Regarding Israel's air action his Government's attitude was clear: the legitimate exercise of the right to self-defence was one thing; armed action which partook of the character of reprisals was another. Israel had not exhausted the avenues of redress open to it. At the same time, Israel's right to freedom from fear of attack must be acknowledged. It was not enough to disclaim responsibility for acts of terrorism or sabotage. The Council was entitled to expect the Syrian Government to prevent, as far as possible, hostile acts from its territory against persons or property in Israel. The duty imposed by the Charter on all Member States to refrain from the threat or use of force was an absolute one; it did not admit of exception in favour of a "people's war of liberation", nor did the Armistice Agreements. He thought the Council would welcome reassurances from the Syrian representative on that score. One of the important elements in the present situation was land cultivation in the demilitarized zone and it would be helpful, in that connexion, if the Council were to give encouragement to UNTSO's efforts to work out arrangements to overcome those cultivation disputes.

46. The Council could not limit itself in considering the Israel air attacks of 14 July. Any resolution adopted should also seek to ensure that both Israel and Syria would make every effort to abide by the terms of the Armistice Agreement and to keep peace in the area, and should, if possible, contain a positive element designed to reinforce the Chief of Staff's efforts.

47. The representative of Argentina said that his Government could not regard armed reprisals as acceptable international conduct, even in extenuating circumstances. However, the Secretary-General's report left room for the firm hope that a solution was possible. He agreed with the representative of Japan that the Council should approve and endorse the Chief of Staff's efforts and emphasized that it was imperative for the parties to make use of the existing United Nations machinery.

48. The representative of Israel said that the draft resolution attempted to deal with Israel's response of 14 July as if it had no relation whatsoever with anything else in the border situation and asked the Council to condemn an action of a Member Government without considering the circumstances that might have prompted that action. It was neither fair nor balanced, amounting to a punitive proposal put forward on behalf of one party to the dispute. Such a proposal, if adopted, would have an extremely adverse effect on the situation and would encourage fresh acts of terrorism and sabotage.

49. The representative of Jordan, he continued, had referred to previous resolutions of the Security Council. In each of the cases mentioned, his Government had taken action which, as a sovereign State responsible for its security, it regarded as justified. The representative of Jordan had failed to point out that the abuse of the veto power by one member had created a situation in which only those resolutions which were acceptable to the Arab party to the dispute were permitted to become verdicts of the Council, regardless of the views of the majority.

50. His Government sought from the Council a condemnation of Syria's acts of aggression and threats

of war and a call on that country to halt such acts. Should the Council take action concerning the Israel act of 14 July, but appear to disregard the dangers to which Israel was subjected by Syria, it would only encourage such activities and perhaps lead to a much graver crisis.

51. At the 1293rd meeting, on 1 August, the representative of the Netherlands said that his Government disapproved of any action that was taken or tolerated by any of the parties concerned in contravention of the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and of the General Armistice Agreement. There was no justification for the air attack even though it was linked with the set of incidents that preceded the attack. On the other hand, his delegation wondered whether the Government of Syria might not endeavour to ease the tension by exercising a restraining influence on those who carried out incursions. His delegation deplored official statements of a highly inflammatory nature, which it considered a violation of the General Armistice Agreement. The attention of the Security Council should be directed primarily to bringing about in the region an atmosphere that was most likely to induce both parties to adhere to the General Armistice Agreement. It would not serve any useful purpose for the Council to make a pronouncement that would be contested and likely to aggravate tension and excite emotions. His delegation would therefore be unable to support the draft resolution. He suggested that the Council concentrate on only one aspect of the problem as laid down in the note of the Secretary-General (S/7434), which might help achieve the limited goal of halting destructive actions along the Israel-Syria border and securing re-establishment of the unconditional cease-fire. The two Governments should recognize the futility of crippling the Mixed Armistice Commission and should be told in unequivocal terms that they were expected to co-operate with the efforts of the Chief of Staff to settle local problems, especially that of cultivation.

52. The representative of Nigeria said the Council had more than once condemned in unequivocal terms the principle of armed retaliation; his Government agreed with that attitude and would, therefore, support the draft resolution. He appealed to both sides to give unconditional co-operation to the Mixed Armistice Commission.

53. The representative of Uruguay said that the bombing raid carried out against Syria on 14 July, if considered separately, was without doubt an illegal act of aggression; that act must, however, be judged in the context of the acts of sabotage committed on 12 and 13 July and the passions and hostilities which had prevailed in the area since 1947. It was obvious that armed retaliation could not in any way be admitted as a legal instrument in international relations and that the undue use of force constituted a flouting of positive international law as embodied in the United Nations Charter. However, in view of the circumstances, a condemnatory resolution by the Council would be neither useful nor conducive to the results desired. The Council should therefore seek a decision which would not be a mere condemnation but would devise simple and effective means to ensure peace within the law and to alleviate passions and animosities. His delegation joined in deploring the serious events which had occurred on the territories of Syria and Israel between 12 and 14 July and agreed with the views expressed in the Council regarding the need to strengthen and support the Mixed

Armistice Commission and other United Nations bodies endeavouring to maintain peace in the Middle East.

54. The representative of China said that, whatever the provocation, the Council must regard retaliation with serious concern. The obligations assumed by the parties under the Armistice Agreement should not be lightly disregarded. United Nations machinery in the area must be fully used to settle disputes. His delegation supported the efforts of the Chief of Staff to settle the problem of land cultivation and to re-establish the unconditional cease-fire.

55. The representative of Syria said the Secretary-General's report of 27 July (S/7434) made it clear that the Israel authorities were responsible for the tension in the demilitarized zone. Nowhere in the Chief of Staff's report were any of the incidents attributed to Syria. Syria's attitude was one of co-operation with UNTSO.

56. United States financial assistance, direct and indirect, he continued, was behind Israel's aggressive intentions, its defiance of United Nations resolutions and pillage of Arab property in Palestine. The Soviet Union had not vetoed any clause to the effect that the armistice machinery should have the co-operation of all the parties.

57. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the Soviet Union decisively condemned the provocative actions of Israel against Syria and considered that the attack on Syria carried out by the Israel Air Force on 14 July was an act of aggression. No Council member had openly defended the concept of military reprisals, a policy which the Council had condemned and which was incompatible with the basic principles of international law. It was regrettable that, because of those whom the representative of Israel called "the majority" who supported Israel and tried to cover up its provocations, the Council for many years had been unable to adopt a really effective decision which would end aggression and would be in conformity with the legitimate demands of the Arab countries. His delegation supported the draft resolution and considered that it represented the minimum action which must be taken by the Security Council in the circumstances.

58. At the 1294th meeting on 2 August, the President, speaking as the representative of Uganda, said that there could be no justification, moral or legal, for the aerial bombings. However, condemnation of Israel by the Council would not alone bring peace to the Middle East. It was necessary to treat the problem in a wider context, to investigate the causes and to examine the events that had preceded the incidents. Moreover, it was the duty of every State to curb the activities of persons resident within its boundaries, including political refugees. His delegation deplored the acts of violence which had characterized the Arab-Israel relationship since 1947, but felt that it was more important to focus on the real sources of those eruptions and to set up the necessary machinery to go to the root cause of the problem.

59. At the 1295th meeting, on 3 August, the representative of Bulgaria said that the Israel action against the frontier region of Syria constituted a flagrant, organized and premeditated act of aggression to which the draft resolution submitted by Jordan and Mali represented a minimum response. A refusal by the Security Council to take the necessary action to condemn Israel's aggressive action against Syria could have disastrous consequences for international peace and security.

60. The representative of Argentina said it was obvious that the draft resolution did not have enough support for the Council to achieve a solution to the question on the basis of that text. A major revision of the greater part of the operative paragraphs would be necessary in order to make the draft acceptable to his own and other delegations.

61. The representative of Japan said that the draft resolution, considered as a whole, did not seem to take sufficient account of the related aspects of the situation. Furthermore, it seemed to lack constructive and positive elements that would help the parties concerned to get at the roots of their bitter differences and achieve a truly lasting solution of the problem.

62. The representative of France said that the basic aims of the Security Council should be to encourage the work of the Chief of Staff; to remind the States concerned that they should resort to parallel initiatives likely to improve the situation and, finally, to insist on the resumption of plenary meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission. He would abstain from the vote on the draft resolution, for he was not convinced that its adoption would contribute to a reduction in tension.

63. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the draft resolution contained a condemnation of the Israel provocation. It was, in his view, the very least that could be done, and it pointed to ways of eliminating the causes of the tension in the Middle East. Its main provisions flowed logically from the need to take urgent measures in order to bridle the aggressor and to put an end to future so-called acts of reprisal which had been condemned by the majority of the Security Council, both in the past and during the present discussion.

**Decision:** *At the 1295th meeting, on 3 August 1966, a vote was taken on the Jordan-Mali draft resolution (S/7437). There were 6 votes in favour (Bulgaria, Jordan, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics), none against and 9 abstentions and the draft resolution was accordingly not adopted, having failed to obtain the required majority.*

64. After the vote, the representative of the United States said it was his conclusion that both Syria and Israel bore responsibility for the violence along the borders and that a resolution which pointed in only one direction was not helpful. There was a broad consensus among members of the Council that both parties had failed to discharge their obligations to maintain the Armistice Agreement, that both were obligated to co-operate with the United Nations in the area, to re-establish an unconditional cease-fire and to resolve the cultivation problems which had been and remained a source of tension and difficulty.

65. The representative of Uruguay once again deplored the tragic events that had taken place in the Middle East and appealed to the parties to set aside their passions and come to a peaceful solution which would enable them to coexist and would be constructive for both peoples.

66. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the draft resolution had seemed to his delegation to lack certain elements which were essential if it were to contribute to the paramount goal of restoring peace and security in the area. His delegation had therefore been unable to vote in favour of it.

67. The representative of Israel said that some positive features had emerged from the debate in the Council: a cease-fire had been established which his Government earnestly hoped would be maintained; the Chief of Staff had informed the Council that he was actively pursuing discussions with the two Governments aimed at avoiding further incidents over the cultivation of lands; and, finally, the sabotage raids carried out in Israel in the name of the El Fatah organization had been exposed to public scrutiny.

68. The representative of Syria noted that every speaker in the debate had either categorically condemned Israel's attack on Syria or deplored it. In spite of the Israel representative's efforts to confuse the issue, it remained clear, first, that the Government of Israel had been convicted of planning and organizing military operations and attacks on the adjoining Arab States; secondly, that no Arab Government had at any stage been found guilty by any of the four Mixed Armistice Commissions of organizing a raid on Israel territory, and thirdly, that when Israel aggression took place the spokesman for that Government had often proclaimed that the organized attacks across the border were retaliation for infiltration by individual Arabs. He again denied that his Government had any knowledge or responsibility whatsoever for the actions of the El Fatah or El-Assefa organizations.

## II. Further complaints by Israel and Syria

### A. COMMUNICATIONS RECEIVED FROM 16 AUGUST TO 10 OCTOBER 1966

69. In a letter of 16 August (S/7460), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Israel stated that on 15 August Syrian military positions located in the vicinity of the villages of Ed-Douga and Moussadiye had suddenly and without provocation opened fire on two Israel police launches on Lake Kinneret (Lake Tiberias). Two persons aboard the first boat had been wounded and both boats damaged. At first, the boats had refrained from returning fire, but as Syrian firing intensified and crews aboard both boats were in imminent danger, fire had been returned by the second patrol boat.

70. In a letter dated 23 August (S/7470), the representative of Syria charged that on 15 August the Israel authorities had committed an act of aggression when an armoured Israel launch had crossed the boundaries of the defensive area by approaching the eastern shore of Lake Tiberias and, in reply to the warning addressed to it by one of the Syrian shore positions, had fired its automatic weapons. The fire had been returned. Several other launches had then rushed towards it under the protection of two Israel jet aircraft, which had bombed Syrian positions. Syrian aircraft had had to intervene to meet that unprovoked attack. The representative of Syria asserted that the presence of armoured launches near the eastern shore of Lake Tiberias constituted a flagrant violation of article V, paragraph 6, of the General Armistice Agreement.

71. By a letter dated 26 August (S/7477), the representative of Israel stated that the Syrian account of the incident was not only false but inherently absurd. There never had been nor could there be any question in principle regarding the right of Israel police boats to operate on Lake Kinneret, which was wholly within Israel ter-



ritory. The question of the armament permissible in the defensive area for the Israel police patrol boats had been clarified in 1954 by a definition suggested by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, and accepted by the Israel Chief of Staff.

72. In a letter dated 7 September (S/7485), the representative of Israel drew the attention of the Council to another mining incident which had taken place on 6 September in the vicinity of the Israel-Syrian border. As a result of the mine explosion, seven labourers had been injured, two of them seriously.

73. In a reply dated 8 September (S/7486), Syria declared that it had no responsibility whatsoever for the alleged incident. The Israel authorities would be responsible for any disruption of security in the area under the pretext of this incident.

74. By a letter dated 11 September (S/7488), the representative of Israel drew attention to two further incidents which had occurred in Israel territory in the vicinity of the Syrian border. The first incident had occurred on 7 September, when an Israel army patrol had intercepted a group of four armed men who had infiltrated across the border. In the ensuing exchange of fire, two of the group were killed and the other two fled across the border. The second incident had occurred on 9 September when an army jeep on a routine patrol had been blown up on a landmine. Israel concluded that Syria had deliberately resumed a pattern of systematic and planned attacks upon the territory and population of Israel in pursuance of the so-called people's war of liberation to which Syria had been publicly committed by its leaders.

75. In a letter dated 15 September (S/7495), the representative of Syria drew the attention of the Council to the very grave situation along the demarcation lines arising out of the most recent official Israel threats against the Government, territory and people of Syria, and Israel's policy of false accusations, which was designed to serve as an advance justification for aggression. He recalled that Syria had already stated that it had no responsibility for the alleged incidents, and had offered to co-operate fully with the Mixed Armistice Commission in any investigation relating thereto.

76. By a letter dated 10 October (S/7536), the representative of Israel again drew attention to the renewal of organized and armed infiltration into Israel territory from Syria for the purpose of murder and sabotage, and the serious threat to peace and security involved in such raids. During the night of 7-8 October, the letter continued, three demolition charges had exploded beneath two apartment buildings in the Romema quarter of the north-western part of the city of Jerusalem. On the following day, Radio Damascus had broadcast a communiqué describing the incident, which Israel considered significant in determining the responsibility of the Syrian Government for these aggressive acts. A second incident had occurred during the night of 8-9 October, when a jeep containing six members of the border police which set out to investigate an explosion incident near the village of Shaar ha-Golan, south of the Sea of Galilee, had been blown up by a landmine laid in the road. Four of its occupants had been killed and the other two wounded.

77. Israel asserted that sixty-one cases of murder, sabotage and mine-laying in Israel territory had been perpetrated by armed infiltrators since January 1965 and formed a single pattern of guerrilla-type activity.

These raids were planned, equipped and directed by the Syrian authorities and armed forces.

B. CONSIDERATION BY THE COUNCIL AT THE 1305TH, 1307TH TO 1310TH, 1312TH TO 1317TH AND 1319TH MEETINGS (14 OCTOBER-4 NOVEMBER 1966)

78. In a letter dated 12 October (S/7540), the representative of Israel requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider Israel's complaint against Syria relating to acts of aggression committed by armed groups operating from Syrian territory against the citizens and territory of Israel, in particular the sabotage and mine-laying incidents of 7-9 October 1966; threats by Syria against the territorial integrity and political independence of Israel, and open Syrian incitement to war against Israel in violation of the United Nations Charter and the Israel-Syrian General Armistice Agreement.

79. In a letter dated 13 October (S/7544), the representative of Syria replied that the allegations against Syria were false and without foundation. The first incident of 7-8 October at the Romema quarter in Jerusalem, the letter continued, had taken place more than 100 miles away from the nearest point of the Syrian demarcation line and any responsibility of the Syrian Government was therefore refuted. The Damascus radio not only broadcast news of events taking place inside the occupied territory of Palestine, but information concerning the struggle of all subjugated peoples for their liberty and independence wherever they might be. Various media of information in the Arab world did likewise. The representative of Syria denied as completely unfounded Israel's attempt to attribute to Syria responsibility for the incident of 8-9 October, as well as all similar incidents. The violent threats contained in the statements of the Israel Foreign Minister made at a press conference held on 10 October were too obvious to be emphasized. It was clear that Israel was using these so-called raids as a pretext to embark upon fresh acts of aggression against Syria. Israel alone would be responsible for any expansion of the conflict and for jeopardizing the peace of the Middle East.

80. At the 1305th meeting on 14 October 1966, the provisional agenda, consisting of the Israel communication dated 12 October (S/7540), was adopted, and the representatives of Israel, Syria and the United Arab Republic were invited, at their request, to take part in the Council's discussion without the right to vote.

81. At the 1307th meeting, on 14 October, the representative of Israel, referring to a number of acts of violence which he said had been perpetrated in the northern part of Israel, near the Syrian frontier, said that these incidents formed a single, organized system of violence. There was no doubt that these actions were incited and organized by Syria, and launched from Syrian territory. Syria mobilized and supported groups of saboteurs, trained them on Syrian territory, sent them into Israel either directly or through Jordan and Lebanese territory, and publicly formulated their political aim in terms of "destroying" a sovereign State. The frivolous contention that Syria was "not responsible" for preventing hostile acts against Israel conducted from its territory could not possibly be reconciled with Syria's obligations both as a Member

of the United Nations and as a party to the 1949 Armistice Agreement, and particularly article III paragraph 3, of that Agreement. The central question, therefore, was whether Syria recognized or repudiated those obligations.

82. Israel, he continued, had no claims against Syria's sovereignty or integrity and coveted no part of its territory. It had no interest in the character of its régime, its social philosophy or its international policies. The charge that Israel, either on its own account or in league with others, was planning to overthrow the present régime in Syria, was false, as was the claim that Israel was concentrating forces for an attack on Syria. The tension in the area was caused by the many official Syrian declarations of its intention to destroy Israel by war and by the policies and actions expressing that intention. Israel had formally expressed to the Chief of Staff of UNTSO its readiness to have him undertake an immediate and free inspection of the frontier area.

83. The representative of Israel said that the Council must support Israel's right to territorial defence and condemn the hostile acts, illicit infiltrations and incitement to war by the Syrian Government. He proposed that both parties reaffirm their intention to abstain from the use or threat of force against each other's political independence and territorial integrity, and that they specifically pledge to the Council their determination to work actively to prevent any act of hostility from the territory of one party against the other.

84. The representative of Syria said his Government had repeatedly rejected the Israel accusations that it was responsible for the activities of the Palestinian groups scattered throughout the area. There were more than 1,250,000 Arab refugees living in wretchedness across the demarcation lines from Israel, within sight of the homes, farms and vineyards usurped from them. They knew that their rights to their homeland had been reaffirmed over and over in United Nations resolutions which had been cynically ignored by Israel. How could Syria be held responsible for their determination to regain their homeland?

85. It was ironic to hear the spokesmen of Israel accuse Syria of aggressive intentions while denying that their Government had any designs against the régime in Syria. General Rabin, the Israel Chief of Staff, had said the opposite in a statement on 16 September 1966. No doubt Council members remembered the Israel air force attack on Syria on 14 July, when nine men had been wounded and a woman and child killed. The record of Israel's aggression and the long series of condemnations of it by the Security Council proved that it was an aggressive colonial State, a guardian of imperialist monopolies, created to destroy the economic and social progress of the area. Syria was determined not to upset the peace, but it was equally determined to stop the aggressor.

86. The representative of the United States of America said that Israel had acted properly and wisely in seeking a solution through peaceful political means by bringing its complaint promptly to the Council. There seemed no doubt that the incidents complained of were part of a pattern and that the chief instigator of many of them was the so-called El Fatah or El-Assefa group. The Syrian Government was not ignorant of the activities of the organization: in fact, it permitted the official radio station in Damascus to broadcast El

Fatah communiqués and some officials had made statements in support of the organization's operations and disclaiming responsibility for preventing hostile acts against Israel. He urged the Syrian Government to reconsider its attitude, recognize its obligations under the Charter and the Armistice Agreements, and put them into practice, specifically by ensuring that its territory was not used as a base for terrorism or destruction with or without its consent. He appealed to all parties, including Israel, to avoid any acts which might contribute to further deterioration of the situation in the area.

87. The representative of France said the Council was justified in asking the host country to control the behaviour of refugees in its territory. No Government could shirk such a responsibility. Moreover, the Syrian broadcasts and the statements of Syrian leaders that they would not act to stop such activities showed that Syria was not free of responsibility for the latest attacks. His delegation considered that the only way to put an end to the violence was to reinstitute plenary meetings of the Israel-Syrian Armistice Commission.

88. The President of the Council, speaking as the representative of the United Kingdom, welcomed the decision by Israel to bring the question to the Council and stated that there was a clear duty, under the Armistice Agreement, on both Syria and Israel to maintain peace on their respective sides of the armistice demarcation line and to exercise proper responsibility to prevent terrorist incidents. The Syrian Government also had a clear responsibility under the Armistice Agreement to prevent the mounting of raids from its territory. As the facts were disputed by Israel and Syria, he welcomed an investigation by UNTSO.

89. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the debate in the Council had reinforced his conviction that Israel's hasty recourse to the Council was nothing but a tactical manoeuvre intended to divert attention from the true sources of tension in the area and to camouflage the military preparations of Israel extremist circles against Syria. The true reasons for the dangerous situation in the Near East were to be found in the extremist political course pursued by Israel and in the attempts of imperialist Powers to prevent by force the development of the national liberation movement of the peoples of the area. It was common knowledge that the forces of reaction in the Near East had recently expanded their activities, because the number of Arab countries pursuing an independent policy was constantly increasing. Israel had concentrated large military forces on the Syrian border and an air attack on Syria was being planned in preparation for the intrusion of Israel forces. General Rabin, Chief of Staff of the Israel armed forces, had revealed the real goals of the conspiracy against Syria, when he had said in an interview that reprisals would be directed "first of all against the political régime existing in Syria". It was the Security Council's duty to address a solemn warning to those who nurtured aggressive designs against the Syrian Arab Republic and not to tolerate developments which would threaten the maintenance of peace and security in the Near East.

90. The representative of New Zealand said that Israel on the present occasion had properly chosen to seek redress from the appropriate international body. The war communiqués which the representative of Israel said had appeared in Syrian news reports

and Government radio broadcasts suggested a relationship which it would be naive to ignore. The Council must accordingly find means of expressing the very real concern of its members. It could reasonably ask, as a first step, for immediate expressions of the parties' determination to fulfil their obligations under the Armistice Agreements. Israel had already given such an undertaking: a statement of similar intent from Syria would be welcome. It was hard to imagine a more conclusive reply to charges of aggressive designs and the massing of military forces near the Syrian frontier than the indication, by Israel, that its Government would welcome without conditions an inspection of its frontier. The Council should emphasize the responsibility of both parties to control their borders, and should place special stress on the dangers of terrorism and so-called wars of national liberation.

91. At the 1308th meeting, on 17 October, the representative of the United Arab Republic said that Israel, having failed to seize Sinai in 1956, was now aiming at the sources of the Jordan River and was paving the way for an attack against Syria in the hope of doing away with a régime which certain great Powers did not favour. Syria was not alone in defending its integrity against any aggression on the part of Israel. Israel, as an agent of colonialism in the Middle East, was being used as a tool for pressure against the Arabs, threatening their security and impeding their economic development. He found it significant that the representative of the three English-speaking countries on the Council had taken a collective stand against the Arabs. The same Governments pursued the same policy in Africa and Asia.

92. The representative of Argentina expressed the hope and desire of his Government that the UNTSO machinery would be used to the maximum of its possibilities by the States in the region. Meanwhile, he supported the suggestion that an investigation be undertaken by UNTSO.

93. The representative of Japan appealed to the Governments concerned to refrain from any action which might further aggravate the situation, and endorsed the suggestion that a first-hand factual report on the situation should be requested from UNTSO.

94. The representative of China said it was heartening to note that this time Israel, instead of resorting to retaliation, had promptly brought its complaint to the Council. He said that the reactivation of the Mixed Armistice Commission could do much to restore peace and tranquillity in the area.

95. The representative of the Netherlands welcomed Israel's decision not to consider military retaliation as an answer to provocation, but to address itself to the Council instead. Although Syria disclaimed responsibility for the acts of aggression and sabotage complained of by Israel, there was no doubt that raids were taking place and that they were publicly welcomed and acclaimed by Syrian officials and by the Syrian Government radio. Such raids endangered the peace and all Governments in the region were under an obligation to prevent them. An impartial survey could help to dispel Syrian fears that Israel was massing troops along its border, and a solemn promise by both parties to respect the Charter and the General Armistice Agreements, especially article III, paragraph 3, would also be helpful. He suggested that the President express, on behalf of the Council, the wish to

receive a report on the situation from UNTSO as soon as possible.

96. The representative of Bulgaria said that Israel, instead of making use of the armistice machinery in the area, preferred to take advantage of the active support of certain countries. The Council meeting was only another link in a plan directed against the people and Government of Syria. The other links were: economic and political pressure on Syria by imperialist countries; a show of force in the guise of a so-called friendly visit by the American Sixth Fleet to Syrian ports; efforts to shatter the unity of the Arab States in order to weaken Arab resistance; and frontier incidents and provocation. The Security Council should warn those who were plotting against the independence and sovereignty of the Syrian Arab Republic that their activities might endanger the peace of the entire world.

97. The representative of Uruguay said that just as he had condemned the armed attack against Syria on 14 July 1966 he now condemned the acts against Israel. The Council should, however, before passing final judgement, ask the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to carry out a complete investigation not only of the facts, but of the rumours of Israel troop concentration on the Syrian border. Further elements of a solution to the problem lay in strengthening the prestige and authority of UNTSO; in urging the parties to abide by their international commitments; and in the psychological disarmament of the Syrians and the Israelis.

98. The representative of Syria said that his Government's attitude of co-operation with the armistice machinery and with UNTSO, mentioned in the Secretary-General's note of 27 July, remained unchanged. Recently, the Syrian Chief of Staff, in a letter to the Chief of UNTSO, had confirmed that while Syrian authorities did not prevent Israel farmers from cultivating lands in the Zone under Israel authority, the Israelis had prevented Syrian farmers from cultivating their lands in the Zone under Syrian authority. Syria had also again confirmed its readiness to co-operate fully with the Mixed Armistice Commission, while Israel had boycotted the Commission, because it feared condemnation. The Syrian Chief of Staff had also pointed out that Israel charged Syria with responsibility for individual acts of infiltration by Arab Palestinian refugees, regardless of their places of operation, and refused responsibility for the plight of those same refugees, scattered over four countries; that Israel had rejected the proposals made by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO on 18 September, as well as Syrian proposals, to create a calm atmosphere on the Demarcation Lines; and that Israel authorities, contrary to article V, paragraph 6, of the Armistice Agreement, continued to commit a provocation by sending armoured launches across the defensive zones on Lake Tiberias.

99. During the July and August meetings of the Security Council, the representative of Syria continued, his Government had asked for a full and comprehensive report on the whole history of the demarcation lines; the report had not been received. Several of the speakers in the current debate had referred to article III, paragraph 3, of the Armistice Agreement. In view of Israel's past record, it seemed appropriate that that reminder should primarily be addressed to it. Nor should the Council be misled by Israel's statement that it was ready to have its borders examined by in-

investigators. Israel could mobilize 250,000 soldiers within forty-eight hours and its villages were armed citadels.

100. The representative of the United States reiterated his appeal to the Governments of Israel and Syria to adhere to the Armistice Agreement and to co-operate in maintaining peace and security in the area.

101. The representative of Israel said that his Government felt encouraged by the fact that several Council members had welcomed Israel's recourse to the Council and had noted that the armed raids into Israel from across the border were part of a planned pattern; that Syria had aided and encouraged that guerrilla activity; that the Syrian Government had publicly refused to prevent those attacks; that Syria was guilty of incitement to a so-called popular war against Israel and that this conduct was in violation of Syria's general obligations under the Charter and its specific commitments under the 1949 Armistice Agreement. That was a very grave indictment and the Council was entitled to expect from the representative of Syria clear and unequivocal answers on behalf of his Government to the crucial questions raised. He denied that General Rabin had ever stated that Israel aimed to overthrow the Syrian régime or any other régime anywhere.

102. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics reiterated his Government's view that the activities of extremist circles in Tel Aviv were creating a most dangerous situation along the borders to which the Soviet Union could not remain indifferent.

103. At the same meeting the representative of Saudi Arabia was invited to take a seat at the Council table. The representative of Saudi Arabia, after discussing the history of the Arabs and the Jews and the origins of the Palestine question, said that the Council must look at the roots of the matter if the problem was ever to be solved. The indigenous inhabitants of Palestine, who were not a party to the Armistice Agreements and were not bound by them, were determined to liberate their homeland, in accordance with the principle of self-determination enshrined in the Charter.

104. At the 1309th meeting, on 20 October, the representative of Nigeria urged a new effort to deal with the Palestine problem as a whole. He said that, for such an effort to succeed, the great Powers would have to deal with the problem outside the context of the cold war and the parties would have to agree on a settlement consistent with the justice of their case, as adjudged by a commission composed of members approved by all parties. Meanwhile it would be essential to insist upon the implementation of all the provisions of the Israel-Syrian Armistice Agreement. He hoped that the indications which the representative of Israel had offered to the Council regarding the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission meant that Israel would do all that was necessary on its part to enable the Commission to begin to function in the near future. Similarly he appealed to Syria to co-operate in the reactivation of the Commission.

105. The representative of New Zealand said that every Member of the United Nations was entitled to the protection of law under the Charter. That meant that Israel and Syria were both entitled to protection from attacks; the principle applied whether or not a State recognized its neighbour.

106. The representative of Uganda said that it remained his view that the United Nations machinery set up over a decade and a half ago to supervise the cease-fire and ensure the maintenance of peace in the Near East had outlived its practical usefulness, and that the time had come to adopt new and bold measures which would take into account the political and other problems of the area. If the United Nations military observers could not investigate and report independently then their reports were of little use to the Council. The new machinery he envisaged, apart from acting as watchdog over the demilitarized zone, would have as its principal duty the task of establishing areas of friendly coexistence between the Arab States and Israel. By means of that new machinery it should be possible to prevent threats in national mass media before they materialized into overt acts of aggression.

107. While there had been no direct evidence linking Syria with the acts of aggression complained of, it was important, in his delegation's view, that Syria should refrain from making hostile and bellicose statements. He appealed to the parties concerned to recognize their obligations under the Armistice Agreement and General Assembly resolution 2131 (XX).

108. The representative of the United States said that his country's foreign policy was based on respect for all peace-loving countries which adhered to the Charter, including those of the Middle East. His Government would unceasingly promote the goal of peace for all countries in the Middle East and had offered to discuss with those who had started the arms race in the Middle East ways of ending it; he repeated that offer now and would welcome an affirmative response.

109. The representative of Israel said that in the three days since the Council had last met, there had been further attacks and threats against Israel and the new Syrian Government formed that week had made a statement renewing the policy of a people's war against Israel. The two incidents dealt with in the Secretary-General's report of 17 October (S/7553) were links in a sequence of nearly seventy attacks since the beginning of 1965. The incidents followed a similar pattern in practically all cases. And only one Government—the Government of Syria—publicized and extolled those incidents. There could be no doubt that Syria was promoting that guerrilla warfare. Not all Arab newspapers and radio stations, as Syria claimed, carried the El Fatah communiqués; only the Syrian radio carried them. As for the charge that Israel was massing troops on the border, Israel awaited with confidence the Secretary-General's report on the inspection of the area. The armistice machinery was working normally; the problem of the plenary meetings of the Mixed Armistice Commission was caused by Syria's attempts to place on the agenda matters that were outside the competence of the Commission. Moreover, the Commission had a backlog of thousands of obsolete complaints which would take years to dispose of. The armistice machinery had never been intended to cope with hit-and-run guerrilla warfare. His Government was willing to discuss the border situation within the framework of the Commission or any other suitable framework; he would be happy to discuss the matter with the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and the Secretary-General. The problem was basically one of governmental attitude and policy. Syria should state whether



or not it intended to abide by its obligations under the Charter and the Armistice Agreement.

110. The representative of Syria said that one of the further incidents referred by the representative of Israel was alleged to have been committed on 18 October; that was one day after the report by the Secretary-General clearing Syria completely. It was hardly likely that such acts would be committed by Syria at the very time when the Council was looking into a complaint of aggression against it. As to the statement attributed by the representative of Israel to the Prime Minister of Syria that the new Government would "give full emphasis to the popular war of liberation as the point of departure for the liberation of Palestine from Zionism . . . and the restoration of the stolen portion of the Arab homeland," the key word was "Zionism". To any Arab, it was the Zionist call for all Jews to migrate to Israel that was the expansionist and aggressive policy. It had been asked if Syria abided by the Armistice Agreement. The answer to that question was clear: Israel had been the first party to violate that Agreement and continued to pursue an aggressive policy of military attacks across the armistice demarcation lines. Neither Syria nor any other Arab State had ever been condemned by the United Nations for military attacks on Israel.

111. The Syrian Government remains ready to work through the United Nations machinery, and specifically the Mixed Armistice Commission. In that connexion it would be useful for the Council to have a report from the Secretary-General dealing with the question of who was and who was not co-operating with the Commission, as well as a report on all the demarcation lines from the beginning of the Mixed Armistice Commissions and their operations up to the present.

112. Pursuant to its requests, the Security Council during the debate received two reports from the Secretary-General relating respectively to the agenda adopted by the Council at its 1305th meeting (S/7553) and the inspection of the demilitarized zone and defensive areas carried out on 19 October 1966 (S/7561/Rev.1). The first report, dated 17 October 1966, submitted a factual account of the investigation carried out by the United Nations military observers of the two incidents mentioned in the Israel letter of 10 October. In the second report, dated 23 October, the Secretary-General gave the results of the inspections of the demilitarized zone and defensive areas carried out by UNTSO. The report stated that violations of the General Armistice Agreement by Israel included military and paramilitary personnel and weapons seen in the demilitarized zone and in the defensive area. Violations of the General Armistice Agreement by Syria included military personnel and weapons seen in the demilitarized zone and in the defensive area. In addition, an increase in the number of tank positions and defensive fortification complexes in the defensive area on the Syrian side had been noted since the June visits. No build-up of forces had been observed either in the demilitarized zone or the defensive areas on either side.

113. At the 1310th meeting, on 28 October, the representative of Jordan said that Israel's charges had not been confirmed and should be dismissed. Israel completely ignored the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission. The Security Council should condemn those incidents which were not mere allegations but were based on findings by the United Nations machinery.

The report submitted on the demilitarized zone and defensive areas (S/7561/Rev.1) did not cover all that the Security Council was entitled to know, including the status of the demilitarized zone, whether it was still as defined by the Armistice Agreement, whether there had been any encroachment on it, and if so from what side. He therefore formally requested that a report on those matters, as well as on the question of co-operation with the Mixed Armistice Commission, should be submitted to the Council.

114. At the same meeting, the representative of the United States on behalf of the United Kingdom and the United States introduced a draft resolution (S/7568) reading as follows:

*"The Security Council,*

*"Having considered the letter contained in document S/7540,*

*"Having heard the statements of representatives of Israel and Syria and having taken into consideration the reports of the Secretary-General in documents S/7553 of 17 October 1966 and S/7561/Rev.1 of 23 October 1966,*

*"Recognizing the imperative need for the Governments concerned to observe strictly their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and the provisions of the General Armistice Agreements,*

*"Noting that the El Fatah or El-Assefa Organization has been responsible for a long series of destructive raids into Israel,*

*"Concerned at the danger to peace and security in the area,*

*"1. Deplores the incidents which have been the subject of this debate as well as the loss of human life and casualties caused by them;*

*"2. Reminds the Government of Syria to fulfil its obligations by taking all measures to prevent the use of its territory as a base of operation for acts constituting a violation of the General Armistice Agreement;*

*"3. Calls for strict adherence to article III, paragraph 3 of the Syria-Israel General Armistice Agreement providing that no warlike act or act of hostility shall be conducted from the territory of one of the parties against other parties;*

*"4. Calls upon the Governments of Syria and Israel, in the light of their statements to the Council, to co-operate fully with United Nations machinery, including the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission established under article VII of the General Armistice Agreement, for the effective implementation of that Agreement in order to prevent incidents, and for the same purpose to facilitate the work of United Nations Truce Supervision Organization personnel in their tasks of observation and investigation on both sides of the Armistice Demarcation line;*

*"5. Intends to consider further as soon as possible in the interest of the promotion of lasting peace in the Middle East what steps could be taken on the broader question of Arab-Israel relations;*

*"6. Requests the Secretary-General to follow closely the implementation of the present resolution and to take such measures as may be necessary to ensure that the Mixed Armistice Commission and the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine can effectively fulfil the functions assigned to them."*

115. Introducing the draft resolution, the representative of the United States said that his country's policy respected the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries in the Middle East, firmly supported the maintenance of a peaceful situation in the area and sought to prevent and to bring to an end all use of violence across existing frontiers. The draft resolution, with its emphasis on restraint, its concern for peace and its recognition of the broader unresolved question which forces of violence were currently exploiting, was an important and appropriate expression of what needed to be said promptly and decisively by the Council.

116. The representative of Uruguay said the Council must provide a solution which ensured that the parties to the dispute complied with the provisions of the Charter and the Armistice Agreements.

117. The representative of New Zealand said that the draft resolution was an essentially fair one, which would, if its provisions were carried out, contribute not only to peace-keeping but to peace-building.

118. The representative of Mali said that the real problem before the Council was that of the Arabs of Palestine, and that problem would be solved only when the United Nations finally agreed to deal with its substance, rather than isolated complaints from the parties to the dispute. The situation involved was a colonial one which had been created by the imperialist Powers. It could be resolved only when the United Nations, in accordance with its own objectives, granted the Arabs of Palestine their elementary human rights of returning to the soil of their ancestors and of self-determination.

119. The African group in the Council, he continued, considered that the two-Power draft resolution (S/7568) had been overtaken by events. It wished to see more effective and objective results, and would therefore request that the Council avoid adopting any resolution and resort instead to the method of consensus. He suggested that the debate should be adjourned so that broader consultations could be held.

120. The representative of Nigeria, Uganda, France and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics supported the recommendation of the representative of Mali for adjournment.

121. At the 1312th meeting, held on 28 October, the representative of Japan said his delegation regarded the draft resolution as constructive, since it concentrated on the future and emphasized that the territory of one country could not be used as a base for hostile operations against another. In considering the specific complaint before the Council, he found it difficult to isolate the incidents referred to from the broader and more complex situation which underlay them. He supported the suggestion that consultations should be continued in an effort to find a consensus.

122. The Secretary-General stated that he would authorize preparation of the two reports as requested.

123. The representative of Jordan suggested that in order to facilitate the task of the Secretary-General, the second report could be divided into two parts, the first of which, dealing with the demilitarized zones in the north, could be submitted shortly, while the second part, dealing with the other demilitarized zones, could be submitted later.

124. The Secretary-General said that the request of the representative of Jordan could be complied with.

**Decision:** *On a motion by the representative of France, the Council decided to adjourn in order to allow time for further consultations among the members.*

125. At the 1313th meeting, held on 31 October, the representative of Saudi Arabia was invited, at his request, to participate in the Council's discussion without the right to vote.

**Decision:** *Following a procedural discussion, on a motion by the representative of New Zealand, the Council decided to adjourn until the following day.*

126. Two further reports were submitted to the Council by the Secretary-General in response to the requests made by the representative of Jordan. The first (S/7572), dated 1 November 1966, dealt with the present inability of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission to function and the attitudes of the parties thereto. The second report (S/7573), dated 2 November 1966, dealt with the present status of the demilitarized zone set up by the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria. In the first report (S/7572), the Secretary-General stated that since 1951 Israel had taken the position that Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission was not competent to deal with issues pertaining to the demilitarized zone, asserting that those issues should be dealt with by the Chairman of the Commission, an assertion which Syria rejected. The Commission had not been able to hold regular meetings since that year. Of the seventeen emergency meetings held since 1951, Israel had failed to attend two. Israel maintained the same principle with regard to emergency meetings as for regular meetings. No meeting, regular or emergency, had been held since February 1960.

127. The inability of the Mixed Armistice Commission to function, the Secretary-General continued, had undoubtedly weakened efforts to maintain quiet along the line between Israel and Syria. As a result, matters which properly should first be considered in the Commission and often might well be disposed of there, were brought instead directly to the attention of the Security Council where they could be considered primarily in a political context and atmosphere. The effectiveness of the Commission depended upon the willingness of the two parties to abide by the General Armistice Agreement and to participate fully in and co-operate with it. The several appeals of the Security Council to the parties to that effect had thus far been unavailing. Serious consideration might well be given now to whether there might be some more fruitful approach to the goal of enabling the Commission to function effectively.

128. In his second report (S/7573), the Secretary-General stated that for several years both Israel and Syria had made daily complaints that the other party had encroached on the demilitarized zone, but no investigations by United Nations military observers had been possible. Israel had not requested investigation of its complaints and had denied United Nations observers seeking to investigate Syrian complaints access to certain areas of the zone. The simultaneous inspections of the demilitarized zone and of the defensive areas arranged from time to time during periods of tension by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO did not allow an adequate visit to alleged fortifications in the area. Finally, the report stated that the problem of the use of lands in the demilitarized zone still constituted one of the main preoccupations of the Chief of Staff

of UNTSO and of the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission.

129. At the 1314th meeting, on 2 November, the representative of Saudi Arabia made a statement outlining his Government's position on the Palestine problem. He wished, he said, to make it clear that Saudi Arabia would not be complacent with respect to any endeavour on the part of certain Powers to act in collusion with one another to liquidate the Palestine problem to suit the designs of the usurper Zionist State. There could be no lasting peace in the Middle East so long as the State of Israel continued to exist in the midst of the Arabs. It was for the Council to find ways and means to ascertain and meet the wishes of the indigenous people of Palestine.

130. At the 1316th meeting, on 3 November, the President drew the Council's attention to the following six-Power draft resolution submitted by Argentina, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria and Uganda (S/7575/Rev.1) :

*"The Security Council,*

*"Having heard the statements of the representatives of Israel and Syria and taking note of the reports of the Secretary-General in documents S/7553 of 17 October 1966, S/7561/Rev.1 of 23 October 1966, S/7572 of 1 November 1966 and S/7573 of 2 November 1966,*

*"1. Deplores the incidents which have been the subject of this debate, as well as the loss of human life and casualties caused by them;*

*"2. Invites the Government of Syria to strengthen its measures for preventing incidents that constitute a violation of the General Armistice Agreement;*

*"3. Invites the Government of Israel to co-operate fully with the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission;*

*"4. Calls upon the Governments of Syria and Israel to facilitate the work of the personnel of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine in their tasks of observation and investigation on both sides of the armistice demarcation line;*

*"5. Urges the Governments of Syria and Israel to refrain from any action that might increase the tension in the area;*

*"6. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council as appropriate."*

131. Introducing the six-Power draft resolution, the representative of Uganda stated that it had emerged from a draft document previously intended as a consensus but not acceptable to all members. It was felt by the co-sponsors to be absolutely necessary, in view of the rapidly deteriorating situation in the Middle East, that the Security Council take a stand that would have an impact in the area and improve the relationship between Israel and Syria. In view of the circumstances, both immediate and remote, preceding the incidents complained of by Israel, the sponsors also considered that the best results would be achieved not by condemning one or the other of the two parties, but by appealing to both of them.

132. The representative of Jordan said that the Council should consider the two reports just submitted by the Secretary-General (S/7572 and S/7573) before adopting a resolution. Those reports made it clear that

it was Israel which was obstructing the functioning of the Mixed Armistice Commission and encroaching on the demilitarized zone. Moreover, the essence of the whole problem lay in the terrorism by which Israel had been created and was now maintained. Unless the Council looked at the problem in that light, and understood the point of view of the Palestinians, it would have difficulty in reaching a solution that would be fair to the people of the region. It was necessary to adopt a balanced resolution which took account of the facts presented in the Secretary-General's reports. Such a resolution should include an objective paragraph inviting both parties to strengthen their efforts to co-operate fully with the Mixed Armistice Commission, and asking all parties to prevent incidents on the demarcation line.

133. The representative of Nigeria said that he subscribed fully to the statement made by the representative of Uganda. He would have preferred the inclusion in the draft resolution of a provision that would enable further measures pursuant to the Secretary-General's reports, but informal discussions had revealed that this would not have received unanimous support in the Council. He hoped that if the draft resolution was adopted both parties would take its provisions more seriously than they had taken other resolutions in the past.

134. The representative of Argentina said that the ideas embodied in the draft resolution were the least the Council could do in the light of the incidents which it was considering. The efforts made to reflect as general a stand as possible had constrained many members to set aside suggestions which might have been helpful. Argentina had co-sponsored the draft in an effort to avoid the paralysis which an acute division of opinion would produce and because the draft offered practical and concrete solutions to a potentially dangerous situation.

135. The representative of the Netherlands said it was necessary for the Council to throw its full authority behind the attempt to end the acts of violence in the area. It was for that reason that five out of six paragraphs of the six-Power draft resolution looked to the future rather than the past. The first of these guidelines for the future invited Syria to strengthen its measures for preventing incidents that constituted a violation of the General Armistice Agreement. The next paragraph in the draft invited Israel to co-operate fully with the Mixed Armistice Commission. He realized that Israel's refusal to co-operate with the Mixed Armistice Commission was a question of principle and of interpretation of article V of the General Armistice Agreement, and that the terrorism of the past years was not all due to Israel's failure to co-operate with the Commission. Nevertheless, the report of the Secretary-General was clear and explicit on that point and, in order to combat the acts of sabotage, the Council was entitled to ask Israel to co-operate with the Commission. The admonition contained in paragraph 5 of the draft resolution was not limited to acts of sabotage alone. The resolution contained a carefully balanced combination of admonitions to both parties; it was not a condemnation of either.

136. The representative of Uruguay said that, although the draft did not fully harmonize the various views, it was the only constructive measure that might achieve success in the Council. He would have preferred a different text, but it was impossible to allow

a situation to arise in which the Council could produce no draft whatsoever.

137. At the 1317th meeting, on 3 November, the representative of Mali said no condemnation of either party would enable the people of the region to live together in peace. The solution to the problem would not be found in resolutions cleverly slanted, for one or another unavowed political purpose, but in an objective and constructive analysis of the situation. In its present form, operative paragraph 2 of the six-Power draft resolution before the Council was unacceptable to his delegation. If the co-sponsors of the draft resolution were willing to allow a separate vote on that paragraph, Mali could once more demonstrate its complete solidarity with its African brothers.

138. The representative of Japan said the text of the six-Power draft was well balanced and was designed to relax tensions and, through the fuller use of existing machinery, to contribute to the peace of the area. He proposed that a reference to the Secretary-General's report (S/7573) be added to the end of the preamble.

139. At the 1319th meeting, on 4 November, the representative of Bulgaria said that the invitation addressed to Syria in the six-Power draft to strengthen its measures for preventing incidents was tantamount to blaming it for the incidents under discussion, although the Syrian Government had rejected the accusations and no evidence had been submitted in support of Israel's charges. The Secretary-General's reports showed that Israel, by refusing to co-operate with the Mixed Armistice Commission, was responsible for the situation in the Middle East. That situation was a result, primarily, of the manoeuvres of the great Powers which were interested in maintaining tension there. He supported the request for a separate vote on operative paragraph 2 of the draft.

140. The representative of Jordan said he would have preferred a consensus which took into consideration the important points raised in the Secretary-General's reports. Neither of the two resolutions before the Council made adequate reference to the statement that the inhabitants of the villages of Baqara and Ghanname had been evacuated and their villages demolished. There was no reference to the attacks by Israel regular armed forces on Syria, particularly the attack of 14 July, which were in part the cause of the tension in the area. Any Council draft should be based on admissible evidence not on hearsay, rumours, distorted facts or half-truths. Syria could not be held responsible for every one of the Palestinian organizations or for acts committed hundreds of kilometres away from its borders. Any resolution adopted by the Council should also make reference to Israel's continued failure to resort to the Mixed Armistice Commission, its continued encroachment on the demilitarized zone and its continued violation of many aspects of the General Armistice Agreement.

141. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics reaffirmed his statement of 14 October, stressing that the main causes for concern about the situation in the Middle East were to be found in the aggressive course followed by the ruling circles in Tel Aviv and in the attempts of the imperialist Powers to prevent by force the development of the national liberation movement in the Middle East. All efforts to arrive at an objective solution in the Council

had been fruitless. The two-Power draft, although it contained a number of unobjectionable provisions, was also unsatisfactory because its authors had ignored the clear and responsible statements of the representative of Syria. The Secretary-General's reports confirmed that not Syria, but Israel was violating the demilitarized zone, and preventing the functioning of the Mixed Armistice Commission.

142. His delegation could not agree to the one-sided solution proposed in the six-Power draft resolution, particularly paragraph 2, which would encourage the aggressive course pursued by Tel Aviv and would lead to further complications in the region. He asked the sponsors to delete paragraph 2, or at least accept a separate vote on it, adding that otherwise his delegation would have to vote against the draft resolution as a whole.

143. The representative of Uganda said the sponsors of the six-Power draft resolution regretted that they were unable to accede to the request of the representative of Mali and the Soviet Union for a separate vote on operative paragraph 2, as they felt that to do so would upset the balance of the resolution. Moreover, the reasons advanced against including paragraph 2 were not, in the view of the sponsors, sufficiently convincing.

**Decision:** *A vote was taken on the six-Power draft resolution (S/7575/Rev.1). There were 10 votes in favour, 4 against (Bulgaria, Jordan, Mali, USSR) and 1 abstention (China). The draft resolution was not adopted, owing to the negative vote of a permanent member of the Council.*

144. After the vote, the President, speaking as the representative of the United States said that the United States and the United Kingdom would not press for a vote on their draft resolution (S/7568).

145. The representative of New Zealand said that the text of the six-Power draft resolution was the absolute minimum required to meet the situation confronting the Council. The text was based on the recognition that Syria had a responsibility to prevent organizations in its territory from mounting terrorist attacks on Israel. It also recalled that Israel's long-standing responsibilities under the cease-fire agreement included the responsibility to co-operate fully with the Mixed Armistice Commission. The draft resolution, though not adopted, had received sufficient support to indicate beyond doubt the responsible position of the international community in the face of the present situation. He hoped that both parties would be guided by that expression of views.

146. The representative of the United Kingdom said that, as the Council had unanimously declared in regard to the complaint by the Congo against Portugal, it was the duty of any Government to prevent, by all means at its disposal, the use of its territory for mounting any activity the aim of which was violence against another. It was in that sense that the invitation to the Government of Syria in operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution was intended. He hoped that, despite the vote, it would be recognized that all States had an interest and a duty to exert every effort to stop violence, reduce tension, prevent extension of conflicts and enlist the United Nations peace-keeping machinery to the full in order to restore and maintain peaceful conditions. The United Kingdom had voted for the draft resolution because the text maintained



the essential requirements for dealing with the present situation, and, at the same time, provided the best basis for whatever action the Council might be called upon to take in the future. Although the will of the majority had been frustrated, he trusted that the draft resolution would be recognized as a clear expression of the determination of the majority of the members of the Council to do their utmost to maintain peace and stability.

147. The representative of Israel said his Government did not believe that the Arab refugees were to blame for the violence; paramilitary forces, operating as an arm of regular forces and in pursuance of government policy, were responsible. Two things had emerged from the debate—first, the recognition that the incidents formed a pattern of organized guerrilla activity, with which Syrian territory was connected, and second that the Government of Syria had to fulfil its obligations under the Charter and the Armistice Agreement by preventing such acts of violence. In both draft resolutions, the Council had deplored the incidents and declared that Syria should prevent such incidents in the future. Many of those who voted for the draft had indicated that they would have supported a stronger text. It was regrettable that a permanent member should have opposed a draft resolution on a matter so obviously involving peace and security.

148. The report of the Chief of Staff of UNTSO showed that the charge that Israel was concentrating forces on the border for an attack on Syria was baseless. Israel's attitude towards the armistice machinery was constructive and there was close co-operation between Israel and United Nations authorities at all levels. However, the problem was not one of machinery, but of Government policy. He added that Israel would gladly join at any time in an effort to move forward from an armistice régime to the firmer ground of peaceful and normal relations as contemplated when the armistice régime had been established. Israel wanted nothing from Syria except the precise fulfilment of its obligations, as laid down in the United Nations Charter and the 1949 Agreement, and could accept no less from Syria.

149. The representative of Syria said that the chief reason for rejecting the resolution was that, when Syria complained of the unprovoked Israel act of war against it on 14 July, an act of aggression which the Israel authorities had admitted, the Council had passed no resolution. The reports submitted by the Secretary-General proved the utter falsehood of the accusations against Syria and the continued cynicism and complete disregard of the Israel authorities for the General Armistice Agreement, Mixed Armistice Commission and the United Nations machinery. Nothing had been proved against Syria and the Council should have dismissed the Israel complaint as false and artificial. Israel would not have been able to pursue its aggressive policy of the last eighteen years, or its defiance of all United Nations machinery and resolutions, without the financial, military, political and other support of the United States and the United Kingdom. He warned the Council that Israel was making preparations for aggression.

150. The representative of the United Arab Republic said that he regarded the six-Power draft resolution as unjust and partial, and regretted that two African delegations had co-sponsored it. The case before the Council was a flagrant example of colonial-

ism, imperialism and racial discrimination and the draft resolution, if adopted, would not have contributed to the peace of the Middle East. He thanked the delegations which had abstained or voted against the draft resolution.

151. The representative of France drew the attention of the parties to the statements made in the Council regarding their respective responsibilities, the General Armistice Agreement as a whole, and particularly, article III, paragraph 3, of that Agreement. He expressed the hope that the parties concerned would comply with the spirit and the letter of the Armistice Agreement.

152. The representative of Mali regretted that the sponsors had not heeded the appeal for a separate vote on operative paragraph 2 of the draft. Mali's vote had been dictated by its wish to lessen tension in the area and to justify faith in the Council. The Council should concern itself more with the background of the problem and the causes of tension rather than with interpretations and elements having no relation to the interests of the populations involved.

153. The representative of Bulgaria said that, in view of the efforts of the United States and the United Kingdom to prepare a draft resolution that was unacceptable to one of the parties concerned and was unfavourable to peace and security, he was gratified that, thanks to the opposition of one of the great Powers, the draft had not been adopted.

154. The President, speaking as the representative of the United States, said that the resolution, which was drafted in an even-handed manner that would have contributed to peace and stability in the area, had received widespread support on a broad geographical basis. Although defeated, the resolution, and the vote on it, were on record for all the world to see and for the parties to note. He urged all Members of the United Nations to exercise their direct influence to assure implementation of the essential features of the resolution. As it was a matter of record that the organization which claimed credit for the incidents was based on Syrian soil, his Government fully concurred with the sense of the draft that it was necessary that Syria ensure that no warlike act or act of hostility was conducted from its territory. The United States also concurred with the draft's recommendation that Israel should co-operate fully with the General Armistice Agreement; it concurred as well with the comment in one of the Secretary-General's reports that consideration might be given to the possibility of finding a more fruitful approach to the goal of enabling the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission to function effectively; and it endorsed the call on both Governments to facilitate the work of UNTSO in the area.

### C. SUBSEQUENT COMMUNICATIONS

155. During the debate in the Council, several communications relating to the Israel complaint were received.

156. By a letter dated 18 October (S/7556), the representative of Israel drew the attention of the Council to another case of road-mining in Israel territory in the vicinity of the Israel-Syria border which had occurred on the morning of 18 October.

157. By a letter dated 20 October (S/7557), the representative of Yemen referred to certain charges

concerning his country made by the representative of Israel in the Council on 14 October, and replied that in asking for military support from the United Arab Republic, it had acted in accordance with previously existing treaties and agreements between the two sister countries.

158. By a letter dated 23 October (S/7562), the representative of Israel referred to the series of mine-laying and sabotage incidents with which the Council was now dealing, and said that since 20 October there had been two further attacks of that kind in Israel territory near the border.

159. In a further letter dated 3 November (S/7576), the representative of Israel submitted charges of fresh sabotage raids into Israel and warlike threats by Syrian leaders.

160. The Secretary-General issued a note dated 29 November (S/7603) concerning references which had been made by a number of the members of the Security Council during its recent debates to the questions of how the UNTSO might be made a more effective instrument for avoiding armed conflict in the area and how its reports on incidents might be improved. The Secretary-General stated that it would be recognized that, due to the nature of the operation, there was a fundamental limitation on the scope and effectiveness of UNTSO's activities. It was an observation operation whose principal function was to help maintain peace by servicing the armistice machinery established by the parties themselves. As an observation mission, UNTSO had no authority to give orders, to reach judgements or forcibly to prevent actions. It operated on the territories of sovereign, independent States only with their explicit permission.

161. Despite its inherent limitations, the Secretary-General stated, it was possible for UNTSO's effectiveness as an instrument for safeguarding the peace to be strengthened without changing its existing mandate or function. The first requirement, of course, was full co-operation of the parties to the General Armistice Agreements with UNTSO in the performance of its functions and full observance by the parties of the obligations they had freely and solemnly accepted in those Agreements. The Secretary-General suggested several measures including full freedom of movement for UNTSO observers in the area of incidents; easy access to responsible authorities on either side at any time; agreement for deployment by UNTSO of mobile observation posts in sensitive sectors as speedily as possible; and the availability of a helicopter and the stationing of a speed boat on Lake Tiberias.

### III. Complaints by Israel and Jordan

#### A. COMMUNICATIONS

162. In a letter of 27 October 1966 (S/7569), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Israel stated that on the evening of that day a freight train travelling from Jerusalem to Tel Aviv had been blown up and partially derailed by explosive charges near the Jordan border close to the Israel village of Battir. Fire had been opened upon the train and one member of the train staff had been injured.

163. By a further letter dated 12 November (S/7584), the representative of Israel charged that during

the night of 11 November an Israel army vehicle engaged on a regular patrol had been blown up by a land-mine. Three of its occupants had been killed and the other six injured. His Government reaffirmed the gravity with which it viewed these raids, and the responsibility which lay upon the Government of Jordan to prevent incursions from its territory by armed saboteur and terrorist groups.

164. By a letter dated 14 November (S/7586), the representative of Jordan drew the attention of the Security Council to a grave situation resulting from a naked act of aggression committed on 13 November by Israel armed forces, which had crossed the armistice demarcation line in brigade strength, supported by a squadron of Mirage jets, heavy artillery, a large number of personnel carriers and more than twenty tanks. The invading force had sought to destroy Arab villages and hamlets south of Hebron, subjecting the villages of As Samu, Rafaat and the police post of Rujm El Madfa'a to bombardment from the air and shelling the police post and village of Tawawani with heavy artillery. Detachments of the Jordanian army and air force had engaged the invaders in battle and had stopped their advance. By that dastardly attack against civilian population and property, Israel had added one more link to its long chain of acts of war against the Arab people.

#### B. CONSIDERATION AT THE 1320TH TO 1328TH MEETINGS (16-25 NOVEMBER 1966) AND REPORTS OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

165. By a letter dated 15 November (S/7587), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Jordan requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the act of aggression committed by Israel armed forces against the citizens and territory of Jordan on 13 November.

166. At the 1320th meeting on 16 November 1966, the provisional agenda, consisting of the Jordan letter dated 15 November was adopted. The representative of Israel was invited, at his request, to take a seat at the Council table.

167. At the beginning of the Security Council's meeting, the Secretary-General made a preliminary oral statement based on some early reports he had received from United Nations Observers in the area. He stated that UNTSO had received a complaint from Jordan that at 0615 hours local time on 13 November, Israel armoured cars had opened fire from the Israel side of the Armistice Demarcation Line against a Jordanian police post at Rujm El Madfa'a in the southern Hebron area using artillery and heavy machine-guns. The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission had immediately endeavoured to arrange for a cease-fire and had undertaken an investigation in Jordan which was continuing. Subsequent information had been received from Jordan that Israel forces had withdrawn and firing had stopped. The investigating United Nations military observers had interrogated eight witnesses and observed evidence of damage and destruction at As Samu, Jimba, Rafaat and the police post at Rujm El Madfa'a. A full report on the incident would be made available to the Council as soon as the investigation had been completed.

168. The representative of Jordan said that the present explosive situation in the Near East, resulting

from the aggressive and irresponsible policy of the Israel authorities, and reflected in the reckless act of aggression just committed, called for serious consideration and urgent action by the Security Council.

169. His delegation had repeatedly warned the Council during its last series of meetings that Israel was planning to commit further aggressions unfortunately, however, no adequate measures had been taken to remedy the situation. Israel had said repeatedly in the Council that it had no complaint against the Government of Jordan, which did not help or encourage any of the incidents inside Israel-occupied territory. Yet, on 13 November, Israel armed forces supported by jets, heavy artillery and tanks had crossed the demarcation line and carried out a brutal and sustained attack resulting in very heavy losses in life and property.

170. As a result of that attack there had been demonstrations in Jordan and the situation was becoming extremely tense. In view of the gravity of the crime, Jordan had expected strong statements of condemnation from the permanent members of the Council. Instead of such condemnations, however, the United States had attempted to justify the attack, and continued to treat the question of Palestine as a domestic issue.

171. Israel had been repeatedly condemned by the Council in the past for acts of aggression. Only six months before, Jordan had informed the Council of a decision of the Mixed Armistice Commission which had condemned "a hostile and warlike act officially planned by the Israel authorities and launched by the Israel forces against Jordan" as "a most serious violation of article III, paragraphs 2 and 3, of the General Armistice Agreement", and had deplored the resulting damage and destruction. The Commission had also called on the Israel authorities in the strongest terms "to desist from a most serious threat to peace and security". Israel had instead committed additional acts of war, terrorism and bloodshed and again defied the Charter and the Council. The new attack on Jordan was a further manifestation of contempt for, and complete defiance of, the Council's authority. Under the circumstances, mere condemnation by the Council was not enough; if the Council wished to maintain its prestige and authority, application of Chapter VII of the Charter was the only answer.

172. The representative of Israel said that no constructive purpose could be served by disapproving a specific action without regard to the circumstances that had prompted it. Contrary to the Charter and the Armistice Agreements, the four Arab Governments bordering Israel, having tried to crush it in 1948, refused to accept its political independence and territorial integrity and called for its extinction as a State and the dispersal of its people by force of arms. There had been seventy-one raids since January 1965, partly across the Syrian border and partly across the borders of other neighbouring Arab States. Israel had always made it clear to the Council that, even if Syria was the basic source of this trouble, the Government of each neighbouring State must be held fully to its commitment to prevent attacks or incursions from its territory into Israel. Recently, organized terrorism and sabotage across the Jordan border had become bolder and more frequent, involving certain villages in Jordan which served as bases of operation and staging posts. The local inhabitants had harboured and assisted the saboteurs without serious interference from Jordanian

security authorities. Israel, after long forbearance, and as a last resort, had reluctantly undertaken limited local action, directed at the villages involved. Its defensive action had been carried out by a relatively small task force which had been strictly instructed to take every possible measure to avoid casualties. His Government regretted any casualties resulting from the action, just as it regretted the casualties resulting from the attacks upon Israel which had preceded the action.

173. In the context of its security problem, Israel could not permit guerrilla raids to be carried out with impunity. It had been suggested that Israel, when attacked, should confine itself to recourse to the United Nations machinery on the spot, particularly the Mixed Armistice Commission. The real issue, however, was not one of United Nations machinery but of government policy. The Arab States, and they alone, could resolve the problem by putting a stop to the attacks from their territories and by ceasing their warlike incitement.

174. The representative of the United Kingdom said that Israel's calculated, admitted and wholly disproportionate military reprisal could not be justified, and deplored the senseless damage and the cost in human life which had resulted. The Israel attack could not be condoned even if Jordan had been found to be directly responsible for the mining incident of 12 November reported by Israel. The reprisal action, a flagrant violation of the Charter and the Armistice Agreement, had done nothing to enhance Israel's reputation or the security of its citizens. Such actions only increased the risk of greater conflict between Israel and its Arab neighbours and the Government of Israel must be held responsible and condemned for them. The tense and deteriorating situation which now prevailed between Israel and certain of its Arab neighbours could only be restored by strict observance of the obligations undertaken under the General Armistice Agreement.

175. The President of the Council, speaking as the representative of the United States, said that immediately after learning of the incident before the Council he had issued a statement expressing his Government's strong disapproval of the large-scale Israel military action on Jordanian territory. The United States condemned the action, which it deemed in clear violation of solemn obligations undertaken by Israel in the General Armistice Agreement. That action could not be justified, explained away or excused by the incidents which had preceded it, in which the Government of Jordan had not been implicated. It had been undertaken without prior recourse to the Mixed Armistice Commission and without any effort to use the good offices of the Security Council. Jordan's record of co-operation with the United Nations peace-keeping machinery in the Middle East spoke for itself. The fact that the Council had been actively concerned with security problems in the area just before the raid made Israel's resort to force even more deplorable. His delegation appealed to all nations in the area to exercise restraint in the present dangerous situation and to adhere strictly to the General Armistice Agreements. He suggested that the Council ask the Secretary-General and the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to keep the situation in the area under close and constant review, reporting as appropriate to the Council. He also supported the suggestion made recently by the representative of Nigeria that the Council consider what steps

it could take to strengthen the fabric of peace in the area, through the machinery of prevention, fact-finding or conciliation, or any other device it might think appropriate.

176. At the 1321st meeting, on 16 November, the representative of France said that his delegation unequivocally condemned the military action planned and carried out by the Israel authorities, as it condemned all reprisal operations. His delegation was aware of the grave incidents which had incited the Government of Israel to commit an act which violated the Charter and the General Armistice Agreement, but found it difficult to understand why such a deadly attack had been launched against a country which respected its international obligations.

177. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the attack carried out by Israel had been a major military operation which could have been executed only on direct government orders. Recently, one Arab country after another had been the victim of Israel provocation and aggression. Such a situation could not be tolerated. The aggressive military action of 13 November had been so flagrant that even the representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom had been forced to condemn it. Events had shown that the Soviet Union had been justified in voting against the one-sided draft resolution submitted during the recent discussion of the Israel complaint against Syria, and fully supported its assessment that the tension in the Middle East was caused by the extremist policy of Israel and its backers towards the Arab countries and by the desire of the imperialist Powers to restrain national liberation movements by force. The Soviet Union, whose borders were near that region, cherished the interests of peace and security in the Middle East and considered that the aggressive actions against Arab States should be stopped immediately. The Council must severely condemn Israel as an aggressor that had violated the Armistice Agreement, numerous resolutions of the Security Council and the fundamental principles of the Charter. It must take effective measures to ensure the cessation, once and for all, of Israel aggression against the Arab countries.

178. At the 1322nd meeting, on 17 November, the representative of Argentina said that he deplored the loss of life involved in the incident under discussion and strongly condemned the attack by Israel as a violation of the Charter and of the principles of international law, unjustified and out of proportion to the provocations mentioned. The time had come to adopt measures which would prevent a repetition of such incidents. The existing organs in the area must be enabled to carry out their task effectively.

179. The representative of Japan said that he strongly deplored the retaliatory action undertaken by Israel, which had been carried out in clear disregard of its obligations under the Charter and the General Armistice Agreement.

180. The representative of New Zealand said that he understood the frustrations caused by continued incidents, including the loss of life through terrorist activities across the borders of Israel, and appreciated the nature of Israel's strategic quandary. However, he could not condone a calculated act of retaliation both different from and disproportionate to the series of terrorist acts which had preceded it. His delegation

had no doubt that the Council was bound to pronounce its firm condemnation. He recognized, however, that the incident that had occurred on Israel's territory must inevitably have been a source of strain and tension in relations between Israel and those of its neighbours from which the infiltrators came. The Council should address itself effectively to this problem if it was to deal with the immediate causes of the violence.

181. At the 1323rd meeting, on 18 November, the representative of the Netherlands said that, had the Council adopted a fair and balanced resolution at its last series of meetings, it might have exercised a restraining influence in the Middle East. Nevertheless, there was never any justification for taking the law into one's own hands and even the inexcusable sabotage against Israel could not justify such a vehement reprisal. The attack was all the more regrettable because it had been directed against civilians in a country which had adhered to its international obligations and had disavowed terrorist groups. The only effective remedy was for all parties strictly to respect their obligations under the Charter and the General Armistice Agreement. The Council's main concern now should be to prevent repetition of such military actions and other acts of violence. If strengthening the Truce Supervision Organization could contribute to that purpose, the Council should seriously consider the possibility.

182. The representative of China strongly deplored the retaliatory raid carried out by the Government of Israel on 13 November and voiced his disapproval of the policy of reprisal as reprehensible and contrary to the letter and spirit of the Charter. The Israel attack was all the more deplorable because it had been directed at a party which had endeavoured to co-operate with the United Nations machinery in the area and to observe its obligations under the General Armistice Agreement.

183. The representative of Israel said the representative of Jordan had asked the Council to consider the action in a void unrelated to previous events and to Israel's security problem, and had claimed that the considerations which prompted that action were irrelevant to the complaint on the agenda. That was an untenable position. While Council members had disapproved of Israel's action, most of them had not regarded the circumstances as irrelevant. That was a logical and necessary view which should be reflected in any draft resolution presented.

184. In his delegation's view, the time had come for the Council to deal with the situation as a whole. The Arab Governments concerned, including Jordan, had failed consistently to respect the basic provisions of the Armistice Agreements. The Council must insist, among other things, on a halt to threats, incitements and terrorist raids, and it must insist that all concerned observe the Armistice obligations.

185. The representative of Jordan said that if there had been violation of the Armistice Agreement, it should have been brought to the Council. Israel could not take the law into its own hands and then ask the Council to discuss every issue relating to Palestine in order to cover up its crime. Jordan condemned violence, but if the theory that violence bred violence was to be adopted, and if the Council did not invoke Chapter VII of the Charter, then Jordan could only conclude that retaliation bred retaliation.



186. The Secretary-General on 18 November submitted to the Council, pursuant to its request, a report from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO concerning the incident of 13 November (S/7393/Corr.1 and Add.1), together with a topographical map of the area in which the incident had taken place. The report, which was based on investigations made in Jordan by the United Nations military observers, stated that the apparent total number of casualties had been three civilians and fifteen military personnel killed and seventeen civilians and thirty-seven military personnel wounded. In the village of As Samu and its vicinity, the investigating United Nations military observers saw that 125 houses, the village medical clinic, a six-classroom school and a workshop had been completely demolished. In addition, one mosque and twenty-eight houses had been damaged. Twenty Jordanian army trucks, two Jordanian army jeeps and one civilian bus had been totally demolished.

187. In the area of Kh Jimba, fifteen stone huts had been totally destroyed, seven damaged and a water well had been destroyed by demolition. Numerous tracks of tanks and half-track vehicles were seen crossing the armistice demarcation line to or from the village. There were shell craters in the ground, caused apparently by high explosive shells or mortar bombs. Shell fragments of undetermined calibre and one sack of high explosives were found on the ground. The police post of Rujm El Madfa'a was almost totally destroyed and many craters were observed in the area.

188. At the 1324th meeting, on 21 November, the representative of Jordan said that Jordan had come to the Council for speedy action and firm, adequate and effective measures under Chapter VII of the Charter. The very least the Council could do was to go a step further than in the past. Jordan would not accept any draft resolution which attempted to place the victim and the aggressor on an equal footing, or which embodied irrelevant references to questions not before the Council. Any resolution which fell short of effective measures would further aggravate the situation. It should refer to Chapter VII in a definite manner, particularly as there was no disagreement about the facts.

189. In order to prevent future aggression, the Council must, in Jordan's view, condemn Israel for the wanton and outrageous attack of 13 November; express its grave concern at Israel's failure to comply with its obligations; decide that the armed attack was a flagrant violation of the Charter and the Armistice Agreement and that it constituted aggression under the provisions of Article 39 of the Charter; and call for economic sanctions against Israel.

190. The President, speaking as the representative of the United States, recalled his statement of 16 November which he said represented the considered view of his Government regarding the complaint before the Council. With respect to United States policy in the Middle East, he referred to his statement of 28 October, in which he had said that the United States respected the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries in the Middle East, as it was required to do under the Charter, and firmly supported the maintenance of peace in the area.

191. The representative of Uruguay said that his delegation would vote in favour of any measure which

promoted peace and tranquillity in the Middle East and would unequivocally condemn acts of reprisal in accordance with the position on international conduct always taken by Uruguay. His country would endeavour to consider constructive formulas designed to strengthen the powers of United Nations bodies active in the area and, if necessary, the establishment of bodies with broader responsibilities.

192. The representative of Israel, commenting on the report by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO of 18 November, referred to his letter of 21 November (S/7594), and said that the account of the Israel action given in the report was based on hearsay evidence which was for the most part exaggerated and inaccurate. The sole objective of the Israel action had been to demolish a limited number of empty houses, after their occupants had been evacuated, and Israel troops had been given strict instructions to take every precaution for the avoidance of casualties. There had been no bombardment or strafing from the air; and there had been no artillery shelling. His Government earnestly hoped that there might now be an end to violence and bloodshed of any kind, and appealed to the Governments of neighbouring States to co-operate to that end.

193. Behind the long sequence of armed raids into Israel from neighbouring States was the contention of Arab Governments that they were in a state of war with Israel. That was the cause of the tension in the area. The situation involved three converging responsibilities: those of the Arab Governments, of Israel and of the United Nations. The Arab Governments were responsible for preventing the use of their territory for armed attacks against a neighbouring State; Israel had the right and duty—for which no United Nations machinery could substitute—to defend its citizens, territory and border against armed attack. And the United Nations had the obligation to discharge its responsibilities in an even-handed manner. However, no Arab Government had ever been condemned for the war against Israel in 1948 and 1949, which Arab leaders declared was unfinished business. For fifteen years, no single resolution unacceptable to the Arabs had been permitted to pass through the Council.

194. At the 1325th meeting, on 21 November the representative of Bulgaria said the Council was now confronted with a repetition of acts of military invasion and premeditated aggression which made it clear that the time for mere condemnation had passed. In July 1966, condemnation might have served as a warning to Israel; now the Council should adopt energetic measures which would bar further aggressive acts by Israel against its neighbours and bring the extremist circles in that country to reason.

195. At the 1327th meeting, on 24 November, the representative of Nigeria reaffirmed his belief that in order to bring peace to the Middle East it would be essential to tackle the Palestine problem as a whole and not on the piece-meal basis of incidents and reprisals. Meanwhile, the Council must unequivocally condemn the action of the Government of Israel and must with equal force insist upon adherence to the provisions of the relevant Armistice Agreements by the parties concerned. It would remain essential also for the Council to initiate such action as would ef-

fectively provide against the recurrence of violent exchanges between the two parties concerned.

196. The representative of Uganda said that Israel's military operation must be unequivocally condemned as completely disproportionate to the cumulative total of the various acts of terrorism conducted against Israel. However, his delegation remained convinced that the Council must turn its attention to the real sources of the outbreaks and set up, as a matter of urgency, the necessary machinery to get to the root of the problem. He suggested that military commanders from both sides should meet to work out practical arrangements for border surveillance and that a direct line of communication between local commanders on either side of the border should be installed. The Council should also call upon the two parties to co-operate fully with UNTSO and permit United Nations military observers engaged in investigating incidents full freedom of movement across the armistice demarcation lines. In addition, United Nations observation posts should be established in sensitive sectors along the demarcation line. In view of the concern expressed by both Jordan and Israel for the relaxation of tensions between them, all avenues should be explored in order to produce practical and constructive results.

197. The representative of Mali said that Jordan had now been made the victim of a major aggression and had come to claim justice before the Security Council. He condemned the attack of 13 November and deplored the loss of human life and the material damage caused. The Council, instead of waiting for a complaint to be placed before it, should meet and consider measures to lessen tensions in the area, with the participations of the parties concerned, and the representatives of the United Nations organs there.

198. At the same meeting, the following draft resolution, co-sponsored by Mali and Nigeria (S/7598), was submitted to the Council:

*"The Security Council,*

*"Having heard the statements of the representatives of Jordan and Israel concerning the grave Israel military action which took place in the southern Hebron area on 13 November 1966,*

*"Having noted the information provided by the Secretary-General concerning this military action in his statement of 16 November and also in his report of 18 November 1966 (S/7593 and Corr.1 and Add.1),*

*"Observing that this incident constituted a large-scale and carefully planned military action on the territory of Jordan by the armed forces of Israel,*

*"Reaffirming the previous resolutions of the Security Council condemning past incidents of reprisal in breach of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan and of the United Nations Charter,*

*"Recalling the repeated resolutions of the Security Council asking for the cessation of violent incidents across the demarcation line, and not overlooking past incidents of this nature,*

*"Reaffirming the necessity for strict adherence to the General Armistice Agreement,*

*"1. Deplores the loss of life and heavy damage to property resulting from the action of the Government of Israel on 13 November 1966;*

*"2. Censures Israel for this large-scale military action in violation of the United Nations Charter and of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Jordan;*

*"3. Emphasizes to Israel that actions of military reprisal cannot be tolerated and that if they are repeated, the Security Council will have to consider further and more effective steps as envisaged in the Charter to ensure against the repetition of such acts;*

*"4. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the situation under review and report to the Security Council as appropriate."*

199. Introducing the draft resolution, the representative of Nigeria stated that the sponsors intended it not only to condemn the action which had been the subject of Jordan's complaint but also to be an expression of the Council's genuine concern over the state of tension between Jordan and Israel and its desire that peace should be restored and maintained in that area on the basis of peaceful co-existence.

200. At the 1328th meeting, on 25 November, the representative of Uganda expressed strong reservations regarding the draft resolution, which he said was a mere statement of the situation. He believed that it was the duty of the Council to prescribe remedies.

201. The representative of New Zealand said that his delegation could not condone Israel's act of retaliation, but such censure, however merited, should be accompanied by a fair acknowledgement of the total situation in which the retaliation had taken place and by constructive proposals aimed at providing effective means for checking a recurrence of violence. In view of the lack of success in producing a more constructive text, his delegation would abstain in the vote.

202. The representative of the Netherlands said that his delegation would have preferred a more comprehensive text. Although the Netherlands delegation deeply deplored the Israel attack on Jordan, it believed that the Council should not be content with a mere censure, but should take into account the situation as a whole and, above all, seek to improve the situation and to prevent a repetition of military attacks and other violence. His delegation would have preferred a specific call upon all Governments concerned to respect scrupulously the provisions of all the General Armistice Agreements. Although the draft resolution did not give him complete satisfaction, he would vote for it in the hope that a unanimous or almost unanimous decision would help to quiet the rapidly deteriorating situation in the Middle East.

203. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that Israel had violated fundamental principles of the General Armistice Agreements, the decisions of the Security Council, the Charter and the elementary norms of international law. He believed that the draft resolution represented no more than the minimum of what should be undertaken by the Security Council, taking into consideration the extreme gravity of the situation created by the act of overt aggression by Israel against Jordan.

204. The representative of Bulgaria said that the Council was prevented from taking effective measures because some of its members sought to place victim and aggressor on the same footing and to distract

attention from the problem by introducing elements designed to minimize Israel's responsibility and even to justify its aggression. The draft was the very least the Council could do.

**Decision:** *At the 1328th meeting, on 25 November 1966, the Mali-Nigerian draft resolution (S/7598) was voted upon and adopted by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (New Zealand) (resolution 226 (1966)).*

205. Following the vote, the representative of Israel stated that the fundamental cause of Arab-Israel tension in the Middle East lay in Arab belligerence and military threat against Israel, in standing violation of the Charter and of the Armistice Agreements signed in 1949. In the last two years, those Arab policies had spawned a pattern of organized terrorist and sabotage raids from the territory of neighbouring States into the territory of Israel, resulting in death, destruction and insecurity within its borders. The Government of Israel was in duty bound to ensure the defence and security of its population, its territory and its borders; it was a matter of profound regret that the Security Council had acted upon complaints concerning Israel reactions, but had not been able, for fifteen years, to adopt any resolutions on Israel's complaints. The fundamental problem could not be solved as long as the people of Israel were not permitted to live peacefully within their borders and as long as the international community did not insist on neighbouring States conducting themselves in accordance with Charter principles, armistice commitments and the concept of peaceful coexistence.

206. The representative of Uruguay said his delegation had voted for the resolution because it was the only text that could obtain the unanimous vote of all the permanent members and because it would enable members to avoid having to leave the Council chamber for the third time in three months, without having been able to take action on the situation in Palestine.

207. The representative of Jordan said that the resolution, although it fell short of imposing sanctions in accordance with Chapter VII of the Charter, contained a clear, final warning to Israel that that would be done if its crimes continued. Jordan saw no need for more warnings, but it had voted for the resolution, not in a spirit of compromise, but because it was the Council's wish to give Israel a last chance. The representative of Jordan added that the problem should be seen in its proper context. The causes of the tension in the area were the forcible occupation of the territory by foreigners and the refusal of the occupying authority to permit repatriation of its rightful inhabitants.

208. The President, speaking as the representative of the United States, said that, as stated previously, his Government's policy was to respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries in the Middle East, as it was required to do under the Charter. He had voted for the resolution because his Government believed it was directed towards that purpose.

#### C. FURTHER COMMUNICATIONS RECEIVED BY THE COUNCIL

209. Following its last series of meetings on the Palestine question, the Security Council received a

number of communications from Israel, Jordan and Syria concerning incidents in their respective areas and from the Secretary-General.

210. The representative of Israel drew the Council's attention to a series of terrorist and armed raids into Israel from across its borders in letters dated 30 December 1966 (S/7656), 8 and 9 January 1967 (S/7668, S/7671), 11 January (S/7675), 16 January (S/7684), 17 January (S/7688), 25 January (S/7698), 27 January (S/7704), 9 February (S/7733), 6 and 7 March (S/7807 and S/7811), 24 March (S/7835), 7 April (S/7843), 14 April (S/7853), 11 May (S/7880), 22 May (S/7901), and 2 June (S/7924).

211. The representative of Syria drew attention to the serious deterioration of the situation and to the intensification of provocations and armed attacks by Israel along the armistice demarcation lines in letters of 10 January 1967 (S/7673), 13 January (S/7680), 20 January (S/7692), 25 January (S/7699), 8 February (S/7725), 20 February (S/7769 and Corr.1), 16 March (S/7825), 9 April (S/7845), 12 April (S/7849), 28 April (S/7863) and 15 May (S/7885).

212. A number of communications were exchanged between the Secretary-General and the representative of Jordan, concerning Jordan's request for a comprehensive report covering the full UNTSO investigation of the Israel charges against Jordan contained in the Israel letter of 30 December 1966 (S/7656). These communications were circulated to the Security Council in documents dated 6 February (S/7722), 8 February (S/7728), 15 March (S/7819), 16 March (S/7823), 21 March (S/7831) and 23 March (S/7832 and S/7833). In two letters dated 17 April and 17 May (S/7855 and S/7890), the *Chargé d'affaires* of Jordan also transmitted the Mixed Armistice Commission's resolutions of 12 April and 3 May 1967, relating to the incident of 16 March in the area south of Hebron.

#### D. COMMUNICATION CONCERNING THE INAUGURATION OF THE ISRAEL PARLIAMENT BUILDING IN JERUSALEM

213. By a letter dated 8 September (S/7487), the representative of Saudi Arabia transmitted to the President of the Security Council a statement issued by the Arab League with regard to what it termed the widely propagandized inauguration by the Israel occupying authorities of their so-called Parliament in occupied Jerusalem.

#### E. NOTE OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL, DATED 15 JANUARY 1967, CONCERNING THE RESUMPTION OF THE MEETINGS OF THE ISRAEL-SYRIAN MIXED ARMISTICE COMMISSION

214. In a note dated 15 January (S/7683), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he had received disturbing reports from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO telling him of a large build-up of heavy arms, armoured vehicles and military personnel in the area of and within the demilitarized zones on both sides of the line between Israel and Syria. He

had thereupon dispatched an urgent appeal to the Government of Israel and Syria, stating that it was clear that the situation threatened to erupt at any moment into a large-scale clash of military forces in overt violation of the provisions of Security Council resolutions and of the General Armistice Agreement between Israel and Syria, and appealing to them to restrain their military forces from any action which might result in an armed clash. He also appealed to them to accept without delay or preconditions the proposal of the Chief of Staff for an immediate emergency or extraordinary meeting of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission on an agreed agenda, with a view to reaching an understanding on the problems of cultivation in the area which had given rise to the incidents of recent weeks.

215. The representative of Syria transmitted his Government's acceptance of the Secretary-General's appeal for the resumption of the meetings of the Commission and comments on related matters in letters dated 16 January (S/7685), 24 January (S/7696), and 23 February (S/7784 and Corr.1).

216. Similarly, the Israel Government's acceptance of the Secretary-General's appeal and comments on related matters were transmitted in letters dated 18 January (S/7690), and 10 February (S/7734 and Corr.1).

217. In a further note dated 8 May 1967 (S/7877), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that he had sent a message on the same date to General Odd Bull, Chief of Staff of UNTSO, stating that he had given particular attention to the Chief of Staff's conclusion that, following the serious incidents of 7 April 1967 and as a result of the fighting that took place then, the gap between the positions of the parties on the resumption of the meeting of the Mixed Armistice Commission had widened and consequently it was not possible for the time being to expect any fruitful convening of such a meeting. The Secretary-General strongly endorsed the Chief of Staff's appeal to both parties, as set forth in his letters to them of 4 May 1967, to exercise the utmost restraint, to observe scrupulously the unconditional cease-fire and to make use of the Commission's machinery in order to resolve any differences which might arise between them. He also approved and supported his intention to continue, in the light of the responsibilities entrusted to UNTSO by the Israel-Syria General Armistice Agreement and by the relevant Security Council resolutions, to exert every possible effort to help maintain an atmosphere of quiet by averting incidents between the parties. Although, unfortunately, the Commission's meeting would not be resumed, the Secretary-General stated, the interest of peace in the area dictated, nevertheless, that the effort to achieve an *ad hoc* understanding on cultivation in the areas of difficulty should not be abandoned. When that was done, the Secretary-General concluded, it should be made clear, naturally, that the practical arrangements aimed at would in no way prejudice the rights, claims and positions of either party, and that the separate discussions were to be undertaken only so long as the 80th emergency and extraordinary meeting of Mixed Armistice Commission remained in abeyance and until it could be convened again. At the same time it should also be

emphasized that he would expect and press for the resumption of that meeting.

#### F. COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO THE HOLDING OF AN ISRAEL MILITARY PARADE IN THE CITY OF JERUSALEM

218. By a letter dated 6 February 1967 (S/7721), the representative of Jordan drew the Secretary-General's attention to the decision of the Israel Cabinet to hold a military parade on 15 May 1967 in the occupied part of Jerusalem in defiance of the General Armistice Agreement and Security Council resolution 162 (1961) of 11 April 1961.

219. In reply, the Secretary-General in a letter dated 8 February (S/7727) stated that the text of the letter of the representative of Jordan had been sent to the Chief of Staff of UNTSO for appropriate action.

220. The representative of Israel, in a letter dated 9 February (S/7733), stated that on 11 December 1966, the Government of Israel had publicly announced that the army parade on Independence Day (falling on 15 May) would be held in Jerusalem, "within the framework of the Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement".

221. By a letter dated 10 May 1967 (S/7879), the representative of Algeria, acting in that capacity and as Chairman of the Arab group, drew the attention of the Secretary-General to the serious situation arising from Israel's decision to hold a military parade in Jerusalem on 15 May 1967.

222. In a letter dated 19 May 1967 (S/7893), the *Chargé d'affaires* of Jordan drew attention to a case of Israel arrogance and lawlessness in connexion with the Israel military parade which had been arrogantly and belligerently carried out in occupied Jerusalem on 15 May, in open and flagrant defiance of repeated warnings, agreements and resolutions.

223. In a letter dated 2 June 1967 (S/7978), the representative of Israel stated that the parade had been held as planned and, in accordance with the publicly announced position of Israel, within the framework of the Israel-Jordan Armistice Agreement.

#### G. COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO THE DEATH OF LT. COLONEL FLINT

224. A number of communications were exchanged between the Secretary-General and the *Chargé d'affaires* of Jordan regarding the claim for reparation in connexion with the death of Lt. Colonel Flint of the Canadian Army on Mount Scopus on 26 May 1958 while serving on behalf of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine (UNTSO). These communications were circulated to the Security Council in documents dated 1 May (S/7867), 4 May (S/7873), 8 May (S/7876), 12 May (S/7882), 16 May (S/7886) and 1 June (S/7922).



**LETTER DATED 23 MAY 1967 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVES OF CANADA AND DENMARK ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

**COMPLAINT OF THE REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC IN A LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL DATED 27 MAY 1967 ENTITLED: "ISRAEL AGGRESSIVE POLICY, ITS REPEATED AGGRESSION THREATENING PEACE AND SECURITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND ENDANGERING INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY"**

**LETTER DATED 27 MAY 1967 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

**LETTER DATED 9 JUNE 1967 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL CONCERNING AN ITEM ENTITLED: "CESSATION OF MILITARY ACTION BY ISRAEL AND WITHDRAWAL OF THE ISRAEL FORCES FROM THOSE PARTS OF THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC, JORDAN AND SYRIA WHICH THEY HAVE SEIZED AS A RESULT OF AN AGGRESSION"**

**LETTER DATED 8 JULY 1967 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

**LETTER DATED 8 JULY 1967 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF ISRAEL ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

#### **A. Communications to the Council**

225. In a report dated 19 May 1967 (S/7896/Corr.1), the Secretary-General conveyed to the members of the Security Council his deep anxiety about recent developments in the Near East. In his opinion, the prevailing state of affairs in the Near East with regard to relations between the Arab States and Israel and among the Arab States themselves, was extremely menacing. Referring to his two earlier reports of 15 January (S/7683) and 8 May 1967 (S/7877), he pointed out that there had been a steady deterioration along the line between Israel and Syria in the demilitarized zone since the beginning of the year. In late January, the Chief of Staff of UNTSO had obtained the agreement of Israel and Syria to attend an emergency and extraordinary meeting of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission on an agreed agenda item on cultivation problems. Three meetings had actually been held but the agreed agenda item had not been discussed because both parties had insisted on first bringing up broader issues, and it had not been possible to achieve a resumption of the meetings. In the absence of an agreement on cultivation arrangements, tension along the line continued high and the possibility of new armed clashes in disputed areas was ever present.

226. The Secretary-General referred in his report to a number of factors which had served to aggravate the situation to an unusual degree. The activities of the El Fatah organization, consisting of terrorism and sabotage, were a major factor in that they provoked strong reaction in Israel by the Government and population alike. Intemperate and bellicose utterances, eagerly reported by Press and radio, were unfortunately more or less routine on both sides of the lines in the Near East. Recently, persistent reports about troop movements and concentrations, particularly on the Israel side of the Syrian border, has caused anxiety, although reports from UNTSO observers had confirmed the absence of troop concentrations and significant troop movements on both sides of the line. Finally, there had been the sudden and unexpected decision of the Government of the United Arab Republic to terminate its consent for the continued presence of the United Nations Emergency Force

(UNEF) on United Arab Republic territory in Sinai and on United Arab Republic controlled territory in Gaza. Although there could be no doubt that UNEF had discharged its responsibilities with remarkable effectiveness and great distinction, it should be borne in mind that all such United Nations peace-keeping operations depended for their presence and effectiveness not only on the consent of the authorities in the area of their deployment but on the co-operation and goodwill of those authorities. There was good reason to fear that the withdrawal of UNEF would give rise to increased danger along the Armistice Demarcation Line and the International Frontier between Israel and the United Arab Republic. There were some particularly sensitive areas involved, notably Sharm-El-Sheikh and Gaza. To a considerable extent, the presence of UNEF had allowed the Organization for ten years to ignore some of the hard realities of the underlying conflict. The Governments concerned, and the United Nations, were now confronted with a brutally realistic and dangerous situation.

227. Turning to the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission, the Secretary-General said it remained in existence with its headquarters in Gaza, and could, as it had prior to the establishment of UNEF, provide a limited form of United Nations presence in the area, as in the case of the other Mixed Armistice Commissions which were served by UNTSO. The Government of Israel, however, had denounced the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission and for some years had refused to have anything to do with it. The United Nations had never accepted as valid that unilateral action by the Government of Israel. It would most certainly be helpful in the present situation if the Government of Israel were to reconsider its position and resume its participation in the Commission.

228. Since the announcement of the decision of the Government of the United Arab Republic with regard to UNEF, tension in the area had mounted. Unless there was very great restraint on both sides of the line, one could readily envisage a series of local clashes which could easily escalate into heavy conflict. The Secretary-General did not wish to be an alarmist but he could



not avoid the warning to the Council that in his view the current situation in the Near East was more disturbing, indeed more menacing, than at any time since the fall of 1956.

229. By a letter dated 23 May 1967 (S/7902) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representatives of Canada and Denmark requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the extremely grave situation in the Middle East which was threatening international peace and security. They cited the anxiety expressed by the Secretary-General in his report of 19 May (S/7896) and stated that since that report was issued, developments had taken place which had caused the situation to deteriorate further. They believed that action by the Security Council would reinforce the current efforts being made by the Secretary-General to preserve peace in the area.

#### **B. Consideration at the 1341st and 1342nd meetings (24 May 1967)**

230. At the 1341st meeting, on 24 May, the representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Bulgaria stated that they considered illegal the occupation of the seat of the People's Republic of China in the United Nations and in the Security Council by the representatives of the Chang Kai-shek clique.

231. The President, speaking as the representative of China, said that he could not allow himself to enter into arguments over a question that had been clearly pronounced upon by the entire membership of the Organization only a few months previously.

232. The representatives of Denmark, France and India stated that they continued to support the right of the People's Republic of China to be represented in the United Nations. The representative of the United States said his country continued to hold that the Republic of China, a founding Member of the United Nations, was properly represented in the Council.

233. The representative of Ethiopia stated that his participation in the meeting of the Council, under its actual presidency, should in no way be prejudicial to the policy of his Government with regard to Chinese representation in the United Nations.

234. The representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Bulgaria said that they did not see sufficient grounds for such a hasty convening of the Security Council and the artificially dramatic climate fostered by the representatives of some Western Powers.

235. The representative of Canada stated that in calling for the meeting of the Council, his delegation and the delegation of Denmark were suggesting that the Council should exercise its responsibilities under the Charter to deal with this grave situation and should reinforce the current efforts being made by the Secretary-General to preserve peace in the area.

236. The representative of Mali was doubtful that this abrupt convening of the Council could in any way lessen tension in the region in question.

237. The representatives of Ethiopia, India and Nigeria felt that the Council should await a personal report from the Secretary-General, who had gone to the area, before proceeding with the discussion on the agenda.

238. The representative of France expressed doubts regarding the usefulness of an urgent meeting of the Council. He feared that public discussion at the present stage might make even more difficult the consultations now going on among the various countries concerned.

239. The representative of the United States of America said that the Council would be burying its head in the sand if it refused to recognize the threat to peace implicit in the developments which had occurred since the Secretary-General left New York two days ago.

240. The provisional agenda, consisting of the communication from the representatives of Canada and Denmark (S/7902), was adopted. The representatives of Israel and the United Arab Republic were invited, at their request, to take seats at the Council table.

241. The representative of Denmark said that since the beginning of the withdrawal of UNEF, the situation along the border between Israel and the United Arab Republic had been deteriorating at an alarming speed; there had been a military build-up along the borders of Israel and the United Arab Republic, and the stage had been set for a major military clash. Moreover, on 22 May, the President of the United Arab Republic had announced that Israel ships and other ships carrying certain cargoes to Israel would be prevented from passing through the Strait of Tiran; the Government of Israel, on the other hand, had declared that it would consider such a move as an attack. The situation had now reached the point where the slightest miscalculation on either side could lead to large-scale hostilities. Generally speaking, it would have been preferable to defer any action by the Council until it had before it the Secretary-General's report on his current efforts, but the facts were that there had been alarming developments and the mission of the Secretary-General, which he fully supported, could not relieve the Council of any of its responsibilities. At the moment the first measure the Council could take in order to ease the tension would be to express its full support for the efforts of the Secretary-General to pacify the situation in the Middle East and to request all States to refrain from any steps which might worsen the situation.

242. At the 1342nd meeting, on 24 May, the President drew the attention of the Council to the following draft resolution submitted by Canada and Denmark (S/7905):

*"The Security Council,*

*"Having been seized of the current situation in the Middle East,*

*"1. Expresses full support for the efforts of the Secretary-General to pacify the situation;*

*"2. Requests all Member States to refrain from any steps which might worsen the situation; and*

*"3. Invites the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council upon his return to enable the Council to continue its consideration of the matter."*

243. The representative of the United States of America said that his Government agreed with the Secretary-General's assessment of the gravity of the situation in the Middle East and had given him its full backing in the difficult peace mission on which he was now embarked. It had also strongly supported the request for an immediate meeting of the Council because of its concern over the sharp increase in tension since the Secretary-General's departure. Conditions in the area

had taken a still more menacing turn because of a threat to customary international rights which had been exercised for many years in the Gulf of Aqaba. At present, the Council's objectives should be limited to expressing full support for the Secretary-General's efforts to work out a peaceful accommodation of the situation, and to calling on all States to avoid any action which might exacerbate the situation. He was fully aware of the long-standing underlying problems in the area, but no problem of this character could or should be settled by warlike acts. The United States' opposition to the use of aggression and violence of any kind, on any side of this situation, its firm commitment to the support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations in the area, and to the solution of all the problems of the area by exclusively peaceful means were a matter of record. The United States was prepared to join with other great Powers—the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and France—in a common effort both within and outside the United Nations to restore and maintain peace in the Middle East.

244. The representative of Japan said he fully shared the deep anxiety expressed by the Secretary-General with regard to the situation. He believed that it was a matter of urgency for the Security Council, which had the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, to discharge its responsibilities. Now that the order for the withdrawal of the UNEF had been given, the foremost and most important consideration was for all Governments concerned to exercise maximum restraint, scrupulously avoiding any action which might lead to further deterioration of the present grave situation. The confrontations now existing there must not be permitted to escalate into armed conflict.

245. Introducing the draft resolution on behalf of its sponsors, the representative of Canada said that it was a straightforward impartial resolution, clear in language, limited in scope, and non-controversial in motive. The sponsors believed that the draft resolution would have a useful effect in extending the moral influence of the Security Council, in the present situation, in support of the Secretary-General's efforts and in support of the preservation of peace in the Near East.

246. The representative of France said that his country had, from the outset of the present crisis, advised moderation to all the parties concerned, and warned them about the danger of transforming the present crisis into a military confrontation. Thus far reason and moderation had not prevailed, and the crisis had obviously reached a new stage with the announcement of the measures taken by the Government of the United Arab Republic to stop any ships going to the Gulf of Aqaba. However, the Security Council could undertake no action as long as the principal Powers were not in agreement. Therefore, for the moment it must limit itself to addressing an appeal to both parties for reason, and to refrain from any initiative which might threaten peace.

247. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his Government welcomed and supported the request made by Canada and Denmark for an urgent meeting of the Security Council. Both the danger and the urgency of the situation had been made very clear in the reports of the Secretary-General. His Government also welcomed and supported the Secretary-General's efforts to keep the peace, to reduce tensions and to search for measures which could prevent conflict in future.

The first aim which he and the members of the Council must set for themselves was to counsel restraint and to keep the peace, so that there would be time to work out new plans for the future. His Government would prefer to see the earliest possible re-establishment of the kind of United Nations operation which had functioned so successfully in Sinai and in Gaza. But it also believed that alternative means could be effective. In addition, it would be necessary to solve the most urgent and most dangerous issue of all—the question of the right of passage for shipping of all nationalities through the Strait of Tiran.

248. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that he was more convinced than ever that certain forces were artificially aggravating the climate for reasons that had nothing to do with a true concern for peace and security in the Near East. If Washington and London, instead of engaging in wordy statements, were really interested in relaxing tensions in the Near East, they could begin by withdrawing their fleets from the Mediterranean.

249. The Soviet Government had made clear its position with regard to the situation in the Near East in its statement of 23 May 1967. It had pointed out, in that statement, that a situation giving rise to anxiety, from the viewpoint of the interests of peace and international security, had been taking shape in the Near East in recent weeks, as a result of the actions of Israel's ruling circles. The Soviet Government had warned the Government of Israel, in connexion with the armed provocation carried out against Syria on 7 April, that Israel would bear the responsibility for the consequences of its aggressive policy. It appeared that a reasonable approach had not yet triumphed in Tel-Aviv. As a result, Israel was again to blame for a dangerous aggravation of tension in the Near East. It should, however, be clearly understood that if anyone tried to unleash aggression in the Near East, he would be met not only with the united strength of the Arab countries but also with strong opposition from the Soviet Union and all peace-loving States. It was only the forces of imperialism, with Israel following along in the wake of their policy, that could be interested in kindling a military conflict in the area. The Soviet Government was keeping a close watch on the developments there. It proceeded from the fact that the maintenance of peace and security in the area directly adjacent to the Soviet borders touched upon the vital interests of the Soviet peoples. Taking due account of the situation, the Soviet Union was doing and would continue to do everything in its power to prevent a violation of peace and security in the Near East and to safeguard the legitimate rights of the peoples.

250. The representative of the United Arab Republic expressed surprise at the campaign of distortion and abuse to which his country had been subjected because it had exercised its inherent rights and discharged its fundamental responsibility in safeguarding its security, defending its people and upholding its obligations towards the Arab nation.

251. The countries which had championed the submission of the question to the Security Council had deliberately ignored the consistent provocations by Israel. By dramatizing the situation today, those countries were seeking to create an atmosphere of anxiety in order to serve their own interests and to cover up any future designs for intervention. The draft resolution which had been introduced by the representatives of Canada and Denmark was, in his opinion, an attempt to

sabotage the mission on which the Secretary-General was at that moment engaged.

252. The representative of Israel said that his Government had on various occasions in recent months brought to the attention of the Security Council its growing concern over the worsening situation in the Near East. A campaign of ever-increasing violence, organized, supported, financed and planned by neighbouring countries, had been conducted against Israel. That campaign had been accompanied by a ceaseless torrent of threats against the territorial integrity, the political independence and the very existence of Israel. The falsity of the charge that Israel had massed large forces along the Israel-Syrian borders had been fully established in paragraph 9 of the report of the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council on 19 May (S/7896). On the other hand, massive troop concentrations had been built up by the United Arab Republic on the Sinai peninsula, along the southern borders of Israel. The United Nations Emergency Force, which for ten years had assisted in maintaining stability there, had been peremptorily evicted. All these steps were part of an over-all plan, the design of which was now unfolding. It was approaching its culmination in the threats of President Nasser to interfere with shipping in the Strait of Tiran at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba.

253. The Prime Minister of Israel had stated that interference with shipping to and from Israel, including the Israel port of Eilat, would be an act of aggression. Other Governments, including the main maritime Powers, had from 1957 onwards publicly committed themselves to exercising their rights to freedom of navigation in the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. This was, therefore, a fateful hour, not only for Israel but for the whole world. The Government of Israel intended to maintain the policy it had enunciated in the General Assembly on 1 March 1957, namely, that the Gulf of Aqaba comprehended international waters and no nation had the right to prevent free and innocent passage in the Gulf and through the Straits giving access thereto, in accordance with the generally accepted definition of those terms in the law of the sea; Israel was therefore resolved, on behalf of vessels of Israel registry, to exercise the right of free and innocent passage, and was prepared to join with others to secure universal respect of this right.

254. The representative of Canada stated that the remarks addressed by the United Arab Republic against his country were entirely unjustified.

255. The representative of Denmark rejected the accusations of the representative of the United Arab Republic regarding the motives of his country in calling the meeting of the Council and submitting the draft resolution.

**Decision:** *Following a brief discussion concerning the scheduling of the next meeting of the Council in which a number of representatives expressed the view that the Council should postpone further consideration of the question until the Secretary-General had reported to it on the results of his consultations, the President adjourned the meeting until further notice.*

### **C. Communications to the Council and requests for a meeting**

256. By a letter dated 27 May (S/7907), the representative of the United Arab Republic requested the

inclusion of the following item on the present agenda of the Council: "Israel aggressive policy, its repeated aggression threatening peace and security in the Middle East and endangering international peace and security". The letter requested further that steps be taken to have the item considered urgently by the Council.

257. By a letter dated 29 May (S/7910), the representative of the United Kingdom requested that the report by the Secretary-General (S/7906) of 26 May be included in the Council's provisional agenda.

### **D. Consideration at the 1343rd to 1346th meetings (29 May to 3 June 1967)**

258. At the 1343rd meeting on 29 May, the provisional agenda consisting of three communications was adopted. The representatives of Jordan and Syria were also invited, at their request, to take seats at the Council table.

**Decision:** *Following a brief discussion the Council agreed to consider all three items on its agenda together.*

259. The President of the Council drew attention to the Secretary-General's second report to the Council (S/7906) dated 26 May 1967.

260. The Secretary-General in his second report reiterated his assessment of the general situation in the Middle East at present as more menacing than at any time since the fall of 1956. The Secretary-General stated that it had been alleged in some quarters that the prompt compliance with the request for the withdrawal of the Force had been a primary cause of the present crisis in the Middle East. That was to ignore the fact that the underlying basis for this and other crisis situations in the Middle East was the continuing Arab-Israel conflict which had been present all along, and of which the crisis created by the unexpected request for the withdrawal of UNEF was the latest expression. He felt obliged once again to reiterate briefly the grounds for the position which he had taken on the withdrawal of UNEF.

261. UNEF had been introduced into the territory of the United Arab Republic on the basis of an agreement between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of Egypt. The consent of the host country, in that as in other peace-keeping operations, was the basis for its presence on the territory of the United Arab Republic. When that consent was withdrawn, the essential part of the basis of UNEF's presence ceased to exist.

262. His decision in the matter had been based upon both legal and practical considerations. It was a practical fact that neither UNEF nor any other United Nations peace-keeping operation could function or even exist without the continuing consent and co-operation of the host country. In fact, the movement of United Arab Republic forces up to the line in Sinai even before the request for withdrawal was received by him had already made the effective functioning of UNEF impossible. It was therefore obvious to him that the position of the personnel of UNEF would soon become extremely difficult, and even dangerous, if the decision for the withdrawal of the Force was delayed, while the possibility for its effective action had already been virtually eliminated. Moreover, if the request were not promptly complied with, the Force would quickly disintegrate due to the withdrawal of individual contingents.

263. He noted that UNEF functioned exclusively on the United Arab Republic side of the line in a zone

from which the armed forces of the United Arab Republic had voluntarily stayed away for over ten years. It was that arrangement which had allowed UNEF to function as a buffer and as a restraint on infiltration. Had UNEF been deployed on both sides of the line as originally envisaged in pursuance of the General Assembly resolution, its buffer function would not necessarily have ended. However, its presence on the Israel side of the line had never been permitted. The fact that UNEF was not stationed on the Israel side of the line was a recognition of the unquestioned sovereign right of Israel to withhold its consent for the stationing of the Force. The acquiescence in the request of the United Arab Republic for the withdrawal of the Force after ten and a half years on United Arab Republic soil was likewise a recognition of the sovereign authority of the United Arab Republic. In no official document relating to UNEF had there been any suggestion of a limitation of that sovereign authority. During his stay in Cairo, from 23 to 25 May, the Secretary-General had had discussions with President Gamal Abdel Nasser and Mr. Mahmoud Riad, the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Both had assured him that the United Arab Republic would not initiate offensive action against Israel. Their general aim, as stated to him, was a return to the conditions prevailing prior to 1956 and to full observance by both parties of the provisions of the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel.

264. The Secretary-General stated that the decision of the Government of the United Arab Republic to restrict shipping in the Strait of Tiran, of which he had learned while en route to Cairo, had created a new situation. Free passage through the Strait was one of the questions which the Government of Israel considered most vital to its interests. The position of the Government of the United Arab Republic was that the Strait was territorial waters in which it had a right to control shipping. The Government of Israel contested that position and asserted the right of innocent passage through the Strait. The Government of Israel had further declared that Israel would regard the closing of the Strait of Tiran to Israel flagships and any restriction on cargoes of ships of other flags proceeding to Israel as a *casus belli*. While in Cairo, he had called the attention of the Government of the United Arab Republic to the dangerous consequences which could ensue from restricting innocent passage of ships in the Strait of Tiran.

265. A legal controversy had existed prior to 1956 as to the extent of the right of innocent passage by commercial vessels through the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. Since March 1957, when UNEF forces were stationed at Sharm el Sheikh and Ras Nasrani at the mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba, there had been no interference with shipping in the Strait of Tiran.

266. At this critical juncture, the Secretary-General felt that his major concern must be to try to gain time in order to lay the basis for a *détente*. The important immediate fact was that, in view of the conflicting stands taken by the United Arab Republic and Israel, the situation in the Strait of Tiran represented a very serious potential threat to peace. He greatly feared that a clash between the United Arab Republic and Israel over that issue, in the present circumstances, would inevitably set off a general conflict in the Middle East.

267. Freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran was not, however, the only immediate issue which was endangering peace in the Middle East. Other prob-

lems, such as sabotage and terrorist activities and rights of cultivation in disputed areas in the demilitarized zone between Israel and Syria would, unless controlled, almost surely lead to further serious fighting.

268. In his view, the Secretary-General continued, a peaceful outcome to the present crisis would depend upon a breathing spell which would allow tension to subside from its present explosive level. He therefore urged all the parties concerned to exercise special restraint, to forgo belligerence and to avoid all other actions which could increase tension, to allow the Council to deal with the underlying causes of the present crisis and to seek solutions.

269. In his report of 19 May to the Council, he had referred to the possibility of the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission providing a limited form of United Nations presence in the area. He suggested that the Council consider this possible approach also during its search for ways out of the present crisis. That form of United Nations presence could to some extent fill the vacuum left by the withdrawal of UNEF. Concerning the maintenance of quiet along the Israel-Syria line, he repeated his suggestion that the two parties should resume their participation in the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission. It would also be useful for the Council to recall its finding, in resolution 73(1949) of 11 August 1949, that the Armistice Agreements constituted an important step towards the establishment of permanent peace in Palestine, and to renew its injunction to the parties to ensure the continued application and observance of those Agreements.

270. In his discussions with officials of the United Arab Republic and Israel he mentioned possible steps which could be taken by mutual consent and which would help to reduce tension. He would of course continue to make all possible efforts to contribute to a solution of the present crisis. The problems were complex and the obstacles formidable. It should be kept in mind, however, that the United Nations had played an essential role for more than eighteen years in maintaining at least some measure of peace in the area. With the co-operation of all parties concerned, the United Nations, and the Security Council in particular, must continue to seek, and eventually find, reasonable, peaceful and just solutions.

271. The representative of the United States of America said that the dangers to which the Secretary-General had referred in his report remained at their height, while diplomacy was still operating within very narrow limits and on a short time schedule. The Security Council must therefore intensify its efforts to promote a *modus vivendi*, particularly at the points of greatest danger. Means must be found to eliminate the possibilities of a military conflict and, in particular, to defuse the most sensitive area, the Gulf of Aqaba. The United States remained firmly committed to the support of the political independence and territorial integrity of all the nations of the Near East, and strongly opposed to aggression by anyone in the area in any form, overt or clandestine. In its view, the first step the Council must take was to put its great authority behind the Secretary-General's appeal to the parties to exercise special restraint, to forgo belligerence and to avoid all other actions which could increase tension. Forgoing belligerence must mean forgoing any blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba during the breathing spell requested by the Secretary-General, and permitting free and innocent passage of all nations and all flags through the Strait



of Tiran to continue as it had during the last ten years. That would enable the Council to deal with the situation deliberately and free of the threat of "dangerous consequences", which, as the Secretary-General had said in his report, could ensue from restricting innocent passage of ships in the Strait of Tiran.

272. He was aware of the claim of the United Arab Republic to control shipping through its territorial waters in the Strait of Tiran, but it was surely not in keeping with the spirit and obligations of the United Nations Charter for such a coastal State to embark unilaterally upon measures of force or threats of force to press its claim. For over ten years the settlement made by the United Nations in 1957 had been the basis of a peaceful régime for the Strait and the Gulf. If any State wished to alter the *status quo*, it had a clear obligation under the Charter to proceed by peaceful means. It was particularly important, in the light of what the Secretary-General had said in his report, that the long-established practice in the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran should not be disturbed during the period in which efforts were being made under Article 33 to deal with claims that had been raised.

273. Turning to the second problem mentioned by the Secretary-General, the military confrontation in the Gaza Strip and on the Syrian-Israel frontier, the next step for the Security Council must then be to find practical means, through whatever United Nations machinery was readily available, to minimize the danger of a military clash and to help the opposing forces to disengage. It would also be necessary to face the problems of sabotage and terrorist activities and rights of cultivation in disputed areas, and to take effective steps to reaffirm the General Armistice Agreements and revitalize the armistice machinery.

274. The representative of the United Arab Republic said that his Government had decided to request the inclusion of an additional item in the Council's agenda because Israel's aggressive policy and its repeated aggression were the root of the present situation in the Middle East. Since its implantation in the area, as a tool of colonial interests, Israel's record had been one of a long series of violations of international law and agreements, intimidation of its neighbours and insatiable expansionism. His Government had every reason to believe that on 17 May 1967 Israel had seriously contemplated an attack against Syria. In the discharge of its responsibilities and in accordance with its sovereign rights, the United Arab Republic had decided, in co-operation with its Arab brethren, to use all measures to defend the Arab nation. Since UNEF's presence would have conflicted with that decision, and for the sake of UNEF's safety, his Government, in the exercise of its sovereign rights, had requested the Secretary-General to withdraw the Force. Thus, the situation had been peacefully restored to what it was before the 1956 aggression against his country.

275. Historically, the representative of the United Arab Republic continued, the Gulf of Aqaba had been under uninterrupted Arab control for over one thousand years. It had always been a national inland waterway subject to absolute Arab sovereignty, and thus a *mare clausum*, not an international waterway. It was an accepted norm of international law that some bays with more than one littoral State were not considered open sea owing to geographical and historical conditions. Since the Gulf of Aqaba had only three legitimate littoral

States, namely Saudi Arabia, Jordan and the United Arab Republic, all of which were in a state of war with Israel, their right to ban enemy vessels was recognized by international law. Israel's presence on the Gulf was without legitimate foundation, as it had been established by usurpation and occupation two weeks after the signing of the General Armistice Agreement between Egypt and Israel. That was in conformity with the well-established doctrine that belligerent occupation could not be legally converted into sovereignty except by the conclusion of a peace treaty. Neither the Armistice Agreement nor the establishment of UNEF had changed the legal status of the Gulf of Aqaba, and they could not affect the United Arab Republic's rights over its territorial waters. His Government's position regarding navigation in the Gulf had been scrupulously maintained since 1950, and the precedent that no innocent passage could be attributed to combatants had been well established. In 1962 the United States had seen fit to take measures of blockade, although there was no state of war between it and Cuba. Now, although the United Arab Republic was in a state of war and was exercising defensive measures within the limits of its territorial waters, the United States supported Israel's claims.

276. His Government had repeatedly declared that, having acted within the limits of its sovereign rights, it did not contemplate any offensive action. The primary responsibility for the relief of tension in the area lay with those who were fomenting trouble and threatening peace, and not those who in all good faith were exercising their sovereign rights. His Government believed that the Council, in considering the situation, should take into account the fact that Israel's unilateral denunciation of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement was legally invalid and unacceptable, and, together with its flagrant violation of the Agreement, was responsible for the deterioration of the situation. Accordingly, the Council should call upon Israel to respect its obligations under the Agreement, and instruct the Chief of Staff of UNTSO to reinstate the headquarters of the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission in El Auja. The Secretary-General should also be requested to report to the Council within fifteen days.

277. The representative of Argentina said that the main responsibility of the Council at the present critical junction was to support fully the Secretary-General's appeal to the parties concerned to exercise special restraint and to avoid armed confrontation and any action that might increase tensions, so that the Council might be able to deal with the underlying causes of the present crisis.

278. The representative of Brazil said that his Government fully endorsed the principle that the consent of the host country was the basis of any peace-keeping operation, and supported the Secretary-General's appeal to the parties for restraint. In his view, the first duty of the Council was to prevent the escalation of the present tensions in the Middle East into an armed conflict whose repercussions would surely affect the whole world.

279. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the Secretary-General's report had more than confirmed both the danger and the urgency of the situation in the Middle East. The Council could not fail, in the light of that warning, to concentrate first and foremost on the vital need for finding a solution to the critical problem of the Gulf of Aqaba. Such a solution must take into account not only the normal requirements of the



States bordering the Gulf, but the interests of all maritime Powers. The United Nations must bend every effort and use all its machinery to defuse the dangerous situation before it exploded. The United Kingdom was eager to work with the Security Council and the General Assembly towards this end.

280. The representative of Israel said that the unfounded charges of alleged Israel troop concentrations were the keystone of the Egyptian case for moving its forces against Israel. If it was pulled away, the whole flimsy edifice of Egyptian propaganda would collapse like a house of cards. On 15 May Israel had assured the Secretary-General that it had not concentrated any troops anywhere and harboured no aggressive intentions against any of its Arab neighbours, and had requested the Secretary-General to convey these assurances to the Arab Governments concerned. The Secretary-General had acted without delay on that request, and had added that the independent inquiries which he had conducted through his own United Nations representatives in the area confirmed the facts conveyed to him by Israel.

281. On 16 May, one day after his Government had conveyed these assurances to the Secretary-General, President Nasser had moved against UNEF, and had deployed heavy Egyptian forces right along the Israel border. In the light of those sudden and threatening moves, his Government had been compelled to take limited precautionary measures. While the Secretary-General was en route to Cairo, President Nasser had proclaimed the blockade of the international waterway of the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. Israel's position remained that every interference with the freedom of navigation in those waters was an act of aggression against Israel, an infringement of the sovereign rights of all nations to the unimpeded use of this international waterway and a gross violation of international law. There was today no controversy whatsoever over the international character of the waterway. For ten years it had been used uninterruptedly by shipping under many different flags, including Israel's, and statements recognizing its international character and acknowledging that freedom of navigation for all countries was the rule there had been made by many countries, particularly those with important maritime interests.

282. The eviction of UNEF from its position at Sharm el Sheikh was not only an act of defiance of the will of the United Nations and a violation of Egypt's pledged word, but the signal for the revival of belligerence after ten years of tranquillity in the Gulf of Aqaba. The policy of belligerence pursued by the United Arab Republic made an empty shell of the Armistice Agreement. The two central violations of that Agreement were the denial of free passage in the Suez Canal and in Aqaba. In September 1951 the Security Council had ruled that such belligerent practices and blockades could not coexist with the armistice régime. Egypt, however, wished to use the Agreements and United Nations machinery as a cover for the continuation of that very belligerency which the Armistice Agreement had been intended to end. That was the meaning of President Nasser's assurances that he wanted only "a return to the conditions prevailing prior to 1956"—conditions which included the illegal blockade of the Suez Canal, armed incursions by organized gangs of Fedayeen, and illicit interference with the freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran. Israel would not tolerate a return to those conditions.

283. His Government believed that five immediate steps should be taken in the present crisis: all inflammatory statements and threats against the territorial integrity and political independence of any State should cease; the Charter obligation of non-belligerence must be strictly observed; armed forces should be withdrawn from their positions as of the beginning of the month; all forms of armed incursion, acts of sabotage and terrorism should cease and the Governments concerned should take all steps to prevent their territory from being used for those hostile acts; there should be no interference with any shipping in the Strait of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. If those steps were taken promptly, the deep anxieties of the hour would be lifted and the present dangerous tensions would subside.

284. The representative of Ethiopia said that his delegation concurred with the Secretary-General's considered judgement that a breathing spell was required to allow the Security Council to study the underlying causes of the present crisis. With that urgent objective in view, it was prepared to join in an effort to work out an urgent appeal to all the parties concerned to exercise restraint and to refrain from taking any action which could give rise to confrontation and conflict.

285. The representative of India said that his delegation supported the Secretary-General's suggestions regarding the participation of Israel in the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission and the resumption of participation of Israel and Syria in the regular sessions of Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission. It considered that, in asking for the withdrawal of UNEF, the United Arab Republic had only been exercising its sovereignty and that the Secretary-General had acted correctly and wisely in agreeing to that withdrawal. His Government also understood the reasons for certain precautionary measures of preparedness taken by the United Arab Republic and noted that they were of a defensive nature. All parties should fully observe the provisions of the General Armistice Agreements between Israel and the Arab States. No State or group of States should attempt to challenge by force the sovereignty of the United Arab Republic over the Strait of Tiran. A *modus vivendi* was most desirable, but any arrangement that was worked out must be within the framework of the sovereignty of the United Arab Republic. It was his Government's earnest hope that peace in the area would be preserved. What was required at this stage was the exercise of the utmost restraint by all parties concerned to enable the Secretary-General and the Security Council to take steps to maintain peace.

286. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the real culprit in the dangerous aggravation of tensions once more was Israel, which could not have acted as it had were it not for the assistance it had received from certain imperialist Powers. Israel did not wish to abandon its policy of provocation and military adventures against the Arab States. However, those who were pushing Israel to the brink should realize that it was much easier to fan the flames of a military conflict than to put them out. The Soviet Union, together with all peace-loving States, condemned the designs of the forces of imperialism against the freedom and independence of the Arab peoples and supported their just struggle to strengthen their security and protect their inalienable and sovereign rights. The Soviet Government considered that the maintenance of peace

and security in the Middle East, which was adjacent to its own shores, was vital to the interests of its own people. It considered that the Security Council must decisively condemn provocations and threats against the Arab States.

287. The representative of Canada said that what was now most urgently needed was the exercise of special restraint by all concerned to allow a breathing spell in the search for a peaceful outcome to the present crisis. He hoped that an early agreement would be reached on the terms of an appeal, as suggested by several delegations.

288. The representative of Syria read out a number of statements made by Israel authorities as evidence of their threats against his country, and expressed surprise at the references to the rule of law made by the representative of Israel when the very existence of Israel was founded on terrorism and gangsterism.

289. At the 1344th meeting, on 30 May, the representative of Lebanon was also invited, at his request, to take a seat at the Council table.

290. The representative of Nigeria said that his Government fully supported the Secretary-General's appeal and considered that it was the Council's pressing and immediate duty to lend its support to any step that would prevent a further deterioration of the situation. His Government would not, however, support any action that tended to encroach upon the right of a legal Government in any country to maintain the integrity of its territory and territorial waters, and to order its affairs according to its own lights. The Council should issue an appeal for restraint, and then take up the suggestions of the Secretary-General, for instance, that of reactivating the Mixed Armistice Commission. The Secretary-General should also be encouraged to continue his contacts with the principal parties involved in the situation.

291. The representative of Lebanon said that his country supported the exercise by the United Arab Republic of its sovereign rights over the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba. He warned that if Israel committed aggression as a result, the responsibility for starting the war would fall fully on Israel. The Arab world was fully united in the defence of the rights of the Arab people of Palestine, who had been expelled from their homeland. Whatever the sacrifices, the Arab peoples would defend their independence, sovereignty and national security, and pursue their aim of undoing the great injustice inflicted on the Arabs of Palestine. The Arab countries wanted peace, but peace with justice. It was the duty of the Security Council to prevent aggression and thus preserve the peace.

292. The representative of Syria said that the Middle East crisis was the direct outcome of the unprovoked, massive attack by regular Israel forces against the Syrian people and territory which had taken place on 7 April 1967. Israel's purpose was to obtain several advantages, regardless of the extent to which it violated international law and United Nations resolutions. It intended first to carry out the gradual expansion that Israel had been bent upon since its inception. Secondly, it wanted to break any restrictions on its conduct provided for by international law, and by the Armistice Agreements, in order to ensure for ever the primacy of the rule of force over the rule of law. Thirdly, it used cultivation as an instrument to provoke Syrian reaction.

293. The basic cause of the tragedy was the fact that the Arab people of Palestine—the party directly involved in this issue—had been completely and deliberately disregarded. Israel must sooner or later account for the war crimes and crimes against humanity it had committed against the Arab people of Palestine and the neighbouring Arab States.

294. The representative of the United Arab Republic reiterated his Government's position that it had acted within the limits of its sovereign rights and did not contemplate any offensive action, but would not hesitate to repel aggression. His Government was committed to the cause of justice and stood firmly by the principle of total respect for the inalienable rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

295. The representative of Denmark said his Government was in full agreement with the Secretary-General's assessment to the effect that a peaceful outcome of the crisis depended upon a breathing spell and that reasonable, peaceful and just solutions would have to be found. He was prepared to co-operate with all members of the Council in the wording of an impartial and urgent appeal to the parties for restraint. In this respect most useful guidance was to be found in the Secretary-General's report.

296. The representative of the United States said that his country's record was one of even handed conduct between the parties. With regard to the question of innocent passage in the Strait of Tiran, its position was that, as there was an Armistice Agreement constructed and endorsed by the United Nations, neither side had the right to exercise belligerent rights. The short-range problem was the restoration of the *status quo ante* to the Strait of Tiran so that the Council could, during the cooling-off period thus established, consider the underlying problems and reach a fair, just and honourable solution of them.

297. The President, speaking as the representative of China, said that the Council's immediate task was to find a way to prevent hostilities, and endorsed the Secretary-General's appeal for restraint. The reactivation and strengthening of the United Nations machinery in the area, as envisaged in the Secretary-General's report, would be a constructive step towards keeping the peace in the future.

298. At the 1345th meeting, on 31 May, the representatives of Iraq and Morocco were also invited, at their request, to take seats at the Council table.

299. The President drew attention to the following draft resolution submitted by the United States of America (S/7916/Rev.1):

*"The Security Council,*

*"Having considered the report of the Secretary-General in document S/7906,*

*"Having heard the statements of the parties,*

*"Concerned at the gravity of the situation in the Middle East,*

*"Noting that the Secretary-General has in his report expressed the view that 'a peaceful outcome to the present crisis will depend upon a breathing spell which will allow tension to subside from its present explosive level', and that he therefore urged 'all the parties concerned to exercise special restraint, to forgo belligerence and to avoid all other actions which could increase tension, to allow the Council*

to deal with the underlying causes of the present crisis and to seek solutions',

"1. *Calls on* all the parties concerned as a first step to comply with the Secretary-General's appeal,

"2. *Encourages* the immediate pursuit of international diplomacy in the interests of pacifying the situation and seeking reasonable, peaceful and just solutions,

"3. *Decides* to keep this issue under urgent and continuous review so that the Council may determine what further steps it might take in the exercise of its responsibilities for the maintenance of international peace and security."

300. The representative of Iraq said that the grave crisis endangering peace and security in the Middle East had arisen because of Israel's threat to start a war if its demands concerning navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba were not met. His Government fully endorsed the sovereign right of the United Arab Republic to control navigation through its territorial waters. Those Powers which demanded an immediate solution to the problem of navigation in the Gulf of Aqaba—on which not a single resolution of the General Assembly or the Security Council had ever been adopted and on which the United Nations had taken no position—did not display the same sense of urgency and concern for the fate of one and a quarter million human beings whose right to repatriation to their homeland had been solemnly proclaimed and reaffirmed in no less than eighteen resolutions of the General Assembly of the United Nations. If the Arab States today were to declare that the non-implementation of these resolutions was a *casus belli*, would they not be on far more solid ground than Israel, which claimed rights which it did not possess under international law.

301. In the present crisis, brought about by Israel, the Arab States had repeatedly stated that they would not initiate military operations or take the first step on the road to war. The problem before the Council was to prevent Israel, which alone was threatening war, from carrying out its threat.

302. The representative of Japan said that the most important consideration was for all Governments concerned to exercise maximum restraint, scrupulously avoiding any action which might lead to further deterioration of the present grave situation. He urged the parties concerned to rely on peaceful means, as specified in the Charter, for a solution of the question of innocent passage in the Strait of Tiran.

303. Introducing the draft resolution sponsored by his delegation (S/7916/Rev.1), the representative of the United States described it as an interim draft reflecting the first step which, in his delegation's view, the Council should take. The measures proposed were designed, in the spirit of the Secretary-General's report, to ensure a cooling-off period in the Near East without prejudice to the ultimate rights or claims of any party, and thus to provide the necessary time for more deliberate disposition of the underlying issues.

304. The representative of Jordan said that the present tensions in the the area had been caused by Israel's persistent violations of the Armistice Agreement and its determination to continue its policy of aggression, despite the Council's appeals. That policy was part of an expansionist plan aimed at acquiring more Arab lands and displacing more Arab people.

Some Council members had spoken of sabotage and terrorism, but it was ridiculous to call the Arab people of Palestine, who were determined to regain their homeland, terrorists.

305. Much had been said about the so-called right of Israel to passage through the Gulf of Aqaba. It must be remembered, however, that the Israel presence on the Red Sea was the result of an act of occupation in violation of a Security Council cease-fire resolution. The Gulf of Aqaba was an Arab gulf, and neither the United States nor the United Kingdom was entitled to pass judgement on the status of Arab waters. The representative of the United States had referred to the territorial integrity of all the countries of the Middle East. But the problem of Palestine remained before the Council; it remained unsolved. The Armistice Agreements had fixed no boundaries, only demarcation lines, and passed no judgement on rights, political, military or other.

306. At the same meeting, the representative of the United Arab Republic introduced the following draft resolution (S/7919):

*"The Security Council,*

*"Mindful* of its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, in accordance with Article 24, paragraph 1, of the United Nations Charter,

*"Conscious* of the grave situation prevailing in the Middle East resulting from the inability of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to function in accordance with the resolutions of the Security Council and in conformity with the obligations of the parties of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement,

*"Noting* with grave concern that in accordance with the various reports of the Secretary-General and, in particular, his latest report (document S/7906) the aforementioned United Nations machinery became particularly inoperative due to the attitude of Israel authorities regarding the General Armistice Agreement,

*"Considering* that the unilateral denunciation by Israel of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement cannot be accepted or tolerated by the Security Council, and does not absolve Israel of its obligations and responsibilities under that Agreement,

*"Fully convinced* that such unilateral denunciation by Israel and its flagrant violation of the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement is responsible for the deterioration of the situation in the Middle East, threatening international peace and security in the area,

*"1. Decides* that the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement is still valid and reiterates that the United Nations machinery emanating therefrom should be fully operative;

*"2. Calls upon* the Israel Government to respect and abide by its obligations and responsibilities as stipulated in the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement and to act accordingly;

*"3. Instructs* the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization to proceed promptly and reinstitute within two weeks the headquarters of the Egyptian-Israel Mixed Armistice

Commission in El-Auja from where it discharged its duties prior to the Israel unilateral action forcing its expulsion from that zone;

"4. *Decides* to bolster additional measures necessary for the full implementation of this resolution in case of the non-compliance by the Israel Government with the terms of this resolution;

"5. *Requests* the Secretary-General to contact the parties to the Egyptian-Israel General Armistice Agreement for the immediate implementation of this decision and to report to the Security Council within fifteen days for its approval with regard to additional measures;

"6. *Decides* to reconvene to discuss the report of the Secretary-General immediately upon its submission."

307. The representative of Jordan, supported by the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics drew the attention of the Council to the fact that the agenda item under discussion should be entitled "The question of Palestine", as it always had been in the past.

308. The representative of Israel said that an assault of unprecedented ferocity had been launched against his country in the Council by the representatives of five Arab States. They had enumerated Israel's alleged violations of United Nations resolutions and proclaimed their compliance with those resolutions and with the provisions of the General Armistice Agreements. Yet, under the cover of the Agreements, the Arab countries had carried on warfare against his country, and their terrorists and saboteurs had crossed Israel's borders thousands of times. The representative of the United Arab Republic had openly declared that his country was in a state of war with Israel, and that it was therefore permitted to carry out acts of war and belligerence against it. The crux of the matter was that, although the Security Council had ruled that the Armistice Agreements terminated belligerence, it was the policy of the Arab States to practice that belligerence. They had massed large offensive forces along his country's borders and proclaimed a blockade in an international waterway which was vital to it. But belligerence was not a one-way street. His country had faced the unrelenting warfare of the Arab States with supreme restraint. That restraint, however, should not be mistaken for a lack of determination to defend its liberty and to fight for its existence.

309. In a letter dated 2 June (S/7924), the representative of Israel drew attention to a new act of aggression committed by Syria against Israel on the same day, when a group of marauders had been intercepted by an Israel patrol at a distance of one kilometre from the Syrian border. In the subsequent exchange of fire, casualties had been suffered on both sides.

310. By a letter dated 2 June (S/7925), the representative of the United Arab Republic transmitted to the President of the Council a statement issued by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of his country, which noted that certain States claiming to speak on behalf of the maritime Powers were attempting to exercise pressure on the United Arab Republic, and declared that his country would consider any collective measure undertaken by those States an encroachment on its sovereignty in the exercise of its legitimate rights over its territorial waters.

311. At the 1346th meeting on 3 June, the representatives of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia were also invited, at their request, to participate in the Council's discussion.

312. The representative of Israel said that the crisis in the Middle East had erupted without warning on 16 May, when an Egyptian general had sent an ultimatum to the Commander of UNEF. At the same time, the Arab States had launched a propaganda barrage of unprecedented violence. Faced by those actions, it was only natural that his Government had found itself under the elementary duty to place the country on a full defence footing.

313. The Arab States had persistently refused to take a single step towards the return to permanent peace which was one of the fundamental goals of the Armistice Agreements. The draft resolution submitted by the United Arab Republic sought the endorsement of the Security Council for that policy. Its object was to promote the real aim of the Egyptian Government, which was not to return to the conditions of 1956, but, as President Nasser had himself stated, to go back to the situation prevailing in 1948, i.e., to abolish Israel's independence. Those who were urging the full restoration of the Armistice Agreements must therefore first insist that the States concerned forgo belligerence.

314. The Arab contention that Israel had no right to be in Elat (Umm Reshresh) at all was a deliberate attempt to obscure the facts. Elat had been included in the Jewish States by the General Assembly's resolution of 1947. In May 1949, Egypt had complained to the Mixed Armistice Commission about the Israel presence at Umm Reshresh. On 8 February 1950, the MAC had rejected the Egyptian complaint that the occupation of Umm Reshresh was a violation of the Armistice Agreement.

315. The question of the international character of the Strait of Tiran had been authoritatively answered at the eleventh session of the General Assembly and at the 1958 Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea. Both had stated clearly that there must be no suspension of the right of innocent passage through international straits. What was required now was action, concrete steps to forgo all belligerence and to withdraw the armies to their previous positions.

316. The representative of Bulgaria said that measures taken by the Government of Israel were only the outward manifestations of the policy of intervention practised by certain imperialist circles to re-establish their control and exploit the enormous natural resources of the region. In response to the Israel provocations, the Arab States had been compelled to adopt the necessary measures to defend themselves. The fact that the presence of UNEF on the soil of the United Arab Republic had been regarded as an extraordinary and temporary measure, and that the consent of the United Arab Republic was the juridical basis for that presence, did not seem to embarrass those circles which contended that the withdrawal of the Force had contributed to the present crisis. The United Arab Republic, while acting in self-defence against a real danger of aggression, had formally assured the Secretary-General that it would not initiate offensive action. His delegation would welcome a similar statement from the Government of Israel. In his view, the Council must call for the strictest restraint and make every



effort to ensure observance by Israel of the General Armistice Agreements and Israel's participation in the United Nations Truce Supervision machinery. His delegation fully supported the draft resolution submitted by the United Arab Republic.

317. The representative of Syria said that Israel was leading the world to the brink of catastrophe. However, Israel could not and would not do what it was doing if it were not assured of strong backing by its powerful protectors and benefactors. The Arab attitude was purely defensive in nature and legitimate in its motives. No peace could be lasting until and unless the full rights of the Arab people of Palestine to their homeland were recognized and fully implemented.

318. The representative of Morocco said that he unreservedly approved the response of the Secretary-General to the request of the United Arab Republic for the withdrawal of the Emergency Force from its territory. The conditions surrounding the creation of the State of Israel, the open support which it had always had from some great Powers, could not but create a certain logic which encouraged it to try constantly to enlarge its territory and to impose itself further on the Arab world. Israel's presence in Elat was and could only be an illegal occupation of Arab territory, which the subsequent military arrangements had left as an integral part of Arab territory. It would be difficult for the great Powers to make the Arabs agree that considerations born of a *fait accompli* should prevail over international law. The true solution lay in possessing the moral and political courage to go back to a complete examination of the whole question of relations between Israel and the Arab States.

319. The representative of Saudi Arabia said that the Gulf of Aqaba and the Strait of Tiran had been under Arab control from time immemorial and were Arab territorial waters. For nineteen years the indigenous Arab people of Palestine had suffered deprivation and the agony of exile while transplanted Zionists ingathered from all corners of the world had reaped the income from Arab properties in Zionist-occupied Palestine. Any resolution that fell short of dealing with the restoration of a united Palestine to its indigenous people would be considered an evasion by the Council of its responsibilities under the Charter.

320. The representative of Mali said that he was gratified at the rapidity with which the Secretary-General, in a desire to respect the rights of a sovereign State and in the interests of peace, had taken the necessary decisions and acted as he did. His delegation felt that the Council must immediately recognize that the problem before it today was an old one; it was the question of Palestine. It was the problem of Israel, which, for the Arabs, was a State created by the racism and imperialism of the West. That problem would not be solved unless the Palestinians were allowed to return to the land of their ancestors. Ever since the creation of Israel, as was evident from the Secretary-General's report, there had existed a state of war, of continuing conflict, between Israel and the Arabs. The Council must recognize that the United Arab Republic had a right not to consider as innocent any ship flying the flag of a country with which it found itself at war or any ship carrying strategic materials to a country which it considered its enemy.

321. The representative of France, having stressed, *inter alia*, the special responsibility borne by the great

Powers, observed that the Council's immediate objective should be to agree on the terms of an appeal to the parties to abstain from supporting their claims by resorting to force of any kind. In that connexion, the party which first decided to initiate military action would incur a tragic responsibility. That appeal should be drawn up in such a way that it neither approved nor disapproved of the positions of the parties. He appealed to the other permanent members of the Council to join in the efforts to move events towards the only road which, in the opinion of his Government, could lead to peace, namely, the reduction of tension and later negotiations. It would be useless to continue the discussion of draft resolutions on which the likelihood of consensus was highly doubtful.

322. The representative of the United States denied the charge that his country's attitude was one-sided on the question and reiterated that the draft resolution proposed by his delegation did not seek to prejudice the claims of any party but to help, in the Secretary-General's explicit words, to alleviate tension in the area.

323. The representative of Ethiopia associated himself with the remarks made by the representative of France.

#### **E. Outbreak of hostilities and consideration by the Council at the 1347th to 1350th meetings (5-7 June 1967)**

324. In a letter dated 5 June (S/7926), the representative of the United Arab Republic stated that he wished to inform the President of the Council that Israel had committed a treacherous premeditated aggression against his country. On the morning of 5 June, the Israelis had launched attacks against the Gaza Strip, Sinai, airports in Cairo, in the Suez Canal area and several other airports within the United Arab Republic. Preliminary reports indicated that twenty-three Israel airplanes had been shot down and that several Israel pilots had been captured. In repelling the aggression, his Government had decided to defend itself by all means in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations.

325. At the 1347th meeting, on 5 June, following the adoption of the provisional agenda, the President, in explaining the circumstances of the meeting, stated that at 3.10 a.m. that morning the representative of Israel had informed him that Egyptian land and air forces had moved against Israel, whose armed forces were engaged in repelling the attack. At 3.30 a.m. the representative of the United Arab Republic had informed him that Israel had launched a treacherous, premeditated aggression against the United Arab Republic, attacking at points in the Gaza Strip, Sinai, airports in Cairo, the Suez Canal area and several other airports inside the United Arab Republic. Information received by the Secretary-General had confirmed that exchanges of fire and air activity had gone on in the area since the early hours of that morning.

326. The Secretary-General told the Security Council that United Nations sources had no means of ascertaining how the hostilities had been initiated, particularly as UNEF was concentrated in its camps and was in the process of being withdrawn. However, all reports agreed that serious military action on land and in the air was taking place at a number of points and was spreading. General Indarjit Rikhye, Com-



mander of UNEF, had reported that violations of the United Arab Republic air space by two Israel aircraft had occurred over Gaza and El Arish at 0800 hours local time. UNEF personnel in Rafah camp had reported heavy fighting between United Arab Republic and Israel forces across the frontier at 0800 hours local time. United Arab Republic authorities in Gaza had informed General Rikhye of large-scale air raids throughout the United Arab Republic and of attacks by Israel forces on El Kuseima in Sinai at 0800 hours local time. United Arab Republic artillery in Gaza had started firing towards Israel-controlled territory at 0915 hours local time. General Rikhye had also reported that Israel aircraft had strafed a UNEF convoy south of Camp Younis on the road between Gaza and Rafah, killing three Indian soldiers and wounding several others. The Secretary-General further said that General Odd Bull, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization, had reported that firing in Jerusalem had started at 1125 hours local time. United Nations observers on the Syrian border had reported air battles between Israel and Syrian planes beginning at 1155 hours local time. Despite assurances received by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO from Israel and Jordan that they would respect the inviolability of Government House, UNTSO's headquarters in Jerusalem, Jordanian soldiers had occupied the building on the morning of 5 June. The Secretary-General said that he had sent an urgent appeal to the King of Jordan for the immediate removal of Jordanian troops from Government House.

327. The representative of India expressed profound shock and grief at learning from the Secretary-General that three members of the Indian contingent of UNEF had been killed and an unknown number wounded in a wanton strafing attack by Israel on the withdrawal columns of those forces. His Government felt that the Council should condemn that wanton, irresponsible and brutal action by the ruling circles of Israel.

328. The President suggested and it was agreed that the Council hear the Israel and United Arab Republic representatives' statements, then recess for consultations.

329. The representative of Israel charged that in the early hours of 5 June, Egyptian armoured columns had made an offensive thrust against Israel's borders, while at the same time Egyptian planes from airfields in Sinai had struck out towards Israel. Egyptian artillery in the Gaza Strip had shelled several Israel villages in that area. Israel, he said, was acting in self-defence, and had brought the matter before the Security Council in accordance with the Charter.

330. The representative of the United Arab Republic charged that Israel had once again committed a treacherous aggression against his country. He asserted that the attack carried out in the early hours of the morning indicated beyond doubt that the Israelis had as usual engineered and planned the aggression in defiance of the United Nations Charter. In the face of aggression, his country had no choice but to defend itself in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter. He called on the Council to condemn vigorously the Israel aggression.

331. In a supplemental report issued on the evening of 5 June (S/7930), the Secretary-General informed the Council that heavy fighting continued in Jerusalem. The Commander of UNEF had reported that in artillery

firing on the Indian battalion main camp, near which were military positions of the United Arab Republic, One Indian officer and an Indian soldier had been killed and nine soldiers wounded. The Chief of Staff of UNTSO had reported that Israel troops had forcibly occupied Government House and that he and his staff had then been escorted into Israel. The report contained the texts of messages sent by the Secretary-General to the Government of Israel protesting the strafing of the United Nations convoy and the occupation of Government House and requesting that Israel restore Government House to exclusive United Nations control. The Secretary-General further stated that firing was still going on in Jerusalem, and he strongly supported the idea of declaring it an open city in order to protect its irreplaceable religious places.

332. The Council reconvened on the evening of 5 June but was immediately adjourned because consultations were still in progress.

333. In an addendum issued on 6 June (S/7930/Add.1), the Secretary-General conveyed to the Security Council further information which he had received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO and United Nations Observers in the field on continued fighting in Jerusalem, Syria, Gaza and El Arish, as well as on unsuccessful efforts by United Nations observers to obtain a cease-fire. The UNEF headquarters in Gaza had come under direct Israel artillery fire during the night of 5/6 June, forcing the Commander of UNEF to re-establish headquarters at Tre Kroner Camp near the beach in Gaza. During the shelling three Indian soldiers had been killed and another three wounded.

334. At the 1348th meeting, on 6 June, the representatives of Libya and Tunisia were also invited, at their request, to take part in the Council's discussion.

335. The President stated that members of the Council had been continuously engaged in urgent consultations as to the course of action to be taken by the Council in this emergency situation. Those consultations had now resulted in unanimous agreement on a draft resolution which called for an immediate cease-fire. In his capacity as President of the Council, he presented the following draft resolution (S/7935):

*"The Security Council,*

*"Noting the oral report of the Secretary-General in this situation,*

*"Having heard the statements made in the Council,*

*"Concerned at the outbreak of fighting and with the menacing situation in the Near East,*

*"1. Calls upon the Governments concerned as a first step to take forthwith all measures for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the area;*

*"2. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the situation."*

**Decision:** *At the 1348th meeting, on 6 June, the draft resolution was adopted unanimously without debate (resolution 233 (1967)).*

336. The President said he was confident that he expressed the unanimous wish of the members of the Council when he appealed most urgently to the parties to comply immediately with the provisions of the resolution.

337. The representative of the United States said that the resolution carried the full authority of the United Nations, and it was now the duty of all the parties concerned to comply fully and promptly with its terms. Once the cease-fire was established the Council should turn its immediate attention to the other steps that would be required to achieve a more lasting peace.

338. The United States representative then denied categorically what he described as fantastic allegations that United States aircraft had been involved in the hostilities in the Near East. To prevent the further spread of these dangerous falsehoods, his Government was prepared to co-operate in an immediate impartial investigation by the United Nations of the charges and was prepared to invite United Nations personnel aboard its aircraft carriers in the Mediterranean at any time to investigate and observe past and present activities of its planes in the area.

339. The representative of Ethiopia said that his delegation looked on the resolution just adopted as the first of many urgent steps needed to deal with the tragic situation which had arisen in the Middle East. He wished also to associate his delegation with the urgent appeal that had been made by the world's religious leaders and by the Secretary-General that the Holy City of Jerusalem be declared an open city and it is be spared from involvement in the present conflict.

340. The representative of France said that the decision which the Council had adopted must now be carried out without delay. The stability of the Near East and peace were at stake.

341. The representative of the United Kingdom categorically denied that any British aircraft or any other British forces had taken part in the fighting on the side of Israel. As he had stated in a letter to the Council's President on 6 June (S/7936), it was his Government's policy to avoid taking sides in the conflict and to do everything possible to bring about a cease-fire. Welcoming the resolution just adopted, he emphasized the responsibility of the United Nations to take further steps to ensure that lives were not lost and innocent people did not suffer from the conflict.

342. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics drew attention to a statement issued by his Government on 5 June, which declared, *inter alia*, that Israel had committed aggression against the United Arab Republic and other neighbouring States in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and elementary rules of international law. The conflict had flared up because of the adventurism of the Israel rulers, who were encouraged by certain imperialist circles. The Soviet Government resolutely supported the Governments and peoples of the Arab States in their just struggle for their independence and sovereign rights and demanded that the Israel Government should, as a first urgent step, cease immediately and unconditionally its military actions against the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan, and withdraw its troops behind the truce line. The United Nations must condemn the actions of the Government of Israel and take urgent measures to restore peace in the Middle East. Having adopted the cease-fire resolution, the Security Council must now go on to adopt, without any further delay, a decision concerning the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of the forces of the aggressor.

343. The representative of Argentina said that the cease-fire must immediately be followed by sustained efforts to find a just and lasting peace for the Middle East.

344. The representative of Canada said that the Secretary-General had been proved all too right in his assessment of the situation in the Middle East. Canada expected that UNTSO would take steps to observe the cease-fire once it came into effect. The cease-fire resolution just adopted was a first step; the Council should now take advantage of the opportunity presented to deal effectively and equitably with the fundamental problems which threatened peace and security in the area.

345. The representative of Brazil said that the main purpose of his delegation's efforts in the Council had been to call upon all Governments concerned, as a first step, to put into effect an immediate cease-fire, to be followed by other measures conducive to the peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israel situation.

346. The representative of Japan said that immediate cease-fire orders should be issued by the Governments concerned to all their military forces. Those Governments, with the help of the Security Council, should then promptly and fully explore all possible ways and means of resolving the questions at issue between them by strictly peaceful means.

347. The representative of Bulgaria said that his delegation had voted in favour of the draft resolution which called for an immediate cease-fire, since that draft represented a first step to stop the brutal aggression launched by the extremist circles in Israel against the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan. That premeditated and flagrant aggression constituted one of the most savage episodes of imperialistic policy in the Middle East. It was the Security Council's duty to take the necessary measures to condemn the aggression of Israel against the Arab States and to effect the prompt withdrawal of the aggressor behind the armistice demarcation lines.

348. The representative of Mali said that his delegation condemned the aggression by Israel on 5 June and fully supported the United Arab Republic and the other Arab peoples in their just and noble struggle for their sovereignty and their lawful rights.

349. The representative of China said he hoped that the Council would be able to follow up this initial step by other effective means to seek a just and peaceful solution of the problems underlying the present conflict.

350. The representative of India said that while his delegation welcomed the unanimous decision of the Council, it would have preferred a resolution which linked the cease-fire with a withdrawal of armed forces to positions held prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Such a decision would have been in accord with past practice of the Council on the principle that the aggressor should not enjoy the fruits of aggression. The Council should take up on an urgent basis the question of withdrawal. He strongly protested against the Israel attacks on withdrawing Indian forces of UNEF and asked for guarantees for the safety and security of those elements of UNEF which remained in the area.

351. The President, speaking as the representative of Denmark, said his Government was happy that it had now proved possible, as a first step, to adopt unanimously a resolution calling for a cease-fire.

352. The representative of Iraq stated that the resolution was a complete surrender to Israel. The Council, instead of condemning the aggressor, had in fact allowed Israel to maintain the fruits of its aggression. He asserted that negotiations aimed at working out a cease-fire resolution which would be accompanied by a call for the withdrawal of forces back to positions held before the outbreak of hostilities had failed because of the refusal of certain States, in particular the United States of America, to support such a resolution.

353. The representative of Israel told the Council that his country, by its independent effort, had passed from serious danger to successful resistance against the combined forces of the United Arab Republic, Jordan, Syria and Iraq. After Egyptian forces had attacked on 5 June, Israel had defended itself under Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Efforts by the Government of Israel to prevent the expansion of the conflict had been ignored by Jordan, which had opened artillery fire across the whole frontier, including Jerusalem, and by Syria, which had started bombing and artillery attacks on Israel villages.

354. The Government and people of Israel, he went on, had been disconcerted by some aspects of the role of the United Nations in the conflict. The withdrawal of UNEF had not been accompanied by due international consultations, nor had Israel's interests been adequately considered. Israel's attitude towards the peace-keeping functions of the United Nations had been traumatically affected by the experience.

355. Speaking of the main elements of tension that had led to the conflict, the representative of Israel said that the sabotage movement, the blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba, the dismissal of the United Nations Emergency Force and the abnormal concentration of troops in the Sinai Peninsula had effectively disrupted the *status quo* which, for ten years, had ensured a relative stability on the Egyptian-Israeli border. It was now the task of the Governments concerned to work out among themselves a new system of relationships based on the acceptance of Israel's statehood and its deep roots in the Middle East, and on the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes. It was also important that States outside the region, and especially the great Powers, apply a balanced attitude in relation to the problems of the area and exercise an even-handed support for the integrity and independence of States and for their rights under the Charter. His country welcomed the Council's call for a cease-fire, but its implementation would depend on the acceptance and co-operation of the Governments which were responsible for the present situation.

356. The representative of Syria denounced Israel as the aggressor and charged that the United States and the United Kingdom had acted in collusion with Israel by joining in the air attack against Arab towns and by providing air cover for the Israel armed forces. He announced that his country, along with Algeria, the United Arab Republic and Iraq, had severed diplomatic relations with the United States.

357. In reply, the representative of the United States reiterated his categorical denial of his country's participation, military or otherwise, in the conflict.

358. The representative of the United Kingdom again categorically denied the charges made against his country by the representative of Syria. He suggested that the representative of Syria did not help his cause by

repeating allegations which had already been denied and could be disproved. The United Kingdom's policy was plain, publicly announced and scrupulously followed. It was not to take sides but to ensure a peaceful solution to the problems in the area.

359. The representative of Morocco said that the Council's primary duty in dealing with the complaint of aggression by Israel should have been to define the aggression and condemn the aggressor. The resolution it had in fact adopted created a dangerous precedent. In the future, any country might undertake aggressive action with the assurance that the Security Council would debate the question and then, in order to safeguard peace, adopt a resolution which fixed no responsibility for the aggression.

360. By a letter dated 7 June (S/7938), addressed to the President of the Council, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that in view of the continuation of military activities by Israel despite the adoption of a cease-fire resolution by the Security Council, he requested an immediate meeting of the Security Council to hear the reports of the parties concerned on their implementation of the Security Council resolution calling for the immediate cessation of military activities.

361. At the 1349th meeting held on 7 June, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the continuation of military activities by the aggressor, despite the decision of the Security Council, might create an even more menacing situation in the area. For its part, the Soviet delegation considered it essential that the Council, without any delay, demand as a first step a cease-fire and a cessation of all military activities at 2000 hours GMT on 7 June 1967. To that end, he submitted to the Security Council the following draft resolution (S/7940):

*"The Security Council,*

*"Noting that, in spite of its appeal to the Governments concerned to take forthwith as a first step all measures for an immediate cease-fire and for a cessation of all military activities in the Near East (resolution 233(1967)), military activities in the area are continuing,*

*"Concerned that the continuation of military activities may create an even more menacing situation in the area,*

*"1. Demands that the Governments concerned should as a first step cease fire and discontinue all military activities at 2000 hours GMT on 7 June 1967;*

*"2. Requests the Secretary-General to keep the Council promptly and currently informed on the situation."*

362. At the same meeting, the Secretary-General informed the Council that he had received a telegram dated 7 June (S/7943 and Corr.1) from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Jordan stating that his Government accepted the cease-fire and had issued orders to its armed forces to observe it, except in self-defence. The Secretary-General also reported that, according to information received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, the headquarters of the Jordan-Israel Armistice Commission had been occupied by Israel troops on the morning of 7 June. In view of the occupation of the headquarters of both UNTSO in Jerusalem and UNEF in Gaza by Israel troops, he had approached the Govern-

ment of Israel to ask for assurances that the records and documents of both those headquarters would be preserved and protected. The Secretary-General also reported to the Council on the casualties suffered by UNEF and the efforts being made to evacuate the remaining contingents.

**Decision:** *The Council, at the suggestion of the representative of Brazil, supported by the representatives of France and the United States, agreed on a short adjournment to consult on the draft resolution submitted by the USSR.*

363. At the 1350th meeting, held on 7 June, the Council resumed its examination of the three items inscribed on its agenda.

364. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics asked for an immediate vote on his delegation's draft resolution.

**Decision:** *At its 1350th meeting, on 7 June, the Council unanimously adopted the draft resolution submitted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (resolution 234 (1967)).*

365. The representative of Canada introduced the following draft resolution (S/7941):

*"The Security Council,*

*"Noting resolutions 233 (1967) of 6 June and 234 (1967) of 7 June 1967;*

*"Requests the President of the Security Council, with the assistance of the Secretary-General, to take the necessary measures to bring about full and effective compliance with these resolutions."*

366. In introducing the draft resolution, the representative of Canada stated that it was intended to fill a gap in the definition of responsibility with regard to the implementation of the Council's cease-fire resolutions. It was necessary to do more than simply keep the Council informed of the situation.

367. The representative of the United Arab Republic said it had been proved beyond doubt that the United States and the United Kingdom had intervened in the hostilities on Israel's side. Now, while Jordan had accepted the cease-fire, Israel continued its aggression and was occupying Jordan territory; it was also continuing its aggression on United Arab Republic territory. He asked the Council to condemn Israel, and to order it to cease fire immediately and to withdraw to positions held prior to the outbreak of hostilities.

368. The representative of Israel denied that his country was the aggressor and emphasized that Israel had received no help from either the United States or the United Kingdom in repelling Arab aggression. He noted that while his country had welcomed and accepted the cease-fire resolution, the United Arab Republic, Syria and Iraq had not yet availed themselves of the opportunity to accept the same call for a cease-fire. Moreover, Jordan's acceptance of the cease-fire was conditioned by the fact that its forces were under United Arab Republic command and Egyptian commando units stationed in Jordan were continuing to carry out military operations against Israel. Therefore, acceptance of the cease-fire by the United Arab Republic was crucial not only for what happened on the Egyptian-Israeli front, but also for what happened on the Jordan-Israel front.

369. The representative of the United States reiterated his denial of the charges made by the repre-

sentative of the United Arab Republic, and renewed his Government's proposal that the United Nations should conduct an investigation of them.

370. The representative of the United Kingdom rejected the charges made by the representative of the United Arab Republic, and read out the text of a letter of 7 June (S/7939) he had sent to the President of the Security Council stating that his Government would welcome an immediate impartial investigation of those charges by the United Nations.

371. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics drew attention to the statement of his Government dated 7 June addressed to the Government of Israel. It warned that if the Israel Government did not now immediately fulfil the demand for a cease-fire made in the Security Council's resolution, the Soviet Union would revise its attitude with regard to Israel, and adopt a decision concerning the further maintenance of diplomatic relations with it.

372. The Secretary-General informed the Council that according to information received from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, the cease-fire in the area of Jerusalem was not effective. During the night of 6/7 June, Israel forces had bombarded and occupied the crest of Mount Scopus dominating the city of Jerusalem. A sector of the city had come under Jordan mortar fire for a short period in the mid-morning of 7 June and at about 1030 hours GMT heavy Israel bombardment had started in the vicinity of Bethlehem.

#### **F. Communications to the Council and consideration at the 1351st to 1357th meetings (8-11 June 1967)**

373. By a telegram of 7 June (S/7945) the Foreign Minister of Israel informed the President of the Security Council that at 4.45 p.m. New York time he had advised the Secretary-General that the Israel Government accepted the Security Council's call for immediate cease fire, provided that the other parties accepted.

374. In a further cable dated 7 June (S/7946), the Foreign Minister of Jordan informed the Secretary-General of his Government's immediate acceptance of the cease-fire resolution.

375. In a letter of 8 June (S/7947), the representative of India transmitted the text of a protest addressed by his Government to the Government of Israel in connexion with the killing of Indian troops serving with UNEF.

376. By a cable dated 8 June (S/7947) the Foreign Minister of Jordan informed the Secretary-General that the Government of Jordan agreed to the implementation of the resolution adopted by the Security Council on 7 June.

377. In a cable dated 8 June (S/7948), the Foreign Minister of Kuwait informed the Secretary-General that the Government of Kuwait would not observe or adhere to the resolutions of the Security Council for a cease-fire, which did not condemn the Israel aggressors and ignored the just rights of the Palestinians in their homeland.

378. In a letter dated 8 June (S/7950), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of the United States stated that in view of the fact that fighting continued in the Middle East despite the unanimous adoption of two resolutions by the Security



Council calling for a cease-fire and despite the indications of acceptance of a cease-fire by Jordan and Israel, he requested an urgent meeting of the Security Council to consider the present grave situation.

379. By a letter dated 8 June (S/7954), addressed to the President of the Council, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that in view of the continuation of Israel's military activities despite the adoption by the Security Council of the resolutions on a cease-fire, he was urgently requesting the convening of a meeting of the Council on 8 June. The letter further stated that this request was to consider the question of condemning Israel's aggressive acts, the immediate cessation by the aggressor of military activities against the Arab States and the effective withdrawal of Israel troops to the Israel side of the Armistice Line. On 8 June the delegation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics introduced the following resolution (S/7951):

*"The Security Council,*

*"Noting that Israel has disregarded the Security Council decisions calling for the cessation of military activities (resolutions 233(1967) of 6 June 1967 and 234(1967) of 7 June 1967),*

*"Considering that Israel not only has not halted military activities but has made use of the time elapsed since the adoption by the Council of the aforementioned resolutions in order to seize additional territory of the United Arab Republic and Jordan,*

*"Noting that even now Israel is continuing military activities instead of halting its aggression, thus defying the United Nations and all peace-loving States,*

*"1. Vigorously condemns Israel's aggressive activities and its violations of the aforementioned Security Council resolutions, of the United Nations Charter and of United Nations principles;*

*"2. Demands that Israel should immediately halt its military activities against neighbouring Arab States and should remove all its troops from the territory of those States and withdraw them behind the armistice lines."*

Subsequently, operative paragraph 2 of the draft resolution was revised (S/7951/Rev.1) to read as follows:

*"2. Demands that Israel should immediately halt its military activities against neighbouring Arab States and should remove all its troops from the territory of those States and withdraw them behind the armistice lines and respect the status of the demilitarized zones, as prescribed in the General Armistice Agreements."*

380. On 8 June the delegation of the United States of America also submitted a draft resolution, calling for scrupulous compliance with the cease-fire and prompt discussions thereafter looking toward the establishment of a stable and durable peace in the Middle East. The draft resolution (S/7952) read as follows:

*"The Security Council,*

*"Recalling its resolutions 233 (1967) and 234 (1967),*

*"Recalling that in the latter resolution the Council demanded that the Governments concerned should as a first step cease fire and discontinue military operations at 2000 hours GMT on 7 June 1967,*

*"Noting that Israel and Jordan have indicated their mutual acceptance of the Council's demand for a cease-*

*fire, and that Israel has expressed with respect to all parties its acceptance of the cease-fire provided the other parties accept,*

*"Noting further with deep concern that other parties to the conflict have not yet agreed to a cease-fire,*

*"1. Calls for scrupulous compliance by Israel and Jordan with the agreement they have reached on a cease-fire;*

*"2. Insists that all the other parties concerned immediately comply with the Council's repeated demands for a cease-fire and cessation of all military activity as a first urgent step toward the establishment of a stable peace in the Middle East;*

*"3. Calls for discussions promptly thereafter among the parties concerned, using such third party or United Nations assistance as they may wish, looking toward the establishment of viable arrangements encompassing the withdrawal and disengagement of armed personnel, the renunciation of force regardless of its nature, the maintenance of vital international rights and the establishment of a stable and durable peace in the Middle East;*

*"4. Requests the President of the Security Council and the Secretary-General to take immediate steps to seek to assure compliance with the cease-fire and to report to the Council thereon within twenty-four hours;*

*"5. Also requests the Secretary-General to provide such assistance as may be required in facilitating the discussions called for in paragraph 3."*

The draft resolution was subsequently revised (S/7952/Rev.1) so as to include a reference to the acceptance by the United Arab Republic of the cease-fire. In a further revision (S/7952/Rev.2), submitted on 9 June, the third and fourth preambular paragraphs and the first and second operative paragraphs of the United States revised draft resolution (S/7952/Rev.1) were revised to read as follows:

*"Noting that Israel, Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic have indicated their acceptance of the Council's demand for a cease-fire,*

*"Noting further with deep concern reports of continued fighting between Israel and Syria,*

*"1. Insists on an immediate scrupulous implementation by all the parties concerned of the Council's repeated demands for a cease-fire and cessation of all military activity as a first urgent step toward the establishment of a stable peace in the Middle East."*

381. Referring to the draft resolution submitted by the United States, the representative of the United States of America said that the increasing gravity of the situation made it clear that the Council must take further steps in order to increase the chances of building a stable and just peace in the tormented region of the Middle East. His delegation welcomed the fact that a mutual cease-fire had already been accepted by Israel and Jordan and that Israel had accepted the Security Council's call for an immediate cease-fire if the other parties accept. It was necessary that all the other parties now agree to put a cease-fire immediately into effect. Secondly, the draft resolution called for prompt discussions after a cease-fire has been achieved, looking toward the establishment of viable arrangements encompassing the withdrawal and disengagement of armed personnel, the renunciation of force regardless of its nature, the main-



tenance of vital international rights and the establishment of a stable and durable peace in the Middle East.

382. His Government believed that such a dual approach, in which the completion of the cease-fire was combined with a call for longer-range discussions, was the approach most likely to bring progress towards real peace in the Middle East. To minimize the obstacles to a prompt beginning to such a discussion, the draft resolution introduced by the United States included the suggestion that the parties make use of such United Nations or third-party assistance as they might wish, and a particular request to the Secretary-General, in his unique position as an impartial international servant, to provide such assistance in this connexion as might be required. He renewed the pledge of the United States to join in efforts to bring a lasting peace to the Middle East and to lend all its energies to achieving that aim.

383. At the 1351st meeting, on 8 June, the Secretary-General stated that the Chief of Staff of UNTSO had reported that on the morning of 8 June he had received a message from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Jordan to the effect that Israel was bombing Mafraq and Israel forces were concentrating on the west side of the Jordan River. General Bull had communicated that information to the Israel Foreign Ministry, which had indicated that Iraqi troops and aircraft were in the Mafraq area. The Secretary-General pointed out that the cease-fire resolutions of the Security Council had also been transmitted to the Government of Iraq, but no response had been received. United Nations Observers in Tiberias had reported that heavy air and ground fire was taking place on the morning of 8 June in the general area of the Israel-Syria central demilitarized zone.

384. The Secretary-General read a communication from the representative of the United Arab Republic (S/7953), dated 8 June, informing him that his Government had decided to accept the cease-fire call, as it had been prescribed by the resolutions of the Council on 6 and 7 June 1967, on the condition that the other party ceased fire.

385. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the extremist circles of Tel Aviv, inebriated by their temporary success, were continuing their aggression against the Arab States and were even laying down conditions for agreeing to the terms of the Council's cease-fire resolutions. Israel had, indeed, hurled a challenge at the United Nations and at all peace-loving States, creating a situation fraught with dangerous consequences. Israel bore the sole responsibility for the aggression and must be severely punished for the crimes it had committed.

386. Referring to the draft resolution submitted by his delegation (S/7951), the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics appealed to members of the Council to take the necessary decision, without delay, so that the Council might do its duty in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations.

387. The representative of the United Kingdom said that he welcomed the statement read out by the Secretary-General that the United Arab Republic had accepted a cease-fire. It was a success for the United Nations. He deplored the unwillingness of the Council to act earlier but now that it had he congratulated those, including the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, who had worked for a cease-fire. He hoped that the United

Nations authorities on the ground would now cope with the resultant tasks. These were to stop the fighting, to secure disengagement, to bring relief to the homeless and wounded and then to move on to the greater tasks of conciliation and establishment of order and justice.

388. The representative of Israel declared that owing to the failure of certain Arab States to observe the cease-fire, fighting and bloodshed continued in the Middle East. The only established and effective cease-fire agreement was that between Israel and Jordan. He added that the acceptance of the cease-fire by the United Arab Republic raised the immediate prospect of the end of hostilities, except in the case of Syria, which had not accepted the cease-fire and where hostilities were becoming intensified. Referring to the Soviet draft resolution, he said that his overriding objection was that it rested on premises that were not accurate and upon an unfair distribution of responsibilities. Israel had been the first to accept the cease-fire resolutions and had halted military activities as soon as a cease-fire had been achieved with any of its neighbours. As for the draft resolution presented by the United States (S/7952/Rev.2), he noted that the emphasis was on the need to move not backwards to belligerence, but forward to peace, and it was in the context of peace negotiations that the draft proposed agreed measures of disengagement. He added that the emphasis in Israel's thinking was not so much on the authority of international bodies as on direct bilateral contacts between the Governments concerned.

389. The representative of the United States of America welcomed the United Arab Republic's acceptance of the cease-fire and noted that his delegation's draft resolution had now been revised to include the United Arab Republic among the countries which had accepted the cease-fire call.

390. The representative of Bulgaria said that the United States draft resolution was unacceptable because it placed Jordan and the United Arab Republic on the same footing with the aggressor. It amounted to allowing Israel troops to remain where they were so as to make sure that Israel's demands with respect to territorial and other concessions from the Arab States were satisfied.

391. At the 1352nd meeting of the Council, held on 9 June at the urgent request of Syria, the President, at the opening of the meeting informed the Council of charges made to him by Israel, and later by Syria, that hostilities were continuing.

392. The Secretary-General told the Council that, early that morning, the Chairman of the Israel-Syrian Armistice Commission had advised him that a message had been received from Syria claiming that Syria was being subjected to an Israel attack on the whole length of the Armistice Demarcation Line. The Chief of Staff of UNTSO had reported that air bombardment had taken place in the central demilitarized zone at 7.45 and 7.55 GMT. General Bull had also reported that Israel authorities had informed him of heavy shelling near Syria, including the town of Safad, and that earlier some sixteen Israel villages had come under heavy Syrian artillery fire. The Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission had confirmed later that Israel aircraft had bombed north and east of Lake Tiberias on the morning of 9 June.

393. The representative of Syria said that his Government had declared its acceptance of the cease-

fire as stipulated in the Security Council resolutions of 6 and 7 June. One hour later, the Israel military forces had unleashed vast air and land operations, which were proceeding with increasing intensity at the present time, leaving no doubt that their aim was the full-scale invasion of Syria. He emphasized that two air attacks by a large number of Israel planes had already taken place over his capital, Damascus. The Israel invasion of Syria, premeditated and well prepared, was a violation of the cease-fire and also of the spirit and letter of the United Nations Charter.

394. The representative of Israel said that Syrian attacks had been directed against the civilian population of no less than sixteen villages along the whole length of the Israel-Syrian frontier. At the same time that Syria had announced its acceptance of a cease-fire, it had opened an attack of unusual vehemence against Israel villages. He reaffirmed that his Government was prepared to observe a cease-fire on that front as soon as it was assured that the Syrian Government had issued the necessary orders to all its fighting forces for an immediate cease-fire, and that the Syrian firing had ceased.

395. The President stated that he had consulted all members of the Council, and it was his understanding that there was agreement that, before the Council proceeded with its business, it ought, in the present situation, to adopt urgently a resolution demanding that hostilities cease forthwith. In his capacity as President of the Council he submitted the following draft resolution (S/7960):

*"The Security Council,*

*"Recalling its resolutions 233 (1967) of 6 June and 234 (1967) of 7 June 1967,*

*"Noting that the Governments of Israel and Syria have announced their mutual acceptance of the Council's demand for a cease-fire,*

*"Noting the statements made by the representatives of Syria and Israel,*

*"1. Confirms its previous resolutions about immediate cease-fire and cessation of military action;*

*"2. Demands that hostilities should cease forthwith;*

*"3. Requests the Secretary-General to make immediate contacts with the Governments of Israel and Syria to arrange immediate compliance with the above-mentioned resolutions, and to report to the Security Council not later than two hours from now."*

**Decision:** *At its 135nd meeting, on 9 June, the Council adopted the draft resolution unanimously (resolution 235 (1967)).*

396. The representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Bulgaria condemned Israel for continuing the fighting and maintained that the Council should demand that Israel cease its aggression and withdraw its troops from the territory of the Arab States.

397. The representative of India said that the Council should reinforce its call for a cease-fire and immediately order withdrawal of all armed forces to the positions occupied before the outbreak of hostilities. United Nations machinery should be strengthened. He also suggested that the Secretary-General be requested to send a personal representative to the area to help

restore peaceful conditions and to ensure the safety of the civilian Arab population in the occupied areas. After the completion of withdrawals the Council should earnestly consider the steps to be taken to stabilize peace in the area within the framework of the sovereignty of the States concerned and the rights of the Arab people.

398. The representative of Brazil, explaining his vote in favour of the draft resolution just adopted, said that to bring military operations to a halt should indeed be the primary concern of the Security Council at that stage, lest the continuation of the hostilities bring to naught both the efforts of the Council and the disposition of the parties to abide by its recommendations.

399. The representative of Canada noted the importance of operative paragraph 3 of the resolution just adopted and expressed the hope that subsequent Council resolutions would also contain, as appropriate, a clear provision for implementation. There was a need to strengthen the United Nations presence in the area, particularly the functions of UNTSO.

400. The Secretary-General read a communication dated 9 June (S/7958) from the representative of Syria indicating his Government's acceptance of the cease-fire resolution of 9 June, and a communication from the representative of Israel stating that his Government accepted the 9 June cease-fire resolution provided that Syria accepted it and would implement the cease-fire.

401. The representative of Syria charged that Israel forces were continuing to advance inside Syria and that Israel planes had attacked Damascus.

402. The representative of Israel denied the charges, and said that Syrian artillery was still shelling Israel border villages.

**Decision:** *After some discussion regarding arrangements for the implementation of the resolution, the Council decided to meet in two hours regardless of the answers received from the parties concerned.*

403. At the 1353rd meeting, held on 9 June, the Secretary-General reported that Syria had replied that orders had been issued to its forces to stop military operations forthwith, but Israel was continuing military activities against Syria, including air attacks. Israel had replied that it had issued orders for the cessation of hostilities, and that on its part all fighting had stopped except for measures of self-defence when it was still being attacked.

404. During the discussion the representative of Syria repeated charges that Israel was continuing with increasing intensity vast air and land operations, leaving no doubt that its aim was total invasion of Syria.

405. The representative of the United Arab Republic charged that many parts of his country had been bombed by Israel after the acceptance of the cease-fire by his Government.

406. The representative of Israel denied the charges made by the representatives of Syria and the United Arab Republic and accused Syria of continuing its shelling of Israel villages.

407. The Secretary-General replying to requests by some members of the Council that further information on the charges of cease-fire violations be obtained from United Nations observers in the area, stated that if certain conditions in respect of co-operation by the parties concerned with the United Nations Observers,

including the restoration of communications facilities in Government House and freedom of movement for observers of both sides, were obtained, he would be able to report promptly to the Council regarding observance of the cease-fire.

**Decision:** *Following a brief discussion, the President stated that there seemed to be agreement among all members that the Council should request the parties concerned to extend all possible co-operation to United Nations observers in the discharge of their responsibilities and request the Government of Israel to restore the use of Government House to General Odd Bull, and ask the parties to re-establish freedom of movement for United Nations Observers in the area.*

408. In a letter of 9 June (S/7963) addressed to the Secretary-General, the representative of the United States reiterated his Government's denial that the United States had engaged in any form of military operations on behalf of Israel, and its proposal for an immediate impartial investigation of the charges by the United Nations.

409. By a letter dated 9 June (S/7967), the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics requested that an item entitled "Cessation of military action by Israel and withdrawal of the Israeli forces from those parts of the territory of the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria which they have seized as the result of an aggression", be placed on the Council's agenda.

410. At the 1354th meeting, on 10 June, the President said that the meeting had been convened at the urgent request of the representative of Syria in view of the fact that the situation had seriously deteriorated.

411. The provisional agenda, consisting of the four communications from the representatives of Canada, Denmark, the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, was adopted. The Council also decided to consider the four items before it simultaneously.

412. The Secretary-General gave the Council oral reports on the developing military situation as reported to him by General Bull and the Chairman of the Israel-Syrian Mixed Armistice Commission. The reports included, among other things, an assessment of the situation by General Bull to the effect that UNTSO observers had reported bombing and continuing hostilities in the area east of Lake Tiberias in Syria and the eastern bank of the Jordan River and that Damascus airport and suburbs had been bombed by the Israel air forces. The Israel Foreign Office had denied the air attack on Damascus or its airport, asserting that Israel aircraft were over Syria only to provide protective cover for Israel forces. The Secretary-General observed that the reports were fragmentary, reflecting the extreme difficulties under which General Bull and the United Nations observers in the area were operating.

413. In the course of the debate the representative of Syria charged that the representative of Israel was deliberately attempting to mislead the Council by his assertions that Israel was abiding by the cease-fire, and asked the Security Council to apply sanctions against Israel for its flagrant violations of the cease-fire resolutions.

414. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that it was absolutely plain from the information submitted by the Secretary-General

that, firstly, the Israel Air Force had bombed Damascus, the capital of Syria and, secondly, that the Israel aggressors were continuing to advance on Syrian territory. That was adequate proof that Israel flouted the resolutions of the Security Council. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics pointed out that the representative of Israel had openly misinformed the Security Council in an attempt to divert it from the real issue. He added that, since the representative of Israel was acting on the direct instructions of his Government, it was perfectly obvious that what the Security Council had to deal with was the perfidy of Tel-Aviv.

415. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics then stated that urgent and decisive measures must be taken to stop the aggressor, who should be condemned by the Security Council to the full extent of international law.

416. The representatives of Bulgaria, Mali and India made similar statements calling on the Council to take immediate measures to halt Israel's aggression.

417. The representative of Israel denied the charges and declared that despite the acceptance of two cease-fire resolutions, Syria had not ceased the shelling of Israel villages. He maintained that Israel forces were engaged in silencing the gun emplacements in Syria.

418. The representative of the United States of America declared that his Government would not condone any violation of the cease-fire by any party and believed that both parties had an obligation to comply with the cease-fire. His Government would not, however, pass judgement on which party was responsible for violating the cease-fire on the basis of allegations brought by the parties.

419. At the 1355th meeting, on 10 June, the Secretary-General reported that the Chairman of the Mixed Armistice Commission had confirmed air attacks in the vicinity of Damascus. General Bull had advised that Israel was prepared to make arrangements for a cease-fire. The Secretary-General added that a meeting had been arranged between General Bull and the Minister of Defence of Israel.

420. The representative of the United Kingdom stated that the Council needed the fullest information; reliable, authentic and verified in order to judge on the situation. The Council could not tolerate any flouting of the cease-fire decision by any party.

421. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics drew attention to a statement issued by the Soviet Government on 10 June, which declared that if Israel did not forthwith put an end to its military activities, the Soviet Union, together with all peace-loving States, would have to apply sanctions against Israel. It further declared that in view of the continuation of aggression by Israel, the Soviet Government had decided to break off diplomatic relations with Israel.

422. The representative of Jordan charged that thousands of Jordanians were being expelled from their homes in the Israel-occupied territory on the western bank of the Jordan River and were fleeing to Amman. He requested the Council, as a matter of utmost urgency, to adopt measures which would prevent the commission of further atrocities against the civilian population.

423. The representatives of Bulgaria, the United Kingdom, Canada, Ethiopia and Japan expressed their

concern over the plight of the refugees and appealed to the parties to observe the utmost humanitarian consideration for the civilian victims of the war and prisoners of war.

424. The representative of Canada also remarked on the need for the strengthening of UNTSO to facilitate the observance of the cease-fire. UNTSO's role might be supplemented by the despatch of a special representative to the area.

425. The representative of Syria observed that UNTSO's report had confirmed earlier reports that Damascus airport and its suburbs were being subjected to continuous Israel aerial attacks.

426. The representative of France stated that the information before the Council was enough to justify an urgent appeal to the parties to apply a cease-fire which was still being frequently violated.

427. The representative of Israel stated that at the meeting between the Minister of Defence of Israel and the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, the Defense Minister had stated that Israel would accept any proposal by the Chief of Staff for the implementation of the Security Council cease-fire resolutions and arrangements for the supervision of the cease-fire. He stressed that those arrangements would not be part of the General Armistice Agreement.

428. The representative of the United States of America declared that his Government deemed it of the gravest importance that the Security Council resolutions should be complied with in letter and in spirit by Israel and the Arab countries.

429. The Secretary-General informed the Council that General Bull had proposed a cease-fire between Israel and Syria, to be effective at 1630 hours GMT on 10 June. Israel had advised General Bull that it was ready to agree to the proposal provided Syria also agreed and provided United Nations observers were deployed on each side at the time of the cease-fire.

430. In a supplemental report dated 10 June (S/7930/Add.2) subsequently issued by the Secretary-General, it was stated that Israel and Syria had accepted the arrangements for a cease-fire proposed by General Bull and that, on the morning of 11 June, the United Nations Observers were to be deployed from Kuneitra on the Syrian side and from Tiberias on the Israel side.

431. By a letter dated 10 June (S/7970), addressed to the President of the Council, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated that, in view of the continuation of military activities by Israel despite the adoption of the cease-fire resolutions by the Security Council, he was requesting an immediate meeting of the Security Council to consider the question of the flagrant violation by Israel of the Security Council's decisions calling for the cessation of military activities.

432. At the 1356th meeting, on 10 June, the Council had before it the following draft resolution (S/7968), sponsored by Argentina, Brazil and Ethiopia:

*"The Security Council,*

*"Considering the urgent need to spare the civil populations and the prisoners of war in the area of conflict in the Middle East from additional sufferings,*

*"Considering that essential and inalienable human rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes of war,*

*"Considering that the obligations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949 should be complied with by the parties involved in the conflict.*

*"1. Calls upon the Governments concerned to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place;*

*"2. Recommends to the Governments concerned the scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civilian persons in time of war contained in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949".*

433. The representatives of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Bulgaria declared that despite the decisions of the Security Council, Israel had not given up its attempt to achieve its military purposes on the territory of Syria. They stressed that the Security Council had no right to postpone the resolute condemnation of the Israel aggressors for their flagrant violation of its decisions.

434. The Secretary-General stated that in response to inquiries which he had made to General Bull regarding the current military situation, he had received confirmation of a bombing raid south of Damascus and of artillery fire directed from Syria to Israel, both incidents having taken place after the time fixed for a cease-fire. Israel and Syria had confirmed the occupation of Kuneitra by Israel forces, Israel claiming occupation prior to the cease-fire.

435. The representative of India said that the Council should take swift action not only to assert its authority but to ensure that such defiance and loss of life were not allowed to continue.

436. The representative of the United States said it had been the consistent view of his Government from the beginning of the conflict that the Council should have a single goal: to quench the flames of war in the Near East and begin to move towards peace in the area. His delegation was submitting the following draft resolution (S/7971), the purpose of which was to condemn any confirmed violations of the cease-fire:

*"The Security Council,*

*"Having heard the reports of the Secretary-General on the current situation*

*"Gravely concerned at reports and complaints it has received of air attacks, shellings, ground activities and other violations of the cease-fire between Israel and Syria,*

*"1. Condemns any and all violations of the cease-fire,*

*"2. Requests the Secretary-General to order a full investigation of all reports of violations and to report to the Security Council as soon as possible;*

*"3. Demands that the parties scrupulously respect its cease-fire appeals contained in resolutions 233 (1967), 234 (1967) and 235 (1967);*

*"4. Calls on the Governments concerned to issue categorical instructions to all military forces to cease all firing and military activities as required by these resolutions."*



437. In reply to questions raised by the representative of France, relating to the Secretary-General's report of 10 June, the Secretary-General stated, among other things, that Israel claimed that its forces had occupied Kuneitra prior to the cease-fire.

438. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the purpose of the United States draft resolution (S/7971) was to assist Israel in its aggression and to legalize the occupation of Arab territory by means of violence.

439. In a further oral report, the Secretary-General informed the Council that, according to information received from the Chief of Staff: (a) bombs had been definitely dropped south of Damascus; (b) there had been no Arab breaches of the cease-fire; (c) a spokesman of the Israel Foreign Office had denied categorically the bombing by Israel aircraft; and (d) steps taken to achieve observance of the cease-fire on either side had been reported.

440. By a letter dated 11 June (S/7973) the representative of Syria drew attention to the continued deterioration of the situation as a result of further military penetration by Israel into Syrian territory, and requested the convening of an emergency meeting of the Council in order to discuss the situation and to take the necessary action.

441. At the 1357th meeting, on 11 June, the Secretary-General informed the Council that he had received three messages from the Chief of Staff that same evening relating to the question of an Israel tank column said to be moving out of Rafid in Syria. The Secretary-General stated that he had urgently sought further information from the Chief of Staff of UNTSO on whether Israel troops were in Rafid and environs before the cease-fire of 10 June or whether they had advanced to that sector after the time fixed for the cease-fire to go into effect.

442. The representative of Syria said that a column of Israel armoured cars and tanks supported by military helicopters had moved at 1800 hours local time from Rafid, which had been occupied three hours and seventeen minutes after the cease-fire had gone into effect, and had occupied new sites and localities where fighting had not taken place previously. The Council was witnessing another step in the systematic Israel invasion of Syria. The new advance was aimed at the Yarmuk River, which was the largest tributary of the Jordan, and its headwaters.

443. The representative of Israel said that there had been no advance by Israel forces in the Rafid area beyond the truce lines established by the cease-fire. He also stated that there was no fighting whatsoever anywhere along the front line and that the cease-fire was being scrupulously observed.

444. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics demanded the adoption by the Council of decisive and immediate measures as outlined in his draft resolution of 8 June (S/7951), to ensure the implementation of its resolution by Israel.

445. The representatives of Canada, the United States, the United Kingdom and Argentina spoke in favour of action by the Council to bring about a complete cessation of hostilities, and appealed to the parties for compliance with the previous cease-fire resolutions and a return to an atmosphere of calm that would facilitate the examination of the problems created by the war.

446. The representative of Mali demanded that Israel be condemned for its aggression and for its violation of the cease-fire agreements. The Council would become an accomplice in a *fait accompli* if the war were allowed to continue in the Middle East and the Security Council did nothing about it.

447. The representative of India said that the most important step the Council could take would be to order an immediate withdrawal of all forces to the positions they occupied on 4 June 1967. Unless the Council took that step immediately, it would be faced every day with situations like the ones it had had to deal with in the last few days. He urged the Council to consider the desirability of adopting the following four-point programme: first, the Council should reinforce its call for cease-fire and immediately order withdrawal of all armed forces to the positions they had occupied before the outbreak of hostilities. Second, it would be necessary to reactivate and strengthen the United Nations machinery in the area to enforce the cease-fire and secure withdrawal on the lines proposed by the Secretary-General in his report of 26 May. Third, the Council should consider whether the Secretary-General should not be requested to depute a personal representative to the area to help in reducing tension and restoring peaceful conditions, and to ensure the safety and security of the civilian Arab population in the areas overrun by Israel. Fourth, when withdrawals had been completed and the aggression had been vacated the Council should consider earnestly the steps to be taken to stabilize peace in the area, within the framework of the sovereignty of the States concerned and the rights of the Arab people.

448. The representative of Nigeria said that the Security Council should now take action to ensure that the cease-fire orders already accepted were fully respected. After ensuring the effectiveness of the cease-fire, the Council should proceed to tackle the more important questions regarding the re-establishment of peace in the area beginning with the withdrawal of forces to positions they occupied prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Any attempt to gain legal and geographical advantages from the current situation must be deplored. He specifically cautioned the Council against the use of the phrase "cease-fire line." It was his understanding that there was no such line but only the recognized Armistice Demarcation Lines.

449. Following the brief suspension of the meeting, the President stated that on the basis of consultations he was submitting the following draft resolution for adoption by the Council without debate:

*"The Security Council,*

*"Taking note of the oral reports of the Secretary-General on the situation between Israel and Syria made at the 1354th, 1355th, 1356th and 1357th meetings and the supplemental information supplied in document S/7930 and Add. 1-3,*

*"1. Condemns any and all violations of the cease-fire;*

*"2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue his investigations and to report to the Council as soon as possible;*

*"3. Affirms that its demand for a cease-fire and discontinuance of all military activities includes a prohibition of any forward military movements subsequent to the cease-fire;*



"4. *Calls for the prompt return to the cease-fire positions of any troops which may have moved forward subsequent to 1630 hours GMT, 10 June;*

"5. *Calls for full co-operation with the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine and the observers in implementing the cease-fire, including freedom of movement and adequate communications facilities."*

**Decision:** *At the 1357th meeting, on 11 June, the draft resolution was unanimously adopted (resolution 236 (1967)).*

#### **G. Reports by the Secretary-General and consideration by the Council at the 1358th to 1361st meetings (13-14 June 1967)**

450. The Secretary-General in a supplemental report dated 11 June (S/7930/Add.3), stated that the cease-fire arrangement of 10 June as proposed and negotiated by the Chief of Staff of UNTSO was being observed and no serious breaches had been reported.

451. Between 12 and 13 June, the Secretary-General issued three additional reports (S/7930/Add.4-6) concerning compliance with the Security Council cease-fire resolutions. In connexion with the question of Israel troop positions in Rafid or environs, the Secretary-General informed the Council that General Bull had no information as to whether the troops were in or had by-passed Rafid at 1630 hours GMT on 10 June.

452. The Secretary-General also referred to the serious handicap imposed upon the Chief of Staff and his Observers due to the continued lack of access to UNTSO Headquarters, in Government House. In that connexion, he had addressed a telegram to the Prime Minister of Israel again urging the return of Government House to UNTSO. He had also addressed a communication to the permanent representative of Israel requesting assurances from his Government for the safety and well-being and for the protection of the interests and rights of the civilian populations in the area now under military occupation.

453. By a letter dated 13 June (S/7979) the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics requested the convening of the Council forthwith for urgent consideration of the item inscribed on the agenda at his delegation's request (S/7967).

454. At the 1358th meeting of 13 June, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that all the decisions so far taken by the Security Council had been initial measures acceptable only on a short-term basis. The Council could no longer merely repeat or confirm earlier resolutions which were totally inadequate, and must insist on the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of forces from the occupied territories of the Arab States. In its resolution 236 of 12 June, the Council had taken the first step towards the condemnation of Israel's actions. It must now go on to condemn categorically and directly all the actions of Israel, which had committed criminal aggression against the Arab countries. No attempt to link the withdrawal of Israel forces with a settlement of the general situation in the Near East was acceptable. In view of those considerations his delegation was submitting the following revision of its earlier draft resolution (S/7951/Rev.2), and requested that it be put to the vote:

#### **"The Security Council,**

**"Noting** that Israel, in defiance of the Security Council's resolutions on the cessation of military activities and a cease-fire resolution (233 (1967) of 6 June, 234 (1967) of 7 June and 235 (1967) of 9 June 1967) has seized additional territory of the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria,

**"Noting** that although military activities have now ceased, Israel is still occupying the territory of those countries, thus failing to halt its aggression and defying the United Nations and all peace-loving States,

**"Considering unacceptable and unlawful** Israel's territorial claims on Arab States,

**"1. Vigorously condemns** Israel's aggressive activities and continued occupation of part of the territory of the United Arab Republic, Syria and Jordan, regarding this as an act of aggression and the grossest violation of the United Nations Charter and generally recognized principles of international law;

**"2. Demands** that Israel should immediately and unconditionally remove all its troops from the territory of those States and withdraw them behind the armistice lines and should respect the status of the demilitarized zones, as prescribed in the General Armistice Agreements."

455. The representative of Jordan charged that Israel was carrying out a well-calculated plan to expel more Arabs with a view to repeating the pattern it had embarked upon in 1948. He was grateful to the Secretary-General for his constructive efforts towards the alleviation of the situation of the civilian population, and hoped that he would find it possible to present a report to the Council on that important and most urgent matter. He considered that the most serious and important question was the condemnation of the invaders and the demand for their immediate withdrawal.

456. The representative of the United States said that the Soviet draft resolution (S/7951/Rev.2) was a prescription for renewed hostilities and a step backwards from the full settlement of all outstanding questions between the parties which the resolutions of the United Nations had contemplated for nearly twenty years. On the other hand, the draft resolution submitted by his own delegation (S/7972/Rev.2) was intended to encourage a decision by the warring parties to live together in peace, and to ensure international assistance to that end.

457. In the aftermath of the fighting, he went on, the Council had an urgent responsibility to see that action was taken to protect the victims of the war in accordance with the 1949 Geneva Convention. He expressed the hope that civilians would be allowed to return home to the same locations in which they had lived before the conflict.

458. The representative of Saudi Arabia upholding the rights of the Palestinian Arabs, recalled that the places of worship in the Holy Land had been respected under Muslim rule and declared that the Arabs would never accept an artificial State created in their midst. He said the Arabs did not want the peace of the grave, but peace with justice.

459. The representative of Israel said that, while the Council's cease-fire was in full effect with the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria, the Governments of Algeria, Iraq and Yemen had openly pro-

claimed their intention to pursue belligerence against his country. Until all the Governments concerned had accepted the resolutions, Israel considered that the cease-fire could not be regarded as fully in effect.

460. Speaking on the situation of the civilian population, he said there had been some movement of civilians, but a large-scale return movement from east to west had now begun and the Israel authorities were doing nothing to prevent it. He assured the Council that his Government respected the provisions of the Geneva Convention of 1949 relative to the treatment of prisoners of war.

461. Commenting on the draft resolution submitted by the Soviet delegation (S/7951/Rev.2), he said that it was negative and one-sided, destructive in intent and designed to restore the conditions of Arab belligerence towards Israel.

462. The representative of Tunisia asserted that the Israel authorities were exerting intolerable pressure on the population of the western bank of the Jordan to leave their homes, and called upon the Council to adopt a clear-cut resolution putting an end to those inhuman actions.

463. The representative of Morocco requested the Secretary-General and the specialized agencies to render at once all possible humanitarian aid to the refugees and the civilian population. He reviewed events leading to the conflict and asked how the Arabs could be told that peace was to be established when two-thirds of Jordan, the Gaza Strip and Elat had been occupied and the Suez Canal was controlled by Israel. He warned that if conditions prevailing prior to 5 June were not restored in accordance with the Armistice Agreements, there would be incalculable consequences in the area.

464. The representative of Bulgaria said that the United States draft resolution (S/7952/Rev.2) was designed to serve the aims of Israel and to legalize its aggression. He supported the Soviet draft resolution (S/7951/Rev.2) and requested that it be voted upon without delay.

465. The representative of the United Arab Republic said it remained the elementary duty of the Council to condemn the clear-cut aggression committed by Israel and call upon the aggressor immediately to withdraw its forces behind the Demarcation Line without any conditions. Referring to operative paragraph 2 of the revised United States draft resolution, he stated that it clearly amounted to a legitimization of Israel's aggression by the Council.

466. At the 1359th meeting, held on 13 June, the representative of Syria said that any resolution which did not clearly condemn Israel and provide for the withdrawal of forces from the Arab countries would fall short of meeting the situation. His delegation supported the Soviet draft resolution (S/7951/Rev.2), which condemned the aggressors and demanded the withdrawal of the invading forces.

467. The representative of Canada referred to the tragic loss of human life suffered in the conflict and said that it should evoke the most serious consideration by the Council. In his view, the responsibilities and action of the Council were clearly defined and guided by Article 2 (3) of the Charter. He pointed out that the cease-fire call by the Council was only a first step which should be followed by other steps, including an arrangement for the disengagement and withdrawal

of forces; and immediate attention to the human problems and to the development of understanding which would guarantee the vital interests of the States in the area. He urged the permanent members of the Council to concert their actions to find positive solutions. He endorsed the idea of dispatching a special representative of the Secretary-General to the area.

468. The representative of Mali warned that Israel could not keep control indefinitely of the regions which it now occupied. The first positive action for peace would be the unconditional withdrawal of the Israel troops to the positions of 4 June.

469. On 13 June, operative paragraph 1 of the three-Power draft resolution (S/7968) concerning the humanitarian aspects of the conflict was revised to read as follows:

"1. *Calls upon* the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place."

470. Subsequently, on 14 June, paragraph 1 of the revised draft resolution (S/7968/Rev.1) was revised to read as follows:

"1. *Calls upon* the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities."

471. At the 1360th meeting, on 14 June, an additional request to participate in the discussion was received from the representative of Pakistan. He was accordingly invited to take a seat at the Council table.

472. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the Council should now turn to the problems of disengagement, withdrawal and the building of a just and lasting peace. He observed that disengagement and withdrawal could not in fact and in practice be secured without discussions and action on the spot. He therefore agreed that the Council should give immediate consideration to the appointment by the Secretary-General of a personal representative. The Council should also give immediate consideration to the appointment of a Mediator who could at once undertake discussions with the Governments concerned. At the same time, the Council should take immediate action to alleviate the suffering caused to the civilian population and to prevent a refugee problem.

473. The representative of Pakistan thought that there was no way for the Security Council to repair the situation except by taking three measures: first, a condemnation of the aggression committed by Israel; second, a demand under Article 39 of the Charter for the immediate withdrawal of the Israel forces to the Demarcation Lines and third, after the completion of withdrawals, active participation by the Council in the exploration of ways and means by which the substantive resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council on the Palestine question could be implemented.

474. The representative of Argentina stated that his delegation had from the beginning of the discussion expressed its view that once the necessary atmosphere of calm had been restored, the Council should set forth the conditions whereby it could search for final and permanent solutions to the problem. He was convinced

that no one would negotiate under the threat of pressure or coercion. However, the necessary conditions could not be established unless troops were withdrawn and assurances of free transit through international waterways were given. That meant that the feeling of belligerence must be set aside and the conditions, both psychological and *de facto*, necessary for peace must be established. For those reasons, he could not support operative paragraph 2 of the revised USSR draft resolution (S/7951/Rev.2)

475. The representative of France stated that a right to occupy a territory could not be based on conquest by force of arms. From the point of view of principle, he could only support the USSR draft resolution. But, even if it were adopted, it was doubtful whether such a resolution would be implemented. He considered that the Council should strive together to facilitate conversations which could lead to agreements acceptable to all parties.

476. The representative of Ethiopia insisted on the prompt withdrawal of forces and on the creation of just conditions for a negotiated settlement of the underlying causes of the present crisis. He favoured the reactivation of the United Nations presence in the area. His delegation would abstain on both the USSR and the United States draft resolutions as now formulated.

477. The representative of Nigeria reiterated his firm conviction that the very first matter requiring the Council's urgent attention was the withdrawal of forces to the positions occupied before the outbreak of hostilities. Referring to the USSR revised draft resolution, he said that it touched upon a number of far-reaching issues, the implications of which he would have liked to consider more carefully. For those reasons, he suggested that the draft resolution should be voted on paragraph by paragraph.

478. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the Canadian draft resolution (S/7941) lacked clarity and, if adopted, might have far-reaching consequences. The implementation of such a resolution could even lead to a violation of the United Nations Charter. He would therefore vote against it. With regard to the revised three-Power draft resolution (S/7968/Rev.2), he remarked that it was limited to one aspect of the problem. In order to put an immediate end to the human suffering it was necessary to take energetic measures for the withdrawal of the troops.

479. The representative of China said that his Government was opposed to the use of force. However, it was not unmindful of the declarations repeatedly made by Israel that it had no territorial designs against its neighbours. For those reasons, he would abstain in the voting on the USSR draft resolution.

480. The representative of Japan said that it was necessary for the Council to proceed in complete unity in order to achieve a settlement of the immediate problems resulting from the conflict and to construct a definitive and lasting peace. His delegation doubted that the revised USSR draft resolution would facilitate that task, and he would therefore abstain in the vote on it.

481. The representative of Israel assured the Council that his Government had made great efforts to restore normal civilian life in the area. An agreement had been reached between his Government and the

Commissioner General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency concerning its work in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip areas. The prisoners of war taken by Israeli were being treated with full regard to their legal and human rights in accordance with international conventions.

482. The representative of Brazil, referring to the revised Soviet draft resolution, said that he was not in a position to state categorically which of the parties involved in the conflict first violated the cease-fire resolutions. He stated further that the occupation by Israel of the territory of the neighbouring Arab States had resulted from the state of war, either "*de facto*" or "*de jure*" existing between the contending parties. He took note of the statement made by the Minister of Defence of Israel that his country had "no aim of conquest" and said that his Government had been consistently opposed to any territorial conquest by military means; however, the problem of withdrawal could not be envisaged as an isolated step. For those reasons, he could not support the revised Soviet draft resolution and would abstain when it was put to the vote.

483. The representative of Canada stated that in view of the fact that the draft resolution submitted by his delegation and Denmark on 24 May (S/7905) had been overtaken by events, it was now withdrawn. He indicated that he wished to defer voting on his delegation's draft resolution (S/7941) of 7 June.

484. At the same meeting, the representative of the United States submitted the following revised text of his delegation's draft resolution (S/7952/Rev.3):

*"The Security Council,*

*"Recalling its resolutions 233, 234, 235 and 236 and the understanding formulated by the President of the Council at its 1353rd meeting,*

*"Noting that Israel, Jordan, Syria and the United Arab Republic have accepted and implemented the Council's demand for a cease-fire and that military operations and any forward military movements have been discontinued;*

*"Desirous of taking steps towards the achievement of a stable peace in the Near East,*

*"1. Insists on the continued scrupulous implementation by all the parties concerned of the Council's repeated demands for a cease-fire and cessation of all military activity as a first urgent step toward the establishment of a stable peace in the Middle East;*

*"2. Requests the Secretary-General to continue to report to the Council on compliance with the cease-fire;*

*"3. Calls for discussions promptly among the parties concerned, using such third party or United Nations assistance as they may wish, looking toward the establishment of viable arrangements encompassing the withdrawal and disengagement of armed personnel, the renunciation of force regardless of its nature, the maintenance of vital international rights and the establishment of a stable and durable peace in the Middle East;*

*"4. Also requests the Secretary-General to provide such assistance as may be required in facilitating the discussions called for in paragraph 3."*

485. Introducing the revised draft, the representative of the United States indicated that it was the third United States proposal before the Council. He

stated that his delegation would not press for a vote on the previous United States draft resolutions submitted on 31 May (S/7916/Rev.1) and 8 June (S/7971), which had been overtaken by events. He also said that his delegation would not ask for a vote today on its revised draft resolution (S/7952/Rev.3) since several delegations had indicated they would wish to suggest changes. He said his delegation would be glad to consider constructive suggestions for improvement in the text.

**Decision:** *At the 1360th meeting, on 14 June 1967, the revised USSR draft resolution (S/7951/Rev.2) was voted upon by parts. Paragraph 1 received 4 votes in favour (Bulgaria, India, Mali and the USSR), none against 11 abstentions; paragraph 2 received 6 votes in favour (Bulgaria, Ethiopia, India, Mali, Nigeria and the USSR), none against and 9 abstentions. The draft resolution was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required majority.*

486. The representative of the USSR stated that as a consequence of the vote an extreme situation had been created demanding extreme measures by the United Nations and all peace-loving States for the immediate and decisive cessation of the continuing aggression in the Near East. Because of the position taken by certain Powers, foremost among them the United States, and because of lack of agreement among the permanent members, the Security Council was unable to take the necessary decisions in conformity with the United Nations Charter. The heavy responsibility for this fell on those States which failed to do their duty as members of the Security Council. That being so, it was necessary to search for other means in order to liquidate the sequels of aggression and to ensure the immediate withdrawal of all Israel forces.

487. The President, speaking as the representative of Denmark, said in explanation of his vote that the Council must approach the task of bringing about lasting arrangements for a stable peace in the Middle East in the light of the political realities. The adoption of a resolution blaming one party and making demands only on it would not serve that purpose. A stable and durable peace in the Middle East would depend on comprehensive and well-balanced solutions, equitable and just to all concerned. His delegation had abstained in the vote on the Soviet draft resolution for those reasons.

488. The representatives of the United Arab Republic and Iraq stated that the outcome of the vote on the USSR draft resolution was one more injustice to be added to the many injustices directed against the Arabs.

489. At the 1361st meeting, on 14 June, the representative of Argentina, speaking on behalf of the sponsors of the three-Power draft resolution (S/7968/Rev.2), said that, in order to take account of the suggestion made by the representative of Mali, they had decided to add an additional operative paragraph to the draft resolution. The revised text (S/7968/Rev.3) read as follows:

*"The Security Council,*

*"Considering the urgent need to spare the civil populations and the prisoners of war in the area of conflict in the Middle East from additional sufferings,*

*"Considering that essential and inalienable human rights should be respected even during the vicissitudes of war,*

*"Considering that all the obligations of the Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of 12 August 1949 should be complied with by the parties involved in the conflict,*

*"1. Calls upon the Government of Israel to ensure the safety, welfare and security of the inhabitants of the areas where military operations have taken place and to facilitate the return of those inhabitants who have fled the areas since the outbreak of hostilities;*

*"2. Recommends to the Governments concerned the scrupulous respect of the humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war and the protection of civil persons in time of war, contained in the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949;*

*"3. Requests the Secretary-General to follow the effective implementation of this resolution and to report to the Security Council."*

490. The representatives of Argentina, Mali, India, Canada, France and Bulgaria expressed support of the revised resolution (S/7968/Rev.3).

491. The representative of the United Arab Republic, referring to the draft resolution submitted by his delegation on 31 May (S/7919), said that for the time being he would not press it to a vote.

**Decision:** *At the 1361st meeting, on 14 June 1967, the revised draft resolution (S/7969/Rev.3) submitted by Argentina, Brazil and Ethiopia was unanimously adopted (resolution 237 (1967)).*

## **H. Communications to the Council and consideration at the 1365th and 1366th meetings (8-9 July 1967)**

492. In two further supplementary reports dated 14 and 15 June (S/7930/Add. 7 and 8), the Secretary-General informed the Council that the situation continued to remain quiet.

493. In a letter dated 15 June (S/7990), addressed to the Secretary-General, the representative of Iraq stated that his country's position with regard to the cease-fire was that the Iraqi forces were under the joint command in Jordan which had already declared its position together with the Governments of Jordan and the United Arab Republic.

494. In a letter of June 15 (S/7989), the representative of Israel transmitted his Government's reply to the Indian Government's protest of 8 June 1967 (S/7957) concerning the killing of Indian troops serving with UNEF. In its reply, the Government of Israel expressed deep regret over the incidents.

495. On 17 June 1967 the representative of the United Kingdom, in a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7997), reaffirmed his Government's desire for an immediate United Nations investigation of the accusations that British aircraft had taken part in the hostilities on the side of Israel, and its readiness to offer the United Nations investigating officials all necessary facilities.

496. In subsequent supplementary reports (S/7930/Add.9-22), covering the period between 16 June to 13 July, the Secretary-General reported to the Council that apart from minor incidents and complaints the situation continued to remain quiet. He also reported on the demarcation of the cease-fire lines between



Israel and Syria (S/7930/Add.18), pursuant to Security Council resolutions 235 of 9 June and 236 of 12 June, on the stationing of United Nations observers in the Suez Canal area (S/7930/Add.19), and on the question of the return of UNTSO and its Chief of Staff to their headquarters at Government House, Jerusalem, which had been under military control since 5 June 1967 (S/7930/Add.20).

497. In a letter dated 8 July (S/8043), the representative of the United Arab Republic stated that Israel's armed forces had that morning launched an attack against the armed forces of the United Arab Republic stationed south of Port Fouad on the eastern bank of the Suez Canal, in violation of the cease-fire order, and had carried out aerial raids against the United Arab Republic control stations in El Tina, Ras El Esh and El Kap in the Suez Canal area. He requested that an emergency session of the Council be convened as soon as possible.

498. By a letter dated 8 July (S/8044), the representative of Israel complained of serious breach of the cease-fire committed by the armed forces of the United Arab Republic on 8 July, when fire had been opened on Israel troops stationed in the area of Ras el'Ish, some fifteen kilometres south of Port Said. In order to repel the attacks, Israel planes had taken action against the Egyptian gun positions.

499. At the 1365th meeting, held on 8 July, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the agenda for the meeting should consist only of the letter from the representative of the United Arab Republic (S/8043).

500. The President said that the provisional agenda (S/Agenda/1365/Rev.1) had been prepared in accordance with the previous practice of the Council.

**Decision:** *Following a brief discussion, at the suggestion of the representative of India the Council decided to add the communications from the United Arab Republic (S/8043) and Israel (S/8044) to the provisional agenda. The agenda, consisting as thus revised of six items, was then adopted.*

501. The Secretary-General stated that it was a matter of great regret to him that he was unable to provide the Council with information about the reports of a new outbreak of fighting on 8 July between the armed forces of Israel and the United Arab Republic in the Suez Canal sector. As he had reported to the Council on 4 July 1967 (S/7930/Add.19) no United Nations military observers had been stationed in the Suez Canal area, and he had therefore received no verified information about hostile activities there. Unlike the two resolutions relating exclusively to the cease-fire between Israel and Syria (resolutions 235 and 236), the Security Council's general cease-fire resolutions of 6 and 7 June 1967 (resolutions 233 and 234), which were applicable to the cease-fire between Israel and the United Arab Republic, requested the Secretary-General to keep the Council informed about the situation, but made no provision for any assistance with regard to implementation of the cease-fire. Realizing that he could not discharge his reporting responsibility under those latter two resolutions without any means of obtaining reliable information, the Secretary-General had decided on 4 July to take the initiative towards a possible alleviation of this situation. On that date, he had undertaken separate exploratory talks with the representatives of the United Arab Republic

and Israel, inquiring what the reactions of their Governments would be to a suggestion from him that United Nations military observers might be stationed in the sector of the Suez Canal where there was now confrontation between the armed forces of the United Arab Republic and those of Israel. Such observers, of course, would have to be stationed on both sides, as had been done in the sector where the forces of Israel and Syria were in confrontation.

502. He had as yet had no word about the reaction of either Government to that suggestion, which he considered to be constructive and helpful in the light of the prevailing circumstances. If it should be agreed that United Nations observers should proceed to Sinai and the Suez sector, that could be done quickly, according to information from the Chief of Staff, General Bull, within his present observers strength, but it would be necessary to increase the number of observers available to him at a very early date thereafter.

503. The representative of the United Arab Republic stated that that morning at 10.15 local time Israel forces had again attacked his country's forces in the southern part of Port Fouad with heavy artillery and bombarded and destroyed control stations for navigation on the Canal at El Tina, Ras El Esh and El Kap. Moreover, the enemy had opened fire from the eastern bank of the Canal on heavily populated areas on the western bank all along the area between El Kantara and Ras El Esh. For the first time since the cease-fire orders of the Security Council, Israel air forces had taken part in the operation and indiscriminately bombarded heavily populated areas. That action by Israel was a new and serious act of aggression. The Security Council could not and should not condone such violations of its decisions.

504. The representative of Israel said that in the course of the last week a chain of incidents had occurred along the Israel-Egyptian cease-fire line which caused grave concern to his Government. The events of 8 July and the incidents which had preceded it gave reason to believe that Egypt had not changed its policy of belligerency and was still carrying it out by initiating armed action despite its acceptance of the cease-fire. The continuation of that belligerent policy and practice had, of course, ominous implications. His Government wished to see the cease-fire faithfully maintained and strictly observed. It hoped that the United Arab Republic had similar intentions.

505. At the 1366th meeting, on 9 July, the representative of Algeria was invited, at his request, to take a seat at the Council table.

506. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that so long as the armed forces of Israel occupied the lands of the Arab countries, the flames of war could again break out at any time and give rise to a new, large-scale armed conflict. That was why the most important and urgent problem was the immediate withdrawal of Israel troops and the liquidation of the aftermath of the aggression committed by Israel. The Soviet Union had firmly and resolutely supported the Arab States in their struggle for freedom and territorial integrity and continued to do so. The new acts of aggression by Israel must not go unpunished; Israel must strictly fulfil the decisions of the Security Council with regard to the cease-fire. Accordingly, should Israel further ignore the decisions and requests of the Security Council,



it would be essential to apply sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter against Israel as an aggressor.

507. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the first action of the Council when the conflict started had been to call for and establish a cease-fire and it must see that the cease-fire was observed. It must condemn any and every breach of it. While the public debate had gone on in the United Nations, there had been a persistent, anxious search for common ground of agreement, and, while disagreement on some essential questions persisted, there was now a wide area of growing agreement. Wide agreement had been reached on the need for the withdrawal of forces from occupied territory, the need not only to preserve the cease-fire, but to make sure that firing never started again, the need to bring succour to those in distress and to give them not only relief, but justice too, the need to give freedom of worship to all religions in the Holy City, to secure freedom of passage on international waterways, to prevent the squandering of resources desperately required for development on a renewed arms race, and to strengthen the United Nations presence in the Middle East. He was prepared to authorize the Secretary-General to send observers to Sinai and to the Suez Canal without delay and without reservations.

508. The representative of the United States welcomed the Secretary-General's proposals to the Governments of both the United Arab Republic and Israel that they accept United Nations observers to report on compliance with the Council's cease-fire orders. The withdrawal of forces was of course an important and essential part of any over-all peaceful solution of the problem of the area. But, as the discussions last month in the Security Council and, more recently, the debates and the voting in the General Assembly had shown, a substantial body of world opinion supported the idea that withdrawal must be accompanied, at the very least, by a termination of any state of war and of any claims to the exercise of belligerent rights.

509. The representative of Mali declared that since 5 June his delegation had been insisting that the cease-fire ordered by the Security Council should be followed up by the immediate withdrawal of Israel troops. Unfortunately, that had not happened. The Council should recommend as soon as possible the withdrawal of Israel troops back to the positions they occupied on 4 June 1967.

510. The Secretary-General stated that since the last meeting of the Council he had consulted the Chief of Staff of UNTSO, and had been informed that for the Suez sector his estimated need would be for an additional twenty-five observers who should be made available to him as soon as possible. Pending the arrival of those additional observers, the Chief of Staff, if called upon to do so, could dispatch a small team of observers now on his staff to the Suez Canal area. They could institute patrols on both the United Arab Republic and the Israel sides of the front. He noted that United Nations observers had been serving in the Near East since 1948, when there were well over 700 as against the 133 now serving in the area. Wherever United Nations military observers had been employed, it had been the established practice to have the approval of the Governments directly concerned regarding the countries from which military observers

for the particular operation might be drawn. That practice still continued.

511. The representative of Syria said that every inch of Syrian territory occupied by Israel forces had been occupied after Syria's acceptance of the cease-fire on 9 June. The purpose of the new Israel aggression action was equally obvious: Israel, with the protection of its supporters, was endeavouring to achieve, by further acts of war and invasion, its objectives in the Canal zone, thus creating a new situation and attempting to by-pass the General Armistice Agreements. He categorically rejected Israel's unilateral interpretation of the tasks of UNTSO. In his view, the United Nations machinery in the area was still functioning in accordance with the appropriate resolutions of the Security Council concerning the armistice régime.

512. The representative of Israel said that his Government wished to propose that local Israel and United Arab Republic commanders in the area of the incidents should meet and agree upon appropriate arrangements to avoid breaches of the cease-fire in the future. Similar local arrangements were already in existence in the Port Said and Kantara areas in respect of civil affairs. He further stated that, despite their incessant repetitions, the Soviet representatives had not obtained the support either of world opinion or of the United Nations itself for their unfounded charges; indeed, the General Assembly had rejected those charges by an overwhelming majority as recently as 4 July. Nor had the Security Council adopted the Soviet thesis. The fundamental change in the situation would come about not through the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israel forces but only through Arab withdrawal from the fruitless policy of rancour, hostility and belligerence.

513. The representative of India said that from the outbreak of hostilities, his delegation had taken the position that the call for a cease-fire must be coupled with a provision for immediate withdrawal of armed forces. The Secretary-General should be requested to take steps to strengthen the United Nations machinery existing in the area, with a view to arresting deterioration of the situation, securing withdrawal of Israel forces and ensuring strict observance of the General Armistice Agreements by all the parties concerned. His delegation was also in favour of the designation by the Secretary-General of a special representative to go to the area for those purposes, to help bring about a reduction in tension and the restoration of peaceful conditions, and to report to the Security Council.

514. The deliberations in the Security Council and in the emergency special session of the General Assembly had once again reaffirmed certain fundamental principles: that no dispute should be settled through the use of force, and that Member States had an obligation to respect the territorial integrity and political independence of other States.

515. At the same meeting, the President read the following statement (S/8047), which was accepted by the members of the Council as a consensus of their views:

"Recalling Security Council resolutions 233, 234, 235 and 236 and emphasizing the need for all parties to observe scrupulously the provisions of these resolutions, having heard the statements made by the

Secretary-General and the suggestions he had addressed to the parties concerned, I believe that I am reflecting the view of the Council that the Secretary-General should proceed, as he has suggested in his statements before the Council on 8 and 9 July 1967, to request the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Palestine, General Odd Bull, to work out with the Governments of the United Arab Republic and Israel, as speedily as possible, the necessary arrangements to station United Nations military observers in the Suez Canal sector under the Chief of Staff of UNTSO."

516. The President stated further that the step the Council had just taken made the previous cease-fire decisions more complete and more effective in their over-all application. He appealed to the parties concerned to give the Secretary-General their full support and whole-hearted co-operation both in ensuring full compliance with the Council's decisions and by extending, whenever necessary, such facilities as the Secretary-General or his personnel might require in the performance of their peace-keeping duties in the area.

517. In a report dated 11 July (S/8053), the Secretary-General informed the Council that the Governments of the United Arab Republic and Israel had informed him of their acceptance of the proposed stationing of United Nations military observers in the Suez Canal sector.

# **I. Other communications received by the Council**

518. During and subsequent to its series of meetings held in May-July 1967, the Security Council received the following communications relating to various aspects of the situation in the Middle East:

## **(a) Communications relating to the outbreak of hostilities between Israel and the Arab States**

The representatives of Yugoslavia, Guinea, Mauritania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Mongolia and Romania transmitted to the President of the Council statements of their Governments concerning the outbreak of hostilities between Israel and the Arab States in letters dated 5 June (S/7929), 5 June (S/7933), 6 June (S/7937), 6 June (S/7942), 7 June (S/7949), 8 June (S/7955), 9 June (S/7966) and 11 June (S/7972), respectively.

## **(b) Communications relating to charges of violations of the Security Council cease-fire orders**

Letters dated 9 June (S/7962), 1 July (S/8026), 10 July (S/8049), 14 July (S/8059) and 15 July (S/8060) from the representative of Israel.

Letter dated 9 June from the representative of Tunisia (S/7964).

Letter dated 13 July (S/8056) from the representative of Jordan.

Letters dated 13 June (S/7983) and 5 July (S/8035) from the representative of Syria.

Letters dated 1 July (S/8025), 12 July (S/8054), 13 July (S/8061), 14 July (S/8057) and 15 July

(S/8062) from the representative of the United Arab Republic.

## **(c) Communications relating to the treatment of civil populations and prisoners of war and related matters**

The Secretary-General stated in two notes dated 20 June and 4 July (S/8001/Corr.1 and 2, and Add.1), that because of the widespread interest in the humanitarian problems resulting from the recent hostilities in the Near East, he was submitting two reports from the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East. In a further report dated 29 June (S/8021 and Corr.1), the Secretary-General submitted a report, pursuant to operative paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 237 of 4 June 1967, concerning the civil population and prisoners of war in the area of conflict in the Middle East.

The following series of communications was addressed to the Council or the Secretary-General by the representatives of Greece, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Tunisia and the United Arab Republic concerning the treatment of civil populations and prisoners of war:

Letter dated 23 June (S/8010) from the representative of Greece.

Letters dated 20 June (S/8003), 23 June (S/8012 and S/8013), 27 June (S/8019), 4 July (S/8030), 5 July (S/8034), 7 July (S/8041 and S/8042), 11 July (S/8073), 12 July (S/8055/Rev.1) and 14 July (S/8058) from the representative of Israel.

Letters dated 12 June (S/7975), 21 June (S/8004) and 5 July (S/8032 and S/8033) from the representative of Jordan.

Letters dated 16 June (S/7991), 27 June and 3 July (S/8016 and Add.1), 6 July (S/8037) and 7 July (S/8040) from the representative of Syria.

Letters dated 12 June (S/7974) from the representative of Tunisia.

Letters dated 15 June (S/7988 and S/7993), 21 June (S/8007 and 28 June (S/8017) from the representative of the United Arab Republic.

## **(d) Communications relating to the situation existing in and around the city of Jerusalem and its Holy Places**

A series of communications was addressed to the Council or the Secretary-General in connexion with the situation existing in and around the city of Jerusalem and its Holy Places by the representatives of Italy, dated 6 June (S/7932), Haiti, dated 8 June (S/7956), Philippines, dated 7 June (S/7959), Portugal, dated 8 June (S/7965) and Pakistan, dated 16 June (S/7994).

The Secretary-General, pursuant to operative paragraph 3 of General Assembly resolution 2253 (ES-V), adopted on 4 July 1967, transmitted to the Council a report dated 10 July (S/8052), on the measures taken by Israel to change the status of the city of Jerusalem, together with the reply, dated 10 July, from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel.

# LETTER DATED 2 AUGUST 1966 FROM THE DEPUTY PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED KINGDOM ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

## A. Communications to the Council

519. In a letter dated 25 July 1966 (S/7429 and Corr.1), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Yemen charged that the United Kingdom was massing troops and war material along the Yemen borders and committing other acts of provocation and aggression. Yemen had repeatedly declared that the war of liberation in occupied South Yemen could not be suppressed by British aggression against peaceful towns and villages in Yemen. In that connexion, the representative of Yemen rejected the British contention that the war of liberation had been instigated from outside the territory. His Government was convinced that sovereignty over the territory belonged to the people of occupied South Yemen.

520. In reply, the representative of the United Kingdom stated, in a letter dated 29 July (S/7438), that the Yemeni allegations concerning border violations would be fully investigated and the results would be conveyed to the Yemeni Republican authorities. He would recall, however, that many previous Yemeni allegations of the same kind had proved, after investigation, to be entirely without foundation; the present allegations, he had no doubt, would similarly prove to be totally unfounded. With regard to the statements in the latter part of the Yemen letter of 25 July, the position of the United Kingdom Government had already been set forth in its letter of 9 May 1966 (S/7284), stating that it could not accept the description of South Arabia as "occupied South Yemen" and that there was no foundation for the Yemeni claims to the States of the Protectorate of South Arabia.

## B. Request for a meeting of the Security Council

521. In a letter dated 2 August 1966 (S/7442), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the United Kingdom requested an immediate meeting of the Council to consider the situation arising from an unprovoked and indefensible attack on a town in a state forming part of the Federation of South Arabia for whose protection and for the conduct of whose external affairs the United Kingdom was responsible. On 30 July, two aircraft, believed to have been MIGs belonging to the United Arab Republic Air Force operating from an airfield in the Yemen, had carried out two low-level strafing attacks on the town of Nuqub in the Amirate of Baihan. Three Arab children had been wounded and a total of seventy-five hits had so far been counted on houses in the town.

## C. Consideration at the 1296th to 1300th meetings (4-16 August 1966)

522. At the 1296th meeting of 4 August, the provisional agenda, consisting of the United Kingdom communication of 2 August 1966, was adopted. The representatives of the United Arab Republic and Yemen were invited to participate in the discussion without vote.

523. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the salient features of the air attack which was the subject of his Government's complaint were that the town involved in the incident was distinctive and isolated, that the attack had been conducted by two aircraft coming from the direction of the Yemen, with ammunition of Soviet manufacture and that the evidence by competent observers pointed to the aircraft being MIGs. It was common knowledge that the United Arab Republic had such aircraft, which it used in support of its armed forces in Yemen. After a similar attack in April 1965, the United Kingdom had informed the United Arab Republic that further attacks would result in a Security Council discussion. In June of that year, the United Kingdom had accepted from the United Arab Republic assurances of "pilot error" in connexion with another attack. Such an explanation was not possible on the present occasion because the attack had taken place seventeen miles inside Federal territory.

524. It could only be concluded from the circumstances that the attack had been deliberate and probably connected with other activities in the area. The United Kingdom was determined to bring South Arabia to independence by 1968; attacks originating from Yemeni territory could only make its task, and that of the United Nations, more difficult. His Government therefore asked the Council to deplore the attack on the town and to call upon the United Arab Republic and Yemen authorities to ensure that no further such attacks would occur. His Government, in co-operation with the Federal authorities, had made a genuine effort to seek a settlement of the difficulties which had arisen in the past between Yemen and the Federation of South Arabia. It might be that some form of United Nations observation would help towards a settlement and the United Kingdom remained willing to explore that possibility through the good offices of the Secretary-General. His Government earnestly desired to see peaceful and stable conditions in that area so that South Arabia might go confidently forward towards independence. The inhabitants of South Arabia had the right to ask that they should be free from external attack and intimidation.

525. The representative of the United Arab Republic said that the United Kingdom, which sought to pose as the friend and protector of Arab peoples, really wanted the wealth and lands of the Arabs. But the peoples of Aden and the Aden Protectorate had made clear their determination to free themselves from British domination and not to be taken in by manoeuvres designed to perpetuate it. The only military aircraft flying over those territories belonged to the United Kingdom. No United Arab Republic aircraft had undertaken any kind of operations in Baihan and, according to the Arab-Yemen joint command, none of its planes had been airborne on 30 July. The United Kingdom, which had already been condemned by the Council for aggression against Yemen, was attempting to cover up its oppression of the peoples of Aden and the Aden Protectorate by discrediting the United Arab Republic, which was supporting the struggle for freedom and self-determination in South Arabia. Colonialism and imperialism and their tools were the root

causes of the tension, troubles and instability in that part of the world.

526. The representative of Yemen said that even if the United Kingdom allegations had been true, they would not have justified the haste with which that country had summoned the Council. His country had been the victim of many acts of provocation and aggression by the United Kingdom far more serious than the British allegation, but had not asked that the Council be convened. It had been subjected to British aggression for 130 years, and had informed the Council of numerous acts of provocation and aggression committed against it by the United Kingdom during the period between 1964 and 1966. The United Kingdom's hostility to Yemen and its intervention in his country's internal affairs had been sharpened by the rise of the popular resistance to British occupation and repression in the occupied South Yemen.

527. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the charges contained in the United Kingdom's complaint were completely unsubstantiated and could hardly be taken seriously. Moreover, the representative of the United Arab Republic had categorically refuted the charges, and convincingly proved them completely groundless. Obviously, the United Kingdom's aim in coming to the Security Council had been, not to seek the latter's protection for the inhabitants of the area, but to distract attention from the struggle of the people of Aden and other territories in the south of the Arabian peninsula for freedom from British colonial domination. British colonialism had carried out many punitive operations against peoples struggling for freedom, and the conclusion seemed obvious that the shelling of Nuqub was one of its many punitive expeditions. The complaint before the Council was an attempt by the United Kingdom to whitewash the guilty and accuse the innocent. The Security Council, in 1964, had decisively condemned the aggressive acts of Britain against Yemen. It was quite likely that British planes, which raided Yemen territory every day, had mistakenly bombed Nuqub, a town in one of their own colonial possessions. The solution to the problem of South Arabia lay in granting independence to the area, dismantling the British military bases there and withdrawing the colonialist troops stationed there.

528. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his Government would not have brought its complaint to the Council before checking on the disposition of British aircraft on the day of the incident. None had been in the area at that time. An eye-witness to the strafing attack had stated that the aircraft had "snub noses and swept wings", a description which could apply to MIGs but not to Hunters, which were the only British aircraft in the area. The United Kingdom fully accepted the objectives of self-determination and independence underlying the United Nations resolutions regarding South Arabia and was discussing with the Secretary-General possible United Nations participation in the process of achieving those objectives.

529. The representative of Jordan stated that his delegation had first thought of objecting to the inscription of the item on the agenda, as, on the face of it, the United Kingdom letter did not warrant consideration. Later, his delegation had decided that the item should be inscribed so that the motives behind the British complaint would be exposed. The letter was

vague and full of contradictions. The motives were obvious from the British record in Palestine, where over 1 million people had been displaced, and in Rhodesia, where a minority held sway. The goal of the United Kingdom was not to protect the people of the area but to maintain a protectorate.

530. The representative of the United Arab Republic read what he said was an eye-witness report from Baihan stating that no airplanes of the United Arab Republic had been seen, but two British Hunters had been observed pursuing Baihan revolutionaries. He added that the eye-witness had said that the incident had seemed to be an attempt to create a pretext for keeping British forces in the area and signing a defence pact with the rulers, and an excuse for further aggression against Yemen.

531. At the 1297th meeting, on 8 August, the representative of Yemen said that his Government categorically denied the British charges and was concerned that the motive behind the British complaint might be the preparation of a new act of aggression against the Yemen Arab Republic. Like other United Kingdom charges in the past, this complaint was baseless. Yemen had real, not imaginary grievances regarding British incursions into its territory, British violations of its air space, provocations and acts of aggression.

532. Another possible motive for the United Kingdom complaint might be a desire to evade action by the General Assembly at the twenty-first session on the issue of occupied South Yemen. The British knew that the Yemen was one and that the occupied South Yemen was an integral part of Yemen. The British plan for what they called the Federation of South Arabia was nothing but a continuation of British colonialism in another form. The reunification of Yemen, which the Yemenis would themselves effect, would be one of the fruits of freedom.

533. The representative of New Zealand said that his country regarded the complaint of violation of a frontier and a strafing attack on a town by aircraft allegedly of a Member State as a serious matter. The Federation of South Arabia was still a Non-Self Governing Territory and the United Nations must therefore show a special concern for its freedom from outside interference, let alone physical attack. In his statement, the representative of the United Kingdom had carefully distinguished between what could be definitely proven from the evidence available and what could logically be deduced from this. On the evidence of eye-witnesses and shell fragments, the United Kingdom had concluded that the aircraft responsible were those of the United Arab Republic operating from an airfield in Yemen. But this case was disputed and the conclusion that could legitimately be drawn from the remarks of those speakers who obviously felt that the United Kingdom's case remained unproved, was that only the findings of an impartial investigator were to be accepted by the Council. The obvious step was, therefore, for the Security Council to arrange for an impartial investigation. He suggested that the Secretary-General might be asked to set in motion an immediate investigation by a United Nations team. The Council might also consider whether at a later stage it might give the Secretary-General a wider mandate by requesting him to resume his efforts to use his good offices to settle issues still outstanding in



that area of the Yemen-South Arabia border. Such efforts would, of course, require the agreement and co-operation of the parties concerned.

534. The representative of Jordan said that he had found no evidence to corroborate the United Kingdom's charge in its complaint or in the statements made by the parties directly concerned. The eye-witness cited by the representative of the United Kingdom seemed to him to have answered leading questions designed to back up the charges. The representative of Yemen, on the other hand, had given the Council at least twenty-one examples of British attacks on Yemen. He accepted the United Arab Republic's denial that any of its aircraft had been in the area. The problem in South Arabia was purely a colonial one and the present case was only one manifestation of it. What was really required was the immediate withdrawal of the colonial power and the restoration of their rights to the people. The Security Council would be creating a dangerous precedent if it sent an investigating team to the area on the basis of the kind of inconclusive evidence presented to the Council.

535. The representative of Argentina said that the problem before the Security Council was difficult to solve. Whereas the United Kingdom had expressed the conviction that the attack on Nuqub on 30 July had been made by United Arab Republic aircraft operating from Yemen territory, the United Arab Republic and Yemen categorically denied the charges. The Council had to be extremely careful, faced with this kind of situation, in determining whether there was a threat to the peace or an act of aggression, requiring the application of certain measures or a call on the parties concerned to settle the controversy by peaceful means. Nevertheless, the general situation justified Council consideration of measures that would prevent it from becoming worse. The Council must take the minimum action provided for under the Charter; it could not remain indifferent in the face of an explosive situation. The suggestion made by the representative of New Zealand was attractive from that point of view and met the need for some action on the Council's part. It might also contribute to achieving the goal the United Nations had set for itself in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV).

536. The representative of the United States said that his country had often expressed its profound sympathy with the aspirations of the people of South Arabia for self-determination and independence. Peace and stability in the area and along its borders were essential to South Arabia at the present important period in its history, and the Council should do everything possible to ensure them. It was regrettable that there had been repeated incidents which had complicated the advance of the people of South Arabia towards independence. The New Zealand suggestion for an investigation seemed a useful one in the circumstances, and he did not see why anyone should object to it. It did not prejudice the issues or the facts, and his delegation supported it as a constructive basis for the Council's further consideration of the matter. All the parties and all Council members should co-operate in ensuring a peaceful early evolution to independence in the general area.

537. The representative of the Netherlands said it had become clear that the Council would be unable to make a decision on the point at issue in the complaint

before it unless more precise and conclusive factual information was put at its disposal. His delegation therefore welcomed the proposal made by the representative of New Zealand that the events should be examined *in loco* by an impartial expert designated by the Secretary-General. Such a mission would have a strictly auxiliary and subsidiary function, that of establishing the facts concerning what had happened on 30 July in Nuqub. The Council would then be at liberty to draw from those whatever conclusions it wished.

538. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the suggestion made by the representative of New Zealand was a constructive one. His Government had no doubt that an investigation would confirm the facts as he had stated them, and would do everything possible to expedite it. The United Kingdom could not accept the reference to South Arabia as "the occupied Yemeni South". It had no doubt as to its sovereignty over the State of Aden; similarly, there was no foundation for the Yemeni claim to the State of the Protectorate of South Arabia. In view of the allegations against his Government put forward by some speakers, he would remind the Council that the United Kingdom had announced that it would withdraw its base in Aden at the time of independence and that it was determined to bring South Arabia to independence by 1968. The United Kingdom had always made it clear that it would accept any solution of the constitutional problem in South Arabia capable of achieving a wide measure of agreement in the territory, and had informed the Secretary-General of its acceptance of the General Assembly resolutions on Aden, subject only to certain understandings.

539. The representative of Jordan said the United Kingdom was trying to impose on the Council acceptance of its own name, the "Federation of South Arabia", even though the General Assembly had deplored the attempts of the United Kingdom to set up an unrepresentative régime under that designation.

540. The representative of Yemen said that his country was not trying to impose anything on the South. Yemen accepted self-determination by the South, freely expressed and with the presence of the United Nations. What it objected to was the Federation imposed by the United Kingdom.

541. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said there could be no question of dispatching a mission to investigate the United Kingdom's complaint. There was nothing for the Council to investigate or discuss, since that complaint was nothing but a fabrication. The Council should immediately cease consideration of the fallacious and unfounded claim put forward by the United Kingdom.

542. At the 1298th meeting, on 10 August, the President drew the Council's attention to the following draft resolution submitted by New Zealand (S/7456):

*"The Security Council,*

*"Decides to request the Secretary-General to arrange for an immediate investigation, to be carried out by experienced United Nations personnel, in order to establish the fact relating to the incident referred to in the letter dated 2 August 1966 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations (S/7442) and to report to the Security Council as soon as possible."*



543. The representative of Bulgaria said that the statements made by the representative of the United Kingdom had confirmed his delegation's belief that the United Kingdom's resort to the Security Council was unjustified. No valid evidence had been submitted to support the complaint, which, in his view, could only be rejected by the Council as baseless. Nor could an investigation of the kind proposed by the representative of New Zealand serve any useful purpose: the Council had already had the opportunity to assess the value of the material evidence and testimony gathered by the British authorities, and it could certainly not put on an equal footing charges based on conjecture and the official denials made by Governments. To involve the United Nations in such a matter would undermine its prestige and its role in the peaceful settlement of international disputes. The United Kingdom's policy in Aden and Southern Arabia was characterized by the most brutal repression of the legitimate aspirations of the population to freedom and independence, while the independence it claimed to be planning to grant the people of the area would be only a continuation of colonialism in another guise. If it were truly interested in reducing the dangerous tension in the area, it would long since have accepted the recommendations of the General Assembly to allow the Sub-Committee on Aden to visit the territory.

544. The representative of the United Arab Republic said that the New Zealand proposal had surprised him as he had already assured the Council that his Government was not responsible for the reported incident and there would be nothing to investigate. The way to ease the tension in the area lay in full implementation of the General Assembly's resolution on the subject. The United Kingdom had not given any assurance that it would lift the state of emergency in the territory; that measure, among others enumerated by the General Assembly, was a prerequisite if self-determination was to be meaningful. No attempt to confuse the issue or to distract the attention of the United Nations from the road it had charted for itself in Aden and the Aden Protectorate should be allowed to succeed.

545. The representative of Nigeria said his delegation felt that when, as in the present situation, the facts of a case brought before the Council were in dispute, an effort should be made to establish those facts through a third party. Nations should be encouraged to bring their complaints to the United Nations instead of taking matters into their own hands and any complaint submitted to the Council should be given a fair hearing. His delegation's support of the proposal for an investigation was without prejudice to its basic position that a truly independent State with a responsible Government should be established in South Arabia. To be effective, the proposed investigation should be supported by a consensus, and it would therefore be useful if the Council members were given more time to pursue their efforts to achieve such a consensus.

546. The representative of Uruguay said that, in the present situation, the Security Council could either make a decision on the basis of the evidence it possessed—in which case the position of each delegation on the complaint would be determined by subjective factors—or it could devise an adequate formula for ascertaining the facts. The Security Council must deal with every incident which posed a threat to international peace and security. The complaint before the Council had

been submitted by a great Power and to ignore it would discourage others from having recourse to the machinery set forth in the Charter. The New Zealand proposal was constructive and his delegation supported it.

547. The representative of Japan said it was extremely difficult for the Council to sift and evaluate the evidence presented to it. The important thing for the Council was not to lose itself in a search, which might well prove illusory, for detailed facts in order to fix responsibility, but to focus its attention on the main point, which was the existence of serious tensions in the area and on the positive steps necessary to alleviate the situation. The Council should ask the Governments concerned to refrain from any action which might further aggravate the situation. It might also ask the Secretary-General to use his good offices to assist the parties in establishing peaceful conditions in the area, by such means, including the investigation of facts, as he would find appropriate.

548. Introducing the draft resolution, the representative of New Zealand said that the objections made to his proposal for an impartial investigation appeared to be based on two grounds: first, that the evidence brought before the Council was inadequate, and, secondly, that such evidence as there was had been submitted by the United Kingdom, an interested party. It would seem that the normal conclusion to be drawn from a lack of conclusive evidence to substantiate a serious allegation was that further evidence should be sought by an agent of the Council whose standing was unquestionable. However, the position of those who opposed his proposal appeared to be that allegations of aggression by sneak attack should be dismissed by the Council unless the attackers were prepared subsequently to identify themselves or an impartial observer happened to be present. He continued to believe that an investigation should be carried out, because that was the preliminary and minimum action needed to enable the Council to decide what it should do about the complaint.

549. The representative of France said he agreed with the main points set out by the representative of Nigeria, i.e., acceptance of the principle of an investigation, to be carried out with the agreement of all interested parties and the assistance of the Secretary-General, and the need for a consensus to ensure that such an investigation would enjoy the maximum support and co-operation. It was from that point of view that his delegation would study any proposal submitted to the Council.

550. The representative of Yemen said that military aircraft of the United Kingdom had committed three further acts of aggression against his country on 8 August. Those acts were further proof that the United Kingdom was seeking to achieve its colonial objectives through intimidation, provocation and the use of armed force.

551. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the new charges the Yemeni representative was now making against the United Kingdom would be investigated. He was confident that the complaint would be found to be without foundation.

552. At the 1299th meeting held on 15 August, the representative of Mali said that, in his delegation's view, no convincing proof of the United Kingdom's

complaint had been presented. Nevertheless, in the hope that United Nations action might contribute to safeguarding the rights of the people of the area to freedom and independence, he considered that the Secretary-General should be requested to use his good offices, with the agreement and co-operation of the parties concerned, towards the establishment of conditions of peace and understanding in the area in the sole interests of the peoples of Aden.

553. At the 1300th meeting, on 16 August, the President reported on the results of the consultations among members of the Council and read the following agreed statement, which, he said, had the support of all parties concerned:

"The President, having noted that the debate which took place has its origin in a complaint presented by the representative of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (S/7442) that the elements on which the complaint is founded are contested by the United Arab Republic and Yemen, and that the statements made by the members of the Council have not been able to produce at this stage a constructive solution, believes that he is authorized to ask the parties concerned each on his part to contribute in lessening the tension, and to invite the Secretary-General to continue his good offices in an endeavour to settle the outstanding question in agreement with the parties concerned."

554. The representative of the United States said his Government would have preferred even more precise action, but was encouraged that the Council had been able to achieve a consensus and, in particular, that that consensus had been accepted by the parties directly concerned. His delegation's understanding was that the parties would extend full co-operation to the Secretary-General.

555. The representative of New Zealand said he would refrain from raising objections to the consensus statement, on the understanding that it bore no implications for the future work of the Security Council, particularly as concerned impartial third-party investigations. He had waived his right to call for a vote on his proposal in the hope that, instead of constituting an unhappy precedent, the reflections to which the present episode might give rise would serve as a stimulus to those who wanted to see the Security Council accept and carry out its full responsibilities.

556. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his Government would honour the consensus. However, it was an inadequate conclusion to the Council's consideration of the matter his Government had brought before it. The United Kingdom had established at least a *prima facie* case and it had also been ready to accept a United Nations investigation as proposed by New Zealand. It remained confident that had the investigation team been allowed to proceed, it would have shown the facts to be as he had stated them. The United Kingdom would do everything possible to co-operate with the Secretary-General. However, should he find himself unable to secure a settlement, his Government hoped he would proceed with an impartial investigation and report back to the Council.

557. The representative of the United Arab Republic said it was his delegation's understanding that the consensus had no bearing on the resolutions of the General Assembly and its organs regarding Aden and the Aden Protectorate.

#### D. Subsequent communications

558. By a letter dated 5 November (S/7581), the representative of Yemen charged that the aggressive acts of the United Kingdom forces stationed in occupied South Yemen were continuing, and on 30 October had taken the inhuman form of an attack on the school of Kaatabah which had resulted in the death of eight pupils and the wounding of eight others.

559. In reply, the representative of the United Kingdom, in a letter dated 11 November (S/7581), stated that there was no basis whatsoever for the allegations put forward in the Yemeni letter of 5 November. Neither the British authorities in South Arabia, nor the Government of the Federation of South Arabia, had been involved in the events referred to.

560. In a letter dated 3 January 1967 (S/7661), the representative of the Yemen stated that on 12 December 1966 three British helicopters and two Hawker-Hunter aircraft had violated Yemeni air space and fired on two patrol posts, completely demolishing one patrol post and killing one Yemeni soldier and wounding two others.

561. In reply the representative of the United Kingdom in a letter dated 13 January 1967 (S/7682) stated that the allegations had been thoroughly investigated and there was no truth whatsoever in them. He drew attention to incidents which had occurred in the same area on 19 and 20 December 1966, when a village in Federation territory was attacked by Yemeni soldiers in uniform and to an incident on 28 December 1966, when Royal Air Force aircraft came under fire from the Yemen near the town of Quataba.

562. In letters of 8 February (S/7729) and 14 February (S/7754), the representative of the Yemen stated that United Kingdom troops and aircraft had committed various acts of aggression against Yemeni territory and violations of Yemeni air space. The irresponsible continuation of acts of aggression against his country, he continued, seemed to reveal further the intention of the British authorities to plant fear and terror in the region and to prevent the people from achieving any progress or development in their country.

563. In reply the representative of the United Kingdom in a letter (S/7803) dated 6 March 1967 stated that there was no truth in these allegations as no British troops had been engaged in operations described and there had been no flights over Yemeni territory by British aircraft as alleged in the letters. In contrast, however, on 4 February 1967, a Royal Air Force Beverly transport aircraft was fired on from a point within the Yemen and again on 5 February a Royal Air Force Beverly aircraft and an Aden Airways Dakota aircraft were similarly fired on by anti-aircraft weapons stationed in the Yemen.

564. By a letter dated 19 June (S/8002), the representative of Yemen drew attention to what he termed the continued deliberate provocations and acts of aggression committed against Yemen by the British authorities in the occupied South of Yemen between January and May 1967.

565. In reply, the representative of the United Kingdom, in a letter dated 27 June (S/8018), stated that the allegations in the Yemeni letter appeared to be a repetition of charges made in earlier letters addressed to the Council, and there was no truth in the allegations made.

**LETTER DATED 21 SEPTEMBER 1966 FROM THE ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

**A. Request for a meeting of the Security Council**

566. In a letter dated 21 September 1966 (S/7503) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo charged that Portugal was using its African territories of Angola and Cabinda as a base of operations for mercenaries recruited in European countries by the opposition, headed by Moïse Tshombé, in order to overthrow the legitimate authorities of the Congo. That situation constituted a serious threat to world peace because as soon as the mercenaries attacked the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Republic would consider itself at war with Portugal. The Democratic Republic of the Congo requested that the Security Council be convened to call upon Portugal to end its aggression.

567. In a letter dated 24 September (S/7506), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Portugal complained that about 400 people had attacked its embassy in Kinshasa that day, seized the *Chargé d'affaires*, wounded him and taken him to an unknown destination. The embassy had been set on fire and its archives sacked. Furthermore, in the preceding days, radio stations and other Congolese information organs had been disseminating frequent appeals and instigations to violence against Portugal and the Portuguese community which had long been resident in the Congo. The Portuguese Government, in view of the fact that it had received no guarantees of protection of the lives and property of its employees and of the Portuguese community in the Congo, requested the Security Council to call the attention of the Congolese Government to its responsibilities in this regard and to take all measures necessary to safeguard the lives and property of Portuguese nationals and to release the embassy staff sequestered in Congolese territory.

**B. Consideration at the 1302nd to 1304th and 1306th meetings (30 September-14 October 1966)**

568. At its 1302nd meeting, on 30 September 1966, the Security Council decided to include the item in its agenda and invited the representatives of Portugal, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United Republic of Tanzania, the Central African Republic, Burundi and the Congo (Brazzaville), at their request, to participate without vote in the consideration of the question.

569. The representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo stated that his country wished to conform to the principles of the Charter calling for the peaceful settlement of disputes among States, and therefore to bring before the Council a problem which was endangering the peace in Africa and seriously threatening the independence of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. That problem was a result of two phenomena: the maintenance in Africa of territories subject to colonial or semi-colonial régimes, despite the United Nations Charter and resolutions of the General Assembly; and the interference in the internal affairs of the independent African countries aimed at indirectly re-establishing domination over people who had become

free. That was, he said, the kind of interference that Portugal was attempting against his country.

570. According to information received by Congolese security services, former Prime Minister Moïse Tshombé had been recruiting mercenaries in order to re-enact the Katangese secession he had already attempted in 1960. Reports to that effect had come from different sources, mainly the Governments of certain friendly countries of Western Europe and former mercenaries in the Congo. The recent discovery by French authorities of a camp of mercenaries at Ardèche had confirmed those reports. It had also been learned that frogmen commandos were training in other camps in France for the sole purpose of sowing destruction in the Congo. In that connexion, he expressed his country's gratitude and respect for the firmness with which the French authorities had acted in the matter. The mercenaries arrested by those authorities had revealed that they and their equipment were to be transported by plane. The relations between the Congo and its neighbours were such that the only country in which a base for such mercenaries could be established was Angola. Portugal had denied that there were any training camps on its territory for troops which were to be used against the Democratic Republic of the Congo. But Portugal had made similar denials in the past, and those denials had been disproved by subsequent events. After the liquidation of the Katangese secession about 4,000 men had taken refuge in Angola, carrying with them considerable stocks of arms. The Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had protested to Portugal against the presence of such an army so near the Congo. Portugal had replied that there was no such camp on its territory and that the troops referred to were imaginary. But when Mr. Tshombé had come to power in the Congo, whole battalions of gendarmes, supported by well-trained, well-equipped mercenaries, had emerged from Angola as if by magic.

571. The Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had recognized the Revolutionary Government of Angola in Exile, and that Government was at present on Congolese territory. Moreover, a stable, prosperous, united Congo, because of the considerable support it could give the nationalists, could only be a menace to Portuguese domination of Angola, whereas Mr. Tshombé's policy regarding Angola coincided exactly with that of Portugal. It was accordingly in the interests of the Portuguese Government to support attempts to disrupt order in the Congo and to eliminate any nationalist government that might hamper Portugal's actions.

572. The Democratic Republic of the Congo had come to the Security Council to draw world attention to the threat to international peace and security created by Portugal's interference in its domestic affairs, for the Congo could no longer, without risking its survival, permit such interventions without reacting. It also desired a solemn commitment from the Government of Portugal that it would not assist any attempt at

subversion of the Democratic Republic of the Congo from its territory.

573. The representative of Portugal said that there were no mercenaries, camps or war material in Angola meant to disturb the peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo or anywhere else. Earlier in September the Foreign Minister of the Congo had taken the initiative in discussing the matter with the Portuguese Government, and had been assured that the rumours to that effect were entirely false. A spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had further confirmed that assurance in a statement to the Press on 20 September. Yet the Kinshasa Government had not thought it improper to bring the matter to the Security Council. That fact amazed the Portuguese Government because the complaint came from a Government that permitted and officially aided armed attacks against Angola from bases established in its territory.

574. As soon as the complaint was lodged the radio and other information media in Kinshasa had launched a hate campaign against Portugal which had led to the ugly events of 24 September, when the Portuguese Embassy was attacked, their staff members badly man-handled and held in duress, and the lives and property of other Portuguese nationals threatened. To judge by the attitude of the mob, the attack had clearly been a sequel to the complaint.

575. The Portuguese Government, therefore, had thought it advisable to bring the matter to the Security Council with the request that it remind the Congolese Government of its responsibility to protect the lives and property of the Portuguese nationals living in the Congo.

576. The representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo replied that the Portuguese nationals in the Congo lived in peace and that no threat had been made against them. His Government had merely warned that the matter of mercenaries coming from Angola was an extremely dangerous one, that it risked unleashing the anger of the people and might make the Government unable to meet its obligation to protect foreign citizens.

577. As for the sacking of the Portuguese Embassy, he wished to point out that the Congolese authorities had themselves been surprised by the suddenness of the action taken by the people and that as a result of the prompt intervention of the authorities the Embassy staff had been rescued. On 25 September, when more than 3,000 persons had attempted to demonstrate in front of the Portuguese Embassy, he and the President of the Republic himself had gone to the Embassy in order to persuade the demonstrators to disperse.

578. It was obvious, he continued, that this country could never come to an understanding with Portugal about the assistance given to Angolan patriots, because while for Portugal the territories in Africa were Portuguese, for the Africans they were African territories. Only when Portugal began the process of decolonization could they be able to understand each other.

579. At the Council's 1303rd meeting, on 3 October 1966, the representative of Portugal said that while his country had never asked the Democratic Republic of the Congo to align itself with Portugal politically, it could not admit that political differences justified aiding and abetting violence against a third country. He added that the Congolese representative had admitted that his Government was assisting anti-Portuguese elements and

had not denied that the Congo provided them with bases for violent activities against Portugal. The Council should take due note of the existence of such bases and call upon the Congo to put an end to them.

580. He reiterated that there were neither mercenaries nor camps nor war material in Angola meant to disturb the peace of the Congo. Assurances in that regard had been given even before the complaint had been lodged. But the Congolese Government had chosen to doubt the word of the Portuguese Government — an attitude which Portugal regarded as offensive.

581. Portugal had never denied, he continued, that some elements of the Katangese forces had entered Angola, where they had been granted political asylum. They had been disarmed and interned in accordance with international law. Later on, in 1963, they had asked to be allowed to go back to the Congo, which they had done with the authorization of the Congolese Central Government. It should be noted that during their stay in Angola they had never allowed to carry on any military or political activities.

582. The Portuguese Government's attitude of co-operation with the Congo had not varied according to the Congolese Governments that had risen and fallen, and it was a gross injustice to accuse it of unfriendliness and ill-will—particularly when those accusations came from a Government permitting bases on its territory for operations against Portugal.

583. Portugal was prepared to meet the Congolese complaint in the same spirit of co-operation and goodwill it had always shown to the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and it naturally wished the Congolese Government to reciprocate. The Congo was concerned about mercenary bases it alleged to be existing in Angola, but had presented no evidence whatever to substantiate that charge. Portugal, on the other hand, had charged that mercenaries were employed in the Congolese army, and the existence of anti-Portuguese bases in the Congo was avowed by the Congolese Government itself. Portuguese sovereignty in Angola was a fact, and whatever the political opinions held by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, it had no right to disturb the peace there, or to assist those who disturbed the peace. When no evidence was presented, as in the case now submitted by the Congo, the word of the Portuguese Government should be accepted. Nevertheless, in order to place its good faith beyond question, Portugal would be prepared to permit an investigation of the allegation that mercenary bases existed at Henrique Carvalho and Vila Luso, if the Democratic Republic of the Congo was prepared to show equal goodwill and co-operation by allowing an investigation of the anti-Portuguese bases existing in its territory.

584. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that for his country and for the other independent African States an unprovoked aggression by Portugal on Congolese territory was an attack on all of them.

585. There was no doubt that Portugal had survived in Africa simply because it had been a tool of much greater forces of evil which for centuries had conspired to plunder the wealth of Africa, both human and material, for the benefit of the Western world. Those forces had established their last bastion in the southern part of Africa, represented by the apartheid Republic of South Africa, the racist régime in Rhodesia and Portuguese colonialism. Portugal's aggressive attitude



towards the Democratic Republic of the Congo was another instance of the lengths to which the forces of evil would go in order to perpetuate that bastion. In their conspiracy against Africa, the forces of evil were able to buy men like Tshombé, who made his aggressive plans against the Congo in collusion with the Portuguese and the forces behind them.

586. Portugal had committed aggression against all the independent States neighbouring the African territories subjected to Portuguese colonialism, and Tanzania, together with other African States, had repeatedly drawn the attention of the United Nations to its aggression. All the African States had been encouraged by the action taken by the French security forces in arresting some of the mercenaries training for their subversive activities against the Congo.

587. Impoverished Portugal derived part of its strength from NATO, which supplied it with the lethal weapons it used to massacre African populations and to intimidate independent African States. Only recently, Portugal had obtained at least seven B-26 bombers from the United States, even though it was alleged that the transaction had been illegal.

588. Tanzania and the other African countries had irrevocably committed themselves to the struggle for the total liberation of Africa, and stood firmly beside the freedom fighters in the Portuguese territories. On that issue, there could be no compromise. Together with the other African States, his Government called upon the Security Council to condemn Portuguese aggression in Africa and in this particular case the aggression against the Democratic Republic of the Congo. It wished also to call upon the members of NATO to re-examine their consciences in view of the great responsibility they bore for the Portuguese aggression in Africa, and to warn the Portuguese Government to desist from all provocative actions against the African peoples.

589. The representative of the United States of America replying to the statement made by the representative of Tanzania, said that there had been an attempt to smuggle some B-26's out of the United States, but the individual involved had been indicted and was standing trial for violation of the United States laws. The United States had forbidden the shipment of arms to Portugal for use in the overseas territories, and it would continue to adhere to that policy.

590. The United States was not ashamed of being a member of NATO, an alliance which protected not only the freedom of his country, but the freedom of the world. NATO was concerned with the defence of the North Atlantic area, which did not embrace the Portuguese African territories, and any implication that Portugal's policy in Africa bore any relation to NATO was incorrect.

591. The representative of the United Republic of Tanzania said that he had not accused the United States Government, as such, of carrying out the B-26 transaction. He hoped the United States would be able to prevent delivery of the aircraft and ammunition. Tanzania would be convinced that Member States were committed to African freedom only when it saw that there was control of armaments intended for Portugal and that there was no longer any covert co-operation with that country.

592. The representative of Burundi said that his country, which was also threatened by Portugal, had

broken all relations with it. He endorsed the charges made by the Democratic Republic of the Congo against Portugal, adding that international financial circles had organized subversion in the Congo in order to protect their profits and that, in Moïse Tshombé, they had found a willing tool.

593. Portugal, he went on, maintained the fiction that the African territories under its control were part of its own territory, but that thesis ran counter to the Charter principle of self-determination of peoples and the Declaration of Human Rights. By harbouring the Angolan Government-in-exile and by giving it all the necessary support, the Government of the Congo was only responding to the call of the Organization of African Unity to its members to recognize and aid that Government.

594. He said that the Council should order Portugal to evacuate its colonies and end the colonial war it was waging. The responsibility of Portugal in the recruitment, harbouring and training of mercenaries in Angola had been established and could not be denied. The attitude of Lisbon in this matter could degenerate into a *casus belli*; any aggression directed against the Democratic Republic of the Congo would be considered a declaration of war against all members of the Organization of African Unity.

595. In that connexion, a number of Western European countries also bore responsibility as accessories. His delegation drew the attention of the countries concerned to the danger such trading held for the peace of the world, and requested them to take sanctions not only against the recruiters but against the persons recruited as mercenaries.

596. Together with the Congolese Government, his delegation requested the Council to condemn Portugal for its brazen interference in Congolese affairs and to ensure the adoption of legislation making dealings with mercenaries, for purposes other than the maintenance of internal public order, an international crime.

597. The representative of the Central African Republic said that the statements made in the Council showed that Portugal had committed aggression against the Democratic Republic of the Congo. That plot, which was intended to reinstate in power a Congolese with a sorry reputation, had failed. His Government expected that the Council would unequivocally condemn the interference and acts of aggression of Portugal.

598. The representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, replying to statements made by the representative of Portugal, said that former Katanga gendarmes, officered by mercenaries, had returned to the Congo fully armed and equipped, when Moïse Tshombé had returned to power. He wondered if the Portuguese Government had not actually returned the weapons of the mercenaries at the time of their departure and even whether they had been interned. If Portugal had truly wished to co-operate, it would have disarmed the mercenaries and handed over their weapons and equipment to the United Nations.

599. The representative of Portugal had referred to the technical assistance his Government had supplied to the Congo, but had neglected to mention that the material involved had been purchased with the money of the Congolese people and stored in Angola by Mr. Tshombé. Portugal had returned that material, not at the request of the Congolese Government, but at the request of Tshombé after his return to power.

600. The mercenaries in the Congo had been recruited by Mr. Tshombé when he had taken power. The Congo had inherited them and was in the process of settling the problem, which was a serious one for Africa.

601. The representative of Portugal, exercising his right of reply, reiterated that the Katangese had been disarmed and interned and that they had returned to the Congo with their weapons with the consent of the legal Government of the time. There was nothing wrong in that. He added that part of the co-operation given by his country to the Congo had taken place very recently. Although the requests for such co-operation may have been made while Mr. Tshombé was in power, they had not been addressed to Portugal by Mr. Tshombé himself.

602. The representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo replied that he had referred to material which Mr. Tshombé had purchased during the secession and later stored in Angola when the United Nations liquidated the secession. Portugal was still holding some of that material bought with Congolese money and refusing to return it to the present Government of the Congo.

603. When the Council resumed consideration of the item, at its 1304th meeting, on 13 October 1966, it had before it the following draft resolution sponsored by Jordan, Mali, Nigeria and Uganda (S/7539):

*"The Security Council,*

*"Having heard the statements of the representatives of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and of the representative of Portugal.*

*"Taking note of the statement of the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo that Angola under Portuguese administration is used as a base of operation for foreign mercenaries for interfering in the domestic affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,*

*"Taking note further of the statement of the representative of Portugal that there are no mercenaries in Angola, nor camps, nor war material meant to disturb the peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,*

*"Deeply concerned over developments in the area,*

*"Recalling the pertinent resolutions of the Security Council and the General Assembly,*

*"1. Urges the Government of Portugal, in view of its own statement, not to allow foreign mercenaries to use Angola as a base of operation for interfering in the domestic affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;*

*"2. Calls upon all States to refrain or desist from intervening in the domestic affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;*

*"3. Requests the Secretary-General to follow closely the implementation of the present resolution."*

604. The representative of Mali, introducing the draft resolution, said everyone was aware that neo-colonialism continued to nurse the illusion that it would be able to acquire a bridgehead in an African State in order to open its way to reconquest. Everyone was aware, also, that Portugal, in spite of the universal condemnation it had earned, persisted in its policy of subjugation of the peoples still under its domination.

The draft resolution (S/7539) had been prepared by the African group in the United Nations, supported by Asian colleagues, in the belief that the practice of recruiting and maintaining expatriates for the purpose of attacks against the security of nations should be proscribed and condemned, and that the Security Council should induce Portugal to end any action aimed at threatening to sovereignty and integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

605. The representative of Nigeria said that his delegation had no difficulty in accepting the Congolese charges. It was doubtful that an investigation would yield an accurate picture of the situation in the bases.

606. He apologized to the African nations for the mediocrity of operative paragraph 1 of the draft. In deference to certain members who were unwilling to condemn Portugal without evidence that it had bases and mercenaries in Angola, the sponsors had not included a paragraph condemning Portugal; that did not mean that they did not regard the charges as justified. He hoped Council members who found the resolution too mild and members who did not wish to act against Portugal because of friendship or because of doubts about the charges, would also understand the reasons for the wording. They should understand that Portugal deserved to be called upon not to repeat the actions it had, on its own admission, committed in the supposedly mistaken belief that it was acting in the best spirit of international law.

607. The representative of the Netherlands said that, before going to the substance of the complaint, he wished to refer to the attack on the Portuguese Embassy in Kinshasa, which was an instance of a much wider phenomenon to which the United Nations should start to pay attention in order to prevent serious damage to international relations. For years now attacks had been mounted on embassies in many countries, and it looked more and more as if such attacks were becoming the latest arm in the arsenal of diplomacy. His country would therefore like to appeal to all Governments to make clear their strong feeling that such infringements on diplomatic practice and privilege should stop. His delegation had noted with satisfaction the Congolese statement that that country wished to adhere to the obligations of international law and practice.

608. Turning to the substance of the question, he said that the Council could not pass judgement unless the facts charged were investigated and proved. Under the circumstances, the wisest action for the Council was to take note of the statements of both parties and request all States to desist from intervening in the domestic affairs of the Congo. Such a decision, without implying any condemnation or judgement, would give the Government of the Congo the assurances it sought, and which the Government of Portugal had implicitly given in its statements.

609. The representative of Portugal said that the charge that his Government had "obstinately refused" to return Congolese planes lying in Angola was as baseless as the other charges. Portugal had authorized a Congolese military mission to visit Angola to inspect the planes and would be happy to have the Congolese Government remove them.

610. With regard to the draft resolution, he said that it was motivated not by any merit in the Congolese complaint, but by other considerations. The draft sought to reward the Congo in terms which were

glaringly discriminatory against Portugal. It embodied a directive to Portugal not to provide mercenary bases in Angola for action against the Congo; and it referred in its preamble to "Angola under Portuguese administration", a phrase which had never before been used in any United Nations resolution and to which Portugal took very strong exception. Portuguese sovereignty in Angola was not involved.

611. Although the draft took note of his statement that there were no mercenaries, camps or war material in Angola meant to disturb the peace in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, it asked Portugal not to do what it had already declared it was not doing. If Portugal was singled out in a Council resolution, it should be as the target of constant injuries from the Congo; but the draft inverted facts and appealed to the aggrieved party not to injure the wrong-doer.

612. The complaint brought by the Congo, he continued, was only camouflage for hostile designs against Portugal. It was astounding that the draft should not mention that point, thus encouraging the Congo to pursue its hostility. No attempt had been made to harmonize and conciliate relations between the two countries; instead an attempt had been made to judge Portugal *ex parte*. The draft resolution, in which Portugal was singled out, even though no case had been made against it, cast aside all fairness and equity and had the sole aim of giving unjustified support to the accusers. The Government of Portugal could not accept this shocking draft resolution, which, if approved, could lead only to grave consequences for which Portugal disclaimed all responsibility.

613. The representative of Bulgaria said that the Congolese delegation and other African delegations had furnished specific information on the role of certain Western allies of Portugal, their secret services, and NATO itself in the formulation and implementation of the policy of creating internal divisions and fratricidal struggles in newly independent African States.

614. The equivocal denials by the representative of Portugal of the accusations against his Government had only confirmed the information presented about its efforts to foment subversive activities in the Congo. The Bulgarian delegation was unconvinced by the denials of the United States representative concerning the responsibility of NATO in encouraging Portugal in its colonialist policy; nor did judicial action in the case of the B-26 bombers relieve the United States Government of its responsibility.

615. The Portuguese Government pursued its aggressive policies against the African States hand in hand with the racist régimes of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia; the aim of the alliance between colonial and racist régimes in Africa was to perpetuate the subjugation of African populations and, by provocation and intervention in their internal affairs, prevent the new States from becoming politically and economically strong.

616. Exercising his right of reply, the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo said that the representative of Portugal had admitted that his Government had waited to return the Congolese property until Mr. Tshombé had returned to Kinshasa and that some Congolese aircraft were still in Angola. However, he had not said that ammunition and weapons were still stored there. It was difficult to understand why, if the Portuguese Government was truly

animated by a spirit of co-operation, it could not return the military material to the Congo without having a commission go to Angola.

617. The four battalions of former Katangese gendarmes had never been disarmed; instead, with the assistance of the Governor-General of Angola, they had trained and re-equipped themselves for further action. These were the battalions which had interfered in Kisanгани against the Congo. The Congo could not be satisfied with mere verbal assurances from a Government which was not ashamed to keep those battalions and allow them to train or to defy the injunctions of the Secretary-General and the United Nations.

618. The representative of Portugal replied that it was immaterial how the property had come into Angola. What was important was that the property in Angola was at the disposal of the Congolese Government.

619. At the 1306th meeting, held on 14 October, the representative of Japan said it seemed to his delegation, in view of the facts presented, that the Council should, as a minimum, request Portugal to give a firm commitment for the future that it would not allow foreign mercenaries to use its territories as a base of operations for interfering in the domestic affairs of the Congo.

620. The incidents at Kinshasa were regrettable; however, he noted with satisfaction the statement of the Foreign Minister of the Congo that prompt action had been taken to prevent expansion or recurrence of the incidents.

621. The representative of the Congo (Brazzaville) said that Portugal was an obvious threat not only to the territories which it illegally occupied but to all African countries. It engaged in subversive manoeuvres because of the encouragement and support it received from South Africa, Southern Rhodesia and NATO.

622. The draft resolution was weak and lacking in substance. It was surprising that some Council members opposed even that minimum. He hoped the Council would not disappoint the Africans, who looked to it for justice.

623. The representative of Argentina said that the draft resolution seemed an adequate way for the Council to express concern over events that might affect the Congo, and to assure that country that intervention from abroad in its internal affairs would not be passively permitted. At the same time, it placed full confidence in the statement made by the representative of Portugal that Angola was not being used and would not be used as a base against the Congo.

624. The representative of New Zealand said that the Council was placed in the position of having to weigh the unsubstantiated accusations of one Member State against the unsubstantiated denials and counter-charges of another. Failing an impartial investigation, his delegation would support the parts of the draft resolution which contained no commitment to either side on matters of substance. His delegation would have preferred the sort of general call contained in the second operative paragraph, together with a reminder that non-intervention should encompass active non-tolerance of the activities of private groups or individuals directed against the Congo. He would not withhold his vote if permitted to state his reservations on the first operative paragraph.

625. Referring to the violation of the premises of the Portuguese Embassy in Kinshasa, and to an incid-

ent which had occurred that day in New York, he said that the rules of customary international law on the inviolability of diplomatic agents and premises enjoined inescapable obligations upon the receiving State.

626. The representative of France, who pointed out that it was the consistent policy of his Government to oppose any outside interference in the affairs of any country, as it had shown by taking strong measures in its own territory, said that his delegation would not be able to support the entire draft resolution unless it was permitted to abstain on operative paragraph 1, on which he requested a separate vote.

627. He also regretted the attack on the Portuguese Embassy, and welcomed the statement of the Foreign Minister of the Congo regarding that matter.

628. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the documents before the Council showed that Portugal was concentrating bands of mercenaries in its colonial territories with a view to invading the Congo. It was obvious that the situation created by those actions constituted a serious threat to peace in Africa. It was becoming more and more apparent also that the principal NATO Powers were attempting to use the Portuguese colonialists as a tool for the repression of national liberation movements and the protection of imperialist interests. The weapons used by Portugal in Africa were supplied by colonialist members of the NATO bloc. That policy was determined by the desire to protect the interests of United States, British, West German and Belgian monopolies exploiting the natural resources of the Portuguese colonies, and by military and strategic considerations.

629. The draft resolution, although it made certain demands on Portugal, was obviously insufficient. Nevertheless, his delegation would support it, as it would serve to put an end to foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Congo.

630. The representative of Jordan said that the Council should request Portugal not to use its colonies for interference in the Congo. In view of Portugal's past behaviour, and the evidence adduced on many of the issues raised, its representative had a very difficult case to defend. Portugal must now desist from provocative actions against the Congo. The draft resolution, which his delegation had co-sponsored, represented the least action the Council could take in the matter.

631. The representative of China said that, in the circumstances, the draft resolution was useful and acceptable, allaying Congolese fears and seeking the co-operation of all States in complying with the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of another independent country. His delegation would vote for it.

632. The representative of Uruguay said that his delegation would support the draft resolution, in order to reaffirm its adherence to a principle of law which it considered to be over and above any private or political circumstances or expediency—the principle of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other States.

633. The representative of Uganda said that the sponsors of the draft resolution had been moderate under the circumstances. All they asked was a firm commitment from Portugal regarding its future conduct. That was not too much to ask, and he hoped that members would vote in favour even of operative paragraph 1. When the facts were in dispute and the Council was unable

to reach a conclusion on the basis of statements presented to it, the sensible course of action was to adopt a resolution similar to the present draft or to dispatch a fact-finding team if the facts were susceptible of proof. In the present case, however, as previous speakers had shown, they were not.

634. The President, speaking as the representative of the United Kingdom, said that he wished to reply to certain accusations made against his country by the representative of the USSR. In this regard, he reiterated that the United Kingdom was not providing Portugal with arms for use in its overseas territories and was fully satisfied that no arms or equipment supplied to metropolitan Portugal in recent years had been used by the Portuguese in their African territories.

635. Turning to the substance of the item, he said that the best basis for a decision would be an impartial investigation of the charges which had been made and denied. His delegation was doubtful about operative paragraph 1 of the draft resolution in the absence of impartial investigation. At the same time it attached great importance to the main purpose of the draft resolution and in particular to the substance of operative paragraph 2. He hoped the sponsors would agree to a separate vote on operative paragraph 1, as he was anxious to support the draft resolution as a whole.

636. The representative of Mali said that the sponsors could have presented a stronger and more effective draft resolution, but had refrained from doing so in the hope of achieving a general understanding on the very important question of interference in the internal affairs of other countries. On behalf of the sponsors, he agreed to a separate vote on operative paragraph 1. The sponsors hoped for a unanimous vote in favour of the resolution. This was not a matter involving only the Congo, for the concern over interference in the internal affairs of States was a permanent concern of all African States.

637. The representative of the United States said that the record of his country's concern for Congolese security was clear and constant and had been manifested by concrete aid and assistance, in contrast to the irrelevant rhetoric which had been the sole and dubious contribution of the Soviet Union and Bulgaria.

638. His country would have supported a call to all States not to interfere in the Congo or to allow their territory to be used as bases for mercenaries to operate in the Congo. However, in the absence of an investigation of the situation, the United States delegation found it difficult at the present stage to support a pronouncement in the terms of operative paragraph 1.

639. He added that his delegation would not now reply to the irrelevant excursions made into the general problem of the Portuguese territories. His Government had made its position in that respect quite clear and was prepared, when the subject came up again, to express its strong views on it.

640. The representative of the USSR, speaking on a point of order, said that he did not understand the difficulties expressed by certain delegations regarding paragraph 1, which was in conformity with the stated views of Portugal. The position of those delegations left the impression that they wished the draft to contain only a restatement of the elementary Charter provision that all States must refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of another country. The draft should



be adopted as presented; if members wanted to prevent even such a decision, they should say so openly.

**Decisions:** *At the 1306th meeting, on 14 October 1966, paragraph 1 of the draft resolution (S/7539) was adopted by 11 votes to none, with 4 abstentions (France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States). The draft resolution as a whole was then adopted unanimously (resolution 226 (1966)).*

641. The representative of Portugal said that the text of the resolution was repugnant to the logic of the facts and to a sense of fair dealing; his delegation deeply regretted its adoption and wished to place on record its most firm and formal reservations with regard to it.

642. His delegation also wished to express its appreciation to the members of the Council who had abstained on paragraph 1 of the text and to those who had deplored the attack on the Portuguese Embassy in Kinshasa.

643. The representative of the Netherlands said that he had voted for the resolution, including paragraph 1, on the understanding that it did not imply any condemnation or judgement, and because it gave the Congo the assurance of freedom from intervention which that country sought.

644. The representative of Uruguay said that he had voted in favour of operative paragraph 1 on the understanding that it was to be interpreted as accepting the Portuguese representative's declaration that his Government had pursued and would continue to pursue a policy of non-intervention in the domestic affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

645. The representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo stressed that the resolution adopted was the minimum that his delegation and the African countries had requested, and expressed the hope that all Member States would respect the territorial integrity of the Congo and its institutions, whether those institutions pleased them or not.

### **C. Subsequent communications**

646. On 30 December 1966, the representative of Portugal, in a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7655), charged that, on 25 December 1966, hundreds of individuals armed with automatic weapons and sub-machine guns had penetrated Angolese territory from the Democratic Republic of the

Congo, and had attacked the civilian population and the headquarters of the security forces, causing six dead, including two women and one child. Portuguese security forces and civilians had repulsed the attackers.

647. By a letter dated 13 March 1967 (S/7818) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Portugal drew the Council's attention to a letter from the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (A/AC.109/227) of 7 March 1967 addressed to the Chairman of the Special Committee of Twenty-Four, and in particular to those passages in which the Congolese Government admitted that its territory constituted a base for acts of aggression against Angola. Portugal wished to place on record the fact that through that note the Congolese Government assumed complete responsibility for the aggression committed against Angola in the common frontier area, and would not be able to attribute to Portugal any responsibility for acts resulting from the exercise of the right of self-defence against such aggression.

648. On 16 March 1967 the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7827), took note of the Portuguese representative's letter of 13 March (S/7818) and stated that, as far as the Congo was concerned, Angola was not a Portuguese province but a colonial territory whose people had been denied the right to self-determination and independence.

649. The record of Portugal's violations of the many resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council calling upon it to grant independence to the African territories under its domination was in itself sufficient evidence of its bad faith in accusing the Congolese Government of violating the Charter. The truth was that the Congo had responded affirmatively to the Assembly's appeal to all States to render the people of the territories under Portuguese administration the necessary support for the restoration of their inalienable rights (resolutions 2107 (XX) and 2184 (XXI)). Portugal's true intentions were to justify in advance its possible future aggression against the Congo to find loopholes in Security Council resolution 226 (1966), which urged Portugal not to allow mercenaries to use Angola as a base of aggressive operations against the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Any attempt by Portugal to impair the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Congo would meet not only the resistance of the Congolese people but also the condemnation of all peace-loving peoples in the world.

## **Chapter 5**

### **LETTER DATED 6 JULY 1967 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL**

#### **A. Communications to the Council**

650. In a letter dated 5 July 1967 (S/8031), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo transmitted the text of a cable from the President of the Democratic Republic of the Congo stating that Western colonialist imperialists had committed aggression by using two unknown aircraft which had parachuted groups of mercenaries at the Kisangani airport. At the same time, so-called volunteers recruited

and paid by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, but unfortunately in collusion with the parachuted mercenaries, had attacked a detachment of the national army, and mercenaries of Belgian, French and Spanish origin, jointly with former Katangese gendarmes, had also started hostilities at Bukavu. The Council, the cable continued, should, in accordance with Security Council resolution 226 of 14 October 1966, call to order the Western countries whose mercenaries had been sent to the Congo to foment disturbances.

651. In a further letter dated 6 July 1967 (S/8036), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo requested that the Council be convened to consider the question of the aggression committed against the Democratic Republic of the Congo on 5 July 1967.

**B. Consideration at the 1363rd, 1364th and 1367th meetings (6-10 July 1967)**

652. At the 1363rd meeting, on 6 July 1967, the Security Council included the item on its agenda and invited the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, at his request, to participate in the debate, without the right to vote.

653. The representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo recalled that, in October 1966, the Security Council had been apprised of the dangers to his country which has arisen as a result of the activities of mercenaries recruited in some countries of Western Europe and based in Angola. A part of the Congolese Army, composed of former Katangese gendarmes, had also mutinied at that time, and had been supported by a group of mercenaries. That mutiny had failed but the danger had now reappeared. The invasion by foreign paratroopers of the town of Kisangani, formerly Stanleyville, was part of a carefully prepared plan, which had included sabotage of communications and power stations vital to his country.

654. An international conspiracy had been organized with a view to overthrowing any Congolese régime determined to break the monopolies of some financial powers. President Mobutu had successfully tackled the fundamental problems of the Congo and a political movement with truly nationalist objectives had been organized at the initiative of the Government. An unprecedented effort had been made to give the Congo political stability and economic independence. New rules for the exploitation of mineral resources had been laid down thus breaking a monopoly profitable only to some foreign financial groups, and a monetary reform had been decreed. Those measures were aimed at making the Congo a prosperous, calm country, but that prospect did not please those harbouring a nostalgia for the colonial era.

655. The mercenaries, he continued, had been recruited and trained in Western Europe; and only France had put an end to the recruiting operations. The recruitment had been carried on openly, leaving no doubt as to the objectives of those engaged in such operations. It was therefore difficult for the Congolese authorities to believe in the sincerity of the friendship professed by those countries which facilitated recruitment of mercenaries. He asked the Security Council to invite all Members of the United Nations to see to it that the activities of those international criminals ceased in their territories, and to forbid the recruitment of mercenaries. The Council should remind all Member States of their fundamental obligations under the Charter and invite them to take concrete measures to put an end to the recruitment and training of mercenaries for the purpose of infringing the sovereignty of any country and in particular that of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

656. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that, just as the Security Council had recently had to examine a situation arising

out of Israel's aggression against the Arab States, it was now examining another dangerous situation which had arisen in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. The forces of aggression must not be encouraged to believe that they could profit from their criminal acts: it was the duty of the Security Council to take the measures necessary to put an end to their activities.

657. The representative of the United States said that his Government's strong opposition to intervention by one State in the internal affairs of another had been demonstrated repeatedly. Such interference, whether with armed forces or through subversion, could not be countenanced. If any foreign Government was in fact aiding and abetting those in the Congo who were seeking by force to wrest control of certain areas from the legitimate authorities, such action would clearly violate the Charter and accepted principles of international law. All Member States should refrain from any such activities and should take appropriate measures to discourage their nationals from participating in them.

658. The representative of Mali expressed his delegation's support for the Democratic Republic of the Congo which, once again, had become the scene of painful events because of imperialist machinations. The failure of the United Nations to condemn the aggression committed by Israel had opened the door to further aggression of every kind. It was most demoralizing to the new States to note that, with every passing day, interests were beginning to prevail over morality in the United Nations. The Congo was one of the wealthiest States of the African continent and it was that wealth which made it the permanent prey of all those circles whose aim was imperialist exploitation.

659. The representative of France, noting that the closing of a mercenary camp in Ardèche indicated the spirit in which his country approached the very serious matter under consideration, said that he hoped the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo would, if possible, add to the supplementary information which he had given the Council.

660. At the 1364th meeting, on 7 July 1967, the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo said that, as the investigation of the individuals involved in the acts of aggression against his country went on, it became clear that the ignorance professed by certain Governments in their official statements could not go unchallenged.

661. The movements and contacts of the individuals concerned inside their countries could not have escaped the knowledge of the Spanish and Portuguese Governments, since those contacts had taken place with Tshombé and, according to the declarations of the Spanish Government, he had been prohibited from taking part in any political activities. Moreover, some of the participants in the conspiracy had entered Congolese territory via Lisbon and Angola.

662. Five Belgian subjects had participated in the acts of sabotage and two French subjects, as well as a high-ranking Belgian officer, had been involved in a plot, formulated in Madrid, which had for its objectives economic sabotage throughout the Congo, the provocation of mutinies in the Congolese National Army, with the assistance of foreigners in the army, and the liquidation of the Congolese Chief of State. The first part of the plot had been completed by the blowing up of a bridge and various power installations with explosives

obtained from installations in Katanga factories and from Angola. The second phase of the plan was the landing of commandos in Kisangani and the mutiny in Bukavu. There was no doubt that certain political and financial centres in Belgium, Spain and Portugal had been aware of the fact that political activities were being planned on their soil with a view to assuming power in the Congo and reinstating Mr. Tshombé as the Head of Government. The Security Council should condemn such activities, which were contrary to the United Nations Charter.

663. At the 1367th meeting, on 10 July 1967, the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo said that his Government had learned that the mutinous Katangese units, together with the Bukavu mercenaries, were trying to reach Kisangani in order to aid the mercenaries besieged at the airport. In order to avoid loss of civilian lives, his Government had delayed an attack on the airport. The same Governments which had allowed criminal activities to take place on their territories were now asking the Congo to ensure the security of their citizens. Those Governments should understand that their complicity had made them responsible for the present disorders in the Congo and that they would therefore be responsible for the measures which might be taken with regard to their nationals and other foreigners living in the Congo. Belgium, Portugal, Spain and Southern Rhodesia were all implicated in the affair. The United Kingdom, which was responsible for the territory of Southern Rhodesia, should take the necessary measures to arrest the mercenaries and return the aircraft stolen from the Congo. For its part, the Council should severely condemn any Government which permitted activities aimed at violating the sovereignty of the Congo.

664. The representative of Argentina said that once again it was necessary for the Security Council to ratify one of the basic principles of international co-existence and peace—the principle of non-intervention in the internal and external affairs of another State. In accordance with the Assembly's declaration on the inadmissibility of intervention in the domestic affairs of States and the protection of their independence and sovereignty, the activities of mercenaries or foreign agents who intended to undermine the political life of a nation for the benefit of foreign interests must be categorically rejected by the international community. His delegation expressed the hope that all States would desist from interfering in the affairs of the Congo and would prohibit the use of their territories as bases of operation for the training or recruitment of mercenaries.

665. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that it was clear that the forces of colonialism were again attempting to subvert the sovereignty and independence of the new States of Africa. The Security Council's debate on the situation in October 1966 had already shown that there was a concentration of mercenaries in the Portuguese colonies and, consequently, the Council had urged Portugal not to allow foreign mercenaries to use Angola as a base of operations for interfering in the domestic affairs of the Congo. Despite the appeal of the Security Council, the colonialists continued to challenge and defy the United Nations in Africa by trying to impose in international relations the law of the jungle, gunboat diplomacy and the diplomacy of air landings. The organizers of the imperialist conspiracy against the Congolese people believed that their plans would be easier to carry out

in the atmosphere of general tension caused by the continuing escalation of military operations by the United States in Viet-Nam and the aggression by Israel against the Arab States in the Middle East. The new aggression against the Congo was occurring at a time when that country was trying to consolidate its independence from monopolies. The events in the Congo showed how grave was the danger to the African people that threatened them from the colonial territories still remaining on that continent. The Portuguese possessions, in particular, served the imperialist Powers as starting points for interference in the internal affairs of the young African States. His delegation categorically supported the request that the Security Council adopt decisive measures to put an immediate end to the aggression against the Democratic Republic of the Congo and demand that various Western countries heed their Charter obligations. Should the aggression continue, then the Security Council should immediately examine the question of further measures to put an end to such interference.

666. The representative of the United Kingdom said that in October 1966 the Council had called on all States to refrain from intervening in the domestic affairs of the Congo. His Government had fully supported that resolution and continued to support it. The United Kingdom also fully supported the efforts of the Government of the Congo to restore and maintain legal authority and order. It was ready to support any renewed call by the Council to the same end.

667. The representative of India said that the takeover of Kisangani, the sabotage of power stations, the blowing up of a railway bridge and power lines were subversive activities of grave import. India took a serious view of any attempt to intervene in the domestic affairs of States or to threaten their independence. The persistent attempts to undermine the territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo were linked with the forces of colonialism which continued to threaten the peace and security of central and southern Africa. An enduring peace could be established in that area only when all vestiges of colonialism were eliminated from Africa. In the view of his delegation, the Council had the solemn duty to call on all States to refrain from any action which would threaten the territorial integrity of any State and of the Democratic Republic of the Congo in particular.

668. The representative of Japan said that intervention in the domestic affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo would be contrary to the United Nations Charter and to the Security Council resolution of October 1966 calling upon all States to refrain from intervening in the domestic affairs of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. His delegation believed that all States had the inescapable duty to desist from intervention of any kind in the domestic affairs of the Congo and that all States should take the necessary measures to prevent their territories from being used for such a purpose. A draft resolution along those lines would be supported by his delegation.

669. The representative of China said that the disturbances fomented by forces from the outside in the towns of Bukavu and Kisangani represented interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign State and could not be regarded with indifference by the Council. His delegation supported the efforts of the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo to preserve the political unity and territorial integrity of the country.

670. The representative of Denmark said that his Government condemned any outside interference which might undermine the territorial integrity of the Congo and which might endanger the peaceful development of that country or the full authority of its legal Government. He therefore hoped that the Council would promptly take the action asked for by the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

671. The representative of Nigeria said that it was intolerable that any country should have its security threatened by foreign soldiers of fortune. The situation became even more deplorable when there was apparent evidence that those mercenaries were the agents and instruments of more powerful foreign interests and groups. The Congo had been the victim of external pressure and intimidation for too long and the Congolese appeal for a respite from harassment should be heeded by all Governments and all interests. Any attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the Congo by any method must be unreservedly condemned. To that end, his delegation, together with those of Ethiopia, India and Mali, was submitting the following draft resolution. (S/8050):

*"The Security Council,*

*"Having taken cognisance of the message of the Congolese Government contained in document S/8031,*

*"Having discussed the serious developments in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,*

*"Concerned by the threat posed by foreign interference to the independence and territorial integrity of the Democratic Republic of the Congo,*

*"1. Reaffirms in particular paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 226 (1966) of 14 October 1966;*

*"2. Condemns any State which persists in permitting or tolerating the recruitment of mercenaries and the provision of facilities to them, with the objective of overthrowing the Governments of States, Members of the United Nations;*

*"3. Calls upon Governments to ensure that their territory and other territories under their control, as well as their nationals, are not used for the planning of subversion, and the recruitment, training and transit of mercenaries designed to overthrow the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo;*

*"4. Decides that the Council shall remain seized of the question;*

*"5. Requests the Secretary-General to follow closely the implementation of the present resolution."*

672. The representative of Brazil said he felt that the resolution should go further and deal with all the aspects of the problem instead of confining itself to the recruitment, training and transit of mercenaries. Even if those persons were not mercenaries but actual volunteers, whose motivations were ideological, their actions could constitute a clear violation of the principles of the Charter. Moreover, even if the recruitment, training and transit of mercenaries were not intended to overthrow the Congolese Government, but were limited merely to subversion, terrorism or sabotage to be carried out in the territory of that State, they should be prohibited and condemned by the Security Council in the same way. His delegation would nevertheless vote for the resolution.

673. The representative of Canada said that his country had been associated with the United Nations efforts to ensure the independence, territorial integrity and stability of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and consequently found it easy to confirm its full support for that policy. It deplored any intervention, through violence or other means, which might tend to compromise the attainment of those objectives. His delegation would therefore vote for the resolution.

674. The representative of Bulgaria said that, while his delegation would have no difficulty in voting for the four-Power resolution because of its general purpose, it was somewhat disturbed because the draft did not mention those who were responsible for the situation. The representative of the Congo had mentioned certain facts and had specified certain names. Moreover, no representative of any country referred to by that representative had even taken the floor to refute the charges. The representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo had stated that his country had been the victim of aggression committed by the Western colonialist imperialists and that he was counting on the Council's intervention to put an immediate end to those acts. Despite the emergence of the Congo as an independent State, the aims and objectives of the international financial circles involved there had remained the same—the continued colonialist exploitation of the Congolese people and the plundering of their natural resources. The international monopolies were still trying to find local agents who were willing to serve them in the achievement of their aims. The Security Council, which had the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, should take measures which went beyond those set forth in the four-Power resolution. However, since the resolution might assist the Government of the Congo in combating the activities of the mercenaries, his delegation would vote in favour of it.

675. The representative of the United States said that, although the draft resolution did not coincide with the preferences of his country in every respect, his delegation would vote in favour of it because the United States supported the principle of non-intervention in the internal affairs of the Congo. It did not, however, consider that the resolution made any specific finding with regard to any specific Government, aided by elements in the Congo, whether they were mercenaries or irregular forces, was seeking to overthrow the Government or to gain control of any part of that country, such action would be in clear violation of the United Nations Charter. The United States had not been content to give merely moral support to the principles laid down in the resolution, but had sought to provide the Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo with some tools which it needed to do the job of protecting its integrity and political independence. It was in that connexion that, in response to a request from President Mobutu and in conformity with previous United Nations resolutions dealing with the Congo problem, it had sent three C-130 aircraft, which would have a non-combatant status.

676. The representative of France said it was his delegation's view that all foreign interference should be condemned, not only when it tended to change the very nature of the Government of a country, but also when it tried to infringe in a more insidious but no less dangerous manner on the public order and the



prosperity of a country. The independence of a State was indivisible and the United Nations must be vigilant against any foreign interference, of any kind. It was in that spirit that the French delegation would vote in favour of the draft resolution. He wished also to express his delegation's concern at the reports that the mercenaries had taken hostages during recent events. That was an odious practice which international public opinion could not tolerate and the Security Council could only condemn.

677. The President of the Council said that he was sure that all the members of the Council shared the preoccupations expressed by the representative of France and which had been brought to their attention by the representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. He appealed for the safety of all persons held as hostages and for their speedy release.

**Decision:** *At the 1367th meeting, on 10 July 1967, the draft resolution submitted by Ethiopia, India, Mali and Nigeria (S/8050) was adopted unanimously (resolution 239 (1967)).*

678. The representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo said that the resolution adopted by the Council did not entirely satisfy his delegation, since it did not mention certain countries whose complicity had been shown. However, if the resolution was respected by those countries, it might be the basis for permanently peaceful relations between them and the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

679. Two communications were received by the Security Council during its consideration of the item. In a letter dated 7 July (S/8039) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Spain stated that his Government had not approved any activity intended to impair relations with the countries to which it was bound by diplomatic ties; that the Spanish authorities had taken great care to ensure that that principle was complied with, and that

the case of a recruit going to the Congo would not be an exception to that principle; that the Spanish people and Government desired the free and peaceful development of the Democratic Republic of the Congo and that no responsibility attached to the Spanish Government for anything relating to the disturbances that had broken out at Kisangani, at Bukavu or in any other part of Congolese territory.

680. In a letter dated 10 July 1967 (S/8051), addressed to the President of the Council, the representative of Belgium stated that the Prime Minister of Belgium had declared that the Belgian Government maintained relations with the Congolese Government and consequently had remained faithful to its policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of the Congo; that Belgium was not involved either directly or indirectly in the events taking place in the Congo and any accusation or insinuation to that effect was unacceptable to it; that Belgium provided the Congo in good time with all the information which its Government had been able to gather with regard to subversive movements; that no aircraft with a suspicious cargo had left Belgium in recent days and it would have been impossible for that to happen because of the very strict surveillance that was being exercised.

681. On 29 June, the letter continued, the Belgian Government had declared to the Parliament that instructions had been given to its diplomatic and consular representatives in the Congo to ensure that its nationals refrained from any action which might be regarded as interference in the domestic affairs of the Congo. The Belgian Government would therefore regard any accusation brought against it as unfounded and unacceptable. Furthermore, it considered discrimination against Belgian nationals in the Congo to be unacceptable. The Belgian Government would, of course, apply the Security Council resolution condemning the recruitment of mercenaries in the service of a foreign State without any exceptions.

## Chapter 6

### QUESTIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN SOUTHERN RHODESIA: LETTERS DATED 2 AND 30 AUGUST 1966 ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL ON BEHALF OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THIRTY-TWO MEMBER STATES

#### A. Communications received from 16 July to 5 December 1966

682. During this period the following communications were received concerning the item: S/7415 of 18 July 1966 from Mexico; S/7420 of 19 July from Japan; S/7436 of 26 July from Thailand; S/7445 of 29 July 1966 from Portugal; S/7463 of 11 August from Turkey; and S/7558 of 14 October from the Sudan. A letter dated 19 September (S/7501) from the United Kingdom dealt with the question of the tanker *Joanna V* and her departure from Beira.

683. By letter dated 18 November 1966 (S/7595), the Secretary-General transmitted to the President of the Security Council the text of resolution 2151 (XXI) adopted by the General Assembly on 17 November 1966. Operative paragraph of this resolution drew the attention of the Security Council once again to the grave situation prevailing in Southern Rhodesia, in order that it might decide to apply the necessary

enforcement measures envisaged under Chapter VII of the Charter.

#### B. Adoption of resolution 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966

684. In a letter dated 5 December 1966 (S/7610), the representative of the United Kingdom stated that since the rebellion in Rhodesia had not been brought to an end, and following consultation with other Commonwealth Governments, his Government had instructed him to request an early meeting of the Security Council at which his Government would wish to propose certain additional measures to be taken against the illegal régime in Rhodesia.

685. In a letter dated 7 December 1966 (S/7614), the Deputy Secretary General of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) transmitted to the Secretary-General, for the information of the Security Council,

the text of the resolution on Southern Rhodesia adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its third ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa from 5-9 November 1966. Among other things, this resolution condemned the current talks between the British Government and the rebel settler régime in Southern Rhodesia as a conspiracy aimed at recognizing the independence seized illegally by the rebel settlers; called upon all member States of OAU and all other States to refuse recognition to any independent régime which those talks might bring about unless such a Government was based on majority rule; strongly condemned the United Kingdom for her refusal to crush the rebel régime and repeated its demands to the United Kingdom Government to bring about the immediate downfall of that régime by any means, including the use of force; reiterated its recommendation to the OAU and to all friendly Governments, to give material and financial aid to the Zimbabwe people who were actually fighting inside Zimbabwe; condemned those States, especially Portugal and South Africa, which rendered support to the rebel régime; invited member countries, in consultation with each other, to take measures against those persons, companies and institutions in their own countries which, in pursuance of colonial interests, continued to have dealings with or business under the illegal régime in Southern Rhodesia; called for support for a programme of mandatory and comprehensive sanctions under Chapter VII of the Charter; and repeated the call upon all member countries to contribute to a fund to enable all Zimbabwe nationalists to intensify the fighting against the rebels. Other provisions concerned assistance to Zambia so as to enable it not only to withstand the effects of the unilateral declaration of independence but also to help all Zimbabwe freedom fighters more effectively; and concerned further efforts by the Foreign Ministers of Algeria, Senegal and Zambia in the Security Council. Finally, the resolution paid tribute to the sons of Zimbabwe who had died in battle with the racist settler régime's usurper forces.

686. At its 1331st meeting, on 8 December, the Security Council included the item in its agenda without objection. In accordance with their respective requests, the representatives of Zambia (S/7613), Senegal (S/7615), Algeria (S/7623), Pakistan (S/7624), and India (S/7625), were invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion.

687. On 8 December, the representative of the United Kingdom submitted the following draft resolution (S/7621):

*"The Security Council,*

*"Reaffirming its resolutions 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965, 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, and 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966, and in particular its appeal to all States to do their utmost to break off economic relations with Southern Rhodesia,*

*"Deeply concerned that this call has not brought the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia to an end,*

*"Reaffirming that to the extent not superseded in the present resolution, the measures provided for in resolution 217 (1965), as well as those initiated by Member States in implementation of that resolution, shall continue in effect,*

*"Acting in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the United Nations Charter,*

*"1. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations shall prevent:*

*"(a) The import into their territories of asbestos iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products and hides, skins and leather originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution;*

*"(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the export of these commodities from Southern Rhodesia and any dealings by their nationals or in their territories in any of these commodities originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Southern Rhodesia for the purposes of such activities or dealings;*

*"(c) Shipment in vessels or aircraft of their registration of any of those commodities originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution;*

*"(d) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the sale or shipment to Southern Rhodesia of arms, ammunition of all types, military aircraft, military vehicles, and equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in Southern Rhodesia,*

*"notwithstanding any contracts entered into or licences granted before the date of the present resolution;*

*"2. Calls upon all States Members of the United Nations to carry out this decision of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of the United Nations Charter;*

*"3. Urges, having regard to the principles stated in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, States not Members of the United Nations to act in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of the present resolution;*

*"4. Calls upon States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies to report to the Secretary-General the measures which each has taken in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of the present resolution."*

688. The representative of the United Kingdom, in introducing the draft resolution, stated that the events of the previous week had marked a turning point in the history of the problem. Reviewing the aims which his Government had set itself and the action it had taken since 11 November 1965, he said that the United Kingdom sought to bring the rebellion to an end by peaceful means. It now asked the Council to place upon all nations the obligation to carry out with the same intensity the measures which had been taken by the United Kingdom since the illegal declaration of independence. Although a greater economic and political impact had been expected from the economic pressure based on voluntary action, the impact on the Rhodesian economy had been significant. Rhodesian exports had been cut by about 40 per cent from a level of £143 million in 1965 to a current annual rate of

£80 million. Despite the attempt by the régime to conceal those effects, there was real damage and very real anxiety among those in Rhodesia aware of the true situation about their future.

689. The United Kingdom representative then proceeded to describe what had been sought in the informal talks with the régime. Two main issues had been explored: the way the rebel régime could be replaced by a broad-based and legal representative government with whom an independent constitution could be agreed; and the constitutional provisions needed to give effect to the six principles which all believed must be the basis of the future independent constitution of Rhodesia. Throughout the informal talks conducted at many levels the régime had maintained a stubborn and recalcitrant attitude which had seemed to hold out the most meagre hope that it would be willing to end the rebellion on just and equitable terms.

690. On H.M.S. *Tiger* the previous week, the British Prime Minister and Mr. Smith had jointly prepared a working document which would have provided immediate political advancement for the Rhodesian Africans, and would have contained guarantees of unimpeded progress towards majority rule and against retrogressive amendment to the constitution. There had also been provisions for a return to legality through the setting up of a broad-based legal government of a representative character, including Africans and independent members and for testing the acceptability to Rhodesian opinion as a whole of the proposed constitutional settlement. The proposals had also provided for the removal of censorship, for review by an impartial tribunal of the cases of all those in detention, with a view to releasing all those against whom it could not be shown that they had committed, or incited the commission of, acts of violence or intimidation. Normal political activities would have been permitted. Despite the fact that such a document had been jointly worked out, Mr. Smith had declined either to join Mr. Wilson in accepting it or even to recommend it to his colleagues. If it had been accepted, the United Kingdom would have commended it to the conscience of the world, but it had been rejected by the Smith régime on 5 December. That fact had created a new situation. The Rhodesian Front régime had shown conclusively that it intended to persist not only in its rebellion but in its defiance of civilized opinion everywhere. The dangers to peace and stability in the whole region of central and southern Africa were acute. There could be interracial strife and bloodshed throughout the region. The Council could not permit the situation to deteriorate further. It should invoke certain measures under Article 39 and 41 of the Charter. His Government had frequently made its position plain on the use of force; it was easy to start to use force, but often very difficult to see just where it would lead or how it would be possible to control or stop it. The economic measures proposed in the draft resolution he was introducing were more certain of success and far more susceptible of proper control. It was necessary to safeguard the essential economic interests of all Member countries and in particular those of neighbouring countries in southern Africa, which were especially vulnerable for geographical reasons. It was the Rhodesian economy his Government sought to affect. If any country did not conform to the decision of the Council, that would create a new situation which, in due course, would be raised. The

main commodities recommended for sanctions in the draft resolution were export commodities since these would most effectively reduce Rhodesian economic activity and earning power and would cause greatest economic damage by blocking the main ho's in the existing sanctions programme. The commodities selected were also those against which sanctions could be most effectively applied by fellow members. His delegation appreciated the strong measure of support for the inclusion of oil, and if an amendment in that sense were to be made in acceptable terms, his delegation would not oppose it. But sanctions must not be allowed to escalate into an economic confrontation with third countries. If the draft were approved, his Government would withdraw all previous proposals for a constitutional settlement to the Rhodesians and would not thereafter be prepared to submit to the British Parliament any settlement which involved independence before majority rule.

691. At the 1332nd meeting on 9 December 1966, the representative of Zambia said that the United Kingdom had purposefully delayed a solution of the Southern Rhodesian problem. The economic sanctions had failed, and the talks between the United Kingdom and the Rhodesian rebels had been illegal and inimical to the interests of the African majority. They had resulted in a sellout arrangement, published in the new British White Paper on Rhodesia. An upper voters' roll of thirty-three seats and a lower one of seventeen seats were proposed. There would also be seventeen seats reserved purely for Europeans, and the minimum age qualification for the vote would be raised (from twenty-one) to thirty years. In effect, the whites would elect the thirty-three members, since it was easier for them to satisfy the very high income, property or educational requirements for registration on the upper roll than it was for the majority of the African Rhodesians. The lower roll, on which Africans would predominate, would elect only seventeen members. Under those proposals white political control would become even more unassailable than it was under the 1961 Constitution, which had enabled the Rhodesian Front régime to declare independence unilaterally. The British Government had gone even further: it had proposed an act of union, so that power would be in the hands of the whites for all time. That was appeasement, but no amount of appeasement would make Mr. Smith willingly surrender his powers. United Kingdom collusion with the minority régime that was committing crimes against the Zimbabwe people had been revealed.

692. The United Kingdom draft resolution proposed yet another ineffective formula. Was it a new stratagem for saving face, or was it the final act in the plot to sell out the African majority of Southern Rhodesia and to destroy Zambia's economy? When racial troubles came, the British Government should be held responsible. South Africa and Portugal, which were still as opposed to any anti-Rhodesia sanctions programme as they had been in the past year, were not involved. Moreover, the existing sanctions had been violated by the British themselves, who had paid the régime for the transportation, through Rhodesia, of copper destined for the United Kingdom, when Zambia, respecting the Security Council's sanctions policy, had refused to supply the rebels with fluid sterling reserves. Britain had also given the Wankie Colliery permission to pay interest on certain debentures from blocked funds in

British banks. The United Kingdom was thus guilty of undoing all that Zambia had done in compliance with its Charter obligations. It had also been reported that the United Kingdom had given the necessary co-operation to West Germany to increase its imports of Rhodesian copper and asbestos in view of the shortage of the world supply, and many British businessmen had been importing vital supplies for the rebel colony through agents in South Africa and Mozambique.

693. British policy in Southern Africa was dishonest. Zambia would henceforth agree only to mandatory comprehensive sanctions in which South Africa and Portuguese Mozambique would be forced to comply. The United Kingdom proposals were favourable to South Africa, where black people were insulted, humiliated, frustrated, gaoled without trial and killed. The Rhodesian economy was now more dependent than ever before on that of South Africa. Zambia would no longer subject itself to greater economic sacrifices to no avail. Describing those sacrifices, he said that *per capita* it had suffered more than any other State, and by comparison the United Kingdom's losses had been infinitesimal. The United Kingdom should cease being hypocritical, for if the problem was not solved there would be a war between black and white which no judge could put right, since both would be wrong. Military means should be employed to quell the rebellion. By seeking to avoid a total oil embargo, Britain was encouraging both Smith and Vorster not to abandon their obnoxious policies. Members should condemn the double dealing of the United Kingdom, which would sell out Southern Rhodesia and destroy Zambia. He would support the British draft resolution only if it was adjusted to include a complete embargo of oil. The United Kingdom should also halt all financial operations with, or for, the Smith régime, close all Rhodesian branches of British banks, and include in the draft all imports and exports, making it a mandatory comprehensive endeavour.

694. The representative of Argentina said that everything seemed to indicate that the régime in Salisbury had consolidated itself, despite its non-recognition by any State, and had managed to overcome its economic and financial difficulties. Effective United Nations action against Rhodesia was necessary because the presence of a minority Government based on racial inequality not only constituted an affront to human dignity, but also disturbed domestic as well as international peace and security. Certain Governments had allowed oil destined for Rhodesia to pass through their territory, and some powerful States had not stopped some of their nationals from doing business with Rhodesia. The result was that the territory had lost only 40 per cent of its export trade. The time had come to prevent the explosive situation from producing far more serious consequences. The situation had become a threat to peace under Articles 1 and 39 of the Charter and it was incumbent upon the Council to decide measures binding on all States. The United Kingdom draft resolution should have described the situation as a threat to peace, in order to enable the Council to adopt effective collective measures. However, the Council should aim at measures that could produce results, while at the same time avoiding any armed confrontations, the results of which were, for the time being, quite unpredictable. The use of force under the Charter was based exclusively on the consent of

States; the Council could not impose it on any State against its will, if the State had not expressed its consent in accordance with Article 43. It should also be borne in mind that Southern Rhodesia was a territory of the United Kingdom, which did not require any authorization by the Council to use force within its own territory. The United Kingdom draft should include oil, since it had been especially mentioned in the existing sanctions programme, and because it was the key to the success of the measures proposed against Rhodesia. Any State failing to abide by the Council's decision would be openly violating commitments freely entered into under the Charter when it had become a Member. The measures should also be binding on non-member States under Article 2 of the Charter.

695. The representative of the United Kingdom said his delegation would carefully consider the constructive suggestions made by the representative of Argentina. The detailed accusations made against his Government by the Foreign Minister of Zambia would be replied to later. However, charges of false motives, hypocrisy and racism had shocked him, and his delegation rejected them as both unworthy and untrue. Abuse was no substitute for constructive criticism. The United Kingdom had been frank to the international community about its economic situation, and recognized the problems of others. However, his Government had more than played its part in that respect. The issue was primarily a great moral one, and the solution was one that was acceptable, must be seen to be acceptable, and determined to be acceptable, in a fair way, for the people of Rhodesia as a whole.

696. At the 1333rd meeting, on 12 December, the representative of the United States repeated that his Government would not recognize the Smith régime, whose claim of independence was a false and spurious one made by and on behalf of a small white minority in a country 94 per cent of whose people were non-white. The United Kingdom was proposing action under Chapter VII of the Charter which, if approved, would be far-reaching and unparalleled in the Organization's history. The United States did not look upon the sanctions as punitive or vengeful, but deemed them necessary in order to emphasize to the illegal régime the Organization's determination not to tolerate the existence of a discriminatory system based on minority rule. The United States was prepared to lose the source of certain materials critical to its industrial economy, and it also recognized the burdens Zambia and the United Kingdom would bear. Legally, the United Nations had recognized over the years that Southern Rhodesia fell under Chapter XI of the Charter. The illegal seizure of power by a minority bent on perpetuating the political subjugation of the vast majority on racial grounds was an act bound to create a dangerous and inflammatory situation. The population of the territory was subject to protection under Chapter XI of the Charter. On 20 November 1965, the Security Council had found that the continuance in time of the Southern Rhodesia situation was likely to lead to a threat to peace. The Council should take resolute and prompt action to deal with the situation in a peaceful but effective way. The sanctions requested were mandatory, binding on Member Governments as well as non-Member States, under the Charter.

697. The United States would apply the full force of its law to implement such mandatory sanctions, if voted by the Council. Unhappily, the Council had in



the past failed to act effectively with respect to certain situations that existed in the world; but by acting together in the Rhodesian situation members could exert a profound effect in Salisbury. That would do much to build respect for the United Nations as a force for peace and justice throughout the world. His delegation supported the United Kingdom draft resolution.

698. The representative of Senegal said that his delegation and the Organization of African Unity did not believe that the proposed sanctions would be effective. The idea of selective sanctions seemed attractive at first, but they were a trick, designed to give the Smith régime more time to consolidate itself. The proposed mandatory sanctions were an illusion, since there was no mention of the action that would be taken against South Africa and Portugal, which would not apply them. The former was Britain's third largest customer, buying \$730 million worth of British goods annually. The gold holdings of the Bank of England, guaranteeing the pound sterling, were 20 per cent South African-owned. The United Kingdom should end the rebellion by its own means, as France had done in Algeria. In his delegation's view, the use of force was the only way to solve the Rhodesian problem. However, if the Security Council was going to consider the United Kingdom draft resolution, the sanctions would have to be comprehensive and apply to all products, including petroleum products, and all States would be bound to implement them, through the use of force if necessary.

699. The representative of Japan said that in compliance with the Council's resolutions his Government had exerted its utmost efforts. As a result of the measures it had taken, imports from Southern Rhodesia into Japan had been reduced practically to nil. The impact of the economic measures based on voluntary action had been disappointingly slow. The rejection of the H.M.S. *Tiger* proposals by the illegal régime had created a new situation which required urgent and vigorous action by the Security Council. It must call for mandatory measures under Article 41 of the Charter. He supported the measures proposed in the United Kingdom draft resolution. His delegation trusted the forecast of the United Kingdom Government would be borne out by evidence. At the same time he strongly appealed to all countries to carry out the measures faithfully and strictly so that the international community shared the burden. Any attempt by any State to render the decisions of the Council ineffective was a direct challenge to the United Nations authority and prestige. He agreed with the representative of Argentina that the Council should define in explicit terms that its action had been taken under Chapter VII, to ensure effective implementation. Oil should be included in the measures proposed by the United Kingdom. The ultimate decision regarding the use of force should be left to the United Kingdom, which could not be compelled to use force by the Council. On the other hand, the Council must not overlook that Zambia's economy was seriously menaced and its stability and social peace threatened. The Southern Rhodesia problem must, therefore, be solved by the most expeditious and appropriate means.

700. On 12 December, the following amendments (S/7630 and Corr.1) to the United Kingdom draft resolution (S/7621) were submitted by Mali, Nigeria and Uganda:

(1) After the first preambular paragraph, insert the following:

*"Noting with deep regret that the administering Power has failed to take effective measures to bring down the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia".*

(2) Before operative paragraph 1, insert the following two paragraphs and renumber paragraph 1 as paragraph 3:

*"1. Determines that the continuance of the illegal racist régime in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security;*

*"2. Deplores*

*"(a) The refusal of the United Kingdom to use every means including force to bring about the immediate downfall of the Ian Smith régime in Southern Rhodesia;*

*"(b) The action of States, notably Portugal and South Africa, which have been rendering support to the rebel régime in contravention of Security Council resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965,".*

(3) Amend sub-paragraph (a) of former operative paragraph 1 as follows:

Between the words "leather" and "originating," insert the following: ", coal and all manufactured goods".

(4) After sub-paragraph (d) of former operative paragraph 1, insert the following sub-paragraph:

*"(e) Participation in their territories or territories under their administration or in land or air transport facilities or by their nationals or vessels of their registration in the supply of oil products to Southern Rhodesia".*

(5) After former operative paragraph 1 (now operative paragraph 3), insert the following five operative paragraphs:

*"4. Calls upon the United Kingdom to make a categorical declaration that it will not grant independence to Southern Rhodesia until majority rule, and that all offers previously made by the United Kingdom to the illegal racist régime are now withdrawn;*

*"5. Invites the Government of the United Kingdom to prevent by all means the transport to Southern Rhodesia of oil or oil products;*

*"6. Reminds Member States that the failure or refusal by any State to implement the present resolution shall constitute a violation of Article 25 of the United Nations Charter calling for appropriate action;*

*"7. Reaffirms the inalienable rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 and recognizes the legitimacy of their struggle to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations;*

*"8. Calls upon all States not to render financial or other economic aid to the illegal racist régime in Southern Rhodesia,".*

(6) After former operative paragraph 4 (now operative paragraph 11), insert the following two operative paragraphs:

"10. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council at regular intervals on the implementation of the present resolution, the first report to be submitted not later than 1 March 1967;

"11. Decides to keep this item on its agenda for further action as appropriate in the light of developments".

701. At the 1335th meeting, the representative of Uganda, introducing the amendments, said that they were the minimum required to improve the United Kingdom draft resolution. Britain tried to exonerate itself from all blame, and was also anxious to exculpate its trading partners, including South Africa and Portugal. The Council's attention had now to be drawn to the abortive efforts of the United Kingdom to bring down the illegal régime in Salisbury. Not only had the United Kingdom refused to use force, but it had informed the Rhodesians it would not use force. The action of certain States—not only South Africa and Portugal—in rendering ineffective the sanctions programme approved by the Council on 20 December 1965 deserved special mention. The amendments sought to enlarge the list of commodities to be embargoed. Oil was vital, and coal and all manufactured goods should also be added. Everybody knew what the effect of that would be on Zambia. Its altruism and self-sacrifice were rare among nations. Zambia had set an example which the rest of the world would do well to follow. Zambia had agreed to the inclusion of the amendments, and the sponsors hoped the United Kingdom would accept them, since he understood that the exclusion of coal and manufactured goods had been due to fear of injuring Zambia's economy. The United Kingdom should declare that there would henceforth be no further "talks about talks" with the rebel régime and no independence before majority rule. It should declare also that the end of the road had been reached. A complete embargo of oil should be voted, even if that involved a confrontation with South Africa which, as a Member Government, should abide by the Charter. The United Nations could not go cap in hand to it. The United Kingdom feared the possibility of hurting its trade with South Africa, but the sanctions were not directed against South Africa. The issue was a great moral one, and at stake was the obnoxious policy of a band of desperate men. The co-operation of all financial interests, from all parts of the world, was necessary before any kind of success could be expected. The Council should also decide to keep the question under review.

702. The representative of Nigeria said the Southern Rhodesia question affected all Africans, and to Nigeria the issue was a great moral one, as the United Kingdom representative had stated before the Council. The contention of the African States that the voluntary sanctions were greatly inadequate had been proved justified. The Africans who had opposed as dangerous the "talks about talks" between Britain and the rebel régime had been proved right. The United Kingdom should accept the African amendments. Sanctions should hit the right thing at the right time, and the United Kingdom draft resolution did not meet that test. He agreed with those who said that Britain should not be given more than it could carry. The Council should approve the three-Power amendments. Portugal and South Africa had flouted many United Nations recom-

mendations, including the resolution on the Rhodesian problem. But they were not the only Member States that had failed to discharge their Charter obligations fully on the matter. Each nation should search its conscience. In announcing that it did not want a confrontation with South Africa, the United Kingdom was making the same error as it had made when it had declared ahead of time that it would not use force against the Ian Smith régime. Collective responsibility was essential. It would be right for the United Nations to leave Britain, Zambia, Malawi and Zimbabwe itself to bear all the consequences of the Council's decision. Other countries should promise support of the United Kingdom in a confrontation. Nobody needed to be persuaded that the Smith régime was a threat to international peace and security. Drastic, rather than step by step, action should be taken so as to end the suffering and misery of the Rhodesian people and to prevent a breach of world peace.

703. The representative of Mali said the United Kingdom, moved by its simple concern to preserve material interests, had brought the question to the United Nations again with hypocrisy and in accord with a clever plan. It had ignored the feelings of 4 million Africans, probably because they were black. Africa accused the United Kingdom of sowing the seeds of the worst possible racial war. It was protecting its trade with South Africa, and had allowed Rhodesia to build up a two-year oil stockpile, thus ensuring that an oil ban would not succeed. The Security Council should not lend itself to the United Kingdom for devious purposes. Britain should face up to its responsibilities. The United Kingdom, which had brought such problems as Kashmir, Cyprus, Aden, Oman, South Africa, South West Africa and, previously, Malaysia, which paralysed the United Nations, was now trying to bring another. It should resort to the use of force as the only means of ending the Rhodesian rebellion. Zambia had played its part in the battle against the illegal authority in Salisbury. The Council should approve the African amendments.

704. The representative of Pakistan said that the situation in Southern Rhodesia constituted a threat to peace and that, although the United Kingdom had Special responsibility for the problem, the United Nations should take remedial action. Resolution 221 of the Council authorized the use of force, however limited. The legal prerequisites of action under Chapter VII had thus been fulfilled, and who could deny that in certain situations economic measures would not be effective unless reinforced by a police action? Events had indicated that the estimates of the African States were sounder than those of others. There were risks if their evaluations were not taken fully into account. The Council should be chary of supporting measures that only helped the racist régime to find time to harden its resistance and to make preparations to combat any measures that the Security Council might employ. His delegation doubted whether any economic measures that left Southern Rhodesia's colonialist neighbours and protectors untouched could succeed. South Africa could not be expected to co-operate with the Council's sanctions, whether voluntary or mandatory. His delegation also considered that mandatory sanctions that were confined to a few selected items would provide no tangible advance on the voluntary sanctions already in force, since their consequences could be evaded or absorbed in the economy. If it was considered that

the effects of mandatory sanctions of a comprehensive character would be ruinous not only for Rhodesia but also for many other countries as well, a substitute would be the use of force. The Council could not avoid both alternatives. He would suggest that the United Kingdom, which had stated that if its draft resolution was approved it would not agree to any settlement involving independence for Rhodesia before majority rule, should welcome the inclusion in the resolution of an unconditional declaration to this effect. Mr. Smith had already stated that selective mandatory sanctions would not cripple his régime any more than those already in force. The Council's action should be sufficiently decisive to enable the people of Rhodesia to exercise their right of self-determination.

705. The representative of the United Kingdom said that his delegation's draft resolution had been formulated after extensive consultations, and it wished to see the draft adopted by an overwhelming majority and with the least possible delay. The United Kingdom stood by its earlier statement that it would not oppose an amendment for the inclusion of oil, if it was couched in acceptable terms. Some of the African amendments raised new and difficult issues, and his delegation wished to enter into urgent consultations with other members of the Council on those amendments.

706. At the 1336th meeting, on 13 December the representative of India said that the only really effective solution to the problem of Southern Rhodesia was the use of force, which the United Kingdom was fully empowered to employ. India had not been fully satisfied with the results of the Commonwealth Conference. The United Kingdom had not then categorically given an assurance of a solution on the basis of one man, one vote, or through the adoption of comprehensive sanctions. India had always had misgivings about the negotiations between the British Government and the Salisbury régime. They had led to the proposals published in the United Kingdom Government White Paper, which had been made under the 1961 Constitution which had been rejected by the United Nations. The United Kingdom had made retrograde proposals. Sanctions on the basis of the United Kingdom draft resolution would have no impact on the Rhodesian economy. To be effective, sanctions had to cover all exports and imports. A comprehensive sanctions policy might well bring a confrontation with South Africa and Portugal. The attitude of the United Kingdom, however, encouraged them to defy the world community. But if those two Governments defied the Council resolution imposing mandatory sanctions, the consequences would be theirs, and the United Nations would deal with them. India supported the African amendments, and was prepared to participate on a priority basis in a relief programme to help Zambia diminish the effects of sanctions. The issues involved were war and peace in Africa.

707. The representative of Zambia said he stood by what he had said earlier in the debate concerning the United Kingdom's attitude to the Rhodesia question. The United Kingdom had given Mr. Smith the red carpet treatment, and the talks had led to the proposals contained in the United Kingdom Government's White Paper, which discriminated against the African people of Zimbabwe. Zambia would not participate in the British proposal, even if adopted by the Council, since it would kill Zambia bit by bit, and Zambia was not going to buy its own coffin. Even if the proposal included oil, the sanctions would not be effective without

the use of force. The proposal was only a smokescreen, designed to aid Ian Smith. Had Smith agreed to the sell-out at Gibraltar there would have been one. He understood the Prime Minister of South Africa had urged the Rhodesian régime to accept the proposals. The White Paper, he declared, had provided for white supremacy in Southern Rhodesia.

708. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the Foreign Minister of Zambia was mistaken when he said that the United Kingdom was bent on perpetuating white supremacy in southern Africa; the United Kingdom regarded that as an insult. The Foreign Minister was also mistaken when he suggested that the British Government was working in collusion with a minority. He asked the representative of Zambia to consider again the United Kingdom proposals. No government or people in this matter had a monopoly of morality, but he wished to pay tribute to the Government of Zambia for its attempts to create what a non-racial society should be. The Foreign Minister of Zambia knew full well that the United Kingdom was prepared to agree to an amendment regarding oil if the wording was acceptable. He hoped the representative of Zambia would return to his country realizing that other people were involved and concerned. The Council's task was not to engage in further accusations but urgently to seek the best solution.

709. At the 1337th meeting the representative of Algeria said that an explosion was imminent, and if the Security Council supported the United Kingdom policy, it would be jointly responsible. That policy had been followed despite Africa's warnings. Smith did not fear the measures the United Kingdom was proposing to the Council because he knew they were not enough to bend the will of the racist minority, who continued to defy world public opinion and to exploit the Zimbabwe people. The régime in Salisbury was growing more secure, and South Africa and Portugal openly supported it; yet London would not abandon its mistaken policy. The United Kingdom had indicated that it did not want to oppose those two Governments, even though they would, no doubt, render ineffective the measures it was asking the Council to adopt. The policy pursued by the United Kingdom had been rejected by the Organization of African Unity which had called on it to use force to quell the Rhodesian rebellion. If the Council approved the British draft, it would be contributing to an aggravation of the explosive situation which, in the near future, might well degenerate into a racial war throughout Africa. In Palestine, Algeria, Kenya and today in Portuguese African territories and Southern Rhodesia, the choice had been coexistence or a racial war. Nothing should be excluded *a priori* to solve the Rhodesian problem and the whole question of southern Africa. Sanctions, if decided on, should be effective, covering fuels and applying in respect of all States. If South Africa and Portugal defied the sanctions, it would not only strengthen Smith but weaken the United Nations.

710. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was increasingly dangerous, threatening the peace of Africa and beyond. British policy had allowed the racists to seize power in Salisbury and to consolidate their authority. The British had millions of pounds sterling invested in Southern Rhodesia. The other capitalist predators with millions invested there were the United States, South Africa, West Germany and Portugal. The basis of the imperialist interest was in the control

of Rhodesia's mining and other wealth by foreign monopolies. These interests were far more important to London, Washington, Pretoria and other capitals than the legitimate aspirations of the Zimbabwe people. The United Kingdom had returned to the Security Council to urge the adoption of further economic measures against the régime in Salisbury, but the African nations had warned that these, like the previous ones, would not be effective. Portugal and South Africa, which the United Kingdom and the United States were determined to continue to protect, would go on undermining Security Council resolutions against the Smith régime. The measures adopted by the United Kingdom had really never been intended to topple Smith but only to frighten his régime into agreeing to a deal. That was why Britain refused to use force, thus aiding and abetting the racists who, finding that they could act with impunity, had turned down the latest British proposals. However, those proposals were neither designed to quell the rebellion nor to bring about majority rule and independence for the territory.

711. United States imports from Rhodesia, he said, had increased since the adoption of sanctions against that territory. Washington had been subverting the economic boycott. West Germany was also assisting the rebel régime in the same way. The Soviet Union supported the just demands of the Africans that swift and effective action be taken by the Council towards normalization of the situation in Southern Rhodesia. The United Kingdom should be called upon to implement United Nations recommendations on the problem, and the inalienable rights of the Zimbabwe people and the legality of their struggle for independence must be confirmed. The Council should urge all States to give moral and material assistance to the people of Zimbabwe, and it should adopt a programme of comprehensive mandatory sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, including an embargo on oil. Corresponding measures must be taken against South Africa and Portugal, which maintained ties with the régime in Salisbury. The Soviet Union was satisfied, he said, that the African amendments were needed and it supported them.

712. The representative of the Netherlands said that his Government condemned the unilateral declaration of independence by the Smith régime and recognized the right and the obligation of the United Nations to supervise the manner in which the decolonization of Non-Self-Governing Territories took place. His Government also held the view that sovereignty over Southern Rhodesia still rested with the United Kingdom. It was the Government of that country which had brought the subject before the Security Council under Chapter VII. A clear warning that such a step could be contemplated was given in operative paragraph 1 of resolution 217 (1965). Since the situation in Southern Rhodesia threatened international peace and security, his delegation was prepared to support the proposals made by the United Kingdom Government for selective mandatory sanctions. The United Nations could help Britain, but it could not put itself in the place of the latter. The previous measures had not had the desired effect, and that was disappointing. But to jump to the conclusion that the United Kingdom intended to maintain the Smith régime and its policy of racial discrimination seemed to his delegation a most unwarranted and unfair judgement. If that had been the British Government's intention, nothing would have been easier for it than to let the Smith régime go ahead and then to recognize it. Charges

that a country which, for one year, had made political and economic sacrifices, had only tried to deceive the world could hardly be taken seriously. His delegation appreciated the sacrifices Zambia was making, but failed to understand why concern for that country's economy was laudable, while the same concern expressed by the United Kingdom for its economy became proof of cupidity and greed. Much of that type of criticism, he would add, came from States which themselves had not had to make any sacrifices.

713. It was essential to prevent the Rhodesian problem from escalating into a conflict enveloping the whole southern part of Africa. One did not solve a conflict of limited dimensions by turning it into a conflict of wider dimensions. The United Nations could not oblige the United Kingdom to use force; that Government needed no authorization to use force if it wished. If the United Kingdom draft resolution, including an oil embargo, were adopted, his Government took it that all States would loyally co-operate. He could accept some of the three-Power amendments, but could not vote for others because of the basic reasons he had outlined previously. Some might be acceptable if couched in different language. His delegation considered that consultations should take place among delegations on those amendments in an effort to achieve a generally acceptable resolution.

714. At the 1338th meeting, on 15 December, the representative of Uganda introduced the following revised amendments by Mali, Nigeria and Uganda (S/7630/Rev.1) to the United Kingdom draft resolution (S/7621):

(1) After the first preambular paragraph insert the following:

*"Deeply concerned that the Council's efforts so far and the measures taken by the administering Power have failed to bring the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia to an end,"*

(2) Before operative paragraph 1, insert the following two paragraphs and renumber paragraph 1 as paragraph 3:

*"1. Determines that the present situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security;*

*"2. Deplores:*

*"(a) The refusal of the United Kingdom to use every means including force to bring about the downfall of the Ian Smith régime in Southern Rhodesia;*

*"(b) The action of States, notably Portugal and South Africa, which have been rendering support to the rebel régime in contravention of Security Council resolution 217 of 20 November 1965;"*

(3) Amend sub-paragraph (a) of former operative paragraph 1 as follows:

In the third line, insert between "leather" and "originating" the following: ", coal and all manufactured goods".

(4) After sub-paragraph (d) of former operative paragraph 1, insert the following sub-paragraph:

*"(e) Participation in their territories or territories under their administration or in land or air transport facilities or by their nationals or vessels of their registration in the supply of oil or oil products to Southern Rhodesia".*



(5) After former operative paragraph 1 (now paragraph 3), insert the following five paragraphs:

"4. *Calls upon* the United Kingdom to withdraw all offers previously made to the illegal régime and to make a categorical declaration that it will only grant independence to Southern Rhodesia under majority rule;

"5. *Invites* the Government of the United Kingdom to prevent by all means the transport to Southern Rhodesia of oil or oil products;

"6. *Reminds* Member States that the failure or refusal by any of them to implement the present resolution shall constitute a violation of Article 25 of the United Nations Charter;

"7. *Reaffirms* the inalienable rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960; and recognizes the legitimacy of their struggle to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations;

"8. *Calls upon* all States not to render financial or other economic aid to the illegal racist régime in Southern Rhodesia;"

(6) After former operative paragraph 4 (now paragraph 11), insert the following two paragraphs:

"12. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution, the first report to be submitted not later than 1 March 1967;

"13. *Decides* to keep this item on its agenda for further action as appropriate in the light of developments".

715. In introducing these revisions, the representative of Uganda stressed the importance of speed. There were reports that attempts were being made in Rhodesia and in Britain to go back to the H.M.S. *Tiger* agreements.

716. The representative of the United Kingdom introduced the following addition (S/7621/Rev.1) to the United Kingdom draft resolution:

"1. (e) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the supply to Southern Rhodesia of all other aircraft and motor vehicles and of equipment and materials for the manufacture, assembly or maintenance of aircraft and motor vehicles in Southern Rhodesia: the shipment in vessels and aircraft of their registration of any such goods destined for Southern Rhodesia; and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the manufacture or assembly of aircraft or motor vehicles in Southern Rhodesia."

717. The representative of the United Kingdom said that the addition would be a useful supplement to other measures and should have an effect on the Rhodesian economy. Stocks of parts would soon run out in Southern Rhodesia, since the United Kingdom had ended all supplies. The Rhodesian transportation system as a whole would be hit.

718. The representative of France said his Government had condemned in the clearest terms the attempt made in Southern Rhodesia to establish a régime based on racial discrimination and the domination of an African majority by a white minority. France had severed all political, consular and trade relations with the régime. At the same time, his Government did not consider the constitutional links between the United Kingdom and Rhodesia affected by the so-called declaration of independence. The character of the situation in Southern Rhodesia had not changed since the illegal declaration of independence, nor had the views presented in the Council changed his Government's judgement of principle as to the limits of United Nations action on the matter. The judgement, he explained, did not in any way mean that France overlooked the primary interest taken by the African nations and the necessity they felt to inform the Council of their disappointment or the means they considered most appropriate to settle it. Refusal to recognize the régime of Ian Smith had been the first unanimous and continuing manifestation of solidarity. As for the measures of economic pressure which the African delegations wished to see strengthened, it should be remembered that they applied to a British territory. France was still prepared to do its utmost to assist the London Government, as it had done hitherto. Whatever might be thought of the effectiveness of the economic decisions already taken to put an end to the rebellion, it would continue to pursue that course, taking into consideration any measures which the United Kingdom might now regard as desirable. Whatever the decision of the Council, while not being able to associate itself with that decision, France would thus have responded to the appeal of the United Kingdom to the international community.

719. The representative of Bulgaria said the frequency with which the item came before the Council was sufficient proof that the situation in Southern Rhodesia was a real threat to peace and security and of the tragedy of the Zimbabwe people under the racist régime. The United Kingdom was trying to dump the problem into the lap of the United Nations and rid itself of its responsibility. Concrete and effective measures were required, not words. The United Kingdom had tried to reach a compromise agreement with the white minority régime to the detriment of the Africans. If the British economic proposals were to work, they had to include an oil embargo, and South Africa and Portugal would have to be coerced to apply them. The recent talks between the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and Ian Smith had been based, not on majority rule and independence in accordance with the United Nations recommendations, but on the six principles of the United Kingdom Government which aimed at legalizing the usurpation of power. Ian Smith was now banking on new concessions. It had been reported that the British Government had not ruled out the possibility of a last minute compromise with Ian Smith. The time had come for the United Kingdom to take all necessary steps, including force, to bring down the racist régime. The list of goods proposed for an embargo showed that it was not designed to end the supply of oil from South Africa. The United Kingdom policy seemed to be in accord with the desires of major financial interests. It seemed that force would have to be used to solve the problem, if necessary under the auspices of the United Nations. His delegation would support the African amendments as a first stage to bring down the régime.

720. The representative of China said the United Kingdom was justified in refusing to recognize the Smith régime and in bringing the matter to the United Nations. The responsibility of the United Nations was not so much to bring down the rebel government but to protect the welfare of the indigenous people of the territory. The economic measures already taken had proved ineffective, as had been foreseen by the African States. That the African States should press for military action against the Smith régime was understandable, for the Council had already determined that the situation would become a threat to peace. It was the prerogative of the United Kingdom, as the Administering Authority, to use force if it wished. His delegation could understand Britain's reluctance to use force, but it had been unwise on its part to rule it out entirely. The Security Council could not impose the use of force against the will of the United Kingdom. The draft resolution seemed too limited in scope to achieve the desired objective. He hoped the United Kingdom delegation would accept the essential features of the amendments before the Council, particularly as regards oil.

721. At the 1340th meeting, on 16 December, the representative of Jordan said that the continued existence of a rebel régime in Southern Rhodesia posed a challenge not only to the Security Council but to the whole family of nations. It was the United Kingdom's primary responsibility to suppress the rebellion. However, inasmuch as the situation threatened international peace and security his Government would endorse any action sanctioned by the Council to end the menace and to protect the legitimate interests of the Rhodesians as expressed by the majority of the inhabitants. Jordan had supported measures to that end in the past because they were a step in the right direction. Progress, however, had been less than expected. His delegation had wanted the United Kingdom to treat rebels as rebels from the outset. By not having been treated as such, the rebels had consolidated themselves. He endorsed the principle of mandatory selective sanctions on the strict understanding that the measures should lead to a complete suppression of the rebellion. The Council should give its consideration to the proposed additions to the import and export lists submitted by the African members, which Jordan supported *in toto*. Both South Africa and Portugal must fulfil their obligations and carry out Security Council recommendations on the problem. He hoped the United Kingdom would use all its influence to ensure respect for Article 25 of the Charter, otherwise the only alternative was the use of force, which Jordan had advocated all along.

722. The President, speaking as the representative of Uruguay, said that time had strengthened the Smith régime, and the Council must decide on drastic measures to eradicate the evil once and for all. In order to avoid any conflict between domestic and international law, the term "rebellion" in the second preambular paragraph should be replaced by the term "*de facto* illegal minority racist Government in Southern Rhodesia". The text needed further revision to make clear the competence of the United Nations to apply economic and financial sanctions. It was not enough to refer to Article 39 of the Charter. The existence of a threat to the peace, or act of aggression should be clearly stated. A request by the Council to States to use force would not be binding on them, as agreements for United Nations

armed forces had not been arrived at. Uruguay agreed by and large with the African amendments, but would abstain on paragraph 5 and would like to see special treatment for humanitarian supplies. The United Kingdom should not agree to independence for Southern Rhodesia before majority rule was achieved in the territory. The means to achieving a triumph for the international community in Southern Rhodesia must be the rule of law and the purpose the welfare of all men.

723. The representative of the United Kingdom said that, after the useful consultations that had taken place, many of the three-Power amendments were acceptable to his delegation, and the Council should proceed to a conclusion without further delay. His Government supported amendment 4, regarding the inclusion of oil in the draft resolution. He would also support amendments 1 and 6. He would also support the new operative paragraph 6 covered under amendment 5. The United Kingdom supported the proposed new operative paragraph 8 on the understanding that it did not inhibit the continued payment by the United Kingdom of pensions, travel to Rhodesia for approved purposes, payments on humanitarian grounds and the continuation of the work of certain missions, medical and charitable organizations. The United Kingdom would not support the proposed operative paragraph 2 (a) regarding the use of force nor could it accept the proposed sub-paragraph 2 (b), since accusations were not helpful at that stage. He would support that part of amendment 2 which determined that the situation constituted a threat to international peace and security. Amendment 3, he said, was of particular concern to his Government, since it could result in greater damage to the economy of Zambia than to the Rhodesian régime. It was for Zambia to decide, but the serious loss or damage that would arise from the adoption of the amendment could not fall on the British Government. It would be a responsibility for the United Nations as a whole. The amendment that would call on the United Kingdom to withdraw all previous offers and make a categorical declaration regarding independence under majority rule was entirely out of place, since it impinged on matters within the sovereignty of the British Parliament. It could not be accepted as part of the resolution. His Government could not accept the amendment calling on it to prevent oil from reaching Rhodesia. It implied a responsibility for enforcement by the United Kingdom alone, using force if necessary. The amendment regarding General Assembly resolution 1514 was not appropriate in a resolution in fulfilment of an undertaking to seek mandatory sanctions. A unanimous vote, he urged, would be the most effective action. His delegation was ready to proceed to the vote, and asked that the amendments be put to the vote amendment by amendment and not paragraph by paragraph.

724. The representative of Uganda said Zambia itself had insisted that both coal and manufactured goods be included in the resolution. What business, then, did the United Kingdom have to speak about the adverse effect that might have on Zambia's economy? The United Kingdom had refused to include a declaration that it would not grant independence except under majority rule, saving that that would impinge on the sovereignty of the British Parliament. But there had been time to consider the matter. Moreover, the United Kingdom had followed such a policy in other cases. Why should it not be able to make such a declaration now? He feared it wanted to leave the door open for

further concessions to Ian Smith. He then asked that the revised amendments be changed to read "Replace the second preambular paragraph with the following" and that the reference to "sub-paragraph (d)" in the fourth paragraph of the amendments be changed to "sub-paragraph (e)", in view of the addition of a sub-paragraph to the United Kingdom draft resolution and the new sub-paragraph proposed in the amendments be termed "sub-paragraph (f)".

725. The representative of Argentina said that the amendments were on the whole a positive contribution. He could not, however, support the call for the use of force by the United Kingdom nor could he support the request that the United Kingdom stop oil from entering Southern Rhodesia, because it implied force. He would not support the amendment calling on the United Kingdom to withdraw all other offers because he felt that it was unrealistic to interfere with the constitutional system of the United Kingdom. He regretted that the sponsors had not used the words of the United Kingdom Foreign Secretary in the Council which were a solemn undertaking not to make proposals to Parliament regarding independence not based on majority rule.

**Decisions:** At the 1340th meeting, on 16 December 1966, a vote was taken on the United Kingdom draft resolution (S/7621/Rev.1) and the proposed amendments to it:

*The first amendment, to replace the second preambular paragraph in the United Kingdom draft, was adopted by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (France).*

*The amendment to insert a new operative paragraph 1 was adopted by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (France).*

*The amendment to insert a new sub-paragraph 2 (a) received 6 votes in favour (Bulgaria, Jordan, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda, USSR), none against and 9 abstentions, and was not adopted having failed to obtain the necessary majority.*

*The amendment to insert a new sub-paragraph 2 (b) received 7 votes in favour (Argentina, Bulgaria, Jordan, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda, USSR), none against, and 8 abstentions, and was not adopted, having failed to obtain the necessary majority.*

*The third amendment, to include "coal and all manufactured goods" in former paragraph 1, received 8 votes in favour (Argentina, Bulgaria, Jordan, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda, Uruguay, USSR), none against and 7 abstentions, and was not adopted, having failed to obtain the necessary majority.*

*The fourth amendment, to include a new sub-paragraph (f) relating to oil and oil products was adopted by 14 votes to 2, with 1 abstention (France).*

*The amendment to include a new operative paragraph 4, received 7 votes in favour (Bulgaria, China, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda, Uruguay, USSR), none against and 8 abstentions, and was not adopted, having failed to obtain the necessary majority.*

*The amendment to include a new paragraph 5 received 7 votes in favour (Bulgaria, China, Jordan, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda, USSR), none against and 8 abstentions, and was not adopted, having failed to obtain the necessary majority.*

*The amendment to include a new paragraph 6 was adopted by 14 votes in favour to none against, with 1 abstention (France).*

*The amendment to include a new paragraph 7 was adopted by 12 votes to none, with 3 abstentions (France, United Kingdom, United States).*

*The amendment to include a new paragraph 8 was adopted by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (France).*

*The amendment to include a new operative paragraph 12 was adopted by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (France).*

*The amendment to include a new operative paragraph 13 was adopted by 14 votes to none, with 1 abstention (France).*

*The United Kingdom draft resolution (S/7621/Rev.1), as amended, was adopted by 11 votes to none, with 4 abstentions (Bulgaria, France, Mali, USSR) (resolution 232/1966). The text follows:*

*"The Security Council,*

*"Reaffirming its resolutions 216 (1965) of 12 November 1965, 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965 and 221 (1966) of 9 April 1966, and in particular its appeal to all States to do their utmost to break off economic relations with Southern Rhodesia.*

*"Deeply concerned that the Council's efforts so far and the measures taken by the administering Power have failed to bring the rebellion in Southern Rhodesia to an end,*

*"Reaffirming that to the extent not superseded in the present resolution, the measures provided for in resolution 217 (1965) of 20 November 1965, as well as those initiated by Member States in implementation of that resolution, shall continue in effect,*

*"Acting in accordance with Articles 39 and 41 of the United Nations Charter,*

*"1. Determines that the present situation in Southern Rhodesia constitutes a threat to international peace and security;*

*"2. Decides that all States Members of the United Nations shall prevent:*

*"(a) The import into their territories of asbestos, iron ore, chrome, pig-iron, sugar, tobacco, copper, meat and meat products and hides, skins and leather originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution;*

*"(b) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the export of these commodities from Southern Rhodesia and any dealings by their nationals or in their territories in any of these commodities originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution, including in particular any transfer of funds to Southern Rhodesia for the purposes of such activities or dealings;*

*"(c) Shipment in vessels or aircraft of their registration of any of these commodities originating in Southern Rhodesia and exported therefrom after the date of the present resolution;*

*"(d) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the sale or shipment to Southern Rhodesia of arms, ammunition of all types, military aircraft, military vehicles, and equipment and materials for the manufacture and maintenance of arms and ammunition in Southern Rhodesia;*

"(e) Any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the supply to Southern Rhodesia of all other aircraft and motor vehicles and equipment and materials for the manufacture, assembly, or maintenance of aircraft and motor vehicles in Southern Rhodesia; the shipment in vessels and aircraft of their registration of any such goods destined for Southern Rhodesia, and any activities by their nationals or in their territories which promote or are calculated to promote the manufacture or assembly of aircraft or motor vehicles in Southern Rhodesia;

"(f) Participation in their territories or territories under their administration or in land or air transport facilities or by their nationals or vessels of their registration in the supply of oil or oil products to Southern Rhodesia;

"notwithstanding any contracts entered into or licences granted before the date of the present resolution;

"3. *Reminds* Member States that the failure or refusal by any of them to implement the present resolution shall constitute a violation of Article 25 of the United Nations Charter;

"4. *Reaffirms* the inalienable rights of the people of Southern Rhodesia to freedom and independence in accordance with the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, and recognizes the legitimacy of their struggle to secure the enjoyment of their rights as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations;

"5. *Calls upon* all States not to render financial or other economic aid to the illegal racist régime in Southern Rhodesia;

"6. *Calls upon* all States Members of the United Nations to carry out this decision of the Security Council in accordance with Article 25 of the United Nations Charter;

"7. *Urges*, having regard to the principles stated in Article 2 of the United Nations Charter, States not Members of the United Nations to act in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of the present resolution;

"8. *Calls upon* States Members of the United Nations or members of the specialized agencies to report to the Secretary-General the measures each has taken in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 2 of the present resolution;

"9. *Requests* the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the progress of the implementation of the present resolution, the first report to be submitted not later than 1 March 1967;

"10. *Decides* to keep this item on its agenda for further action as appropriate in the light of developments."

726. The representative of Nigeria said the Africans had been sadly disappointed by the outcome of the vote. The Security Council in its wisdom had decided that the half-measures policy sponsored by the United Kingdom should be continued. What had been shown was the futility of relying on the Security Council for

a solution of the outstanding problems of Africa. It was regrettable that the amendment deploring the refusal of the United Kingdom to use force which remained essential to bring about the downfall of the racist régime had not been accepted by the Council. It was sad for the United Nations that South Africa and Portugal had been supported in a resolution. It must confound public opinion that the amendment about "coal and all manufactured goods" had been rejected out of plausible considerations for the interests of Zambia when, as had been pointed out by the representative of Uganda, the elected representatives of Zambia had already made it clear to the Council that they fully supported the provision. Rejection by the United Kingdom of the amendment calling on it to declare that there would be no independence for Southern Rhodesia except under majority rule, had confirmed the opinion strongly held in Africa that the United Kingdom did not mean what it said. Regarding the rejection of the amendment to prevent oil from reaching Southern Rhodesia, he questioned the use of passing a law without a sanction. Africa had hoped that a decision would be taken by the Council marking the beginning of the end of racism in Africa and laying the foundations of governments of the people, for the people, by the true representatives of all the peoples in southern Africa. Uganda and Nigeria had voted for the resolution because they realized that in the United Kingdom there were influential circles who were averse to the adoption of any sanctions against Southern Rhodesia, and in favour of continued negotiations between Mr. Wilson and Mr. Smith for a settlement unacceptable to Africans. Those circles would have been delighted if no resolution had been adopted, and Mr. Wilson would have said that he had no alternative but to continue talking with Smith. The hand of the racist régime would have been strengthened. Mr. Wilson should also proceed now to fulfil his promise to withdraw all offers previously made to the illegal régime and make a categorical declaration that the United Kingdom would only grant independence to Southern Rhodesia under majority rule. The Security Council had taken a decision of historic significance under Chapter 7 of the Charter. Consequently it should be clearly borne in mind that the remedies for a breach of an enforceable decision taken under Chapter 7 were contained only in that Chapter of the Charter.

727. As soon as the fears of the African delegations about the futility of the action just taken were confirmed, they would come again before the Security Council.

728. The representative of Jordan said his delegation had voted for the amended draft resolution considering that, although it was not adequate, it might be helpful. Jordan had voted for all the amendments except one, on which it had abstained because the United Kingdom had already made a commitment that it would not give Southern Rhodesia independence before majority rule. It was therefore premature to include such a provision now.

729. The representative of Mali said the Rhodesian problem was a domestic, colonial and purely British affair. The rejection of the African amendments had emptied the resolution of its effective elements. His delegation was surprised that whereas in various United Nations committees actions by Portugal and South Africa had been condemned, in the Security



Council the same thing had not applied. Britain had hurried to the Security Council to prevent a few tankers from supplying oil to Rhodesia, but had refused to accept an amendment to prevent such deliveries in future. The adoption once again of the United Kingdom solution had confirmed his view that that was a domestic problem. The Council never seemed to go beyond the United Kingdom's prescriptions. He had abstained for that reason.

730. The representative of Bulgaria said his delegation had voted for all the African amendments considering that they improved the United Kingdom draft, but inasmuch as the most important of those amendments had been rejected through the system of organized abstentions, his Government had not supported the resolution as amended. The Smith régime would now expect further concessions, and the United Kingdom had shown that it would continue negotiations. The United Kingdom, in order to defend its own interests, had not supported the inclusion of coal and manufactured goods in the resolution. The question of Southern Rhodesia would come back to the Council, which would adopt effective measures to bring independence to the people of Zimbabwe.

731. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said the attitude of his delegation on the Rhodesian problem remained the same, and it had energetically supported all the African amendments. The Soviet Union had abstained on the United Kingdom draft because it was inadequate and far short of the mark, after the rejection of the amendments. The indirect veto of the Western Powers had once again been applied in this case to subvert what they did not like. Responsibility for what happened in Southern Rhodesia rested squarely with the London governing circles, which continued to support the racist régime in Salisbury.

732. The representative of the United Kingdom was sure no Council member would like to be dogmatic on this matter, the difficulties of which were desperately serious. All courses were fraught with danger. The Council's unprecedented action was right and necessary action at the time. It was a major step towards a just solution of the problem.

### C. Report of the Secretary-General

733. On 21 February 1967, the Secretary-General submitted a report (S/7781 and Add.1) to the Council on implementation of resolution 232 (1966). In response to requests made in notes of 17 December 1966 and 13 January 1967, addressed to States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies, he had received up to 21 February 1967 replies from seventy-two States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies. The substantive parts of those replies were reproduced in annex 2 of the report.

734. It would be seen, the report stated, that a great majority of the States which had replied had reported that they had taken measures which they considered necessary in order to comply with the provisions of the Security Council resolution. Several States had reported that they had had no trade or other relations with Southern Rhodesia and would refrain from such relations. Most of the other States

had reported the measures they had taken and indicated that they had initiated or were initiating legislative action necessary to ensure full compliance with the resolution.

735. One State Member of the United Nations, Malawi, had reported that it had taken various measures called for under the Security Council resolution but was unable because of certain special problems, to prohibit altogether the import of sugar, meat and meat products from Southern Rhodesia at the present time.

736. One State member of the specialized agencies, Switzerland, had reported that while it could not, for reasons of principle as a neutral State, submit to the mandatory sanctions of the United Nations, it had decided to strengthen the restrictions on imports from Southern Rhodesia, and to continue certain other measures it had already taken, so that Southern Rhodesian trade was given no opportunity to avoid the United Nations sanctions policy through Swiss territory.

737. A substantial number of States had not yet reported in pursuance of operative paragraph 8 of Security Council resolution 232 (1966) calling upon States Members of the United Nations or of the specialized agencies to report to the Secretary-General the measures each had taken in accordance with the provisions of operative paragraph 2 of the resolution. Those included certain States which had significant trade with Southern Rhodesia.

738. While several States had undertaken to provide the trade statistics requested in his note of 13 January 1967, full information on the effect of implementation of Security Council resolution 232 on the trade of Southern Rhodesia was not at present available and might not be available for some time. It was his intention to utilize the data hitherto provided by States Members of the United Nations and of the specialized agencies as a basis for estimating the effect of the measures. The document to that effect would be submitted to the Council later.

739. As the Secretary-General had reported to the Security Council in his note of 6 February 1967, reproduced as document S/7720, the Foreign Minister and the Finance Minister of Zambia had called on him and had explained the serious difficulties which had arisen for Zambia as a result of its compliance with the resolution. The difficulties related in particular to transportation, communications, storage of fuel and alternative supplies for some commodities. They had stated that Zambia would welcome a technical mission to study the whole problem on the spot with the various ministries concerned.

740. In response to that request, which had been discussed in detail by the Finance Minister of Zambia with the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and his staff and with the Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Africa, the Administrator of the UNDP, with the concurrence of the Secretary-General, had sent out a group of technical consultants to Zambia.

741. The Secretary-General drew the particular attention of the Council to the note dated 15 February 1967 from the Permanent Representative of Malawi in which it was stated that the Government of Malawi felt obliged to report to the Security Council that, by

reason of certain special economic problems with which Malawi was confronted in view of its geographical situation, certain very limited quantities of sugar, meat and meat products might have to continue to be obtained for a limited period of time from Southern Rhodesia. The Government of Malawi anticipated that imports of sugar would cease by April 1967: import licences in respect of meat and meat products, especially of certain grades of beef, would be restricted to the absolute minimum necessary.

742. The Government of Malawi had stated that while it had not been possible at the present time to prohibit altogether the import from Southern Rhodesia of sugar, meat and meat products, without immediately available alternative sources of supply, it was ready to enter into consultations in terms of Article 50 of the Charter if that was considered appropriate.

743. The Minister for Foreign Affairs of Portugal in his communication dated 3 February 1967, had not reported any measures taken or contemplated by his Government in compliance with the resolution. He had stated that the reply as regards such measures would have to be considered in the light of answers to certain questions or "points of doubt" he set forth in the communication.

744. In a further communication on the same day, he had stated that as a result of the carrying out of a number of measures envisaged in the Security Council resolutions 221 (1966) of 9 April and 232 (1966) of 16 December 1966, the economy of "the Portuguese province of Mozambique" was suffering severe financial and economic losses. He had added that "in terms of, and for the purposes of Article 50 of the Charter", the Portuguese Government wished that consultations should be initiated between the Security Council and the Portuguese Government in order that the modalities for paying compensation to "the province of Mozambique" might be agreed upon. He had requested that the matter be placed before the Security Council for its consideration.

745. On 9 March 1967, in a second addendum to his report of 21 February 1967 (S/7781), the Secretary-General informed the Council of the additional communications he had received in reply to his notes of 17 November 1966 and 13 January 1967.

746. The Secretary-General drew the particular attention of the Council to the note dated 27 February 1967 (S/7813) from the Permanent Representative of Botswana transmitting a memorandum by the Government of Botswana which expressed the opinion of that Government that if it complied with resolution 232 (1966) to a greater extent than it had been doing, as indicated in the memorandum, and if the illegal régime retaliated by (a) banning all exports from Southern Rhodesia to Botswana; (b) prohibiting the export of commodities from Botswana to or through Southern Rhodesia; and (c) preventing the supply of petrol, oil and lubricants to Botswana from Lourenço Marques through Southern Rhodesia, harmful economic consequences to Botswana would follow due to the fact that the people of Botswana would be required to endure a significant rise in the cost of living. If in addition the illegal régime took action which seriously curtailed the operation of the railway within Botswana, then its Government would be faced with an economic threat of the utmost gravity. In those circumstances, the memorandum stated, the Botswana Government felt that the application by it of any additional sanctions against Southern Rhodesia under resolution 232 (1966) would pose, in the terms of Article 50 of the Charter, special economic problems for Botswana.

747. In addition to the above-mentioned replies, the Secretary-General also drew attention to a letter dated 27 February 1967 from the Permanent Representative of Bulgaria (S/7794) transmitting a "statement of the Government of the German Democratic Republic on the implementation of resolution 232 (1966) adopted by the Security Council on 16 December 1966, concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia". The statement reaffirmed the German Democratic Republic's determination to fulfil without reservation the demands set forth in the resolution of the Security Council and declared that all commercial relations with Southern Rhodesia had been broken off.

748. Between 9 March 1967 and the end of the reporting period thirty-six additional replies to the Secretary-General's notes of 17 November 1966 and 13 January 1967 were received. The substantive parts of these replies were reproduced in a further addendum to the Secretary-General's report (S/7781/Add.3).

## Chapter 7

### LETTER DATED 26 DECEMBER 1963 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF CYPRUS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

#### A. Communications and reports received between 16 July and 31 December 1966

749. In a report of 20 July 1966 (S/7418) the Secretary-General gave an account of developments in the Trypimeni-Chatos-Knodhara area. He reported that on 24 April 1966 the Cyprus Government had begun improving a track between the Greek-Cypriot villages of Trypimeni and Vitsadha. The Turkish Cypriots, contending that the work endangered their security, had thereupon deployed armed men in positions south of Trypimeni. To prevent an armed confrontation, the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus had deployed its own troops in the area and had begun

urgent negotiations with the Government and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership in order to prevent tension from rising out of control. Those negotiations had not, however, succeeded in resolving the problem, and the situation thus developing threatened to lead to a dangerous increase in tension in the area. The Secretary-General appealed to all concerned to accept and implement the Force Commander's suggestions for defortification in the area.

750. In a letter dated 29 July (S/7439) the representative of Turkey called attention to what he termed the "inhuman and degrading searches" at Greek-Cypriot checkpoints, particularly at the Famagusta

Gate checkpoint in Nicosia. He also complained about certain military exercises by the Cyprus armed forces near Famagusta and incidents which had taken place in the Turkish-Cypriot villages of Meriç and Pelitli (Melousha), charging that the Cyprus Government was deliberately creating tensions between the two communities.

751. In a letter dated 12 August (S/7457) the representative of Cyprus rejected the charges contained in the previous Turkish letter (S/7439) and said that the representative of Turkey had sought by this letter to create a pretext for threats of unilateral aggressive action by Turkey.

752. In a letter dated 17 August (S/7465) the representative of Turkey maintained his contention that the situation in the island showed signs of rapid deterioration towards an armed confrontation between the Cyprus communities and said that his Government had wished to prevent such a development by calling the attention of the Council to the latest events.

753. In a letter dated 20 August (S/7467) the representative of Cyprus regretted the fact that hardships were involved in searches of the Turkish Cypriots but recalled that searches were the direct consequence of the maintenance of the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves operating against the security of the Republic. Turkish Cypriots were free—except for the temporary inconvenience of being searched—to enter and leave the Greek-Cypriot sectors. The Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, were not free to enter the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves without running the risk of being killed or tortured.

754. In a letter dated 24 August (S/7475) the representative of Cyprus denied the contention of the representative of Turkey (S/7465) that Greek Cypriots had deliberately sought to increase tensions, charging that it was the Turkish-Cypriot side which had shown persistent recalcitrance and opposition to UNFICYP's proposals for the solution of specific problems.

755. In letters dated 19 September (S/7499) and 6 October (S/7531) the representative of Cyprus called the Council's attention to what he termed a series of acts of sabotage against the State of Cyprus. He said that the Turkish-Cypriot rebels had set fire to forests adjacent to Turkish-Cypriot villages in different parts of the country.

756. In letters dated 23 September (S/7505) and 10 October (S/7538) the representative of Turkey, on behalf of the Turkish Cypriots, denied responsibility for the forest fires in Cyprus and stated that the fires had been started by the Greek Cypriots themselves in order to put the blame on the Turkish-Cypriot community.

757. In a report on the financial situation in respect of the United Nations Operation in Cyprus dated 4 October 1966 (S/7532), the Secretary-General informed the Council that, despite the generous contributions he had lately received from Governments for the defrayment of the costs of the Force, there was still a deficit of approximately \$6.1 million between the estimated costs and financial resources available to cover the expense of the Force until 26 December 1966. He urgently appealed for further voluntary contributions.

758. In his report of 8 December (S/7611 and Corr.1) covering the period from 11 June to 5 Decem-

ber 1966, the Secretary-General observed that the familiar pattern of uneasy truce had continued and the situation remained precarious.

759. The report dealt with a number of incidents, most of them attributable to the construction of fortified positions that were considered provocative by one side or the other, resulting occasionally in exchanges of fire. Only the rapid deployment of the Force, coupled with negotiations at all levels, had prevented those incidents from escalating into large-scale fighting.

760. Two important problems, however, had yielded to a solution. Land records, heretofore kept in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia, had been made available to the Government and to the Greek-Cypriot community, and facilities had been provided by the Force for the registration of transactions involving Turkish Cypriots. Arrangements had also been negotiated by the Force Commander to restore postal services in the Turkish quarter of Nicosia and in Lefka which had been deprived of such services since December 1963.

761. Apart from those achievements, the prevailing attitude towards normalization continued to be one of pervasive caution and of apprehension lest any concession might affect disadvantageously the terms of the ultimate settlement.

762. The dialogue concerning Cyprus between Greece and Turkey had continued, as the Secretary-General had been advised by the delegations concerned, but no information had been made available to him on the substance of the talks. For that reason he was not in a position to give the Council any indication as to whether there had been any progress in the secret negotiations. In order not to imperil the successful outcome of the talks, the Secretary-General was of the opinion that all other efforts at the local level should be suspended, including the one pursued by his Special Representative in Cyprus. In the interest of an ultimate solution, however, United Nations efforts should not be suspended for too long.

763. In an addendum to his report (S/7611 and Add.1), the Secretary-General also informed members of the Security Council that on 10 December his Special Representative and the Force Commander had been advised by President Makarios that the new arms which had been imported to Cyprus from Czechoslovakia for the use of the Cyprus Police had been stored and would not be issued for another two months. On 13 December, President Makarios had agreed to a suggestion that the unopened crates should be inspected by the Force Commander.

764. On various other occasions during this period the representative of Turkey transmitted letters from the Vice-President of Cyprus concerning the implementation of the Ktima cease-fire agreement of 11 March 1964 (S/7473) and the blockading of Turkish Cypriot villages (S/7507), the "Public Service Commission 'Temporary Provisions' Law, 1965" passed by the House of Representatives (S/7527) and the Turkish-Cypriot community's views in connexion with the situation in the island of the forthcoming Security Council meeting on Cyprus (S/7631).

## **B. Consideration at the 1338th meeting (15 December 1966)**

765. The letter dated 26 December 1963 (S/5488) from the representative of Cyprus and the report of the

Secretary-General (S/7611 and Corr.1 and Add.1) were included in the agenda of the 1338th meeting of the Council, on 15 December 1966. The representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece again participated in the discussion, pursuant to their requests (S/7633, S/7634, S/7636).

766. The representative of Argentina introduced the following draft resolution (S/7635), co-sponsored by Argentina, Japan, Jordan, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda and Uruguay:

*"The Security Council,*

*"Noting from the report of the Secretary-General of 8 December 1966 (S/7611 and Add.1) that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,*

*"Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 26 December 1966,*

*"1. Reaffirms its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August and 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, 220 (1966) of 16 March and 222 (1966) of 16 June 1966, and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting on 11 August 1964;*

*"2. Urges the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint, and to continue determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council;*

*"3. Extends once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964) for a further period of six months ending 26 June 1967, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force."*

767. The representative of Japan expressed his earnest hope that continued, determined and co-operative efforts by all the parties concerned during the six months would bring the Security Council closer to a peaceful solution to the problems of Cyprus.

**Decision:** *At the 1338th meeting, on 15 December 1966, the draft resolution (S/7635) was adopted unanimously (resolution 231 (1966)) by the Security Council.*

768. After the vote, the representative of the United Kingdom, on behalf of his Government, pledged \$1 million for each three-month period of the new mandate, and appealed to others to join with the United Kingdom in contributing to the costs of the Force.

769. The representative of the United States said that he was disturbed at the increase in the number of incidents the Secretary-General had reported on, and at the contents of the Secretary General's additional report. The United States believed that the importation of additional arms in violation of the spirit of the Council's resolution of 4 March 1964 would not contribute to greater security and peace in the island.

Welcoming the fact that the Force could inspect those arms, he hoped that the arms could be put under continuing custody. He announced that the United States would contribute \$4 million towards the budget of the Force for the period from 27 December 1966 to 26 June 1967 depending on contributions of other Governments and confirmation of UNFICYP's cost estimates.

770. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that the position of his Government on the Cyprus question remained unchanged. The Soviet Union continued to favour the settling of the Cyprus question by peaceful means in the interest of the Cypriots themselves frustrating any attempts to settle it behind the backs of the people of Cyprus in the interests of NATO, in order to ensure the genuine independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. All foreign troops must be withdrawn from the territory of the Republic and all foreign bases liquidated. The Soviet Union had no objection to the resolution submitted by the seven Powers (S/7635), on the understanding that the functions of the Force would not change and its financing would remain on a voluntary basis.

771. The representative of Greece said that the Greek-Turkish talks which had started in July 1966 at Brussels covered not only the question of Cyprus but also problems affecting the relations of Greece with Turkey. The talks were being conducted by the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, and the Government of Greece was of course keeping the President and the Foreign Minister of Cyprus informed about the progress of the dialogue. While not wishing to convey any over-optimism about the prospects of reaching a settlement in the immediate future, he wished to stress that both sides seemed determined to do their best to reach an early solution of the problem.

772. The representative of Nigeria, speaking on behalf of Mali and Uganda as well as his own delegation, said it was important that complete normalcy should be restored in Cyprus and that the peace-keeping operation should be terminated satisfactorily at the end of the new mandate.

773. In connexion with the arms shipment to Cyprus, the representative of Cyprus observed that it was the responsibility of the Government of Cyprus to maintain law and order in the island, as had been clearly stated in operative paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 186 of 4 March 1964, and it therefore had the right to import arms for the use of the Cyprus Police. Claims to the contrary were a baseless effort to interfere in the internal affairs of Cyprus.

774. The representative of Turkey said that the influx of arms for the use of the Cyprus Police was intended for the purpose of renewed pressure against the Turkish Cypriots and was a flagrant violation of the 4 March 1964 resolution. The action of the Government of Cyprus could not be defended on the basis of the prerogatives of a sovereign government, because the Cyprus Government, having freely consented to the dispatch of a United Nations Peace-keeping Force to Cyprus, had voluntarily limited its sovereignty to the extent of no longer being free to exercise so-called "acts of Government" which were incompatible with the mandate of that Force.

775. The representative of Cyprus said that the Security Council resolution of 4 March 1964 had clearly



distinguished between the Cyprus Government and the two communities and had never curtailed that Government in its right to govern the island.

776. The President of the Security Council, speaking as the representative of Uruguay, said he believed that the situation in Cyprus could not be resolved by the presence of foreign forces even if they flew the colours of the United Nations. What was necessary was for the people of Cyprus to be allowed to exercise the right of self-determination, which was the very essence of sovereignty.

777. In a note of 20 December 1966 (S/7643) the Secretary-General informed members of the Council that, as of 5 January 1967, Mr. Carlos A. Bernardes, his Special Representative in Cyprus, had resigned from his post, and the Secretary-General had accepted his resignation with regret. The Secretary-General took the opportunity to pay tribute to the great service which Mr. Bernardes had rendered in his post. The Secretary-General had asked Mr. Pier P. Spinelli, Director-General of the United Nations Office in Geneva, to act temporarily as Special Representative in Cyprus after the departure of Mr. Bernardes.

### **C. Communications and reports received between 1 January and 15 July 1967**

778. In a letter dated 11 January 1967 (S/7674), the representative of Cyprus drew the Council's attention to a statement made by the Turkish Foreign Minister before the Turkish National Assembly on 6 January 1967. According to the letter, the Turkish Foreign Minister had stated that Turkey would use force as a way of solving the problem of Cyprus if a political solution was not to Turkey's liking. The representative of Cyprus protested against the use by Turkey of threats of force and aggression.

779. In a letter dated 14 January (S/7687), the representative of Turkey said that the statement by the Turkish Foreign Minister had been misquoted in the letter from the representative of Cyprus (S/7674). The statement, if read in its full context, was an appeal to reason.

780. In a letter dated 24 January (S/7697) the representative of Cyprus pointed out other passages in the Turkish Foreign Minister's statement which had not been referred to by the representative of Turkey in his letter (S/7687).

781. On 26 January the Secretary-General announced the appointment of Mr. Bibiano F. Osorio-Tafall as his Special Representative in Cyprus, to replace acting Special Representative Mr. P. P. Spinelli as of 20 February 1966.

782. During this period the representative of Turkey transmitted letters from the Vice-President of Cyprus concerning the situation in the village of Kophinou (S/7713) and the supply of cement for the Kanlikeuy Dam (S/7777). The representative of Cyprus also sent a letter to the Secretary-General concerning his Government's action to prevent the collapse of the Dam (S/7789).

783. On 8 May 1967, the Secretary-General appealed to Governments (S/7878) for further voluntary contributions to provide the necessary financial support for the United Nations Peace-keeping Operation in Cyprus. He stated that new pledges totalling approxi-

mately \$6.6 million must be received if the Organization was to cover in full the costs involved in maintaining the Force until 26 June 1967.

784. On 13 June 1967, the Secretary-General submitted to the Council his tenth report on the United Nations Peace-keeping Operation in Cyprus (S/7969), covering the period from 6 December 1966 to 12 June 1967. During that time the truce had been generally observed, though the situation in Larnaca District had caused considerable concern.

785. Very little progress, the Secretary-General continued, had been made by the Force during the period under review in achieving a return to normality, let alone in overcoming the stalemate over broader issues, but the Force had had no small measure of success in preventing a recurrence of fighting and helping to maintain law and order. Certainly the day-to-day situation in the island had improved since 1964. However, both sides seemed grimly determined to stick to their entrenched positions and set attitudes. As a result, hardships in daily life continued to be suffered by the Turkish-Cypriot population, while Greek Cypriots were denied access to areas controlled by the Turkish Cypriots and the authority of the Government was not allowed to be exercised in those areas.

786. Despite the continued uneasy quiet, frequent breaches of the cease-fire, often deliberate, bomb explosions and other terrorist acts and the construction of new and reinforcement of old fortified positions from time to time disrupted the quiet and caused concern in a number of areas.

787. The deadlock over the final settlement of the Cyprus question remained as described in the Secretary-General's previous report (S/7611) of 8 December 1966. The Secretary-General most earnestly urged all parties directly concerned to make every effort to overcome the deadlock. The reported secret talks between Greece and Turkey had come to a halt in December 1966. There were no official indications as to when or if they would be resumed. It was clear that the issue could not be left indefinitely in abeyance and new efforts were called for actively to seek a solution to the Cyprus problem.

788. It was regrettable that neither some elements of the National Guard nor some local Turkish-Cypriot leaders had shown all the necessary measure of co-operation towards the Force. There had been occasions when sections of the Press in Cyprus had undertaken what had seemed to be a campaign against the Force. It was hoped that those instances would not recur and the Force would enjoy goodwill and understanding.

789. The Secretary-General again expressed the view that it was necessary to balance against the undoubted need for the Force's continued presence in Cyprus the danger that excessive confidence in the indefinite continuation of its presence might be a factor in reducing the sense of urgency of the contending parties about seeking solutions for the underlying differences. If only for financial reasons, it was an inexorable fact that the Force could not remain indefinitely. For the moment, however, he could see no alternative but to recommend to the Council an extension of the mandate for a further period of six months. The Government of Cyprus as well as the Governments of Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom had indicated their agreement to that proposal.

**D. Consideration at the 1362nd meeting  
(19 June 1967)**

790. At the 1362nd meeting of the Council on 19 June 1967 the report of the Secretary-General (S/7969) was included in the agenda. The representatives of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece were again invited, at their request, to participate in the discussion (S/7995, S/7998, S/7999).

791. The representative of Argentina, on behalf of Argentina, Brazil, Ethiopia, India, Japan, Mali and Nigeria, introduced the following draft resolution (S/7996):

*"The Security Council,*

*"Noting from the report of the Secretary-General of 13 June 1967 (S/7969) that in the present circumstances the United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus is still needed if peace is to be maintained in the island,*

*"Noting that the Government of Cyprus has agreed that in view of the prevailing conditions in the island it is necessary to continue the Force beyond 26 June 1967,*

*"1. Reaffirms its resolutions 186 (1964) of 4 March, 187 (1964) of 13 March, 192 (1964) of 20 June, 193 (1964) of 9 August, 194 (1964) of 25 September and 198 (1964) of 18 December 1964, 201 (1965) of 19 March, 206 (1965) of 15 June, 207 (1965) of 10 August and 219 (1965) of 17 December 1965, 220 (1966) of 16 March, 222 (1966) of 16 June and 231 (1966) of 15 December 1966, and the consensus expressed by the President at the 1143rd meeting, on 11 August 1964.*

*"2. Urges the parties concerned to act with the utmost restraint and to continue determined co-operative efforts to achieve the objectives of the Security Council;*

*"3. Extends once more the stationing in Cyprus of the United Nations Peace-keeping Force, established under Security Council resolution 186 (1964), for a further period of six months ending 26 December 1967, in the expectation that by then sufficient progress towards a solution will make possible a withdrawal or substantial reduction of the Force."*

792. The representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics recalled his Government's position on the Cyprus problem, which was that in order to ensure the genuine independence and integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, all foreign troops must be withdrawn from its territory and the foreign military bases situated therein must be liquidated. He stated that recent events bore witness to an intensification of the activities of the imperialist strategists of NATO who were bent on transforming the Eastern Mediterranean region into a bastion of neo-colonialism and who were accordingly endeavouring to place Cyprus under NATO's military and political control in order to use it for NATO's aggressive purposes. The Soviet Union had stressed on numerous occasions that the utilization of foreign troops, including United Nations forces, might lead to interference in the domestic affairs of States and might bring serious complications with highly dangerous consequences for the Organization itself. The prolonged presence of United Nations armed forces on Cyprus could not be recognized as normal. The Soviet Union had steadfastly been in favour of

strict compliance with the Charter of the United Nations in all matters connected with the use of United Nations forces. The Soviet Union wished to indicate once again that only the Security Council had been vested with authority to adopt decisions on such questions. If it had been unable to adopt decisions on such matters, the General Assembly was empowered, within the limits of its competence, to adopt recommendations to the States concerned or to the Security Council. In the light of these general considerations, the Soviet Union did not object to the extension of the stationing of the Force in Cyprus for a further period of six months, on the understanding that such an extension was being made in accordance with the provisions of Security Council resolution 186 (1964) of 4 March 1964 and in accordance with the wishes of the Government of Cyprus.

793. The representative of India commended the efforts of the Secretary-General and his staff in doing their best to avert clashes and to help achieve the objectives of the United Nations in Cyprus.

794. The representative of Japan said that he was disappointed with regard to a number of aspects of the situation in Cyprus which could hardly be described as hopeful. He sincerely regretted certain developments, especially the halt in the dialogue between Greece and Turkey over the Cyprus problem. It was the view of his delegation that all Governments and parties concerned should promptly renew their efforts to solve the underlying issues in order to bring lasting peace in Cyprus.

**Decision:** *At the 1362nd meeting, on 19 June 1967, the draft resolution (S/7996) was adopted unanimously (resolution 238 (1967)).*

795. After the vote, the representative of the United Kingdom said that the Secretary-General had given a grave warning of the dangers and needs of the Cyprus situation. His Government had always supported the United Nations endeavour in Cyprus by maintaining a contingent in the Force and by contributing to the finances of the whole Force. He pledged \$1 million for each three-month period of the new mandate.

796. The representative of the United States noted his Government's disappointment at the lack of progress towards solving the fundamental issues but expressed the hope that the knowledge that the Force was staying in Cyprus for an additional six months would encourage those who were most directly concerned to renew and intensify their efforts to reach a just and lasting solution. The United States pledged up to \$4 million towards the cost of maintaining the Force for an additional six months, depending upon the amounts contributed by other Governments.

797. The representative of Canada regretted that it had not been possible to seek agreement on a resolution which would have come to grips with some of the issues raised by the Secretary-General in his report. He shared the Secretary-General's concern at the lack of progress towards a settlement of the Cyprus problem and would welcome further initiatives at a political level. He noted that the continuation of the Force placed a heavy burden on a relatively small group of countries which had contributed to the maintenance of the force. He had voted for the resolution with the clear understanding that any change in the Council's

decisions concerning UNFICYP or any proposals for a change would be submitted for prior consideration by the members of the Security Council.

798. The representative of Nigeria stated that he had joined the co-sponsors of the draft resolution with some degree of regret at the lack of progress in several aspects of the Cyprus situation. He was, however, encouraged by the hope that some further definite urgent efforts would be made in the coming six months towards a solution of the Cyprus problem.

799. The representative of Mali said he believed that the attainment by Cyprus of total independence accompanied by unequivocal territorial integrity could lead to the reduction, and even disappearance, of the United Nations Force stationed there.

800. The representative of France deplored the total stagnation in the bilateral conversations between Greece and Turkey, and expressed the hope that it would soon be ended. He supported the Secretary-General's appeal to the parties concerned to reject the dangerous attitude of being pleased with the *status quo*.

801. The representative of Cyprus said that the reason for the lack of progress towards normalization in the island had been the policy of division and partition. The last two decades amply showed that that policy had created the gravest threats to peace. The people of Cyprus were determined to preserve their island as one undivided unit and no partition or federation would ever be acceptable to them.

802. The representative of Turkey said that the partition charge was a myth. Unfortunately, however, certain expansionist elements in the island wanted to take the whole land of Cyprus and not part of it. The dialogue between Greece and Turkey had not reached total stagnation but, because of circumstances

beyond the control of the parties, it had come to a temporary halt. Genuine efforts were being made through contacts to revive the negotiations. However, normalization in Cyprus could come only when and if the Greek Cypriots left the Turks alone until a political settlement was reached.

803. The representative of Greece said that no solution to the Cyprus problem would be sought behind the backs of the people of Cyprus. As far as his Government was concerned, its general position on the Cyprus problem remained the same. As to the Greek-Turkish dialogue, he would confirm what the representative of Turkey had said and inform the Council that the Foreign Secretary of Greece had expressed to his Turkish counterpart the resolute intention of the Greek Government to resume the Greek-Turkish dialogue.

804. The representative of Brazil stressed his Government's agreement with the Secretary-General on the lack of progress towards the solution of the substance of the Cyprus problem and thanked the delegations which had praised the service Mr. Carlos A. Bernardes had rendered in Cyprus to the United Nations.

#### **E. Subsequent communication**

805. In a letter of 30 June 1967 (S/8028) addressed to the Secretary-General, the representative of Turkey transmitted a message from Dr. Küçük, Vice-President of the Republic of Cyprus, protesting against a resolution adopted on 26 June 1967 by the Greek members of the House of Representatives of the Republic, in which the Greek-Cypriot members declared that they would continue to struggle for "the union of the whole and undivided Cyprus with the motherland".

## Part II

### OTHER MATTERS CONSIDERED BY THE COUNCIL

#### Chapter 8

#### QUESTION OF A RECOMMENDATION REGARDING THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

806. By a letter dated 1 September 1966 (S/7481) the Secretary-General transmitted to the members of the Security Council a statement in connexion with the expiration on 3 November 1966 of his term as Secretary-General of the United Nations. After recalling the circumstances under which he had been appointed Acting Secretary-General and then Secretary-General, he referred to some of the problems which the Organization had had to face since he was first appointed, pointing out, however, that he did not wish to relate them to the variety of considerations, of a personal, official and political nature, which had influenced his own decision.

807. While the financial solvency of the Organization had not yet been assured, there was no longer the same sense of crisis and anxiety on that score, and he remained hopeful that substantial voluntary contributions would be forthcoming which would place the Organization on a basis of complete solvency so that it could face the great tasks ahead with confidence. He considered that a lack of new ideas and fresh initiatives and a weakening of the will to find means of strengthening and expanding genuine international co-operation would have even more serious consequences than insolvency. In respect of peace-keeping, the promise held out by the demonstrated usefulness and success of the Organization's extensive operations in recent years had remained unfulfilled because of the continuing failure to agree on basic principles, and in his judgement it was important that the United Nations, in conformity with the Charter, should be enabled to function effectively in that field. No less important was the task of peace-building, and he noted the efforts of the United Nations to equip itself with more effective means of tackling some of the basic problems of development.

808. Members of the Organization, the statement continued, were surely aware of the Secretary-General's abiding concern for peace. The state of affairs in South-East Asia was a source of grave concern, not only to the parties directly involved and to the major Powers, but also to other Members of the Organization, as it was to him personally. The cruelty of that war and the suffering it caused the people of Viet-Nam were a constant reproach to the conscience of humanity. For many months it had seemed to him that the pressure of events were remorselessly leading towards a major war, while efforts to reverse that trend were lagging disastrously behind. He considered that the tragic error was being repeated of relying on force and military means in a deceptive pursuit of peace. He was convinced that peace in South-East Asia could be obtained only through respect for the principles

agreed upon at Geneva in 1954 and those contained in the Charter.

809. The Secretary-General also noted that there were signs of growing tension elsewhere in the world, which the increasing imbalance in the world economic situation could only aggravate. Moreover, he was dissatisfied with the fact that the Organization had not yet achieved universality of membership. Owing mainly to the international situation and to circumstances beyond the control of the Organization, no decisive progress had been made by the Governments of Member States in the co-operative efforts which were essential if the Organization was to serve effectively the cause of peace and to contribute significantly to the economic development of the poorer regions of the world.

810. Regarding his own plans for the future, the Secretary-General reiterated his belief that a Secretary-General should not normally serve for more than one term, and his disbelief in the concept of indispensability of any particular person for any particular job. In the circumstances, he had decided not to offer himself for a second term as Secretary-General and to leave the Security Council unfettered in its recommendation to the General Assembly with regard to the next Secretary-General.

811. In conclusion, he expressed his abiding faith in the United Nations and in its ultimate success. Despite the difficulties facing the Organization, he believed and hoped that the world would continue its efforts to develop the United Nations as an indispensable instrument for the attainment of a peaceful and just world order—a task to which he pledged his personal support and whole-hearted devotion.

812. At its 1301st meeting, held in private on 29 September, the Council approved a communiqué stating that after consultations among the members of the Security Council, there was a consensus that the members of the Council welcomed the statement of the Secretary-General on 19 September that he was ready to consider serving until the end of the twenty-first session of the Assembly. Taking into account the great positive role played by the Secretary-General in the activities of the United Nations, the members of the Security Council further expressed their confidence in him and considered that if U Thant should express willingness to serve another term as the Secretary-General, that would fully meet the desires of the members of the Council.

**Decision:** *At its 1311th meeting, held in private on 28 October 1966, the Security Council adopted resolution 227 (1966), which reads as follows:*



*"The Security Council,*

*"Confirming the consensus approved at its 1301st meeting, on 29 September 1966,*

*"Recalling that, in that consensus, its members welcomed the statement of the Secretary-General on 19 September 1966 that he is ready to consider serving until the end of the present twenty-first session of the General Assembly,*

*"Recommends to the General Assembly, pending further consideration by the Security Council of the question of the appointment of the Secretary-General, that it extend the appointment of U Thant as Secretary-General of the United Nations until the end of the twenty-first regular session of the General Assembly."*

813. At the 1329th meeting of the Security Council, held in private on 2 December 1966, the President made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council, recalling its consensus of 29 September 1966 concerning the great positive role played by the Secretary-General, U Thant, in the activities of the United Nations, has further examined the question of the appointment of the Secretary-General and, in particular, the situation created by the impending expiration of the present term of Secretary-General U Thant at the end of the twenty-first regular session of the General Assembly.

"After taking all considerations into account, the members of the Council have agreed that the higher interests of the Organization would be best served if U Thant continues in the post of Secretary-General.

"They are aware of the Secretary-General's intention not to offer himself for a second term and his desire to leave the Council unfettered in its recommendation. They have weighed the Secretary-General's wish that they examine the possibility of another nominee. Whatever their views may be in the observations he made with his announced expression of intention, they fully respect his position and his action in bringing basic issues confronting the Organization and disturbing developments in many parts of the world to their notice, as he has done in his statement of 1 September 1966 to which they accord their closest attention.

"The members of the Security Council would like to ask him to recognize with them that the Organization should continue to be served by a Secretary-General who has the demonstrated capacity to evoke the co-operation and confidence of all Members. The wide support for the present Secretary-

General among all the Members of the United Nations is an important factor which should be preserved in order to help the Organization continue to face its problems constructively and play its role in maintaining peace and security.

"The Security Council therefore, conscious of his proven qualities and his high sense of duty, has unanimously decided to appeal to U Thant's dedication to the Organization and to ask him to continue to serve for another full term as Secretary-General of the United Nations. The Security Council hopes that the Secretary-General will accept its appeal, and thereupon it would be the intention of the Security Council to make the appropriate recommendation to the General Assembly."

814. The President then read to the Council the following statement by the Secretary-General:

"The Secretary-General is grateful to the Security Council for the serious consideration it has given to the question of the appointment of the Secretary-General. He is also deeply appreciative of the sympathetic understanding it has shown of the reasons which impelled him to announce his intention not to offer himself for a second term.

"The Secretary-General takes note of the observations made by the Security Council and recognizes the validity of the reasons it has advanced in requesting him to continue to serve the Organization for another full term. He notes with particular appreciation that, for its part, the Security Council respects his position and his action in bringing to the notice of the Organization basic issues confronting it, and disturbing developments in many parts of the world. He hopes that the close attention being given to these issues and developments will serve to strengthen the Organization by the co-operative effort of the entire membership, and promote the cause of world peace and progress. It is in this hope that the Secretary-General accedes to the appeal addressed to him by the Security Council."

**Decision:** *At its 1329th meeting, held in private on 2 December 1966, the Council adopted resolution 229 (1966), reading as follows:*

*"The Security Council,*

*"Conscious of the proven qualities and high sense of duty of U Thant, and believing that his reappointment would be most conducive to the larger interests and purposes of the Organization,*

*"Recommends the appointment of U Thant for another term of office as Secretary-General of the United Nations."*

## **Chapter 9**

### **ADMISSION OF NEW MEMBERS**

#### **A. Application of Botswana**

815. In a letter dated 30 September 1966 (S/7518), the President of Botswana submitted the application of Botswana for admission to membership in the United Nations, together with a declaration, signed by the President, accepting the obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations.

816. The Security Council considered the application of Botswana at its 1306th meeting, on 14 Octo-

ber 1966. The following draft resolution was submitted by Jordan, New Zealand, Nigeria, Uganda and the United Kingdom (S/7541):

*"The Security Council,*

*"Having examined the application of Botswana for admission to the United Nations,*

*"Recommends to the General Assembly that Botswana be admitted to membership in the United Nations."*

**Decision:** At the 1306th meeting, on 14 October 1966, the draft resolution (S/7541) was adopted unanimously (resolution 224 (1966)).

## B. Application of Lesotho

817. In a telegram dated 7 October 1966 (S/7534), the Prime Minister of Lesotho submitted the application of Lesotho for admission to membership in the United Nations, together with a declaration, signed by the Prime Minister, accepting the obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations.

818. The Security Council considered the application of Lesotho at its 1306th meeting, on 14 October 1966. The following draft resolution was submitted by Jordan, New Zealand, Nigeria, Uganda and the United Kingdom (S/7542):

*"The Security Council,*

*"Having examined the application of Lesotho for admission to the United Nations,*

*"Recommends to the General Assembly that Lesotho be admitted to membership in the United Nations."*

**Decision:** At the 1306th meeting, on 14 October

1966, the draft resolution (S/7542) was adopted unanimously (resolution 225 (1966)).

## C. Application of Barbados

819. In a letter dated 30 November 1966 (S/7607), the Prime Minister of Barbados submitted the application of Barbados for admission to membership in the United Nations, together with a declaration, signed by the Prime Minister, accepting the obligations contained in the Charter of the United Nations.

820. The Security Council considered the application of Barbados at its 1330th meeting, on 7 December 1966. The following draft resolution was submitted by Argentina, New Zealand, Nigeria, Uganda, the United Kingdom and Uruguay (S/7609):

*"The Security Council,*

*"Having examined the application of Barbados for admission to the United Nations,*

*"Recommends to the General Assembly that Barbados be admitted to membership in the United Nations."*

**Decision:** At the 1330th meeting, on 7 December 1966, the draft resolution (S/7609) was adopted unanimously (resolution 230 (1966)).

## Chapter 10

### ELECTION OF FIVE MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

821. In accordance with Article 7 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the Secretary-General transmitted to the General Assembly and the Security Council on 15 September 1966 the list of candidates nominated by national groups (S/7490) for the election of five Members of the Court to fill the vacancies which would occur on 5 February 1967 upon the expiry of the term of office of five judges.

822. At its 1315th meeting, on 2 November, and its 1318th meeting, on 3 November, the Security Council proceeded to vote by secret ballot on the candidates included in the list (S/7490/Rev.1 and Add.1-7).

823. On the first ballot, the following four candidates received the required absolute majority of votes: Mr. Manfred Lachs (Poland), 14 votes; Mr. Fouad Ammoun (Lebanon), 13 votes; Mr. Charles D. Onyeama (Nigeria) 11 votes; and Mr. Antonio de Luna (Spain), 8 votes.

824. The Security Council then continued voting by secret ballot for the fifth seat, and on the twentieth ballot Mr. Sture Petrén (Sweden) received 10 votes. The President announced that the names of the five candidates who had received the required majority would be communicated to the President of the General Assembly.

825. At the 1318th meeting, on 3 November, the President read to the Council the text of a letter from the President of the General Assembly stating that an absolute majority of votes had been obtained in the General Assembly by Mr. Ammoun, (Lebanon), Mr. Bengzon (Philippines), Mr. Lachs (Poland), Mr. Onyeama (Nigeria) and Mr. Petrén (Sweden). Consequently the Assembly had been informed that Mr. Ammoun, Mr. Lachs, Mr. Onyeama and Mr. Petrén, having received an absolute majority both in the General Assembly and in the Security Council, were elected Members of the International Court of Justice. As only four members had been duly elected, the Council proceeded in accordance with Article 11 of the Statute of the Court to hold a new election to fill the remaining seat. On the third ballot, the President announced that Mr. Cesar Bengzon (Philippines) had received 10 votes, and that he would communicate the result to the President of the General Assembly. He then informed the Council of the receipt of a letter from the President of the General Assembly stating that Mr. Bengzon had also obtained an absolute majority of the votes in the General Assembly. Accordingly Mr. Bengzon was also elected a Member of the International Court of Justice.

## **Part III**

### **THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE**

#### ***Chapter 11***

#### **WORK OF THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE**

826. The Military Staff Committee has been functioning continuously under the draft rules of procedure during the period under review and has held a total of twenty-six meetings without considering matters of substance.

## Part IV

# MATTERS BROUGHT TO THE ATTENTION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL BUT NOT DISCUSSED IN THE COUNCIL DURING THE PERIOD COVERED

## Chapter 12

### COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN TERRITORIES UNDER PORTUGUESE ADMINISTRATION

827. In a letter dated 18 August 1966 (S/7471 and Corr.1), addressed to the Secretary-General, the representative of Mexico stated that, in accordance with Security Council resolution 218 (1965), his Government had decided to prohibit the supply or sale of arms and military equipment to Portugal, including materials required for their manufacture and maintenance.

828. In an addendum to the report in pursuance of Security Council resolution 218 (1965), on the question concerning the situation in territories under Portuguese administration, published on 14 November 1966 (S/7385/Add.4), the Secretary-General informed the Security Council of an exchange of communications with the Foreign Minister of Portugal. In reply to his letter of 5 July 1966, in which he had expressed readiness to discuss with Portuguese representatives all relevant questions within the context of the above-mentioned resolution during the twenty-first session of the General Assembly, the Secretary-General had received a communication, dated 11 July, in which the Foreign Minister of Portugal had informed the Secretary-General that the Portuguese Government would be prepared to discuss problems of regional co-operation in Africa and questions of international peace and security in that continent immediately following the termination of the general debate in the session. In a letter of 14 July, the Secretary-General had agreed to hold discussions at the period suggested by the Foreign Minister, but no discussions had taken place as of the date of publication of the addendum to the Secretary-General's report, as no information had been received from Portugal in regard to the proposed discussions.

829. On 14 December 1966, the Deputy Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity addressed a letter to the Secretary-General (S/7638) by which, in accordance with Article 54 of the United Nations Charter, he transmitted the text of a resolution adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its third ordinary session, held at Addis Ababa from 5 to 9 November 1966, concerning the territories under Portuguese administration. The resolution, among other things, called upon all States to implement Security Council resolution 218 (1965); condemned the attitude of those States which were continuing to sell or deliver arms and military material or the equipment or material needed to maintain arms and ammunition to Portugal; and called on all States to implement

resolution 2107 (XX) adopted by the General Assembly on 21 December 1965.

830. In a letter dated 15 December 1966 (S/7640), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General transmitted the text of resolution 2184 (XXI) adopted by the General Assembly at its 1490th plenary meeting on 12 December 1966, by which the General Assembly recommended that the Security Council make it obligatory for all States, directly and through their action in the appropriate international agencies of which they were members, to implement the measures contained in General Assembly resolution 2107 (XX), and in particular those mentioned in paragraph 7 thereof.

831. By a letter of 20 June 1967 (S/8023), the Chairman of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples transmitted to the President of the Security Council the text of a resolution on the question of territories under Portuguese administration (A/AC.109/251) adopted by the Special Committee at its 541st meeting held at Dar es Salaam on 20 June 1967.

832. By the operative part of that resolution the Committee drew the urgent attention of the Security Council to the continued deterioration of the situation in the territories under Portuguese domination as well as to the consequences of the aggressive acts committed by Portugal against the independent African States that border upon its colonies; and recommended that the Security Council take the necessary measures to make mandatory the provisions of its resolutions concerning the question, particularly resolution 218 (1965) of 23 November 1965, and those of General Assembly resolution 2184 (XXI).

833. On the same day the Chairman of the Special Committee sent to the President of the Council a letter (S/8024) transmitting the text of a resolution adopted by the Special Committee at its 541st meeting with regard to colonial territories.

834. The resolution, after noting with deep regret the intransigent attitude of the Governments of Portugal and South Africa, which refused to recognize the right of colonial peoples to self-determination and independence, once again recommended that the Security Council make obligatory the measures provided for under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations against Portugal, South Africa and the illegal racist minority régime in Southern Rhodesia.



**COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING COMPLAINTS BY GREECE AGAINST  
TURKEY AND BY TURKEY AGAINST GREECE**

835. During the period under review the Secretary-General received communications from the representatives of Greece and Turkey.

836. Communications from the representatives of Greece included the following: letters dated 8 August (S/7453) and 19, 21 and 30 September 1966 (S/7500, S/7504, S/7526) complaining of the violation of Greek air space by Turkish military aircraft; and letters dated 15 July (S/7414), 27 October (S/7574 and Corr.1), 29 December 1966 (S/7659) and 18 January 1967

(S/7689) rejecting complaints made in letters of Turkey.

837. Communications from the representative of Turkey included: letters dated 18 July (S/7416), 22 August (S/7472), 6 October (S/7533) and 6 December 1966 (S/7616, S/7617) complaining of the violation of Turkish air space by Greek military aircraft; and letters dated 25 July (S/7431), 15 and 30 August (S/7464, S/7480), 12 September (S/7494) and 15 November 1966 (S/7592) replying to complaints made in letters of Greece.

**Chapter 14**

**COMMUNICATIONS RELATING TO COMPLAINTS CONCERNING ACTS OF AGGRESSION AGAINST  
THE TERRITORY AND CIVILIAN POPULATION OF CAMBODIA**

838. During the period under review, the representative of Cambodia addressed thirty-two communications to the President of the Security Council, for the Council's information, complaining of violations of Cambodian territory and air space by armed forces of the United States and the Republic of South Viet-Nam. Most of the letters concluded by stating that the Government of Cambodia had protested against these acts of aggression and provocation and had demanded that the Government of the United States and the Republic of South Viet-Nam bring about the immediate cessation of such criminal acts.

839. Included in the communications were many charges that soldiers of the United States-South Viet-Nameese armed forces had fired with various weapons, including mortars and artillery, across the demarcation line into Cambodian territory at farmers, villages and provincial guard posts, and that United States-South Viet-Nameese helicopters and airplanes, violating Cambodian air space, had machine-gunned and fired rockets at similar targets. There were also numerous charges that United States-South Viet-Nameese armed elements from a few to up to 200 in number, sometimes landed by helicopter, had penetrated into Cambodian territory and, on occasion, had fired at villagers and Cambodian guard post elements, resulting in clashes with Cambodian defence elements. There were also complaints of naval vessels or armed motor-junks entering Cambodian territorial waters, occasionally firing at or seizing fishing boats and abducting crew members. Deaths and injuries to both Cambodian villagers and to members of Cambodian defence elements were charged in connexion with many of the incidents. Additional casualties were reported as caused when mines laid by United States-South Viet-Nameese elements exploded under Cambodian villagers or their animals. Finally, the communications included charges of almost daily violations of Cambodian air space by planes of the United States-South Viet-Nameese air force during the months from August through December 1966.

840. In a letter dated 28 April 1967 (S/7864), the Permanent Observer of the Republic of Viet-Nam transmitted to the President of the Security Council a list of twelve violations of the territory and seven of the

air space of the Republic of Viet-Nam which he charged had been committed by members of the Cambodian armed forces between May 1966 and March 1967 despite the protests of his Government. The letter stated that in each of the twelve above incidents, Cambodian soldiers had abducted one or more Viet-Nameese nationals.

841. In a letter dated 26 June 1967 (S/8015), the representative of Cambodia, referring to the violations charged in the above letter, informed the President of the Security Council that detailed investigation had confirmed that no Cambodian aircraft or armed personnel had entered South Viet-Nameese air space or territory on the dates mentioned. He added that the unfounded accusations were designed to mislead international opinion and to justify the acts of aggression committed almost daily by the Saigon authorities and their American masters against Cambodia.

842. Listed below and briefly summarized are the letters from the representative of Cambodia to the President of the Security Council for the information of the Council:

Letter dated 5 August 1966 (S/7451) complaining of firing by United States-South Viet-Nameese aircraft on Cambodian villages on 31 July and 3 August, in the latter case in the presence of investigating members of the International Control Commission;

Letter dated 23 September 1966 (S/7511) concerning incidents on 18 and 20 August and 4 and 7 September involving firing across the frontier and aircraft machine-gunning Cambodian border villages;

Letter dated 28 September (S/7515) and 4 October 1966 (S/7528) concerning machine-gunning and rocket firing by helicopters on 20 September at a Cambodian guard post;

Letter dated 11 October 1966 (S/7543) concerning incidents between 17 August and 16 September 1966;

Letter dated 24 October 1966 (S/7566) concerning incidents of firing across the demarcation line into Cambodian territory between 12 and 18 September 1966;

Letter dated 11 November 1966 (S/7583) concerning incidents between 29 August and 10 October 1966;

Letter dated 14 November 1966 (S/7588) concerning incidents between 12 August and 14 October;

Letter dated 22 November 1966 (S/7597) complaining of violations of Cambodian air space in August 1966 and of Khmer territorial waters on three occasions between 15 September and 19 October;

Letter dated 28 March 1967 (S/7601) complaining of a mortar bombardment by South Viet-Namense forces of a frontier guard post on 22 November 1966, resulting in five dead and five wounded;

Letter dated 28 November 1966 (S/7602) complaining of the machine-gunning on 22 November of a Cambodian guard post by helicopters of the South Viet-Namense forces;

Letter dated 6 December 1966 (S/7619) concerning incidents between 29 August and 22 November, including charges of soldiers firing across the frontier and penetrating into Cambodia, and of aircraft and naval vessels violating Cambodian air space and territorial waters;

Letter dated 8 December 1966 (S/7626) concerning violations of Cambodian air space on twenty-five days in September 1966;

Letter dated 29 December 1966 (S/7652) concerning incidents between 29 October and 21 November;

Letter dated 3 January 1967 (S/7662) charging attacks by United States-South Viet-Namense air force on Cambodian villages between 16 August and 27 November 1966;

Letter dated 5 January 1967 (S/7667) complaining of an attack on a Cambodian village on 30 December by United States-South Viet-Namense forces transported by fifty helicopters, four villagers being killed and twelve abducted;

Letter dated 12 January 1967 (S/7678) concerning incidents between 13 November and 5 December 1966;

Letter dated 19 January 1967 (S/7695) concerning incidents between 5 February and 14 December 1966;

Letter dated 30 January 1967 (S/7707) complaining of two cases of firing into Cambodian territory on the night of 8/9 November 1966 and on 4 January 1967;

Letter dated 7 February 1967 (S/7726) complaining of an attack by 100 United States-South Viet-Namense soldiers on a Cambodian village on 30 January;

Letter dated 14 February 1967 (S/7738) concerning incidents between 22 November and 30 December 1966;

Letter dated 23 February 1967 (S/7782) charging violations of Cambodian air space in October 1966;

Letter dated 27 February 1967 (S/7792) complaining of an attack by 200 United States-South Viet-Namense ground forces, landed from sixty helicopters and supported by other aircraft, on Cambodian villages on 20 and 21 February;

Letter dated 2 March 1967 (S/7801) concerning incidents between 20 December 1966 and 15 February 1967;

Letter dated 15 March 1967 (S/7820) concerning incidents on five days between 24 February and 3 March 1967, including on 24 February, an armed attack by United States-South Viet-Namense and South Korean forces on a Cambodian village and its occupation until 3 March;

Letter dated 15 March 1967 (S/7824) concerning incidents between 3 January and 15 February 1967;

Letter dated 15 March 1967 (S/7830) complaining of violations of Cambodian air space in November and December 1966.

Letter dated 27 March 1967 (S/7838) concerning incidents between 19 February and 9 March;

Letter dated 1 May 1967 (S/7870) concerning incidents between 10 January and 24 March;

Letter dated 3 May 1967 (S/7874) charging the dropping on 20 March of booby-traps on Cambodian territory by aircraft causing casualties;

Letter dated 6 June 1967 (S/7944) charging violations on 6 and 17 April of Cambodian air space and firing of rockets by aircraft killing livestock;

Letter dated 12 June 1967 (S/7977) concerning incidents between 23 March and 11 May;

Letter dated 3 July 1967 (S/8029) concerning incidents between 11 May and 1 June.

## Chapter 15

### COMMUNICATIONS AND REPORTS RELATING TO THE SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

843. During the period from 2 July to 21 September 1966, the Secretary-General, acting under Security Council resolutions 203 (1965) and 205 (1965) of 14 and 22 May 1965, submitted to the Council ten reports (S/7338/Add.6-15), containing detailed information received from the office of his representative in the Dominican Republic concerning the withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force from the Dominican Republic. These reports indicated that the withdrawal of troop units and other military personnel as well as of equipment of the Peace Force was taking place in accordance with the resolution adopted on 24 June 1966, at the request of the Dominican Government, by the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the American States. In his report dated 21

September 1966 (S/7338/Add.15), the Secretary-General informed the Council that with the departure on that day of the last remaining troops and of the Commander of the Peace Force, General Alvaro Alves da Silva of Brazil, and the Deputy Commander of the Force, General Robert A. Linvill of the United States, the withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force had been completed.

844. By a cable dated 20 September 1966 (S/7502), the Assistant Secretary General of the OAS transmitted, for the information of the Security Council, the text of a report of the *Ad Hoc* Committee of the Organization of American States to the President of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of the Ministers for Foreign

Affairs of the American States, concerning the implementation of the OAS resolution of 24 June 1966 on the withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force from the Dominican Republic. The report expressed, *inter alia*, the view of the Committee that without the Inter-American Peace Force it would not have been possible for the provisional government to have accomplished the task of national reconciliation, nor would it have been possible to hold the national elections in an atmosphere of complete calm and order.

845. By a letter dated 13 October 1966 (S/7551), the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Dominican Republic, Mr. Gilberto Herrera Baéz, in expressing the appreciation of his country to the United Nations for its interest in the restoration of peace and harmony in the Dominican Republic, stated, *inter alia*, that in view of his Government, the objectives of the Security Council resolution of 14 May 1965 having been achieved, it would be advisable to withdraw the United Nations Mission from the Dominican Republic.

846. In a report to the Security Council dated 14 October (S/7552), the Secretary-General drew attention to the important developments which had taken place in the Dominican Republic, including the installation on 1 July 1966 of the newly elected government of Dr. Joaquin Balaguer, and the completion on 21 September of the withdrawal of the Inter-American Peace Force from the Dominican Republic, and stated that, in the light of these circumstances, he had initiated arrangements for the withdrawal of the United Nations Mission in the Dominican Republic, which was expected to be completed shortly.

847. In his annual report on the work of the Organization for 1966-1967, the Secretary-General stated that on 22 October 1966 the United Nations Mission in the Dominican Republic, established under Security Council resolution 203 (1965) of 14 May 1965, had ended its activities and had been withdrawn from the Dominican Republic.

## Chapter 16

### COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN VIET-NAM

848. In communications to the President of the Security Council dated between 27 July and 4 August 1966, the Permanent Missions of Romania, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland and Czechoslovakia referred to the letter of 30 June 1966 (S/7391) addressed to the President of the Security Council by the representative of the United States.

849. In its *note verbale* dated 27 July (S/7435), the Permanent Mission of Romania considered the letter a new attempt to justify and to cloak the aggressive actions of the United States against the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. The intensification of the United States air war against North Viet-Nam and the military operations in South Viet-Nam proved that the so-called peace campaign was an attempt to impose on the Viet-Namese people the conditions of the United States "unconditional negotiations". Fully backing the stand of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam on the settlement of the conflict, the Romanian Government stated that the problem was within the competence of the 1954 Geneva Conference, that the United States must end the aggressive war in Viet-Nam, unconditionally stop the bombing of the DRV, withdraw its troops and bases from South Viet-Nam, recognize the National Liberation Front as the only authentic representative of the population of South Viet-Nam and recognize the Viet-Namese people's right to decide their own future without foreign interference.

850. In their *notes verbales* of 1 August (S/7444), 3 August (S/7448) and 4 August (S/7450), the Permanent Missions of Hungary, Mongolia and Czechoslovakia stated that the letter was a deliberate attempt by the United States to use the United Nations as cover for the expansion of its aggression in Viet-Nam by bombing Hanoi and Vinh. Nobody could be deceived by a United States declaration about its peaceful intentions. The solution for restoring peace in Viet-Nam lay in the cessation of United States aggression there and in the application of the four-point programme of the Government of the DRV and of the five-point programme of the National Liberation Front of South Viet-

Nam. Upon instructions from its Government, the Permanent Mission of Mongolia returned the United States letter to the President of the Security Council.

851. In his letter dated 4 August (S/7446), the representative of Poland wrote that the United States letter was another attempt to use the Security Council as a cover for its expanded aggression in Viet-Nam and as a manoeuvre to avoid fulfilment of the commitments ensuing from the Geneva Agreements. Peace could only be restored by cessation of the aggression and implementation of those Agreements.

852. In a letter dated 6 October (S/7535), the representative of Thailand transmitted to the Secretary-General a copy of the letter from the Prime Minister of Viet-Nam which had been delivered to the Secretary-General by the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Viet-Nam. Expressing concern that all efforts, including those of the Secretary-General, for re-establishing peace and order had been rejected by Peking and Hanoi, the Prime Minister stated that the root cause of the war was the armed attack upon the Republic of Viet-Nam planned, launched and directed by North Viet-Nam. The response of the United States, Australia, New Zealand, the Republic of Korea, Thailand and the Philippines to his Government's call for military and economic assistance had enabled it to defend itself against communist military aggression.

853. Declaring that the conflict was a struggle for the survival of the people of South Viet-Nam, who had demonstrated at the ballot box their refusal to accept what North Viet-Nam sought to impose on them, the Prime Minister stressed that his Government and people stood ready to consider any effort by the Secretary-General, organs of the United Nations or any of its Members for a settlement of the conflict which would preserve the independence of the Republic of Viet-Nam and the right of its people to choose their own way of life. In this connexion he recalled the four points of his Government's statement of 22 June 1965.

854. By letter dated 15 November 1966 (S/7591), the representatives at the United Nations of the seven

participants in the Manila Summit Conference—Australia, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, the Republic of Viet-Nam, Thailand and the United States—transmitted to the Secretary-General the texts of three statements issued at the Conference on 25 October stating that they attested to the joint determination of their Governments to secure the freedom of South Viet-Nam, to pursue any avenue which would lead to a just peace and to ensure that the people of South Viet-Nam should enjoy the inherent right to choose their own way of life and their own form of government. The participants endorsed a restatement by the Republic of Viet-Nam of the essential elements of peace: (1) cessation of aggression against South Viet-Nam and preservation of its territorial integrity; (2) the unfortunate partition of Viet-Nam brought about by the Geneva Agreements of 1954 would be respected until, by free choice of all Viet-Nameese, reunification was achieved; (3) to resolve their internal differences, the people of South Viet-Nam were prepared to engage in a programme of national reconciliation when aggression had stopped; (4) South Viet-Nam would ask its allies to remove their forces and installations as the military and subversive forces of North Viet-Nam were withdrawn, infiltration ceased, and the level of violence thus subsided; (5) any negotiations leading to the end of hostilities must incorporate effective international guarantees. With respect to point (4), the participants at the conference added that the allied forces whose support the Republic of Viet-Nam had requested in the resistance of its people to aggression would be withdrawn as soon as possible and not later than six months after the above conditions had been fulfilled.

855. In a letter to the Secretary-General dated 19 December (S/7641), the representative of the United States noted the former's hope that the parties directly concerned would, in accordance with Pope Paul VI's appeal of 8 December, transform the temporary Christmas truce into a cessation of hostilities. Recalling that in the fourteen points which his Government had put forward as elements of a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam, the United States had stated that a cessation of hostilities could be the first order of business at a conference seeking a peaceful settlement or could be the subject of preliminary discussions, he reaffirmed that proposal, which he declared was in keeping with the appeal of the Pope as endorsed by the Secretary-General, and requested the latter to take whatever steps he considered necessary to bring about the discussions which could lead to a cease-fire. The United States objective remained the end of all fighting, of all hostilities and of all

violence in Viet-Nam—and an honourable and lasting settlement there, for which, as had been repeatedly said, the Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 would be a satisfactory basis.

856. In his reply of 30 December (S/7658), the Secretary-General expressed appreciation of the assurance that the Government of the United States would co-operate fully in the desired discussions. He reiterated his three-point programme: (1) the cessation of the bombing of North Viet-Nam; (2) the scaling down of all military activities by all sides in South Viet-Nam; and (3) the willingness to enter into discussions with those who were actually fighting. He stated his belief that this programme, of which the cessation of the bombing of North Viet-Nam was the first and essential part, was necessary to create the possibility of fruitful discussions leading to a just and honourable settlement of the problem of Viet-Nam on the basis of the Geneva Agreements of 1954. The Secretary-General also wished to recall that in the course of the twenty-first session, in the debate of the General Assembly, the majority of delegations had endorsed the three-point programme and that many more heads of delegations had also pleaded for the cessation of the bombing of North Viet-Nam. In such a situation as that posed by the Viet-Nam war, a powerful nation like the United States should take the initiative by making a humanitarian approach. The Secretary-General recalled the fact that he had endorsed the Pope's appeal for an extended cease-fire and had urged all the parties to heed the Pope's appeal. He also recalled his statement of 2 December 1966 in which he had expressed the hope that what was made possible for just a couple of days by the occurrence of common holidays might soon prove possible for a longer period by the new commitments that peace required, so that an atmosphere might be created which was necessary for meaningful talks to be held in the quest for a peaceful solution. The Secretary-General added that that was what he had in mind when referring to the need for a humanitarian approach. The Secretary-General said that if the United States could, in such a spirit, undertake, even without conditions, to stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam, and if the New Year cease-fire could be extended by all parties, he felt hopeful that thereafter some favourable developments might follow. In this connexion the Secretary-General recalled that the 1954 negotiations for a peaceful settlement had been conducted even without a formal cease-fire and while the fighting was going on. He would continue his utmost efforts to explore every avenue towards a peaceful solution of the problem of Viet-Nam.

## Chapter 17

### COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN CAMBODIA AND THAILAND

857. During the period under review the representatives of Cambodia and Thailand sent to the President of the Security Council more than forty communications containing mutual charges and counter-charges of frontier violations, shooting at border posts and villages, violation of territorial waters and air space, mine planting, etc. Most of the charges were categorically denied by the other party.

858. On 16 August 1966 (S/7462), the Secretary-General informed the President of the Security Council

that, after consultations with the Governments of Cambodia and Thailand, he had designated Herbert de Ribbing as his special representative to examine the situation, endeavour to find ways and means of reducing tension in the area and explore the possibilities of resolving problems existing between the two countries. In this connexion, the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics stated in a letter of 27 August (S/7478) that under the Charter decisions on matters connected with the maintenance of international peace



and security could only be taken by the Security Council. If the Council took a decision on the particular candidate put forward, the letter continued, the Soviet Union would have no objection. Letters on the subject were also received from Argentina (S/7522) and Uruguay (S/7550), dated 30 September and 12 October respectively, stating that they considered the action by the Secretary-General fully justified.

859. By a letter of 8 August 1966 (S/7454), the representative of Thailand informed the President of the Security Council that a group of Cambodian armed elements had on 17 July penetrated into Thai territory and fired on Thai villages. If such terroristic acts were continued, the letter went on, the Thailand Government would deem it necessary to take more effective measures of self-defence. The Cambodian representative, in a letter of 14 September 1966 (S/7496), having underlined Cambodia's faithfulness to its policy of non-interference in the affairs of other countries, strongly protested against this accusation and on his side blamed Thai armed forces for having stepped up acts of aggression, sabotage, murder and systematic terrorism in Cambodian territory.

860. In a letter of 12 September (S/7492), the representative of Thailand reported that on 28 August Cambodian armed elements fired upon a group of Thai policemen on patrol within Thailand territory. This charge was denied by the Cambodian representative in a letter of 18 October (S/7557).

861. By a letter of 5 October (S/7530), the Thai representative rejected charges contained in the Cambodian letter of 14 September (S/7496) and stated that the competent Thai authorities, after careful and thorough investigations, had established that no member of the Thai armed forces had crossed the border into Cambodia at times and places mentioned by the Cambodian side. He also denied that Thailand supported the Khmerserei movement. At the same time he blamed Cambodian armed elements for their continuous provocative and terroristic acts of border violation, mine planting and shooting. In reply to this statement the Cambodian representative categorically denied, in a letter of 14 October (S/7548), that Cambodian military personnel had taken part in mine-laying or other unlawful operations on Thai territory and qualified the accusations of Thai authorities as attempts to divert the attention of world public opinion from the constant attacks against Cambodia made by armed elements from Thailand. He further recalled Cambodia's offer to Thailand to sign a joint declaration of mutual respect for the territorial integrity of the two States.

862. In letters of 12 September (S/7493), 23 September (S/7510) and 28 September (S/7516), the representative of Cambodia charged that on 21 July, 12 August and 2 September Khmer units on border patrol missions had set off mines laid by Thai armed forces within Cambodian territory; as a result several men had been killed and wounded.

863. In reply to these charges, the representative of Thailand stated, in a letter of 21 October (S/7560), that no member of the Thai armed forces had crossed the border into Cambodia. At the same time he charged that Cambodian armed elements not only had laid mines in the border areas of Thailand but had also planted grenades and mines within their own territory.

864. On 6 October (S/7555), the Government of Cambodia protested against a new incident of mine-

laying on 18 September and drew attention to the extremely serious situation created on the Khmer-Thai border by the warlike and expansionist policy of Thailand.

865. On 24 October the representative of Cambodia protested (S/7567) to the President of the Council concerning an attack on 1 October by about 100 armed men from Thai territory against the Khmer village of Bos. In a letter of 11 November (S/7582), he informed the President of the Council of a new attack by Thai armed elements against the Khmer military post of Khvao, on 2 October.

866. In a letter of 6 December (S/7618), the representative of Cambodia complained of further incursions by armed elements from Thai territory into Cambodia.

867. In a letter of 9 December (S/7627), the representative of Thailand, referring to the letters from the representative of Cambodia of 14, 17 and 24 October and 11 November, categorically rejected the Cambodian charges.

868. In a letter of 28 December (S/7651), the representative of Cambodia reported a new series of incursions by armed elements from Thai territory into Cambodia involving firing upon Cambodian villages and posts, planting mines, etc.

869. On 5 January 1967 (S/7666), the Cambodian representative, referring to the letters of the Thai mission dated 21 October 1966 (S/7560) pointed out that the Thai representative, by quoting an Agence Khmère de Presse bulletin of 9 September 1966, had admitted the penetration of Thai scouts into Cambodian territory. Cambodia, the letter continued, did not deny that it planted booby-traps on its own territory for the precise purpose of protecting its territory against repeated Thai incursions. Cambodia had protested because Cambodian civilians and soldiers had been killed or injured by mines planted inside Cambodia by the Thais.

870. By letters of 4 and 12 January 1967 (S/7665, S/7677), 19 January (S/7694), 30 January (S/7708) and 6 and 13 February (S/7724, S/7739), the Cambodian representative protested against new violations of Cambodian territory by Thai armed elements, aircraft and warships.

871. By a letter of 24 February (S/7787), the representative of Thailand denied charges contained in the letters from the Cambodian representative dated 6 and 28 December 1966, 4, 12, 19 and 30 January and 6 February 1967, and stated that there had been no incursions on the part of Thai armed elements into Cambodia and that no members of Thai armed forces had ever laid mines on either side of the Thai-Cambodian border. He said it was probable that Cambodian inhabitants in the border area had exploded grenades and mines planted by their own compatriots since the representative of Cambodia had acknowledged in his letter of 5 January that Cambodian authorities planted booby-traps on their own territory.

872. In two letters (S/7808, S/7809) dated 6 March, the representative of Cambodia informed the President of the Council of further incidents of mine explosions and protested against the incursion on 2 February of a band of some fifty armed men from Thailand into Cambodian territory.

873. In a letter of 2 May (S/7869), the Cambodian representative informed the President of the Council

that during a press conference held on 14 February in Phnom Penh three persons who had participated in the raid by an armed group into Cambodia on 2 February and had surrendered to the Cambodian authorities had stated that they had been enlisted by representatives of the Saigon authorities and trained for subversive activities in a South Viet-Name military camp near Saigon, and had subsequently been transported by South Viet-Name planes to Thailand, from where they had participated in incursions into Cambodian territory. By a letter of 6 June (S/7981), the representative of Thailand informed the President of the Council that the Thai Government categorically rejected the charge contained in the Cambodian letter of 2 May (S/7869).

874. In letters of 15 March (S/7829), 27 March (S/7837), 30 March (S/7840), 6 April (S/7844), 19 April (S/7858) and 1 May (S/7868), the representative of Cambodia drew attention to a series of new incursions by Thai armed elements into Cambodian territory, involving clashes with Cambodian armed forces, planting mines, etc. He also protested against more than twenty violations of Cambodian air space by Thai aircraft in November-December 1966.

875. On 18 April (S/7859) and 19 May (S/7894 and S/7895), the representative of Thailand complained to the President of the Council of terroristic acts committed by Cambodian armed elements against Thai inhabitants living in the border areas, and stated that the Government of Thailand categorically rejected all Cambodian charges concerning border incidents and other conflicts. He further accused Cambodia of allow-

ing its territory to be used for the passage of armaments and military units into South Viet-Nam and of giving active support to the Asian communists in their conspiracy to infiltrate and subjugate Thailand.

876. By a letter of 14 June (S/7986), the representative of Cambodia, referring to letters dated 24 February, 18 April and 19 May from the representative of Thailand denied these accusations and stressed that the Thai allegations were intended to disguise countless crimes against the Cambodian people and to prepare world public opinion for a possible escalation of the criminal war against neutral and peaceful Cambodia. The letter went on to state that if Thailand had proof that Cambodia was giving asylum to Viet-Minh and Viet-Cong forces it should communicate that proof to the International Control Commission at Phnom Penh for inquiry and verification.

877. By a letter of 22 May (S/7900), the representative of Cambodia protested against violations of Khmer territorial waters by Thai fishing junks. In a letter of 29 May (S/7918), he reported that during the night of 30 April the Khmer military positions established at Kauk-Prich in the Battambang area had been attacked by members of the Thai armed forces. The Government of Cambodia strongly protested against that act of aggression and demanded that the Royal Government of Thailand should put an end to provocations on Khmer territory.

878. In two letters dated 19 June (S/8011) and 21 June (S/8008), the representative of Cambodia reported several new cases of incursion by Thai elements into Cambodian territory.

## Chapter 18

### COMMUNICATION CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC AND HAITI

879. By a cable (S/7459) dated 12 August 1966, the Secretary-General of the Organization of American States transmitted to the Security Council the text of a resolution adopted on that day by the Council of the OAS whereby the OAS Council which had acted as the Provisional Organ of Consultation in the situation which had arisen between Haiti and the Dominican Republic in 1963, considering that the Governments of Haiti and the Dominican Republic had taken measures to eliminate causes of friction and incidents along their border and that the two countries had now resumed diplomatic relations, declared the Council's action on this question terminated.

## Chapter 19

### COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA

880. By a letter dated 22 July 1966 addressed to the Secretary-General (S/7428), the *Chargé d'affaires*, a.i. of the Ivory Coast transmitted the text of a statement by the Government of the Republic of the Ivory Coast following the judgement of the International Court of Justice on 18 July 1966 on the complaints of Ethiopia and Liberia against South Africa concerning South West Africa.

881. By letter dated 28 July 1966 addressed to the Secretary-General (S/7443), the representative of Nigeria transmitted the text of a statement made on 20 July 1966 by the National Military Government

of Nigeria on the judgement of the International Court of Justice.

882. By letter dated 31 October 1966 (S/7571), the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the text of resolution 2145 (XXI) adopted by the General Assembly on 27 October 1966 on the question of South West Africa. In operative paragraph 8 of this resolution, the General Assembly "calls the attention of the Security Council to the present resolution".

883. By letter dated 14 December 1966 addressed to the Secretary-General (S/7639), the Assistant Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity

transmitted, for the information of the Security Council, the text of a resolution adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, at its third ordinary session held in Addis Ababa from 5 to 9 November 1966, concerning South West Africa. In the operative paragraphs of this resolution, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government considered that the continued domination of South West Africa by South Africa constitutes an illegal military occupation of an African sister country; called upon all member States to spare no effort in helping the people of South West Africa to rid themselves of foreign occupation in order to exercise their inalienable right to freedom and independence, and urged the Co-ordinating Committee for the Liberation of Africa to give priority to the termination of the occupation of South West Africa; called upon the various organs of the United Nations to take all measures deemed necessary under its Charter to put into immediate effect the General Assembly's resolution of 27 October 1966 on South West Africa to terminate this oppressive illegal occupation of South

West Africa; pledged whole-hearted co-operation with the United Nations in discharging its responsibilities with respect to South West Africa and urged all its member States, in the light of the aforementioned United Nations General Assembly resolution, to communicate to the Secretary-General of the United Nations the manner and the extent of material support they were ready to place before the United Nations for the effective implementation of the United Nations resolution; and urged all States which had not yet done so to refrain from supplying arms, military equipment, petroleum or petroleum products to South Africa.

884. By letter dated 29 June 1967 (S/8022), the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the text of resolution 2248 (S-V) adopted by the General Assembly on 19 May 1967 on the question of South West Africa. In operative paragraph 5 of section IV of the resolution, the General Assembly "requests the Security Council to take all appropriate measures to enable the United Nations Council for South West Africa to discharge the functions and responsibilities entrusted to it by the General Assembly".

## Chapter 20

### COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN ZAMBIA AND PORTUGAL

885. In a letter dated 25 July 1966, addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7430), the representative of Zambia charged that, on 15 July 1966, a Portuguese military aircraft had violated Zambian territory and Portuguese troops had made an armed incursion into Zambia, using bazookas to shell the houses in the Zambian village of Chipatala. One of the three spent shells found in the village was of British manufacture, and the other two had American markings, thus confirming the invalidity of the Portuguese claim that weapons supplied to Portugal by NATO would never be used for aggressive purposes. Zambia wished to make it clear that unless Portugal ceased its aggressive policies, it would be compelled to take defensive measures.

886. In a further letter dated 5 December 1966 (S/7612), Zambia again charged Portugal with committing acts of colonialist aggression on Zambian territory, stating that on 21 November 1966, Portuguese military forces operating in Angola had attacked two villages in Zambian territory. The repeated aggressive acts of the Portuguese, it was stated, were threatening the peace and security of Africa, and unless those provocations were stopped, Zambia would be compelled to take defensive measures.

887. On 12 December 1966, in a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7632), the representative of Portugal denied the charges made by Zambia, which, he said, were totally without foundation. The Zambian Government, the letter continued, was allowing illicit activities on its territory against Portuguese territory, as had been pointed out previously by the Portuguese Government. Zambia should put an end to such activities; otherwise, the relations between Zambia and Portugal would be affected, and in

that event, Portugal would reject all responsibility for any damage that might ensue.

888. In a letter dated 3 January 1967 (S/7664), the representative of Zambia stated that the charges against his Government made in the Portuguese letter to the President of the Council of 12 December 1966 (S/7632) were false and unfounded. Portugal was engaged in a war against the local inhabitants of Angola and Mozambique, who had committed no crime except asking for their inalienable human rights and freedom. Because of the Portuguese policy of domination over the black people of Angola and Mozambique and of suppressing the demands of the people by force, no less than three thousand refugees had fled into Zambia, causing it a major refugee problem. It was unjustifiable to accuse Zambia of acts of aggression against the Portuguese Government. No Zambian citizens were known to be engaging in such acts. Moreover, Zambia had at no time allowed or encouraged activities against the Government of Portugal. In August 1964, the Vice-President of Zambia had visited and addressed refugees in camps and firmly informed them that they were not to carry out activities against the neighbours of Zambia, stressing that if anyone were found to be engaged in political activities he would be dealt with severely. That remained the policy of Zambia.

889. It was surprising, the letter continued, that the Portuguese Government had denied the incident which had occurred on 21 November 1966, as the facts were well known and irrefutable. Zambian officers in charge of the area had themselves witnessed the Portuguese activities. Moreover, further Portuguese incursions into Zambian territory were occurring almost daily. In order to protect Zambian citizens against any further attacks the Zambian Government had dispatched a small contingent of militiamen to guard the border and to meet any eventualities.

## COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE INDIA-PAKISTAN QUESTION

890. In a letter dated 22 August 1966 (S/7469) addressed to the Secretary-General, Pakistan renewed its complaint that Indian forces had violated the cease-fire agreement on 29 April 1966, and expressed surprise at the accusation that Pakistan had launched a propaganda drive against India merely because it reported violations of the cease-fire line to the Security Council. Pakistan, the letter continued, considered that any tendency to make light of such violations could only lead to a deterioration of the situation and should not, therefore, be countenanced.

891. On 6 September 1966, Pakistan, in a *note verbale* (S/7483) addressed to the Secretary-General, protested against what it termed the grave implications of a private member's bill introduced in the Indian Parliament proposing steps which, if accepted, would further erode the special status enjoyed by the disputed territory of Jammu and Kashmir. It warned that any such steps were contrary to the spirit and letter of the Tashkent Declaration and were certainly not conducive to the establishment of peaceful and good-neighbourly relations as envisaged in the Declaration.

892. On 7 September, Pakistan, in a *note verbale* (S/7484) addressed to the Secretary-General, denied that its forces had encroached on the Indian side of the cease-fire line, as alleged by India on 29 June.

893. On 5 October 1966, India, in a letter (S/7529 and Corr.1) addressed to the Secretary-General, again denied that its forces had breached the cease-fire agreement on 29 April 1966. In a letter of 12 October 1966 (S/7545) addressed to the Secretary-General,

India rejected Pakistan's protest concerning the introduction of a private member's bill in the Indian Parliament. The Government of India, it said, could not entertain advice or interference from any other Government in such matters or in regard to the scope of the application of the Constitution to any part of India, including Jammu and Kashmir. It further deplored the threatening language used by Pakistan in its protest, which was hardly conducive to promoting understanding and peaceful relations.

894. In a letter of 27 April 1967 (S/7862), addressed to the President of the Security Council, Pakistan complained that the régime of oppression in the Indian-occupied area of Jammu and Kashmir showed no sign of relaxation. The recently staged elections in the occupied area had been held in an environment of repression and denial of fundamental freedoms, and the actual conduct of the elections had confirmed their farcical nature. The elections had been boycotted by the Plebiscite Front; moreover, the nomination papers of over 100 opposition candidates had been rejected on one pretext or another, while the nomination papers of not even a single candidate of the Congress Party had been rejected. The so-called elections could not be considered as constituting a valid expression of the will of the people of the Indian-occupied area. The Government of Pakistan remained firmly of the view that no laws promulgated by India or elections staged under such laws could in any way prejudice the right of the people of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to decide their own future through a fair and impartial plebiscite.

## Chapter 22

### REPORTS ON THE STRATEGIC TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS

895. On 26 August 1966 the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council (S/7425) the report of the Trusteeship Council on the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, covering the period from 1 July 1965 to 26 July 1966.

896. On 15 May 1967 the Secretary-General transmitted to the members of the Council the report (S/7883) of the United States Government on the administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands for the period from 1 July 1965 to 30 June 1966.

## Chapter 23

### COMMUNICATION CONCERNING INDONESIA'S MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS

897. In a telegram of 19 September 1966 (S/7498) addressed to the Secretary-General, the Ambassador of Indonesia to the United States of America informed the Secretary-General that his Government had decided to resume full co-operation with the United Nations and to resume participation in its activities starting with the twenty-first session of the General Assembly.



## COMMUNICATION CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF BASUTOLAND, BECHUANALAND AND SWAZILAND

898. By a letter dated 3 October 1966 (S/7525), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the Secretary-General transmitted the text of resolution 2134 (XXI) concerning the question of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland, adopted by the General Assembly at its 1422nd plenary meeting on 29 September 1966 (A/RES/2134 (XXI)). By operative paragraph 2 of this resolution the Assembly approved the chapter of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland and endorsed the recommendations contained therein (A/6300/Add.5). The Secretary-General also drew attention to the recommendation contained in paragraph 14, sub-paragraph (b) (ii) of appendix III to the report of the Special Committee (A/6300/Add.5, appendix III, page 5).

## Chapter 25

### QUESTION OF RACE CONFLICT IN SOUTH AFRICA RESULTING FROM THE POLICIES OF APARTHEID OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

#### A. Report of 25 October 1966 by the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa

899. On 21 October 1966, the Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa submitted to the Security Council and the General Assembly a report (S/7565) in which it reviewed the developments in the Republic of South Africa since its report of 10 August 1965 and made a number of recommendations for action, particularly by the General Assembly at its twenty-first session.

900. The Special Committee stated that the situation in the Republic of South Africa had deteriorated further as a result of the failure of the international community to take effective action during the previous year because of the continued unwillingness of the major trading partners of South Africa to support such action. Its international effects, particularly on the neighbouring territories, had assumed graver proportions. The Special Committee felt that the grave developments and trends of the previous year called for a reassessment of the situation and a serious discussion of the means to secure an end to apartheid.

901. The Special Committee fully endorsed the unanimous conclusion of the International Seminar on Apartheid held in Brasilia in August-September 1966 that "the United Nations has a fundamental interest in combating the doctrine of apartheid and should find, as a matter of urgency, ways and means for its elimination". It recommended that an international campaign against apartheid be inaugurated under United Nations auspices as a demonstration of its determination to take all measures adequate to secure the eradication of apartheid.

902. The Special Committee recommended that the General Assembly reaffirm its earlier resolutions on the problem of apartheid, particularly its resolution 2054 (XX) of 15 December 1965; deplore the failure of the main trading partners of South Africa, including three permanent members of the Security Council (United Kingdom, United States and France), to

abide by the appeals and requests in resolution 2054 (XX); note the aggravation of the situation in South Africa mainly as a consequence of the attitudes of these Powers; emphasize the urgency of solving the problem of apartheid in view of the increasingly explosive situation in southern Africa; warn the Powers concerned that their non-co-operation in implementing resolutions of the General Assembly was aggravating the danger of a violent racial conflict which would endanger the peace of the world and present them with agonizing alternatives, request these Powers to take urgent steps of disengagement from South Africa; and encourage all efforts to persuade these Powers to change their attitudes to conform with the convictions of the great majority of Member States so that decisive action might be taken under the auspices of the Security Council.

903. The Special Committee also recommended that the General Assembly appeal to all States:

(a) Especially the main trading partners of South Africa, to undertake that when the Security Council should decide on sanctions against South Africa, they would apply them faithfully and scrupulously;

(b) To comply with the decisions of the Security Council solemnly calling on them to cease forthwith the sale and delivery to South Africa of arms, ammunition of all types, military vehicles and equipment and materials intended for their manufacture and maintenance;

(c) To discourage immediately closer economic and financial relations with the Republic of South Africa, particularly in investment and trade, as well as loans by banks registered in their countries to the South African Government or South African companies, and to report to the Secretary-General on steps taken in this respect, such reports to be transmitted by the Secretary-General to the General Assembly and Special Committee;

(d) To consider effective political, moral and material assistance to all those combating the policies of apartheid, in the light of the recommendations of the International Seminar on Apartheid;

(e) To make adequate and generous contributions to humanitarian programmes designed to assist the victims of apartheid;

(f) To endeavour to grant asylum and extend travel facilities and educational and employment opportunities to refugees from South Africa.

904. In other recommendations, the Special Committee requested the Secretary-General to organize, as soon as possible, an international conference or seminar on the problems of apartheid, racial discrimination and colonialism in southern Africa and to transmit the report of that conference or seminar to the twenty-second session of the General Assembly; and to take steps, in consultation with the Special Committee, for timely publication of statistics on South African international trade.

## **B. Communication from the Organization of African Unity**

905. By a letter dated 14 December 1966 addressed to the Secretary-General (S/7637), the Assistant Secretary-General of the Organization of African Unity transmitted, for the information of the Security Council, the text of a resolution adopted by the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity, at its third ordinary session held in Addis Ababa from 5 to 9 November 1966, concerning the policies of apartheid and racial discrimination of the Government of the Republic of South Africa. In that resolution, the Assembly of Heads of State and Government, *inter alia*, reaffirmed the decision taken by the Organization of African Unity on this matter; expressed deep regret that the United Nations Security Council had failed to take effective measures to secure an end to apartheid because of the resistance of the main trading partners of South Africa, including permanent members of the Security Council; supported the recommendation of the United Nations Special Committee on the Policies of Apartheid of the

Government of the Republic of South Africa for an international campaign against apartheid, under the auspices of the United Nations; and requested the Foreign Ministers of Liberia, Madagascar, Sierra Leone and Tunisia, in co-operation with the African group at the United Nations, to persevere in their efforts to secure effective action to eliminate apartheid in South Africa.

## **C. Resolution 2202 (XXI) adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 1966**

906. By letter dated 29 December 1966 (S/7657), the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the text of resolution 2202 (XXI) adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 1966 with regard to "the policies of apartheid of the Government of the Republic of South Africa". In operative paragraph 7 of part A of the resolution, the General Assembly "once again draws the attention of the Security Council to the fact that the situation in South Africa constitutes a threat to international peace and security, that action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations is essential in order to solve the problem of apartheid and that universally applied mandatory sanctions are the only means of achieving a peaceful solution".

## **D. Resolution 2 (XXIII) adopted by the Commission on Human Rights on 6 March 1967**

907. By a note of 16 March 1967 (S/7826), the Secretary-General transmitted to the Security Council the text of resolution 2 (XXIII) adopted by the Commission on Human Rights on 6 March 1967 concerning the question of treatment of prisoners detained and persons in police custody in the Republic of South Africa. In operative paragraph 9 of the resolution, the Commission requested the Secretary-General to circulate the resolution to the members of the Security Council.

## **Chapter 26**

### **COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA AND PORTUGAL**

908. In a letter dated 1 December 1966, addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7605), the representative of the United Republic of Tanzania charged that on 29 November 1966 Portuguese military personnel had entered Tanzanian territory and laid anti-personnel mines on roadways which later exploded, causing the death of four persons of Tanzanian nationality and the wounding of five others.

909. On 5 December 1966, by a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7622), the representative of Portugal replied, denying and rejecting the charges against Portugal made by the United Republic of Tanzania. Portugal, he stated, was in no way responsible for any incidents which had been alleged to have occurred in Tanzania.

## **Chapter 27**

### **COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE "FIRST SOLIDARITY CONFERENCE OF THE PEOPLES OF ASIA, AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA" IN HAVANA**

910. By a letter dated 29 November 1966 (S/7606) the Assistant Secretary General of the Organization of American States (OAS) transmitted to the

Secretary-General of the United Nations, for circulation to the Security Council, the text of a report entitled "The First Afro-Asian Latin American Peoples' Soli-

darity Conference and its Projections (Tricontinental Conference of Havana)" prepared by the OAS Special Committee to study resolutions II.1 and VIII of the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs. By a cable dated 1 December 1966 (S/7606), the OAS Assistant Secretary General also transmitted, for the information of the Security Council, the text of a resolution adopted on 28 November 1966 by the Council of the Organization of American States whereby the Council, *inter alia*, had submitted for the consideration of the member States of the OAS the recommendations contained in the report of the Special Committee and urged them, on the basis of those recommendations, to adopt the measures they deemed necessary to counteract the policy of intervention and aggression that had emanated from the Afro-Asian-Latin American People's Solidarity Conference, and the permanent organizations established by that Conference. Subsequently, the OAS Secretary General transmitted

(S/7606/Add.1) the text of volume II of the above-mentioned report.

911. By a letter dated 5 December 1966 (S/7620), the representative of Mexico informed the Secretary-General that the Mexican Government had abstained from voting on the 28 November resolution adopted by the Council of the Organization of American States (S/7606), and requested the circulation of a statement of explanation of vote made by the Mexican representative in the Council of the Organization of American States. The statement had reaffirmed Mexico's rejection of any acts involving a violation of the guiding principles of the organization and in particular, of the principle of non-intervention, but had reiterated the view of the Mexican delegation that it was within the exclusive competence of each Government to take such steps as it deemed necessary to safeguard public order.

## Chapter 28

### COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE QUESTION OF MEMBERSHIP IN THE UNITED NATIONS

#### A. *Note verbale* from the Permanent Mission of Bulgaria requesting the circulation of a memorandum from the German Democratic Republic concerning its application for admission to the United Nations

912. In a *note verbale* of 24 September 1966 (S/7508) addressed to the Secretary-General, the Permanent Mission of Bulgaria transmitted a memorandum, which it requested be circulated, from the German Democratic Republic concerning its application for membership in the United Nations. The application of the German Democratic Republic for membership in the United Nations, the memorandum stated, had received widespread international support, in particular from the countries neighbouring the German Democratic Republic, which were best qualified to judge its peaceful character, and from Governments and political personalities in Asian and African countries. The Government of the German Democratic Republic continued to believe that the admission of both German States to the United Nations would promote the interests of European security and the preservation of peace, as well as a peaceful settlement of the German issue. The assumption that the admission of both German States to the United Nations would mean recognition in international law and a perpetuation of the division of Germany was not only untenable from the point of view of international law but had long been refuted by practice in such cases as the formation of the United Arab Republic and the United Republic of Tanzania. Any serious concern for the reunification of the German people must take as its point of departure the reality of the existence of two sovereign German States. Membership of both German States in the United Nations, the normalization of relations between them and an agreement on the vital issues of the German nation were the only way gradually to bridge the gap dividing Germany. It was not the recognition of the realities prevailing on German soil but the support given to the aggressive claim of the West German Government to sole representation that rendered reunification impossible. The German Democratic Republic remained convinced that membership

in the United Nations on an equal footing would increase its possibilities of working in the service of peace and serve the interests of the German people and all peace-loving peoples.

#### B. *Note verbale* from the Permanent Missions of France, the United Kingdom and the United States maintaining that the so-called German Democratic Republic cannot be eligible for membership in the United Nations, which is open only to States

913. In a joint *note verbale* of 7 November 1966 (S/7580), France, the United Kingdom and the United States referred to the *note verbale* of 24 September 1966 (S/7508) from Bulgaria which, they said, gave the impression that a Government other than that of the Federal Republic of Germany was entitled to speak on behalf of the German people in international affairs. That State or Government did not exist. France, the United Kingdom and the United States would refer in particular to their letter of 16 March 1966 (S/7207) addressed to the President of the Security Council, and insist once again that only the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany was entitled to speak on behalf of the German people in international affairs. The so-called German Democratic Republic could not be eligible for membership in the United Nations, which, according to Article 4 of the Charter, was open only to States. Attempts to establish it as a separate State could only frustrate the implementation of the principle of self-determination in Germany, and thus make more difficult a peaceful settlement in Europe.

#### C. Subsequent communications

914. In a *note verbale* of 22 August 1966 (S/7474) addressed to the Secretary-General, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic supported the application for admission to the United Nations of the German Democratic Republic. In its view, the German Democratic Republic met all the requirements laid down

in the Charter for States desiring to become Members of the Organization, and its admission would serve to reinforce international peace and security, develop friendly relations among States and promote general international co-operation.

915. In a *note verbale* of 25 November 1966 (S/7599) addressed to the Secretary-General, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics said that in their note of 7 November (S/7580) the United States, the United Kingdom and France had restated their unwarranted and unrealistic position of refusing to recognize the objective fact of the existence of two German States and had gone so far as to make crude attacks upon a sovereign German State, the German Democratic Republic. The Soviet Union opposed any attempts to discriminate against the German Democratic Republic, either in the United Nations or elsewhere. It considered that the removal of the obstacles artificially erected to bar the establishment of normal relations between the German Democratic Republic and other States and the participation of the German Democratic Republic in United Nations activities would promote the development of international co-operation and help to ensure the universality of the United Nations.

916. In a *note verbale* of 6 December 1966 (S/7629) addressed to the Secretary-General, Bulgaria protested against what it termed the unjustified allegations put forward in the *note verbale* of 7 November 1966 (S/7580) from France, the United Kingdom and the United States regarding the international status of the two German States. The existence of the German Democratic Republic as a sovereign and independent State could not be affected by any one-sided and discriminatory statement of non-recognition. Equally groundless and legally irrelevant was the claim that the Federal Republic of Germany had the right to represent the whole German people in international affairs.

#### **D. Exchange of communications between the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Secretary-General**

917. In a *note verbale* of 15 March 1967 (S/7822) addressed to the Secretary-General, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics noted that the United Nations Secretariat continued to take a different attitude to the

issuance as official United Nations documents of notes and statements of, on the one hand, the Government of the German Democratic Republic and, on the other, the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany. While the Secretariat circulated documents of the Federal Republic of Germany without the slightest difficulty, it refused to issue as documents communications received from the German Democratic Republic until a request for issuance was received from a Member of the United Nations. That practice was devoid of any legal foundation, groundless as far as the terms of the Charter were concerned, narrowly pro-Western and unobjective. The Soviet Union trusted that the Secretary-General would do away with it.

918. The Secretary-General, in a *note verbale* of 2 May 1967 (S/7891) addressed to the representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, stated that, with regard to the general question of the circulation of communications, he believed that it was beyond his competence, in the absence of explicit directives from the deliberative organ concerned, to determine the highly political and controversial question whether or not certain areas, the status of which was in dispute among Members of the United Nations, were States within the meaning of the "all States" or "States not Members of the United Nations" formulae which on occasion appeared in United Nations resolutions. He therefore considered that he had no alternative but to continue the existing practice until the Security Council or the General Assembly directed to the contrary.

919. In a *note verbale* of 16 May 1967 (S/7888) addressed to the Secretary-General, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics again expressed its strong opposition to any attempts, including attempts made in the United Nations, to discriminate against the German Democratic Republic and, in that connexion, drew the Secretary-General's attention to the inadmissibility of continuing in the United Nations Secretariat the discriminatory approach to the issuance as official United Nations documents of the statements and notes emanating from the Government of the German Democratic Republic. The practice was devoid of any legal foundation, groundless as far as the terms of the Charter were concerned, narrowly pro-Western and unobjective, and had been adopted by the Secretariat without any decisions of United Nations organs on the matter. The Soviet Union trusted that the Secretary-General would take steps to do away with that abnormal practice.

### **Chapter 29**

#### **COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN PORTUGAL AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO (BRAZZAVILLE)**

920. In a letter dated 21 October 1966 (S/7563), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Portugal charged that on 7 October 1966, a Portuguese post in Cabinda had been fired upon from the Congo (Brazzaville) with cannons, mortars and heavy and light machine-guns. On the following day, a number of terrorists had been seen mixed with the Congolese *gendarmes*, wearing uniforms similar to those used by Cuban soldiers.

921. On 3 November 1966, by a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7578), the representative of the Congo (Brazzaville) protested against the charges made by Portugal and asserted that, in reality, Congolese peasants and *gendarmes* had been the victims of countless acts of Portuguese terrorism. Since 9 October 1966, Portuguese forces had been building



up steadily along the frontier, and jet aircraft of the Portuguese army were constantly violating Congolese air space. The Government of the Congo drew attention once again to the provocative acts of the Portuguese, which were a threat to the security of certain African States.

### Chapter 30

## COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN SAUDI ARABIA, THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC AND THE YEMEN ARAB REPUBLIC

922. In a letter of 14 February 1967 (S/7749) addressed to the Secretary-General, the representative of Saudi Arabia charged that on 27 January 1967 two air raids had been carried out by Egyptian planes on the town of Najran, eighty kilometres inside the territory of Saudi Arabia, killing ten and wounding many amongst the civilian population. Aside from Najran, Saudi Arabia had on many other occasions been subjected to air raids by Egyptian planes. The representative requested the Secretary-General to seize the members of the Security Council of the dangerous situation that obtained in the area and expressed the hope that the Secretary-General would deem it fit to use his good offices so as to prevail upon the authorities concerned to desist from any action which would jeopardize world peace.

923. In reply, the Secretary-General, in a letter dated 18 February 1967 (S/7768), advised the representative of Saudi Arabia that his letter of 14 February 1967 had been promptly circulated to the members of the Security Council and that he had personally exercised his good offices by conveying the substance of the Saudi Arabia complaint to the Government of the United Arab Republic through its representative to the United Nations. The Secretary-General would transmit to the representative of Saudi Arabia any information or observations which the Government of the United Arab Republic might wish to offer on the matter.

924. On 27 February 1967, the Secretary-General circulated an exchange of cables (S/7793 and Corr.1) concerning the air raids on the town of Najran referred to in the Saudi Arabian representative's letter of 14 February 1967 (S/7749), and the charge that United Arab Republic aircraft had employed "lethal gas" in the attack of Kitaf in Northern Yemen on 5 January. In these communications the Secretary-General stated that he had received no word from the Government of the United Arab Republic regarding the alleged raids but had received a prompt denial of the use of any lethal or poison gas as alleged.

925. On 6 April 1967 the Secretary-General, pursuant to the request made on 5 April by the repre-

sentative of Saudi Arabia, transmitted to the Security Council (S/7842) a number of communications from the representative of Saudi Arabia relating to the charge that lethal gas had been used in Kitaf by aircraft of the United Arab Republic, and the Secretary-General's replies to those communications.

926. In a letter dated 25 April 1967 (S/7861) the representative of Saudi Arabia, replying to a number of notes from the Secretary-General transmitting communications sent by various parties protesting the execution of seventeen Yemeni saboteurs by the Government of the United Arab Republic, stated that the communications had been instigated by the Government of the United Arab Republic to cover their scheme to overthrow the Government of Saudi Arabia by having, *inter alia*, employed these saboteurs, trained in the United Arab Republic and smuggled into Saudi Arabia, to perpetrate acts of terrorism.

927. On 11 May 1967 the representative of Yemen, in a *note verbale* addressed to the Secretary-General (S/7881), replied to the letter of the representative of Saudi Arabia of 25 April 1967 (S/7861).

928. In a letter of 15 May 1967 addressed to the Secretary-General (S/7887) the representative of Saudi Arabia drew attention to the situation in Yemen, and stated that his Government considered the presence of alien armed forces in Yemen a naked aggression against the Yemeni people.

929. In a letter dated 16 May 1967 (S/7889), the representative of Saudi Arabia informed the Secretary-General that aircraft of the United Arab Republic had again subjected the territory of Saudi Arabia to several bombings which had resulted in the death of three persons and the wounding of fifteen others.

930. On 20 May 1967 the representative of Saudi Arabia addressed a message to the Secretary-General (S/7897) requesting him to take an opportunity during his visit to Cairo, to obtain, if possible, from the Government of the United Arab Republic an official reply to the charges that it had repeatedly subjected the territory of Saudi Arabia to bombing.

### Chapter 31

## COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING THE SITUATION IN ADEN

931. On 10 March 1967 the representative of Saudi Arabia, in a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7816) transmitted copies of communications which, he said, emanated from petitioners in a region where international peace and security was threatened.

932. In a further letter of 15 March 1967 (S/7821) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Saudi Arabia requested

the circulation, as Security Council documents, of three further communications which had been sent to the Secretary-General by petitioners from the troubled regions of the south-western part of the Arabian peninsula.

## **Chapter 32**

### **COMMUNICATIONS CONCERNING MEASURES TO STRENGTHEN THE UNITED NATIONS IN THE SAFEGUARDING OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY**

933. By a letter dated 4 April 1967 (S/7841), the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics transmitted to the President of the Security Council a memorandum of the USSR Government concerning "United Nations operations for the maintenance of international peace and security" dated 16 March 1967. The memorandum stated that certain Powers ostensibly concerned to strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations in safeguarding international peace and security were in fact launching an offensive against the provisions of the United Nations Charter which regulate measures taken on behalf of the Organization to safeguard or restore international peace, in particular measures connected with the employment of armed force. That was an undisguised effort to accelerate the elaboration of proposals aimed at revising the basic provisions of the United Nations Charter, under which the Security Council alone was authorized to decide on all questions pertaining to measures for the maintenance of international peace and security.

934. The Soviet Government, the memorandum continued, was convinced that the provisions of the Charter to the effect that any and all decisions relating to the dispatch of United Nations troops could be taken only by the Security Council with the agreement of all permanent members of the Council, were a reliable guarantee of the interests of the newly independent States and of all peace-loving countries, and that any attempt to revise them might have very dangerous consequences. The experience of the United Nations, in particular in the Congo, showed clearly that violations of the Charter in matters relating to the use of armed force on behalf of the United Nations and to the financing of such a force could not fail to lead to situations in which operations of this kind were used for purposes that had nothing in common with the principles of the Charter, and actually damaged the Organization itself. With regard to the question

of increasing the effectiveness of the United Nations in the maintenance of international peace and security, the Soviet Union had always advocated a fuller utilization of the possibilities of the United Nations Charter. That position was stated in the proposals outlined in its memorandum of 10 July 1964. The USSR Government declared itself ready to co-operate with States Members of the United Nations in giving effect to the provisions of the Charter relating to the maintenance of international peace and security and trusted that, in return, its proposals in that connexion would be given due consideration by Member States. At the same time, it would oppose any attempts to revise the provisions of the Charter relating to the use of armed force on behalf of the United Nations, or to the terms on which such operations were financed. The Soviet Union would not be able to remain a detached observer of breaches of the Charter which would enable certain Western Powers to impose upon the General Assembly decisions likely to impair the basic interests of Member States. If Member States of the United Nations were to embark on that course, the Soviet Union would be obliged to reconsider its attitude to United Nations activities.

935. In a letter of 13 April 1967 (S/7852), addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Czechoslovakia drew attention to the offer made by his Government, in a statement of 26 November 1964 (S/6070), to make available to the Security Council a contingent of the Czechoslovak armed forces and to conclude an agreement with the Security Council to that effect. Such an agreement, the letter continued, should be based on a number of principles, which it then listed. The Czechoslovak Government, the letter concluded, expected that the Security Council would proceed to the consideration of its offer, and was ready to take part in the consideration of the question both in the Security Council and in the Military Staff Committee.

## **Chapter 33**

### **COMMUNICATION CONCERNING FRENCH SOMALILAND**

936. In a letter dated 16 June 1967 (S/7992) addressed to the President of the Security Council, the representative of Somalia charged that the authorities of French Somaliland, soon after they had decided, in September 1966, to hold a referendum in the Territory regarding its future status, had begun a systematic policy of forcibly expelling inhabitants of the Territory into Somalia, with the evident intention of affecting the referendum so as to produce a result favourable to continued non-self-governing status for the Territory. Immediately after the referendum, which had been held on 19 March 1967, the authorities of French Somaliland had moreover carried out large-scale arrests among the Somali inhabitants of the Territory on the pretext that the arrested persons were citizens of Somalia and not of French Somaliland. The arrested persons had been forcibly transported to camps outside Djibouti in a waterless area, and a considerable

number had succumbed to exhaustion, exposure and hunger before aid could be given them. As a result of these policies of the authorities of French Somaliland, almost 5 per cent of the total population of the Territory had been forced into involuntary exile since 1966. The systematic expulsion of Somalis which constituted, under the conditions described, a direct violation of the sovereignty of Somalia was part and parcel of a policy aimed at changing the ethnic balance and character of the Territory. The Government of the Republic of Somalia was therefore compelled to bring that serious situation formally to the attention of the Security Council in accordance with Article 35, paragraph 1, of the Charter.

### ***Chapter 34***

#### **COMMUNICATIONS FROM THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES CONCERNING RELATIONS BETWEEN VENEZUELA AND CUBA**

937. By a cable dated 5 June 1967 (S/7931) addressed to the Secretary-General, the Secretary General of the Organization of American States transmitted for the information of the Security Council the text of a resolution adopted on 5 June by the Council of the Organization convening a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the American Republics to consider, at the request of the Government of Venezuela, an item entitled "The serious situation confronting the member States of this Organization as a consequence of the attitude of the present Government of Cuba, which is carrying out a policy of persistent intervention in their internal affairs with violation of their sovereignty and integrity, by fostering and organizing subversive and terrorist activities in the territory of various States, with the deliberate aim of destroying the principles of the Inter-American System". By a cable of 19 June 1967 (S/8009), the Organization of American States transmitted the text of a resolution adopted on 19 June by the Twelfth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs authorizing the President of the Meeting to appoint a committee to go to Venezuela to gather information on the events which had taken place there and had been denounced by the Government of Venezuela in its note of 1 June 1967 to the Organization of American States.

## APPENDICES

### I. Representatives and deputy, alternate and acting representatives accredited to the Security Council

The following representatives and deputy, alternate and acting representatives were accredited to the Security Council during the period covered by the present report:

#### *Argentina*

Dr. José María Ruda  
Dr. Raúl Quijano  
Mr. Carlos Alberto Gofí Demarchi  
Mr. Hugo Juan Gobbi

#### *Brasil<sup>a</sup>*

Mr. José Sette Camara  
Mr. M. Geraldo de Carvalho Silos  
Mr. M. Celso Antônio de Souza e Silva

#### *Bulgaria*

Mr. Milko Tarabanov  
Mr. Konstantin Tellalov  
Dr. Alexander Yankov

#### *Canada<sup>a</sup>*

Mr. George Ignatieff  
Mr. Paul André Beaulieu  
Mr. Gordon E. Cox

#### *China*

Mr. Liu Chieh  
Mr. Yu Chi Hsueh  
Dr. Chun-Ming Chang

#### *Denmark<sup>a</sup>*

Mr. Hans R. Tabor  
Mr. Skjold G. Mellbin  
Mr. Torben Dithmer

#### *Ethiopia<sup>a</sup>*

Mr. Endalkachew Makonnen  
Mr. Kitle Wodajo

#### *France*

Mr. Roger Seydoux  
Mr. Jacques Tiné  
Mr. Claude Chayet  
Mr. Jean Plihon

#### *India<sup>a</sup>*

Mr. Gopalaswami Parthasarathi  
Mr. B. C. Mishra

#### *Japan*

Mr. Akira Matsui  
Mr. Isao Abe

#### *Jordan<sup>b</sup>*

Dr. Muhammad H. El-Farra  
Dr. Waleed Sadi

#### *Mali*

Mr. Moussa Léo Keita

#### *Netherlands<sup>b</sup>*

Dr. J. G. de Beus  
Jonkheer L. Quarles van Ufford

#### *New Zealand<sup>b</sup>*

Mr. Frank Henry Corner  
Mr. John George McArthur

#### *Nigeria*

Chief S. O. Adebo  
Mr. J. T. F. Iyalla  
Mr. B. A. Clark

#### *Uganda<sup>b</sup>*

Mr. Apollo K. Kironde  
Mr. Mathias K. L. Lubega

#### *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*

Mr. Nikolai Trofimovich Fedorenko  
Mr. Platon Dmitrievich Morozov  
Mr. Evgeny Nikolaevich Makeev  
Mr. Nikolai Panteleimonovich Kulebiakin  
Mr. Alexei Vasiyevich Zakharov

#### *United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*

Lord Caradon  
Sir Roger Jackling  
Sir Leslie Glass  
Mr. C. P. Hope  
Mr. Edward Youde

#### *United States of America*

Mr. Arthur J. Goldberg  
Mr. James M. Nabrit, Jr.  
Mr. Joseph J. Sisco  
Mr. William B. Buffum  
Mr. Richard Pedersen  
Mrs. Eugenie M. Anderson

#### *Uruguay<sup>b</sup>*

Dr. Pedro P. Berro  
Mr. Mateo Marques-Sere

<sup>a</sup> Term of office began on 1 January 1967.

<sup>b</sup> Term of office ended on 31 December 1966.

### II. Presidents of the Security Council

The following representatives held the office of President of the Security Council during the period covered by the present report.

#### *Nigeria*

Chief S. O. Adebo (16 to 31 July 1966)

#### *Uganda*

Mr. Apollo K. Kironde (1 to 31 August 1966)

#### *Union of Soviet Socialist Republics*

Mr. Nikolai Trofimovich Fedorenko (1 to 30 September 1966)

#### *United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland*

Lord Caradon (1 to 31 October 1966)



**United States of America**

Mr. Arthur J. Goldberg (1 to 30 November 1966)

**Uruguay**

Dr. Pedro P. Berro (1 to 31 December 1966)

**Argentina**

Dr. José María Ruda (1 to 31 January 1966)

**Brasil**

Mr. José Sette Camara (1 to 28 February 1967)

**Bulgaria**

Mr. Milko Tarabanov (1 to 31 March 1967)

**Canada**

Mr. Liu Chieh (1 to 31 May 1967)

**China**

Mr. Liu Chieh (1 to 31 May 1967)

**Denmark**

Mr. Hans R. Tabor (1 to 30 June 1967)

**Ethiopia**

Mr. Endalkachew Makonnen (1 to 15 July 1967)

**III. Meetings of the Security Council during the period from 16 July 1966 to 15 July 1967**

<i>Meeting</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Date</i>
1288th	The Palestine question	25 July 1966
1289th	Ditto	26 July 1966
1290th	Ditto	28 July 1966
1291st	Ditto	29 July 1966
1292nd	Ditto	29 July 1966
1293rd	Ditto	1 August 1966
1294th	Ditto	2 August 1966
1295th	Ditto	3 August 1966
1296th	Letter dated 2 August 1966 from the Deputy Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7442)	4 August 1966
1297th	Ditto	8 August 1966
1298th	Ditto	10 August 1966
1299th	Ditto	15 August 1966
1300th	Ditto	16 August 1966
1301st	Consideration of the report of (private) the Security Council to the General Assembly Question of a recommendation concerning the Secretary-General	29 September 1966
1302nd	Letter dated 21 September 1966 from the Acting Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7503)	30 September 1966
1303rd	Ditto	3 October 1966
1304th	Ditto	13 October 1966
1305th	The Palestine question	14 October 1966
1306th	Admission of new Members Letter dated 21 September 1966 from the Acting Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7503)	14 October 1966
1307th	The Palestine question	14 October 1966
1308th	Ditto	17 October 1966
1309th	Ditto	20 October 1966
1310th	Ditto	28 October 1966
1311th	Question of a recommendation (private) concerning the Secretary-General	28 October 1966
1312th	The Palestine question	28 October 1966
1313th	Ditto	31 October 1966
1314th	Ditto	2 November 1966

<i>Meeting</i>	<i>Subject</i>	<i>Date</i>
1315th	Election of five Members of the International Court of Justice (S/7466, S/7490/Rev.1 and Add.1-6, S/7491 and Corr.1 and Add.1)	2 November 1966
1316th	The Palestine question	3 November 1966
1317th	Ditto	3 November 1966
1318th	Election of Members of the International Court of Justice (S/7466, S/7490/Rev.1 and Add.1-7, S/7491 and Corr.1 and Add.1)	3 November 1966
1319th	The Palestine question	4 November 1966
1320th	Ditto	16 November 1966
1321st	Ditto	16 November 1966
1322nd	Ditto	17 November 1966
1323rd	Ditto	18 November 1966
1324th	Ditto	21 November 1966
1325th	Ditto	21 November 1966
1326th	Ditto	23 November 1966
1327th	Ditto	24 November 1966
1328th	Ditto	25 November 1966
1329th	Question of a recommendation for the appointment of the Secretary-General	2 December 1966
1330th	Admission of new Members	7 December 1966
1331st	Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia: letters dated 2 and 30 August 1963 addressed to the President of the Security Council on behalf of the representatives of thirty-two Member States (S/5382 and S/5409)	8 December 1966
1332nd	Ditto	9 December 1966
1333rd	Ditto	12 December 1966
1334th	Consideration of the report of (private) the Security Council to the General Assembly	13 December 1966
1335th	Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia: letters dated 2 and 30 August 1963 addressed to the President of the Security Council on behalf of the representatives of thirty-two Member States (S/5382 and S/5409)	13 December 1966
1336th	Ditto	13 December 1966
1337th	Ditto	14 December 1966

Meeting	Subject	Date	Meeting	Subject	Date
1338th	Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488)	15 December 1966		Complaint of the Representative of the United Arab Republic in a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 27 May 1967 entitled: "Israel aggressive policy, its repeated aggression threatening peace and security in the Middle East and endangering international peace and security" (S/7907)	
	Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia: letters dated 2 and 30 August 1963 addressed to the President of the Security Council on behalf of the representatives of thirty-two Member States (S/5382 and S/5409)			Letter dated 29 May 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom addressed to the President of Security Council (S/7910)	
1339th	Question concerning the situation in Southern Rhodesia: letters dated 2 and 30 August 1963 addressed to the President of the Security Council on behalf of the representatives of thirty-two Member States (S/5382 and S/5409)	16 December 1966		Letter dated 9 June 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning an item entitled: "Cessation of military action by Israel and withdrawal of the Israeli forces from those parts of the territory of the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria which they have seized as the result of an aggression" (S/7967)	
1340th	Ditto	16 December 1966			
1341st	Letter dated 23 May 1967 from the Permanent Representatives of Canada and Denmark addressed to the President of the Security Council (A/7902)	24 May 1967			
1342nd	Ditto	24 May 1967			
1343rd	Letter dated 23 May 1967 from the Permanent Representatives of Canada and Denmark addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7902)	29 May 1967	1355th	Ditto	10 June 1967
	Complaint of the Representative of the United Arab Republic in a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 27 May 1967 entitled: "Israel aggressive policy, its repeated aggression threatening peace and security in the Middle East and endangering international peace and security" (S/7907)		1356th	Ditto	10-11 June 1967
	Letter dated 29 May 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7910)		1357th	Ditto	11 June 1967
1344th	Ditto	30 May 1967	1358th	Ditto	13 June 1967
1345th	Ditto	31 May 1967	1359th	Ditto	13 June 1967
1346th	Ditto	3 June 1967	1360th	Ditto	14 June 1967
1347th	Ditto	5 June 1967	1361st	Ditto	14 June 1967
1348th	Ditto	6 June 1967	1362nd	Letter dated 26 December 1963 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/5488)	19 June 1967
1349th	Ditto	7 June 1967	1363rd	Letter dated 6 July 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8036)	6 July 1967
1350th	Ditto	7 June 1967			
1351st	Ditto	8 June 1967	1364th	Ditto	7 July 1967
1352nd	Ditto	9 June 1967	1365th	Letter dated 23 May 1967 from the Permanent Representatives of Canada and Denmark addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7902)	8 July 1967
1353rd	Ditto	9 June 1967		Complaint of the Representative of the United Arab Republic in a letter to the President of the Security Council dated 27 May 1967 entitled: "Israel aggressive policy, its repeated aggression threatening peace and security in the Middle East and endangering international peace and security" (S/7907)	
1354th	Letter dated 23 May 1967 from the Permanent Representatives of Canada and Denmark addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7902)	10 June 1967		Letter dated 29 May 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7910)	

Meeting	Subject	Date	Meeting	Subject	Date
	representative of the United Kingdom addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/7910)			Letter dated 8 July 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the United Arab Republic addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8043)	
	Letter dated 9 June 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics addressed to the President of the Security Council concerning an item entitled: "Cessation of military action by Israel and withdrawal of the Israeli forces from those parts of the territory of the United Arab Republic, Jordan and Syria which they have seized as the result of an aggression" (S/7967)			Letter dated 8 July 1967 from the Permanent Representative of Israel addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8044)	
			1366th	Ditto	9 July 1967
			1367th	Letter dated 6 July 1967 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of the Security Council (S/8036)	10-11 July 1967

#### IV. Representatives, chairmen and principal secretaries of the Military Staff Committee

##### A. REPRESENTATIVES OF EACH SERVICE IN RESPECT OF EACH DELEGATION

16 July 1966 to 15 July 1967

	Period of service from 16 July 1966
<i>China</i>	
General Wang Shu-ming, Chinese Air Force	16 July 1966 to present time
Rear Admiral Yang Yuan-chung, Chinese Navy	16 July 1966 to 20 January 1967
Rear Admiral Hsiung Teh-shu, Chinese Navy	20 January 1967 to present time
<i>France</i>	
Général de Brigade G. Arnous-Rivière, French Army	16 July 1966 to present time
Capitaine de Frégate H. J. J. Roulleaux-Dugage, French Navy	16 July 1966 to present time
Colonel Roland Charles, French Air Force	16 July 1966 to present time
<i>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</i>	
Major General V. I. Meshcheryakov, Soviet Army	16 July 1966 to present time
Captain A. R. Astafiev, USSR Navy	16 July 1966 to 25 May 1967
Captain 1st Rank V. N. Vashchenko, USSR Navy	25 May 1967 to present time
Colonel V. S. Afanasiev, USSR Air Force	16 July 1966 to present time
<i>United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland</i>	
Major General R. A. Fyffe, British Army	16 July 1966 to present time
Rear Admiral P. M. Compston	16 July 1966 to 25 April 1967
Rear Admiral L. E. S. H. Le Bailly	25 April 1967 to present time
Air Vice-Marshal A. D. Frank, Royal Air Force	16 July 1966 to present time
<i>United States of America</i>	
Lt. General Charles H. Bonesteel III, US Army	16 July 1966 to 1 September 1966
Lt. General J. L. Throckmorton, US Army	1 September 1966 to 8 May 1967
Lt. General A. J. Goodpaster, US Army	8 May 1967 to present time
Vice-Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., US Navy	16 July 1966 to 18 April 1967
Vice-Admiral A. McB. Jackson, Jr., US Navy	18 April 1967 to present time
Lt. General James Ferguson, US Air Force	16 July 1966 to 1 September 1966
Lt. General T. P. Gerrity, US Air Force	1 September 1966 to present time

##### B. CHAIRMEN AT MEETINGS

Meeting	Date	Chairman	Delegation
552nd	21 July 1966	Air Vice-Marshal A. D. Frank, Royal Air Force	United Kingdom
553rd	4 Aug. 1966	Colonel C. F. Nelson, US Army	United States
554th	18 Aug. 1966	Colonel C. F. Nelson, US Army	United States
555th	1 Sep. 1966	General Wang Shu-ming, Chinese Air Force	China
556th	15 Sept. 1966	General Wang Shu-ming, Chinese Air Force	China
557th	29 Sep. 1966	General Wang Shu-ming, Chinese Air Force	China
558th	13 Oct. 1966	Général de Brigade G. Arnous-Rivière, French Army	France
559th	27 Oct. 1966	Général de Brigade G. Arnous-Rivière, French Army	France

<i>Meeting</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Chairman</i>	<i>Delegation</i>
560th	10 Nov. 1966	Major General V. I. Meshcheryakov, Soviet Army	USSR
561st	22 Nov. 1966	Colonel V. S. Afanasiev, USSR Air Force	USSR
562nd	8 Dec. 1966	Major General R. A. Fyffe, British Army	United Kingdom
563rd	21 Dec. 1966	Rear Admiral P. M. Compston	United Kingdom
564th	5 Jan. 1967	Vice-Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., US Navy	United States
565th	19 Jan. 1967	Vice-Admiral John S. McCain, Jr., US Navy	United States
566th	2 Feb. 1967	General Wang Shu-ming, Chinese Air Force	China
567th	16 Feb. 1967	General Wang Shu-ming, Chinese Air Force	China
568th	2 Mar. 1967	Général de Brigade G. Arnous-Rivière, French Army	France
569th	16 Mar. 1967	Général de Brigade G. Arnous-Rivière, French Army	France
570th	30 Mar. 1967	Général de Brigade G. Arnous-Rivière, French Army	France
571st	13 Apr. 1967	Major General V. I. Meshcheryakov, Soviet Army	USSR
572nd	27 Apr. 1967	Captain 2nd Rank A. D. Golovtchenko, USSR Navy	USSR
573rd	11 May 1967	Air Vice-Marshal A. D. Frank, Royal Air Force	United Kingdom
574th	25 May 1967	Rear Admiral L. E. S. H. Le Bailly	United Kingdom
575th	8 June 1967	Vice-Admiral A. McB. Jackson, Jr., US Navy	United States
576th	22 June 1967	Vice-Admiral A. McB. Jackson, Jr., US Navy	United States
577th	6 July 1967	General Wang Shu-ming, Chinese Air Force	China

#### C. PRINCIPAL SECRETARIES AT MEETINGS

<i>Meeting</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Principal Secretary</i>	<i>Delegation</i>
552nd	21 July 1966	Group Captain B. P. Mugford, Royal Air Force	United Kingdom
553rd	4 Aug. 1966	Colonel James M. Boyd, US Air Force	United States
554th	18 Aug. 1966	Colonel C. F. Nelson, US Army	United States
555th	1 Sep. 1966	Rear Admiral Yang Yuan-chung, China	Chinese Navy
556th	15 Sep. 1966	Colonel Hwang Hsiung-sheng, Chinese Air Force	China
557th	29 Sep. 1966	Colonel Hwang Hsiung-sheng, Chinese Air Force	China
558th	13 Oct. 1966	Lt. Colonel L. F. Monteagle, French Army	France
559th	27 Oct. 1966	Colonel Roland Charles, French Air Force	France
560th	10 Nov. 1966	Major Y. P. Vetrov, Soviet Army	USSR
561st	22 Nov. 1966	Major Y. P. Vetrov, Soviet Army	USSR
562nd	8 Dec. 1966	Colonel H. J. Sweeney, British Army	United Kingdom
563rd	21 Dec. 1966	Colonel H. J. Sweeney, British Army	United Kingdom
564th	5 Jan. 1967	Captain A. H. Warner, Jr., US Navy	United States
565th	19 Jan. 1967	Captain A. H. Warner, Jr., US Navy	United States
566th	2 Feb. 1967	Colonel Hwang Hsiung-sheng, Chinese Air Force	China
567th	16 Feb. 1967	Colonel Hwang Hsiung-sheng, Chinese Air Force	China
568th	2 Mar. 1967	Lt. Colonel L. F. Monteagle, French Army	France
569th	16 Mar. 1967	Lt. Colonel L. F. Monteagle, French Army	France
570th	30 Mar. 1967	Lt. Colonel L. F. Monteagle, French Army	France
571st	13 Apr. 1967	Lt. Colonel Y. P. Vetrov, Soviet Army	USSR
572nd	27 Apr. 1967	Lt. Colonel Y. P. Vetrov, Soviet Army	USSR
573rd	11 May 1967	Colonel I. S. Harrison, Royal Marines	United Kingdom
574th	25 May 1967	Colonel I. S. Harrison, Royal Marines	United Kingdom
575th	8 June 1967	Colonel Ernest P. Lasche, US Army	United States
576th	22 June 1967	Commander E. Duane Kemp, US Navy	United States
577th	6 July 1967	Colonel Hwang Hsiung-sheng, Chinese Air Force	China